NFPA 1420 --A98 ROP

NFPA 1420 - - A 9 8 ROP

Report of the Committee on PART I

Pre-lncident Planning

Michael J. Seraplglla, Chair Lucent Technologies, Inc., NJ [U]

Robert G. Acker, Piano Fire Dept., TX [E] Thomas Baileys, IBEX Engr Services, PA [SE] Richard g. Botts, Sedgwick James of PA, In~, PA [I] Joseph R. Ciepierski, Chubb Group of Insurance Cos., NJ [I] Lee M. DeWoody, Jr., Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., GA [I]

Rep. Tbe Alliance of American Insurers Richard W. Duncanson, City of Middletown Fire Dept., NY [E]

Rep. NFPA Fire Service Section Richard Dyer, Lee's Summi Fire Dept., MO[E] James M. Feld, Feld Engr, CA [SE] Darrell M. Franchuk, HSB Professional Loss Control, TN [I] William Charles Gearhart, Virginia Sprinkler Co., ln~ [IM] John W. Kennedy, Jr., J. W. Kennedy Inc., NJ [SE] James G. Manger, James G. Munger & Assoc., Inc., AL [SE] Mark Andrew Oglesby, Boiling Brook, Illinois Fire Dept., IL [U] Tod B. Ossmann, The Yasucla Fire and Marine Insurance Co. of

America, NY [I] Donald L. Schmidt, M&M Protection Consultants, MA[I] Michael D. Snyder, Dow Coming Corp., MI [U] J. Michael Thompson, Gage-Babcock & Assoc., Inc., VA [U]

Rep. American Health Care Assn. Harry J. Walsh, Pennsylvania Lumbermens Mutual Ins Co., PA[I] John A. Welling, Ill , Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., NJ [U] Don N. Whittaker, Locld~eed Martin, ID [U] Robert A. Woodard, CIGNA Loss Control, PA [I] Ronald W. Woodfin, TetraTek, Inc., TN [SE] Michael IL Zanotti, Science Applications Int'! Corp. (SAIC), MD

[sEI

(Log #CP1) 1420- 1 - (Entire Document): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Pre-lncident Planning RECOMMENDATION: Withdraw NFPA 1420, Pre-lncident Planning for Warehouse Occupancies, 1993 edition. This document has been incorporated in the proposed NFPA 1620, Recommended Practice for Pre-lncident Planning. SUBSTANTIATION: This document has been incorporated into the proposed NFPA 1620. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 24 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 20 NOT RETURNED: 4 Bailey, Ciepierski, Oglesby, Ossmann

Alternates

Edmund M. Kelly, Chubb Group of Insurance Cos., GA [I] (Alt. toJ. IL Ciepierski)

Richard C. Ryan, TetraTek, Inc., TN [SE] (Alt. to R. W. Woodfin)

Staff Liaison: L. Charles Smeby

This list represents the membership at the time the Committee was balloted on the text of this edition. Since that tir,~ changes in the ra~rahership nta~ have occurred. A key to classifications is found at the back of this doenmenL

Committee Scope: This Committee shall bave primary responsibility for documents on the site-specific pre-incident planning for response to fires and other types of emergencies.

The Report of file Technical Committee on Pre-lncldent Planning is presented for adoption in 2 parts.

Part I of tiffs Report was prepared by tile Technical Committee on Pre-Incident Planning, and proposes for adoption a withdrawal to NFPA 1420-1993, Recommended Practice for Pre-Incident Planning for Warehouse Occupancies. NFPA 1420-1993 is published in Volume 12 of the 1997 National Fire Codes and in separate pamphlet form.

Part I of this Report has been submitted to letter ballot of the Technical Committee on Pre-Incident Planning, which consists of 24 voting members. The results of the balloting, after circulation of any negative votes, can be found in die report.

Part II of this Report was prepared by tile Technical Committee on Pre-lncident Planning, and proposes for adoption a new document to NFPA 1620-1998, Recommended Practice for Pre-Incident Planning.

Part H of this Report has been submitted to letter ballot of file Technical Committee on Pre-lncident Planning, which consists of 24 voting members. Tlle results of tile balloting, after circulation of any negative votes, can be found in tile report.

523

N F P A 1 6 2 0 m A 9 8 R O P

P~TH

(Log #13) 1620- 1 - (5-2.5.1 and 5o2.5.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITrER: Richard W. Duncanson, Middletown, Fire Dept., NY RECOMMENDATION: Combine this section to read:

"the location, type, capacity of each fire hydrant. Both primary and secondary should be recorded. The compatibility o f threads and diameters of outlet should be recorded."

Renumber Section 5-2.5.3. SUBSTANTIATION: For clarity. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Proposal 1620-14 (Log #CP1). NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 24 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 18 NEGATIVE: 1 NOT RETURNED: 5 Baileys, Ciepierski, Gearhart, Oglesby,

Ossmann EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE:

FELD: The Proposal included the word "capadty'. The Committee Action deletes dais word. I believe that recording the capacity (in terms of flow and pressure) is equally important as location, type, number of oudets, etc. A Pre-lncident Plan should indicate the available water supply at the hydrant outlet (2 1 /2 in. or 4 1 /2 in.). This is important in that the responding engines can select the most appropriate hydrant based on the situation encountered.

The Committee Statement is not relative to dais Proposal. There should be a specific reason why the word =capacity" was not included in die Committee Action.

1620- 2 - (5-8.1): Accept (LOg #1) SUBMITTERa Richard W. Duncanson, Middletown, Fire Dept., NY RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

List instead of paragraph form. SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial - for conformity. COMMITI'EE ACTION: Accept. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Proposal 1620-14 (Log #CP1). NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 24 VOTE ON COMMITI'EE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 19 NOT RETURNED: 5 Baileys, Ciepierski, GearharL Oglesby,

Ossmann

(LOg #3) 1620- 3- (9-4.1): Accept SUBMITTER: RichardW. Duncanson, Middletown, Fire Dept., NY

I RECOMMENDATION: Change to read: "Due to possible large numbers of occupants, consideration

should be given to the expected characteristics of persons such as:" SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Proposal 1620-14 (Log #CP1). NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 24 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 19 NOT RETURNED: 5 Baileys, Ciepierski, Gearhart, Oglesby,

Ossmann

(Log #2) 1620- 4 - (9-8): Reject SUBMITrER: Richard W. Duncanson, Middletown, Fire Dept., NY RECOMMENDATION: Delete entire section. SUBSTANTIATION: Material is found in more detail in Chapter 8. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The committee feels that dais materials should be duplicated here for conformity and clarification.

NUMBER OF COMMITrEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: VOTE ON COMMITI'EE ACTION:


Ossmann

24

(Log #4) 1620- 5 - (10-8): Reject SUBMITTER: Richard W. Duncanson, Middletown, Fire Dept., NY RECOMMENDATION: Entire section to be deleted. SUBSTANTIATION: Section is not used anywhere in document. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 1620-4 (Log #2). NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 24 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 19 NOT RETURNED: 5 Baileys, Ciepierski, Gearlmrt, Oglesby,

Ossmann

(Log #5) 1620- 6 - (11-8): Reject SUBMITTER: Richard W. Duncanson, Middletown, Fire Dept., NY RECOMMENDATION: Entire section to be deleted. SUBSTANTIATION: Section is not used anywhere in document. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 1620-4 (Log #2). NUMBER OF COMMITrEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 24 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


Ossmann

(Log #6) 1620- 7- (12-8): Reject SUBMITTER: Richard W. Duncanson, Middletown, Fire Dept., NY RECOMMENDATION: Entire section to be deleted. SUBSTANTIATION: Section is not used anywhere in document. COMMrITEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 1620-4 (Log #2). NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 24 VOTE ON COMMrITEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 19 NOT RETURNED: 5 Baileys, Ciepierski, Gearhart. Oglesby,

Ossmann

(Log #7) 1620- 8 - (13-8): Reject SUBMITTEI~ Richard W. Duncanson, Middletown, Fire Dept., NY RECOMMENDATION: Entire section to be deleted. SUBSTANTIATION: Section is not used anywhere in document. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 1620-4 (Log #2). NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 24 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


Ossmann

(Log #8) 1620- 9 - (14-8): Reject SUBMITTER: Richard W. Duncanson, Middletown, Fire Dept., NY RECOMMENDATION: Entire section to be deleted. SUBSTANTIATION: Section is not used anywhere in document. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject.

524

N ~ A 1 6 2 0 1 A 9 8 R O P

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 1620-4 (Log #2). NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 24 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


Ossm~tnn

(Log #9) 1620- 10- (15-8): Reject SUBMITTER: Richard W. Duncanson, Middletown, Fire Dept., NY RECOMMENDATION: Entire section to be deleted. SUBSTANTIATION: Section is not used anywhere in document. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 1620-4 (Log #2). NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 24 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


Ossmann

(Log #10) 1620- 11 - (16-8): Reject SUBMITI'ER: Richard W. Duncanson, Middletown, Fire Dept., NY RECOMMENDATION: Entire section to be deleted. SUBSTANTIATION: Section is not used anywhere in document. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 1690-4 (Log #2). NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS EUGIBLE TO VOTE: 24 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


Ossn/anu



Ossmann



Ossmann

(Log #CP1) 1620- 14- (Entire Document): Accept SUBMITTERx Technical Committee on Pre-lncident Planning RECOMMENDATION: Adopt a new standard NFPA 1620, Recommended Practice for Pre-lncident Planning, as shown at the end of dlis report. This proposal contains all changes from the public proposals in addition to file committee's proposals.

In addition, withdraw NFPA 1420, Pre-Incident Planning for Warehouse Occupancies, 1993 Edition. SUBSTANTIATION: This proposal is a completely new recommended practice for all occupancies. The previous recommended practice, NFPA 1420, only covered warehouse occupancies. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 24 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 19 NOT RETURNED: 5 Baileys, Ciepierski, Gearbart, Oglesby,

Ossmann

525

NFPA 1620 - - A 9 8 ROP

NFPA 1620

Recommended Practice for

Pre-lncident Planning

1998 Edition

NOTICE: An asterisk (*) following the n u m b e r or letter designat ing a paragraph indicates explanatory material on that paragraph in Appendix A.

Informat ion on re fe renced publicat ions can be found in Chapter 19 and Appendix F.

Chapter 1 Administration

I-1 Scope.

1-1.1" This d o c u m e n t is a r e c o m m e n d e d practice for evaluating the

pre- incident plan, inc luding technical experts who may not actually respond to an incident .

1-2.6" The pre- incident plan should be coord ina ted with an inc ident m a n a g e m e n t system.

1-2.7 The responding pe r sonne l ' s ability to respond to and control an inc ident in a specific occupancy should be evaluated. Factors to evaluate include the depa r tmen t ' s equipment , personnel , and

~ ersonnel t ra in ing to de te rmine if a sufficient level of response can e achieved. I t may be necessary to involve o ther emergency

response agencies after evaluating their capabilities.

1-2.8 Once the basic informat ion has been gathered, file deve lopment of the actual pre- incident plan can begin.

1-2.9 The plan should be developed and main ta ined so that all part icipants are aware of the i r respective responsibilities.

1-3 Definitions. protect ion, construct ion, and operat ional features of specific .~?'..':~:::.. occupancies to develop a pre- incident plan for responding to fires 1-5.1 The f o l l o w i n g S : for the purposes of dais r e commended and o ther emergencies. The pre- incident plan should be used by practice, have th.e.:~'eaniri~;:given in this section, unless modified in responding personnel to manage fires and o ther emergencies in ano the r c h a p t e # ~ i ~ e r e c o m m e n d e d practice. the-se facilities using the available resources. .::i.-'.-i~ ?" ::~:....:"~ii~.,.

1-3.2 Word~(~ed in"~..'~ii~resent tense include the future. Words The pr imary purpose of a we- inc iden t plan is to help responding used i n . ~ ? . ~ ' ~ u l i n e ~ . r include the femin ine and neuter . The

personnel effectively manage emergencies with the available s i n g u ! ~ i ~ " ~ ' f : q n c l u d e ~ : ? ~ i : ~ n d the plural, singular. resources. A pre- incident plan should no t be confused with fire ~.#::" ":~ ':-:~iii!i!ii~ -~::" • inspect i°ns which, moni to r code. compliance. . . . . . . . . Pre- incident p lann ing /~,~.~"~roved-~..*....:i:~ . . . . Acceptable to :.:.~ authori ty having jur isdict ion involves evaluau ng the protect ion systems, budd ing constructaon, ..~~i~!.'.,. !~ii~:~.::.. " contents, and opera t ing procedures that may impact emergency " : : : ~ A r ~ i i ~ : ~ - A s s i s t a n e e . An area, separated f rom the remainder operations, of t h ~ ' : : ~ i n g by at least 1 h r fire-rated construction, that has direO

access tt:!~i8.xit, w.here occupants who are unab le to use the stairs 1-1.2 Unlike fire prevent ion or fire safety inspections, pre-inciden¢i~i!.."-:::,~ may remal~ii~..m.~'arily, safe f rom smoke and heat, and wait for n lann in~ assumes that an inc ident will occur• It makes no snecial'~-:i~'.:~.'.:':'~.,'-~::.:g.urther i n s t r ' ~ b n " s or assistance dur in~ an emergency evacuation. effort to prevent a fire or ehmlnate a hazard, bu t ra ther to prepare ~i~. "'-:~::::~:?.'~..-..~.l..so be. . .~led an area of refuge. for an incident . ".~i~: :.:.:~'.:~i~.i~"~:.::Y

'% ~..:#i~!~utJ~'~.~Having Jurisdict ion.* Tile organization, office, or 1-1.$ Chapters 1 th rough 8 of this documen t provide ~ - ~ : . '::~ff+ i n d i v i ~ a l responsible for approving equipment , an installation, or informat ion, philosoplties, a n d p r i n c i p l e s which mafiOSi: ~ ! ~ o t be "i~: a procedure . applicable to all occupancies. Tile authori ty h a v i ~ ] ~ u r i s d i ~ n -iii!::.....::::~!:- should de te rmine tile level of p lann ing appropn'.~$.br the ~:~... ........ ~ : : . . .~ '~onf ined Space. A conf ined space is a space that: jur isdict ion and the property being p r e - p l a n n e a ~ e r s - . . ~ t . ~i.-":'~. ~::~ (a) Is large enough and so conf igured that an individual can 18 provide informat ion address ing special or u ~ ~ c t e r i s ' ~ i i i i ~ i i ~ :~ bodily en te r and perform work; and of specific occupancy classifications . . . . .:.: ...... ":-~:...:..~!:::: " ..... (b) Has l imited or restricted means for entry or exit (for example.

- ..-:.:~iiiiiiiiiii'.:!~.::. ":%iiiiiii~:, -'.:.::- tanks, vessels, silos, storage bins, hoppers , vaults, and pits; and 1-2 General. -i'F . . . . :::::::::::::::::::::::::: .... ":~#::~ (c) Is no t designed for cont inuous occupancy.

