North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Chair: Nicolette D’Angelo

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Contents

Letter from the Chair…….………………………...……………………...…..3

Introduction to NATO.….………………………...……………………...…..3

Topic A: Hybrid Warfare in the Baltic………….....……………..……………4

History of the Topic…..…………..………..……………………….……….…………6

Current Status/Key Issues……………………….……………..…………...…………9

Country Policy.....…………………………………………….……………………….13

Keywords……………………………………....………………...…………….…..….15

Questions for Consideration………..…………….………………...…….……….…...15

Bibliography……….................……………………………..……………………...…...17

Topic B: Counter-terrorism.……………....…………………..……………..19 History of the Topic..……………………..……………………….……….…………19 Current Status………………………………………………………………………....23 Country Policy.….…………………...……………...…..……………………………..27 Keywords………………………………………………………………………….......28 Questions for Consideration...........…………….……………………..………………..30 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………..30

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Letter from the Chair

Dear Delegates,

On behalf of Princeton and the International Relations Council, welcome to

PMUNC 2016! My name is Nicolette D’Angelo, and I’m a sophomore from West Milford,

New Jersey majoring in the English department. My main focus of study is poetics and

antiquity, so I’m also pursuing certificates in Creative Writing and Humanistic Studies. And

while I did Model UN all throughout high school, this is my first time staffing a college

conference. It's both an honor and dream-come-true to be your chair!

When I'm not stalking Best Delegate, I'm also involved on campus editing the

Nassau Literary Review, singing with the Chapel Choir and working for the Princeton

Writing Center. Other hobbies include blogging, reading the Nass Weekly over brunch and

being woefully overdressed for class. But enough about me - I'm so excited to meet you all

and share our first PMUNCs together!

That said, if you have any questions about this background guide - or about MUN,

the committee or anything in general - please do not hesitate to contact me. I look forward

to seeing all of you in action very soon!

Sincerely,

Nicolette D’Angelo

ndangelo@princeton.edu

Class of 2019

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Introduction to NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a military and political alliance

made up of 28 member states throughout Europe and the Americas. First established on

April 4th, 1949 with the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO’s creation at the beginning of the

Cold War was an attempt at balancing power between the East and West. More specifically,

the rise of Soviet Union following WWII – and the widespread fear of the communism that

came without it, especially in Europe – necessitated some form of intergovernmental action

that would provide for the mutual protection of several allied nations in the North Atlantic.

As such, NATO’s primary purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members

through its most unique, enduring principle – the principle of collective defense.

In the North Atlantic Treaty, collective defense is established in Article 5, wherein it is

stated that “an armed attack against one or more [members]… shall be considered an attack

against them all.”1 However, Article 5 had never been formally invoked until the 9/11

terrorist attacks against the United States. In so doing, the North Atlantic Council – the

governing body of the organization – exhibited solidarity toward the US, as well as its power

to engage in collective action against counterterrorism. Among other things, this action

involved radar aircraft patrol, naval standing forces and efforts to “enhance intelligence-

sharing and cooperation, both bilaterally and in appropriate NATO bodies.”

The cooperation and sharing of NATO’s military assets follows both a civilian and a

military structure. Of the former, each member state has at its disposal a delegation of

permanent representatives, all of which are overseen by the NATO headquarters in Brussels.

1 "The North Atlantic Treaty." NATO. Accessed September 29, 2016.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.

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Of the latter, NATO military operations oversee forces placed under the organization’s

jurisdiction by individual member states, along with associated command and control

structures. These forces are available for NATO operations once they meet a specific set of

readiness criteria, as well as rules of deployment that vary from country to country.

In civilian and military matters alike, however, a consensus is taken by common consent.

Since 1949, this principle of consensus has existed at every committee level, meaning that

any “NATO decision” passed is an expression of the collective will of the 28 sovereign

states participating in the Alliance.2 This system is interesting politically – and rather

idiosyncratic on the international stage – seeing as consensus decision-making means there is

no voting within NATO. Consultations instead take place until a course of action that is

acceptable to all is agreed upon. Surprisingly, this negotiation process happens rapidly since

members consult each other on a regular basis. They often can anticipate each other's

positions as a result.

2 Nato. "Consensus Decision-making at NATO." NATO. March 14, 2016. Accessed September 29, 2016.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49178.htm.

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Topic A: Hybrid Warfare in the Baltic

NATO was originally established to balance power between the Soviet Union and North

Atlantic nations, and today, many of the Alliance’s recent actions still concern the relationship

of its member states to Russia. Especially in the wake of Vladimir Putin’s aggressive foreign

policy and the annexation of Ukraine, Russia’s use of unconventional tactics has been a

controversial military Frankenstein – otherwise known as hybrid warfare, its tactics of

international conflict (for which there is no universal definition) have only further

complicated the already-delicate geopolitical status of the Baltic region. And in NATO’s

tenure of dealing with this threat, hybrid warfare increasingly has delegitimized the Alliance’s

usual posture of deterrence.

