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Page 1: Chinese 2016 - Princeton International Relations …irc.princeton.edu/pmunc/docs/PMUNC Politburo BG.pdfChinese Politburo PMUNC 2016 3 Letter from the Chair Dear Delegates, My name

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Contents

Letter from the Chair…….………………………...……………………...…..3

Topic A:…………………..…..………………….....……………..……..……4

Introduction…..………………………………….……………………….……………4 History of the Topic………………………..……………………….……….…………4 Current Status…………………………………….……………..…………...…………6 Country Policy…...…………………………………………….……………………….7 Keywords……………………………………....………………...…………….…..….12 Questions for Consideration………..…………….………………...…….……….…...15 Bibliography……….................……………………………..……………………...…...15

Topic B:…………………………....…………………..…………………….18 Introduction……..………………………...……………………………………..……18 History of the Topic.………………………….………………..………………...……18 Current Status………………………………………………………………………....20 Country Policy.….…………………...……………...…..……………………………..20 Keywords………………………………………………………………………….......25 Questions for Consideration...........…………….……………………..………………..28 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………..30

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Letter from the Chair

Dear Delegates,

My name is Nina Sheridan, class of 2019 at Princeton, and I am super excited to be

chairing the Chinese Politburo committee this fall. I am a potential major in the Woodrow

Wilson School, and interested in pursuing certificates in East Asian Studies and History and

the Practice of Diplomacy. This summer, I interned at the American Chamber of Commerce

in Taipei on their business magazine, and I spent six weeks in China through the State

Department’s NSLI-Y Program in high school. At Princeton, I am part of Princeton U.S.

China Coalition, Business Today, and a program that sends tutors into nearby prisons. I also

intern for Princeton Alumni Weekly, our alumni magazine. In high school, I was part of my

school’s Model U.N. team and had a great experience with it. I hope you all are looking

forward to the conference!

See you soon!

Nina

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Introduction

Ever since the beginning of the Mao era, the Politburo has been the most

concentrated source of political power in China. The Central Politburo typically consists of

25 members who play significant and often overlapping roles in the leadership of the Party

and the government. Within this group, power is further centralized within the seven

members of the Politburo Standing Committee. This smaller group was established in 1956,

and its members are chosen in secret negotiations by outgoing members and Party elders.

The Politburo is considered the most influential body in shaping both China’s

foreign and domestic policy, though there is much secrecy as to the exact workings of the

body’s meetings and power structure. In private, the Politburo allows for the voices of its

members to be heard and pit against each other in rigorous debate. Factions and personal

alliances play a large role in these conversations. Matters can be decided by a majority,

however, important decisions rarely move forwards without a consensus. Once a decision is

made, the Politburo shows a united front to the public.

The rare times when factionalism is apparent to the public, such as during the

Tiananmen protests in 1989, often indicates that a significant power struggle is occurring

within the Party. Party General Zhao Ziyang’s public defense of the student protesters

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during Tiananmen directly conflicted with the official Politburo stance that these students

were working to undermine the government. Those who sided with Zhao favored restraint

and negotiating with the students, but Premier Li Peng and his allies were determined to

reinstate social stability regardless of the cost. When Zhao took his views public in a speech

to foreign bankers, he began to fall out of favor with senior Party leaders. He cemented his

fall from power with continued efforts to help the students avoid the wrath of the Politburo

in this rare instance of public factionalism.

The full Politburo meets monthly, while the Standing Committee meeting weekly.

The Politburo has the authority of the Central Committee, a larger assembly of the

Communist Party that meets yearly, when it is not in session. Currently, six geographic areas

are represented in the Politburo, four municipalities, Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and

Tianjin; and the coastal provinces of Guangdong and Xinjiang. The Party also maintains an

array of members of State, the military, and the National’s People Congress to ensure all

political spheres are represented. It is also important to note the age of the Politburo

members, with the younger ones considered leading candidates for eventual promotion

within the Politburo. Ascending to the Politburo at a young age is particularly important,

because all Politburo members must retire if they are 68 by the end of their five-year term.

The members of the Politburo usually hold the highest positions within both the

Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government. For example, the Party General

Secretary serves as Chairman of the Party and State Central Military Commissions, with

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oversight over China’s foreign policy as well. The second ranked member of the Standing

Committee is the Premier of the State Council, serving as the top economic official for the

country. These positions continue downward with Politburo Standing Committee members

serving as Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress,

Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) National

Committee, Party Secretariat, Head of the Party’s Central Disciplinary Inspection

Commission, and State Council Vice Premier. Of the full Politburo, members hold other

important positions including, head of the Organization Department, head of the

Propaganda Department, and head of the Central Commission of Politics and Law.

These roles give the Politburo significant power over shaping:

● Foreign policy ● Economic policy ● Legislative agenda ● State-sanctioned religious activity ● Outreach to non-Communist groups ● Ideology and propaganda ● Security ● Corruption and disciplinary problems

Collectively, the portfolio of powers of those in the Politburo will allow for the body to

solve the most difficult and pressing issues that face contemporary China. Although each

member has his or her own individual role in the Party and government, a majority of

Politburo members must vote for any decisions that address the issues posed in committee.

