Noam Chomsky - The Gulf Crisis, 1991

The Gulf Crisis

Noam Chomsky

Z Magazine,

February, 1991

Aggression and Response

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 evoked a strong response from the industrial powers;

in fact, two rather different responses. The first was an array of economic sanctions of

unprecedented severity. The second was the threat of war. Both responses were initiated at once,

even before Iraq's annexation of the invaded country. The first response had broad support.

The second is pretty much limited to the U.S. and Britain, apart from the family dictatorships that

had been placed in charge of the Gulf oil producing states. As leader of the two-member coalition,

the U.S. moved quickly to ensure that sanctions could not be effective and to bar any diplomatic

initiative.

Two questions at once arise: What explains the unprecedented actions? What lies behind the

tactical division over generally shared objectives?

The second question is rarely raised explicitly, except in the course of complaints about our faint-

hearted and money-grubbing allies, who lack the courage, integrity and sturdy national character

of the Anglo-American duo. The general question, however, suffers from no shortage of answers,

including impressive phrases about the sanctity of international law and the U.N. Charter, and our

historic mission to punish anyone who dares to violate these sacred principles by resorting to

force.

President Bush declared that "America stands where it always has, against aggression, against

those who would use force to replace the rule of law."

While some questioned his tactical judgment, there was widespread admiration for the President's

honorable stand, and his forthright renewal of our traditional dedication to nonviolence, the rule

of law, and the duty of protecting the weak and oppressed.

Scholarship weighed in, adding historical and cross-cultural depth. A noted Cambridge University

Professor of Political Science wrote in the Times Literary Supplement (London) that "Our

traditions, fortunately, prove to have at their core universal values, while theirs are sometimes

hard to distinguish with the naked eye from rampant (and heavily armed) nihilism. In the Persian

Gulf today, President Bush could hardly put it more bluntly...."

Others too basked in self-adulation, though it was conceded that we had not always applied our

traditional values with complete consistency, failures that we are sure to rectify as soon as we

have finished with the business at hand. These past lapses are commonly attributed to our

The Gulf Crisis http://docs.google.com/View?docID=0AZ2SM5IjBmn3ZDVr...

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understandable preoccupation with defense against the Russians, now of lesser urgency with the

U.S. triumph in the Cold War.

The issue was raised to cosmic significance, with visions of a New World Order of peace and

justice that lies before us if only the new Hitler can be stopped before he conquers the world --

after having failed to overcome post-revolutionary Iran with its severely weakened military, even

with the support of the U..S., USSR, Europe, and the major Arab states. "We live in one of those

rare transforming moments in history," Secretary Baker declared, with the Cold War over and "an

era full of promise" just ahead, if we can avoid "the self-defeating path of pretending not to see."

Commentators marvelled at the "wondrous sea change" at the United Nations, which is

"functioning as it was designed to do...for virtually the first time in its history" and thus offering

"a bold pattern of peacekeeping for the post-Cold War world" (New York Times). The standard

explanation is that with the U.S. victory in the Cold War, Soviet obstructionism and the "shrill,

anti-Western rhetoric" of the Third World no longer render the U.N. ineffective.

Narrowing the Options

Professing high principle, Washington moved vigorously to block all diplomatic efforts, restricting

its own contacts with Iraq to delivery of an ultimatum demanding immediate and total

capitulation to U.S. force -- what George Bush called "going the extra mile to achieve a peaceful

solution." Europeans were warned not to deviate from the firm U.S. rejection of any form of

diplomacy or any hint of willingness to negotiate.

Washington also sternly rejected any "linkage" with regional issues, expressing its moral revulsion

at the very thought of rewarding an aggressor by considering problems of armaments, security,

and others in a regional context. The effect was to minimize the likelihood that Iraqi withdrawal

from Kuwait might be arranged without the threat or use of force. It is difficult to imagine that

this was not the purpose of the rejection of "linkage," also an unprecedented stand.

These solemn declarations of high principle were generally accepted at face value, leaving

unchallenged the pretexts offered for war. Debate was therefore limited to tactical questions of

U.S. interest. In this limited frame, the Administration is sure to prevail, and did. The rhetorical

stance, in contrast, could not have survived the slightest challenge. The general abdication of

critical standards was thus a matter of no small importance -- not for the first time.

Some did express concern, and a degree of wonder, over the inability of backward sectors to

perceive our nobility. "Perhaps most troublesome for Bush in his effort to create a `new world

order'," one reporter observed plaintively, is the fact that "a surprising number of Europeans

believe that the United States is in the gulf not to free Kuwait or punish Saddam Hussein but to

bolster its own influence and power."

A poll reported in the same paper the same day (Boston Globe, Jan. 13) revealed that a

surprising number of Americans share these delusions, believing that control over oil is the "key

reason" for the U.S. troop presence (50%), not "liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation"

(28%) or "neutralization of Iraq's weapons capabilities (14%). Such confusions are even more

rampant in the Third World, apart from the wealthy and privileged elements which, like their


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counterparts here, have a proper understanding of our innate virtue and benevolence.

Washington's explicit rejection of any form of diplomacy was welcomed as a "sensational offer to

negotiate" (in the words of a British loyalist), a forthcoming willingness to "explore any diplomatic

avenue," along the "diplomatic track" that had been effectively blocked. There was eloquent

rhetoric about Iraqi human rights abuses, and the anguish they caused George Bush, who "keeps

copies of Amnesty International's reports on Iraqi torture in his office" (Daniel Yergin) and whose

soul had been seared by the experience of fighting to stop Hitler and Tojo, after the cowardly

appeasers had let them go too far.

Rejection of diplomacy was explicit from the outset. New York Times chief diplomatic

correspondent Thomas Friedman (in effect, the State Department voice at the Times) attributed

the Administration's rejection of "a diplomatic track" to its concern that negotiations might

"defuse the crisis" at the cost of "a few token gains in Kuwait" for the Iraqi dictator, perhaps "a

Kuwaiti island or minor border adjustments" (August 22). Anything short of capitulation to U.S.

force is unacceptable, whatever the consequences.

Diplomatic options opened shortly after Saddam Hussein realized the nature of the forces arrayed

against him, apparently with some surprise, though we cannot evaluate their prospects because

they were barred at once by Washington's rigid rejectionism. On August 12, Iraq proposed a

settlement linking its withdrawal from Kuwait to withdrawal from other occupied Arab lands: Syria

and Israel from Lebanon, and Israel from the territories it conquered in 1967.

Two weeks later, about the time that Friedman warned of the dangers of diplomacy, the Times

learned of a considerably more far-reaching offer from Iraq, but chose to suppress it. A similar

(or perhaps the same) offer was leaked to the suburban New York journal Newsday, which

published it very prominently on August 29, compelling the Times to give it marginal and

dismissive notice the next day.

The Iraqi offer was delivered to National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft by a former

high-ranking U.S. official on August 23. It called for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait in return for the

lifting of sanctions, full Iraqi control of the Rumailah oil field that extends about 2 miles into

Kuwaiti territory over a disputed border, and guaranteed Iraqi access to the Gulf, which involves

the status of two uninhabited islands that had been assigned by Britain to Kuwait in the imperial

settlement, thus leaving Iraq virtually landlocked.

Iraq also proposed negotiations on an oil agreement "satisfactory to both nations' national

security interest," on "the stability of the gulf," and on plans "to alleviate Iraq's economical and

financial problems." There was no mention of U.S. troop withdrawal or other preconditions. An

Administration official who specializes in Mideast affairs described the proposal as "serious" and

"negotiable."

