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The Barrington Moore Thesis and Its Critics Author(s): Jonathan M. Wiener Source: Theory and Society, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Autumn, 1975), pp. 301-330Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/656776Accessed: 09-10-2015 23:44 UTC

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301

THE BARRINGTON MOORE THESIS AND ITS CRITICS

JONATHAN M. WIENER

At a time when most studies of modernization assume that the existing political order is the most desirable one, Barrington Moore argues in Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston, 1966) that violent social revolution has been, and is, a prerequisite for increasing freedom and rationality in the world. Moore rejects the view that all modernizing societies undergo essentially the same process. Where most recent studies have tried to find characteristics which all modernizing societies share - whether "economic take-off" (Rostow), "expanded political participation" (Huntington), or "multiple dysfunction" (Chalmers Johnson)- Moore argues that there have been three different types of modernization distinguished by the changes in class structure that acconmpany development, and by the political costs and achievements of each in their contribution to increasing freedom and rationality.

The first type Moore calls "bourgeois revolution," in which a violent revolution abolished the domination of the traditional landed elite and brought capitalist democracy to England, France, and the United States. The second is "revolution from above," the process in Germany and Japan by which the traditional landed elite defeated popular revolution and preserved its dominant position during industrialization, a process which culminated in fascism. The third type is "peasant revolution," which in Russia and China saw the traditional elite abolished, not by a revolutionary bourgeoisie, but by a revolutionary peasantry which cleared the way for modernization. All modernizing societies have undergone a version of one of these three types, Moore argues, providing case studies of England, France, the United States, Japan, China, and India.

More than 35 discussions of the Moore thesis have appeared in English since the book was published; they include many brief journal reviews and some longer review essays. These discussions have been of three kinds: criticism of

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Moore's method, consideration of the thesis itself, and examination of particular case studies. I will consider the important issues raised in each of these areas, and conclude with a brief evaluation of the Moore thesis in light of the critical discussion of the past nine years.

1. Moore's Method

The most frequent criticism of Moore's method is that he is an economic determinist who neglects non-economic "factors" which play a causal role in modernization. The charge of economic determinism was made explicitly by Gabriel Almond, Lee Benson, David Lowenthal, and Cyril Black, among others.' Stanley Rothman's review article in the American Political Science Review was the longest and most polemical statement of this argument: Moore, he wrote, sees "actors moved inevitably towards a predetermined end" by their economic interests; Moore argues that ideology, politics, society, and culture are all "determined" by economic forces, and function as "mechanisms used by the ruling classes to further their own interests," Moore considers past revolutions to have been "inevitable" results of economic forces.2

Rothman provided evidence for his critique by embarking on a massive search through Moore's footnotes, conclusively proving that Moore's own sources did not support an economic determinist interpretation of history. They argued the importance, at various points, of politics, social structure, ideology, and so on. And every point at which Moore examines the relations between these elements in a particular historical setting, Rothman stated that he had found a point at which Moore "weakened his thesis" of economic determinism, exhibited a "tendency to hedge," and "whimsically introduced other factors" beyond the economic.3

Rothman failed to see that behind Moore's apparent whimsey lay a method. He was correct in arguing that the sources did not put forward an economic determinist analysis; but neither did Moore. Rothman's critique of Moore's method succeeded in demolishing the classic straw man.

Those who criticized Moore for economic determinism missed one of the most fundamental purposes of his project: to distinguish between economic analysis and social class analysis. Moore's book stands as the most thorough and systematic demolition of economic determinism from a social class perspective.4 The decisive element in historical development from Moore's


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point of view is class conflict, an understanding of which presupposes a specific historical analysis of the constituent classes. The confusion between Marxian class analysis and economic determinism arises from the Marxian definition of classes in terms of property in the means of production. Moore follows Marx be defining classes in terms of the various mechanisms by which elites have extracted an economic surplus from the underlying population.

This method is "economic" only in the broadest sense. It permits comparative analysis by recognizing the existence of a recurring problem (ex- tracting the surplus) and limited historical solutions (feudalism, agrarian bureaucracy, commercial agriculture, etc.); but it also recognizes the difference among particular classes at particular places and times. These differences result from unique configurations of economic interests, existing political alternatives, semi-autonomous cultures, and particular world views, which are seen in relation to economic interests, but not wholly subordinate to them. The assumption that the "economic factor" determines the behavior of a class in any particular situation rather than, for instance, the "religious factor" or the "political factor," is ahistorical, ignores the totality and interrelationships of the various elements, and is therefore not Marxist. As Marx himself wrote, "empirical observations must in each separate instance bring out empirically . . . the connection of the social and political structure with production."5

Moore himself repeatedly rejects economic determinist explanations. The conception of bourgeois revolution as the result of a "steady increase in the economic power" of the bourgeoisie Moore describes as "a caricature of what took place;" he rejects as "obviously inadequate" the idea that peasant revolts are caused by the deterioration of the peasants' economic situation under the impact of commerce and industry.6

A case in point is Rothman's description of Moore's chapter on the English Civil War as an "economic interpretation." Rothman's own analysis is that "wide agreement had been reached in the Long Parliament on purely economic issues; it was the political and religious question, as well as Charles' personality, which ultimately produced the conflict."7 Rothman here confuses the explicitly economic issues debated in Parliament with the changes in class structure which culminated in war - Moore's own concern. But Rothman's categories of analysis are not exactly clear; in what sense did the "factor" of personality "ultimately produce" the conflict?


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The most frequently recommended alternative to economic determinism was the addition of non-economic factors to the list of effective causes of social change. Thus Lawrence Stone insisted that demography be considered, Rein- hard Bendix and Gabriel Almond agreed that international relations should not be ignored, and Lee Benson called for attention to religious and ethno- cultural influences; Cyril Black's list of factors was among the longest: "ideology, social psychology, leadership, war, diplomacy, and indeed, chance, must be taken into account."8

What these critics shared was an unsystematic, almost haphazard notion of how to explain social change. In place of a theory of change, they depended on the existing sub-fields of academic disciplines to form the basis of their conception of society and history, uncritically assuming that, just as each field "makes a contribution," so each factor "plays a role" in explaining the overall pattern of social change. The resulting list of factors amounts to, not an alternative method to social class analysis, but rather an absence of theory and method.

The "multi-factor" approach tended in two directions - either toward an emphasis on a particular factor, or else toward an effort to compare the causal importance of different factors. Some of those criticising Moore for economic determinism argued that their own academic specialty dealt with the most important causal factor - thus an intellectual historian argued for the fundamental causal significance of formal ideas in history. Other critics, however, saw as their task not emphasizing the importance of one particular factor, but rather comparing the causal role played by different factors. Rothman, for instance, made statements such as "the changing political culture played some role, and religious factors played at least as important a role as economic."9

In this attempt to list all potential causes, to measure the relative influence of different factors case by case, critics like Rothman left themselves in a theoretical void - facing each new historical case without a tested way to begin an analysis, with no conception of what is fundamentally important and what is not, without a method for examining the structure of interrelationships among the various factors, or of systematically comparing the cases thus studied.

Rothman described his alternative to Moore's position as "Weberian." It was Max Weber, Rothman suggested, who provided- the most thorough critique


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and alternative theory to Marx's, and Rothman has strong words about "Moore's attack on Weber."'0 But Moore has emphasized the extent to which Weber's work is the basis of much of his own, arguing that Weber's method resembled Marx's in several crucial respects, which distinguishes their work from contemporary social science.11 Moore wrote that both Weber and Marx possessed a "critical spirit," a refusal to accept the status quo as given, that had disappeared from modern sociology (Moore was writing in the mid-fifties' "end of ideology" interlude); both were steeped in historical study and possessed a historical perspective on present society which has been lost by contemporary social scientists; and both refused to sacrifice content to technical virtuosity, as modern social science has done. Marx and Weber, Moore wrote, in spite of their lack of sophisticated statistical technique, had more to say about significant social questions than today's sociologists.