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Topic A: Controlling the Media

Introduction

“All websites: please self-inspect and delete all content related to the ‘Panama Papers’ leak,

including news reporting, microblogs, WeChat, forums, community pages, bulletin boards,

cloud storage, comments and other interactive media. Delete mobile content at the same

time.” –Order from government authorities on April 4th, 20161

The Chinese government has a long history of censoring media in China. Both

traditional media, like newspapers and books, and new media, like Facebook and online

blogs, are tightly controlled to prevent the inflow of information that could threaten the

government’s authority and the Communist Party’s position of power. The post-Mao

opening up of the country has exposed domestic issues to the scrutiny of foreign media

and has also led to an influx of information from abroad. The government has developed

elaborate systems to censor sensitive information, creating a model admired by authoritarian

regimes and denounced by democratic governments. In recent years, however, the

1 “Minitrue: ‘Delete All Content Related to Panama Papers.’” China Digital Times. April 4, 2016. http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2016/04/minitrue-delete-content-related-panama-papers-2/

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prevalence of internet access, along with the introduction of methods of subverting

firewalls, have made the flow of information increasingly difficult to control .

Internationally, China has faced a barrage of criticism for its continued censorship, with

many claiming that it is a violation of human rights. A recent resolution passed by the United

Nations Human Rights Council condemned countries that limit or block internet access as

violating human rights law.2 Organizations like Amnesty International, and leaders like

Barack Obama have criticized China publicly on its continued censorship. In April of this

year, the United States added China’s “Great Firewall” to a list of trade impediments for the

first time for the burden they put on foreign suppliers, Internet sites, and the users who rely

on them to conduct business.3 The government is at a crossroads where it must determine

not only how to control access to the different spheres of media in China moving forward,

but also how to effectively utilize the media to further the CCP agenda and retain their

position of power.

History of the Topic

2 Williams, Lauren. “Disrupting Internet Access is a Human Rights Violation, UN Says.”

Think Progress. July 1, 2016. https://thinkprogress.org/disrupting-internet-access-is-a-human-rights-violation-un-says-e8399647ef29#.5fopiru7t

3 Mozur, Paul. “U.S. Adds China’s Internet Controls to List of Trade Barriers.” New York Times. April 7th, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/08/business/international/china-internet-controls-us.html

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Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, “Everyone has the

right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions

without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any

media and regardless of frontiers.”4 On December 19th, 1948, China was one of 48 countries

to sign this declaration. Shortly after, Mao Zedong and the Communist Party came to power

in China, and their policies quickly proved that the CCP was not interested in upholding

these promises. The CCP had not signed the resolution and felt no qualms about subverting

the protections it had laid out. Mao’s authoritarian regime made sweeping use of censorship

as a tool to maintain political power and guide the thinking of the population.

However, the history of censorship is a long one and not necessarily confined to

authoritarian regimes. Often justified as a way to protect the moral and political life of

citizens, the first government to have an official office responsible for censorship was

Greece in 443 BC.5 Throughout history, governments both Western and Eastern have

sought to control the content and information available to their citizens. Today, China is

probably the most notable current examples of censorship of media, both because of its

large population and the expansive and precise nature of the censorship.

4 “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” United Nations. December 10, 1948. http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/

5 Newth, Mette. “The Long History of Censorship.” Beacon for Freedom of Expression. 2010. http://www.beaconforfreedom.org/liste.html?tid=415&art_id=475

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Media censorship in China expanded dramatically during the Mao era. While

spreading propaganda in newspapers, books, and plays, he also sought to stamp out those

who criticized him or the Communist Party, destroying books and jailing those who voiced

opinions and thoughts critical of the Party. Foreign media was almost entirely banned

during this time. TV broadcasts from the West would have large segments deleted. In the

1960s and 70s, foreign literature was available to no one except top Party members.6

Interestingly, freedom of speech and press is not just a right China agreed to before

the country came under Communist control. The Chinese constitution7, adopted in 1982 by

the CCP ruled government, also affords the population these rights. However, these rights

come with a caveat that allows the government to censor and punish anyone who reveals

state secrets. The use of “state secrets” has thus become much of the justification for the

large scale censorship seen in China.

As long as the Chinese government has engaged in censorship, however, so have

Chinese citizens found ways to circumvent it. From handwritten Western books to the use

of VPNs to shield location, Chinese citizens have frequently managed to gain access to

banned content if they are willing to try hard enough. Since 1978, thousands of Chinese

6 Osnos, Evan. “China’s Censored World.” New York Times. May 2, 2014.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/03/opinion/sunday/chinas-censored-world.html?_r=0 7 “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China” National People’s Congress.

December 4, 1982. http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm

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students have studied abroad in the U.S. and other foreign countries every year, gaining full

access to foreign media and sites, as well as unedited versions of their own countries history.

There has been little official policy or legislation on censorship in China. One of the

first documents to address the new issues presented by the internet was the 2005

“Provisions on the Administration of Internet News and Information Services.” This

addressed content on websites, text messages, and online forums, but was before

smartphones and mobile access to the web developed. In 2014, then, there was further

codification of what is and is not acceptable with a focus on instant messaging services. The

“Provisional Regulations for the Development and Management of Instant Messaging Tools

and Public Information Services,” also known as “the WeChat articles” for China’s popular

social media site, forces users to authenticate their identities and allows articles on current

events to be posted only by media organizations or sites.8 These stricter controls over

grassroots media attempts to curb the dissemination of information that the government

does not want to spread or contradicts the official version of a story.

Additionally, in 2010 the government issued its first White Paper focusing on the

internet. This, along with the “Public Pledge on Self-Regulation and Professional Ethics for

China Internet Industry,” imposes strict rules on internet users, both foreign and domestic,

8 Yong, Hu. “China’s Tough New Internet Rules Explained.” ChinaFile. September 10, 2014. http://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/china-tough-new-internet-rules-explained

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calling for their pledge to abide by Chinese law and regulations.9 The CCP is working to

balance the freedom desired as Chinese citizens interact with the rest of the world and the

order necessary to Party survival and legitimacy.

