Operation Reckless (1944)

8/9/2019 Operation Reckless (1944)

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B=4 TI]T Y/30

OP2RATIOM "RECUMIS f

AJlPHIBIOUS OPRATIONZ 2IN THE TANAI .AH BAY

HBUOLW BAY ""AITAP.E AREAS OF NEW(GUIJMFINAPRIL, 194

NOTE - This Bulletin is issued for information only and isnot- to be taken as authority for initiating action.It has been compiled from a report by the AustralianLiaison Officer with the US Seventh Amphibio s Force,

but does not necessarily express the views of theCowannder of that Force.

Contents Pg

PAR GB {A~L EC fiION OQFTHE OPERATIONAND) HE FEAUVURESAFFCTING4 IT*

General eooeeooo. ew~oee ..eooooo o eo eoooeoeloeo 1Objects of the Operation o..o00oo09009900o"....0000900 1, 2

Composition of ForcesDo09.e. ............... .* . .... oeee2

Planning weie.909009999"e "ew099902iis.on1..eio~oeo""009!0099e09** . ....... ***g**e** 0 2

Rehearsals 099of oesoo .909ss... oosoe90 e. 3

Prelliminary .Air Attacks r.....w.,a..,,wr. 0ooo.o..ooo 3

Aproc of Convoys .e...... .................. 3Close Su/pport .of the Landing «rAwer~~." . . we.3Control of Carrier Aircraft o9 s A Ar 9 9 e a "" . e e 9 f e

Assault Scales we0o90.00*0*0.* sooo00,oo**9*o*,** ... oooo95 4Beach Organisation .e.ef... w0e0we.0ee0.o!....... 0s90 4, 5

Maintenance Supplies .a...,.,...........,...,.

Unloading *ooeo*990.oo0.o.99.0 *0eeoooeoo.oeooeoosee~eo 5

Construction of Beach Exits f.....,.........s...... 5,6

Use of LVT f009000009.009900009099s900000990990000900 6,

7Ships ~and Craft "..w..wle 7®er.A.A.e.fMedical *ooooe.*o*a9905o.*e.o.eo"oaeeoeeoo0o95...o.eooo ^7

Comuictin 000so000009.r990 99*e**... ...........

Japanese Mo1rale 9.f.".safe..000*0000009000009.o.00000009900 7Japanese Defences ".,90s.99,009090900, 0.09. 9909s"s~w~ew.00

Stnary of Conclusions *.o.*o*ol.oo,,* .. ooooo.ogwe~ 7, 8

PART II_ LAN~DINGS

A TANAI-D"'RAH BAY.

Coastline .e a w..*~o Owo.e®.-ooe~ ooo00909990i0"090900990008

Be aches 0,0. o0000r9Aa90000 00069 000990090000000 0900 oe0998

LnigPa

Close a .w~ua~ wost0we..0000 000 900 000 .. 0 099 900 000 .*0 900 8 ,

Beac~h Maintenance 9.O999ee 99.eeoeeooo~o~oo o0... 9

B RE{3OIAYI2BAY



_TQ BUhL Yi

Ctets - Continued

" hh:ii i 7J

Beach . ......... . ........ .......... .............. .. ...Landing Plan ***..*...*..... ....*** .. ..**..**....**.**...

Operations Ashore ....,....., .....o......o..,,,,,0...0,.o

APPENDIX :- Outline Carrier Support Air Organisation .......

SECTION 1

SECTION 2

SECTION 3

SECTION 4

SECTION 5

SECTION 6

SECTION 7

SECTIO 9

SECTION 10

SECTION 11

SECTION 12

SECTION 13

wwrXwriyw

DISTRIB T ION

(Nm.ber of copies as shown in list issued withMIS/13 unless otherwise stated.)

- a, b, a, d(2 copies), f(l copy), gto o, q to u, w.

Plus- Capt.

HIMVERNON(M)" Supt. Mine Design.

- a, b, c, e, f, h, j k, n to y,

Plus - 7

-a to p.