1-2.1 A pre-incident plan is o n e . . : ~ i ~ . m o s t valuat~~ii~9ols ~vailable Emergency Action Plan. The des ignated actions of employers, for aiding responding personnel:"to ~.t.a. 'vely contro"!::i~n emergency, employees, and o ther bui lding occupants should take to ensure Al though there are many different typ~.~: '4pcidents ...t-.~at require an that they are safe f rom fire a n d odaer emergencies. emergency response, fires generally r e p r ~ l ~ . . t b e r t ~ t f requent chal lenge to emergency responders. M'any":~i~..¢..:-.~:commehdafions Emergency Operations Center. A meet ing place and in this d o c u m e n t daat relate to fires and fire iS~i~:~ction features may communica t ions center tha t may be u n m a n n e d except dur ing be equally applicable to o ther types of incid¢.~/ts, emergency situations when it is occupied by emergency response

1-2.'~ Pre-incident p lann ing is a total concept based upon dae following: awareness of the problem, m a n a g e m e n t commitment , educat ion, prevention, protect ion, and emergency organization. A tho rough pre- incident plan involves informat ion gathering, analysis, and dissemination, the "what if approach," and plan review, training, an d evaluation. Pre-plans within a jur isdic t ion should be similar in style, procedures, a n d con ten t to maximize effectiveness mad to reduce the t ime required to familiarize responding forces with tile plan.

I-2.3" Tile deve lopment of a pre- incident plan for new facilities should begin before construct ion and actual occupancy•

personnel .

Fire Barrier. A cont inuous membrane , e i ther vertical or horizontal , such as a wall or floor assembly, tha t is designed and constructed with a specified fire resistance rating to limit the spread of fire and that will also restrict the movement of products of combust ion or contaminants a n d / o r toxic gases and vapors. Such barriers should have protec ted openings. (101:3-2)

Fire Command Center. The fire c o m m a n d center, which may be m a n n e d or u n m a n n e d , typically contains moni to r ing and control equ ipmen t for detect ion, alarm, communicat ions , utilities, and o ther control systems.

1-2.4 Before tile pre-incident p lann ing process begins, all parties involved should be familiar with the componen ts of the basic informat ion to be ga thered and inc luded in the final plan. Construct ion, occupant characteristics, protect ion systems, the capabilities of public or industrial r e sponding personnel , availability of mutual aid, water supply, and exposure factors are some of the factors ,affecting a facility's situation dur ing emergency condi t ions that should be addressed.

1-2.5 Tile pre-incident plan should be a cooperative effort between tile plan developer, facility and responding personnel . Others may be able to provide valuable input dur ing the deve lopment of tile

Fire Compar tment . A space within a bui lding tltat is enclosed by fire barriers on all sides, including the top ,and bottom. (101:3-2)

Fire Wall. A wall separat ing buildings or subdividing a building to prevent the spread of fire and having a fire resistance rating and structural stability. (221: 1-3)

HVAC. Heating, ventilation, and air condi t ioning systems and the i r related components .

Key Box. See Lock Box.

5 2 6

N F P A 1 6 2 0 ~ A 9 8 R O P

Lifts. Mechanically or electrically operated platforms used to work at various heights within a building.

Lock Box. A locked container often used to store building entry keys, plans, and related data. Keys to open these containers are assigned only to selected individuals, such as representatives of the local fire department or police department.

Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS). Thesesheets contain a variety of physical properties, precautions, and emergency actions for specific chemicals or substances.

Plan Developer. The individual, group or agency responsible for developing and maintaining the pre-incident plan.

Pre-lncideat Plan. A written document resulting from the gathering of general and detailed data to be used by responding personnel for determining the resouces and actions necessary to mitigate anticipated emergencies at a specific facility.

Recommended Practice. A document that is similar in content and structure to a code or standard but that contains only nonmandatory provisions using the word "should" to indicate recommendations in the body of the text.

Responding Personnel. Private a n d / o r public personnel available to respond to emergencies. Personnel may include, but are not limited to, facility owners, operators, or occupants; contractors hired by the owner or operator; privately organized plant emergency organizations, emergency response teams, fire brigades, hazardous material teams, rescue or medical response teams, health and safety personnel, risk management or insurance personnel, technical experts, security personnel; and public fire, law enforcement,

Before on Inddent

(O~apt=r a)

! I i

l

(Ch~,~ ~)

Evaluat~ spedal hazards

!

1 Ev~uat~ special or t~f>~O)

unur,~ ~aolsdstos of

(Chapter* ~-t S) .... | . ~ . . .

(~'="') I "NW . % . | #~:

Maintain pre~ddent plen ((~aptor S) I

Dta~ art k~cldent Afl~ an ~ d ~ l

I~lmt plan ~

1 I Cftq~ outcom. I Emergency oj~ra~

l Evalua~ #~n elfeclh.'eness

emergency medical services, emergency management, .~-~::. environmental, and utility departments or agencies. .. " ~ ' e 2-~. Development, use, and m a i n t e n a n c e of a

~.'::'::'$-:~:. ~.,-.~,. ~:.?:.?.: • . • .~:~::.-:~:~. ~ : . :~ : , ore- inc ident o lan.

Should. Indicates a recommendation or that wlfich is advised n u ~ , . . ~ :-~.. ~#..'..~ - - not required. '~. ""~-'-~ ~ : . . . . 4~::"

Smoke Barrier. A continuous membrane, either vertical or % .~ :" ~:.:i~.:: ~ horizontal, such as a wall, floor, or ceiling assembly, t~. ~.~.~-.':~, ~-'.:~ • • ":" . . . . . ~ " ~ u d @ architect/engmeer, water authority, and ~nsurance designed and constructed to restrict the movement . . ~ ' - ] ~ of " ~ nterests, as well as site surveys. combustion or contaminants a n d / o r toxic gases ~w~tpors~...~A ~'.'.:.-...'.'~ smoke barrier might or might not have a fire r ~ r a t i n ~ % ~X~'~:~'E .:~'.',~ Data may also be obtained from existing emergency plans required barriers might have protected openings. (101:#~':*~:.~.,. ,~,~.~...,x.~,,.~. "-'~s" by governmental regulatory agencies.

" ~ t h i n a . . . . . Historical data on similar occupancies involved in emergencies : l [ ~ . ~ a d should be reviewed for items that could cause problems in the

Smoke Compartment. A smoke compa~c0k..Lis a sp~ n a building enclosed by smoke barriers o ~ ~ c l u t ~ .~ bottom. (101.3-2) ...-~. .~.:.-::::::~::~. ,:

• :.%" ~:'-i:~:i:.::: • ..~:~:: "%':~.:',~. Chapter 2 P r e - l n ~ ! a n n i n g P r o ~ -

"" "%~'~:.,,. ~ 2-1 Preparing to Plan. ~ % . ~#"

x-~j~i:~., " ,~..-.-'~ 2-1.1 Selection and Prioritization Process. " ~ . ~ . . & ~ p i n g a schedule for pre-incident plans, strong consideration s ~ t d be given to items such as potential life safety hazard, s ~ " " re size and complexity, value, importance to the commu'nity, location, presence of chemicals, and susceptibility to natural disasters.

2-1.2" Once a site has been selected for pre-incident planning, dae plan developer slmuld explain the nature of the information required. The needs andbenef i t s of pre-incident planning should be explained in detail to all involved participants.

2-1.3 To develop a pre-incident plan, plan developers should regularly visit die property to become thoroughly familiar with its layout, contents, construction, and protection features.

2-2 Before the Incident. Emergency response programs are planned; emergencies are not. Tile best time to learn about an occupancy is before the incident. Therefore, deciding what to include in a pre-incident plata, how to execute it, and what to do with rite information should occur before the incident. The following activities are involved. (See Figure 2-2.)

2-2.1 Collect Data. Pre-incident plan data includes quantitative and qualitative information about d~e facility (such as physical site, operation features, personnel, and protection features).

Tiffs data should be collected by consulting with other professionals involved in tbe site/facility development, some examples include fire protection engineer, sprinkler contractor,

structure being surveyed.

Regardless of file source of the data, some of the information gathered may be of a sensitive or proprietary nature. Appropriate arrangements should be taken to protect the confidentiality of this information.

2-2.2 Organize Data. Deciding what information is needed and how it is to be used influences how it should be recorded. Most organizations will find ap r in t ed form useful for data collection and data retrieval. The proliferation of lightweight, high speed personal computers, cellular telephones, facsimile machines, and other advanced information technology can support other techniques or applications.

2-2.3* Prepare Plan. Once data is collected, decisions are made about what data is to be presented, and how it should be stored, retrieved, and utilized.

2-2.4 Review and Evaluate Plan. Testing and practicing the pre- incident plan will provide an opportunity to review the data-and refine the plan. Chapter 8 provides specific detail on how training and maintenance should be completed.

2-2.5 Training.

2-2.5.1 Unique Operations. The pre-incident planning process should include a provision for training in those portions of the plan that involve unique or unusual evolutions or operations.

2-2.5.2 Diverse Participants. Pre-Incident plans may identify participating individuals or agencies that do not normally work together. Training should be utilized to communicate the plan expectations to these groups.

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N F P A 1 6 2 0 ~ A 9 8 R O P

2-3 During the Incident.

2-$.1 The pre-incident plan should be the foundation for decision making during an emergency situation and provide important data that will assist the incident commander in developing appropriate strategies and tactics for managing the incident.

2~.2 The pre-incideut plan should help responding personnel identify critical factors that will affect the ultimate outcome of the incident, including personnel safety.

2-3.3 The pre-incident plan should provide for available facility personnel to advise responding personnel of current conditions upon arrival.

2-$.4 The information contained in a pre-incident plan should enable the incident commander to anticipate likely scenarios. A pre-incident plan should assist die incident commander in developing tactical options. Consulting die pre-incident plan throughout the incident should keep the incident commander aware of factors that might affect the success of the operation and the need for strategic or tactical adjusffnent.

2-4 After the Incident. The effectiveness of the pre-incident plan should be re-evaluated after an actual emergency. This review should include an analysis of die incident and die performance of responding personnel, owners, and occupants." The review may indicate the need for plan revision.

Chapter $ Physical Elements and Site Considerations

3-1 General. Physical elements and site considerations are classified into three groups: (1) construction, (2) building services including utilities, and (3) external conditions. These elements are relatively static. They are considered to be unaffected by outside influences and, therefore, unchanging during the pre-incident {~$ planning process. ~:~

$-2 Construction.

$-2.1 Area and Height. The size of the building, bod ~ar~d horizontal, can have a profound effect on tile decisi~ process during an emergency. It is therefore of u.tt3 ~ ~ c e that building size, including overall height, nu . ~ . . . ~ ~ d square footage be determined and included in~'{~ "~ ~ - ~

t ofth~ ~ $-2.1.1 Tbe number of stories might not r ~ . ~ . n t th~ building. There are cases where d~e n)/...~'~'~..9.d~ ~,~q~ include ~half stories ~ used for u t i l i t i ~ ~ els

iere are cast throughout a facility. A d d i t i o n a l l ~ ~-~-'~ e~9 standar( =~ feWdistance,Storiesandof athus,bUildingfl~e number ' r f are hict~s~.,,.,:~ '~" a uldt~,co be~t~ ~Y ~iling

estimating height based on the numb ~¢..$.tories. ~

3-2.1.2 Grade level access may be to d i f f e r ~ r ~ ,.~; on various sides of an occupancy. It is cridcal that the d F C i g ' ~ t pre-in plan address access and floor designations from all p o t e n t = avenues of approach.

3-2.2 Building Features.

3-2.2.1 The pre-incldent plan should address ti~e structural integrity of walls, roofs, and floors. Potential areas of concern would include added live and dead loads, indications of deterioration and structural weakening, and any other conditions impacting:

(a) The spread of fire, products of combustion or contaminants, toxic gases and vapors spread from floor to floor via the building's exterior or voids in curtain walls

(b) The ability to safely perform interior operations

(c) The ability to access file building's interior, either through openings or by breaching a wall

(d) The potential for falling #ass, curtain walls, exterior ornamentation, parapets, and overhanging components

(e) Exposures

3-2.2.2 Data that should be recorded regarding building construction details include wall construction and insulation information such as the location(s) of:

(a) Unsupported exterior walls

(b) Metal panel walls

(c) Masonry walls

(d) Glass walls

(e) Wood frame walls

(f) Plastic wall components, and

(g) Combustible insulation

$-2.2.$ Examples of data regarding roof construction that should be recorded are:

(a) Roof support components (wood joist, wood truss, steel joist, steel truss, beam and girder, and so forth), including file length of the support spans

(b) Roof deck r n ~ w o o d , metal, concrete) ~ - ~ : (c) Roof co~ .~ . t . ud ing insulation materials, vapor barrier, and

w a t e r p r o o f i n ~ c o m b u s t i b i l i t y and the buildup thickness can affects::, 1 i~i~g h ti n '~. . ."~y ~ ~ ,

r coX N (d) ~|..o:..~..__.. o'00 o :':':'!~-'.'~*'~"0"~'Oh (for example, peaked, flat, d o ~ " sawto

~ . . ~ . v ~ ' l ~ t y of means *~)r runoff drainage, such as trenches, d r ~ ~ slopes

$-2.2.4 ~ e g a r .ding floor construction that should be recorded include di '~.~#g:

i

om.oooo .oo.jo , w o o . t s. . . . . truss, beam and girder) including long lengths of

l ~ ~ e level of protection afforded to the floor support e l

(b) Floor members (wood deck, metal deck, concrete, etc.)

(c) Availability of means for runoff drainage, sudx as trenches, drains, scuppers, slopes

$-2.2.5 Data regarding other building features that should be recorded include the following:

(a) Construction of interior walls

(b) Interior finish materials

(c) Suspended ceiling assemblies

(d) Raised floors

(e) Concealed spaces including multiple ceiling and roof levels

(f) Windows for rescue and/or ventilation

(g) Confined space

(h) Fire resistance and protection of structural members.

3-2.2.6 Data regarding the location, types, and construction of access features that should be recorded include the following:

(a) Doorways

(b) Locking devices

(c) Accessible windows

(d) Fire escapes

(e) Tunnels

(f) Breechable walls

$-2.2.7 The pre-incident plan should note areas where products of combustion or other contaminants may spread due to a lack of structural barriers. The construction of any barriers should be

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N F P A 1 6 2 0 1 A 9 8 R O P

identified as well as the presence of any protection items such as fire doors, fire shutters, or fire or products of combustion or contaminants automatic closure devices/dampers. Data regarding spread of products of combustion or other contaminants that should be recorded include die following:

(a) Large undivided areas

(b) Unprotected openings between floors

1. Stairwells

2, Elevator shafts

3. Utility shafts

4. Escalators

critical equipment or processes that may pose a hazard if the compressed or liquefied gas supply is interrupted.