While Moore recommended Weber's historical work as a model of comparative sociology, he was convinced that Weber's later writing - particularly Economy and Society - was characterized by a decline of historical perspective" which culminated in an "arid desert of definitions" - eventually elaborated by Talcott Parsons.12

Between Weber and Marx, Moore suggested that Marx provided the more valuable starting point. He considered four aspects of Marx's method to be of crucial value to social science today: Marx's conception of social class "as arising out of an historically speciflc set of economic relationships;" his "conception of the class struggle as the basic stuff of politics;" his awareness of the sharp divergence between official values and aspirations, and the way a society actually works; and his sense of the absence of antagonism between science and morality. For Marx, "the whole enterprise of science makes sense only in terms of moral convictions," Moore wrote.'3 To this list should be added Moore's acceptance of Marx's conception of exploitation as an objective and measurable economic phenomenon.

Rothman indicated that the "Weberian" method he was defending against Moore was a "cultural explanation." 14 Moore, however, in criticizing cultural explanations, attacks not Weber, but Parsons,15 He rejects the Parsonian position that the cultural factor is the starting point in historical and social analysis, and an independent causal factor in its own right. Moore says that the basic error of those who rely on cultural explanations is "the assumption of social inertia," the assumption that continuity of value systems requires no explanation, that only change requires explanation. Social analysis based on


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value systems "begs the fundamental question." Moore writes: "Why did this particular outlook prevail when and where it did? The answer to this question is historical:" particular values are maintained and transmitted by particular groups under particular conditions, "often with great pain and suffering." 16

But Rothman himself did not defend the Parsonian position which Moore attacks - that cultural values, rather than social classes, should be the starting point for historical analysis. Rothman's argument was much weaker; he says only that "the cultural inheritance of a society is a significant part of any explanation," and urges historians to "give significant weight to cultural factors." 17 Moore never denies that cultural values are "significant;" he does attempt to explain where they come from and how they function in the context of social classes.

Parsons himself has referred to Social Origins - in his System of Modern Societies, published just before he retired.18 But, instead of responding to Moore's critique of his theory, he treated Moore as a source of half a dozen facts to be incorporated into a structural-functional analysis of European history. Thus Parsons cited Moore as the authority for the statement that English peasants were weaker than the French, and that the French aristocracy was more dependent on the crown than the English - and fit these into a value-oriented rather than a class-oriented analysis. Parson's decision not to defend his own work - the single most important American alternative to Marxist social theory - appears to be an implicit admission of the strength of Moore's critique, a recognition of Moore's success at demonstrating the value of class analysis as a method.

All the criticisms of Moore's method discussed thus far have come from non-Marxists who regard Moore as a Marxist of some sort. Marxist criticism of Moore's method was radically different. Eric Hobsbawm generally praised Moore's method, but observed that his focus on relations between landlord and peasant neglects some of the more subtle aspects of rural social structure. Hobsbawm listed them: rural society's "marginal and mobile strata, its nuclei of permament dissidence and withdrawal, its permanent flux of inter-com- munal and inter-gentry conflict and alliance, and its occasional or permanent recognition of wider social units." Hobsbawm said that Moore's chapter on China in particular demonstrates that he is "aware of some of these dimen- sions;" Moore's problem is that the necessary primary research has not been done, and "the comparativist can only be as good as the material available for comparison."'9


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Eugene Genovese has written that he considers Moore's chapter on the American Civil War "the most successful attempt at a Marxian analysis." Genovese confined his discussion of Moore to the American chapter, without considering his thesis as a whole - a procedure which, Genovese recognized, "risks some distortions." He agreed that Marxian analysis requires the "broader context" of comparative concerns "such as the one Moore offers."20

Within this context of agreement on the general requirements of Marxian class analysis, Genovese put forward some rather strong criticism of Moore's American chapter. Genovese shared Moore's concern that class analysis be distinguished sharply from economic determinism, and most of Genovese's essay on "Marxian interpretations of the slave south" is an attack on various forms of vulgar Marxian determinist writing. But, Genovese wrote, Moore "is so anxious to repel (a) crude economic interpretation that he concedes far more ground than is necessary or safe." In arguing that the Southern class structure was a "separate civilization," Moore "minimized the economic aspect" of planter domination, and "obscures the class issue," while at the same time paying "little attention" to ideology; in consequence, "despite a framework that places social class at the center, he never analyzes the slaveholders as a class; he merely describes certain of their features and interests in a tangential way." 21

Genovese said that Moore's version of the separate civilization argument does not include an analysis of the planter class in terms of its economic interests, ideology, and social relations with the rest of the "plantation community." Such an analysis, Genovese wrote, would consider the "hegemonic mechanisms" of the planters' domination as a "special case of class rule" - would consider the role of planter ideology in defending a particular set of economic interests.22

Initially it may appear that in calling for great attention to "the economic aspect" and to ideology, Genovese was making the same kind of argument as the anti-Marxists who criticise Moore for emphasizing the wrong "factors" in his thesis, who want to add different "variables" to the list of effective causes in history. In fact Genovese's argument does not take this form. His argument is that the method of class analysis requires a more thorough consideration of the relationships and the reciprocal influences among different aspects of a social class; his purpose is not to demonstrate that the "economic factor" is causally more important in history that the "political factor" or the "cultural


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factor," but to demonstrate that understanding history in terms of conflict among social classes is more fruitful than understanding it in terms of particular "variables," like political structure or cultural characteristics. Genovese's argument against Moore is not that his list of variables is incomplete, but that a full understanding of social class requires more attention to the reciprocal influence of economic interests and ideology in establishing a system of class rule.

The question which Genovese does not raise, but which naturally follows, is whether his criticism of Moore's method in the American chapter applies to the thesis as a whole, or whether the American chapter is an exception to a generally satisfactory method. In his discussion of particular agrarian ruling classes, does Moore have a sufficient consideration of their economic interests, and of the role of ideology in establishing their hegemony? Moore's focus on the levers by which agrarian elites extract an economic surplus from the underlying working population is very much a study of particular forms of class rule. But, on the issue of ideology and the establishment of hegemony, Genovese's criticism of Moore's American chapter does seem to apply to the book as a whole; Moore is not particularly concerned about the ideological aspect of class relations, and Gramsci's work on hegemony - which Genovese ranks high on the list of Marxian theoretical writing - does not appear in Moore's general bibliography.

2. The Moore Thesis

The relationship between the Moore thesis and Marxism was a leading issue in most discussions of Social Origins. Some saw the book as part of Marxist scholarship, an elaboration and defense of Marx's own ideas; some saw it as a critique or refutation of Marx, while still others saw Moore making use of Marx, among others, where helpful. Reinhart Bendix considered the book to be "a major landmark of Marxist thought in its period of disillusionment,"23 while Michael Rogin wrote, Marxist orthodoxy turns out to be wrong at every point.'"24 Eugene Genovese noted that although Moore's "categories are basically Marxian," he writes "in a manner calculated to divorce himself from Marxism."25 C. Vann Woodward observed that Moore "is a Marxian in some of his interpretations, but he is not an apologist for any regime or any ruler."26 Lawrence Stone considered Moore a "neo-Marxist,"27 the T.L.S. Reviewer said "he is fundamentally a Marxist,"28 and Joseph Featherstone described Moore as one who "does sociology in the grand ... historical manner of Marx."29 The most lengthy and also most favorable evaluation of


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Moore's relation to Marxism was that of J. H. Plumb, who wrote, "for too long American historians have been concerned with narrative, with biography, or with cultural and institutional history that evades economic and social roots." Moore's work shows that Marx "demonstrated the type of historical question that needs to be asked, and the way answers require to be framed, if one is to understand the process of social change." Plumb concluded that, with Moore, "a new analytic materialism is putting down strong roots."30

Eric Hobsbawm criticized Moore's thesis from a Marxist perspective. In a brief review, he agreed with Moore that modernization in all forms implies the destruction of the traditional peasantry; however he found "exaggerated" Moore's argument that peasants were more important than industrial workers in radical anti-capitalist movements.31

In objecting to Moore's argument that industrial workers were historically less important than peasants in radical movements, Hobsbawm was of course upholding the traditional Marxist view. Moore makes it clear that his sociology of revolution is sharply at odds with Marx's. Moore sees no revolutionary potential whatsoever in the industrial proletariat at any stage of the development of capitalism. Successful revolutionary movements find their mass base of support among the declining artisans and peasants, rather than among the growing factory proletariat; for Moore, modern social revolutions are "the dying wail of a class over which the wave of progress is about to roll;" they are reactionary rather than progressive in terms of the political perspective of their mass of supporters. Here Moore joins the ranks of those who use Marxist categories in an effort to "refute" Marx - Adam Ulam and S. M. Lipset being prominent among them.