Lu Wei, Deputy Head of the Propaganda Department, sums up the CCP approach

by extending Deng Xiaoping’s quoted “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” to the

internet, calling China’s internet policy “cyber governance with Chinese characteristics.”10

While documents like the White Paper provide some limited insight into the careful balance

the government is trying to strike with regards to online media, they do not give a full

picture of the scale of censorship in the country or clearly define what content is to be

censored, continuing the government’s long policy of secrecy and ambiguity on the issue.

Current Situation

“There are more than 2,000 newspapers, 8,000 magazines, 374 television stations,

and 150 million internet users in China”11 This is an enormous sum for any government to

9 Xu, Beina. “Media Censorship in China.” Council on Foreign Relations. April 7, 2015. http://www.cfr.org/china/media-censorship-china/p11515

10 Denyer, Simon. “China’s Scary Lesson to the World: Censoring the Internet Works.” Washington Post. May 23, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinas-scary-lesson-to-the-world-censoring-the-internet-works/2016/05/23/413afe78-fff3-11e5-8bb1-f124a43f84dc_story.html 11 Wetherbee, Rebecca. “Censorship and Evolving Media Policy in China.” Elon University. Winter, 2010. http://www.elon.edu/docs/e-web/academics/communications/research/11weatherbeeejspring10.pdf

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control, yet China continues to attempt to do so, with varying levels of success. It has

adapted to each new hurdle brought on by advances in technology as it comes its way. As

users find new ways to subvert internet censors, be it by using homonyms for blocked words

or VPNs, the CCP has created an increasingly sophisticated censorship model in its effort to

detect these deceptions. Newspapers operating on a budget, with a staff and traceable

location, are easy to control and shut down. Individual bloggers and grassroots media on the

other hand, are far more difficult.

Since the start of Xi Jinping’s presidency in 2012, China has seen a government

increasingly willing to crack down on media outlets and censor online content. Although

most countries tend to expand freedom of speech and press over time, or at least maintain

the level of freedom, Chinese citizens are facing more hurdles in getting a full range of news

than before, and reporters are having more trouble giving it to them, facing potential jail

time if they cross the invisible line that separates what is and is not acceptable to publish.

Due to this, the NGO Reporters Without Borders ranked China 175th out of 180

countries in their Worldwide Index of Press Freedom in 2014.12 Two years earlier, in 2012,

Freedom House ranked China the 3rd most restrictive country in the world with regards to

12 Xu, Beina. “Media Censorship in China.” Council on Foreign Relations. April 7, 2015. http://www.cfr.org/china/media-censorship-china/p11515

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internet access.13 Researchers at Carnegie Mellon University found in a 2012 study that more

than 16% of all posts on Sina Weibo, a social media site, are deleted because of the content.14

This widespread censorship may be crucial to securing political stability for the Party and

limiting the potential for grassroots gatherings and protest, but it comes at a cost as the

population becomes increasingly aware of the censorship and concerned with how it

violates their freedoms. When real estate tycoon Ren Zhiqiang’s social media accounts were

taken down after he criticized President Xi Jinping, his 37 million followers took notice.

While the support Ren received from Party elites was perhaps a more surprising outcome,

hinting at fissures within the Party on the extent of censorship, the public reaction of both

fear and mocking is important to note. In a widely shared post, one user commented, “1984

was supposed to be a warning, not an instruction” in reaction to Ren’s silencing.15

The censorship regime in China is incredibly sophisticated, with the Communist

Party’s Central Propaganda Department playing the largest role in censoring media in China,

although more than a dozen government bodies are involved. The government employs a

13 “How does China censor the internet?” The Economist. April 21, 2013. http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/04/economist-explains-how-china-censors-internet 14 Bamman, David. O’Connor, Brendan. Smith, Noah. “Censorship and Deletions Practices in Chinese Social Media.” First Monday. March 2012. http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3943/3169

15 Denyer, Simon. “China’s ‘Donald Trump’ is Latest Victim of Government Crackdown.” Washington Post. February 29, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/02/29/chinas-donald-trump-silenced-latest-crackdown-sparks-fear-and-mockery/

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diverse array of methods to censor information as it is posted online. During controversial

periods, such as the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square protests, the government blocks

both sites that contain politically sensitive information such as Wikipedia and certain search

terms. Websites like Bloomberg and the New York Times were both blocked for a period of

time after running controversial stories in 2012 on the private wealth of important Party

members. Some articles are shortened to exclude references to any controversial subject

matters.

The main strategy the government employs to censor media in China is “The

Golden Shield”, a domestic surveillance system set up in the 1998 by the Ministry of Public

Security. The largest component of this program is the “Great Firewall,” which was begun in

the 1990s to limit Chinese access to foreign websites. Initially, it was only certain websites

that contained information deemed politically sensitive that were blocked, but the filters

have grown increasingly sophisticated over time. Now, certain pages on websites may be

blocked, but not the site in its entirety. Searching for certain words can leave users banned

from search engines for up 90 seconds, and pages containing these search words are often

inaccessible. Internet companies frequently ban pages preemptively that contain words from

the government list of banned terms in order to avoid trouble with the government.

