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Chair:NinaSheridan
Chinese Politburo
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Contents
Letter from the Chair…….………………………...…………………………3Introduction to the Committee.…………………….……………..……..……4Topic A: Controlling the Media…………………….……………..……..……7
Introduction…..………………………………….……………………….……………7History of the Topic………………………..……………………….……….…………8Current Status…………………………………….……………..…………….………12Country Policy.…...…………………………………………….…………………...…22Questions for Consideration………..…………….………………...…….……….…...25
Topic B: Pacific Land Disputes.…....…………………..…………………….26
Introduction……..………………………...……………………………………..……26History of the Topic.………………………….………………..………………...……28Current Status………………………………………………………………………....31Country Policy.….…………………...……………...…..……………………………..38Questions for Consideration...........…………….……………………..………………..28Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………..30
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Letter from the ChairDear Delegates,
My name is Nina Sheridan, and I am a member of the class of and I am super excited
to be chairing the Chinese Politburo committee this fall. I am a potential major in the
Woodrow Wilson School, and interested in pursuing certificates in East Asian Studies and
History and the Practice of Diplomacy. This summer, I interned at the American Chamber
of Commerce in Taipei on their business magazine, and I spent six weeks in China through
the State Department’s NSLI-Y Program in high school. At Princeton, I am part of
Princeton U.S. China Coalition, Business Today, and a program that sends tutors into nearby
prisons. I also intern for Princeton Alumni Weekly, our alumni magazine. In high school, I
was part of my school’s Model U.N. team and had a great experience with it. I hope you all
are looking forward to the conference!
See you soon!
Nina
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Introduction
Ever since the beginning of the Mao era, the Politburo has been the most
concentrated source of political power in China. The Central Politburo typically consists of
25 members who play significant and often overlapping roles in the leadership of the Party
and the government. Within this group, power is further centralized within the seven
members of the Politburo Standing Committee. This smaller group was established in 1956;
its members are chosen through secret negotiations involving outgoing members and Party
elders.
The Politburo is considered the most influential body in shaping both China’s
foreign and domestic policy, though there is much secrecy as to the exact workings of the
body’s meetings and power structure. In private, the Politburo allows for the voices of its
members to be heard and pit against each other in rigorous debate. Factions and personal
alliances play a large role in these conversations. Matters can be decided by a majority;
however, important decisions rarely move forward without a consensus. Once a decision is
made, the Politburo shows a united front to the public.
The rare times when factionalism is apparent to the public, such as during the
Tiananmen protests in 1989, often indicates that a significant power struggle is occurring
within the Party. Party General Zhao Ziyang’s public defense of the student protesters
during Tiananmen directly conflicted with the official Politburo stance that these students
were working to undermine the government. Those who sided with Zhao favored restraint
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and negotiating with the students, but Premier Li Peng and his allies were determined to
reinstate social stability regardless of the cost. When Zhao took his views public in a speech
to foreign bankers, he began to fall out of favor with senior Party leaders. He cemented his
fall from power with continued efforts to help the students avoid the wrath of the Politburo
in this rare instance of public factionalism.
The full Politburo meets monthly, while the Standing Committee meeting weekly.
The Politburo has the authority of the Central Committee, a larger assembly of the
Communist Party that meets yearly, when it is not in session. Currently, six geographic areas
are represented in the Politburo: four municipalities (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and
Tianjin) and the coastal provinces of Guangdong and Xinjiang. The Party also maintains an
array of members of State, the military, and the National’s People Congress to ensure all
political spheres are represented. It is also important to note the age of the Politburo
members, with the younger ones considered leading candidates for eventual promotion
within the Politburo. Ascending to the Politburo at a young age is particularly important,
because all Politburo members must retire if they are 68 by the end of their five-year term.
The members of the Politburo usually hold the highest positions within both the
Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government. For example, the Party General
Secretary serves as Chairman of the Party and State Central Military Commissions, with
oversight over China’s foreign policy as well. The second ranked member of the Standing
Committee is the Premier of the State Council, serving as the top economic official for the
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country. These positions continue downward with Politburo Standing Committee members
serving as Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress,
Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) National
Committee, Party Secretariat, Head of the Party’s Central Disciplinary Inspection
Commission, and State Council Vice Premier. Of the full Politburo, members hold other
important positions including, head of the Organization Department, head of the
Propaganda Department, and head of the Central Commission of Politics and Law.
These roles give the Politburo significant power over shaping:
● Foreign policy● Economic policy● Legislative agenda● State-sanctioned religious activity● Outreach to non-Communist groups● Ideology and propaganda● Security● Corruption and disciplinary problems
Collectively, the portfolio of powers of those in the Politburo allow for the body to solve
the most difficult and pressing issues that face contemporary China. Although each member
has his or her own individual role in the Party and government, a majority of Politburo
members must vote for any decisions that address the issues posed in committee.
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Topic A: Controlling the MediaIntroduction
“All websites: please self-inspect and delete all content related to the ‘Panama Papers’ leak, including
news reporting, microblogs, WeChat, forums, community pages, bulletin boards, cloud storage, comments and
other interactive media. Delete mobile content at the same time.” –Order from government authorities on
April 4th, 20161
The Chinese government has a long history of censoring media in China. Both
traditional media, like newspapers and books, and new media, like Facebook and online
blogs, are tightly controlled to prevent the inflow of information that could threaten the
government’s authority and the Communist Party’s position of power. The post-Mao
opening up of the country has exposed domestic issues to the scrutiny of foreign media and
has also led to an influx of information from abroad. The government has developed
elaborate systems to censor sensitive information, creating a model admired by authoritarian
regimes and denounced by democratic governments. In recent years, however, the
prevalence of internet access, along with the introduction of methods of subverting firewalls,
have made the flow of information increasingly difficult to control .