Like others, this diplomatic opportunity quickly passed. Where noted at all in the media, the offer

was dismissed on the grounds that the White House was not interested; surely true, and

sufficient for the offer to be written out of history, on the assumption that all must serve the

whims of power. Iraqi proposals continued to surface, along with others. As of January 15, the

last known example was made public on January 2, when U.S. officials disclosed an Iraqi offer "to


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withdraw from Kuwait if the United States pledges not to attack as soldiers are pulled out, if

foreign troops leave the region, and if there is agreement on the Palestinian problem and on the

banning of all weapons of mass destruction in the region" (Knut Royce, Newsday, Jan. 3).

Officials described the offer as "interesting" because it dropped any claims to the islands in the

Gulf and the Rumailah oil field, and "signals Iraqi interest in a negotiated settlement." A State

Department Mideast expert described the proposal as a "serious prenegotiation position." The

U.S. "immediately dismissed the proposal," Royce continues. It passed without mention in the

Times, and was barely noted elsewhere.

The Times did however report on the same day that Yasser Arafat, after consultations with

Saddam Hussein, indicated that neither of them "insisted that the Palestinian problem be solved

before Iraqi troops get out of Kuwait." According to Arafat, the report continues, "Mr. Hussein's

statement Aug. 12, linking an Iraqi withdrawal to an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and

Gaza Strip, was no longer operative as a negotiating demand." All that is necessary is "a strong

link to be guaranteed by the five permanent members of the Security Council that we have to

solve all the problems in the Gulf, in the Middle East and especially the Palestinian cause."

Two weeks before the deadline for Iraqi withdrawal, then, the possible contours of a diplomatic

settlement appeared to be these: Iraq would withdraw completely from Kuwait with a U.S. pledge

not to attack withdrawing forces; foreign troops leave the region; the Security Council indicates a

serious commitment to settle other major regional problems. Disputed border issues would be left

for later consideration. Once again, we cannot evaluate the prospects for settlement along these

-- surely reasonable -- lines, because the offers were flatly rejected, and scarcely entered the

media or public awareness. The United States and Britain maintained their commitment to force

alone.

The strength of that commitment was again exhibited when France made a last-minute effort to

avoid war on January 14, proposing that the Security Council call for "a rapid and massive

withdrawal" from Kuwait along with a statement that Council members would bring their "active

contribution" to a settlement of other problems of the region, "in particular, of the Arab-Israeli

conflict and in particular to the Palestinian problem by convening, at an appropriate moment, an

international conference" to assure "the security, stability and development of this region of the

world."

The French proposal was supported by Belgium, a Council member, and Germany, Spain, Italy,

Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and several non-aligned nations. The U.S. and Britain rejected it (along

with the Soviet Union, irrelevantly). U.N. Ambassador Thomas Pickering stated that the proposal

was unacceptable, because it went beyond previous U.N. resolutions on the Iraqi invasion.

The Ambassador's statement was technically correct. The wording of the proposal is drawn from a

different source, namely, a Security Council decision of December 20, adjoined to Resolution 681,

which calls on Israel to observe the Geneva Conventions in the occupied territories. In that

statement the members of the Security Council called for "an international conference, at an

appropriate time, properly structured," to help "achieve a negotiated settlement and lasting

peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict." The statement was excluded from the actual Resolution to

prevent a U.S. veto. Note that there was no "linkage" to the Iraqi invasion, which was


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unmentioned.

We do not, again, know whether the French initiative could have succeeded in averting war. The

U.S. feared that it might, and therefore blocked it, in accord with its zealous opposition to any

form of diplomacy, and, in this case, its equally strong opposition to an international conference

that might lead the way towards a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict that the U.S.

has long opposed. In this rejectionism, George Bush was joined by Saddam Hussein, who gave no

public indication of any interest in the French proposal, though doing so might possibly have

averted war.

The U.S. at once dispatched a huge expeditionary force to the Gulf (even before the annexation,

which was therefore not a factor in this decision). That force was virtually doubled after the

November elections. While a deterrent force could be kept in the desert and offshore, hundreds of

thousands of troops cannot be maintained in the desert for long, and withdrawal of this military

force without victory was ruled out by same lofty rhetorical stance that blocked the diplomatic

track. The predictable effect of this decision -- and, presumably, its purpose -- was to undercut

the reliance on sanctions, which could only have an impact over an extended period.

We might take a moment to review the standard arguments against sanctions. Advocates of force

observed somberly that there is no guarantee that sanctions would work. That is quite true; there

is also no guarantee that the sun will rise tomorrow. There is, however, a strong probability that

in this case sanctions would have been effective, if only because of their extraordinary severity,

and because -- for once -- the usual "sanctions busters" (the U.S., Britain, and their allies)

happen to be on board, a simple truth that plainly cannot be expressed.

It was also argued that we cannot delay until sanctions have an effect. Why can't we wait? One

reason offered is that the coalition would not hold -- a tacit concession of the lack of support for

the U.S. stance. Another is that it would be too costly for us. But the costs of a deterrent force

would, in fact, be slight. The main argument is again high moral principle: it offends our

sensibilities to stand by while the aggressor remains unpunished.

That is not very convincing, to put it mildly. As Edward Herman discussed in the January issue of

Z magazine, for two decades South Africa defied the U.N. and the World Court on Namibia,

looting and terrorizing the occupied country and using it as a base for its aggression against

neighboring states, exacting an awesome toll.

In the 1980s, the cost of South African terror just to its neighbors is estimated by the UN

Economic Commission on Africa at more than $60 billion and 1.5 million lives. No one proposed

bombing South Africa, or withholding food. The U.S. pursued "quiet diplomacy" and "constructive

engagement," insisting upon "linkage" to a variety of other issues, with thoughtful consideration

of the interests of the occupiers.

Exactly the same was true when George Shultz attempted to broker Israel's partial withdrawal

from Lebanon, also with ample reward for the aggressor, who had been the beneficiary of U.S.

material aid and Security Council vetoes as it battered the defenseless country in the course of

completely unprovoked aggression that opened, symbolically, with bombing of civilian targets

leaving over 200 killed, including 60 patients in a children's hospital.


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Avoidance of "linkage," whatever the merits of this stance, is another diplomatic innovation

devised for the present case. Obviously, it reflects no high principle. In fact, no argument

whatsoever was presented for this radical departure from normal procedure -- and none was

needed, given the reflexive obedience of the educated classes.

From the outset, then, policy was carefully designed to reduce the likely alternatives to two: war,

or Iraqi capitulation to a display of armed might. Crucially, the peaceful means prescribed by

international law must be barred. On that fundamental principle, the U.S. and Britain have been

adamant, standing almost alone.

The moral level of debate was illustrated by the reaction to an influential interview with the

commander of the U.S. forces, General Norman Schwartzkopf, featured in a front-page story in

the New York Times, which opened as follows:

"The commander of the American forces facing Iraq said today that his troops could obliterate

Iraq, but cautioned that total destruction of that country might not be `in the interest of the

long-term balance of power in this region'."

The warning was elaborated by others. In a typical example, Times Middle East specialist Judith

Miller, under the heading "Political Cost of Victory Questioned," wrote:

There are few who doubt that if there is a war in the Persian Gulf, the United States and its

allies can "turn Baghdad into a parking lot," as an American diplomat in the Middle East

recently put it. But many analysts are increasingly concerned about the probable effect of

such a victory on longer-term American interests in the region. William Crowe, a former

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned last week that "many Arabs would deeply

resent a campaign that would necessarily kill large numbers of their Muslim brothers...."