Deterrence

Historically, deterrence has always been a core element of NATO’s collective defense

strategy. It can be defined as “the threat of force in order to discourage an opponent from

taking an unwelcome action.”3 The Alliance or a member state typically can deter an

adversary in two ways: by the threat of retaliation (deterrence by punishment) and/or by

rejecting the validity of the adversary’s war aims (deterrence by denial).4 In both cases,

deterrence seems to be a matter of displaying military prowess – of putting one’s power “on

display.” In theory, then, deterrence should never fail to be effective according to a cost-

benefit analysis of both parties’ security and interests: if all parties were to act “rationally,”

3 Collective Defence - Article 5." NATO. March 22, 2016. Accessed September 29, 2016.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm. 4 Ibid.

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belligerence would often seem to be an unattractive option, especially when nuclear power is

involved.

Or at least one would think. Unfortunately, in the 21st century, conventional deterrence

techniques have often failed, especially in cases of hybrid warfare – that is, when an adversary

incorporates “a tailored mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and

criminal behavior in the same time and battlespace to obtain [a group’s] political objectives,”

among other things.5

History of Hybrid Warfare

For NATO to both understand the threat of hybrid warfare and make strides to

neutralize it peacefully, it is necessary to fully explore how this tricky combination of

conventional and irregular war strategies has been used throughout history. In other words,

the serious security challenge now called hybrid warfare is not nearly as new as it seems.

As early as the Peninsular War in 1807, states have deployed hybrid warfare in the

following forms – through the use of regular and irregular forces, strong links with national

or transnational criminal groups, unclear distinction between civilians and soldiers, and finally,

military activities in the situation when war is actually not declared.6 For example, just as

regular militiamen joined forces with Spanish guerillas under the British Army in the

Napoleonic Wars, today’s hybrid tactics also involve a broad array of military, political,

5 By History: Why Sweden and Finland Will Not Be More than NATO Partners. "On Not-So-New

Warfare: Political Warfare vs Hybrid Threats - War on the Rocks." July 28, 2015. Accessed September 29, 2016.

http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/on-not-so-new-warfare-political-warfare-vs-hybrid-threats/. 6 Šešelgytė, Margarita. "Can Hybrid War Become the Main Security Challenge for Eastern Europe?"

October 17, 2014. Accessed September 29, 2016. http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/can-hybrid-war-

become-the-main-security-challenge-for-eastern-europe_2025

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economic, information, and – now – even cyber instruments used by actors, be them nation-

states or non-state actors without strict allegiance to any one state or sovereign body.

This brings several salient examples of hybrid warfare to our attention, such as the 2006

war between Israel and the Hezbollah; the September 11th attacks; and the 2014 Islamic

State’s advance into Iraq.

The 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict is a well-trod example of hybrid warfare for

several reasons. From 2000 to 2006, the Hezbollah – a militant Shia group supported by Iran,

also known as the “Lebanese Party of God” – conducted over 200 attacks on the Israeli

Defense Forces, culminating in a proxy war in Lebanon lasting 34 days. The Hezbollah was

surprisingly successful in the efficacy of its regular troops, guerrilla forces and mass-

communication disruption efforts – although Israel was ultimately able to deter further

Hezbollah attacks after the war, the group’s successful terrorist cells, Security Apparatus and

military units (all supported by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards) arguably make it the best

indicator of the direction of future hybrid conflicts, according to political theorist Marcin

Andrzej Piotrowski. He points out the Hezbollah’s success in its “simultaneous use of a

conventional arsenal, irregular forces and guerrilla tactics, psychological warfare, terrorism

and even criminal activities, with support from a multi-dimensional organisation and capable

of integrating very different sub-units, groups or cells into one united, large force.”7 As a

result, the Hezbollah has become a model not only for other terrorist groups, like Al Qaeda,

but also for actors employing hybrid strategies. To again quote Piotrowski,

“the Hezbollah case is of clear relevance to debates about the adaptation of NATO to

the new threats and hybrid warfare demonstrated by Russia in its conflict with

Ukraine… The Russian combination of well-trained and organised forces, support

7 Piotrowski, Marcin Andrzej. "Hezbollah: The Model of a Hybrid Threat." March 2, 2015.

https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=19320.

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with weapons and equipment, psychological warfare and cyberwarfare … might

transform them into a very dangerous and long-term threat.”

Knowing this – and that, at its prime, the Hezbollah had within its capacities a missile arsenal

larger than all NATO countries combined, except the US – reminds that deterrence is no

longer a standalone method for NATO to ensure the strategic security of its members against

state and non-state actors alike.