1 “Minitrue: ‘Delete All Content Related to Panama Papers.’” China Digital Times. April 4, 2016. http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2016/04/minitrue-delete-content-related-panama-papers-2/
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Internationally, China has faced a barrage of criticism for its continued censorship, with
many claiming that it is a violation of human rights. A recent resolution passed by the United
Nations Human Rights Council condemned countries that limit or block Internet access as
violating human rights law.2 Organizations like Amnesty International, and leaders like
Barack Obama have criticized China publicly on its continued censorship. In April of this
year, the United States added China’s “Great Firewall” to a list of trade impediments for the
first time, due to the burden they put on foreign suppliers, Internet sites, and the users who
rely on them to conduct business.3 The government is at a crossroads where it must
determine not only how to control access to the different spheres of media in China moving
forward, but also how to effectively utilize the media to further the CCP agenda and retain
their position of power.
History of the Topic
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, “Everyone has the
right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any
2Williams, Lauren. “Disrupting Internet Access is a Human Rights Violation, UN Says.”
Think Progress. July 1, 2016. https://thinkprogress.org/disrupting-internet-access-is-a-human-rights-violation-un-says-e8399647ef29#.5fopiru7t
3 Mozur, Paul. “U.S. Adds China’s Internet Controls to List of Trade Barriers.” New York Times. April 7th, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/08/business/international/china-internet-controls-us.html
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media and regardless of frontiers.”4 On December 19th, 1948, China was one of 48 countries
to sign this declaration. Shortly after, Mao Zedong and the Communist Party came to power
in China, and their policies quickly proved that the CCP was not interested in upholding
these promises. The CCP had not signed the resolution and felt no qualms about subverting
the protections it had laid out. Mao’s authoritarian regime made sweeping use of censorship
as a tool to maintain political power and guide the thinking of the population.
However, the history of censorship is a long one and is not necessarily confined to
authoritarian regimes. Often justified as a way to protect the moral and political life of
citizens, the first government to have an official office responsible for censorship was
Greece in 443 BC.5 Throughout history, governments both Western and Eastern have
sought to control the content and information available to their citizens. Today, China is
probably the most notable current examples of censorship of media, both because of its
large population and the expansive and precise nature of the censorship.
Media censorship in China expanded dramatically during the Mao era. While
spreading propaganda in newspapers, books, and plays, he also sought to stamp out those
who criticized him or the Communist Party, destroying books and jailing those who voiced
opinions and thoughts critical of the Party. Foreign media was almost entirely banned during
4 “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” United Nations. December 10, 1948. http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/
5 Newth, Mette. “The Long History of Censorship.” Beacon for Freedom of Expression. 2010. http://www.beaconforfreedom.org/liste.html?tid=415&art_id=475
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this time. TV broadcasts from the West would have large segments deleted. In the 1960s and
70s, foreign literature was available to no one except top Party members.6
Interestingly, freedom of speech and press is not just a right China agreed to before
the country came under Communist control. The Chinese constitution7, adopted in 1982 by
the CCP ruled government, also affords the population these rights. However, these rights
come with a caveat that allows the government to censor and punish anyone who reveals
state secrets. The use of “state secrets” has thus become much of the justification for the
large-scale censorship seen in China.
However, for as long as the Chinese government has engaged in censorship, Chinese
citizens have found ways to circumvent it. From handwritten Western books to the use of
VPNs, Chinese citizens have frequently managed to gain access to banned content. Since
1978, thousands of Chinese students have also studied abroad in the U.S. and other foreign
countries every year, gaining full access to foreign media and sites, as well as unedited
versions of their own country’s history.
There has been little official policy or legislation on censorship in China. One of the
first documents to address the new issues presented by the Internet was the 2005
“Provisions on the Administration of Internet News and Information Services.” This
6 Osnos, Evan. “China’s Censored World.” New York Times. May 2, 2014.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/03/opinion/sunday/chinas-censored-world.html?_r=0 7 “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China” National People’s Congress.
December 4, 1982. http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm
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addressed content on websites, text messages, and online forums, but was before
smartphones and mobile access to the web developed. In 2014, then, there was further
codification of what is and is not acceptable that focused on instant messaging services. The
“Provisional Regulations for the Development and Management of Instant Messaging Tools
and Public Information Services,” also known as “the WeChat articles,” for China’s popular
social media site, forces users to authenticate their identities and allows articles on current
events to be posted only by media organizations or sites.8 These stricter controls over
grassroots media attempts to curb the dissemination of information that the government
does not want to spread or contradicts the official version of a story.
Additionally, in 2010 the government issued its first White Paper focusing on the
Internet. This, along with the “Public Pledge on Self-Regulation and Professional Ethics for
China Internet Industry,” imposes strict rules on Internet users, both foreign and domestic,
calling for their pledge to abide by Chinese law and regulations.9 The CCP is working to
balance the freedom desired as Chinese citizens interact with the rest of the world and the
order necessary to Party survival and legitimacy.
Lu Wei, Deputy Head of the Propaganda Department, sums up the CCP approach
by extending Deng Xiaoping’s quoted “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” to the
8 Yong, Hu. “China’s Tough New Internet Rules Explained.” ChinaFile. September 10, 2014. http://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/china-tough-new-internet-rules-explained9 Xu, Beina. “Media Censorship in China.” Council on Foreign Relations. April 7, 2015. http://www.cfr.org/china/media-censorship-china/p11515
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Internet, calling China’s internet policy “cyber governance with Chinese characteristics.”10
While documents like the White Paper provide some limited insight into the careful balance
the government is trying to strike with regards to online media, they do not give a full
picture of the scale of censorship in the country or clearly define what content is to be
censored, continuing the government’s long policy of secrecy and ambiguity on the issue.