3-3.2.6 Steam. The location of steam lines and boilers should be noted as well as the equipment dlat depends on them. The location of die nearest shutoff means for the steam supply should be noted.

3-3.2.7 Fuels. Some facilities have die capability of changing over from one fuel to another. Information regarding these systems should be noted•

3-$.2.7.1 Gas. The location of all metering and pressure-regulating equipment as well as all shut-off valves should be noted. For LP-gas systems, the location and size of storage tanks, and shut-offvalves should be noted.

3-3.2.7.2 Liquid Fuels. The location of all pumps, tanks, regulating equipment, and shut-off valves should be noted•

5. Light wells 3-3.3 Elevators. The pre-incident plan should note the number,

(c) High hazard areas floors served, type (electric/hydraulic, passenger/freight, manual /automatic) , r.:~rictions, and location of all elevators.

3-2.2.8 Data regarding atriums that should be recorded include the ..::!i#~::::~::::.. following: 3-3.3.1 Elevator ~ a l l . TI'~'~ pre-incident plan should note data for

automatic e l e ~ . . c a l l including primary and secondary recall (a) Their location in die building floor levels. :::"."-:.:.:" "'i~.'~k

,-~i!iiiii "%i~i~..",:.. (b) Number of stories connected by the atrium 3-$.3.2 ~ ! ' ~ i . . . O v e r r ~ . h e pre-incident plan should note if fire

servic.c.~;~.¢':-~s provid~!~.. . .~:elevators and the location of any (c) Number of stories open to die atrium key.s..i~ce~ar¢:Tor this o p e r ~ ' .

(d) Fire suppression system(s) present in die atrium area ~ :~" -~* E ~ . o r Lobbies. : ~ h e pre-incident plan should note the .... p r e " '~ .~ .~ : . - .~ r e / smoke - r e s i s t an t elevator lobbies.

(e) Automatic fire detection and alarm system(s) present in the "~"-'~.":, atrium 3-3.3.4 " ~ e n c ~ . Power. The pre-incident plan should note if

~-.-'$.::,. . . . . emergenc~:~.~..g.:~|'s provided for tile elevators. (f) Smoke management systems including location of controls " ' ~ b : . . . . . ::~i.'#'* • , .,,..:; ~ .,.~:!~:::~-~:......:. . ~.~.

and operauon %: ",~?~,:,::~:..:~i~...,ffe. Co......t#mons.

3-3 Building Services. Experience has shown that various building '"~: ~ . ' ~ . ~ { s s . Conditions that would hamper the access of services and their associated equipment can cause or ~ t e to %~-..'~*: respot~[ing personnel should be noted. These might include an emergency incident. Information about these se..~i~es $'~ii: ~i.~. bridges with width or weight restrictions; narrow rights of way; roads equipment can help reduce dleir potential to h a v ~ adver'~iii" "~j.-::.'...:...~ject to flooding drifting snow washout, primary approach is impact on an incident. Conversely, this inform..~..'~..:.flaay o~. .e , . . ~,.~, ili#q:o :':~" ha downwind, or other blockage; and low overhead clearances, medlods to use the building services to s u p p o r ~ : " 6 ~ ' ~ ~ . ~ ~,.,'--"::~ railroad grade crossings, and drawbridges. an incident. Emergency contact information should: :~ .~{3taine~"~¢g building service . ...~.:~m ..... "::~j~..':..~.: ~ .... 3-4.2 Security. Many occupancies have some form of security

~!~i~!~iiii~i?::.. '::':'~ii!~:~. ,# measure that can restrict access to the facility. This can include 3-3.1 HVAC. I-IVAC systems can cou.t~lbute to*':"~::~, read ~{~.~:~ various types of locking devices. Data regarding security measures oroducts of combustion and c o n ~ a n t s t h r o u ~ t a fa . ~ y . utilized should be noted. ~rhe ability to control this e q u i p ~ . . i ~ . a y be n e e ~ i ~ D d d~{~ plan should note the location and ol~era/~t'~..~ file c o n t r ~ Some $4.2.1 The height and construction of fences should be noted. facilities may be provided with c e n ~ . , . . C , s e l f - c ~ n e d units, Location and security (lock boxes, alarms, unusual locking devices, or a combination of both. Some H V A C " : ~ s ar .~lesigned for and so forth) of access points need to be identified. Electrically- smoke management. (See Chapter 5 for s r a ~ e m e n t systems), charged fences or those that contain restricting measures, such as ..-.~..~ • o . .

~*.:.'.-* barbed yore or razor ware should be noted. 3-3.2 Utilities. ~ :

3-4.2.2 Tile use and number of guard dogs should be noted. 3-5.2.1 Electric Power. The location(s) and method of entrance (aboveground or underground) for electric power, the location of disconnects both inside and outside the facih'ty, and overhead primary and secondary conductors resulting in reduced vertical clearance should be noted.

3-3.2.2 Transformers. The location of transformers, both inside and outside the building, and the combustibility and environmental concerns of transformer fluids should be noted.

3-3.2.3 Emergency Power. The location and duration of emergency power components (generators, fuel supply, batteries, uninterruptible power supply systems) as well as what equipment remains powered when normal power is lost should be noted. If die emergency power system requires manual action, it should also be noted.

3-3.2.4 Domestic Water. Water shutoffs should be noted with st~ecial consideration given to any critical equipment or processes

at require an uninterrupted supply of water.

3 - 3 . 2 . 5 C o m p r e s s e d a n d L i q u e f i e d G a s e s . Tile location of compressors, storage containers, and the nearest disconnecting me,ms should be noted. Special consideration should given to any

Contact information should also be obtained for the person(s) responsible for the dogs•

3-4.2.3 Data regarding an on-site security service that should be recorded include the following:

(a) Procedure for contacting them

(b) Their location

(c) The number of personnel on duty

(d) Their level of access within the facility

(e) The scope of their emergency response training

$4.3 Exposures. The characteristics of an exposure determine the exposure's potential for becoming involved in an incident. Exposures can include both structural and non-structural elements.

$-4.4 Environmental Impact. Information should be gathered on potential environmental contaminants. Sprinkler operation or manual fire-fighting operations can produce large quantities of contaminated water, that can be harmful to wastewater treatment plants or the environment.

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NFPA 1620 - - A 9 8 R O P

3-4.5 Communications Impact. A functional test of the communications system as it would be used at an emergency should be conducted. Data such as die following regarding communications impact should be recorded:

(a) Interference or poor coverage as a result of construction or desigti of ~d io system. Areas to be checked should include below grade and shielded areas, interiors of large structures, and upper floors of high rise buildings

(b) Assignment of radio channels

(c) Other supplemental communications

Chapter 4 Occupant Considerations

4-1 General. The number and type of occupants in a facility can have a substantial impact on a pre-incident plan. Information should be gathered on the number of occupants; their ages, physical/mental condition, and whether they are ambulatory or n o n-am bu lato ry.

4-2 Life Safety Considerations.

4-2.1 General. Depending on tile type of occupancy, varying numbers of people will be present in a facility. Populations can range from a few individuals to several hundred or more. Regardless of die population, in the event of an emergency, life mfety considerations are a priority that should be addressed to allow responding emergency service personnel to assist in an immediate mad s,--fie evacuation of the facility or support protection in place.

4-2.2 Hours of Operation. While most activities take place during daylight hours, major activities can occur in most occupancies at other times. The hours of operation should be noted•

4-2.3 Occupant Load. The number of occupants can vary ~i depending upon the time of day, day of the week, and year• Information should be gathered regarding the normal occupant Io,'~! and any expected variations.

4-2.4 Location of Occupants. Various uses of sectig~. ~ facilities should be identified and the number o r ~ i anticipated tO be in those areas noted. .~?,'.~. ~" ..,:.o ~.,,:.:.,. ~g~,.:: ,

4-2.5 Means of Egress. The number of exits, their I'~ curl special locking c o n d i t i o n s such as d e l a y e ~ % ~ e , lin ty

access, and stairwell locking, should b ~ ~ i ' . . ~ 3 e ~ plan. The potential for exits to be c o , ~ r o m i s ~ e t ~

~,~:-'-'~ -.:~.....-.~ ,~.,.. :~.-

4-2.6 Emergency Action Plan. ~ ! i t y has an e / '~ action plan (also known as a site emergencg~.~...mg. , emergen~ response plan, and so forth), it should be revie~.k . .The suat.~ y and tactics to be used by emergency responders sho~|~iib.....e coq.*.~ dated with the facility's emergency action plan. ":~.:i.:.-"!::~::!i!.::..,......<-~ ?'~'

4-2.7 Assistance for the Disabled. Special c~~]derations might be required to evacuate or protect occupants who need assistance. The locations of occupants wilt need assistance to safely evacuate should be noted. Areas of refuge, if provided, should be noted. Location of equipment such as stair chairs, stretchers, or lifts that may assist evacuation should be identified.

4-2.8 Defend in Place Concept. Defend in place methods are utilized where complete evacuation is eiti~er impossible or impractical such as in high rise, health care, or detention facilities. The planned methods, safe areas, and all areas utilizing this method should be noted.

4-3 On-Site Emergency Organization. The on-site emergency response capabilities and how their functioning coordinates with responding personnel should be noted.

4-3.1 The facility emergency action plan might specify total evacuation without any efforts to control the emergency or might specify an active occupant response. The anthority having jurisdiction or the owner/occupant might require an emergency response organization of building occupants to specifically control fires, chemical spills, and related emergencies, or to facilitate evacuation or deliver emergency medical services.

4-3.2 Emergency Action Plan,

4-3.2.1 Organizational Structure. An organizational structure and emergency contact list should be obtained from facility management. The emergency contact list should be updated annually or when changes occur. At a minimum, the list should include who to contact, in order of priority, in tile event of an emergency.

4-3.2.2 Assignment of Non-~z-f ight lng Duties. A current list of personnel assigned emergency response duties that specifies each individual's responsibilities s h o u l d b e available. For example, this list might identify a technical liaison who is familiar with the building's electrical and HVAC systems and otbers.

4-3.2.3 Special Equipment Operation. Some occupancies contain very specialized operations, processes and hazards that can pose unique cllallenges in an emergency. Emergency operating procedures a n d personnel for these conditions should be documented and readily available.

4-3.2.4 Hazardous M...~....rinls Coordinator. Many occupancies have an individual(s) w i ~ ! $ ' ~ p , onsible for maintaining material s~ety data sheets (MS~i i iand i ~ n t o r i e s of hazardous materials. Contacting thi . ,s . i i i~n(s ) for on-scene assistance should be given priority at a ~ ' m d ~ y . The location of MSDS and related data should be i ~ t e d r ~ h e pre-incident plan.

.~%. :-~i~i:. "~@"~!~::, .... ~ 5 P r o ~ . . ~ s t e m s and Water Supplies

5 -~ i~ i~en~ . Fire protecti~'~ystems and water supply should be ~ i n e d i i i ~ j ~ . t h e develop/~i'ent of and specifically noted in the pre-

flies. 5-2 W a t ~ i . ": . ' . '~f~:.

~:2.1" The ~ ' h a c y of available water for fire-fighting purposes is ~ . b l y th~.iiff-ngle most significant factor to consider when ~ . ~ . g $ s;ite for its fire loss potential. This includes ensuring $~leqti~.~-~ater supplies for sprinkler systems, inside and outside hose ~ ' . ams , and any other special requirements or needs.

~ 2 The required fire flow should be determined by evaluating tile in terms of size of the building (height, number of floors, and

~rea), construction type, occupancy, exposures, fire protection systems, and any other features that could affect the amount of wate~ needed to control or extinguish file fire.

5-2.2.1" A water supply test should be conducted in accordance with NFPA 291, Recommended Practice for Fire Flow Testing and • Marking. of Hydrants.. The results should, be reported in the plan, including the available flow at a specified residual pressure [typically 20 psi (138 kPa) ].

5-2.2.2 The results of die water supply test should be compared to the sprinkler system demand. Where the demand exceeds the available supply, the plan should address an appropriate response to mitigate the deficiency.

5-2.8 Fire Department Connections (FDC). Data concerning the FDC that should be recorded include the following:

(a) Physical location

(b) Area covered

(c) Type of system(s) supplied

(d) Size and type of threads

5-2.4 Fire Pumps.

5-2.4.1 Data regarding file fire pump that should be recorded include the following:

(a) Location

(b) Type of driver (electric, diesel or other)

(c) Capacity (rated flow, pressure)

(d) Source of water supply (reservoir, tank. public supply)

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NFPA 1620 - - A98 ROP

(e) Operation (automatic, manual)

(f) Areas/systems served

(g) Name of, and contact information for person(s) responsible for maintaining the pump

5-2.4.2 For electric fire pumps, the location and means of electrical disconnect should be identified (such that the power to the pump is not compromised during the incident). If the fire pump power supply is not electrically separated from the facility disconnect, it should be noted in the plan•

5-2.5 Fire Hydrants. Data regarding the fire hydrants that should be recorded include die following:

(a) The location and the type of each fire hydrant

(b) Number and diameter of each outlet

(c) Threads and diameter

(d) Alternate hydrant locations from other sources of water (that is, public, private, or high pressure)

5-3" Automatic Sprinkler Systems. Data concerning automatic sprinkler protection that should be recorded include the following:

(a) Type of system (wet, dry, pre-action, other)

(b) * Hazard classification of the system and occupancy

(c) * Kaown sprinkler system deficiencies

(d) * Location and identification of all exterior control valves, including street boxes ~

(e) Location and identification of all interior control and sectional valves

(f) Location and identification of all risers "~;~{ k~,~

(g) Location and identification of local water fl~'~'~"~ " ~ a l a r m d procedures for silencing the local alarms ~ ~ ~ ~ ! ~ "" . # . ~

(h) Name of, and contact information for perso for maintaining the system

~ 6~'~'* (i) Extent ofspdnlder coverage ~ .~ ~ :::"::::" . ~

5-4" Standplpe System. ~ " e ~ . , . ~ g ,¢..,"- ~ "%.~ 5-4.1 Data concerning standpipe syst shoui recorded include the following: , . ~ ~.~'

(a) Type of system (wet, dry, pre-action, o t I ~ J

(b) Location, threads and size of hose outlets

(c)* Pressure available at hose valve outlet(s)

(d) Water supply (demand)

(e) Location and identification of all exterior control valves, including street boxes

(f) Location and identification of all interior control and sectional valves

(g) Location and identification of all risers

(h) Narne of, and contact information for person(s) responsible for maintaining the system

5-4.2* Pressure Restricting Devices and Pressure Reducing Valves. In order to regulate the residual and/or static pressure at standpipe outlets, some systems are equipped with standpipe valves that are pressure restricting devices (regulate residual pressure only) or pressure reducing valves (regulate both static and residual pressures). The presence of these devices should be noted in the pre-incident plan.