Current Status

Recent developments in the deployment of hybrid warfare worldwide have largely

confirmed that NATO’s leverage and deterrence strategy must now adapt to transcend

military means alone. This has been especially true in the case of North Atlantic relations with

Eastern Europe, particularly with Russia. The ongoing crisis in eastern Ukraine is thus

considered one of the greatest threats to the western world and the alliance of nations within

NATO, largely due to Russia’s illegal military intervention into Crimea as well as the support

it gives to separatist sentiment in the area.

More specifically, the situation of hybrid warfare in Ukraine is comprised of several

simultaneously-occurring forms of antagonism: guerrilla and conventional warfare, as well as

economic, cyber and information warfare. It is important to note that this conflict is not

fueled by the pursuit of Ukrainian territory, but rather for the ends of exacerbating

preexisting weaknesses in the Ukrainian government and ultimately delegitimizing it.

Key Issues

Legal Intervention in Eastern Europe

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First and foremost, NATO is tasked with protecting the sovereignty and legal

autonomy of its member states in/around Eastern Europe from Russian hybrid warfare.

Those at risk today primarily include Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Estonia,

Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Albania, otherwise known as the member

states who joined the Alliance in 1999 and 2004 after previously holding membership in the

rival Warsaw Pact. What this means is that, while Ukraine does not hold membership in

NATO formally or otherwise, Russia’s hybrid warfare with and intervention into the nation

have direct ramifications into the wellbeing of NATO of nearby member states and their

western allies.

The successful March 2014 referendum in Crimea to join Russia was the legal pretext

of Russia’s hybrid warfare in the region. According to the referendum results, Crimeans

supported joining Russia by 96.77% of the vote with an 83.1% voter turnout.8 There have

been multilateral efforts to try and declare the referendum invalid in 2015, such as through

the EU and with a UN resolution, however Russia has vetoed these documents. Rather than

discarding the referendum results, Russia has used them as legal means for annexation.

Ethnic Divisions in the Baltics

A related broad security threat is the persistence of ethnic minority divisions in the

region. Generally speaking, there are four sizeable groups to consider: first, the largest ethnic

minority in every Baltic State is Russians; the second is Poles; and the third and fourth largest

are Belarussians and Ukrainians respectively.9 Especially in Estonia and Latvia, Russian

8 Seyfettin, Mehmet. "Hybrid Warfare Studies and Russia’s Example in Crimea." 2015.

http://dergipark.ulakbim.gov.tr/gav/article/viewFile/5000159909/5000144268 9 Zvidrins, Peteris. "Changes of Ethnic Composition in the Baltic States." Centre of Demography,

University of Latvia. http://epc2008.princeton.edu/papers/80280

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authorities have accused the Baltic countries of “denying their ‘compatriots’ human rights,

discriminating them on the basis of ethnic or linguistic differences, and restricted their civil

freedoms,” while, at the same time, endorsing a pro-Kremlin political party claiming to act in

the Lithuanian Poles’ favor.10 These machinations have only exacerbated existing tensions

among the different ethnic groups of the Baltic in the interest of advancing Russian interests

within Baltic parliaments and municipal councils.

Military Provocations

In addition to the prolonged threat of conventional military attack, Russia has repeatedly

provoked Baltic governments by air policing their territories, conducting multiple military

exercises, and arresting an Estonian security officer, among other things, thereby obstructing

domestic security in the Baltic, as well as international infrastructural endeavors (ex. the

NordBalt electricity link). Another hybrid military threat is the phenomenon of “little green

men,” or the unmarked Russian soldiers who are smuggled into Baltic territories.

As one of many countermeasures, NATO too has employed air policing as a “smart

defense” essential for safety in aviation and for the Allies. Especially since the 2014

annexation, extra air policing missions have been deployed as part of a NATO Quick Reaction

Alert (QRA) in order to guard the airspace over Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. However,

questions of missile defense system placement,

territorial disputes between the Baltic States and

Russia, and military training all bear the risk of

provoking Russia; meanwhile, economically, a

10 Mickus, Justinas. "Baltic Security Overview: A Short Overview." Eastern European Studies Centre.

September 2016. http://www.eesc.lt/uploads/Baltic-Security-Overview-EESC.pdf

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problem persists in that long-term prospects for the mission are dependent on increased

financial contributions and defense expenditures from struggling beneficiary states.