Hobsbawm also objected, although with great tact, to the central terms of Moore's analysis: "dictatorship" and "democracy" (Hobsbawm puts them in quotation marks) - which "require ... rather more preliminary analysis" than Moore provided.

Hobsbawm suggested that Moore's conception of "freedom" was the con- ventional liberal one, limited to "a constitutional framework," and was not a Marxist conception. Moore does not dwell on his definition of 'democracy,' remarking that concern for such definitions "has a way of leading away from real issues to trivial quibbling." He defines "the development of democracy" as a "long and certainly incomplete struggle" to accomplish three related goals: first, to "check arbitrary rulers;" second, to "replace arbitrary rules


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with just and rational ones;" third, to "obtain a share for the underlying population in the making of rules." He cites the beheading of kings as important steps in checking arbitrary rule, and indicates that he considers "efforts to establish the rule of law, the power of the legislature, and later to use the state as an engine for social welfare" as steps toward establishing just and rational rules and increasing popular participation.32 Hobsbawm suggests that we ask whether there is anything here that challenges the assumptions of cold-war liberal historiography.

I think there is. First, Moore does not equate fascism and communism, but distinguishes them sharply and evaluates them differently. Second, he argues that liberal historians have tended to accept the ruling class's own definition of what is "just and rational," when in fact it can be shown that they are simply providing an ideological justification for ruling class interests.33

Third, Moore challenges cold-war liberal conceptions of democracy by his attention to the repressive role played by Western democracies in the Third World. Moore points to imperialism and to America's "armed struggle against revolutionary movements in backward areas" as evidence that liberal democracy has "started to turn into [an] ideology that justifies and conceals numerous forms of repression."34 While it can be shown that this relationship is not one which has "started" recently, Moore's position is to the left of the cold-war liberal one.

Although Moore expresses this criticism of the activities of the United States the Third World, he does not indicate much about the state of democracy and freedom within contemporary America. He would probably agree with Joseph Featherstone's argument that "it would be a mistake to conclude that because this freedom was tainted or incomplete, it was not worth having." At the same time, Featherstone saw Moore arguing that "revolution is no guarantee of freedom," citing Moore's statement that "the claims of existing socialist states to represent a higher form of freedom than Western democratic capitalism rest on promises, not performance."35

Lawrence Stone had a critique of Moore's political categories which was similar to Hobsbawm's. Stone wrote that Moore's conceptions of dictatorship and democracy were based on "formalist, institutional, and legal standards." Moore accepts the notion that "the institutions of Anglo-Saxon societies (are) the last word in political equity and wisdom," Stone wrote,36 He stated explicitly what Hobsbawm only implied, that Moore's conception of the


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problem of the development of twentieth-century dictatorship and democracy has its origins in the cold-war scholarship of the late forties and early fifties.

Stone's own critique of these views has an ad hoc quality and lacks any firm theoretical basis that could rival Hobsbawm's implicit Marxism. He wrote that Moore was wrong to have a formal constitutional conception of democracy because "we now realize that what matters is the state of mind which governs the rulers." This appears to be a suggestion that psychological analysis of rulers replace formal analysis of the rules. Stone concluded that Moore's political conceptions should be "less legalistic and more anthropological."37 Surely the basis on which formal analysis of political institutions should be rejected is that it does not lead to a satisfactory understanding of power - which groups use it to achieve what, and by what means, formal and informal. Neither anthropology nor psychohistory have been particularly concerned with these questions; thus Stone's position does not seem to be a satisfactory one.

Stone's argument on the cold-war form of Moore's statement of the problem is more substantial, though equally problematic. To pose the problem of "dictatorship versus democracy" is an historical anachronism today, Stone argued; it is to exaggerate the historical importance of the thirties and forties. In 1945 or 1950 it seemed that the rise of Stalin and Hitler was the greatest development of modern times, the culmination of centuries of historical development; Stone believes this view to have been wrong. "Fascism and Stalinism," he wrote, "both now look like short-term transition phases rather than permanent and deep-seated structural phenomena."38 Cyril Black agreed with Stone's view of what can be called the "culmination problem." "in what sense did the conservative route taken by Germany and Japan 'culminate' in fascism?" Black asked, observing that "in neither country did fascism survive for more than a dozen years."39 The criteria by which Black in particular separates genuine 'culminations' from brief 'interludes' seems to be simply temporal duration - depending upon the brevity of the phase, rather than the extent of social or political transformation which are involved.

As evidence for his view, Stone cited the apparent success of democratic institutions in post-war Germany, Italy, and Japan, and the apparent evolu- tion of the Soviet Union toward increased political participation and personal freedom. He concluded that in studying the "social origins of dictatorship and democracy," Moore is not "asking a significant question;" a better


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question would be: "under what conditions a given society is likely to pass through a relatively brief authoritarian phase as it enters the modern world." However, he regarded even this question as "not a terribly important one," since "the phase is not likely to be prolonged much beyond the period of industrial takeoff."40

Stone's reasoning overlooks elementary facts. In the thirties, Germany and the Soviet Union were at radically different stages of development; it hardly seems necessary to point out that German industry in 1933 was far beyond "take-off." Even if we accept all the assumptions behind Stone's argument, the conclusion based on the German case would be that an "authoritarian phase" is likely to occur in some of the most developed industrial countries at times of capitalist crises, rather than, as Stone sees it, that such a phase will come in the less developed countries at the time of "take-off.",4'

Stone argued that because there are "short-term fluctuations in the degree of liberty and democracy" in different societies, Moore may not be "asking a significant question" in seeking the social origins of democracy. Stone cited the Greek colonel's coup of 1968 as an example of such a short-term fluctuation; Greece was a constitutional democracy from 1948 to 1968, and now is in a period of right-wing dictatorship; Stone asked, how then is it possible to discuss social origins for such relatively brief political phases?

Moore's thesis in this regard is that industrial development tends to culminate in fascism unless there is social revolution which destroys the power of the traditional elite. Michael Walzer has applied this thesis to the case Stone cites against Moore - the Greek colonel's coup. Walzer argued that American foreign aid in the 1948-68 period promoted Greek economic development while it repressed radical social change, with the consequence of "simulta- neously reinforcing oligarchic rule and threatening it" - threatening it by enhancing the "resentment and capacities" of the underlying population, at the same time providing the elite with "the material forces to meet the threat."42 The result was the rise of fascism. Walzer concluded that the Moore thesis provides an excellent analysis of the social basis of post-war Greek political developments.

Stone also cited the development of democratic politics in post-war Germany and Japan as evidence that fascism was a "short-term transition phase" rather than "the culmination of deep-seated structural phenomena." N. Gordon Levin had a more consistent and more satisfactory analysis of this develop-


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ment. He argued that "the defeats and occupations of 1945 may be seen as providing in some sense the bourgeois revolutions which Germany and Japan both missed;" if this is the case, then the post-1945 constitutional politics Stone cited against Moore "seem to bear out his general theory."43 Thus, for Moore, one way or another, the violent destruction of the traditional agrarian ruling class is necessary if democracy is to have a chance in a developing society - destruction either through social revolution, or international war; either by the exploited classes, or by foreign powers. Moore believes the choice is between Jacobin terror and Nazi horrors.

Black's criticism focused on Moore's contention that his types constituted successive historical stages. "In what sense have democracy, fascism, and communism succeeded each other?" he asked, arguing that "the introduction of Communism . . . preceded that of fascism."44 What Moore says is that ''conservative revolutions from above" bring about successful modernization before peasant revolutions do, which is only to say that Germany industri- alized before Russia and China.45 Fascism does not appear in nineteenth- century Germany, but conservative modernization, which later culminates in fascism, does. It is in this sense that what Moore calls "the reactionary experience" of industrialization precedes "the communist method."