In short, we could slaughter 17 million people and wipe a country off the face of the earth, but

mass extermination might be tactically unwise, harmful to our interests. This wrenching moral

issue was thoughtfully discussed in many articles. Those who have expressed concern over the

decline of our traditional values may rest assured.

High Principle

As noted, the largely uncritical acceptance of Washington's rhetorical stance by articulate opinion

was no insignificant matter. Its effect was to undercut reliance on sanctions and to bar

exploration of the diplomatic track, on the grounds that "aggressors cannot be rewarded" -- in

this unique case. The effect, then, was to leave violence as the only policy option: Iraq might

succumb to the threat, or pay the price.

Restricting the options to these was no small achievement, given the unprecedented character of

the U.S. stance and its narrow base of real support. The rhetorical stance assumed by the White

House, and accepted uncritically by its mainstream critics as well for the most part, therefore

merits some attention. Not a great deal of attention is required, however, because the rhetorical

stance cannot withstand even a moment's scrutiny.


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As a matter of logic, principles cannot be selectively upheld. As a matter of fact, the U.S. is one of

the major violators of the principles now grandly proclaimed. We conclude at once, without

ambiguity or equivocation, that the U.S. does not uphold these principles. We do not admire

Saddam Hussein as a man of principle because he condemns Israel's annexation of the Syrian

Golan Heights, nor do his laments over human rights abuses in the occupied territories encourage

our hopes for a kinder, gentler world.

The same reasoning applies when George Bush warns of appeasing aggressors and clutches to his

heart the Amnesty International report on Iraqi atrocities (after August 2), but not AI reports on

El Salvador, Turkey, Indonesia, the Israeli occupied territories, and a host of others. As for the

"wondrous sea change" at the U.N., it has little to do with the end of the Cold War, or the

improved behavior of the Russians and Third World degenerates, whose "shrill, anti-Western

rhetoric" commonly turns out to be a call for observance of international law, a weak barrier

against the depredations of the powerful.

The U.N. was able to respond to Iraq's aggression because -- for once -- the U.S. happened to be

opposed to criminal acts, as distinct from its own invasion of Panama in the first post-Cold War

act of aggression, the Turkish invasion and virtual annexation of northern Cyprus, Israel's

invasion of Lebanon and annexation of the Golan Heights (sanctions vetoed by the U.S.), the

Moroccan invasion of the Sahara (justified on grounds that "one Kuwait in the Arab world is

enough"; it is unjust for such vast resources to be in the hands of a tiny population); and much

else.

As for the unprecedented severity of the U.N. sanctions, that was a direct result of intense U.S.

pressures, cajolery, and threats, and the considerations of self-interest that motivate other

powers, great and small.

Saddam Hussein is a murderous gangster, just as he was before August 2, when he was an

amiable friend and favored trading partner. His invasion of Kuwait is another crime, comparable to

others, not as terrible as some; for example, the Indonesian invasion and annexation of East

Timor, which reached near-genocidal levels thanks to diplomatic and material support from the

two righteous avengers of the Gulf. The truth was revealed by U.N. Ambassador Daniel Patrick

Moynihan in his memoirs, describing his success in implementing State Department directives to

render the U.N. "utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook" in response to Indonesia's

aggression, because "the United States wished things to turn out as they did, and worked to

bring this about."

It was stated with equal frankness by Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, explaining his

country's acquiescence in the forcible annexation of East Timor: "The world is a pretty unfair

place, littered with examples of acquisition by force...." Saddam Hussein's aggression, in

contrast, called forth Australian Prime Minister Hawke's ringing declaration that "big countries

cannot invade small neighbors and get away with it."

If Libya were to join the Butcher of Baghdad in exploiting Kuwait's oil riches, we would be hearing

calls to nuke the bastards. The reaction was slightly different when Australia joined the Butcher of

Jakarta a few weeks ago in development of the rich petroleum resources of the Timor sea.


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U.N. peacekeeping efforts have regularly been frustrated by the United States. The first post-Cold

War U.N. session (1989-90) was typical in this regard. Three Security Council resolutions were

vetoed, all by the U.S. Two condemned George Bush's murderous invasion of Panama, the third

condemned Israeli human rights abuses; the U.S. vetoed a similar resolution the following May.

Britain and France joined the U.S. in blocking one of the resolutions on Panama; the other,

condemning U.S. violations of diplomatic rights, was voted 13-1, Britain abstaining.

The General Assembly passed two resolutions calling on all states to observe international law.

The U.S. voted against both, alone with Israel. The first condemned the continuing U.S. support

for the contras, the second, U.S. economic warfare against Nicaragua -- both declared "unlawful"

by the World Court, but irrelevantly, by the standards of the U.S. and its allies. A resolution

condemning the acquisition of territory by force passed 151-3 (U.S., Israel, Dominica); this was

yet another call for a political settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict, which the U.S. has blocked

for 20 years.

The U.S. is far in the lead in the past 20 years in Security Council vetoes. Britain is second,

France a distant third, and the USSR fourth. The situation is similar in the General Assembly,

where the U.S. regularly votes against resolutions on aggression, international law, human rights

abuses, disarmament, and other relevant issues, often alone, or with a few client states. That has

been the pattern since the U.N. ceased to serve as a virtual instrument of U.S. foreign policy.

There is no reason to expect that the Soviet collapse will induce the U.S. and Britain to end their

campaign against international law, diplomacy, and collective security -- a campaign that had

little to do with the Cold War, as a look at cases shows. The record offers no prospects for a bright

new era.

The actual stance of the U.S. was made clear during the debate over its invasion of Panama,

when U.N. Ambassador Thomas Pickering lectured the Security Council on the meaning of Article

51 of the Charter, which restricts the use of force to self-defense against armed attack until the

Council acts. These words permit the U.S. to use "armed force...to defend our interests,"

Pickering explained to his backward students.

The same Article permits the U.S. to invade Panama to prevent its "territory from being used as a

base for smuggling drugs into the United States," the Justice Department added. Washington has

even claimed the right of "self-defense against future attack" under Article 51 (justifying the

terror bombing of Libya). In brief, like other states, the U.S. will do what it chooses, regarding

law and principle as ideological weapons, to be used when serviceable, to be discarded when they

are a nuisance. We do no one any favors by suppressing these truisms.

Washington's rejection of "linkage" in this particular case is readily understandable when we

dispense with illusion. The U.S. opposes diplomatic resolution of each of the major issues;

therefore it opposes linking them. Simple enough.

There are two crucial regional issues, apart from Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, a fact underscored

by the Iraqi proposal released by U.S. officials on January 2. The first is the Arab-Israel conflict,

the second, the matter of weapons of mass destruction. On both issues, the U.S. has been

consistently opposed to the diplomatic track.


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Consider first the Arab-Israel conflict. There has long been a broad international consensus on a

political settlement of this conflict. The U.S. and Israel have opposed it, and have been isolated in

this rejectionism, as the recent General Assembly vote of 151-3 indicates. The President likes to

tell us how James Baker has labored to advance the peace process, but he remains silent about

the terms of the famed Baker plan, with its unwavering support for the Israeli government "peace

plan."

Its basic principles ban an "additional Palestinian state" (Jordan already being one); bar any

"change in the status of Judea, Samaria and Gaza other than in accordance with the basic

guidelines of the [Israeli] Government," which preclude any meaningful Palestinian

self-determination; reject negotiations with the PLO, thus denying Palestinians the right to choose

their own political representation; and call for "free elections" under Israeli military rule with

much of the Palestinian leadership rotting in prison camps. Unsurprisingly, the official U.S.

position is kept carefully under wraps, and diplomacy is not a policy option.