“The Weaponization of Information”

Another unique aspect of this ongoing crisis is Russia’s capacity for utilizing the

informational dimensions of hybrid warfare. NATO and much of the global community have

recognized that, through a remarkable capacity for propaganda, Russia has “spread lies among

its people and constructed alternative narratives and realities in cyber space which in turn

amplify the conflict.”11 Propaganda efforts of this kind – more specifically, shutting down

independent press, sponsoring rallies, referendum advertisements, and pushing misinformation

as well as oversimplified stories online and on television12 – all have been especially effective in

Russia and Crimea, where the public has limited exposure to alternative media outlets and

sources of information. Most notably, Russian TV channels in the Baltics and in Russia and

various pages, groups, and personal profiles on social media platforms such as Facebook have

also been successfully subversive.13

11 Ibid. 12 Yuhas, Alan. "Russian Propaganda over Crimea and the Ukraine: How Does It Work? | Alan Yuhas and

Raya Jalabi." The Guardian. March 17, 2014. Accessed September 29, 2016.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/17/crimea-crisis-russia-propaganda-media. 13 Lucas, Edward. "The Coming Storm: Baltic Sea Security Report." June 2015.

http://cepa.org/sites/default/files/styles/medium/Baltic%20Sea%20Security%20Report-%20(2).compressed.pdf

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Beyond the annexation of Crimea after the 2014 referendum, the consequences of this

“weaponization of information” has led NATO to consider "strategic narratives that lead to

aligned words and actions ... appropriately adapted and culturally attuned to resonate with all

audiences and counter opposing narratives."14 In other words, it is important that the Alliance

avoids countering propaganda with more propaganda.

Similarly, NATO’s prime directive is not to isolate or weaken Russia. Since signing the

Founding Act of Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security in 1997, and organizing the

NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002, the Alliance is committed to working together with

Russia in areas of mutual interest -- from counter-terrorism to mechanisms for emergency

planning – all in the service of ensuring security and peace for a free Europe.

Country Policy

Note: These policies often vary even within regional blocs, especially given the lack of both

unilateral and multilateral stances on the topic of unconventional tactics.

1) The Baltic States

The majority of government responses to Russian hybrid warfare in the Baltic have been

unilateral. Multilaterally, a defining achievement on the part of NATO was establishing the

NATO Centers of Excellence in Estonia and in Lithuania, thereby enabling better-coordinated

European action (especially in the realms of energy and cyber-security) as well as giving the

14 Emmott, Robin. “NATO May Start Using Military Tactics to Try and Combat Russian Propoganda.” January 27, 2016. Accessed September 30, 2016. http://www.businessinsider.com/r-nato-looks-to-combat-russias-information-weapon-document-2016-1

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Baltics a platform to speak about hybrid threats.15 However, these nations continue to feel

deep insecurity in the face of hybrid threats (given their failure to neutralize Russian threats in

the past) and know that any marked attempts to build up their defensive capacities will

necessarily result in a negative military response from Moscow. As such, a security dilemma is

delaying multilateral action – which, coupled with ethnic issues, economic insecurities, unequal

access to EU resources, and suspicious attitudes toward politicians and national parties in each

nation – all combine to create a geopolitically destabilizing and disillusioned attitudes in the

Baltic region as a whole.

Policy recommendations have pointed to utilizing the OSCE (the Organization for

Security & Cooperation in Europe) in order to improve conflict prevention mechanisms,

border security management, combatting propaganda and corruption, and foster the inclusion

of minorities/easing ethnic tensions, in addition to NATO and the EU.

2) Russia

As the purported perpetrator of these hybrid threats, Russia has an interest in building their

own military capacities, indirectly occupying Baltic territories and borders, as well as gaining

Kremlin support in the Baltic through asymmetrical military means, propaganda and cyber

warfare, especially in ways that further exploit existing ethnic minority divisions.

Interestingly, Russia is an active member of the OSCE, which “has largely been viewed

positively by the Kremlin (contrary to NATO or the EU)” although the organization

“grants broad powers to its Secretariat on technical cooperation issues.”16

3) Western NATO Nations

15 Mickus, Justinas. "Baltic Security Overview: A Short Overview." Eastern European Studies Centre.

September 2016. http://www.eesc.lt/uploads/Baltic-Security-Overview-EESC.pdf 16 Ibid.

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While a united position on hybrid warfare has yet to be established by NATO member nations

such as the United States and the United Kingdom, it is always the vested interest of these

states to provide for the collective security and defense of other Alliance members in such a

way that prevents the use of Article V, the collective defence clause. Nonetheless, more

resources and a larger security presence has been demanded of these nations by the Baltic

bloc.

It is also relevant to note that several NATO states in the West are part of intergovernmental

insitutions and coalitions, and have various degrees of leverage in those settings (for example,

the EU and the OSCE).

4) East Asia

In recent years, China has also turned to tactics of hybrid warfare in order to enervate Western

alliances elsewhere in Asia, thereby expanding its own geopolitical influence. Like many

Russians who argue that Crimea should remain under Russia’s jurisdiction for historical,

cultural and geopolitical reasons, many Chinese citizens have expressed similar territorial

grievances and expansionist ambitions.17

Key Terms

Hybrid Warfare

Deterrence Strategy

Article V/Collective Defence

Cyber Warfare/Propaganda

Ethnic Minority Divisions

17 Weitz, Richard. “The US Faces Rival Powers Waging Hybrid Warfare.” YaleGlobal.edu. January 12, 2016. Accessed July 2016. http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/us-faces

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Security Dilemma

Multilateral VS Unilateral Action

Non-State Actors

The Kremlin

Annexation

Little Green Men

Questions to Consider

There is currently no agreed-upon definition for hybrid warfare. How should it be

defined internationally?