N. Gordon Levin also noted Moore's account of the relationship between "the reactionary experience" and fascism. Levin saw Moore arguing "con- trary to the traditional Marxist view" that German fascism was "not the last stage of a dying and threatened monopoly capitalism, but rather the defensive maneuver of a capitalism which has never really been triumphant."46 Here Levin misread Moore. It was democracy that had never been triumphant in Germany, not capitalism; the German economy was thoroughly capitalist by the 1930's, but the political system was far from being thoroughly democratic. Moore emphasizes that the reactionary road has been as successful as the bourgeois democratic one at transforming agrarian into industrial societies, as Germany and Japan prove; it is "nonsense" to believe otherwise, he writes.47 What distinguishes these two routes is not their success at industrialization, but rather the political practices which accompany that process.

Stanley Rothman, whose review article in the American Political Science Review was the most critical, and most intemperate, summarized what he believed to be Moore's "propositions," which took twenty pages for Rothman to disprove: "All industrialization has ... been more or less equally violent and repressive; all ruling classes are ... equally exploitative; and


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fascism is . .. the necessary outcome of so-called 'conservative industrialization.' "48 It is difficult to believe that such a massive failure to understand Moore's book could not be willful. Moore does not say all industrialization has been "equally violent and repressive;" the whole point of identifying distinctive types of modernization for Moore is to distinguish their different costs. He concludes that the route of moderation and gradualism creates at least as much, and probably more suffering than revolutionary modernization, and argues that the greatest violence and repression is asoociated with industrialization under conservative auspices. As Joseph Featherstone wrote, for Moore "there is pointless suffering and suffering that leads to progress and even to freedom."49

Moore does not believe that all ruling classes are "equally exploitative." He argues that exploitation has an objective character which can be measured in terms of "rewards and privileges commensurate with the socially necessary services rendered by the upper class."50 This varies among societies and historical periods; Moore argues that the less the degree of exploitation, the greater the chances for social stability in a particular society.

Moore does not argue that fascism is the "necessary outcome" of modernization under conservative auspices. He writes that "where the [reactionary] coalition succeeds in establishing itself, there has followed a prolonged period of conservative and even authoritarian government, which, however, falls far short of fascism;" in Germany, Italy and Japan, fascism eventually took power (as it did in Poland, Romanian Hungary, Spain and Greece), but "it failed in other countries," even those where the same "reactionary syn- drome" was present - notably Russia, India, and early nineteenth-century England.5' Moore spends several pages explaining why periods of conservative modernization led to fascist rule in some cases but not others.

One of Moore's most radical conclusions is that revolutionary violence has been a prerequisite for liberal government - constitutional democracy has succeeded only where a social revolution has taken place. One might think that many would object to this conclusion, but only one reviewer did: Lawrence Stone. Stone characterized Moore's argument as "the Catharsis theory of history," and said he was "in serious disagreement" with Moore on "a basic judgment about the moral and practical justification for the use of violence." He argued against Moore that "such violence is . . . almost always self-defeating," citing the French Revolution as a case in which "the evil they did came out of the violence they employed."52 This is indeed exactly the


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opposite of Moore's conclusion that without a violent attack on the French landed aristocracy, democracy would never have had a chance. Moore's position is precisely that the "good" the revolutionaries did - removing the social obstacles to democratic modernization - came out of the violence they employed.53

Where Stone disagreed sharply with Moore's conclusions about the desirabili- ty of revolutionary violence, other critics accepted Moore's argument. Joseph Featherstone wrote that for the victors in social conflicts, "violence is the worst thing that can happen," but for the "victims of history, the worst thing would be the perpetuation of the present."54 Michael Rogin agreed with Moore that "the refusal to countenance apocalypic violence from below eventually produced fascism," writing that "authoritarian violence from above is the price paid for failing to overthrow pre-modern authorities,"" (Moore might reject the implication of irrationality in Rogin's adjective "apocalyptic," and argue that popular violence directed at exploiters often is characterized by a clear rationality.) C. Vann Woodward similarly accepted Moore's argument that those who attempted the "democratic parliamentary way" without social revolution "wound up at the mercies of the totalitarian fascists," and Gabriel Almond agreed that Moore's conclusion "is a most useful corrective for those of us who sometimes permit hope to carry us away."56

Almond criticized Moore for neglecting an "exploration of policy alternatives" in relation to "contemporary problems of modernization and demo- cratization."57 Moore's thesis does contain implications about alternatives facing developing countries; indeed it is surprising that Almond should miss what other reviewers made it a point to praise or attack. Joseph Featherstone, for instance, argued that Social Origins showed that "the picture of the world inside the heads of men like Dean Rusk is substantially inacurrate." Com- pared to those who "think of nations as dominos and communism as cancer," Moore's book is "a ray of light."58 Moore argues that democracy, where it exists in the world, was possible only as the result of violent social revolutions against the traditional agrarian elite. He compares India and China, and concludes that the cost of capitalist development has been economic stagna- tion and the "threat of death on a massive scale" from starvation and disease, while, at the same time, "democracy does not yet exist in the Indian countryside." "The only policy that seems to offer real hope," he concludes his 100-page analysis of India, "is a system approaching the communist model."59 Could Almond ask for a clearer "exploration of policy alternatives


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in dealing with contemporary problems of modernization and democratiza- tion?"

At the same time that he argues that only "the communist model" offers "real hope" for developing countries like India, Moore is not enthusiastic over the prospects of political freedom developing under such governments. Communism, like liberalism, he writes, has "started to turn into an ideology that justifies and conceals numerous forms of repression." The "common feature of both," he writes, is "repressive practice covered by talk of freedom;" "it is dubious in the extreme" that the opressive tendencies in either system will be overcome.60

3. The Case Studies

The simplest kind of critique of Moore's book is for a reviewer to pick the chapter on which he is a specialist, and attack Moore for ignoring recent monographs, for exaggerating or misunderstanding particular developments, for coming to the material with categories that don't necessarily fit it - and to conclude as the basis of one of the case studies that the book is seriously flawed, without considering the author's cornparative method or his thesis.

However, the increasing interest in comparative studies of development has made such critiques less tenable, and few in fact appeared in print. No doubt the practice of assigning books for review to writers with similar comparative interests played a role. Several reviewers in fact explicitly rejected the tactic: Lawrence Stone wrote, "it is very easy, but perhaps not very fruitful nor very generous, for the local expert to pick holes" in particular chapters, and Eric Hobsbawm commented, "it would be easy but pointless for the specialists to criticise any one of the case studies;" Hobsbawm explained that the comparative analyst "does not compete with the specialists, he exploits them and may have to question them."6' Nevertheless, the reviews sometimes con- tained criticism of specific interpretations in the case studies, and these deserve consideration.

Moore's chapter on the American Civil War evoked more discussion than any other single chapter, apparently because more of the reviewers were historians of the United States than of any other country.