Another of the President's favorite slogans is that "it is the world against Saddam Hussein." It is

even more true that it is the world against George Bush and his predecessors, as the recent U.N.

vote again illustrates. For this reason, the U.S. has consistently opposed an international

conference on the Middle East. The excuse offered now is that we must not reward aggression.

But that cannot be the reason. The U.S. is commonly quite happy to reward aggression, and it

opposed an international conference long before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and continued to

oppose a call for such a conference even when it was not "linked" to Iraq, as noted above.

The real reason is that at an international conference, the U.S. would be isolated. Such a

conference could only lead to pressures for a political settlement that the U.S. rejects. Therefore,

Washington opposes an international conference. For the same reasons the U.S. has vetoed

Security Council resolutions calling for a political settlement and blocked other diplomatic

initiatives for the past 20 years.

The same is true with regard to weapons of mass destruction, surely an issue that must be

considered on a regional basis, hence with the dread "linkage," as in all similar cases. In April

1990, Saddam Hussein, then still George Bush's friend and ally, offered to destroy his chemical

and biological weapons if Israel agreed to destroy its non-conventional weapons -- including its

nuclear weapons.

The State Department welcomed Hussein's offer to destroy his own arsenal, but rejected the link

"to other issues or weapons systems." Note that these remain unspecified. Acknowledgement of

the existence of Israeli nuclear weapons would raise the question why all U.S. aid to Israel is not

illegal under congressional legislation of the 1970s that bars aid to any country engaged in

clandestine nuclear weapons development.

The story continues. In December, speaking at a joint press conference with Secretary of State

Baker, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze proposed a nuclear-free zone in the Middle

East if Iraq withdraws from Kuwait. Baker gave "qualified support," the press observed, but

"carefully avoided using the words `nuclear-free zone' " -- for the reason just noted. A week

later, Iraq offered to "scrap chemical and mass destruction weapons if Israel was also prepared to


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do so," Reuters reported. The offer seems to have passed in silence here. Iraq's more recent call

for "the banning of all weapons of mass destruction in the region" as part of a negotiated

settlement of its withdrawal from Kuwait has already been mentioned.

We gain further understanding of the high principles inspiring the U.S. and its British partner

when we look at the forces assembled, however ambiguously, under their flag. It has been hard

to overlook the fact that there is little to distinguish Saddam Hussein from Syria's Hafez el-Assad,

apart from current service to U.S. needs; in fact, prior to August 2 their rankings were often

reversed within the doctrinal system.

An inconvenient Amnesty International release of November 2 reported that Saudi security forces

tortured and abused hundreds of Yemeni "guest workers," also expelling 750,000 of them, "for no

apparent reason other than their nationality or their suspected opposition to the Saudi Arabian

government's position in the gulf crisis." Apparently George Bush, though an avid reader of AI

reports (so we are told), somehow missed this one. The press also looked the other way, though

in the case of Arab states, there is no shortage of commentators to denounce their evil nature.

It was also necessary to overlook Turkey's abysmal human rights record, not to speak of its

conquest and virtual annexation of northern Cyprus, with thousands of casualties and hundreds

of thousands of refugees after an orgy of killing, torture, rape and pillage to extirpate the last

remnants of Greek culture back to classical antiquity. Nonetheless, few winced when George Bush

praised Turkey for serving "as a protector of peace" as it joined those who "stand up for civilized

values around the world," opposing Saddam Hussein.

The alliance with Turkey also required some fancy footwork because of the question of the Kurds

in northern Iraq. It is difficult not to notice that Iraqi forces facing U.S. troops would be severely

weakened if the U.S. were to support a Kurdish rebellion. Washington rejected this option,

presumably out of concern that a Kurdish rebellion in Iraq might spread to Eastern Turkey, where

the huge Kurdish population (subjected to torture and other severe punishments for the crime of

speaking or writing Kurdish or otherwise identifying themselves as Kurds) suffer brutal

oppression.

In a rare notice of the issue in the press, the Wall Street Journal observed that "the West fears

that pressing the `Kurdish question' with Turkey, Syria and Iran...could weaken the anti-Iraq

alliance." The report adds that "the U.S. administration pointedly refused to meet with an Iraqi

Kurdish leader who visited Washington in August" to ask for support, and that "Kurds say Ankara

is using the Gulf crisis and Turkey's resulting popularity in the West as cover for a crackdown" --

while Western commentary now laments Iraq's vicious treatment of the Kurds, whose grim fate

has been cynically exploited by the West for many years. Other reports confirm new population

transfers in the regions near the Iraqi border, with several hundred villages either partially or

totally evacuated, though increased press censorship -- the most severe since 1925, according to

an informed Turkish source -- leaves the matter obscure.

The avoidance of this topic is particularly remarkable because of its relevance to the sole issue

that is supposed to concern us, in accord with our traditional values: saving American lives.

Evidently, this concern was outweighed by the higher priority of protecting Turkey's right to

repress its Kurdish population.


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Proceeding through the list, the plea that Washington is inspired by any wisp of principle can

hardly be sustained. Inquiry will reveal nothing beyond the usual reasons of state.

It is child's play to demonstrate that Saddam Hussein is a major criminal, who would be

subjected to the judgment of Nuremberg in a just world. Many others would stand beside him

before the bar of justice, among them many of his most passionate accusers, some well within

the reach of U.S. law enforcement. The arguments advanced to justify the bombing of Baghdad

might be taken seriously if they were put forth by people who had also been calling eloquently for

the bombing of Jakarta, Ankara, Tel Aviv, Cape Town, and many other capitals, not excluding

Washington.

Returning to the two questions raised at the outset, the answer to the first is straightforward: the

response to Saddam Hussein's aggression is unprecedented because he stepped on the wrong

toes. The U.S. is upholding no high principle in the Gulf. Nor is any other state.

Let's also be clear about a further point. Since the justifications for war are based on an appeal to

principle that is clearly fraudulent, it follows that no reason at all has been given for going to war.

None whatsover. Doubtless there are reasons, but not the ones that have been offered, because

these plainly cannot be taken seriously.

The Guardians of the Gulf

Let us turn now to the second question raised: Why have the U.S. and Britain insisted on the

threat or use of force to attain the ends generally shared, instead of sanctions and diplomacy?

Why do we find two major First World military forces in the Gulf, the U.S. and Britain, while other

powers declined to give more than token support -- even financial? Furthermore, even after

extensive U.S. pressures, the Security Council could not be moved beyond an ambiguous

resolution authorizing "all necessary means" to secure Iraqi withdrawal: diplomacy, sanctions, or

military action by those intent on undertaking it.

As noted by David Scheffer, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

the resolution "neither requests nor commands the use of military force" and "avoids the

terminology of war and such explicit terms as `armed force' or `military measures'." When the

history of this period emerges, if it ever does, it may well turn out that, in reality, the U.N. record

did not deviate much from the standard pattern of attempts at peacekeeping frustrated by U.S.

veto; in this case, attempts to pursue the course of sanctions and diplomacy, blocked by U.S.

threats and pressures, leading the U.N. in effect to wash its hands of the matter, never pursuing

the procedures by which the Security Council may make "plans for the application of armed

force," according to the Charter.

At this point, one can only speculate about the reasons for the U.S.-British insistence on force,

but there are relevant factors, including the historical background and the nature of the emerging

world order.