To what extent has your country experienced hybrid warfare and/or its consequences?

How can the security of the Baltic be reconciled with the collective security of NATO?

What limits exist in NATO’s jurisdiction?

How should political disturbances in Ukraine/Crimea be addressed by the Alliance,

given that Ukraine is not a member state?

How should propaganda and cyber warfare be thwarted on an international scale?

How should non-state actors be addressed in their role in this conflict, if at all?

What readiness action plans can be put into effect during ‘peacetime’ or proxy wars, if

at all?

How should NATO utilize its standing forces/other military means in relation to the

Baltic situation? How will this (or any other resolutions) be funded?

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Consider revisiting the North Atlantic Treaty once more. What changes could be made

to the existing institutional framework of the Alliance to better adapt it to the threats

of hybrid warfare?

Bibliography

By History: Why Sweden and Finland Will Not Be More than NATO Partners. "On Not-

So-New Warfare: Political Warfare vs Hybrid Threats - War on the Rocks." July 28, 2015.

Accessed September 29, 2016. http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/on-not-so-new-warfare-

political-warfare-vs-hybrid-threats/.

"Collective Defence - Article 5." NATO. March 22, 2016. Accessed September 29, 2016.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm.

Emmott, Robin. “NATO May Start Using Military Tactics to Try and Combat Russian

Propoganda.” January 27, 2016. Accessed September 30, 2016.

http://www.businessinsider.com/r-nato-looks-to-combat-russias-information-weapon-

document-2016-1

Nato. "Consensus Decision-making at NATO." NATO. March 14, 2016. Accessed

September 29, 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49178.htm.

Lucas, Edward. "The Coming Storm: Baltic Sea Security Report." June 2015.

http://cepa.org/sites/default/files/styles/medium/Baltic%20Sea%20Security%20Report-

%20(2).compressed.pdf

Mickus, Justinas. "Baltic Security Overview: A Short Overview." Eastern European

Studies Centre. September 2016. http://www.eesc.lt/uploads/Baltic-Security-Overview-

EESC.pdf

Piotrowski, Marcin Andrzej. "Hezbollah: The Model of a Hybrid Threat." March 2, 2015.

https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=19320.

Seyfettin, Mehmet. "Hybrid Warfare Studies and Russia’s Example in Crimea." 2015.

http://dergipark.ulakbim.gov.tr/gav/article/viewFile/5000159909/5000144268

"The North Atlantic Treaty." NATO. Accessed September 29, 2016.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.

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Weitz, Richard. “The US Faces Rival Powers Waging Hybrid Warfare.” YaleGlobal.edu.

January 12, 2016. Accessed July 2016. http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/us-faces

Yuhas, Alan. "Russian Propaganda over Crimea and the Ukraine: How Does It Work? |

Alan Yuhas and Raya Jalabi." The Guardian. March 17, 2014. Accessed September 29, 2016.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/17/crimea-crisis-russia-propaganda-media.

Zvidrins, Peteris. "Changes of Ethnic Composition in the Baltic States." Centre of

Demography, University of Latvia.

Šešelgytė, Margarita. "Can Hybrid War Become the Main Security Challenge for Eastern

Europe?" October 17, 2014. Accessed September 29, 2016.

http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/can-hybrid-war-become-the-main-security-

challenge-for-eastern-europe_2025

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Topic B: Counter-terrorism

Introduction

Countering terrorism is, and always has been, an enduring security priority for NATO

and its constituent nations. From the 1972 hostage situation at the Olympic games in Munich,

to the infamous Lockerbie attack that killed over 200, terrorism has remained embedded in

the psyche of the western world.18 However, although the intimidating specter of terrorism

has always remained a constant, such cannot be said for the the structure, tactics, and goals of

the organizations that perpetrate terrorism. In the past two decades, the nature of terrorism

has evolved dramatically. Modern terrorist organizations are decentralized, diffuse, and play

by a different set a rules than those of the 20th and early 21st centuries. In order to combat

these emergent threats, NATO will need to entirely rethink the way it approaches terrorism.

The organization will need to develop a different set of principles and strategies to ensure that

NATO remains a relevant and effective security coalition for years to come.

History of the Topic

The word terrorism dates back to the mid-18th century, when Maxmilien Robespierre

instigated a “Reign of Terror” immediately following the French revolution. Robespierre

believed in the use of terrorism as a way to carry out dramatic societal reforms.19 This idea of

using violence as a form of ideological control was novel at the time, and laid the basis for the

modern conception of terrorism.