Current Situation
“There are more than 2,000 newspapers, 8,000 magazines, 374 television stations,
and 150 million internet users in China”11 This is an enormous sum for any government to
control, yet China continues to attempt to do so, with varying levels of success. It has
adapted to each new hurdle brought on by advances in technology as it comes its way. As
users find new ways to subvert Internet censors, be it by using homonyms for blocked
words or VPNs, the CCP has created an increasingly sophisticated censorship model in its
effort to detect these deceptions. Newspapers operating on a budget, with a staff and
10 Denyer, Simon. “China’s Scary Lesson to the World: Censoring the Internet Works.”
Washington Post. May 23, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinas-scary-lesson-to-the-world-censoring-the-internet-works/2016/05/23/413afe78-fff3-11e5-8bb1-f124a43f84dc_story.html 11Wetherbee, Rebecca.“Censorship and Evolving Media Policy in China.” Elon University. Winter, 2010. http://www.elon.edu/docs/e-web/academics/communications/research/11weatherbeeejspring10.pdf
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traceable location, are easy to control and shut down. Individual bloggers and grassroots
media, on the other hand, are far more difficult to trace.
Since the start of Xi Jinping’s presidency in 2012, China has seen a government
increasingly willing to crack down on media outlets and censor online content. Even as many
countries have relaxed media restrictions in the face of the Internet, Chinese citizens are
facing more hurdles in getting a full range of news than before, and reporters are having
more trouble giving it to them, facing potential jail time if they cross the invisible line that
separates what is and is not acceptable to publish.
Due to this, the NGO Reporters Without Borders ranked China 175th out of 180
countries in their Worldwide Index of Press Freedom in 2014.12 Two years earlier, in 2012,
Freedom House ranked China the 3rd most restrictive country in the world with regards to
Internet access.13 Researchers at Carnegie Mellon University found in a 2012 study that more
than 16% of all posts on Sina Weibo, a social media site, are deleted because of the content.14
This widespread censorship may be crucial to securing political stability for the Party and
limiting the potential for grassroots gatherings and protest, but it comes at a cost as the
12 Xu, Beina. “Media Censorship in China.” Council on Foreign Relations. April 7, 2015. http://www.cfr.org/china/media-censorship-china/p1151513 “How does China censor the internet?” The Economist. April 21, 2013. http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/04/economist-explains-how-china-censors-internet14 Bamman, David. O’Connor, Brendan. Smith, Noah. “Censorship and Deletions Practices in Chinese Social Media.” First Monday. March 2012. http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3943/3169
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population becomes increasingly aware of the censorship and concerned with how it violates
their freedoms. When real estate tycoon Ren Zhiqiang’s social media accounts were taken
down after he criticized President Xi Jinping, his 37 million followers took notice. While the
support Ren received from Party elites was perhaps a more surprising outcome, hinting at
fissures within the Party on the extent of censorship, the public reaction of both fear and
mocking is important to note. In a widely shared post, one user commented, “1984 was
supposed to be a warning, not an instruction” in reaction to Ren’s silencing.15
The censorship regime in China is incredibly sophisticated, with the Communist
Party’s Central Propaganda Department playing the largest role in censoring media in China,
although more than a dozen government bodies are involved. The government employs a
diverse array of methods to censor information as it is posted online. During controversial
periods, such as the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square protests, the government blocks
both sites that contain politically sensitive information (such as Wikipedia) and certain search
terms. Websites like Bloomberg and the New York Times were both blocked for a period of
time after running controversial stories in 2012 on the private wealth of important Party
members. Some articles are shortened to exclude references to any controversial subject
matters.
15 Denyer, Simon. “China’s ‘Donald Trump’ is Latest Victim of Government
Crackdown.” Washington Post. February 29, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/02/29/chinas-donald-trump-silenced-latest-crackdown-sparks-fear-and-mockery/
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The main strategy the government employs to censor media in China is “The
Golden Shield”, a domestic surveillance system set up in the 1998 by the Ministry of Public
Security. The largest component of this program is the “Great Firewall,” which was begun in
the 1990s to limit Chinese access to foreign websites. Initially, it was only certain websites
that contained information deemed politically sensitive that were blocked, but the filters
have grown increasingly sophisticated over time. Now, certain pages on websites may be
blocked, but not the site in its entirety. Searching for certain words can leave users banned
from search engines for up 90 seconds, and pages containing these search words are often
inaccessible. Internet companies frequently ban pages preemptively that contain words from
the government list of banned terms in order to avoid trouble with the government.
Estimates put the number of people involved in censoring media in China to be
around 100,000. This does not include the “50 Cent Army” paid by the government to steer
online conversation away from politically sensitive topics and provide a pro-government
voice in the comment sections of sites. A Washington Post article reports that the Chinese
government is able to create 450 million fake social media comments in a year through their
use of the “50 Cent Army.” That means one in every 178 posts on social media is fake.16
16 Farrell, Henry. “The Chinese Government Fakes Nearly 450 Million Social Media Comments a Year. Here’s Why.” Washington Post. May 19, 2016. www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/19/the-chinese-government-fakes-nearly-450-million-social-media-comments-a-year-this-is-why/
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There is little official legislation as to what content is allowed and what content is not.