- a(6 copies).

- a(2 copies), u to xs , aa(2 copies), ag to ap.

-a

tof, g(2 copies), j,

m.

Plus - Vice Admiral Malta & Flag Officer Central Med." Flag Officer, Western Med.

" Flag Officer, Western Italy." Flag Officer, Taranto, Adriatic and Liaison Italy.

Commanding Officer, M HAIELCAR." " " 1MS PHOENICIA.

- a(2 copies), j(l copy), k, n(2 copies).

- a(30 copies).

-ab, c, f, g(l copy).

- a(2 copies), b.

- b, o , e, af, ag, aj, em, ap .Plus - Cdr. Amphibian Training Centre RASC(2 copies)

- a to d g, h(2 copies), j, k, o.

SECTION 14. - a to o, r, s, w, x, y,.

Plus - NAW3, TD, ASO, BO.

Issued from -

Combined Operations Headquarters,

1A, Richmond Terrace, Whitehall,

LOMDOM, S.W.1.

(OR 2606/44) July, 1944

Ex

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(c 26o 44

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M 'qBULLET]CJ~_-- r r

MKWIONZ6 "R CRZHMS"s :,

PARE I - DESCRIPTION OF THE OPRIATION AND THE FEATURES AFFECTING IT

General

Operation RECKLESS was the largest amphibious operation ye carried

out in th e South West Pacific area, and included landings in three separate

localities.

Over 200 vessels took part and th e total Army and Air forces amounted to

79,800 personnel. It was planned to land more than 50,000 tons of bulk storesand 3,000 vehicles during the first three days and larger quantities once th e

objectives were gained.

The operation resulted in the capture of an important Japanese base at HOLLANDIA

and isolated an estimated 50,000 Japanese troops in the WEWAK-MADANG. area.It necessitated moving part of the force over 1000 miles by sea. The farthestobjective area (TANAIMERAH BAY) was 425 air miles beyond our forward positions

at BOGADJIM, near MADANG.

2. An outline map of the area of operations is given below :-

140°

1o 1.

-5- N C

.Statute MilesIII-l l----I M----

50 0 100 200 300

-10°

14

135° 140°I I

145" 1500

:'"Admiralty mo

Is czp

S * Newladan . 9, Britain

1I

1450I.

QOb eot s of th e Opeation '

3. The objects were :-

(a) To seize and hold the area TANARMERAH BAY - BIOLANDIA AIRFIELDS -

HOMBOLI. BAY and to establish facilities for t he operation of

strong ar forces and light naval forces as early as possible.

(b) To capture th e TADJI airfields near AITAPE, destroy th e

garrison in that area and rapidly establish operational facilit-

ies for fighter aircraft in order to cover th e HOLLADMIA area

by land-based planes,

4, D Day was 22 A 194, land bei g |&de simultaneously at

TANAHMRAH BAY/



COHQ tEuaTIN Y/30

July 194 (O4)

TANAHIvtERAH BAY, HUMBOLDT BAY and AITAPE and the operations appeared to

have been the most complete surprise imaginable. This and th e intense

air and naval preparation eliminated opposition and allowed all landings-

to be made practically without casualties. HOLLANDIA airfields were

captured on 26 April and fighters started operating the following day.

Composition of Fbrces

5. Nava. The total naval forces forming the Naval attack Force

comprised :-

Cruisers 5

Destroyers 55

Esoort Carriers 8Patrol Craft 10Submarine chasers 8 (2 fitted with rockets)

Minesweepers 10

APA 8AKA 2

AK 4APD 14LOI (troop carrying) 31

IDI (fitted with rockets) 3LST 51ISD 3

In addition, Battleship and Fast Carrier Forces from th e Central Pacific Area

co-operated by affording proteotion against surface attack, by powerful

preliminary air bombardments anid by close air support for the operation.