5-5 Protective Signaling Systems.

5-5.1" Protective signaling systems can provide notification to building occuijaatants and responding personnel .as well as provide supervision of the operational status of protection systems.

5-5.2 Data regarding the protective signaling system that should be recorded include the following:

(a) Method of system activation (manual, automatic)

(b) Area of coverage

(c) Location of fire alarm control panel (FACP) and remote annunciator panels

(d) Type of automatic detectors provided (smoke, heat, other)

(e) Method of off-site alarm transmission, if any

(f) Name of, and contact number for, any off-site monitoring agency

(g) Capability for ~ i c address system or voice alarm ~ - .

(h) C a p a b i l i t y ~ e m e r ~ c y ' fire service telephone, location of telephone c o n ~ s and handsets

(i) N a n ~ . e ~ t a n ~ . . t information for person(s)responsible

5-6.1 ~ a l protecti, • ~xany t ~ e s h~zar~ ~ l ~ - n g

Halon, g: ~wet chemic2 ems.

(a) Type of system

;ystems These may include CO~,

foam-water, dry chemical, and

cial protection systems that should be ing:

~-~"(b) Hazard or area protected by the system

(c) Location of control panels

(d) Location of all protective agent supply and reserve containers

(e) Activation method

(f) Activation threshold

(g) Personnel hazards of protective agent

(h) Name of, and contact information for, person(s) responsible for maintaining the system

(i) Method and extent of occupant notification

5-7 Portable Fh'e Extinguishers.

5-7.1 Portable fire extinguishers can be found in many types of occupancies. The plan should note the location and type of fire extinguishers when they are useful for responding personnel.

5-7.2 In some facilities, large wheeled equipment and/or spedalized extinguishers (such as Class D fire extinguishers, chemical neutralization units) might be provided. In these instances, consideration should be given to file value that these extinguishers might have to responding personnel.

5-8* Smoke Management. The term "smoke management" as used in this section indudes all methods that can be used alone or in combination to modify smoke movement for the benefit of occupants, or responding personnel, or to reduce property damage. Data regarding smoke management systems that should be recorded include the following:

(a) Type(s) of system(s)

(b) Location(s) of areas served by system(s)

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N F P A 1 6 2 0 ~ A 9 8 R O P

(c) Location(s) of control systems

(d) System operation information ( that is, automatic/manual, and so forth)

(e) Location(s) of back up operating instructions

(f) Location(s) of manual override controls

(g) Locations and types of detection devices

(h) Location of supply (make up air) and discharge arrangement

(i) Name of, and contact information for person(s) responsible for maintaining the system

Chapter 6 Special Hazard Considerations

6-1" General. Special hazards are those hazards tlmt an occupancy can contain that are not usual or typical . . . . for emergency resp.onse or fire department personnel, and pose significant addmonal risk if not evaluated properly during an emergency. The pre-incident plan needs to document these special conditions to ensure emergency response personnel awareness of the situation, so that appropriate response considerations a n d / o r resource activation may occur during an emergency response.

6-2 Transient Conditions.

6-2.1 Many special hazards might exist only during specific times throughout the year for an occupancy. Such conditions may include the following:

(a) Annual maintenance

(b) Special events or productions ~

(c) Construction ~,.i

(d) Special manufacturing production runs

6-$ Inventory. ..:~. A :::¢" ~ 6-8.1 Inventory of special hazard materials can ~ ~ l ~ t l t the year. It is essential to request maximum i n ~ { ~

include a method to l r r e n ~ site surveys. The plan should o1~ inventories of special hazard materials a t . , t ~ . . ~ e of : .¢rgency.

6-3.2 Some materials presenting spe . ~ f : " h ~ ~ ~ d l k and non-bulk containers that can ~.'..:~,.~emporarily ~ ~.~ear the occupancy being surveyed. ~ r / ~ t i o n a l cot~..

c a r locations, a n d characteristics o f ~ a e s ' ~ t a i n e r s ~ • documented aspa r t of the pre-inciden~:~'~,ey. Data j ~a as the following regarding special hazards shoul~l/i~ recor.~ d:

(a) Rail cars ~.~.~.

(b) Tank trucks

(c) Van trailers

(d) Intermediate bulk containers

(e) Hazardous materials storage lockers

(f) Construction trailers

6-4 Special Hazards. Experience has shown that various hazardous materials and conditions can cause great difficulties and risks during an emergency incident.

6-4.1 Flammable and Combustible Liquids. Flammable and combustible liquids create fires that grow faster and produce much more heat than ordinary combustibles. The high heat release can cause premature structural collapse, in addition to making entry into the fire area extremely difficult. Data regarding flammable and combustible liquids that should be recorded include the following:

(a) Where this material will drain if spilled

(c) Necessary extinguishing agent resources, such as fire-fighting foams

6-4.2 Explosives. The use or storage of explosive materials in an occupancy will normally be highlighted as part of the initial site survey. The presence and location of such materials should be noted on the pre-incident plan, since these materials can pose extreme risk to the emergency responder.

Typical commercial materials that could explode upon exposure to fire a n d / o r heat, such as ammonium nitrate, should also be documented on the pre-incident plan.

6-4.$ Toxicological/Biological Agents. The use of toxic or biological agents within an occupancy can pose risk to emergency responders. Location and amount of these materials should be documented in the pre- inddent plan, with special notation as to what special protective equipment might be needed.

The impact of these materials on neighboring or downwind occupancies should also be evaluated.

6-4.4 Radloactive " " ~ T h e location and type of radioactive materials and r a ~ o n - p ? i ~ u c i n g devices should be identified.

Small a m ~ manufacturing, care ~ . laboratory, health or other o c o , ~ ; i e s c i ~ s e significant risks.

6-4.5 ~ O ~ e m l c a t s ~ . ~ . ~ e r i a l s . Many chemicals can p r o ~ e an a ~ e r s e reac t io~ .~ 'on tamina ted or mixed with other ~ i a l s . ~ d i t i o n a l l y , m .a~:'i:hemicals undergo chemical reaction

•

x p o ~ . t o elevated t~mp.eratures, as in a fire. The build-up of • ~.~lt '~o~l~. reefs, generauon of toxic byproducts, and heat g e n e ~ . ~ . y chemical reaction should be evaluated during the pre- i n e i d e n ~

,. Reactive ~.~eact cii"~'cals that require cooling (such as in a refrigerated ~ . < o . . n s e ) .~'$uid also be noted, since it is likely that power may

o

• Mate~als that react upon exposure to air or water need to be aocumenvdocumented on the pre-incident plan.

¢ 2 . 6 Electrical a n d / o r Mechanical Hazards. Some occupancies have large electrical and mechanical systems that could present the emergency responder with hazards of electrocution, mechanical entrapment, or other perils.

Systems that present hazards to the emergency responder can usually be de-energized or the mechanical energy isolated and secured. The pre-incident plan should identify where the instructions for such procedures exist.

6-4.7 Special Atmospheres. Some occupancies maintain special rooms or equipment with special gases or vapors that may present hazards to the emergency responders. Such areas may include the following:

(a) Confined spaces

(b) Inert atmospheres

(c) Ripening facilities

(d) Special equipment treating atmospheres

Chapter 7 Emergency Operations

%1 General. A system to utilize the pre-incident plan should be designed to allow access to the plan, or a summary with key elements of the plan, while in route and during the incident. An important component of responding personnel 's emergency response plan is the inclusion of a system that provides for the preparation, distribution, and updating of pre-incident plans of various occupancies. The pre-incident information should be presented so as to be easily deciphered and understood under the emergency response conditions that would be expected to be encountered within a responding emergency vehicle's passenger compartment.

(b) If secondary containment is provided, evaluate the amount of fire-fighting water that can be contained with the spilled materials

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N F P A 1 6 2 0 ~ A 9 8 R O P

7-2* Incident Notification. The pre-incident plan may provide critical information that could be advantageous for responding personnel at the time of dispatch. Communicat ing this information should be incorporated as part of tile normal dispatching procedures .

7-3* Incident Operations.

7-3.1 The plan should address a s tandard response to an incident at the facility or site, as well as additional resources required for significant incidents. Where local resources are limited, the plan should address acquiring addit ional resources.

7-3.2 The plan may include initial actions based on tile priorities of life safety, scene sw.bilization, and incident mitigation.

7-3.3 Tile plan must address tile importance of the facility and responding personnel baying a working knowledge of each other 's capabilities and emergency operat ional procedures. Tiffs will facilitate tile smooth transference of information at tile incident c o m m a n d post.

7-3.4 The plan should address the implementa t ion of an appropriate incident management system upon tlle arrival of rile first emergency units. Tile plan should address bow timely information will flow in

percept ions or assumptions. In any test, unusual conditions should also be considered, such as how to identify and handle an actual emergency tilat might occur dur ing a test.

8-2.4 To tile extent possible, plan testing should involve all who might be expected to assist dur ing an actual emergency. Such persons may include mutual aid units, emergency medical service personnel , law enforcement officials, facility management and technical experts.

8-2.5 Pre- inc identp lan testing should be coordinated with both emergency responders and facility personnel . For tests involving the facility itself, it is necessary to involve the management of the facility in the planning of the test and it may even be necessary to convince management of the need for a drill or on-site test. In such cases, presentat ion of a video-tape of an earlier major fire or emergency in a similar occupancy may be of assistance.

8-2.6 Tile test should be p lanned with as much detail as used in the development of the pre - inc iden tp lan itself. Distribute copies of the plan to all assisting parties, including facility representatives so timt all participants know what is supposed to happen and what responsibilities each part icipant has in tile drill.

8-2.6.1 Internal coordinat ion is necessary to ensure that the owner botll directions between the facility and tile fire depar tment . When and occupant are aw,.~.e of their individual roles in tile test and that a facility representative is no t available, file facility should provide all available r e s o u r ~ . ~ . e most efficiently utilized. Each level of the fire depar tment i rdonnat ion allowing for rapid access to, and management wifl.~' theTadli ty should ensure that the staff and consultation with, a site representative until an on-site liaison can be employees are . ~ : , o f their individual roles and responsibilities established. While tile scope and intensity level of required during tile t~"str"~$..~g the flexibility of such roles and information flow between tile facility staft and tile fire depar tment " responsib!..l:.il{'~: "::i~::ii~i~::, incident commander will vary during various phases of the incident, ,::#~i~i~!i?:ia.?~!i:. "%i~!i::....,-:~:- information flow, including any actions taken by the occupants, 8-2.6.2:f,~nce "t~:6 facility o i ~ : d e p a r t m e n t is completely self- between both parties must continue throughout the incident, suff...~nt, d~Lernai coordi..~Ktion is also essential if the pre-incident

pl~t~ii~9 b~.!~ective. SuCh external coordinat ion should involve 7-3.5 Tile location of tile incident command post and emergency p u b l i c " ~ ' ~ ' ¥ e r s o n n e l , the news media, police, medical operat ions center, if provided, should be noted, whether it is s e r v i c e s , ' ~ a t c h center, and other units as appropriate. manne d or u n m a n n e d and the ability to gain access to tile area. ~.~:~::::... ":%i~?::,,.:~:- Some supplemenud detailed information such as building plans and ":~:,~-- .~..'..~.,..7 Tile r e ~ : ~ i v e duties and responsibilities of tile various fire alarm drawings may be kept in a lock box or odler secured area. % " ~ : ~ i ~ . : : i f i " t h e test need to be clearly identified. The use of

:~i~. co . .~Y- : ' ~ : ' a rm bands, head gear, vests, or some other form of 7-3.6 Tile plan shonld provide that operations begnn by t h e . ~ i . ~ :~i:-':..~lble i.d~htification is r ecommended . should be communica ted to the emergency responders. ..:~i;-::':''::!~i:':'.'ili': "~ii.

,::!i::~:. . . . . . !ii! i: ~3.~: 'Appropriate security measures should be established, it should 7-3.7 The plan should contain provisions for sheltering~if~uat~-: i : i : : , . %~: :?ecognized that occupancies can contain valuable objects and occupants . " ~::':'.'%~iii:!#':"~"%%i~i~tfiat tile facility operator also maintains information about

......... "::-"!i~i~ii.~.. ":':':':" operations and employees that should remain secure. 7-3.8 The plan should address situations that ar.¢iil~'~ii...~., reqti~..~!}:::...:::. tile use of [ t ug hose stretches that may inch~ .d.....c'."i~uppl)?'~i.:'.,a...ttacl¢~'Y" 8-2.9 Tile communicat ion system for a test should include an hose lines. ..::!."..'ii~::.. ":!illii::iii: .:~i::" "emergency signal" to identify an actual emergency during the test m

-:ii::"%!!~!!i::, %!!: " exercise. Tiffs signal would be used if an emergency situation 7-4 Location and number of occupants should::'~i..'..0.etermi~d since occurs, such as an injury to a test participant. these will vary with tile facilities operations and t i~ l~ .£ d~.~..~flMany facilities have implemented an accountability systefii.~ii-~}~..~":: 8-2.10 A visitor or observer identification system should be unders tanding of such a system will assist emergency~ '~ponders in established. This system should distinguish between actual test carrying out their life safety priority actions, participants and spectators. In add i t i on ,p rocedures need to be

established to control tile movement a n d l o c a t i o n of spectators. Chapter 8 Plan Testing and Maintenance

8-1 General. During the plarming process, it can be difficult to recognize various problems or requirements that might be encounte red during an emergency. An effective plan requires initial and periodic testing, and maintenance.

8-2 Plan Evaluation.

8-2.1 Testing can be conducted by various methods including computer modeling, blackboard or tabletop exercises, or a full-scale test. During testing, using tile pre-incident plan may provide an opportuni ty to train facility ,and responding personnel.

8-2.2 In preparat ion for a test o f tile pre-incident plan, three questions should be addressed:

8-2.11 An on-the-scene test will involve a large number of personnel , apparatus, and other forms of vehicular traffic. Plans to handle file additional traffic that is not normally present at rile facility or during an actual incident should be included.

8-2.12 The most valuable port ion of a test is the post-test analysis. This can result in subsequent modifications of die plan to correct any deficiency or increase efficiency. Personnel who are not participants in the test should be assigned to observe mad provide critical evaluation to the post-test analysis.

8-2.13 Tile analysis should f i t ly discuss test procedures to assist in fi~ture testing of rile pre-incident plan.

8-3 Plan Maintenance.

(a) What is tile test designed to accomplish?

(17) How will tile test be conducted?

8-3.1 Most occupancies present an ever-changing environment making o n g o i n g maintenance of tile pre-incident plan is as critical as the original development of the plan.

(c) What resources will be needed for tile test?

8-2.3 It is impor tant to consider all of rile variables that might be encountered dur ing an actual emergency. Plans for a test should rely on research, development , and experience, ra ther tilan

8-3.2 New const ruct ion/expansion, changes in water supply, changes in available hydrants, change in occupancy, changes in response routes/ t raff ic patterns, a test that identifies problems; or problems in an actual inc ident can indicate tile need for updat ing or review.