Estimates put the number of people involved in censoring media in China to be

around 100,000. This does not include the “50 Cent Army” paid by the government to steer

online conversation away from politically sensitive topics and provide a pro-government

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voice in the comment sections of sites. A Washington Post article reports that the Chinese

government is able to create 450 million fake social media comments in a year through their

use of the “50 Cent Army.” That means one in every 178 posts on social media is fake.16

There is little official legislation as to what content is allowed and what content is

not. Censorship online often appears random, and there is no clear line drawn as to what

traditional media can publish either. This blurry line has caused significant self-censorship in

media organizations and from journalists who do not want to cross the line and risk firing or

even imprisonment for their articles. “The idea is that if you're never quite sure when, why

and how hard the boom might be lowered on you, you start controlling yourself, rather than

being limited strictly by what the government is able to control directly," explained James

Fallows of The Atlantic.17

The most important criteria considered in employing these various methods of

censorship is whether the content threatens political or social stability, rather than whether

the post criticizes the government or Party. Accordingly, any reports on protests, even pro-

government ones, are swiftly removed, while criticism of mid-level government officials are

16 Farrell, Henry. “The Chinese Government Fakes Nearly 450 Million Social Media Comments a Year. Here’s Why.” Washington Post. May 19, 2016. www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/19/the-chinese-government-fakes-nearly-450-million-social-media-comments-a-year-this-is-why/ 17 Duffy Marson, Carolyn. “Chinese Internet Censorship: An Inside Look.” Network World. May 12, 2008. http://www.networkworld.com/article/2279237/lan-wan/chinese-internet-censorship--an-inside-look.html

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often allowed to remain online. The ultimate goal of censorship is to prevent the

organization of any sort of political activity.18

Skirting government censors is hard, but not impossible. As the government

continues to fine-tune its filters, the public has fine-tuned mechanisms for circumventing

them. “Over the years, in a series of cat-and-mouse games, Chinese Internet users have

developed an extensive series of puns—both visual and homophonous—slang, acronyms,

memes, and images to skirt restrictions and censors” writes Jason Ng in his book Blocked on

Weibo.19

Reporters and newspapers in China, both foreign and Chinese nationals, also face

significant censorship. The government has actually instituted “a diverse range of methods

to induce journalists to censor themselves, including dismissals and demotions, libel lawsuits,

fines, arrests, and forced televised confessions.”20 Leaders argue that these actions are

necessary because of the excessive smearing of China and the Chinese government by

Western media. They “regularly claim that Western media plays up China’s weaknesses,

exaggerates its potential as a regional threat, and ignores its successes,” hindering China’s

18 King, Gary; Pan, Jennifer; and Roberts, Molly. “How Censorship in China Allows

Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression.” American Political Science Review. 2013. http://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/censored.pdf?m=1447795312

19 Ng, Jason. “Blocked on Weibo.” August 6, 2013.

https://www.amazon.com/dp/B00AXS5E6Y/ref=r_soa_w_d 20 Xu, Beina. “Media Censorship in China.” Council on Foreign Relations. April 7, 2015. http://www.cfr.org/china/media-censorship-china/p11515

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growth by placing unnecessary emphasis on the trials that a developing superpower

reasonably must undergo.21

Key Issues:

Foreign Media: Recent policy in China on censorship includes a directive in July of

2014 that bars journalists from releasing information from interviews or press conferences

on social media without permission from their employer. Since 2015, the government has

made it increasingly difficult to access Google, and social media sites like Facebook,

Instagram, and Twitter. 80% of foreign journalists reported in a 2014 survey that their

working conditions in China has gotten worse of stayed the same since 2013. The treatment

of foreign journalists and censorship of foreign has the potential to become a major foreign

policy issue, particularly with the U.S., if not handled properly.

While Politburos of the past have made promises to allow foreign media unrestricted

access in cases like the 2008 Olympics, these have not borne out in any sort of meaningful

way. This was most clearly illustrated during the 2008 Olympics when the CCP made some

concessions such as allowing journalists to freely travel the country and interview anyone

who consents, while continuing to limit journalists’ internet access to controversial content,

21 Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany. “How China Won the War Against Western Media.” Foreign Policy. March 4, 2016. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/04/china-won-war-western-media-censorship-propaganda-communist-party/

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threaten, detain, and harass some journalists, and bar them from observing protests in Tibet

and neighboring provinces.22

Civil Unrest: The Chinese population may not have as much access to unbiased

content as the rest of the world, but they are not ignorant to fact that they are seeing the

world through a tinted lens. With the rise of the internet, awareness and discontent over

censorship has spread. In 2013, hundreds of protesters gathered to protest the lack of press

freedom as some domestic reporters went on strike, gaining international attention for the

widespread support these actions received from both intellectuals and everyday citizens.23

People read news with a healthy dose of skepticism, and this pervasive doubt could have

significant negative consequences for the government. However, as recently as 2014, a

GlobalScan poll found that only 5% of Chinese believed their national media is not free. On

the other hand, 51% believe that the internet is not a safe place to express their views.24 As

the government fights to keep credibility, it must figure out how to maintain public trust. In

2008, a Pew poll showed that 85% of those surveyed said that the government should be

22 “Falling Short.” Committee to Protect Journalists. June 5, 2008.

https://cpj.org/reports/2008/06/summary-2.php 23 Kaiman, Jonathan. “China Anti-Censorship Protest Attracts Support Across Country.”

The Guardian. January 7, 2013. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/07/china-anti-censorship-protest-support

24 Keck, Zachary. “Chinese Don’t Believe They’re Being Watched and Censored.” The Diplomat. April 3, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/chinese-dont-believe-theyre-being-watched-and-censored/

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responsible for censoring the internet.25 That notion, while increasingly challenged as the

scope of censorship is made public, is one important way in which the government has

maintained this controversial practice thus far.

Economic Consequences: The widespread censorship of internet in China limits

startups and innovation. Daily use is often limited for unknown reasons, and VPNs can be

slow. In 2012, the government temporarily blocked GitHub and SourceForge, widely used

open source websites for programmers. This causes a loss of efficiency, that when multiplied

across the companies in China, add up to a significant cost for China’s economy.26 Not only

that, but the difficult conditions may discourage companies from establishing themselves in

China, particularly startups who do not have the scale to endure these costs. One counter

argument to this, says Kaifu Lee, the founder of an innovation incubator in Beijing, is that

censorship can protect local technology firms.27

China is an enormous market, and companies often have a lot to gain from

expanding their companies into the country. But companies like Google, Snapchat,

Facebook, and many other tech companies are continually frustrated with impediments to

25 Sydell, Laura. “How Do Chinese Citizens Feel About Censorship?” NPR. July 12,

2008. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=92489122 26 Bao, Beibei. “How Internet Censorship is Curbing Innovation in China.” The Atlantic.