6. A The forces employed formed part of the Sixth US Anny. Comand

of the TANAH RAH - HUMBOLDT BAY operation was exercised by Commanding General

1st US Corps but the AITAPE Landing Force was directly under 6th Army control.In general, th e three landing forces were of normal composition except that

the BfLLANDIA forces had a'high proportion of engineers and service troops fo r

the early establishment of a large base.

155 ma guns were landed on D + 1 at UMWBOLWT BAY. These had' sufficient range

to cover the advance to the airfields without moving from the vicinity of thelanding beach. Air observation of fire was arranged by the use of light air-craft fitted with floats, which were assembled on the .beach, thus avoidingthe necessity of preparing a landing strip.

Only two companies of medium tanks (Sheman) were allotted fo r th e operation

and were distributed between th e three landing forces,

7. Air. In addition to the carrier aircraft already mentioned, 5th

Air Force provided heavy and medium bomber aircraft, and were responsible for

fighter cover of the convoys within range. Aircraft were based on the ADMIRALTY

ISLANDS and at FINSOHAfEN, GUSAP and SAIDOR.

It is estimated that about 800 aircraft including shore based and carrier borne

were available.

A large number of Aviation Engineer units was allotted in order to put captured

airfields into operation as rapidly as possible.

Planning.

8. The headquarters of the various planning agencies were separated

by considerable distances, increasing the difficulties of planning.

Although good air photos were eventually obtained, the coverage was unsatis-

factory and hampered the early st ages of th e planning,

Liaison

9. Navy and Air Force liaison was close. NIaOs were attached to Air

Force Headquarters, and Fighter Director and Support Air Controllers also

acted in the capacity of Air Liaison Officers with the Naval st aff during

the planning stage. ' * ; il,

.... Rhearsals/



COHQ BULLETIN Y/30 S33

July 1944 -3- (4)

Rehearsals

10. Assault Group rehearsals were held separately on 8 - 10 April

for each landing area. These tested th e landing plan and shore organisat-

ions but, unfortunately, owing to th e restrictions on firing in th e rehearsal

area, they did not cover th e co-ordination of rocket fire and low

airattack

covering th e final approach.

The TANABMERAH BAY Landing Force rehearsal suffered by comparison with the

other two, since very little unloading was satempted and the area selected

did not permit supporting fire.

11. The Landing Force commander must decide between thoroughly testing

his shore organisation by full unloading, and keeping his equipment and

stores ready loaded for th e operation to avoid damage or deterioration.

Provided time is available, the value of the rehearsal is greatly enhanced

by fully unloading the early echelons and the risk to equipment should not

be serious.

Preliminary A ir Attacks

12. Prior to the operation, 5th Air Force maintained the neutralisation

of th e HANSA BAY and WEWAK airfields. Three attacks by heavy bombers about

D - 10 began the neutralisation of the HOLANDIA area. Nearly 200 aircraft

were reported destroyed or damaged, mainly on th e ground, and dump areas

near BDOLLADIA village and at the airfields were successfully bombed. AITAPE

also received attention. Night bombing of these areas was continued up to

D - 1.

Long range operations were carried out against MANOKWARI and other Japanese

aerodromes westward of H0LLANDIA.

On D-

1 the main Carrier Force made heavy attacks on SARII and WAKDE ISLAND,from which air attacks could be staged against th e Landing farces. Attacks

by carrier aircraft on D - 1 were also carried out in great strength against

th e SE TANI airfields and HUMBOLDT BAY areas.

The TANABMRAH BAY area, in which few enemy defences were expected, was

reconnoitred but not bombed.

Approach of Convoy

13. The main convoy movement began at GOODENOUGH ISLAND and LST

joined en route, th e convoy speed being set at 9 knots after th e LST joined.

Anune ted 1 knot current was encountered which necessitated a slight

.ase of speed beyond that consieresuitable fo rLST

on such a longrun,

IDI of all forces left th e concentration areas before the main convoy and

staged at th e ADMIERALTY ISLANDS where troops rested and exercised.