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N F P A 1620 ~ A 9 8 R O P

8-3.3 Responsibility for plan maintenance must be determined at flae time of planning initiation. The ideal procedure will provide for a review of each plan on at least an annual basis.

(c) Water front location

(d) Fixed water crafts

8-3.4 New information or circumstances may indicate tile need for plan revision. These may include dae following:

(a) Property or deed transfers

(b) Issuance of occupancy permits

(c) Information from utilities, such as water, electric, gas, or sewer authorities

(e) Sub-grade locations

9-4 Occupant Considerations.

9-4.1 Due to the possible large numbers of occupants, consideration should be given to die expected characteristics of the persons, such as dae following:

(a) Age

(d) Information from police and security officials (b) Mobility

(e) Changes in telephone numbers (c) Awareness

(f) Issuance of building permits (d) Knowledge

(g) Inquiries from architects, engineers, or other consultants (e) Density

(h) Observations of economic or social change 9-4.2 Tile p o t e n t i ~ ' . , 7 O e a n s of egress to become obstructed or impaired sbould.~iynoted']~t the plan.

(i) Observations by response personnel during training exercises ..::.:~-~..%~ 9-4.3 Expec.k.~:[." "eff'@~.e.ness of crowd managers, security, or on site

(j) Notices from highway department of street closings emergency. ~ e e s , i~':.~.vided, should be included in the pre- i nc iden tz i~3%, :~j~::,

(k) Protection equipment impairment notices .~i'.i'i::....)::?~ "::~iii?::,...:.-::.:.:-:" 9-5 ~'tectio~:::2gystems and':'~.'..'"~r Supply.

(I) Submission of data to regulatory authorities .s~!~ %::. ~'::'::~ .~.:~."~i][iii~:..Clos~::i~..w.l. uation of afitomatic sprinkler systems in locations

(m) Actual incidents " : : 'wh~. .~. ."~.h. 've stage product ions and similar shows are condff~..: . to determine if adequate protection is expected for die

(n) Loss experience in similar occupancies intende~.: ' . -~e sh.ould be included. :6":::.. ~:.':'-':':'::::::~. .:4:: ~

(O) Fire department inspections :"~.:::::..9..-5.2 The ~ ' o f an event could result in the intentional :':~ik ""::::~iii~.:.rary i ~ a i r m e n t of a protection system to allow for

8-3.5 Where conditions indicate that a change in a pre-incident plan%, ~ . . ~ . . ~ k h s p l a y s or theatrical smoke generation. The plan is warranted, flae plan should be brought up-to-date and copies "~i~: . . : : ~ ~ ' ~ e alternate protection means or procedures for daese distributed to appropriate persons and agencies. Prior..:~'.i.i.9..n. s of ~:.-'.-".~:" situati~ias. dm pre-incident plan should be archived or destroyg.~i-:~/n:':~":%%".-"i: '%. accordance wifll local policy. ,~!" "~if :-"i~i!, ~ Special Hazards. No special considerations.

Chapter 9 Assembly O c c u p ~ i : : : .,~":':':"~i?:::.~ii:~Y:9-7 Emergency Operations. ':~iii i~!~i::i?.; ' ~ # '

9-1 Administration. .~.,:..:.-::::::::.:.~ ":'~i~-:$.. " .... 9-7.1 Consideration of life safety at p laces of assembly should be dae ~ i . . : . ' . / . : ; .... "::!'~i~i~i!i~..%: . . . . major point addressed by dae plan.

9-1.1 Pre-incident planning in an a s s # ~ | y o c c ~ i n v o ' l ~ ' t only the emergency responders, b.~.~ii~!so a d m i n i s ~ s , eve#" 9-7.2 Sufficient space and resources should be provided to relocate su pervisors,, other staff, m e m b e r ~ ~'~:',:...f~i::~'tz°nsiderati°~!i~i~'" dae '~q3es of occupants away from operating emergency units occupants tlaat may ne present. " x-i~:~:~:!:!::, ':-y.--.'~:

":~!~i'-'.-::. ~ii~: 9-7.$ The potential for emergency responder's access to become 9-1.2 This chapter contains r e c o m m e n d ~ : ~ . s p e c ~ : to dais type of obstructed or impaired should be noted in the plan. occupancy. All pre-incident plans should"~.......~X~e general provisions set forth in Chapters 1 through 8 -".~i~iU 9-8 Plan Testing and Maintenance. Testing of the pre-incident plan

.::#;:" under actual occupancy conditions will not be practical in most 9-1.$ Special Definition. " instances. Every effort and consideration should be exercised

Assembly Occupancies. Assembly occupancies include, but are not limited to, all buildings or portions of buildings used for gathering togedaer 50 or more persons for such purposes as deliberation, worship, entertainment, eating, drinking, amusement, or awaiting transportation. Occupancy of any room or space for assembly purposes. . by fewer flaan 50 persons in a building or other, occupancy and incidental to such other occupancy shall be classified as part of the other occupancy and shall be subject to the provisions applicable thereto. (101:4-1.2)

9-2 Pre-Incident Planning Process. No special considerations.

9-3 Physical Elements and Site Considerationg

9-3.1 Places of assembly may occur within other occupancies. The pre-incident planning concepts of dais chapter shou ldbe utilized for daese areas.

9-3.2 Situations such as the following where access is difficult due to location and other conditions should be noted in the plan:

(a) Low levels of lighting

during testing to account for the expected occupant load.

Chapter 10 Educational Occupancies

10-1 Administration.

10-1.1 Pre-incident planning in an educational occupancy involves not only the emergency responder, but school administrators, teachers, other staff members, and students.

10-1.2 This chapter contains recommendations specific to dais type of occupancy. All pre-incident plans should follow die gener,'d provisions set forth in Chapters 1 through 8.

10-1.$ Special Definition.

Educational Occupancy. Educational occupancies include all buildings or portions of buildings used for educational purposes through the tweffth grade by six or more persons, for four or more hours per day, or more than 12 hours per week. Educational occupancies include schools, kindergartens, nursery schools, academies, and day-care facilities. ( 10h 4-1.3)

(b) High-rise top story

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N F P A 1 6 2 0 ~ A 9 8 R O P

10-2 Pre-Incident Planning Process. No special considerat ions.

10-3 Physical Elements and Site Considerations. The pre- incident plan should note any changes in access pat terns tha t may occur dur ing occupancy.

10-4 Occupant Considerat ions.

10-4.1 Tile pre- incident plan should include data concern ing file n u m b e r of s tudents and thei r age range.

10-4.2 The pre- incident plan should include data concern ing the location of various age groups within the facility.

10-4.3 The pre- incident plan should include the location and capacity of any assembly areas (see Chapter 9).

10-5 Protect ion Systems and Water Supply. No special considera t ions .

10-6 Special Hazards.

10-6.1 T h e location of any hazard areas such as shops, laboratories and kitchens should be no ted on the pre- incident plan.

11-2.1 Obta in the h e a l t h care facil i tyfire/disaster p lan and incorpora te d ie informat ion into die pre- incident plan. Note die acronyms dlat die facility uses to imp lemen t the f i re /disaster plan.

11-2.2 During die p lann ing process, a knowledge of existing safety related documen ta t ion will enhance and expedite the deve lopment of tile pre-incident plan itself. Example documenta t ion includes tile following:

(a) Emergency procedures established for control l ing chemical spills.

(b) Procedures for opera t ing room/surg ica l suite emergencies. Such procedures may include evacuation and equ ipmen t shut down procedures, and provisions for control of emergencies by facility staff unt i l arrival of die emergency responders.

11-3 Physical Elements and Site Considerations.

11-3.1 General . Large lleaith care facilities or complexes may occupy a large tract of l and with numerous site specific hazards. Sep~a te , s tand a lone buildings may provide physical p lant suppor t funct ions or specialized medical care or t rea tment . Pre-incident plans should address each of fliese operat ions individually and note the criticality of diem, and what impact, bo th f rom a fire and

10-6.2 The quantity, type and location of any hazardous materials con t inued facility se~.'ces po in t of view, die i r loss would have on the should be no ted on dae pre- incident plan. ent ire facility. Sm.aJ~ .~ea l th care facilities such as nurs ing homes

vail general ly occupy o ~ i ~ u d d m g . 10-7 Emergency Operations. ~ :

11-3.2 C o n s t r ~ t i o / ~ . ~ . general , hea l th care facilities are designed 10-7.1 Tile pre- incident plan should note die system or m e t h o d used with c o n s ~ . ~ n fe'2i~':_ ~ . to compar tment ize a fire within the for account ing for all of tile occupants, e n c l o s u ~ . . ' ~ of o r ~ , . . T..~e location of fire walls, fire barriers,

smoke , .~r r ie /~ ' and a r e a s : ~ f u g e should be no ted in die pre- 10-7.2 The pre- incident plan should include provisions for hand l ing m c i ~ t plY... die interact ion between emergency responders , facility staff, and ~ i i k - ~ .:~:...~i~., s tudents and their parents or guardians. 1 1 - $ . 3 " ~ # . ~ e a l t h care facilities may have multiple entrances to

the facil~'~i(~ch as a main entrance, an emergency room entrance 10-8 Plan Testing and Maintenance. No special considerat ions. $'.-...'~i::,.,.and spec ia l~ . - ,~ i~a tment entrances. These ent rances may be

:~£6~].".,ac~ted on d"~...~"~nt sides of die facility and due to grade changes, ,::.-: ~ i ~'t~.o . located on Chapter 11 Health Care Occupancies ~:.x <~:.:..-.....::~, .-:, .~, .~/. ..... .t~l-y different f loor levels. '..::.,.':. .~ ~.~..':..'.~

11-1 Administration. ~:,-:::..:::~.. ~ 3 . 4 * , ~ ' i l d l n g Services. Since evacuation of a healda care facility • ~:::~:::~."-"~ "~.:.s. no t al'ways feasible or necessary, sbut t ing off bui lding utilities ma) , . . . . . .:.,.'-" ..~

11-1.1 P r e - m o d e n t p lann ing m a hea l th care occupancy_:-~.t), f lves~ ~ . ~ ' ~ t d m e n t a l to the occupants ' safety and health. The plan should not only the emergency responders, bu t also heal th c ~ i ~ ] .,.~,,....,. % ".a~ress tile decis ion-making process to shut off a hea l th care facility administrators , section or d e p a r t m e n t supervisors, ma~nte~ }~:'?': " ~ - ~ t i l i t y . d i r ec to r /bu i ld ing engineer , odier staff members , a~.O.,.recol~ ~ , of "~'"'~: the types of occupants and hazards tha t may b e . ~ , . : i ~ : f %~ii::i~..-.¢:" 11-3.5 S~eclal Utility Considerat ions. The types and extent of

special utilities will be based on die size and types of t rea tment 11-1.2 Widfin heal th care facilities, an e s m . ~ e d m a n a ~ :nt ~:"~ be ing provided. Tile plan should address die decis ion-making team will have the overall responsibility o f " ~ n g die h~... fll care process to sbut off a special utility. facility. This team should be consul ted for the " ~ ' : o p m e n + i ~ f tile pre- incident plan. ":~I++~.~ ...-:#' 11.4 Occupant Considerat ions. T b e p r e - i n c i d e n t plan should note

":~+~:- tile max imum n u m b e r of patients within each smoke zone. This 11-1.3 This chapter contains r ecommenda t ions spec~+:'~:o this type will he lp al locate resources should an inc ident occur. of occupancy. All pre- incident plans should follow ff{e general provisions set forth in Chapters 1 th rough 8. (a) Facility Emergency Action Plan. The pre- incident plan should

incorpora te appropr ia te data f rom the facihty plan. 11-1.4 Special Definit ions.

Facility Emergency Action Plan. A plan developed by the healfl~ care facility to describe the actions to be taken dur ing various internal an d external emergencies sbould be available on site. The dep th of each facility plan will vary d e p e n d i n g on the size of tile facility and die type and extent of medical services provided. This facility plan should detail evacuation protocol, emergency contacts, responsibili t ies of various heal th care facility staff, and required action of facility staff. Other sections of the facility plan may note tbe use of communica t ions systems, security and traffic control, procedures to follow in the event of natural disasters and civil disturbances, an d so forth.

(b) Special Needs. A hea l th care facility will consist mostly of patients who are incapable of self-preservation. Movement of paden t and file care of patients after movemen t are issues tha t require considerat ion and p lann ing to include a close working relat ionship with the facility staff.

11-4.1" Health Care Facility Evacuation Procedures . ff horizontal evacuation is necessary, reference to die individual smoke zones ma$ be necessary. An analysis of the required resources necessary for the horizontal evacuation of patients sllould be considered as par t of die pre- incident plan. Building plans of tile heal th care facility will assist in evaluating the features of such smoke zones.

Heal th Care Occupancy. Health care occupmicies are those used for purposes such ,as medical or tal ler t r ea tmen t or care of persons suffering f rom physical or mental illness, disease, or infirmity; and for tile care of infants, convalescents, or infirm persons. Heal th care occupancies provide sleeping facilities for four or more occupants and are occupied by persons who are mostly incapable of self-preselvation bec~ause of age, physical or mental disability, or because of security measures no t u n d e r the occupant ' s control• (101: 4-1.4)

11-2 Pre- lncident Planning Process.

The pre- incident plan should include procedures arid guidelines if exterior evacuation of patients become necessary. Evacuation of bealda care facilities will require addi t ional resources to ensure each pat ient is a t t ended to and cared for after the evacuation. Additional issues to consider when evacuating patients f rom heal th care facilities include:

(a) Weather

(b) Relocation facilities for pa t ien t evacuation

535

NFPA 1620 - - A 9 8 ROP

(c) Movement of bedridden patients and patients on life-support systems

(d) Special needs of the patients

(e) Medical records and required medications

11-4.2 Siaecial Considerations for Health Care Facilities. Due to the unique tunctions performed by health care facilities, special occupant considerations are needed. These areas include the following:

(a) Operating rooms and surgical suites

(b) Recovery rooms

(c) Intensive care, cardiac care units

(d) Areas where padents may be housed on a locked floor, wing or room due to the clinical needs of the patient. Such areas may house patients with dementia, or psyclfiatric illnesses or patients under control of the courts.

11-5 Protection Systems and Water Supply. No special considerations.

11-6 Special Hazards. The pre-incident plan should note the follovnng:

(a) Laboratories

(b) Areas containing, using, or storing biological hazards

(c) Areas containing, using, or storing radioactive har.~ds

(d) Areas with strong magnetic radiation, such as magnetic ~-.-:,, resonance imaging (MRI) equipment ~#~

1 I-7 Emergency Operations. No special considerations.

11-8 Plan Test and Maintenance. No special consider, ~ .