April 22, 2013. http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/how-internet-censorship-is-curbing-innovation-in-china/275188/

27 Bao, Beibei. “How Internet Censorship is Curbing Innovation in China.” The Atlantic. April 22, 2013. http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/how-internet-censorship-is-curbing-innovation-in-china/275188/

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accessing this market. In 2010, Google actually shut down its China search-engine after four

years of abiding by China’s censorship policies, in reaction to a ban by the Chinese

government. This ban remains up six years later, although Google has been consulting with

the Chinese government on reentering the market.28 The U.S. has substantiated claims of

negative impact on businesses with its listing of China’s internet censorship as an

international trade barrier. This negative effect on business in China is important for the

government to consider as the economy’s growth rate starts to slow.

Potential Solutions

Increase the Severity of Censorship: One option for China is to increase censorship,

as well as the punishment for those who circumvent the censors or publish sensitive content.

This might increase the success of avoiding the infiltration of banned content, but would be

met with significant international criticism and domestic criticism. As international travel

continues to increase, this solution would not entirely prevent Chinese citizen’s access to

foreign media.

Use Censorship as a tool in International Dialogue: Many countries would like to see

China decrease its censorship and more unrestricted coverage for their reporters. Foreign

businesses also stand to gain if China loosens its controls. The Politburo could use these

28 Waddell, Kaveh. “Why Google Quit China-And Why It’s Heading Back” The Atlantic.

January 19, 2016. http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/01/why-google-quit-china-and-why-its-heading-back/424482/

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facts to its advantage and use decreased censorship to help their image internationally and

domestically, as well as to get concessions out of foreign countries.

Invest in Refining Censors: China’s censorship program is already highly developed

and nuanced, but further investment could be made into creating a censorship program that

censors content depending on the internet user. Already, censorship is reduced at hotels and

cafes that Westerners frequent in order to limit the foreigner’s awareness of the scope of

censorship in the country. This could be further developed to make censorship less

detectable.

Country Policy

Although the Politburo maintains a united front to the public, there are significant

factions within the Politburo with distinct opinions on how to best proceed on different

matters. Some call it the “one party, two coalitions” system, giving insight into the potential

conflicts that exist even in a one party system. Members of the Politburo come from a

diverse array of backgrounds, have different functions with the Party and government, and

are representative of different regions and political bodies.

This widespread factionalism affects the members’ opinion on issues like media

censorship. One important divide is the one between the princelings and populists. The

princelings are considered the elitists in China. They typically come from well-known

families, those who contain well-known revolutionaries and high-ranking Party officials.

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They grew up in economically secure household, usually in coastal cities, with a mind to

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protect and develop China’s entrepreneurs. 29 They are likely to consider the economic

29 Lawrence, Susan. “China’s Political Institutions and Leaders in Charts.” Congressional Research Service. November 12, 2013. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43303.pdf

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consequences of China’s “Great Firewall” when making decisions on censorship. However,

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the princelings will also have to consider the growing anger by the population over the

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Politburo members’ personal wealth and the relationship between wealth and power in the

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country that censors have been trying to mitigate awareness of.

Figure 1: Politburo Members and Roles

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The populist coalition tends to come from less-privileged families, who live inland. They

work their way up in the Party through the Chinese Communist Youth League, and give

voice to the concerns of farmers, migrants workers, and the urban poor. The populist

Politburo members tend to be more inclined towards political reform then their princeling

colleagues. In recent years, they have faced a shift in power away from previous balance,

making it harder for them to obtain a majority in decisions.30 Recent fissures between the

two factions became apparent this summer when President Xi Jinping and Premier Li

Keqiang gave speeches on the economy indicating differences in preferred policy moving

forwards.31

Smaller factions within the Politburo include the Tsinghua clique, graduates of Tsinghua

University with strong personal ties to each other; and the Shanghai clique, members who

reached political prominence through positions in Shanghai, although they have lost political

power since the retirement of Hu Jintao.

Xi Jinping began his presidency in 2012 without a loyal following in the Politburo,

meaning that those looking for political opportunity have the chance to decide how closely

they wish to align themselves with their current leader. Although the princelings have found

30 Li, Cheng. “Rule of the Princelings.” Brookings. February 10, 2013. http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/02/china-xi-jinping-li

31 Wei, Lingling. Page, Jeremy. “Discord Between China’s Top Two Leaders Spills Into the Open.” The Washington Post. July 22, 2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/discord-between-chinas-top-two-leaders-spills-into-the-open-1469134110

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themselves more frequently in line with President Xi’s course of action, they do not always

find their ideologies to be in sync.

While each Politburo member typically belongs to one of the major factions, overall,

their opinions on issues are highly personalized based on their unique experience and past.

CNN's Beijing bureau chief, Jaime FlorCruz, writes "Factional lines are often unclear,

shifting or overlapping, conditioned by old alliances, family interconnections, conflicts,

rivalries, shifting loyalties and pragmatic tactical considerations.”32 This is important to

consider when determining where each member might stand on an issue like censorship.