A ll groups concentrated early on D - 2 northwest of the AJIDRALTY ISLANDSand then proceeded in company.

Escort carriers operated independently during daylight and joined th e rear

of th e convoy at night.

The voyage from GOODENOUGH ISLAND occupied five days and was completely

lacking in incident.

Close Support of the Landing

14. . Naval and air bombardments were effective and accurate, although

a number of unoccupied Japanese defence posts facing the beach were un-

touched.

Salient features were th e use of short ranges to ensure good observation

on jungle targets and the heavy smoke haze over target areas at th e conclus-

ion of shooting, While this did not seriously confuse boats heading fo r

the beach, it is considered that th e bombardment haze at TANAHMERAH BAY was

sufficiently thick to have caused difficulty in th e co-ordination of air-craft attacks just prior to H-Hour.

Rocket crat t were allotted for close suaport of th e final stage 0f the

approach. O .ingo t1 .h ength of theo aches the available rocket craft

were insii'fficient for the task, buk the lack, of opposition overcame thisshortage. iiJh t

Control of Carrier Aircraft/



COHQ BULLETIN iY

Control of Carrier Aircraft

15. The system of control used for carrier aircraft is shown in

Appendix. The Support Air Controller handles all aircraft after their

arrival at a rendezvous near th e landing area.

Details which require early co-ordination are :-

(a) Method of indicating the position of own troops and th e location

of targets. Various visual pyrotechnic systems were employed

in th e operation, but suffered from th e usual difficulty of

accurate recognition in jungle areas. In view of the speed

with which air support can be provided it may be possible to

nominate the proposed method of marking target and bomb line

in the call fo r support.

(b) Allotment of Air Liaison Teams. These are normally provided

forall

headquarters down to Battalions.In

thisoperation

they were confined to Divisional and Regimental Headquarters

only.

(c) Availability of Air Observers, whose work in these operations

was of great value.

Assault Scales

16. A real effort was made by 1 US Corps to reduce the quantity of

transport landed. A flat rate of 25 per cent of authorised scales was

imposed on non-technical vehicles but the lavish quantities of stores landed

and th e large numberof technical vehicles more than counteracted the

reductions achieved.

Every item taken on a jungle landing operation must be considered from the

points of view of necessity and opportunity for use. No piece of equipment

should be landed unless it is intended to make full use of it. Neither

should any essential item be landed on D Day, or any other day, unless it

can be taken into use at once. Probable requirements can be called forward

rapidly if the commander needs them.

In the early days of a jungle landing, routes fit for traffic are few and

short, while labour demands are heavy and failure to restrict vehicles,

equipment and stores to essentials causes administrative indigestion.

Beach Organisation

17. Shore Parties were very similar in composition to a British or

Australian Beach Group. A typical Shore Party consisted of :-

Shore Battalion ESB

One company Medical Battalion

Detachment Div M ilitary Po lice

Detachment QM Company

Two QM Service Companies

One platoon QM Truck Company

One Ordnance Company

Two workshop detachments for waterproofing.

18. A First Key Plan was prepared far each beach area during planning.

Reconnaissance and the preparation of a Second Key Plan were undertaken

immediately on landing.

19. Priority for engineer work for th e Shore Party was allotted as

follows :-

(a) Beach exitsIk Lateral behind the beach

S Loop road through ,c4u, area ' :

d rac

20/



COHQ BULIETIN Y/30 r

July 1944 (OR

20. Vehicle and craft salvage and maintenance were handled within

th e ESB Shore Battalion. Craft maintenance units were slow in getting

established ashore and it is suggested that craft equipped as workshopscould have functioned from th e outset and prevent ed any considerable la g

in repair work.

21. Signboards, loud speakers and additional active Provost work wouldhave been advantageous in th e congested conditions experienced on th e beaches.

Maintenance Supplies.

22. The Army fear of interruption to the shipping programme Ifr

supplies was even more evident in this operation than in previous ones.