Most frequently discussed was Moore's argument that the key to American democracy lies in the Civil War more than in the Revolution. Reinhard


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Bendix asked, "why discuss the social origin of American democracy by reference to the Civil War rather than the American revolution?" and David Lowenthal similarly suggested that Moore should have focused on the Revolutionary War and "the basic tenets of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution" if he wanted to understand American democracy.62 Perez Zagorin wrote that Moore's view of the Civil War as a bourgeois revolution was incompatible with his argument that "southern plantation slavery was economically compatible with Northern capitalism."63 Lawrence Stone asked whether, "if a reactionary coalition was formed after the failure of Reconstruction, the civil war was in fact not negotiable after all, if the results have been as decisive as Moore supposes."64

Other reviewers disagreed with these objections, restating Moore's case. Joseph Featherstone described Moore's American chapter as "persuasive but uneasy," arguing that "Moore has some difficulty fitting America into his scheme," and observing that "it is characteristic of his scholarship to lay weak cards on the table as well as strong."65 Michael Rogin's evaluation was more favorable; he found Moore's "bourgeois revolution" argument to be "bril- liantly relevant," arguing that "the Civil War delayed and weakened the foundations of an alliance which, . . . in a slave-owning country, would have been profoundly anti-democratic."66 C. Vann Woodward similarly emphasized the importance of Moore's argument that the Civil War was crucial, agreeing that it "broke the power of landed resistance to democratic and capitalist advance."67

Stanley Rothman also raised a number of objections to Moore's American chapter. Moore argued that industrialization under the auspices of a Prussian- styled reactionary coalition of northern industrialists and southern planters was an alternative to war in 1960; Rothman found this "absurd," and went on to argue that Reconstruction was not liquidated by such a reactionary coalition.68 He cited Genovese and Woodward as his authorities on these points; however, both have sided with Moore in subsequent publications.69 Finally Rothman questioned the analogy Moore draws between slave-owning planters and Prussian Junkers, arguing that class divisions among white southerners were less sharp than in Europe.70 Genovese objected to the same analogy, but on radically different grounds; he saw the southern planters as a clearly delineated social class, but more reactionary than the Junkers, who Genovese suggests were more modern than Moore indicates.71

David Lowenthal, writing in History and Theory, put forward the only


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objections to appear in print to Moore's favorable evaluation of the goals of Radical Reconstruction after the American Civil War - the abolition of the planters as a class and the transformation of former slaves into small farmers. Lowenthal spoke of "the immorality of destroying a white South," which had "an explicit constitutional right" to slavery. He asked whether American democracy "could have survived the moral shock" of a successful Radical Reconstruction: "that Moore does not even raise such questions is yet another sign of the great harm done to the critical faculties by an imprudent, doctrinaire, and even fanatical radicalism," Lowenthal writes.72 It is not clear whether the "fanatical radicalism" in question is that of the Radical Republi- cans, or Moore. Lowenthal's racism was an isolated phenomenon among Moore's critics.

Lee Benson's idiosyncratic criticism of Moore's American chapter was part of his project to discredit and eventually abolish "the established historiographic system" and to "reorient and reorganize the social sciences."73 Moore's chapter represents "the best work done to date on Civil War causation," Benson wrote; yet, to understand it "is to dismiss it as not worth serious consideration." It is significant primarily because the seriousness with which it has been taken indicates "something must be radically wrong with the historiographic system."74

Moore's basic problem in Benson's view is that the question he asked - "what caused the Civil War?" - is "useless." He should have asked "who" caused it.75 To the extent that Benson was able to "translate" Moore's arguments into answers to this question, it appears that the answer is "northern politicians." But, Benson asked, "what evidence did he offer . . . to support that claim? None."76 Moore, however, did not attempt to answer Benson's question; it seems unfair to criticize him for failing to provide evidence for an argument he did not make.

Aside from his American chapter, Moore's English case study was the only one which was commented on by more than two or three reviewers. Lawrence Stone argued that Moore's conclusions about the peasants and revolution did not fit the English case very well. Moore held that democratic modernization required the destruction of the peasantry as a social class - the elimination of agriculture as the primary activity of a majority of the population. And Moore described the enclosures of eighteenth-century England as a "social upheaval" which "destroyed the whole structure of English peasant society as embodied in the rural village." Stone wrote that


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this interpretation "flies in the face of modern scholarship," which has found that enclosures were a slow, "relatively equitable" process that "improved the rural standard of living by providing more food." Stanley Rothman also sided with the revisionists against Moore on the enclosure question.77

Hobsbawm, like Stone, observed that Moore's view on enclosures "runs counter to recent fashions in scholarship," but Hobsbawm found Moore's position "perfectly tenable," because Hobsbawm was not convinced that "recent fashions in scholarship" had resolved the issue - as Stone apparently was.78 The position Moore took seems to be a reasonable one, which recognized the revisionist evidence: "though the enclosures may not have been as brutal or as thorough as some earlier writers have led us to think." Moore writes, they "eliminated the peasant question from English politics" in a way that did not occur in Germany, France, Russia or China.79

Stone's second criticism of the English chapter was that during the Civil War "the English peasantry remained passive and quiescent," that after 1549 England did not have "constant, desperate, ferocious peasant revolts."80 Stone stated this as a disagreement with Moore, but in fact it is one of the problems Moore is investigating: he calls the peasants' role in the English civil war "trivial," rejects many explanations of that fact, and concludes that the most important reason for it was the rise of commercial agriculture before the war.8' However, Moore does conclude that "the process of modernization begins with peasant revolutions that fail," and Stone rightly suggested that this is not the way Moore explains modernization in England.82

J. H. Plumb argued that Moore "exaggerates the extent of bourgeois revolution in 17th century England, ... a great deal of land in 18th century England was still held for status rather than for profit."83 And Stone agreed that Moore "greatly exaggerates the degree to which English society . .. had gone over to a competitive, individualistic, commercialized value system" in the seventeenth century.84 Moore's argument, however, is not that the value system changed, but rather that the structure of social classes did: he rejects analysis of social change in terms of value systems.

There was little discussion or criticism of the French case study. Stone devoted one paragraph to various points of disagreement, and concluded that Moore's analysis "seems acceptable although one could quarrel over details."85 Rothman believed Moore underestimated the costs of the Revolu- tion and exaggerated its achievements.86 Zagorin charged that Moore "does


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nothing to explain why the French political order, in contrast to the English, was so unstable and divided against itself."87 Zagorin overlooked Moore's explanation: that the French revolution, instead of abolishing peasant holdings as the English Civil War did, consolidated peasant property, thereby strengthening a class which "cared next to nothing about democracy as such," at the same time that it "displayed strong anticapitalist tendencies," thus the revolution, by consolidating peasant property, left a "legacy (which) was a baneful one for a long time."88

One of the most important achievements of Moore's book was to bring together the study of both eastern and western history, apply a single theory to compare the development of the two "civilizations." Half of his case studies deal with non-Western societies - Japan, China, and India. These Asian case studies, in spite of their significance, recieved very little attention from the critics. G. D. Ness wrote that Moore was "insufficiently impressed with the development of Meiji agriculture and the emergence of new peasant capitalists" in nineteenth-century Japan; Rothman argued that Japanese industrialization was less repressive, and provided more popular benefits than Moore indicated. He also rejected Moore's argument that Japanese big business was one of the main supporters of fascism.89 On India, Ness termed Moore indicated. He also rejected Moore's argument that Japanese big which he worked." Ness also had some minor criticism of Moore's use of Indian statistics.90 Rothman found that Moore's account of Indian historical development neglected her political heterogeneity as well as her inadequate natural resources and "the problems of a tropical agriculture dependent on the monsoon." He also found Moore's discussion of the origins of caste "unsatisfactory," while Joseph Gusfield wrote in Social Forces that "it is too early to count India out."9'

The only criticism of the Chinese case study came from Rothman; he challenged Moore's characterization of Chiang Kai Shek as a "proto-fascist," preferring to classify Chiang as "authoritarian," "unattractive," and "wrong." Rothman also argued that the revenue problems of the Chinese state resulted from a reliance on "Confucian precepts" rather than political opposition from the gentry, as Moore held.92

Some reviewers criticized Moore's omission of smaller countries. Stein Rokkan wrote that Moore "has made no effort to account for politics at varying levels of size and economic strength; in fact he rejects this task as unworthy of his intellectual efforts."93 Stanley Rothman wrote that Moore's


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exclusion of Sweden and Norway was "problematical," and Edith M. Link wrote in the Journal of Economic History that "it is not clear" how the Moore thesis would explain Eastern Europe today.94

Moore anticipated these objections in his introduction; "smaller countries depend economically and politically on big and powerful ones," he wrote; thus "the decisive causes of their politics lie outside their own boundaries," and "their political problems are not really comparable to those of larger countries." His concern is with "innovation that has led to political power," not with "the spread and reception of institutions that have been hammered out elsewhere."95

Moore did not include chapters on Russia and Germany, which play a central role in his thesis, but few reviewers criticized these omissions. David Lowenthal pointed out that Moore devotes much less time to the differences and similarities of Russian and Chinese communism than he does to German and Japanese fascism; he rightly suggested that it is the Russian, more than the German case, that poses potential problems for Moore's thesis.96

Moore's exclusion of the Russian case certainly does not rest on his own ignorance; he spent the earlier years of his career studying Soviet politics.97 He writes in the preface to Social Origins that he "discarded" the draft of a Russian chapter "because first-rate accounts became available during the course of writing to which it was impossible for me to add anything."98 That is, the story of class relations in the Russian Revolution is told elsewhere. But in his bibliography, Moore lists only two books on Russia published since 1949: Franco Venturi's Roots of Revolution, and Jerome Blum's Lord and Peasant in Russia Neither deals with the twentieth century; neither answers what for Moore is the absolutely crucial question: what role did the industrial proletariat play in the Russian Revolution? If the revolution was based on an anti-capitalist urban proletariat, then it does not fit Moore's China-oriented type of "peasant revolution." Moore's assertion that the proletariat has never played a revolutionary anti-capitalist role must be abondoned, and some fourth type of modernization must be created to account for the Russian case.