Key Words

The Great Firewall

The Golden Shield

50 Cent Army

Populists (Tuanpai)

Princelings

Central Propaganda Department

Weibo

Questions

32 Lai, Alexis, “‘One Party, Two Coalitions’- China’s Factional Politics,” CNN, Nov 9 2012, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/23/world/asia/china-political-factions-primer/

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1. Why has media censorship increased in the past few years? What does the shift in

balance of the factions in the Politburo have to do with this? How will this shift

affect decisions on the future of censorship in China?

2. How does this domestic issue affect foreign policy and international relations? How

should the issue of foreign reporters be handled particularly? How does censorship

affect China’s image internationally?

3. What is the main purpose of censorship? Why does the government censor media?

Why do they censor what they do, and what affect would it have if the government

reduced or stopped its censorship?

4. How much resources are being put into censoring the media? What are the costs

economically, as well as the more abstract? How does censorship affect the

population’s trust in the government?

If the population is aware of the censorship, is it effective?

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5.

Topic B: Pacific Land Disputes

Introduction

“We are strongly committed to safeguarding the country’s sovereignty and security, and defending our

territorial integrity” –Chinese President Xi Jinping

The pressing issues of overlapping claims of land in the East and South China Sea

began in 2010 with the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, also claimed by Japan. Since then, China

has been involved in land disputes with Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan,

Vietnam and Brunei. These countries are actively disputing China’s claims, maintaining their

own claims to these waters.

China’s increasing assertiveness over these areas has created significant international

tension as nearly one-third of shipping or about five trillion in commerce passes through the

waters each year. These disputed areas also contain large sources of precious fossil fuel.33

The United States, in an effort both to maintain peace and disrupt China’s actions to claim

the waters, has increased its military presence in the area.

33 Brown, Patrick. “China Prepares to Ignore a Binding Decision on Territorial Dispute.” CBC News. July 11, 2016. http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/south-china-sea-philippines-1.3670851

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This issue is critical to China’s interest in expanding influence in Asia, asserting itself

as a superpower, and maintaining national pride. Now that China has taken such a strong

stance on claiming these waters, and invested such large amounts of economic resources

into building artificial land and military capacity in the area, it would be difficult to simply

back down. Every day the issue remains unresolved increases the chance of military conflict

breaking out in the waters, making these disputes a top priority for the Politburo.

History of the Topic

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Land disputes in the Pacific area are not merely recent occurrences. The issue of

sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands first arose during the Sino-Japanese War in 1894. In

recent years however, the number of land disputes has risen rapidly, and China has made

increasingly forceful claims to large swaths of land with significant trade importance. The

Chinese government has based these claims “mostly on an old map of uncertain provenance

that it has lodged with the United Nations. China asserts sovereignty over everything inside a

‘nine-dash line’ encircling about 90 per cent of the sea around its coast, engulfing the rival

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overlapping claims of Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.”34 In

their efforts to make these claims, China has invested money in enlarging the islands,

creating artificial new ones, and equipping the islands with ports, airstrips, and other military

installations.

Other countries involved have responded with measures of their own. “In response

to China’s assertive presence in the disputed territory, Japan sold military ships and

equipment to the Philippines and Vietnam in order to improve their maritime security

34 Brown, Patrick. “China Prepares to Ignore a Binding Decision on Territorial Dispute.”

CBC News. July 11, 2016. http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/south-china-sea-philippines-1.3670851

Figure 2: Conflicting Claims

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capacity and to deter Chinese aggression.”35 While China’s actions are seen as a power grab

by the other claimants, who worry about their national security, China sees the disputes as a

necessary step in its evolution into a superpower. The reclamation of this land comes after

two centuries of struggle and weakness, of humiliation caused by foreign aggression against

the country. The country, therefore, seeks to secure its own future and place in region, as

well as limit the United States’ presence and influence.

No country involved is likely to give up the land easily, however. The significance of the

dispute only increases when the strategic and economic importance of the area is considered.

“There are are 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in deposits

under the sea” that is being disputed.36 The area also contains up to 10% of the world’s

fisheries, as well as, possibly the single most important trade route. “The oil transported

through the Malacca Strait from the Indian Ocean, en route to East Asia through the South

China Sea, is triple the amount that passes through the Suez Canal and fifteen times the

amount that transits the Panama Canal.”37 A major concern internationally is the possibility

that China will disrupt the free transit of goods along this route if it take control of these

35 “Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea.” Council on Foreign Relations. July 14, 2016. http://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-tracker/p32137#!/conflict/territorial-disputes-in-the-south-china-sea 36 Fisher, Max. “The South China Sea: Explaining the Dispute.” New York Times. July 14, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/15/world/asia/south-china-sea-dispute-arbitration-explained.html?ref=asia

37 Kaplan, Robert. “Why the South China Sea is So Crucial.” Business Insider. February 20, 2015. http://www.businessinsider.com.au/why-the-south-china-sea-is-so-crucial-2015-2

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waters. China has already shown a desire to restrict access to the area, with an August 2nd

decision by the Chinese Supreme People’s Court that China has the right to prosecute

foreign fishermen found in waters claimed by China.38

Geo-strategically, the other countries involved have not been able to form an

effective counter-weight to China’s military and economic force, and appeasing China in this

case could set the precedent for increasingly aggressive action by China in the future.

For China, the geo-strategic importance of the islands outweighs the economic and

nationalist importance in many leaders’ eyes. While the U.S. is in the process of its pivot

towards Asia, China sees America’s post-World War 2 presence in the area as a security

threat and roadblock to Chinese interests in the area.39 This makes determining sovereignty

over the area a critical foreign affairs issue with far reaching economic and strategic

consequences.