The great distances to be covered by supply echelons, involving an

8-day turn-round, was largely responsible for the Army attitude andaccounted for the very large tonnages to be handled during the first three

days when beach organisation was in its early: stages. All available

shipping was absorbed in carrying this large amount of stores and a gapoccurred between D + 2 and D + 8 during which no supply echelons arrived

at the beaches. The congestion on th e beaches offered good targets fo r

enemy air attack and the loss of the bulk part of eleven LST loads at

Beach WHITE 1, through fires started by a lone bomber, stressed th e diffi-

culty of attempting to get every requirement ashore in th e initial stages.

It is considered that the landing of seven days' reserve supply of all

kinds with th e troops, followed by regular convoys every day or second day

to continue maintenance and build up reserves, is the logical solution to

the closely related problems of congestion, dispersal, labour and security.

U loadi

23. Roller runway was successfully used for stacking an th e beach

in isolated cases. No palletised cargo was observed.

Unloading of 334 Engineer Regiment at TANA1MERAH BAY was assisted by th e

use of numbers of l ight boats with outboard motors. These were small butmoved at high speeds. Their very shallow draught enabled themn to operate

over a coral shelf. It is understood that the boats formed part of th eunit equipent and that their primary function was for light pontoon bridg-

ing. Quantities of a similar type of boat, crated in sections, were

observed in Japanese dumps near HOLLANDIA.

Construction of Beach Exits.

24. Few coastal areas in th e South West Pacific area offer anpthing

but soft muddy ground or outright swamp behind the beaches and all threemain beaches in this operation were backed by bad swamps. At AITAPE there

was room for dispersal of stores close to th e beach area, but at the other

two landing points, beaches were only 50-100 yards wide. Clearance of the

large quantity of vehicles and stores from th e beaches could, therefore, be

effected only by the speedy construction of beach exits and adequate routesto dispersal areas.

The need for speed precludes real roadmaking and makes any attempt to

surface a track with corduroy, stone or gravel out of th e question sincethese are slow methods. What is required is a temporary track circuit

which may last only for several days until proper routes can be substituted.If equipnent and labour are available to develop more than one exit simultan-

eously, this should be done. Rapid track construction must be reduced

to a drill and the maximum resources made available to expedite progress.

25. Shore Parties constructing tracks encountered serious terraindifficulties including swamp, dense jungle and heavy clay soil. th e need

for ample track surfacing material was not appreciated beforehand with theresult that exits from beaches were not available fo r over 24 hours and

very serious congestion occurred at TANAIH{NIERAH BAY (RED BEACBES) andHuRBOLIr BAY (WHITE BEAITES). An air attack at Beach RED 2 might havecaused losses as grave as occurred through the fire which destroyed large

quantities of stores on Beach WHITE 1.



cOHQ BO lLSIN Y/30

July 194 .- , (^ ^oW )

TANAH]ERAH BAY

BEACH RED 2. 1500 hrs. D DAY

TANAIHERAH BAY

BEACH EXIT NEAR RED 2. 1500 hrs. D DAY

Use of LVT

26. LVT were employed in a landing over coral at DEPAPRE in

TANAHvBRAH BAY and to exploit to PIM in JAUIEPA BAY near HOLLANDIA where

numerous sandbars of uncertain depth were anticipated. In both cases

LVT performed satisfactori ly.

At DEPAPRE the leading LVT wave was 20 minutes l:t, since th e slow speed

an4q ong

i6



co 1EUI-W ,30July 1944 . ^ , .'-r Ji.

a

e

and long approach made timing difficult. The speed set was 4*5 miles

per hour for the 4lowing distances :-

Outer Control to Line of Departure 6000 yardsLine of Departure to Beach 4000 yards

Ships and Craft

27. LSD carried mixed loads including LVT, LCM(3), V(P), LOS

and LOT. Arrangements were also made fo r 17 LOT to be towed by 1ST.

28. A number of LST carried Naval pontoon equipment secured along

their sides.