However, terrorism under Robespierre’s formulation is carried out by a state actor,

whereas modern perpetrators of terrorism are overwhelmingly non-state actors. This

18 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Pan Am flight 103 disaster", accessed October 01, 2016, https://www.britannica.com/event/Pan-Am-flight-103-disaster. 19

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transition from state to non-state actors did not occur until the mid 20th century, when ethnic

nationalism, combined with the rejection of European colonialism and the rise of differing

ideologies such as communism led to the increasing use of guerilla tactics and other forms of

rebellious violence. For example, the separatist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) employed

terrorist tactics in Turkey in an attempt form an independent Kurdish State. The Irish

Republican Army (IRA) carried out bombing and assassinations in Ireland with the purpose

of separating from Great Britain, and the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers used suicide bombings

to wage an ethnic war against the incumbent Sri Lankan government.20 It was clear that

terrorism had evolved beyond its roots in the 18th century. It had become an instrument for

political usurpation; no longer a tool to be used by the state, but rather a tool to be used

against it.

Terrorism took on another new dimension with the advent of mass-air travel in the

mid 19th century. The 1960’s saw the rise of new forms of terrorism such as hijackings,

airplane bombings, and attacks on foreign territory. Terrorist organizations were no longer

relegated to the domestic affairs of any individual country: their attacks were often carried out

overseas, and with motivations that transcended national boundaries. The infamous Munich

Massacre encapsulated this transformation perfectly. In the midst of the 1972 Munich

Olympic Games the Palestinian terrorist organization Black September infiltrated the

Olympic village, taking nine Israeli hostages.21 The terrorists demanded the release of a

number of Palestinian political prisoners, and when their demands were not met, proceeded

to massacre all of the Israeli hostages. Many contend that the German police, unprepared and

20 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Irish Republican Army (IRA)", accessed October 01, 2016, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Irish-Republican-Army. 21 Keyan, Milanian, “Munich Attack: Who are GSG9?”, Mirror.co.uk, July 22 2016, accessed October 01, 2016, http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/munich-attack-who-gsg-9-8476291

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ill-equipped to properly handle a terrorist situation, committed a number of tactical blunders

that directly led to the tragic ending of the standoff.22

The tragedy of the 1972 Munich Olympics was a watershed moment for the

international community. First, the massacre served as a reminder that terrorism had become

a truly global phenomenon. Terrorists now had the capabilities to make dramatic and

symbolic statements on the most prominent of global stages. It wasn’t until the Munich

Massacre that the world regarded terrorist attacks as theatrical or dramatic in nature, and this

shift in perspective would set the precedent for future high-profile attacks such as the 1988

Lockerbie bombing and the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center. But the

Munich Olympics didn’t just highlight the rapidly evolving capabilities of terrorist

22 Zalman, Amy, “The History of Terrorism.”, terrorism.about.com, September 30, 2016, accessed September 30, 2016, http://terrorism.about.com/od/whatisterroris1/p/Terrorism.htm

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organizations, it also revealed how ill-prepared the international community was to check

these new capabilities. The words “counter-terrorism” and “international terrorism” were

never in the political lexicon of the United States until the Munich Massacre.23 Germany

lacked an official counterterrorism unit at the time of the Munich Massacre, and its local

police forces were woefully underprepared to face a terrorist threat. The massacre directly led

to the creation of an official German counterterrorism agency: GSG-9, and other countries

quickly followed suit.24 The late 20th century was when countries started taking the terrorist

threat seriously- as not just isolated domestic guerillas, but as ideologically motivated and

dangerously capable transnational organizations.

Throughout this dramatic evolution of terrorism, NATO had remained relatively

stagnant. Even as the terrorism threat further evolved at the turn of the century to include

religiously motivated groups such as Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, the organization was sluggish

to respond. In 1999, NATO adopted a strategic concept that identified terrorism as a risk

affecting its member nations. However, no formal measures to combat terrorism were agreed

upon at the summit.

Counter-terrorism momentum picked up in the organization after the September 11

attacks on the United States. In the days following the attacks, NATO invoked Article 5 –its

mutual defense clause- for the first time in its history. Under Article 5, any attack on a NATO

member is an attack on the entire alliance, compelling the entire coalition to come to the

assistance of the United States through security operations such as Operation Eagle Assist and

23 Zalman, Amy, “The History of Terrorism.”, terrorism.about.com, September 30, 2016, accessed September 30, 2016, http://terrorism.about.com/od/whatisterroris1/p/Terrorism.htm 24 Keyan, Milanian, “Munich Attack: Who are GSG9?”, Mirror.co.uk, July 22 2016, accessed October 01, 2016, http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/munich-attack-who-gsg-9-8476291

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Operation Active Endeavor.25 In 2002, NATO adopted the “Prague Package”, aimed at “adapting

NATO to the challenge of international terrorism”. The package adopted four pillars that

constituted NATO’s comprehensive response to the emerging threat of terrorism: anti-

terrorism (reducing the vulnerability of civil and military elements to terrorist attacks),

offensive counter-terrorism, consequence management, and military cooperation. Subsequent

summits have served to reinforce these themes. For example, in 2004 NATO launched the

Defense Against Terrorism (DAT) initiative, which utilized technology in helping NATO

develop countermeasures for asymmetric terrorist threats.