Current Situation

China’s recent rise to power has resulted in a more confident and assertive

government that has the military strength and financial capabilities to make serious claims on

land in the East and South China Sea. The government has put significant effort into

38 “Conflict and Cooperation in the South China Sea.” Stratfor. August 31, 2016.

https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/conflict-and-cooperation-south-china-sea 39 Cronin, Patrick. “The Strategic Significance of the South China Sea.” Center for

Strategic and International Studies. June 2013. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/attachments/130606_Cronin_ConferencePaper.pdf

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reclaiming all the area within the “nine-dash line,” spending billions of dollars on artificial

islands and infrastructure. This includes the construction of helipads, airstrips, piers, radars

and surveillance structures. Since December 2013, China has reclaimed more than 2,900

acres of land. Additionally, from 2005 to 2014, China’s military spending increased by

167%.40

China’s recent stance on this area has serious security implications for most of the

countries in the region, causing the issue to extend beyond just the countries directly

involved. The Council on Foreign Relations reports that “the potential to deploy aircraft,

missiles, and missile defense systems to any of its constructed islands vastly boosts China’s

power projection, extending its operational range south and east by as much as 1,000

kilometers.”41 Although this would appear to be an offensive measure by China to many

countries, it is at least in part defensive as China’s leaders become increasingly concerned

with U.S. military presence in the area. Leaders point to the U.S.’s regular marine patrols in

the name of “Freedom of Navigation” as just one example of current security risks in the

area.42

40 “China’s Maritime Disputes.” Council on Foreign Relations. February 2016. http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345 41 Ibid

42 “Understanding China’s Position on the South China Sea Disputes.” Institute for Security and Development Policy. June 2016. http://isdp.eu/publication/understanding-chinas-position-south-china-sea-disputes/

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China’s security concerns should not be taken lightly. While the United States has

conducted military expeditions in nearby waters for decades, China’s new leaders have the

political and military capabilities to challenge this in a way previous leaders did not. The

U.S.’s increasingly close ties to other countries in the region have been seen as a further

threaten to China’s national interests, with the U.S.’s pivot to Asia viewed as a direct

challenge to China’s goal to gain influence in the region.43

That is why “China maintains that under international law, foreign militaries are not

able to conduct intelligence gathering activities, such as reconnaissance flights, in its

exclusive economic zone (EEZ).”44 The area China is claiming would fall into this category,

limiting the United States ability to conduct military activities in the area without notifying

China. This is crucial to China as it worries about a U.S. hostile to the Chinese government’s

goals, and as it seeks recognition by the wider international community as a superpower with

as much economic and political clout as the United States. Curbing U.S. activities in the area

would allow China to make strides towards increasing its influence in the region, a much

desired goal of the government, which often seems hampered by U.S. presence in the region.

This issue has also created quite a stir domestically, with anti-Japanese opinion

increasing dramatically, which could be said to have distracted some of the population’s

43 Ibid

44 “Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea.” Council on Foreign Relations. July 14, 2016. http://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-tracker/p32137#!/conflict/territorial-disputes-in-the-south-china-sea

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fixation on the slowing economy. Nationalism has long been an important feature of

Chinese society. However, “contemporary Chinese history shows that the practice of trying

to distract the public from domestic problems by playing up foreign problems has often

ended with regime change. Xenophobic public sentiments can quickly transform into an

anti-government uprising. Yet CPC leaders may be cornered into taking a confrontational

approach to foreign policy due to the nationalistic appeal from both the Chinese military and

left-wing opinion leaders.”45 This will be an important consideration for leaders moving

forward in how to best handle the situation.

Additionally, in the face of China’s assertions, the Chinese government has faced

significant criticism from the international community, particularly the U.S., which has made

it clear that it is willing to challenge China on the issue. The U.S. has already established

some military presence in the area in order to maintain freedom of navigation and to deter

China from aggressively escalating its efforts to reclaim the area. Freedom of navigation is

one of the most important issues for all parties involved in the disputes, particularly the

United States, which will fight any attempts by China to restrict the trade routes. Surveillance

aircrafts now fly over the artificial islands built by China, and warships sail in the contested

waters to assure that freedom of navigation for boats in these waters continues.

45 Li, Cheng. “Rule of the Princelings.” Brookings. February 10, 2013. http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/02/china-xi-jinping-li

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Only one official legal body has weighed in on the legitimacy of China’s claims thus

far. The United Nations Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled against China’s claims to

lands in the Pacific on July 13th, 2016. The court also declared that China had broken the

law “by endangering Philippine ships and damaging the marine environment.”46 This is in

response to the first official case brought to the court by the Philippines against China under

the United Nation Convention of Law of the Sea back in 2013. Under the Law of the Sea, countries

get 12 nautical miles from shore as territorial waters, and 200 nautical miles as an exclusive

economic zone. This does not include any land that is undersea at high tide or man made

islands.47

The court ruled that the Taiping Island, one of the islands under dispute, does not

qualify as an island and therefore cannot be the basis for a 200 nautical mile economic zone

as China has claimed.48 China boycotted the entire proceedings and has refused to

acknowledge any power of the court in deciding such matters.

The ruling poses a lot of potential problems for China. The decision has expanded

the issue of the territorial disputes to not only whether or not China’s claims have merit, but

46 Fisher, Max. “The South China Sea: Explaining the Dispute.” New York Times. July 14, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/15/world/asia/south-china-sea-dispute-arbitration-explained.html?ref=asia 47 Brown, Patrick. “China Prepares to Ignore a Binding Decision on Territorial Dispute.”

CBC News. July 11, 2016. http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/south-china-sea-philippines-1.3670851 48 “Permanent Court of Arbitration’s Ruling Creates Common Ground.” South China Morning Post. July 16, 2016. http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1990352/permanent-court-arbitrations-ruling-creates-common-ground

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also whether or not China will abide by the ruling of this international court. All signs thus

far indicate that it will not. One of the problems is that although the ruling is binding, there

is no enforcement mechanism to see to it that China abides by the decision. While no

country involved wants to see these trade routes closed, none want to give up what they see

as their territory.