Censorship online often appears random, and there is no clear line drawn as to what
traditional media can publish either. This blurry line has caused significant self-censorship in
media organizations and from journalists who do not want to cross the line and risk firing or
even imprisonment for their articles. “The idea is that if you're never quite sure when, why
and how hard the boom might be lowered on you, you start controlling yourself, rather than
being limited strictly by what the government is able to control directly," explained James
Fallows of The Atlantic.17
The most important criteria considered in employing these various methods of
censorship is whether the content threatens political or social stability, rather than whether
the post criticizes the government or Party. Accordingly, any reports on protests, even pro-
government ones, are swiftly removed, while criticism of mid-level government officials are
often allowed to remain online. The ultimate goal of censorship is to prevent the
organization of any sort of political activity.18
Skirting government censors is hard, but not impossible. As the government
continues to fine-tune its filters, the public has fine-tuned mechanisms for circumventing
17 Duffy Marson, Carolyn. “Chinese Internet Censorship: An Inside Look.” Network World. May 12, 2008. http://www.networkworld.com/article/2279237/lan-wan/chinese-internet-censorship--an-inside-look.html
18 King, Gary; Pan, Jennifer; and Roberts, Molly. “How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression.” American Political Science Review. 2013. http://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/censored.pdf?m=1447795312
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them. “Over the years, in a series of cat-and-mouse games, Chinese Internet users have
developed an extensive series of puns—both visual and homophonous—slang, acronyms,
memes, and images to skirt restrictions and censors” writes Jason Ng in his book Blocked on
Weibo.19
Reporters and newspapers in China, both foreign and Chinese nationals, also face
significant censorship. The government has actually instituted “a diverse range of methods
to induce journalists to censor themselves, including dismissals and demotions, libel lawsuits,
fines, arrests, and forced televised confessions.”20 Leaders argue that these actions are
necessary because of the excessive smearing of China and the Chinese government by
Western media. They “regularly claim that Western media plays up China’s weaknesses,
exaggerates its potential as a regional threat, and ignores its successes,” hindering China’s
growth by placing unnecessary emphasis on the trials that a developing superpower
reasonably must undergo.21
Key Issues
Foreign Media
19Ng, Jason. “Blocked on Weibo.” August 6, 2013.
https://www.amazon.com/dp/B00AXS5E6Y/ref=r_soa_w_d20 Xu, Beina. “Media Censorship in China.” Council on Foreign Relations. April 7, 2015. http://www.cfr.org/china/media-censorship-china/p1151521 Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany. “How China Won the War Against Western Media.” Foreign Policy. March 4, 2016. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/04/china-won-war-western-media-censorship-propaganda-communist-party/
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Recent policy in China on censorship includes a directive in July of 2014 that bars
journalists from releasing information from interviews or press conferences on social media
without permission from their employer. Since 2015, the government has made it
increasingly difficult to access Google, and social media sites like Facebook, Instagram, and
Twitter. 80% of foreign journalists reported in a 2014 survey that their working conditions in
China has gotten worse of stayed the same since 2013. The treatment of foreign journalists
and censorship of foreign has the potential to become a major foreign policy issue,
particularly with the U.S., if not handled properly.
While Politburos of the past have made promises to allow foreign media unrestricted
access in cases like the 2008 Olympics, these have not borne out in any sort of meaningful
way. This was most clearly illustrated during the 2008 Olympics when the CCP made some
concessions such as allowing journalists to freely travel the country and interview anyone
who consents, while continuing to limit journalists’ internet access to controversial content,
threaten, detain, and harass some journalists, and bar them from observing protests in Tibet
and neighboring provinces.22
Civil Unrest
With the rise of the Internet, awareness and discontent over censorship has spread.
In 2013, hundreds of protesters gathered to protest the lack of press freedom as some 22 “Falling Short.” Committee to Protect Journalists. June 5, 2008.
https://cpj.org/reports/2008/06/summary-2.php
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domestic reporters went on strike, gaining international attention for the widespread support
these actions received from both intellectuals and everyday citizens.23 People read news with
a healthy dose of skepticism, and this pervasive doubt could have significant negative
consequences for the government. However, as recently as 2014, a GlobalScan poll found
that only 5% of Chinese believed their national media is not free. On the other hand, 51%
believe that the Internet is not a safe place to express their views.24 As the government fights
to keep credibility, it must figure out how to maintain public trust. In 2008, a Pew poll
showed that 85% of those surveyed said that the government should be responsible for
censoring the Internet.25 That notion, while increasingly challenged as the scope of
censorship is made public, is one important way in which the government has maintained
this controversial practice thus far.
Economic Consequences
The widespread censorship of Internet in China limits startups and innovation. Daily
use is often limited for unknown reasons, and VPNs can be slow. In 2012, the government
temporarily blocked GitHub and SourceForge, widely used open source websites for 23 Kaiman, Jonathan. “China Anti-Censorship Protest Attracts Support Across Country.”