Current Status

The evolution of terrorism did not stop at the conclusion of the 20th century. The

terrorist threat continues to evolve today, and has taken on a number of unique

characteristics that did not exist in the 9/11 era.

First and foremost, the balance of power between the major Islamist terrorist

organizations has changed dramatically. Fourteen years ago, al Qaeda was the “undisputed

heavyweight among jihadist groups”. Now however, the organization faces increasing

competition from groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and Hezbollah. In

2014, al Qaeda released a video lecture that railed against ISIS, claiming that they do not

acknowledge ISIS’ Caliphate as the true Caliphate of Islam.26 This very fact that this video

was made demonstrates the dynamic between the jihadist organizations has shifted: al Qaeda

25 Iklody, Gabor, “The New Strategic Concept and the Fight Against Terrorism: Challenges and Opportunities”, NATO. 2010. accessed September 29, 2016, http://www.coedat.nato.int/publication/datr/volume6/01-The_New_Strategic_Concept_and_the_Fight_Against_Terrorism_Challenges&Opportunities.pdf 26 Lister, Tim, “9/11 Anniversary. How has terrorism changed in the past 14 years?”, CNN, September 10, 2015. accessed September 29, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/10/us/9-11-how-has-terror-changed/

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is being put on the defensive, while ISIS is becoming recognized as the primary jihadist

organization.

Map of ISIS Territorial Holdings

Tangentially related to ISIS’ rise to prominence is the fact that it has organized itself

into a de-facto state entity. Though the Taliban, Al-Shabaab, and al Qaeda have historically

controlled limited swaths of territory in the Middle East, none have controlled as much land,

and administered it in the organized and institutionalized way that ISIS has. Within its

territory, ISIS provides utilities, basic social services, courts, and enforces the rule of law.27

Though the international community largely refuses to recognize ISIS as a state, for all intents

and purposes, the group is indeed running one. This behavior marks a substantial departure

27 Westervelt, Eric, “ISIS and the Corporatization of Terrorism.”, NPR.org, November 29, 2014, accessed September 29, 2016, http://www.npr.org/2014/11/29/367424785/isis-and-the-corporatization-of-terrorism

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from the terrorist organizations of the 20th century, which were predominantly non-state

actors, and provides ISIS several key advantages. Nick Rasmussen of the United States

National Counterterrorism Center contends that ISIS’ creation of a de-facto state provides it

the necessary ingredients to develop substantial “external operations capability”. The creation

of a state provides a “save-haven” for terrorists and provides them with valuable manpower

and financial resources. Developing proper countermeasures to meet the enhanced

capabilities of a state-based terrorist organization will be of crucial importance for NATO.

The basic structure of the terrorist organization has changed as well. Once highly

centralized and hierarchical, the chain of command has become highly diffuse and

decentralized.28 For example, from an operational standpoint, ISIS operates not as one

coordinated body, but as a series of independent nodes. These nodes are self-financing, self-

directed, and granted a large degree of autonomy by ISIS’ governing body.29 This allows

individual operations to be conducted across the broad swath of ISIS territory at an

alarmingly fast pace. It also makes ISIS particularly difficult to destabilize, as eliminating a

high-level official, or degrading the capabilities of one node leaves the rest of the organization

completely unaffected. This decentralized system of authority allows ISIS to be flexible,

adaptable, and resilient to the sustained counterterrorism efforts of the international

community.

Also worthy of note is the evolving nature of terrorist attacks against NATO member

nations. The previously discussed attacks of the late 20th and early 21st centuries all involved a

substantial amount of planning and coordination. However, in response to the

28 McChrystal, Stanley. “Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World”, Print. May 12, 2015. Accessed September 29, 2016. 29 Westervelt, Eric, “ISIS and the Corporatization of Terrorism.”, NPR.org, November 29, 2014, accessed September 29, 2016, http://www.npr.org/2014/11/29/367424785/isis-and-the-corporatization-of-terrorism

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comprehensive counterterrorism security measures mandated by NATO agreements such as

the “Prague Package”, terrorist organizations have been forced to evolve. In recent years, they

have become less reliant on heavily-coordinated attacks such as Lockerbie and 9/11, and

more dependent on so-called “inspired” or “lone-wolf attacks”.30 ISIS in particular makes

extensive use of social media to encourage overseas converts to conduct their own

homegrown attacks. The transition towards using these attacks has significant implications for

the nature of terrorism: attacks are now far more frequent and less spectacular. ISIS is now

able to leverage media channels to inspire self-radicalized people from all over the western

world.31 Admittedly, these new attacks are not as well-planned and often lacking in resources,

but they are frequent and extremely difficult for national intelligence services to anticipate.