Chapter 12 Detention and Correctional ~ ' ~ ~

12-I Administration. *': . . . . :%!ii " ~ i

12-1.1 Pre-incident planning in a d e t e n t i o ~ : ~ : c o r r e t occupancy involves not only e m e r ~ e n c ~ ~ . ~ , b~ ~.ti'q.~ and correctional facility adminis t r" /a t~; ' "sec '~!~.e . . j ~ : " supervisors, maintenance director/~.~.~ildin~ e n g i ~ " ~ ~x~staff members, and a recognition of ~ . ~ . f s ot o c c u p ~ i'azards • . ..~.*.~:~.'..',x "-.:(.:.." : that may be present. ":"~':.~.x :,~:

- - : : : : . - : :~: : . ~ . :

12-1.2 This chapter contains r ecommend~ .~ . , spe : .~c to this type of occupancy. All pre-incident plans sho ;r g ¢the general provisions set forth in Chapters 1 through 8. :~i~-".:!# :~

12-1.3 Special Definitions. "

Facility Emergency Action Plan. A facility plan developed by the detention and correctional facility to describe the actions to be taken during various internal and external emergencies should be available on site. The depth of each facility plan will vary depending on the size of the facility and the type and number of residents housed. The plan should detail evacuation protocol, emergency contacts, responsibilities of various detention and correctional facility staff, and required action of fadlity staff. Other sections of the plan may note the use of communications systems, security and traffic control, procedures to follow in the event of natural disasters and civil disturbances.

Sallyport. A compartment provided with two or more doors/gates where the intended purpose is to prevent continuous and unobstructed passage by allowing the release of only one door or gate at a time. May also be known as a security vestibule. (101: 14- 1.3)

Use Conditions.* Detention and correctional occupancies are used to house individuals under varied degrees of restraint or security and are occupied by persons who are mostly incapable of self-preservation because of security measures not under the occupants' control. ( 101: 4-1.5) Community residential facilities, training schools, work camps, and substance abuse centers may also

be considered detention and correctional fadlities if they fall within the definition with respect to occupancy restraint and security measures.

12-2 Pre-lncident Planning Process.

12-2.1 Points of Contact. Detention and correctional facility administrator.

12-2.2 Obtain a copy of the detention and correctional facility's fire/disaster plan and incorporate into the pre-incident plan.

12-2.3 The pre- inddent plan should address the level of security provided in a facility and the restrictions that the emergency responders will be operating under. The following issues should be understood and considered in the development of the preqncident plan:

(a) The site a n d / o r facility's buildings will be secured, therefore, access will be delayed. In addition, exiting a facility or site will also be delayed.

(b) Access to I personnel by the responding per.~

be l ~ t e q ~ a

g may be limited to responding poses of ensuring safety to the

I ',leme~:"~d Site Considerations.

~. b#small stand~;~iFacilitie -alone buildings, may "~" art of anott " " " " " " ." ! # t e , s ~, ~ c u p a n c y , in high-rise buildings or

o ~ cam .'.~tyte site. L a ~ a c i l i t i e s on large sites may contain ~ x o u l ~4.1pancies in fftldition to the resident housing and ' k d ' ~ : : " " ~i.~ildingS.sucn as Such buildings may include assembly

gymnasiums, industrial occupancies used in the [~ro~ ~ n of furniture or other commodities, warehouse

~6~ealth occupanc care occupancies. Each occupancy may ~$.~.~:.-....~ave diff¢ ~ e l s of security (use conditions). ~:<':<.-:.:.~:~:x'.-... .~-'":" . • ~ . ~ . The pre~modent plan should reference tile security .:~easd~:~necessary to enter a site or facility. Lar~ze facilities may r" equir*F'access through sallyports.

.~3.8 Construction. Detention and correctional fadlities are igned with construction features to compartmentize a fire within

the enclosure or area of origination. The location of fire and smoke barriers should be noted on the pre-incident plan.

12-$.4 Building Services. Evacuation of a detention a n d / o r correctional facility is not always practical or necessary. Shutting off building utilities may be detrimental to the resident's safety and heal th .Detent ion and correctional facilities may be located in buildings of different occupancies. The plan should address the decision-making process to shut off any utilities.

12-4 Occupant Considerations. The pre-incident plan should address a process for identifying the maximum number of residents, staff members or visitors within smoke zones.

12-4.1 The level of restraint of the residents will vary between facilities as well as different areas within a facility. Inmates in most cases will not automatically be released outside the secured boundaries (the boundaries being within a building or site).

(a) Facility Emergency Action Plan. The pre-incident plan should incorporate appropriate data from the facility plan.

(b) Special Needs. Movement of inmates is an issue that requires consideration and planning to include a close working relationship with the facility staff.

12-4.2" Detention and Correctional Facility Evacuation Procedures.

Detention and correctional facility staff are trained to evacuate residents when necessary to an adjacent smoke zone through horizontal exits as the first level of evacuation. The location of the smoke zones and areas of refuge should be emphasized in the pre- incident plan.

The pre-incident plan should include procedures and guidelines should exterior evacuation of residents, outside of secured enclosures, become necessary. In all cases, regardless of how far residents are moved in a fire incident, any movement of residents must be done under the direction of staff on site.

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N F P A 1 6 2 0 ~ A 9 8 R O P

12-5 Protection Systems and Water Supply. Fire department connections serving sprinkler a n d / o r standpipe systems may be remotely located away from the building served or outside of the secured site perimeter• The pre-incident plan should note the locadon of all connections and the protection systems served.

12-6 Special Hazards. Armory or munitions storage areas should be noted.

12-7 Emergency Operations•

(a) Avoid any direct contact with inmates.

(b) Any piece of equipment brought to the site by responding personnel can be used as a weapon, therefore, all equipment brought into a facility must be accounted for.

(c) Responding personnel in most cases will not be given keys to secured doors, andwill probably require escorting by facility staff.

13-3.1.1 The fire resistive separation (or lack of) between guest rooms in transient occupancies and corridors should include details on transoms, transfer grills, and door closures.

13-$.1.2 Common attics, cocklofts, truss spaces and other areas of potential concealed fire spread should be noted in the plan.

13-3.2 Building Services. Supplemental heating equipment such as coal or wood stoves should be noted in the pre-incident plan.

13-3.3 External Conditions.

13-3.3.1 The availability of master key(s) and a list of doors that cannot be opened by the master keys should be noted in the pre- incident plan.

13-3.3.2 During operating and especially during late night hours, exterior doors may be locked preventing access to the building(s). Interior doors and stairwells may be locked to prevent movement within or between buildings. Where the locking of any door impacts

12-8 Plan Testing and Maintenance. No special considerations, the accessibility of emergency responders, it should be noted in the pre-incident plan. ..:~::,

• . . ~ : : Chapter 13 Residential Occupancies ~::•~: -~::~ 13-4 Occupant C~lderat ln~as.

13-1 Administration. . ~ . ~ . 13-4.1 Wher¢/:..~. e a n ~ . e g r e s s or escape are consMered inadequate,

13-1.1 Pre-incident planning in a residential occupancy such as o p e r a t i o n a l ' ~ s i d e ~ necessary to effect evacuation should be hotels motels dormitories, apar tment buildings, and lodging or included::-~.~$%.,lan. ~ attention should be paid to public

. ' ' • ~ . . . : : : : : : . x ; : : . 4 . . . : : : : .

roormng houses, revolves not only the emergency responders, but a s s e m ~ i : ~ ~ c l u d i n g ~ t . . q # a m s , banquet halls meetang administrators, owners, managers, maintenance director/building roo....~; tl":'~'~eatrl " "~al stages, a f i ' ~ f o r t h . engineer, other staff members, and a recognition of the types of .o~-.:~" ":.'-':"i::, ~::..'~-~:" occupants that may be present. : ~ ! i ~ : a o ~ . ~ f Operation~';The pre-incident plan should include a

" : ' p r o ~ ~ occupant load by area of the building(s) and 13-1.2 This chapter contains recommendations specific to this type o p e ~ I ~ . a o u r s . of occupancy. All pre-incident plans should follow the general ":%Ji'>% provisions set forth in Chapters 1 through 8. @.~:x.. 13-4.$ O c ~ : ' o a d . Hotel management maintains a continual

~ t . & s t of gues t s¢"~ ,om number at the front or registration desk. The 13-1.3 Special Definitions. ~ ~ i l i t y ~ l a i s list should be noted in the pre-incident plan.

~.::. ~ . : . : ' ~ s - Residential Occupancies. Residential occupancies are those ~ .....-~-'$-4.4":'-'~ff'mg. The number of hotel management, supervisory and . . . . . . . x.- ~..-... . . . . . . .

occupancies m which sleeping accommodations are p . g . ~ ~ for %~:" other.~ersonnel who are responsible for building operauons vary normal residential purposes and include all b u i l d i ~ : ~ to % : greatly by the time of day. Personnel who are knowledgeable in provide sleeping accommodations. ( 101: 4-1.6) ~.::~:': '~ii-~ "~...l..~i. "ildingoperations or who can assist in emergency operations

~-::-~: ~:..... ~. ~ : .~ou ld~e noted in the plan. Exception: These classified under health care or d ~ i ~ d ~ L '~': occupancies. ' ~ " . - ' ~ 13-4.5 Location of Occupants. The pre-incident plan should

..... :-:--::::::::-:.... "":@~$i .... . . . . include a process to identify occupants needing assistance. In hotel Dormitories. Buildings or spaces in b u ~ i ~ g r e g r ~ . e e # n g occupancies, the guest list may or may not include this information.

accommodations ,are provided for m ~ than " I ~ o n s ~ not members of the same family 1 .l~i~.~.~e room or ~ i ~ e s of~..~sely 13-5 Protection Systems and Water Supply. associated rooms under jo in t oc...~+~.y and s i n g l ~ " ~ n a g ~ e n t , with or without meals, but w i t h ~ u t ~ u a l cooki~iiifacilifies. 15-5.1 The type and design of automatic sprinkler systems should be Examples are college dormitories, f r a t ~ . ~ h o u s e s , ~ d military noted in the pre-incident plan. In residential occupancies NFPA 13, barracks. (1Ol: 16-1.3) .... ~i~'.-.-. ~::" Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems, or NFPA 13R,

""~::.:.~i;':: Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems in Residential Hotels. Buildings or groups of buildings und~.'~;te same Occupancies up to and Including Four Stories in Height, design systems

management in which there are more than 1..O.~.~'sleeping utilize fast-response residential--type sprinklers. In particular, the accommodations primarily used by transient~ (those wlao occupy design area o f application and non-sprinklered areas should be accommodations for less than 30 days) for lodging with or without meals, whether designated as a hotel, inn, club, motel, or by any other name. So-called apar tment hotels shall be classified as hotels because they are potentially subject to the same transient occupancy as hotels. (101: 16-1.~)

Apartment Buildings. Buildings containing three or more living units with independent cooking and bathroom facilities, whether designated as apar tment houses, tenements, garden apartments, or by any other name. (101: 18-1.3)

Lodging or Rooming Houses. Applies to buildings that provide sleeping accommodations for a total of 16 or fewer persons on either a transient or permanent basis, with or without meals, but without separate cooking facilities for individual occupants. ( 101: 20-1.1)

13-2 Pre-lncident Planning Process. No special considerations.


13-3.1 Construction.

noted.

18-5.2 Special Extinguishing Systems. In hotel occupancies special extinguishing systems may be installed in kitchens and may also be found in computer rooms• Area or hazard protected and operating procedures should be noted in the pre-incident plan.

13-6 Special Hazards. Special hazards such as hotel or tenant storage areas, automobile parking, maintenance shops, kitchens, restaurants, retail outlets, exhibition halls, mechanical rooms, etc. should be noted in the pre-incident plan.

13-7 Emergency Operations. No special considerations.

15-8 Plan Testing and Maintenance. No special considerations.

Chapter 14 Residential Board and Care Occupancies


14-1.1 Pre-incident planning in a board and care occupancy involves not only the emergency responders, but managers, owners, maintenance director/building engineer, other staff members, and the recognition of the types ot occupants that may be present.

537

N F P A 1620 - - A 9 8 R O P

14-1.2 This chapter contains recommendations specific to this type of occupancy. All pre-incidentplans should follow the general provisions set forth in chapters l t h r o u g h 8.

14-1.3 Special Definitions.

Evacuation Capability.* The ability of dm occupants, residents, and staffas a group to either evacuate a building or to relocate from die point of occupancy to a point of safety. Following are the levels of evacuation capabilities:

(a) Prompt. Evacuation capability equivalent to the capability of the general population.

(b) Slow. Evacuation capability of a group to move to a point of safety in a timely manner, with some of the residents requiring assistance from the staff.

(c) Impractical. Evacuation capability of a group that, even with staff assistance, cannot reliably move to a point of safety in a timely manner. ( 10h 22-1.3)

Residential Board and Care Occupancy. A building or part thereof that is used for lodging and boarding of four or more residents, not related by blood or marriage to the owners or operators, for the purpose of providing personal care services. ( 101: 22-1.3)

14-2 Pre-incident Planning Process. No special considerations.

14-3 Physical Elements and Site Considerations. No special considerations.

14-4 Occupant Considerations.

14-4.1 The pre-incident plan should note the evacuation capabiliti~ of the residents. Where evacuation capabilities are determined to"~ be slow or impractical, the pre-incident plan should note any "--'i additional required resources. Where facilities are deemed to have all residents capable of prompt evacuation, the pre-incident plan should also consider the recommendations of Chapter 15, Residential Occupancies. , ~ . , .

14-4.2 Staffing. The number ofs taffwho are rq residents will vary depending on time of day, siz personal care needs of the residents. In many-~i care facilities, staff may be asleep at night. The their locations within the facility should b$.<~.t plan. ~ . ~

14.4.s Location of Occupants. %~ipants needi-ei evacuate should be notedin t h e ~ d e n t plan.

14-4.4 The adequacy and arrangemen~,.:.'.~. noted in the pre-incident )Inn. In addit~'g~ egress provisions, residen6ai board and c~ emergency escape routes consisting of exter

tess should be means of

may include ¢s or door.

14-5 Protection Systems and Water Supply. No special considerations.

14-6 Special Hazards. No special considerations.

14-7 Emergency Operations. The plan should contain provisions for sheltering evacuated occupants with special needs.


Chapter 15 Mercantile Occupancies


15-1.1 Pre-incident planning in a mercantile occupancy involves not only the emergency responders, but administrators, section or department supervisors, maintenance director/building engineer, otller staff members, and recognition of the types of occupants that may be present.

15-1.2 This chapter contains recommendations specific to this type occupancy. All pre-incident plans should follow die general provisions set forth in Chapters 1 through 8.

15-1.3 Special Definitions.

Anchor Store. A department store or major merchandising center having direct access to the covered mall, but having all required means of egress independent of the covered mall. (10h 25-1.3).