The Guardian. January 7, 2013. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/07/china-anti-censorship-protest-support
24 Keck, Zachary. “Chinese Don’t Believe They’re Being Watched and Censored.” The Diplomat. April 3, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/chinese-dont-believe-theyre-being-watched-and-censored/
25 Sydell, Laura. “How Do Chinese Citizens Feel About Censorship?” NPR. July 12, 2008. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=92489122
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programmers. This causes a loss of efficiency, that when multiplied across the companies in
China, add up to a significant cost for China’s economy.26 Not only that, but the difficult
conditions may discourage companies from establishing themselves in China, particularly
startups who do not have the scale to endure these costs. One counter argument to this, says
Kaifu Lee, the founder of an innovation incubator in Beijing, is that censorship can protect
local technology firms.27
China is an enormous market, and companies often have a lot to gain from
expanding their companies into the country. But companies like Google, Snapchat,
Facebook, and many other tech companies are continually frustrated with impediments to
accessing this market. In 2010, Google actually shut down its China search-engine after four
years of abiding by China’s censorship policies, in reaction to a ban by the Chinese
government. This ban remains up six years later, although Google has been consulting with
the Chinese government on reentering the market.28 The U.S. has substantiated claims of
negative impact on businesses with its listing of China’s internet censorship as an
26 Bao, Beibei. “How Internet Censorship is Curbing Innovation in China.” The Atlantic.
April 22, 2013. http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/how-internet-censorship-is-curbing-innovation-in-china/275188/
27Bao, Beibei. “How Internet Censorship is Curbing Innovation in China.” The Atlantic. April 22, 2013. http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/how-internet-censorship-is-curbing-innovation-in-china/275188/
28 Waddell, Kaveh. “Why Google Quit China-And Why It’s Heading Back” The Atlantic. January 19, 2016. http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/01/why-google-quit-china-and-why-its-heading-back/424482/
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international trade barrier. This negative effect on business in China is important for the
government to consider as the economy’s growth rate starts to slow.
Potential Solutions
Increase the Severity of Censorship: one option for China is to increase censorship, as well
as the punishment for those who circumvent the censors or publish sensitive content. This
might increase the success of avoiding the infiltration of banned content, but would be met
with significant international criticism and domestic criticism. As international travel
continues to increase, this solution would not entirely prevent Chinese citizen’s access to
foreign media.
Use Censorship as a tool in International Dialogue: Many countries would like to see China
decrease its censorship and more unrestricted coverage for their reporters. Foreign
businesses also stand to gain if China loosens its controls. The Politburo could use these
facts to its advantage and use decreased censorship to help their image internationally and
domestically, as well as to get concessions out of foreign countries.
Invest in Refining Censors: China’s censorship program is already highly developed and
nuanced, but further investment could be made into creating a censorship program that
censors content depending on the internet user. Already, censorship is reduced at hotels and
cafes that Westerners frequent in order to limit the foreigner’s awareness of the scope of
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censorship in the country. This could be further developed to make censorship less
detectable.
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Country Policy
Although the Politburo maintains a united front to the public, there are significant
factions within the Politburo with distinct opinions on how to best proceed on different
matters. Some call it the “one party, two coalitions” system, giving insight into the potential
conflicts that exist even in a one party system. Members of the Politburo come from a
diverse array of backgrounds, have different functions with the Party and government, and
are representative of different regions and political bodies.
This widespread factionalism affects the members’ opinion on issues like media
censorship. One important divide is the one between the princelings and populists. The
princelings are considered the elitists in China. They typically come from well-known
families, those who contain well-known revolutionaries and high-ranking Party officials.
They grew up in economically secure household, usually in coastal cities, with a mind to
protect and develop China’s entrepreneurs. 29 They are likely to consider the economic
consequences of China’s “Great Firewall” when making decisions on censorship. However,
the princelings will also have to consider the growing anger by the population over the
Politburo members’ personal wealth and the relationship between wealth and power in the
country that censors have been trying to mitigate awareness of.
29 Lawrence, Susan. “China’s Political Institutions and Leaders in Charts.” Congressional Research Service. November 12, 2013. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43303.pdf
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The populist coalition tends to come from less-privileged families, who live inland.
They work their way up in the Party through the Chinese Communist Youth League, and
give voice to the concerns of farmers, migrant workers, and the urban poor. The populist
Politburo members tend to be more inclined towards political reform then their princeling
colleagues. In recent years, they have faced a shift in power away from previous balance,
making it harder for them to obtain a majority in decisions.30 Recent fissures between the
two factions became apparent this summer when President Xi Jinping and Premier Li
Keqiang gave speeches on the economy indicating differences in preferred policy moving
forwards.31
Smaller factions within the Politburo include the Tsinghua clique, graduates of
Tsinghua University with strong personal ties to each other; and the Shanghai clique,
members who reached political prominence through positions in Shanghai, although they
have lost political power since the retirement of Hu Jintao.
Xi Jinping began his presidency in 2012 without a loyal following in the Politburo,
meaning that those looking for political opportunity have the chance to decide how closely
they wish to align themselves with their current leader. Although the princelings have found
30 Li, Cheng. “Rule of the Princelings.” Brookings. February 10, 2013. http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/02/china-xi-jinping-li
31 Wei, Lingling. Page, Jeremy. “Discord Between China’s Top Two Leaders Spills Into the Open.” The Washington Post. July 22, 2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/discord-between-chinas-top-two-leaders-spills-into-the-open-1469134110
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themselves more frequently in line with President Xi’s course of action, they do not always
find their ideologies to be in sync.
While each Politburo member typically belongs to one of the major factions, overall,
their opinions on issues are highly personalized based on their unique experience and past.
CNN's Beijing bureau chief, Jaime FlorCruz, writes: "Factional lines are often unclear,
shifting or overlapping, conditioned by old alliances, family interconnections, conflicts,
rivalries, shifting loyalties and pragmatic tactical considerations.”32 This is important to
consider when determining where each member might stand on an issue like censorship.
Questions
1. Why has media censorship increased in the past few years? What does the shift in
balance of the factions in the Politburo have to do with this? How will this shift
affect decisions on the future of censorship in China?
2. How does this domestic issue affect foreign policy and international relations? How
should the issue of foreign reporters be handled particularly? How does censorship
affect China’s image internationally?