Nick Rasmussen believes that these evolving tactics provide law enforcement “far less time to

disrupt or mitigate potential plots”, and this presents a great challenge for NATO’s future

anti-terrorism efforts.32

NATO has also identified a number of emerging threats posed by terrorist

organizations. In a report prepared by the Assistant Secretary-General, NATO identified

several areas of global infrastructure and development that it believes will become key

terrorist objectives in the future. For example, NATO believes that the rising demand of

strategic resources such as energy will compel terrorist organizations to disrupt of seize

control of such infrastructure.33 NATO also believes that shipping lanes, particularly narrow

30 Ibid 31 Lister, Tim, “9/11 Anniversary. How has terrorism changed in the past 14 years?”, CNN, September 10, 2015. accessed September 29, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/10/us/9-11-how-has-terror-changed/ 32 Gordon, Phillip H, “NATO’s Growing Role in the Middle East.” The Brookings Institution, March 1, 2006, accessed September 29, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/research/natos-growing-role-in-the-greater-middle-east/ 33 Iklody, Gabor, “The New Strategic Concept and the Fight Against Terrorism: Challenges and Opportunities”, NATO. 2010. accessed September 29, 2016,

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bottleneck straits such as The Strait of Malacca will also become high-value targets for

terrorists.34

Beyond the social media capabilities of organizations such as ISIS, NATO also

believes that terrorist organizations are looking into more advanced forms of technological

warfare. Namely, NATO believes that cyber-terrorism and cyber-attacks could fit in

extremely well with the “strategic-level objectives of terrorists”.35 Though it is currently

estimated that terrorists do not have the capabilities to conduct large-scale cyber attacks as of

yet, this situation may quickly change in the future as terrorist organizations develop more

advanced technological capabilities.

Though a comprehensive NATO framework for meeting these evolving threats has

yet to be developed, nearly all agree that any course of action must involve the organization

evolving beyond its original mission as a reactive security coalition. The NATO Assistant

Secretary-General noted that in order to afford its member states credible and effective

protection, the organization must become “more of a team player”.36 This means that NATO

must transform from a defense alliance into a “multi-faceted security organization”.37 It

cannot sit idly waiting for one of its member nation to be attacked, it must take proactive

steps to ensure that such an attack is never allowed to happen in the first place. This may

include initiatives such as intelligence sharing, multilateral consultations, preventative social

programs, and coordinating with other international partners or coalitions.

http://www.coedat.nato.int/publication/datr/volume6/01-The_New_Strategic_Concept_and_the_Fight_Against_Terrorism_Challenges&Opportunities.pdf 34 Ibid 35 Ibid 36 Ibid 37 Ibid

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Country Policy

Economically Advanced Western Democracies (e.g. France, United States, U.K.)

With substantial economic and political clout, these countries are at the forefront of NATO,

and as such are prime targets for potential terrorist attacks. From the Pulse shooting in

Orlando, to the truck massacre in Nice, France, the most high-profile attacks are often

perpetrated against these countries. Hence, this bloc of highly developed countries would be

more willing to commit significant financial resources in evolving NATO’s capabilities and

developing it into a proactive security-based organization.

Eastern European and Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, etc.)

Most of these countries were former members of the Warsaw Pact, and many suffer from

chronic economic and political instability. It is important to consider that though

transitioning NATO into a more proactive organization would likely have security-related

benefits, it would also be expensive, dramatically expand the organization, and mandate

certain actions that might be seen as compromising national sovereignty, such as intelligence

sharing. Because high-profile terrorist attacks seldom occur in these Eastern European

countries, they may be less willing to transition the organization into an enhanced security

partnership.

Key Terms

Terrorism

Decentralization

“Lone-wolf” attacks

Al-Qaeda

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Hezbollah

ISIS

Taliban

Article 5

Prague Package

Defense Against Terrorism (DAT)

Assymetric warfare

Questions to Consider

In what ways has terrorism evolved since the 20th century?

The United States has set a precedent for invoking Article 5 in the event of a

terrorist attack, even if it is perpetrated by a non-state actor. Should this precedent

continue?

What are some of the specific terrorism-related policy proposals that NATO

adopted after the September 11 attacks? How effective have they been?

Can you anticipate other valuable strategic targets that terrorists may be inclined to

attack in the future?

How will terrorism capabilities evolve in the future? Where will they be at five years

from now? Ten years? How can NATO best anticipate and meet these enhanced

capabilities?

Should every country maintain a specialized counterterrorism police force?

How can NATO best degrade the capabilities of decentralized and diffuse

organizations such as ISIS?

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Should NATO evolve into a proactive security-based coalition? What competing

factors are at play, and how do these factors align with the priorities of your country?

Which non-NATO countries would be strategically valuable for NATO to work

with?

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