Regardless whether China abides by the ruling or not, it is a blow to China’s goals in

the region. It destroys much of the small amount of credibility China had in its actions, and

forces the Chinese Politburo to consider carefully what the next steps are moving forward.

Countries like the Philippines will now have increased leverage if diplomatic negotiations are

chosen as the method to resolve this issue, whether it be in bilateral negotiations or through

international organizations.

The current status of the islands claimed by China remains unresolved. The longer

the issue remains contentious, the more likely conflict will break out. Already, many are

afraid that the use of the contested waters by ships from the different claimant countries

could result in a misunderstanding that might lead to serious conflict. China faces not only

the possibility of military conflict with the other opposing claimants, but also with the

United States, which is obligated to defend Japan and the Philippines as a result of prior

defense treaties. Other possible actions by foreign countries could complicate China’s

chance of securing a favorable outcome regarding the disputes. Economic sanctions against

China are one such possibility.

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There are multiple solutions for the Chinese Politburo to consider when deciding

how to proceed on the issue. Possibilities include,

Resource Sharing: China could agree to the development and sharing of resources in

the areas with overlapping claims. Bilateral patrols could be established to avoid illegal

fishing and other potential for conflicts.

Military-to-Military Communication: To reduce the possibility of the conflict

between China and other Asian countries from escalating, further dialogues between its

military and others could be supported. China already has a history of military hotlines with

Japan, Vietnam, and ASEAN. This could be extended to include maritime disputes to avoid

conflict resulting from miscommunication and misunderstanding.

Multi-lateral Binding Code of Conduct: China could work with other countries to

create a binding code of conduct with the other countries involved in the disputed areas. A

similar measure in 2002, however, has not yielded much success. None of the ASEAN

countries have adhered to the provisions. Additionally, China typically prefers to resolve

issues through bi-lateral negotiations.

International Arbitration: The disputes could continue to be brought to the

International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and

resolved there. Perhaps if China acknowledged and participated in the proceedings, it could

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influence some of the outcomes in its favor.49 It would first have to acknowledge the recent

outcome of the case brought to the court by the Philippines.

Continued Claim: China could refuse to back down on any of its claims. This has

been the approach thus far, with the Chinese government appearing to assume that other

countries will eventually give in to China’s demands rather than face confrontation with this

new superpower. This strategy would risk military confrontation with other countries, but

could eventually force the other parties to give up their claims to the area.

Military Action: China could aggressively pursue its claims in the region. Already,

China has expanded its military capabilities. China could enforce its control over the region

through the use of warships and other military means, driving out the naval presence of

other countries. This is extremely risky, however, because of the United States pledge to lend

military assistance to most of the countries involved and possible rebuke from members of

the United Nations in the form of economic sanctions or military dispatches.

Country Policy

Factions in the Politburo are also apparent in the foreign policy sphere. The tension

between Politburo members over the territorial disputes lies between the war hawks in

49 “China’s Maritime Disputes.” Council on Foreign Relations. February 2016. http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345

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China’s Politburo and those who would like to avoid military conflict, with some also

preferring a more middle-ground strategy.

Although the Politburo is mostly civilians, members of the military have voiced their

opinions loudly in favor of securing sovereignty over the region by any means necessary.

This gives insight into the opinion of those Politburo members who also serve as part of the

Central Military Commission. When he left office, “Hu Jintao ceded his military position

instead of following the practice of his predecessor Jiang Zemin, who retained the

chairmanship of the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) for two years after

resigning from the formal party leadership. Now the number of princelings in this supreme

military leadership body is unprecedentedly high.”50 This has caused an increasingly hard line

stance on the territorial disputes.

While thus far, it appears the princelings are more likely to favor military aggression,

their tie to business complicates their stance. As of now, aggression in the sea has not

interfered with trade, but that is an important factor to consider when deciding just how far

they are willing to press the issue. Trade is also an important factor for a number of

provinces who rely on exports. These Politburo members still tied to their regions must

consider this in determining their policy stance.

50 Li, Cheng. “Rule of the Princelings.” Brookings. February 10, 2013. http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/02/china-xi-jinping-li

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Each Politburo member has his or her own ties and interest to look out for, but

President Xi Jinping has made it increasingly clear he will not tolerate factional politics. He

has also taken aggressive measures in his anti-corruption campaign to remove those from

rival factions from power. When making decisions on such a high-profile issue, Politburo

members must keep in mind the uncertainty of their position. While previously there was

always a near even split between Princelings and Populist, Xi Jinping has been increasing the

Princelings in powerful positions and the coming replacement of five members of the

Standing Politburo Committee dues to the mandatory retirement age should be kept in

mind. Politburo members should consider their own future after their departure, as well as

the mark they wish to leave on the country and the road China may be headed down when

new members of the Politburo are chosen.

Key Words

Diaoyu Islands

Law of the Sea

Nina Dash Line

Exclusive Economic Zones

Questions

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1. Why has this issue, based on a map from centuries ago, risen only recently? What

caused China to assert these claims so strongly? Why has China made claims on such

vast swath of land and sea rather than focusing on specific areas?

2. What will the consequence of the international court’s decision be? Will China

continue to ignore the court? Will other countries take action to force China to

comply to the court’s ruling?

3. What potential solutions could China agree to without losing face? Is there any way

for China to convince other country’s to acknowledge the validity of China’s claims?

4. What is the role of Chinese nationalism in the issue? What role do domestic issues

play in this international conflict? What does the Politburo hope to accomplish by

making these claims so publicly and persistently?