The U.S. and U.K. largely established the post-war settlement in the region. A principle guiding

U.S. policy has been that the incomparable energy resources of the Gulf region, and the


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enormous profits reaped, must remain under the effective control of the U.S., its corporations,

and dependable allies and clients. Britain viewed matters in a similar light. In the early post-war

years, there was considerable conflict between the U.S. and Britain over the terms of the imperial

settlement, resolved by the 1950s within the global order dominated by the United States.

Iraq challenged Anglo-American privilege in 1958, when a nationalist military coup overthrew a

dependent regime. There is, of course, an earlier history, including British terror bombing of

civilians and the request of the RAF Middle East command for authorization to use chemical

weapons "against recalcitrant Arabs as experiment." The request was granted by the Secretary of

State at the War office, who was "strongly in favour" of "using poisoned gas against uncivilised

tribes" (Winston Churchill) -- another illustration of the "universal values" that animate our

traditions.

In his history of the oil industry, Christopher Rand describes the 1958 coup as "America's biggest

setback in the region since the war," "a shocking experience for the United States" that

"undoubtedly provok[ed] an agonizing reappraisal of our nation's entire approach to the Persian

Gulf." Recently released British and American documents help flesh out earlier surmises.

Kuwait was a particular concern. The "new Hitler" of the day was the secular nationalist Gamal

Abdel Nasser of Egypt, and it was feared that his pan-Arab nationalism might spread to Iraq,

Kuwait, and beyond. One reaction to the 1958 coup was a U.S. Marine landing in Lebanon to prop

up the regime, and apparent authorization of use of nuclear weapons by President Eisenhower "to

prevent any unfriendly forces from moving into Kuwait" (in his words). Britain considered several

options for Kuwait, the least harsh being a grant of nominal independence, but with acceptance of

"the need, if things go wrong, ruthlessly to intervene, whoever it is has caused the trouble"

(Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd).

Lloyd stressed "the complete United States solidarity with us over the Gulf," including the need to

"take firm action to maintain our position in Kuwait" and the "similar resolution" of the U.S. "in

relations to the Aramco oilfields" in Saudi Arabia; the Americans "agree that at all costs these

oilfields [in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar] must be kept in Western hands." Six

months before the Iraqi coup, Lloyd summarized the major concerns, including free access to Gulf

oil production "on favourable terms and for sterling," and "suitable arrangements for the

investment of the surplus revenues of Kuwait," a matter of no little significance.

Declassified U.S. documents outline British goals in similar terms: "the U.K. asserts that its

financial stability would be seriously threatened if the petroleum from Kuwait and the Persian Gulf

area were not available to the U.K. on reasonable terms, if the U.K. were deprived of the large

investments made by that area in the U.K. and if sterling were deprived of the support provided

by Persian Gulf oil." These British needs, and the fact that "An assured source of oil is essential to

the continued economic viability of Western Europe," provide some reason for the U.S. "to

support, or if necessary assist, the British in using force to retain control of Kuwait and the

Persian Gulf."

In November 1958, the National Security Council recommended that the U.S. "Be prepared to use

force, but only as a last resort, either alone or in support of the United Kingdom," if these

interests are threatened. In January, the National Security Council had advised that Israel might


12 of 23 2/20/10 2:38 AM

provide a barrier to Arab nationalism, articulating the basis for one element of the system of

control over the Middle East developed in the years that followed.

The concern that Gulf oil and riches be available to support the ailing British economy was

extended by the early 1970s to the U.S. economy, which was visibly declining relative to Japan

and German-led Europe. Furthermore, control over oil serves as a means to influence these

rivals/allies, a fact noted in the internal record in the early post-war years. One of the major

architects of the New World Order of that day, George Kennan, advised that Japan should be

helped to reindustrialize within the U.S.-dominated global framework, but that the U.S. should

keep control of its energy system, which would give the U.S. "veto power" if some time in the

distant future, Japan might get out of hand. That "veto power" is not as strong today, with the

decline of U.S. hegemony; but influence over oil production, prices, and access is still not a

negligeable factor in world affairs. And as the U.S. and Britain lose their former economic

dominance, privileged access to the rich profits of Gulf oil production is a matter of serious

concern.

Capital flow from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the other Gulf principalities to the U.S. and Britain

has provided significant support for their economies, corporations, and financial institutions.

These are among the reasons why the U.S. and Britain have often not been averse to increases in

oil price. The issues are too intricate to explore here, but these factors surely remain operative. It

comes as no great surprise that the two states that established the imperial settlement and have

been its main beneficiaries and guarantors are now girding for war in the Gulf, while others keep

their distance.

Also worth noting is a division in the Arab world. By and large, support for the U.S. military

initiative tends to decline as the influence of the public increases. Commentators have

occasionally noted that support for the U.S. military initiative was least in the governments that

had "nascent democratic movements": Jordan, Algeria, Yemen, and Tunisia (Judith Miller, New

York Times). Administration analysts expressed concern that if U.S. troops were kept in place too

long, the "Islamic religious periods" (the Hajj and Ramadan) would allow more expression of

popular feelings and "could set off protests and perhaps coups" that "could topple western-

oriented governments in the region and cut the diplomatic ground out from under US-led troops

facing Iraq" (Peter Gosselin, Boston Globe). Similar concerns are regularly voiced about the home

front. The standard conclusion is that the U.S. must therefore strike fast. Fear of the public is a

normal feature of statecraft, as familiar as it is instructive.

The New World Order

Secretary Baker's comments on the new "era full of promise" raise another issue relevant to

explanation of the U.S.-U.K. stance. The New World Order that has become a virtual cliche since

August is real enough, though the lovely phrases about peace and justice are another matter.

Basic elements of the New World Order were coming into focus 20 years ago, with the emergence

of a "tripolar world" as economic power diffused within U.S. domains. The U.S. remains the

dominant military power, but its economic superiority, though still manifest, has declined, and

may well decline further as the costs of Reagan's party for the rich fall due. The collapse of Soviet

tyranny adds several new dimensions. First, new pretexts are needed for Third World


13 of 23 2/20/10 2:38 AM

intervention, a serious challenge for the educated classes.

Second, there are now prospects for the "Latin Americanization" of much of the former Soviet

empire, that is, for its reversion to a quasi-colonial status, providing resources, cheap labor,

markets, investment opportunities, and other standard Third World amenities. But the U.S. and

Britain are not in the lead in this endeavor.

A third important consequence is that the U.S is more free than before to use force, the Soviet

deterrent having disappeared. That may well increase the temptation for Washington to transfer

problems to the arena of forceful confrontation. The United States intends to maintain its near

monopoly of force, with no likely contestant for that role. One effect will be exacerbation of

domestic economic difficulties; another, a renewed temptation to "go it alone" in relying on the

threat of force rather than diplomacy, generally regarded as an annoying encumbrance.

These factors too help to clarify the varied reactions to the Gulf crisis. War is dangerous; defusing

the crisis without a demonstration of the efficacy of force is also an unwelcome outcome for

Washington. As for the costs, plainly it would be advantageous for them to be shared, but not at

the price of sacrificing the role of lone enforcer. These conflicting concerns led to a sharp elite

split over the tactical choice between the threat of force and reliance on sanctions, with the

Administration holding to the former course.

In the New World Order, the Third World domains must still be controlled, sometimes by force.