3. What is the main purpose of censorship? Why does the government censor media?
Why do they censor what they do, and what affect would it have if the government
reduced or stopped its censorship?
32 Lai, Alexis, “‘One Party, Two Coalitions’- China’s Factional Politics,” CNN, Nov 9 2012, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/23/world/asia/china-political-factions-primer/
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4. How much resources are being put into censoring the media? What are the costs
economically, as well as the more abstract? How does censorship affect the
population’s trust in the government?
5. If the population is aware of the censorship, is it effective?
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Topic B: Pacific Land DisputesIntroduction
“We are strongly committed to safeguarding the country’s sovereignty and security, and defending our
territorial integrity” –Chinese President Xi Jinping
The pressing issues of overlapping claims of land in the East and South China Sea
began in 2010 with the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, which are claimed by both China and Japan.
Since then, China has been involved in land disputes with Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines,
Malaysia, Taiwan, Vietnam and Brunei. These countries are actively disputing China’s claims,
maintaining their own claims to these waters.
China’s increasing assertiveness over these areas has created significant international
tension, as nearly one-third of global passes through the waters each year. These disputed
areas also contain large sources of precious fossil fuel.33 The United States, in an effort both
to maintain peace and disrupt China’s actions to claim the waters, has increased its military
presence in the area.
This issue is critical to China’s interest in expanding influence in Asia, asserting itself
as a superpower, and maintaining national pride. Now that China has taken such a strong
stance on claiming these waters, and invested such large amounts of economic resources into
33 Brown, Patrick. “China Prepares to Ignore a Binding Decision on Territorial Dispute.” CBC News. July 11, 2016. http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/south-china-sea-philippines-1.3670851
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building artificial land and military capacity in the area, it would be difficult to simply back
down. Every day that the issue remains unresolved increases the chance of military conflict
breaking out in the waters, making these disputes a top priority for the Politburo.
History of the Topic
Land disputes in the Pacific area are not merely recent occurrences. The issue of
sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands first arose during the Sino-Japanese War in 1894. In
recent years however, the number of land disputes has risen rapidly, and China has made
increasingly forceful claims to large swaths of land with significant trade importance. The
Chinese government has based these claims “mostly on an old map of uncertain provenance
that it has lodged with the United Nations. China asserts sovereignty over everything inside a
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‘nine-dash line’ encircling about 90 per cent of the sea around its coast, engulfing the rival
overlapping claims of Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.”34 In
their efforts to make these claims, China has invested money in enlarging the islands,
creating artificial new ones, and equipping the islands with ports, airstrips, and other military
installations.
Other countries involved have responded with measures of their own. “In response
to China’s assertive presence in the disputed territory, Japan sold military ships and
34 Brown, Patrick. “China Prepares to Ignore a Binding Decision on Territorial Dispute.” CBC News. July 11, 2016. http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/south-china-sea-philippines-1.3670851
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equipment to the Philippines and Vietnam in order to improve their maritime security
capacity and to deter Chinese aggression.”35 While China’s actions are seen as a power grab
by the other claimants, who worry about their national security, China sees the disputes as a
necessary step in its evolution into a superpower. The reclamation of this land comes after
two centuries of struggle and weakness, of humiliation caused by foreign aggression against
the country. The country, therefore, seeks to secure its own future and place in region, as
well as limit the United States’ presence and influence.
No country involved is likely to give up the land easily, however. The significance of the
dispute only increases when the strategic and economic importance of the area is considered.
“There are 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in deposits under
the sea” that is being disputed.36 The area also contains up to 10% of the world’s fisheries, as
well as, possibly the single most important trade route. “The oil transported through the
Malacca Strait from the Indian Ocean, en route to East Asia through the South China Sea, is
triple the amount that passes through the Suez Canal and fifteen times the amount that
transits the Panama Canal.”37 A major concern internationally is the possibility that China
35 “Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea.” Council on Foreign Relations. July 14, 2016. http://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-tracker/p32137#!/conflict/territorial-disputes-in-the-south-china-sea36 Fisher, Max. “The South China Sea: Explaining the Dispute.” New York Times. July 14, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/15/world/asia/south-china-sea-dispute-arbitration-explained.html?ref=asia
37 Kaplan, Robert. “Why the South China Sea is So Crucial.” Business Insider. February 20, 2015. http://www.businessinsider.com.au/why-the-south-china-sea-is-so-crucial-2015-2
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will disrupt the free transit of goods along this route if it takes control of these waters. China
has already shown a desire to restrict access to the area, with an August 2nd decision by the
Chinese Supreme People’s Court that China has the right to prosecute foreign fishermen
found in waters claimed by China.38
Geostrategically, the other countries involved have not been able to form an
effective counter-weight to China’s military and economic force, and appeasing China in this
case could set the precedent for increasingly aggressive action by China in the future.
For China, the geostrategic importance of the islands outweighs the economic and
nationalist importance in many leaders’ eyes. While the U.S. is in the process of its pivot
towards Asia, China sees America’s post-World War II presence in the area as a security
threat and roadblock to Chinese interests in the area.39 This makes determining sovereignty
over the area a critical foreign affairs issue with far reaching economic and strategic
consequences.
Current Situation
China’s recent rise to power has resulted in a more confident and assertive
government that has the military strength and financial capabilities to make serious claims on
38 “Conflict and Cooperation in the South China Sea.” Stratfor. August 31, 2016.