The problem with the Russian case is to understand the relationship between the revolutionary leadership, the urban proleteriat, and the peasantry. Moore's French case study provides a key: in France, he wrote, the urban laborers "made" the bourgeois revolution, while "the peasants determined


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just how far it could go."99 This would seem to be a fruitful comparative hypothesis with which to approach the issue of the social class basis of the Russian revolution.

Moore's discussion of "Catonism" in his epilogue on reactionary ideology was a subject of criticism. David Lowenthal argued that Moore was "spared the necessity of investigating the truth of the various parts of Catonism . .. by his bias against it;" as a result, "the problem of the relation between the moral virues and human happiness . . . is entirely ignored." He went on to argue that "Cato was no Catonist in Moore's sense ... he harkened back to old Roman ideals,"'00 Richard Frank disagreed with Lowenthal: he found Moore's conception of "Catonism" to be "an insight of fundamental importance for understanding both the history and literature of the Augustan Age." Frank found evidence for Moore's argument that Catonism shared essential ideological elements with modern reactionary movements, citing translations of Cato published in Germany in 1935 as "reading matter . . . for the schools of the National Socialist state."'01

Few critics rose to defend quantitative history against Moore's charge that the use of statistics has tended to impose a conservative bias in recent history- writing.102 Only Lawrence Stone took up Moore's argument. The crux of Stone's defense of quantitative methods was his charge that Moore's "suspicious attitude" was "old-fashioned" - "it would be mere obscurantism to deny the role that statistics must increasingly play in social history," Stone wrote, arguing that Moore's position was "grist to the mill of the neo- Luddites of our time."103

In his appendix on statistical methods, Moore examines three important quantitative studies bearing on the major concerns of his own book, and criticizes each by refuting the author's argument with his own statistics. Moore's critical method here consists first of all of a closer, more careful reading of the quantitative evidence, rather than a rejection of it. Thus, where Brunton and Pennington studied Parliament during the Civil War, found no social differences between Royalists and Parliamentarians, and concluded that the war was not based on any broad social cleavage, Moore dug into their own tables to show that the developing capitalist areas had Parliamentarian representatives and the more backward areas had Royalists. This kind of refutation of Brunton and Pennington is not all "grist to the mill of the neo-Luddites of our time;" but as Featherstone observes, Moore's case is a "caution about the use (of statistics), not an argument against them.104


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Moore does go on to argue that "there may be a point at which quantitative evidence becomes inapplicable, where counting becomes the wrong procedure to use."105 The key question is obviously where the point is. Moore never says it is wrong to count members of Parliament during the Civil War, or to count victims of the Terror, or the number of small farms that survived enclosure, as long as that counting is done with an awareness of the nature of the evidence and the problem under investigation. His argument is that there are "qualitative changes from one type of social organization to another" - such as the transition from feudalism to capitalism - in which "there may be an upper limit to the profitable use of statistics."'06 Can Stone really believe these cautious and qualified statements amount to "obscurantism?"

4. Conclusion

The critical response to Moore's Social Origins may reveal as much about the present state of social science as it does about the book itself. While the critics accused Moore of an excessive emphasis on economic factors, the economists and economic historians virtually ignored the book; while Moore's case studies were all historical, national historians have tended to overlook them.'07 The academic group which showed the greatest interest was the new field of "comparative modernization," which consists mostly of sociologists and sociologically-oriented historians. Critics of this school were enthusiastic about the interdisciplinary and comparative aspect of the book, but tended not to discuss the theoretical issues presented by Moore, except for a vigorous defense of non-Marxist and anti-Marxist positions. In general the critics did not defend value neutrality, which Moore attacked, and were impressed by Moore's case for progressive violence, but eager to move on to other topics, instead of considering the implications of these issues. There were only a few committed cold warriors; Stanley Rothman described Moore as a former fellow traveller, and Gabriel Almond indicated that Moore was soft on communism, but these arguments were the exception rather than the rule.108

Moore has demonstrated that an analysis of changes in the structure of social classes is the most fruitful method by which to study comparative modernization. The Moore thesis stands - because the critics either did not attempt to make, or else did not succeed at making, arguments that would lead to its rejection. As the T.L.S. reviewer wrote, Moore's thesis "imposes limitations as well as offering opportunities. But the limitations appear fewer, and the opportunities greater, than in any alternative approach . . . this [is] a very important book indeed; it may even be a great one. "109


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Unfortunately, a large proportion of the critical remarks arose out of a misunderstanding of Moore's method. This suggests that a major weakness of Moore's book is that he did not spell out more clearly the distinction between his method of class analysis and the alternative positivist and empiricist explanations in terms of "factors" and "variables." In this respect his 1959 essay "Strategy in Social Science" is essential supplementary reading."0 As Gianfranco Poggi wrote in the British Joumal of Sociology, "Moore is not explicit enough ... about his theoretical assumptions and his conceptual apparatus;" it would have been helpful had he "clarified the theoretical significance" of this thesis."' It is unlikely that such a clarification of his method would have changed the minds of his positivist and empiricist critics, but at least the issues would be clearer.

Given that Moore has demonstrated the superiority of class analysis of comparative modernization, the question which remains is one of weaknesses in his method and conclusions, aspects in which the comparative class analysis of modernization could be strengthened. The least satisfactory case in Moore's book itself is the Russian one. If the Russian Revolution does not fit his model of peasant revolution, but is some kind of a proletarian movement, it may be necessary to modify the Moore thesis; thus an analysis of Russian developments along the lines set out in Social Origins would be one of the most important contributions to the comparative class analysis of modernization.'12

The analysis of European developments could be strengthened by making use of the Marxian concepts of the "feudal mode of production" and the "transition from feudalism to capitalism." Moore covers similar ground by analyzing how the links between lord and peasant in traditional society change with the introduction of commercial agriculture, but he does not begin with an explicit analysis of the feudal system of class relations." 3 Such a consideration would offer a clearer sense of the starting point of the process of change in Europe; it would also provide the opportunity for considering the relationship between demographic change and the social transformations Moore describes.

The comparative class analysis of modernization would be further strengthened by a fuller and more explicit consideration of the ideological aspect of these developments - of the manner in which classes become conscious of their positions, and of the terms in which the conflicts are fought out (or not fought out). Puritanism in seventeenth-century England, to make a familiar


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case, hardly enters into Moore's analysis - because it was an urban phenomenon, and he focuses on rural society - but it obviously plays a crucial role in shaping the self-conceptions and political goals of the popular revolutionary groups, a role which cannot be understood simply as "reflec- tion" or "superstructure." (Moore's appendix on "reactionary and revolutionary imagery" provides a significant contribution to the study of ideology in relation to the three types of modernization.)

It would be useful to analyze the histories of smaller countries from the perspective of comparative social class developments. For example, Michael Walzer has suggested that the Moore thesis be used to compare Greek with Yugoslav developments since World War II - by contrasting the "genuinely indigenous insurrection" which established socialist Yugoslavia with the "relatively sophistical intervention" of the British and Americans in Greece to defeat social revolution and lead Greece down the capitalist road. The question Walzer proposes is, "what price has Yugoslavia paid for destroying, and Greece for failing to destroy, the social and institutional basis of old authoritarianism and traditionalist mythology?"'114 It seems likely that a number of comparative studies along these lines would be possible - South- east Asia and Latin America being obvious choices.