This task has been the responsibility of the United States, but with its relative economic decline,

the burden becomes harder to shoulder. One reaction is that the U.S. must persist in its historic

task, while others pay the bills. Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger explained that

the emerging New World Order will be based on "a kind of new invention in the practice of

diplomacy": others will finance U.S. intervention to keep order.

In the London Financial Times, a respected commentator on international economic affairs

described the Gulf crisis as a "watershed event in US international relations," which will be seen

in history as having "turned the US military into an internationally financed public good." In the

1990s, he continues, "there is no realistic alternative [to] the US military assuming a more

explicitly mercenary role than it has played in the past" (David Hale, FT, Nov. 21).

The financial editor of a leading U.S. conservative daily puts the point less delicately: we must

exploit our "virtual monopoly in the security market...as a lever to gain funds and economic

concessions" from Germany and Japan (William Neikirk, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 9). The U.S. has

"cornered the West's security market" and will therefore be "the world's rent-a-cops"; the phrase

"rent-a-thug" might be more accurate, if less appealing.

Some will call us "Hessians," he continues, but "that's a terribly demeaning phrase for a proud,

well-trained, well-financed and well-respected military"; and whatever anyone may say, "we

should be able to pound our fists on a few desks" in Japan and Europe, and "extract a fair price

for our considerable services," demanding that our rivals "buy our bonds at cheap rates, or keep

the dollar propped up, or better yet, pay cash directly into our Treasury." "We could change this

role" of enforcer, he concludes, "but with it would go much of our control over the world economic

system."


14 of 23 2/20/10 2:38 AM

The British right has added its special touch as well. The editor of the London Sunday Telegraph

writes that the "new job" for "the post-Cold War world" is "to help build and sustain a world order

stable enough to allow the advanced economies of the world to function without constant

interruption and threat from the Third World," a task that will require "instant intervention from

the advanced nations" and perhaps even "pre-emptive action." Britain is "no match for Germany

and Japan when it comes to wealth creation; or even for France and Italy. But when it comes to

shouldering world responsibilities we are more than a match." England will thus join the U.S.,

with its similar configuration of strengths and weaknesses, in "rising to this challenge." The offer

is welcomed by American neoconservatives, happy to have support in the mercenary role.

That role is also welcomed by the local administrators of Gulf riches. A high Gulf official quoted in

the Wall Street Journal sees no reason for his son to "die for Kuwait." "We have our white slaves

from America to do that," he explains with a "chuckle" -- not having looked too closely at the skin

color of his mercenaries, and forgetting momentarily that those who have the guns will call the

shots, if he forgets his responsibilities.

The "new job" to which the editor of the Sunday Telegraph refers is actually a very old one,

though it needs a new guise. George Bush has been much criticized for his failures as a

"communicator," unable to articulate the reasons (necessarily noble) for the attack on Panama

and the insistence on force in the Gulf. But the criticism is unfair. The reflex appeal to "defense

against the Russians" had lost its last shreds of plausibility, and new constructions are not so

simple to devise.

This vision of the future helps illuminate Washington's reaction to the Gulf crisis. It implies that

the U.S. must continue to enforce obedience (called "order" or "stability" in the doctrinal system),

with the support of other industrial powers. Riches funnelled by the oil-producing monarchies will

help prop up the troubled economies of the guardians of order. To be sure, force is only a last

resort. It is more cost-effective to use the IMF than the Marines or the CIA if possible; but it is

not always possible.

Parallel domestic developments add another dimension to the picture. Studies by the U.S. Labor

Department and others predict serious shortages of skilled labor (everything from scientists and

managers to technicians and typists) as the educational system deteriorates, part of the collapse

of infrastructure accelerated by Reaganite social and economic policies. The tendency may be

mitigated by modification of immigration laws to encourage a brain drain, but that is not likely to

prove adequate.

The predicted result is that the cost of skilled labor will rise and transnational corporations will

transfer research, product development and design, marketing, and other such operations

elsewhere. For the growing underclass, opportunities will still be available as Hessians. It takes

little imagination to picture the consequences if such expectations -- not inevitable, but also not

unrealistic -- are indeed realized.

For the traditional victims, the New World Order is not likely to be an improvement on the old,

and the prospects for citizens of the mercenary states are also less than attractive, if they permit

this scenario to unfold.


15 of 23 2/20/10 2:38 AM

Let's return finally to the initial questions raised. Choice of policy is determined by the goals that

are sought. If the goal had been to secure Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, settle regional issues,

and move towards a more decent world, then Washington would have followed the peaceful

means prescribed by international law: sanctions and diplomacy. If the goal is to firm up the

mercenary-enforcer role and establish the rule of force, then the Administration policy of

narrowing the options to capitulation or war has a certain chilling logic.

http://www.chomsky.info/articles/199102--02.htm

Gulf War Pullout

Noam Chomsky

Z Magazine, February, 1991

The "Logic" of War

To effectively combat war in the Gulf we have to understand its motives. Bush is seeking to get

Iraq out of Kuwait. Possibly he is seeking to reduce Iraq to rubble. But that is not the whole story.

Hundreds of U.S. bombers are not "storming" Iraq to maintain cheap oil. (1) The cost of more

expensive oil would be much less than the cost of the military operation. (2) Oil prices have a

marked-regulated cap anyhow. If oil producers raise prices too high for too long, users drift away

which is self-defeating for oil rich countries. (3) Insofar as high oil prices cause problems to

industrialized economies, Europe and Japan are more vulnerable than the U.S., so relative to

these countries higher oil prices often help our economy at a time of its threatened dissolution.

Fleets of U.S. helicopters are not "storming" Iraq to honor Kuwait's national sovereignty. U.S.

history is a near continuous chronicle of violating other countries' national sovereignty for even

less compelling reasons than those Saddam Hussein offers to rationalize his militarism. For

example, Kuwait's oil policies were certainly more damaging to Iraq's economy than Panama's

policies were to the U.S. economy. No U.S. elected official or mainstream media commentator has

even hinted that our invasion of Panama was just as much a violation of national sovereignty as

Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. Respect for national sovereignty is an after-the-fact rationalization

of Desert Storm, not a motive.

U.S. troops are not "storming" Iraq because we fear Hitlerite expansionism. Iraq is only a local

power, not pre-World War II Germany. Iraq just spent the 1980s failing to conquer Iran despite

U.S. support.

The real reason for U.S. opposition to Iraqi occupation of Kuwait is not to keep oil prices low, but

to keep Washington, Wall Street, and their allies in charge of setting oil prices. We are fighting to

maintain and even enlarge one of our few continuing claims to international economic clout:


16 of 23 2/20/10 2:38 AM

control of oil prices. The Bush administration and the New York Times alike view the Mideast as

an extension of Texas. It is "our oil," not theirs. The U.S. oil posture is not a sober defense of

countries dependent on oil. It is a greedy offensive that pursues U.S. oil advantage. Most

countries, particularly Third World countries, suffer horribly for these policies.

But fulfilling our imperial need to control the "oil card" requires only that Hussein be pushed out

of Kuwait. A second question therefore arises. Why not let diplomacy and sanctions push Hussein

out? Why escalate the war?

The answer is at the heart of understanding the U.S. role in the so-called "new world order."

George Bush wants Hussein out of Kuwait, yes. But he does not want UN activism, international

sanctions, and multilateral diplomacy credited with causing withdrawal. From Bush's perspective a

diplomatic solution would be as bad as Hussein's interference in the first place. Diplomatic

success would undercut the efficacy of U.S. military interventionism, now, and well into the

future. And it would add powerful fuel to calls for a "peace dividend" and conversion here in the

U.S.