Covered Mall Building. A building, including the covered mail, enclosing a number o f tenants and occupancies, such as retail stores, drinking and dining establishments, entertainment and amusement facilities, offices, and other similar uses, wherein two or more tenants have a main entrance into the covered mall. (10h 25- 1.3)

Mercantile Occupancies. Include stores, markets, and other rooms, buildings or structures for the display and sale of merchandise. Minor merchandising operations in buildings predominantly of other occupancies, such as a newsstand in an office building, should be subject to tile provisions that apply to the predominant occupancy. (101: 4-1.7)



15-3.1 Constructim of fire walls, fire.:~ noted on the p ~ openings. S ~ f i c :~

~ ? ~ r e s e n c e , location and component ratings ers,"a3~l smoke compartments should be well as the protection provided for any ~erns that should be noted include the

(a) ~i]~::~p.-~i~ng cen(~. . . .~.O~s of attached mercantile o c c ~ . ~ c i e s l]a+'ve common""~ '~ Cocklofts, attics, or basements ~ . [ ) e cG'~...arnon areas or p . ~ d e d with fire barriers. Breached fire

~.~.. sh¢~.l.~ be ~ noted o/l the plan. t~i..".-'i~, . .~; '%.

• " : : i ?~ '~d m~dl buildings have large, undivided areas and ~:p. peni.ngs between floors. The tenants are open to the ~.~.~, '~g to the size of the open areas. Entrances to

..~. chor s tord '~" .m the covered mall may be protected by water ~ s , firc-i~garriers or smoke barriers. The size and ~ ~ c s of the protection for tile openings should be detailed ~'onl~"~iivl reliability of the closing mechanism.

4-: 15-3.2 Building Services. No special considerations.

~ L Occupant Consideration.

15-4.1 Life Safety Considerations. In a covered mall building with anchor stores the hours of operation of the tenants may vary. There may be separate entrance and egress controls for tenants in a covered mall building and for the anchor stores. Seasonal events, temporary kiosks, and special promotions in common areas could affect occupant evacuation or the operations of emergency responders. Information on these characteristics shou ldbe noted.

15-4.2 Emergency Organization. Expected effectiveness of mail or store managers, security, or on-site emergency services, if provided, should be included in the plan. Evacuations of covered mall occupancies can be diIficult to accomplish and should be jointly completed with the emergency organization. The plan should note the resources needed to completed this task.

15-5 Protection Systems and Water Supply.

15-5.1 Hydrants. Water supply for on-site hydrants, public or pdvate, should be noted in dae plan due to the potential complexity of multiple sources. For private systems, an emergency contact familiar with the supply should be noted.

15-5.2 Automatic Sprinkler Systems. It is not uncommon for there to be numerous risers and control valves due to the potential complexity of multiple systems located throughout a covered mail building and anchor stores. Details on types, location, layout, and areas protected should be noted.

15-5.$ Standpipes. Interior hose line stretches within the mail or stores may be extensive and should be noted.

15-5.4 Protective Signaling Systems. The areas of coverage and method of occupant, notification included.in protective signaling systems may vary within a covered mall budding and anchor stores. There may be separate systems for tenants in covered mail buildings. As a result, there may be multiple fire alarm control panels. The presence of multiple fire alarm control panels should be noted.

(b) unprote covered

538

N F P A 1 6 2 0 1 A 9 8 R O P

15-5.5 Smoke Management. No special considerations.

15-6 Special Hazards. Hazards that should be noted include the following:

(a) Stock areas

(b) High challenge commodities or hazardous materials such as aerosols and flammable or combustible liquids

(c) Warehouse store concerns typically found in large home improvement stores, large furniture stores, carpet outlets, and automobile tire distributors

(d) Food courts or restaurants with commercial cooking equipment

(e) Trash collection and compactor rooms

(f) Seasonal events, temporary kiosks, and special promotions

Chapter 17 Industrial Occupancies

17.1 Administration.

17-1.1 Pre-incident planning in a industrial occupancy involves not only responding personnel, but administrators, section or department supervisors, maintenance director/building engineer, other staff members, and recognition of the types of occupants that may be present.

Within industrial occupancies, oftentimes an established management team will have the overall responsibility of operating a specific facility. Included within their responsibilities may be environmental and safety functions. Personnel with knowledge of o~ direct control over industrial hygiene operations, emergency response teams, and plant engineering will be assigned to this team. Much of the preliminary data gathering process and assignment of safety duties may already be established. In any event, requests for information and other related pre-incident planning document development material should be referred to the local facility management team, where appropriate.

in common areas .+.~:.~. 17-1.2 This c h a p t e r - - s recommendations specific to this type

15-7 Emergency Operation. No special considerations, of occupancy. - ~ r e - i n ~ t X e n t plans should follow the general provisions set . f ~ . C ~ h a p t e r s 1 through 8.

15-8 Plan Testing and Maintenance. No special considerations. ~ , ' ~ . , " 17-1.$ S p e c g ~ ~ . ~

Chapter 16 Business Occupancies ~ . . " t ~ ~ ~ . I n d u ~ ~ a n c y . ~ ' ~ t ~ . ~ l occupancies include factories

16-1 Administration. m ~ p r . o d t ~ t s of all kin. , ~ . . ' ~ properties devoted to operations sg..~.'~ak p~-~essing, a s s e m b ~ , mixing, packaging, finishing or

16-1.1 Pre-incident planning in general business offices; physician's ~ t i n g ~ repairing. ~16"i: 4-1.9) offices; outpatient clinics; college, instructional and university ~ ~ : ~ . classrooms under 50 persons; and government offices, revolves not Proc~d.~ : : . .~ . . Analysag An analysis of a process, or system used only responding personnel, but administrators, owners, managers, to i d e n ~ - ~ e n t i ~ cause and effect relationships and resultant maintenance director/building engineer, other staff members, an~j~(¢~.~ hazards o r ~ . ~ a i l u r e s . The methods used to perform the recognition of the types of occupants that may be present. ~ , ~ p a l y s i s v a r y ~ simple to complex and depend upon the detail

~ . - ~ . . e d an.@~fLh., e risk being evaluated. As example, a simple 16-1.2 This daapter contains recommendations specific to this type ~ / : ~ . ~ a detailed fault tree analysis may be utilized. of occupancy. All pre-incident plans should follow the general ~ ' ~ ~ . ~ provi~ ~ SpHlYfevention Control and Countermeasure (SPCC) Plans. A

~ plan prepared for facilities with chemical(s) that exceed certain 16-1.." %qTCpacities in accordance with governmental regulation.

Busl *g 17.2 Pre-lncident Planning Process. During the planning process, a the U knowledge of pre-existing safety related documentation will enhance "Mer, and expedite the development of the pre-incident plan itself. simil: Example documentation includes the following:

16-2 (a) Process hazard analysis

16-3 (b) Confined space rescue plans consi

(c) Spill prevention control and countermeasure (SPCC) plans 16-4~

17.3 Physical Elements and Site Considerations. 16-4.1 inclu 17-3.1 General. Industrial occupancies may occupy a large tract of meetingrooms which are c/)mmon to business occupancies, land with numerous site specific hazards. Separate, stand alone

buildi.n~s may provide physical plant support functions, or supply 16-4.2 Location of Occupants. The pre-incident plan should materials in various stage of development to other buildings on site include a process to identify occupants needing assistance. In as part of the overall process. Examples include steam generation business occupancies, the guest list may or may not include this plants, chemical reactors, raw materl'ai conveyor processes, and information, general assembly operations. Pre-incident plans should address

each of these operations individually and note the criticality of 16-5 Protection Systems and Water Supply. No special them, and what impact their loss would have on the entire facility. considerations.

17.$.2 Construction. Buildings may be provided with walls or panels 16-6 Special Hazards. High hazard contents may be stored in designed to relieve pressure in the event that an explosion occurs. multiple areas throughout the building(s). Examples include print Reactors and other process vessels may incorporate relief shops, storage areas, file storage areas, automobile parking, mechanisms into their design. The plan should note these features. maintenance shops, kitchens, retail outlets, and so forth. Physician's offices, outpatient clinics or instructional laboratories may store 17-3.3 Utilities. The plan should address the decision-making flammable or combustible liquids or flammable gases. Significant process for shutting off utilities, because their interuption may cause high hazard contents shouldbe noted in die pre-incident plan. catastrophic consequences.

16-7 Emergency Operations. Open floor plans could be a maze of 17-3.4 Access. Certain operating features may hinder access to a cubides and present a hazard to emergency responders during facility. Included are rack storage, rolling stock, railroad sidings, operations, trucking, container storage, automatic rack storage retrieval systems,

fences or caged-in areas (aerosols), furnaces (molten metal), 16.8 Plan Testing and Maintenance. No special considerations, plating operations (caustic/acidic solutions).

539

N F P A 1620 - - A 9 8 R O P

17-4 Occupant Considerations. Tile total number of people present at an industrial facility will vary widely depending on the time of day, time of year, level of automation, and to what extent non-employees (contractors, delivery personnel, and so forth) are used.

(a) Accountability/Location of Personnel. Occupant load will vary with file operations conducted. Personnel may work in remote locations, for example, in outside buildings, overhead cranes, and boiler rooms. Many facilities have implemented an accountability system. Understanding such a system will assist emergency responders in carrying out dleir life safety priority actions.

Depending on die magnitude of the incident and the hazard potential, many large industrial facilities will not have a need for total evacuation. Areas of refuge dmt utilize fire walls and other rated separations may be provided. Building plans will assist in evaluating the location and appropriateness of such features.

(b) Emergency Action Plan (EAP). Smaller facilities may list their plan of action to include total evacuation of the building. A local emergency contact may be listed along with a designatedmeeting area to account for personnel after an evacuation. Larger facilities may list an emergency response team in their action plan with responsibility for controlling an emergency incident until responding personnel arrive. Other sections of the plan may note the availability of subject matter experts, procedures and authorized personnel for shutting down processes, and procedures to follow to follow in the event of civil disturbances.

Note that some processes may require an extended period of time for proper shutdown. Shutdown procedures may be performed manually. Depending on the location of the emergency incident, this may expose the process operators to potentially hazardous conditions in the surrounding area. A decision must be made by the emergency responders at what point such operators should be removed. ~l,~li

(c) Special needs. Special arrangements may be necessary for personnel evacuation due to their being physically dhallenged or ~. because of their location. For example, personnel may belocated iE t overbead cranes, upper floors of a multiple story builc g. critical control centers where standard means of ev~....~" ~ y not he applicable. Consideration should be given for.t~.~e! ~ e a n s of evacuation or rescue. ~.:..i$~.::~i~: . : : ~ : ~ . .

'~:~:~:~:~: -~ 17-5" Protection Systems and Water Supply. In addi't]~ ~t~raxietm~ sprinkler systems, many industrial facilitie...~..~[~.tilize i :y of fire and snecial protection systems ~ ~ e r y ~ . @ The plan should note the Iocation,~,~c...~rage ~ : ~ . ~ ~z,."

17-6 Special Hazards. Hazards ~ ¢ u l d be noted '~ "the following: ". ":.':.:.¢i::::'.:. ::i:~:i

'¢:::::::.'.q.'... ~. (a) Controlled environments. Clean r " " ' ~ , . f r e e ~ and other

- x ~ ) ~ : ~ ' : P r o c e d u r e s for environmentally controlled areas should t ~ . " ~ reviewed with entering these areas during an incident sbo~ facility personnel and noted on the pre-incid~'~i'[ plan.

(b) Commodity combustibility and hazard. The hazardous properties of the commodity as well as its stability under fire conditions are of importance. Facilities may have some quantity of flammable liquids, most in the form of solvents and cleaning chemicals. Dedicated storage of flammable liquids may be inside or outside. Outside storage of flammable or toxic gases may be in separate buildings or bunkers. Some materials may be reactive with air or water. Should a release occur, whether or not water is used, consideration for air or water contamination should be taken into account.

(c) Fueling facilities. Industrial facilities may utilize powered industrial vehicles with a variety of fuels.

(d) On site treatment plants will present their own hazards including storage of chemicals such as chlorine, other oxidizers, and corrosives.

(e) The plan sbould identify any process hazards that may involve hazardous materials and operations.

17-7" Emergency Operation. An industrial facility will often maintain their own emergency response team with varying degrees of training and areas of expertise. Discussions with the on-site emergency response team coordinator to determine the level of

succe know] withil

response and resources available from the site team should be included.


Chapter 18 Warehouses and Storage Occupancies


18-1.1 Pre-incident planning in a warebouse occupancy involves not only emergency responders, but also administrators, owners, maintenance director/building engineers, tenants, and recognition of the types of commodities and the storage arrangements that could be present.

Warehouses pose one of the greatest challenges to fire control for both automatic fire suppression systems and manual fire fighting. Manual fire suppression cannot take the place of a properly designed, installed and functioning sprinkler system in a warebouse. If the warehouse is not protected by automatic sprinklers that are designed for the commodities stored and the configuration in which they are arranged, t h ~ x i s little dmnce of controlling a fire. Likewise it must b e ~ e d that even the best designed sprinkler

ise m' :~not extinguish a warehouse fire and system for a w a r ~ n manual fire s ~ will be req~uired t o " effect final extinguishm, ~ e h o u s e fire-figbting operations to be

tccessful tl~ ~ plan must be developed with a full k n o w l e ~ i ~ r e - i n :':~ .:, ke d e ~ , $ ~ ! capabilities of the sprinkler systems

1~.$..~12 TI~....chapter c o n t a i ~ e c o m m e n d a t i o n s specific to this type ~ p a d t i ~ x All pre-inci~fent plans should follow the general ~ r ~ ~ " ~ t h in Olapters 1 through 8.

18-1.3 S ~ Definiti . . . ._Bonded W a ~ u s e . A facdlty for storing controlled materials,

~...:..~.... a l c o ~ l and tobacco products, generally has high levels of ~ ~ very limited access. An entire building or portions of a ~ n be designed with these restrictions.

Controlled Atmosphere (CA) Warehouse. A facility for storing

~ cialty products, such as fruits. Generally includes sealed rooms storage, with the rooms being controlled with regard to

temperature and air content, the most common being an atmosphere containing a high percentage of a gas such as nitrogen.

Storage Occupancy. Storage occupancies include all buildings or structures utilizedprimarily for the storage or sheltering of goods, merchandise, products, velficles, or animals whether designated as a warehouse, storehouse, distribution center or any other name. Such buildings can be used for general purpose storage, f lammable/combustible liquids, cold storage, or other specialized goods, merchandise or products. Includes bonded warehouses and controlled atmosphere warehouses.



183.1 Construction Features. The construction of the building, as well as information on whether internal walls are fire rated and constructed as fire walls or fire barriers and the wall assembly rating, should be noted on the plan. The protection of openings in fire walls and fire barriers should be noted as well. The adequacy of maintenance for fire doors should be evaluated to determine their probable performance in a fire.