Medical

29. The LST available permitted the allotment of a sufficient

number for casualty evacuation. Each LST so allotted carried a surgical

team. The necessary facilities in these LST were provided by using the

troop compartments, to which the Americans obtained access by cutting a

stretcher hatch through the bulkhead.

Oomaxications

3d , In general counications were satisfactory. Headquarters shipswhich took part in bombardment experienced temporary dislocation of coimnuni-

oations. Relief ships were provided for use in the event of casualties to

Heady.arters or Fighter Director ships.

Japanese Morale

31. Supply difficulties and the lack of air support appear to be

causing a rapid decline in Japanese morale. In this operation the over-

whelming naval and air bombardment broke any attempt at resistance. The

enemy at HUMBOLfD BAY fled to the hills. A party at AITAPE left their

defences at the conclusion of the bombardment and sat on the beach, naked

and unarmed, to surrender. Serious resistance was never met.

The weight and sacuracy of the bombardment appear. to have been the essent-ia l elements in completely destroying the morale of Japanese beach defenders.

Japanese Defences

32. No beach defences, wire, obstacles or minefields were encountered

at TANA RAH BAHAY Prepared positions covering the beach were found at

HOMBOLT BAY and AITAPE, but the defenders vacated theme There were no

minefields or obstacles.

HOILAIDIA was remote from the main area of operations at the time it was

captured. It is possible that the Japanese will learn the lesson and that

much more attention will be paid to beach defences in rear areas in th e

future.

The absence of any quantity of hostile field artillery in the capturedareas is also notewort r The Japanese appear to rely on dual purpose AA

weapons for covering beaches and then, as at GLOUCESTER and HOILADIA,fail to use them in a ground role.

Szaarg' of onclusionsi

33. The completeness of the surprise achieved was of the greatest

importance in ensuring the rapid success of land operations with onlyslight losses.

34. Carrier air support was excellent. The overwhelming andcontinuous air bombardment that can be carried out, the speed with which

close air support can be provided and the strong fighter cover maintainedare important features. The syste of control worked admirably and the

reports of air observers were most useful

35. Naval gun obtained geat accuracy against jungle targets byemploying close rage observed fire The problem of destroying prepared

and undetected/

Lib



July ° {1i {Vy44

and undetected defences in the vicinity of beaches has not yet been

overconeo

36, The early provision of suitable air photographs is essential.

37. Rapidly constructed and surfaced tracks are essential for theclearance of beaches in jungle conditions. It is unwise to place anydependence on existing tracks as potential routes fbr maintenanoe bywheeled vehicles. The construction or improvement of jungle tracks is

a slow and arduous task.

38, The importance of th e early arrival of ample landing and harbourcraft for unloading and minor coastwise operations was appreciated and

adeuate arrangements were made for their provision and transportation.Single naval control under th e Landing Force Coirmander of all craft in thearea is preferable to independent control by several agencies,

39. Small float planes commenced operating in th e early stages ofth e landing. Provided fighter cover is adequate, they can be of thegreatest value for artillery reconnaissance and liaison purposes,

PART II - LLADINGS

A, TANRA BAS'

Coastline

40, The coastline in is area is generally steep, rooky andimpracticable

for landings The mountains rise steeply from the waterto heights of 4000-6000 feet and bar any approach to the airfields fromth e north.

Beaches

41. Two beaches, RED 1 and RED 2, were used. The approach to theformer was narrow and overlooked by ridges on either side at ranges of600 yards. The landing place offered a width of 100 yards over a widecoral shelf onto a small flat beside the village of IEPAPRE.

RED 2 was a steep sandy beach at least 800 yards long with clear approaches.Air photography indicated some swamp immediately inland. The extent of

this swamp was doubtful, but a dispersal and maintenance area on slopingground within 40 0 yards of th e beach, and th e fact that it was the only

suitable beach near to the airfield route, determined its selection asth e main beach for th e area.