On the other hand, the early dispatch of hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops and immense

firepower allowed Bush to enter what he undoubtedly saw as a "win/win" game. If Hussein had

withdrawn Bush would have claimed he did so due to our military threat, thus establishing the

logic of continued military spending to maintain peace. Now, the U.S. will forcibly annihilate

Hussein, again evidencing the necessity for military might. The goal of our drive to war is to

maintain the region's effective colonization while re-legitimating militarism.

Now Secretary of Defense Cheney will argue not only for increased conventional military

expenditures, but also for nuclear and star wars expenditures to forestall future Third World

conflicts and/or smash future dictators who stray from doing our bidding. Desert Storm is,

therefore, also a war against the redistribution of domestic wealth and power than conversion

away from militarism implies. It is a war against Iraq, but also a war against the poor in our own

country.

For years the U.S. has been the biggest economic power and has shared contested military

dominance with the Soviet Union. Now we are alone at the top of the military heap with the

biggest, best, and most numerous weapons of every conceivable type. Moreover, our economy is

losing its ability to coerce international obedience. The U.S. is climbing down the ladder of

economic influence as U.S. military stature rises without limit. Big guns and fewer dollars suggest

a warfare state hiring out as the world's enforcer.

Now we fight Exxon's wars and anyone else's, as long as they pay the proper fees, either because

they want to or, if necessary, because we force them to. Have gun will travel. Destination: a

warrior state domestically and internationally.

The first battle over this scenario is unfolding now in the Mideast, as well as here at home. Will

militarism be re- legitimated or will conversion gain momentum as a policy alternative? To

reverse Bush's war scenario social movements must explain the underlying forces compelling

Bush's violence and galvanize the deep-rooted and sustained opposition needed to stop it.


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Questions and Answers

1. Does the U.S. oppose aggression? No.

Aggression is fine if it's in U.S. interests. It's bad only if it's opposed to U.S. interests.

The U.S. invaded Panama and imposed a puppet regime still under U.S. control. The

world objected so we vetoed two UN Security Council resolutions.

Turkey invaded northern Cyprus, broke it up, killed two thousand people, tried to

destroy relics of Greek civilization, drove out 200,000 people. That was fine. Turkey is

our ally.

Israel attacked Lebanon, killed about 20,000 people, bombarded the capital, and still

occupies southern Lebanon. The U.S. vetoed a series of UN Security Council

resolutions to terminate that aggression. Israel holds on to the occupied territories. It

has annexed some of them. Fine. The U.S. supports Israel.

Morocco invaded the Western Sahara, annexed it. The U.S. thinks that's fine.

Indonesia invaded East Timor. Two hundred thousand killed. The worst slaughter

relative to the population since the Holocaust. The U.S. gives them aid.

Iraq attacked Iran. The U.S. assisted them. Iraq gassed the Kurds in the north of

Iraq. Fine. After all, the Turks are having problems with the Kurds too and the Turks

are our ally.

Iraq invades Kuwait. Outrage. Cries of Hitler reborn. Send 400,000 troops. Bomb

Baghdad.

The United States can claim it's opposed to aggression on ABC News without ridicule

because we have a disciplined intellectual class who look the other way and/or lie as a

matter of course. In the Third World, however, the claim is seen as ludicrous. People

there consider the U.S. the major violator of the principle that aggression is wrong.

2. Does the U.S. oppose proliferation of super-weapons? No.

In April 1990, Saddam Hussein, then still the U.S.'s friend and ally, offered to destroy

his chemical and biological weapons if Israel agreed to destroy its non-conventional

weapons--- including its nuclear weapons. The State Department welcomed Hussein's

offer to destroy his own arsenal, but rejected the link "to other issues or weapons

systems."

Acknowledgment of the existence of Israeli nuclear weapons would raise the question

why all U.S. aid to Israel is not illegal under 1970s congressional legislation that bars

aid to any country engaged in clandestine nuclear weapons development.

In December 1990, speaking at a joint press conference with Secretary of State

Baker, then Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze proposed a nuclear-free

zone in the Middle East if Iraq withdraws form Kuwait. Baker gave "qualified support,"

the press observed, but "carefully avoided using the words nuclear-free zone" -- for

the reason just noted.

A week later, Iraq offered to "scrap chemical and mass destruction weapons if Israel

was also prepared to do so," Reuters reported. The offer seems to have passed in

silence here. Weapons proliferation for our allies -- including Iraq before August 2 --

is fine.

Iraq's more recent call for "the banning of all weapons of mass destruction in the


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region" as part of a negotiated settlement of its withdrawal from Kuwait evoked no

Western support.

3. So what is Bush concerned about? Domination.

Iraq violated a fundamental principle of world affairs -- that the energy reserves of

the Middle East have to be firmly in the hands of U.S. energy corporations and

trusted U.S. clients like Saudi Arabia's elites.

This means Mideast populations do not really benefit from their own resource, but "so

what," says Bush. The West benefits because Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and Qatar

are basically sectors of London and New York. The U.S. government doesn't care if

the Saudi elite administers oil prices because that's like having it done on Wall Street.

The U.S. does care if an independent Arab nationalist threatens to use the resources

for domestic purposes. The U.S. opposes that kind of behavior anywhere in the world.

That is why we "destroy cities to save them."

The State Department says Mideast oil is a "stupendous source of strategic power"

and "one of the greatest prizes in world history." So what if it's in the Mideast?

In Iran in 1953 we overthrew a nationalist parliamentary regime. Now we threaten a

murderous tyrant's regime, although Hussein was just as much a murderous tyrant

before August 2, when we supported him because doing so furthered U.S. interests.

4. Why does Bush oppose negotiations? They might work.

The U.S. is usually against diplomacy. If the U.S. can establish force as the way to

rule the world, the U.S. wins because it's way ahead in force. If diplomacy succeeds,

it delegitimates militarism, reduces the relevance of military might and increases the

relevance of diplomacy.

This is also why the U.S. adamantly opposes linkage between Kuwait and the West

Bank. The U.S. supports linkage when it benefits us. But in this case we're against

linkage, and the reason is not just because Israel is our ally, but because linkage is a

step toward diplomatically resolving the Gulf and Arab-Israeli crises. The U.S.

opposes a diplomatic settlement of

either crisis and therefore certainly opposes a joint diplomatic settlement of both of

them.

When Bush sent 400,000 troops instead of 15,000, which could have been just as

effective in preventing further Iraqi aggression, he did it to scuttle negotiations and

leave only military might as the arbiter. His worst nightmare is a negotiated solution

that would legitimate the rule of international law rather than U.S. power.

5. What is the New World Order all about? Same as the old, with an ominous new wrinkle.

In the London Financial Times of November 21, 1990, a respected commentator

describes the Gulf crisis as a "watershed event in U.S. international relations," which

will be seen in history as having "turned the U.S. military into an internationally

financed public good." In the 1990s, he continues, "there is no realistic alternative

[to] the U.S. military assuming a more explicitly mercenary role than it has played in

the past."


19 of 23 2/20/10 2:38 AM

The financial editor of the Chicago Tribune recently put the point less delicately: we

must exploit our "virtual monopoly in the security marked...as a lever to gain funds

and economic concessions" from Germany and Japan. The U.S. has "cornered the

West's security marked" and will therefore be "the world's rent-a-cops."