Moore's concept of the "reactionary coalition" of a persistent traditional landed elite with a weak modernizing bourgeoisie is one of the richest aspects of his thesis; it deserves continuing attention. It should be particularly helpful in analyzing social and political developments in contemporary Latin America, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Perhaps it would be possible to distinguish variations in the "revolution from above" model to explain why, in some countries, the reactionary coalition remains in a traditional authoritarian phase, while in others it moves toward a fully developed fascism.

Many would appreciate seeing Moore's argument on the industrial proletariat spelled out in greater detail. That the most industrially developed countries have not had proletarian revolutions is a commonplace observation; it would be interesting to learn of Moore's evaluation of the relative importance of capitalist concessions and repression, of liberal hegemony, of reformism in the labor bureaucracy, and of Communist and Soviet strategy.

Finally, there is the question of the practical implications of Moore's thesis, of the relationship of the student of comparative class development to his own work. The Weltanschauung which informs Moore's work is closer to


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Weber's "heroic pessimism" than to Marx's optimistic attempts to unite theory with revolutionary practice.115 Moore works as a politically isolated individual; he is associated with no movement, intellectual or political. As Peter Nettl wrote, Moore is "a loner,"' "a radical of great and austere scholarship." 116 He sees his task not as a political one, but as a personal and intellectual one - to work until he can comprehend the whole; to find the facts, and then "face them like a man," however unpromising that may be. When he has accomplished that, he believes his work is done. Marx, of course, would have thought otherwise.

NOTES

1. Gabriel A. Almond, Review of Social Origins, American Political Science Review, 61 (1967), p. 769; Lee Benson, Toward the Scientific Study of History (Philadelphia, 1972), p. 243; David Lowenthal, Review Essay on Social Origins, History and Theory, 7 (1968), p. 296; C. E. Black, Review of Social Origins, American Histori- cal Review, 72 (1967), p. 1338. See also Stein Rokkan, "Models and Methods in the Comparative Study of Nation-Building," in T. J. Nossiter, et. al. (eds.). Imagina- tion and Precision in the Social Sciences (London, 1972), pp. 136-37; Lawrence Stone, "News from Everywhere," New York Review of Books, 9 (24 August 1967), p. 34; Lester H. Salamon, "Comparative History and the Theory of Moderniza- tion," World Politics, 23 (1970), p. 100; Reinhard Bendix, Review of Social Origins, Political Science Quarterly, 82 (1967), p. 626; Isaac Kramnik, "Reflections on Revolution: Definition and Explanation in Recent Scholarship," History and Theory, 11 (1972), p. 40.

2. Stanley Rothman, "Barrington Moore and the Dialectics of Revolution: An Essay Review," American Political Science Review, 64 (1970), p. 82-162. Rothman set the tone for his attack on Moore with an opening epigram taken from Through the Looking Class. Alice asks Humpty Dumpty "whether you can make words mean so many different things," to which comes the reply, "the question is, which is to be the master - that's all." Rothman thus suggested that Moore is a kind of authoritarian Marxist Humpty Dumpty to whom he seeks to play Alice.

3. Rothman, pp. 62, 63. 4. See also Eugene D. Genovese, "Marxian Interpretations of the Slave South," in In

Red and Black: Marxian Explorations in Southern and Afro-American History (New York, 1972), and E. J. Hobsbawm, "Karl Marx's Contribution to Historiogra- phy," in Robin Blackburn (ed.), Ideology in Social Science (London, 1972).

5. Karl Marx, The German Ideology; see also Genovese, pp. 322-25. Gianfranco Poggi provided a good brief summary of the conceptions that underlie Moore's method: "an intrinsically, objectively exploitative relationship typically binds the upper and lower strata; the maintainance of this relationship involves the systematic use of coercion; the critical process is that whereby the productive surplus yielded by the labor of the majority is extracted from it and allocated within the minority." Poggi, Review of Social Origins, British Journal of Sociology, 19 (1968), p. 216.


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6. Moore, Social Origins, pp. 428, 453-54. Reviewing J. H. Hexter's attack on Tawney for being an economic determinist, Moore writes, "this is simply untrue ... Tawney has written one of the best eloquent warnings against doctrinaire determinist history that has ever come to my attention," p. 8, n. 8. Rothman's critique of Moore simply reiteratcs the Hexter attack on Tawney.

7. Rothman, pp. 66, 67. 8. Stone, p. 34; Bendix, p. 626; Almond, p. 769; Benson, p. 243; Black, p. 1338. Dean

C. Tipps, "Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical Perspective," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 15 (1973), pp. 199-226, criticizes others but ignores Moore.

9. Rothman, p. 66-67. 10. Rothman, p. 65. 11. Moore, "Strategy in Social Science," Political Power and Social Theory (New York,

1956). 12. Moore, "Strategy," 13. Moore, "Strategy," p. 1 17. 14. Lester Salamon was similarly concerned with alternative 'cultural' explanations to

Moore's questions. He suggested it was not the persistence of a pre-modern elite that contributed to the rise of German fascism but rather the absence of "political skill" among the German bourgeoisie. If they had had a greater "capacity to organize," Salamon wrote, they would have been better able to resist the rise of fascism. But where does "political skill" come from? Salamon says from "cultural values," p. 19.

15. Moore, Social Origins, p. 486 n. Moore cites Weber's historical work favorably on at least three occasions: pp. 121, 172, 220.

16. Moore, Social Origins, p. 486. Poggi considered Moore's critique of cultural explanations to be his "outstanding contribution." Poggi, p. 217.

17. Rothman, p. 64. At every point where Rothman offers Weber as an alternative to Moore, he footnotes not Weber himself, but Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait - an introductory interpretation which many, including Moore, reject. See for instance H. Stuart Hughes' review in American Historical Review, 66 (1960), p. 154-55. Irving Zeitlin, in Ideology and Social Theory also argues against Bendix for the compatibility of Weber with Marx.

18. Talcott Parsons, The System of Modern Societies (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., (1972). 19. E. J. Hobsbawm, Review of Social Origins, American Sociological Review,

32 (1967), p. 36. 20. Genovese, pp. 345, 348. 21. Genovese, pp. 346, 347. 22. Genovese, p. 348. 23. Bendix, p. 626. 24. Michael Rogin, Review of Social Origins, Book Week, 4 ( 1 January 1967), p. 5. 25. Genovese, p. 353 n. 58. 26. C. Vann Woodward, "Comparative Political History," Yale Review, 56 (1967),

p. 453. 27. Lawrence Stone, Causes of the English Revolution (New York, 1972), p. 148 n. 5. 28. "Lord and Peasant," Times Literary Supplement,3434 (21 December 1967),

p. 1231. 29. Joseph Featherstone, "Modern Times," New Republic, 156 (7 January 1967),

p. 347. 30. J. H. Plumb, "How It Happened," New York Times Book Review, 171 (9 October

1966), p. 11. See also James H. Meisel, "Origins: A Dialogue. Tape-Recorded,


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Michigan Quarterly Review, 7 (1968), pp. 135-38; A. L. Stinchcombe, Review of Social Origins, Harvard Educational Review, 37 (1967), p. 291-92.

31. Hobsbawm, Review, p. 882. 32. Moore, Social Origins, p. 414. 33. However, Moore does not attempt to deal with the thorny issues in the Marxian

critique of the notion of "justice." See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cam- bridge, 1971); Allen W. Wood, "The Marxian Critique of Justice," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 (1972), pp. 244-82.

34. Moore, Social Origins, p. 508; Gareth Stedman Jones and Robin Blackburn criticize Moore for overlooking the connection between the imperialism he condemns and the bourgeois democracy he admires. Jones, "The History of U.S. Imperialism," in Blackburn, Ideology in Social Science, p. 219-20; 1 1.