Landing Plan

42. Two hours were allowed for transports to get craft to th e water,

troops loaded and waves formed up. In spite of the 'ample time, the

interval between leading waves widened to a degree which might not have

bui l t up th e assault elements sufficiently rapidly had opposition beenencountered.

The initial landings were made by LOV(P) and LOM from APA on RED 2 beachand by Buffaloes and LOM from the LSD on RED 1. The landings were un-opposed. LOM beached at high tide but were unable to retract until thenext tide. Naval demolition parties commenced work later to improve the

landing point and clear coral heads from th e approach.

Close Support

43. Two 8-inch cruisers and six destroyers provided support froaH - 60 minutes to H - 15 minutes. All ships stood well in to ensure

good observation, 600 rounds 8-inch and 1500 rounds of 5-inch and

4.7-inch were fired without response. At th e conclusion of th e bombard-

ment destroyers stood close in for targets of opportunity.

)i~j ,swa



OOHQ BULLJTIN Y/30 _ lUP>

July 194 -9

4, The support plan allowed for air bombing and strafing of the beaches

between H - 15 minutes and H - 3 minutes, but this bombardment was cancelled

on the day owing to th e absence of any indication of the presence of the enemy.

45. One Rocket LCI, two LC S and the Mas of the craft in th e leading wave

covered th e final stage of the approach to RED 2.

Beach Maintenance

46. The exit on th e right of RED 2 beach necessitated a track being pre-

pared along the slopes overlooking th e swamp. Once off the sandy beach the

soil turned to clay. No surfacing material was available and trucks had to

be dragged individually by tractors.

47. The experience in this area emphasised the lesson that th e exit from

the beach to dispersal areas is usually a critical factor.

48. A ll maintenance to the troops inland was by hand-carry.

B. HMBOL BAY

Beaches

49. South of HAMADI ISLAND a good beach extended fbr about a mile with an

approach free from coral. The Japanese barge landing point at PE in JAUTEPA

BAY had a narrow shallow approach through sand bars and appeared suitable only

for LCIM The long spit on th e east side of the entrance to JAUTE]A BAY was

considered suitable only for landing assault elements. The only points cap-

able of development were :-

(a3 South of HAMADI ISLAMD (WHITE 1 Beach)b Barge landing point at PIM.

The spit east of th e entrance to JAUTEFA BAY was required to cover exploitationto PIM and was called beach HITE 2. The following is an outline of th e

coastline in the HUMBOLDT BAY area :-

Ho//andi'a

I

/

(

. Scale of Yards*Hamadi . .. ,,.. a1000 100 0

N

BEACH

WHITE I

._. 700 YDS.

Jau t efa

Bay

CoconutyP/an tation



July 1944 4___J

50. Beach WHITE I was apparently backed by swamp involving a detour

to the north to reach a suitable dispersal area. There was no evidence

of a road connection from th e beach to the track HOLAfDIA-PIM which la y

about 1- miles inland. A motor road to th e SENTANI airfields started at

PIm.

Landinfg Plan

51. The bulk of the assault troops landed on WHTfE 1 beach with a

subsidiary landing of one battalion on WHITE 2.

Subsequently a force of LVT and small boats entered JAUTEFA BAY and

captured the barge landing point and roadhead at PIM.

Bombardment

52. Serious resist ance had been anticipated. Three l ight cruisers

and six destroyers were allotted for the bombardment which followed the

same general lines as for TANAI 1RAH BAY. The greatest care was taken toensure close co-ordination between naval and air bombardment and to

neutralise all target areas in which enemy defences were suspected. The

enemy defence posts covering beach WHITE 1, however, were untouched by th e

bombardment.

53. The presence of destroyers close inshore watching for targets of

opportunity and the harassing fire undertaken during th e first day and nighteffectively prevented any enemy attempt to retaliate.

54. Prisoners stated th t th e heavy air attacks on the days prior

to D Day, culminating in a day long strike by carrier forces, drove many

of the enemy into th e hills.