Some will call us "Hessians," he continues, but "that's a terribly demeaning phrase for

a proud, well-trained, well-financed and well-respected military" and whatever

anyone may say, "we should be able to pound our fists on a few desks" in Japan and

Europe, and "extract a fair price for our considerable services," demanding that our

rivals "buy our bonds at cheap rates, or keep the dollar propped up, or better yet, pay

cash directly into our Treasury." "We could change this role" of enforcer, he concludes,

"but with it would go much of our control over the world economic system."

6. Why is Bush so eager to wage war? Momentum and preference!

Having sent a gigantic military force to ensure that any Gulf resolution would be

military, Bush left himself few options. Either Hussein would withdraw, with or without

concessions, or we would bomb him out. Bush could not maintain so high a level of

force indefinitely nor withdraw without a resolution of the crisis.

But Bush has shown that he actually favored war. Why was he so eager to start a

conflagration that could endanger oil supplies, our place in the Mideast, and

international alliances -- all things he certainly holds dear?

The answer has to be that there is something about the effects of war that Bush finds

desirable. In the "rubble" he wants to "bounce" in Baghdad, Bush sees a prize worth

struggling for.

What could it be? Peace? No. Justice? No. Stability? No. So what?

Bush is seeking the legitimation of war, the end of the "peace dividend," and the

elevation of the U.S. to the status of World Mercenary Police, thus ensuring years

more of U.S. international domination even as our economy flounders. That's his

preferred scenario.

Additionally, many CEOs and other influential economic and political figures fear a

serious collapse of the U.S. economy. To push up the price of oil dramatically and

ensure that the super revenues are then invested in U.S. banks is, they think, one

way to avert this collapse. They do not care if this approach will also mean blood,

gore, pain, retribution, and hate for years to come.

7. What will be the results of war? Rivers of blood.

If the U.S. military is not curtailed, tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands

or even a million Arab lives will be lost.

Thousands and perhaps tens of thousands of U.S. lives will be lost.

Countless Third World lives will be lost via inflated oil prices and international

economic turmoil.

There will be world wide economic recession. Mideast destabilization with unknown

repercussions. Increased nightmares for Palestinians. Possible disaster for Israel.

Possible ecological devastation.

The peace dividend will be reduced or lost. Military expenditures will be reenlarged.

The Hessianization of the U.S. and subordination of international affairs to U.S.


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mercenary might will proceed.

A new "enemy," the Moslem world, will help scare the U.S. public into tolerating

outrageous defense appropriations.

And, if all goes as planned, U.S. corporate officials and state policy-makers will

continue to oversee vast wealth and unfettered power -- the real motive for U.S.

intervention in the first place.

8. Why does the U.S. oppose linkage? Fear of isolation.

There has long been a broad international consensus on a political settlement of this

conflict. The U.S. and Israel have opposed it and have been isolated in this

rejectionism, as numerous lopsided General Assembly votes (most recently 151-3)

indicate.

President Bush likes to tell us how James Baker has labored for peace, but remains

silent about the terms of the famed Baker plan, whose basic principles ban an

"additional Palestinian state"; bar any "change in the status of Judea, Samaria, and

Gaza other than in accordance with the basic guidelines of the [Israeli] Government,"

preclude any meaningful Palestinian self-determination; reject negotiations with the

PLO, thus denying Palestinians the right to choose their own political representation;

and call for "free elections" under Israeli military rule.

Regarding the Palestinian question, it is therefore the world against George Bush and

his predecessors. For this reason, since long before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait the U.S.

has consistently opposed an international conference on the Middle East.

Such a conference would lead to pressures for a just political settlement that the U.S.

rejects, since by force they can maintain an unjust situation. For the same reasons

the U.S. has vetoed Security Council resolutions calling for a political settlement and

blocked other diplomatic initiatives for the past 20 years.

9. Why oppose war in the Gulf? It's wrong.

Some liberals oppose a Gulf war on the grounds it will be too expensive. Usually they

mean lost stability, lost resources, or heightened recession. Sometimes they mean

lost U.S. lives. Rarely do they mean lost Arab lives. While these costs are real, the

best grounds on which to oppose the Gulf War is that it is not just.

It is not anti-interventionist. It is not pro-national sovereignty. It is not

pro-international legality. It is not pro-"a new and more peaceful world order."

This war is to reinforce U.S. control of Arab oil. It is to crush Arab nationalism.

It is to establish the U.S. as the world's policeman with the bills paid, whether they

like it or not, by whoever we pass them on to.

This war should be opposed because it is wrong. We have no right controlling oil

prices. No right administering the future of the Middle East. And no right becoming

the world's

Hessian state, sacrificing much of the U.S. population to a Third World existence in

the process.

We should oppose this war because we oppose militarism as a solution to

international conflict.


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10. What is the logic of our antiwar activism? Raise the social cost.

Arguments that war is immoral will not deter Bush. Arguments that he isn't seeing

the costs will not change his mind.

Pursuers of war, including Bush, don't care about Iraqi lives, American lives, or

anyone's lives. The same holds, by and large, for U.S. media which has yet to discuss

the potential loss of Arab lives as a central cost of war.

Nor do U.S. warmakers care about subtle concerns of culture or history. They care

about advancing the geopolitical interests of the U.S. as they are understood by the

White House and Wall Street. That's all.

To get Bush to reverse his war policies requires that the public raise costs that

warmakers don't want to pay.

Warmakers do not want to endure an end to business as usual. They do not want war

to cause a new generation to turn to activism. They dread the escalation of dissent

from events that oppose war, to actions that oppose militarism, to projects that

oppose capitalism.

These costs curtailed U.S. militarism in Indochina. They can do the same, and more,

in the Gulf.

Raise the social cost.

11. What should be the focus of our activism? Peace and justice.

Antiwar activity needs to develop lasting consciousness of the causes and purposes of

U.S. war policies including understanding underlying institutions. And it also needs to

send a powerful message of dissent.

Events that focus on ROTC, on campus military centers, such as military bases or the

Pentagon, and that demand an end to war are excellent.

Events that focus on centers of domestic suffering that demand an end to war and

and end to militarism and a reallocation of military resources to social ends, are still

more powerful.

Multi-focused events will reveal and enlarge not only antiwar militance, but militance

extending to gender, race, and class policies and institutions that war-makers hold

even more dear. Multi-issue events send an even more powerful and threatening

message than single issue efforts, and can have that much more impact.

They also have the capacity to build a movement that can last beyond the Gulf crisis

to attack the causes as well as the symptoms of oppressive institutions. Build a

movement not just for peace, but for peace and justice too.

Create a multi-issue focus.

12. What tactics should we use? Demonstrate, demand, disobey.

A gathering of people at a teach-in to learn about U.S. policies threatens leaders of a

country who want people as ignorant as possible. A march with many constituencies

threatens the leadership of a country who want people as passive and divided as

possible. A march that include civil disobedience and says that some people are

willing to break laws and, moreover, next time many more will do so, is still more

powerful.


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Create a multi-tactic movement.

But lasting movements also have to develop a positive component that can become a

center of organizing energy and a place for learning and support.

In addition to teach-ins, marches, rallies, and civil disobedience, we need to create

lasting coalitions and institutional centers of Peace and Justice in occupied buildings

on campuses or in community centers, and/or churches.

Such student and community centers could be places for people to do peace work:

creating leaflets and banners and writing letters to GIs. They could be places from

which people could do systematic coordinated canvassing and provide each other with

support and help.

Further, these campus and community centers could be places where people consider

how their universities or communities might become centers of peace and conversion

rather than militarism. Create a long-term movement.

http://www.chomsky.info/articles/199102--.htm


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Documents

Noam Chomsky - The Gulf Crisis, 1991