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/conflict-and-cooperation-south-china-sea 39 Cronin, Patrick. “The Strategic Significance of the South China Sea.” Center for
Strategic and International Studies. June 2013. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/attachments/130606_Cronin_ConferencePaper.pdf
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land in the East and South China Sea. The government has put significant effort into
reclaiming all the area within the “nine-dash line,” spending billions of dollars on artificial
islands and infrastructure. This includes the construction of helipads, airstrips, piers, radars
and surveillance structures. Since December 2013, China has reclaimed more than 2,900
acres of land. Additionally, from 2005 to 2014, China’s military spending increased by
167%.40
China’s recent stance on this area has serious security implications for most of the
countries in the region, causing the issue to extend beyond just the countries directly
involved. The Council on Foreign Relations reports that “the potential to deploy aircraft, missiles,
and missile defense systems to any of its constructed islands vastly boosts China’s power
projection, extending its operational range south and east by as much as 1,000 kilometers.”41
Although this would appear to be an offensive measure by China to many countries, it is at
least in part defensive as China’s leaders become increasingly concerned with U.S. military
presence in the area. Leaders point to the U.S.’s regular marine patrols in the name of
“freedom of navigation” as just one example of current security risks in the area.42
40 “China’s Maritime Disputes.” Council on Foreign Relations. February 2016. http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p3134541 Ibid
42 “Understanding China’s Position on the South China Sea Disputes.” Institute for Security and Development Policy. June 2016. http://isdp.eu/publication/understanding-chinas-position-south-china-sea-disputes/
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China’s security concerns should not be taken lightly. While the United States has
conducted military expeditions in nearby waters for decades, China’s new leaders have the
political and military capabilities to challenge this in a way previous leaders did not. The
U.S.’s increasingly close ties to other countries in the region have been seen as a further
threaten to China’s national interests, with the U.S.’s pivot to Asia viewed as a direct
challenge to China’s goal to gain influence in the region.43
That is why “China maintains that under international law, foreign militaries are not
able to conduct intelligence gathering activities, such as reconnaissance flights, in its
exclusive economic zone (EEZ).”44 The area China is claiming would fall into this category,
limiting the United States ability to conduct military activities in the area without notifying
China. This is crucial to China as it worries about a U.S. hostile to the Chinese government’s
goals, and as it seeks recognition by the wider international community as a superpower with
as much economic and political clout as the United States. Curbing U.S. activities in the area
would allow China to make strides towards increasing its influence in the region, a much-
desired goal of the government, which often seems hampered by U.S. presence in the region.
This issue has also created quite a stir domestically, with anti-Japanese opinion
increasing dramatically, which could be said to have distracted some of the population’s
43 Ibid
44 “Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea.” Council on Foreign Relations. July 14, 2016. http://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-tracker/p32137#!/conflict/territorial-disputes-in-the-south-china-sea
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fixation on the slowing economy. Nationalism has long been an important feature of
Chinese society. However, “contemporary Chinese history shows that the practice of trying
to distract the public from domestic problems by playing up foreign problems has often
ended with regime change. Xenophobic public sentiments can quickly transform into an
anti-government uprising. Yet CPC leaders may be cornered into taking a confrontational
approach to foreign policy due to the nationalistic appeal from both the Chinese military and
left-wing opinion leaders.”45 This will be an important consideration for leaders moving
forward in how to best handle the situation.
Additionally, in the face of China’s assertions, the Chinese government has faced
significant criticism from the international community, particularly the U.S., which has made
it clear that it is willing to challenge China on the issue. The U.S. has already established
some military presence in the area in order to maintain freedom of navigation and to deter
China from aggressively escalating its efforts to reclaim the area. Freedom of navigation is
one of the most important issues for all parties involved in the disputes, particularly the
United States, which will fight any attempts by China to restrict the trade routes. Surveillance
aircrafts now fly over the artificial islands built by China, and warships sail in the contested
waters to assure that freedom of navigation for boats in these waters continues.
45 Li, Cheng. “Rule of the Princelings.” Brookings. February 10, 2013. http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/02/china-xi-jinping-li
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Only one official legal body has weighed in on the legitimacy of China’s claims thus
far. The United Nations Permanent Court of Arbitration rule against China’s claims to lands
in the Pacific on July 13th, 2016. The court also declared that China had broken the law “by
endangering Philippine ships and damaging the marine environment.”46 This is in response
to the first official case brought to the court by the Philippines against China under the
United Nation Convention of Law of the Sea back in 2013. Under the Law of the Sea, countries get
12 nautical miles from shore as territorial waters, and 200 nautical miles as an exclusive
economic zone. This does not include any land that is undersea at high tide or man made
islands.47
The court ruled that the Taiping Island, one of the islands under dispute, does not
qualify as an island and therefore cannot be the basis for a 200 nautical mile economic zone
as China has claimed.48 China boycotted the entire proceedings and has refused to
acknowledge any power of the court in deciding such matters.
The ruling poses a lot of potential problems for China. The decision has expanded
the issue of the territorial disputes to not only whether or not China’s claims have merit, but
46 Fisher, Max. “The South China Sea: Explaining the Dispute.” New York Times. July 14, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/15/world/asia/south-china-sea-dispute-arbitration-explained.html?ref=asia47 Brown, Patrick. “China Prepares to Ignore a Binding Decision on Territorial Dispute.” CBC News. July 11, 2016. http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/south-china-sea-philippines-1.367085148 “Permanent Court of Arbitration’s Ruling Creates Common Ground.” South China Morning Post. July 16, 2016. http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1990352/permanent-court-arbitrations-ruling-creates-common-ground
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also whether or not China will abide by the ruling of this international court. All signs thus
far indicate that it will not. One of the problems is that although the ruling is binding, there
is no enforcement mechanism to see to it that China abides by the decision. While no
country involved wants to see these trade routes closed, none want to give up what they see
as their territory.