35. Featherstone, pp. 34, 36. 36. Stone, New York Review, p. 32. 37. Stone, p. 32. 38. Stone, p. 32. 39. Black, p. 1338. 40. Stone, p. 32. 41. Furthermore, Stone does not seem to recognize that Rostow's "stages of economic

growth" notion is radically incompatible with Moore's version of Marxian class analysis of modernization, that Moore emphatically rejects the understanding of industrialization in terms of the one-dimensional concept of "take-off:" that is the whole point in developing a theory of different types of modernization.

42. Michael Walzer, "The Condition of Greece," Dissent, 14 (1967), p. 429. 43. N. Gordon Levin Jr., "Paths to Industrial Modernity," Dissent, 14 (1967), p. 241. 44. Black, p. 1338. 45. Moore, Social Origins, p. 414. 46. Levin, p. 241. 47. Moore, Social Origins, p. 438. 48. Rothman. 49. Featherstone, p. 34. 50. Moore, Social Origins, p. 470. 51. Moore, Social Origins, pp. 437, 442. Rothman also criticized Moore for failing to

see the "irony and "genuine tragedy" in the historical developments he describes; Rothman says Moore lacks the sense that history consists of "tragic encounters among men equally caught up in their own limitations." (p. 81) I would agree that Moore's book does lack this kind of ahistorical pseudo-significant thought.

52. Stone, p. 34. Stone's criticism of Moore is reviewed in Henry Bienen, Violence and Social Change (Chicago, 1968), p. 79.

53. At the same time that Stone deplores Moores' defense of revolutionary violence by arguing that such violence is "evil," Stone characterizes German fascism as a "short-term transition phase." Some might see an inconsistency in Stone's evaluation of revolutionary violence in comparison to reactionary violence.

54. Featherstone, p. 43. 55. Rogin, p. 5. 56. Woodward, p. 453; Almond, p. 769. 57. Almond, p. 770. 58. Featherstone, p. 37; see also Werner L. Gundersheimer, "Journey to Synthesis,"

Reporter, 36 (9 March 1967), p. 59; Gilbert Shapiro, Review of Social Origins, American Sociological Review, 32 (1967), p. 820; Black, p. 1338. On the other


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hand, Rothman believes the Moore thesis "is not applicable... to much of the 'Third World.' " Rothman, p. 61-62.

59. Moore, Social Origins, pp. 408-10. Kramnik observes that Moore is virtually alone among theorists of modernization in advocating this position.

60. Moore, Social Origins, p. 508. 61. Stone, p. 32; Hobsbawm, p. 82. A similar view was expressed by Gundersheimer,

p. 58; see also Review of Social Origins, Virginia Quarterly Review, 43 (1967), p. cliv.

62. Bendix, p. 627; Lowenthal, p. 267. A similar view was expressed by Joseph Gus- field, Review of Social Origins, Social Forces,46 (1967), p. 114.

63. Perez Zagorin, "Theories of Revolution in Contemporary Historiography," Political Science Quarterly, 88 (1973), p. 41.

64. Stone, p. 34. 65. Featherstone, p. 34. 66. Rogin, p. 5: 67. Woodward, p. 451. 68. Rothman, p. 73. 69. Genovese; Woodward. 70. Rothman, p. 72. 71. Genovese's criticism of Moore's American chapter was discussed above in the

section on Moore's method. 72. Lowenthal, p. 272. 73. Benson, p. 228-29. 74. Benson, pp. 228, 247. 75. Benson. p. 234. 76. Benson, p. 242. 77. Stone, pp. 21, 33; Rothman, pp. 67-69. 78. Hobsbawm. 79. Moore. p. 426. 80. Stone, p. 33. 81. Moore, pp. 453, 477. 82. Moore, p. 453. 83. Plumb, p. 11. 84. Stone, p. 32. 85. Stone, p. 33. 86. Rothman, p. 70-71. 87. Zagorin, p. 41. 88. Moore, p. 107-08. 89. Gayl D. Ness, Review of Social Origins, American Sociological Review, 32 (1967),

p. 819; Rothman, p. 77. 90. Ness, p. 819. 91. Rothman, p. 79; Gusfield, p. 115. See also H. D. Harootunian, Review of Social

Origins; Journal of Asian Studies, 27 (1968), pp. 372-74. 92. Rothman, p. 74-75. 93. Rokkan, p. 141. 94. Edith M. Link, Review of Social Origins, Journal of Economic History, 27 (1967),

p. 261. 95. Moore, p. xiii. Walzer's success at using the Moore thesis to analyze Greek politics

should be recalled in this regard; see above. 96. Lowenthal, p. 260. 97. Moore, Soviet Politics: The Dilemma of Power; USSR: Terror and Progress.


330

98. Moore, p. xii. 99. Moore, p. 110. I am indebted to Juan Corradi for this argument.

100. Moore, p. 410; Lowenthal, p. 275. 101. Richard Frank, "Augustan Elegy and Catonism," in Aufstieg und Niedergang der

romischen Welt, vol. II, p. 2. (1974). 102. Gilbert Shapiro found that Moore's "minor disgressions" on statistical studies

"increase confusion" and "disorient the reader;" Gabriel Almond considered Moore's "polemics with the statisticians" to be "often unessential and diverting," but unlike Shapiro he found Moore to "offer a useful corrective to the quantitative theory of know ledge so influential today." Joseph Featherstone wrote, "Moore's careful work is a standing rebuke to social scientists who imagine that quantitative data, like virtue, is its own reward." Shapiro, p. 820; Almond, p. 768; Featherstone, p. 36.

103. Stone, p. 34. 104. Featherstone, p. 36. 105. Moore, p. 519. 106. Moore, p. 519. 107. For instance, Colin Lucas' review essay on the social interpretation of the French

Revolution discussed dozens of obscure articles but ignored Moore's chapter on France: "Nobles, Bourgeois and the Origins of the French Revolution," Past and Present, 60 (1973), pp. 84-126.

108. Rothman, p. 81. When Moore objected in print to Rothman's characterization, Rothman replied that his source of information on Moore's "fellow-travelling" was "my memory of classes of his which I attended in the early 1950s, in which he indicated what his sympathies had been earlier." (p. 182); Almond, p. 769.

109. Times Literary Supplement, p. 1231. 110. Moore, "Strategy." Poggi, p. 217. Along these lines, see Leopold Haimson. 111. Poggi, p. 217. 1 12. Along these lines, see Leopold Haimson. 113. I am indebted to Robert Brenner for this analysis. 114. Walzer, p,429. Walzer's own view is that "Yugoslavia is today the better society, or

at least the one for which we can entertain higher hopes." 115. Wolfgang Mommsen, "Max Weber's Political Sociology and his Philosophy of World

History," in Dennis Wrong (ed.), Max Weber (Englewood Cliffs, 1970), pp. 183- 94. Moore emphatically rejects the narrow liberal nationalism and limited conception of democracy that characterized Weber's political writing, particularly in the World War I period.

116. Peter Nettl, "Return of the Intellectual," New Statesman, 73 (6 October 1967), p. 438..

Theory and Society, 2 (1975) 301-330 ? Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Amsterdam - Printed in The Netherlands


Article Contentsp. 301p. 302p. 303p. 304p. 305p. 306p. 307p. 308p. 309p. 310p. 311p. 312p. 313p. 314p. 315p. 316p. 317p. 318p. 319p. 320p. 321p. 322p. 323p. 324p. 325p. 326p. 327p. 328p. 329p. 330

Issue Table of ContentsTheory and Society, Vol. 2, No. 3, Autumn, 1975Front Matter [pp. 388 - 388]Towards a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism [pp. 287 - 300]The Barrington Moore Thesis and Its Critics [pp. 301 - 330]Changes in the Social Definition of Early Childhood and the New Forms of Symbolic Violence [pp. 331 - 350]Hedonism, Incest and the Problem of Difference [pp. 351 - 374]Review ArticlePhilosophy as Politics [pp. 375 - 387]Theodor W. Adorno: Theoretician through Negations [pp. 389 - 400]The Importance of the Romantic Myth for the Left [pp. 401 - 414]

Book Reviewsuntitled [pp. 415 - 418]untitled [pp. 418 - 421]untitled [pp. 421 - 423]untitled [pp. 423 - 426]

Back Matter [pp. 427 - 430]

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