Beach Maintenance

55. It had been planned to land nearly 20,000 tons of bulk stores atHt1LBOILT BAY during th e first three days of the operation. The diversion

of all shipping from TANAHERAH BAY involved an increase of over 8000 tons

together with considerable numbers of personnel, guns and vehicles.

56. Three things happened after the initial landing :-

(a) Beach WHITE 1 was found to be already congested with large

Japanese dumps which occupied much of the available space

on th e 100 yards wide sandy strip between th e sea and the

swamp.

(b) The only beach exit was to the northward. The same

difficulties were experienced as at TANAfI 1H BAY with wet

clay soil , short steep gradients and an almost complete

absence of surfacing material. Most vehicles were dis-

persed to the north of th e beach by fight D + 1/D + 2, but

no stores had been moved.

(c) The air bombardment on D - 1 had started fires in the

Japanese dumps which were no t completely extinguished on

D + 1. A single enemy aircraft using th e fire as an

aiing mark dropped a stick of bombs in the Japanese dumps

that evening. A series of conflagrations commenced which

spread to our supply dumps, destroying a few heavy vehicles

stuck in th e sand and some bulk supplies and anmunition.

These fires continued for two days and, owing to th e constant

explosion of ammunition and bambs, prevented LST beaching

and th e use of the beach track,

57. Beach WHITE 2 (the sand spit) was never considered suitable fo r

LST, They beached there on D + 4 at high tide and at full speed but ramps

were up to 40 yards from the shore in 3 - 4 feet of water. No arrangements

were made for bri I ".



GOgQ BUILLETI Y/30

July 1914 L KrJi 4i

C.- AITAPE.

Beach

58. The sandy shore opposite the TADTI airfields near AITAPE wasuniform for long distances with clear approaches and a medium gradient.

Beach BLUE was selected with reference to exits and objectives ashore.

The beach was exposed and heavy surf was anticipated but beach conditions

could not be accurately determined beforehand.

Swamps and lagoons existed behind the beach and the country genea ally was

low lying and jungle covered except for isolated plantation areas and th e

extensive aerodrme clearings.

A track le d directly inland to th e airstrips, a distance of 1000 yards.

Landing Plan

59. Owing to th e landing area being over 100 miles east of DLLANDIA,H-Hour was 15 minutes earlier - at 0645 hrs. The morning was dull,

visibility poor and the coastline featureless. Under these circumstances

th e landing actually took place 600 yards east of th e point originally in-

tendedo

This actually made little difference to the leading wave as th e area hadbeen adequately covered by bombardment.

60. LVT were used ashore for th e transport of stores. It was

planned not to use them in th e early assault waves owing to the possibilityof high surf, A special beach reconnaissance report was made by th e

leading wave commander immediately after beaching, in order that the land-

ing plan could be adjusted to any special conditions encountered.

61. Surf was moderate during th e landing and all waves, including

LVT, ran to schedule.

Operations Ashore

62. Operations ashore progressed rapidly and without any majorincidents. The airfields, which were the main objectives, were secured

by 1400 hrs on D Day. Fighters began using-the strips on D + 2.

APPENDIX - OTILINE CARRIER SUPPORT AIR

OR.ANISATI/

r I

T6744)J

::ji

i



OJHQ TN9

July 194..

OTAINE CARRIER SUPPORTAIt OR&AIISATION

IiEAD~UARTs S'HIP

SYSTEM OF CONTROL

Observation net

Assistant Operations

and Gunnery

Communications

Fighter Direction

Int elligence

FUNCTIONS CO OFFICERS

Suort~ Air Controller

Air Co-ordinator

Air Observer

Tactical control of

bomber aircraft from HQ

ship,

Stationed in th e air

from where he reconnoitres

for targets and leads or

coordinates the actual

missions.

An army reconnaissance

officer carried in an

aircraft who provides

continuous reports of

progress and enemy action.

He may carry out artill-

ery reconnaissance in

addition,

ector - Controls all fighter

Sperations from a ship

\ tHQ ship.

RighterEr

Documents

Operation Reckless (1944)