Regardless whether China abides by the ruling or not, it is a blow to China’s goals in
the region. It destroys much of the small amount of credibility China had in its actions, and
forces the Chinese Politburo to consider carefully what the next steps are moving forward.
Countries like the Philippines will now have increased leverage if diplomatic negotiations are
chosen as the method to resolve this issue, whether it be in bilateral negotiations or through
international organizations.
The current status of the islands claimed by China remains unresolved. The longer
the issue remains contentious, the more likely conflict will break out. Already, many are
afraid that the use of the contested waters by ships from the different claimant countries
could result in a misunderstanding that might lead to serious conflict. China faces not only
the possibility of military conflict with the other opposing claimants, but also with the
United States, which is obligated to defend Japan and the Philippines as a result of prior
defense treaties. Other possible actions by foreign countries could complicate China’s
chance of securing a favorable outcome regarding the disputes. Economic sanctions against
China are one such possibility.
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Potential Solutions
There are multiple solutions for the Chinese Politburo to consider when deciding
how to proceed on the issue. Possibilities include:
Resource Sharing: China could agree to the development and sharing of resources in
the areas with overlapping claims. Bilateral patrols could be established to avoid illegal
fishing and other potential for conflicts.
Military-to-Military Communication: To reduce the possibility of the conflict between
China and other Asian countries from escalating, further dialogues between its military and
others could be supported. China already has a history of military hotlines with Japan,
Vietnam, and ASEAN. This could be extended to include maritime disputes to avoid
conflict resulting from miscommunication and misunderstanding.
Multi-lateral Binding Code of Conduct: China could work with other countries to create a
binding code of conduct with the other countries involved in the disputed areas. A similar
measure in 2002, however, has not yielded much success. None of the ASEAN countries
have adhered to the provisions. Additionally, China typically prefers to resolve issues
through bilateral negotiations.
International Arbitration: The disputes could continue to be brought to the
International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and
resolved there. Perhaps if China acknowledged and participated in the proceedings, it could
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influence some of the outcomes in its favor.49 It would first have to acknowledge the recent
outcome of the case brought to the court by the Philippines.
Continued Claim:
China could refuse to back down on any of its claims. This has been the approach
thus far, with the Chinese government appearing to assume that other countries will
eventually give in to China’s demands rather than face confrontation with this new
superpower. This strategy would risk military confrontation with other countries, but could
eventually force the other parties to give up their claims to the area.
Military Action: China could aggressively pursue its claims in the region. Already,
China has expanded its military capabilities. China could enforce its control over the region
through the use of warships and other military means, driving out the naval presence of
other countries. This is extremely risky, however, because of the United States pledge to lend
military assistance to most of the countries involved and possible rebuke from members of
the United Nations in the form of economic sanctions or military dispatches.
Country Policy
Factions in the Politburo are also apparent in the foreign policy sphere. The tension
between Politburo members over the territorial disputes lies between the war hawks in
49“China’s Maritime Disputes.” Council on Foreign Relations. February 2016. http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345
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China’s Politburo and those who would like to avoid military conflict, with some also
preferring a more middle-ground strategy.
Although the Politburo is mostly civilians, members of the military have voiced their
opinions loudly in favor of securing sovereignty over the region by any means necessary.
This gives insight into the opinion of those Politburo members who also serve as part of the
Central Military Commission. When he left office, “Hu Jintao ceded his military position
instead of following the practice of his predecessor Jiang Zemin, who retained the
chairmanship of the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) for two years after
resigning from the formal party leadership. Now the number of princelings in this supreme
military leadership body is unprecedentedly high.”50 This has caused an increasingly hard ine
stance on the territorial disputes.
While thus far, it appears the princelings are more likely to favor military aggression,
their tie to business complicates their stance. As of now, aggression in the sea has not
interfered with trade, but that is an important factor to consider when deciding just how far
they are willing to press the issue. Trade is also an important factor for a number of
provinces which rely on exports. These Politburo members still tied to their regions must
consider this in determining their policy stance.
50 Li, Cheng. “Rule of the Princelings.” Brookings. February 10, 2013. http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/02/china-xi-jinping-li
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Each Politburo member has his or her own ties and interest to look out for, but
President Xi Jinping has made it increasingly clear he will not tolerate factional politics. He
has also taken aggressive measures in his anti-corruption campaign to remove those from
rival factions from power. When making decisions on such a high-profile issue, Politburo
members must keep in mind the uncertainty of their position. While previously there was
always a near even split between Princelings and Populist, Xi Jinping has been increasing the
Princelings in powerful positions and the coming replacement of five members of the
Standing Politburo Committee dues to the mandatory retirement age should be kept in mind.
Politburo members should consider their own future after their departure, as well as the
mark they wish to leave on the country and the road China may be headed down when new
members of the Politburo are chosen.
Questions
1. Why has this issue, based on a map from centuries ago, risen only recently? What
caused China to assert these claims so strongly? Why has China made claims on such
vast swath of land and sea rather than focusing on specific areas?
2. What will the consequence of the international court’s decision be? Will China
continue to ignore the court? Will other countries take action to force China to
comply with the court’s ruling?
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3. What potential solutions could China agree to without losing face? Is there any way
for China to convince other country’s to acknowledge the validity of China’s claims?
4. What is the role of Chinese nationalism in the issue? What role do domestic issues
play in this international conflict? What does the Politburo hope to accomplish by
making these claims so publicly and persistently?