18-3.2" Building Access. Warehonses are generally built with limited access and increased security measures for inventory control. In addition to building construction barriers, operating features can hinder access. These should be noted.

18-3.3 Controlled Environments. The presence of large freezers and a controlled atmosphere or temperature-controlled areas should be noted. Special care may be required before entering these areas. It may be necessary to identify persons or procedures to provide for system shutdown at engine rooms or other locations remote from the scene of the release.

540

N F P A 1 6 2 0 1 A 9 8 R O P

18-4 Occupant Considerations. Storage configuration, seasonal variations in stock and material-handling devices all impact on life safety considerations, on-site emergency action plans, and due safety of emergency responders.

18-5 Protection Systems and Water Supply.

18-6.5 Fueling Facilities. Fueling stations and fuel storage areas should be identified in the plan. Electrical battery-charging stations provide a personnel hazard due to corrosive materials as well as to die off-gassing of hydrogen during charging operations. LP-gas cylinders for forklifts introduce a boiling liquid evaporating vapor explosion (BLEVE) hazard.

18-5.1 Automatic Sprinklers.

18-5.1.1 The presence of automatic sprinkler systems and tl~e systems' designs should be no ted along wida any special design features such as in-rack systems, large-drop sprinklers, early snppression fast response (ESFR) sprinklers, sprinkler control valves, and hydraulic placard information.

18-5.1.2 Design Deficiency. Sprinkler system design deficiencies can occur when due water supply is not adequate to suppor t due system design, or the sprinkler system design provided is no t appropriate for due commodity stored, or its arrangement . Identified deficiencies should be no ted on due plan.

18-6.6 Environmental Considerations. Certain commodit ies contribute to air or water pollution during an emergency. The pre- incident plan should make note of these commodities.

18-6.7 Outside Storage. Outside storage is often an integral part of warehouse operations, and sometimes includes hazardous commodit ies such as idle pallets and cylinders of f lammable gases. Toxic and f lammable liquids are often segregated f rom a main building and located in due open or in separate small structures dlat are usually unprotected. Outside storage can reduce accessibility or create a fire exposure hazard to die facility.

18-7 Emergency Operations. No special considerations.

18-5.2 Water Supply. A sprinkler system's water supply should be 18-8 Plan Testing and Maintenance. No special considerations. capable of meet ing not only the sprinkler demand, but also die d e m a n d for hose streams. There is a vital need to evaluate die water Chapter 19 Referenced Publications supply and to de te rmine if it is adequate for the sprinkler system design, storage, configuration, and the warehouse occupancy class. 19-1 The following dg.cuments or port ions d le reof are referenced

widfin dais recomm.~i~..g...d pract ice and should be considered as purl 18-5.3 Products o f Combustion or Contaminants and Heat Venting. of its r ecommen~ 'onf" :~Yae edition indicated for each referenced

documen t is d .~ . "~ ' .~n t edition as of die date of due NFPA issuance 18-5.3.1 Products of combustion or contaminants control is of dais r e c o ~ n d i ~ : : ~ r a c t i c e . Some of these documents might impor tant in warehouse occupancies due to the l ~ g e volume of also be r e ~ e d iff:~!§, r e c o m m e n d e d practice for specific combustible commodit ies s tored wi.dfin them. Proper ven.ting o f in forma~.~i i i i [ i~oseg"~:~ , : t~ , erefore are also listed in Appendix products of combustion, or contaminants, and ho t gases mm~rmzes. F. ..::::...::::-" ... " ~-~::::::::~::::..:, property damage and increases responding personnel effectiveness ..::~:!:~:. %: ,:.-:'::~ and safety. The plan should note how venting can be accomplished 194..-~:~iiiii:..~..Fl~.~ublication~. National Fire Protection Association, 1 and die location of any manual or automatic controls. B a t t e r ~ - ~ i P~k , P.O. Box 9101, Quincy, MA 02269-9101.

".::~..'..~::, 18-5.3.2 Automatic venting details should be no ted in the pre- "~:i::::,.., NFPA 131"::~,~?d for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems, 1996 incident plan, as dais could affect fire behavior. The power supply "~ii.:-':j~::~tion. "%:~:::b to fans and ventilation equipment should be investigated to ~§:. "~"~.~iiiiii¥.:'.-'~:~:::: . . . . . . .:.:.:i::" de termine if it is reliable enough to remain in service dur ing a fire. ~ili~.. ~ ? " : " S t a n d a r d f o r the Installation of Sprinkler Systems in Likewise, due actual fan components dlemselves must be abl.e....:t~..~:?.:.:. '!!:..#~'~den.~"I Occupancies Up to and Including Four Stones in Height, withstand die heat of a fire if tl, ey are to be of value d u r i n ~ ! ~ '~::9..96.edition.

18-6 Special Hazards. <:..-~:; . . . . ~ : . : : . . : . % , ) ~ A 101®, Life Safe 0 Code~. - x.:~i...:~::..:...:::: . . . . ~..::.:~:

18-6.1 Storage. Storage of lfigh-hazard items sncb g .~5 . . .p las t i~ ic "--':'::~::'...:.s:" NFPA 221 Standard for Fire Walls and Fire Barrier Walls, 1997 materials, aerosols, . . . . or flammable/combustible.:::,$~i~':~:%~o.n~i ..::::.-..~.:, te~]'~....:.:.:.....,,..:,::, edi t ion limits of p ro tecuon even an a fully sprmklere~marehott~.-'.:'.~!::New %iiS:" commodit ies can be in t roduced or moved.,.~.'.'.'.~.in rite w a ~ u s e J f NFPA 291, Recommended Practice for Fire Flow Testing and Marking o~ the commodity changes, existing p r o t e c t i o i ; f ' i " ~ t be i n a d ~ n a t e . Hydrants, 1995 edition. Recording the cmmnodity class on due plan wi l ] e~ ica t e c l~hged classifications. "::':.~?:::, ..4 ~-'" 19-1.2 Other Publications.

18-6.2 Storage Configuration. Some commodit ies re.~.~]:iZe extensive OSHA, Process Safety M a n a g e m e n t - 29 CFR 1910.119. manual fire-fighting operations. All interior operati~'%s should be conducted wida full knowledge dmt d~e stored commodity might not EPA, Risk Management Plans, 40 CFR Part 68. be stable and that fire fighters are at risk from collapsing commodity storage. Stock can be s tored in bulk or palletized piles, in racks, or AiChE CCPS references for Hazard Analysis on shelves. Fire behavior of a given material can vary wid~ such NRT, Join t Integrated Contingency Planning Guidance Federal factors as storage height, shelving, presence or absence of vertical Reister, June 15, 1996. flue and aisle spaces, and pile stability. Storage configuration and tl~e nse of any floor-marking system should be recorded. Appendix A Explanatory Material

18-6.3 Storage Configuration Variations. T b e p l a n should note the possibility of storage configuration variations due to daily, weekly, mondfly or seasonal changes daat in tnrn could lead to arriving or depart ing shipments being double stacked on d ie rack level, or s tored "temporarily" in access aisles despite efforts to prevent excessive storage heights or storage in aisles.

This appendix is not a part of the recommendations of this NFPA document but is included for informational purposes only.

A-I-I.I Fire a n d / o r life safety hazards observed during die pre- inc ident p lanning process should be repor ted to due appropriate authority having jurisdiction.

18-6.4" Material-Handling Operat ions. Personnel using lift trucks powered by batteries or internal combustion engines remain the most common means of moving stock in warehouses. Some high- capacity warehouses use specialized equ ipment such as computer ized stackers. The number , aw, dlability and operat ion of tile material-handling equipment should be investigated.

In high-rack warellouses, storage height may reach over 100 ft. (30.5 m). In such situations the custom stackers provide die only practical means of gaining quick access to file racks for suppression, rescue or overhaul. Personnel wit1 special training will be required to operate the equipment .

A-1-2.3 Tile p lanning process should begin during die construction design process of due proposed facility to identify emergency responders ' concerns. Tile p lanning process should allow for revisions to die plan during different phases of construction.

A-1-2.6 The pre-incident plan will be most effective when coordinated with an incident management system such as tile one presented in NFPA 1561, Standard on Fire Department Incident Management System.

541

NFPA 1620 - - A 9 8 ROP

A-1-3.3 Approved. The National Fwe Protection Association does not approve, inspect, or certify any installations, procedures, equil~n-lent, or materials; nor does it approve or evaluate testing laboratories. In determining the acceptability of installations, procedures, equipment, or materials, the authority having jurisdiction may base acceptance on compliance with NFPA or -other appropriate standards. In the absence of such standards, said authority may require evidence of proper installation, procedure, or use. The authority having jurisdicti%n may also refer to the listings or labeling practices of an organization that is concerned with product evaluations and is dins in a position to determine compliance with appropriate standards for the current production of listed items.

A-I-3.3 Authority Having Jurisdiction. The phrase "authority having jurisdiction ~ is used in NFPA documents in a broad manner, since

r~sdictious and approval agencies vary, as do their responsibilities. ere public safety is primary, the authority having juri/diction may

be a federal, state, local, or other regional department or individual such as a fire chief; fire marsha/; chief of a fire prevention bureau, labor department, or health department; building official; electrical inspector, or others having statutory anthority. For insurance purposes, an insurance inspection department, rating bureau, or other insurance company representative may be the authority having jurisdiction. In many circumstances, the property owner or his or her designated agent assumes the role of the authority having jurisdiction; at government installations, the commanding officer or departmental official may be the authority having jurisdiction.

A-2-1.2 This document assumes that the public fire department will take a lead role in the preparation of a pre4ncideut plan, however this does not preclude any other interested party from assuming the lead role if the public fire department does not.

A-2-2.S It is recommended that each plan be kept simple enough to remain useful. As individual pre-incidentplaus become too cumbersome, it is strongly recommended that they be split into multiple plans.

(a) Planning Level Detail - Various levels of pre-incident planning may be utilized depending on factors such as the complexity of the facility, expected first responders, special hazards and special Three planning levels are established here and generall~

of plans are Overview Plans, I.$~1 ] '1 The three levels Building and Process Level Plans. ~

(b) Overview Plans - This is the highest level pla~.~ 1~¢ ''~ simplest" It is expected t° identify the l °ca t i °n j~ i~ i ~ i with a standard response by emergency resp~i~ers. details such as public water supplies, a c ~ oco overview plan could be used as a starting . [ ~ / - t ~ la ~pus" facilities to act as a directory to more detailed 1 ~

(c) Building Level Plans - This level of detail ~ i s iK ~ o r circumstances where a strategy to respond to a fire ~ , a unique building is needed. This level pre-incident plan willht ade building access and hazards, fire protection and water supply details, structural construction considerations and specific occupancy details. If necessary, it is_expected that this level plan will be supported by an overview plan and /or a "process" plan.

(d) Process Level Plans - This is the most detailed level of planning and is intended to include process hazards and protection schemes, detailed occupancy considerations, room or area layouts and operational features (such as ventilation, power, and so on). The defining criteria does not have to be a process, it can be a floor, a building wing or even a unique building. This level plan is recommended where it is expected that emergency responders will require detailed information for limited scope scenarios.

The predncident plans presented in Appendix E demonstrate planning levels applied to a Hospital-type facility, although the concept is equally applicable to other facilities.

A-3~.5.3 Some elevator lobbies are formed by the activation of a power-operated sliding door by the fire alarm system. These doors have either a swinging door or a special release device to open the door to a predefined width (typically 32 in.). Other types of operable elevator lobby separations are available.

A-5-2.1 The adequacy of a water supply is based on two primary factors.

(a) Capacity - being able to deliver the quantity of water needed for as long as it is needed.

(b) Pressure - having the pressure necessary to deliver the required quantity of water to the point of use plus meet any additional pressure requirements of the systems being supplied.

Most authorities having jurisdiction do not accept fire pumps drawing water directly from a natural well (below ground) as a source of water as its capacity is unknown and could change at any time because of naturally occurring phenomena like changes in the water table and new fissure in rock strata that could channel water away. This reduces the reliability of a natural well since the quantity of water required for fire protection may not be continually available.

Evaluating Water Supplies:

Evaluating the adequacy of a water supply can be outlined in two steps. The first is the "Determination of Water Required" and the second, the "Determination of Water Available." Only after you have determined both the need and availability can one draw a conclusion as to the ACCEPTABILITY OF A WATER SUPPLY. The following is a guide for determining the acceptability of a water supply for fire protection purposes. Meeting the requirements for fire protection may b~less demanding than the water demand during times of n o ~ p e r a t l o n . This is especially true where water is used f o r . ~ o c ~ g and cooling needs.

I. Determina~J3 o l ~ e r required (a) D e t e j ~ q u a n ~ f water needed for fire protection

2. ~ l t s i ~ h o s e lines (3qSr use by the responding personnel)

er ousd~ased extin ishing systems - ~ ~ uanti~ gu (b) q~ of water needed for building services 1. Air itioning, heating, refrigeration 2. Rest1 ~ o t a b l e (drinking), cooking, other uses

uantity of water t ~ q needed for processes that cannot )e interrupted

r cooling purposes (for example, cooling machines) v2. U~l~t in actual process (additive, catalyst, and so forth)

Determine any --utditional factors that may increase the Dt~ and/or duration of time that be available for water must

protection purposes. Such factors may be: I. Type of construction ( f re resistive, noncombustible, wood

~me) and th~ the presence or lack of fire-limiting construction features (for example, the advantages of fire wails, rated fire doors, draft curtains, as opposed to the disadvantages caused by the presence of atriums, large open areas, and so on)

2. Combustibility of contents (high fire loading) 3. Presence and quantity of accelerants that could rapidly spread

a fire (such as combustible or flammable liquids, gases, and aerosols)

4. Presence and quantity of hazardous materials (pyrophoric, oxidizers, water reactive, and so forth)

5. Local fire department response time 6. Human resource and equipment capabilities

(e) Resources that can be used tu determine the water supplies required for fire protection purposes include:

1. NFPA l S, Standard for tl~ Installation of Sprinkler ~stcr~ 2. NFPA 14, Standard for tlw Installation of Sta~pipe and Hose

s ~ 3. Outside hose lines (NFPA 13, Standard for th, Installation of

sprinkler Systems; NFPA 231, Standard for General Stomg¢ NFPA 231C, Standard for Rack Storage of Matoials; and the local fire department)

4. Other aqueous-based extinguislting systems (for example, NFPA 16, Standard for the Installation of Dduge Foam-Water S/ninkler and Foam-Water Spra~ Systems, and others)

5. Process water requirements can usually be obtained fxom the equipment manufacturer, the user, or the National Plumbing Cod~

6. The local fire department and other applicable fire protection standards (for example, NFPA 1231, Standard on Water Supplies for Suburban and Rural Fire Fighting; NFPA 50, Flammable and Combustibh Liquids Code; NFPA ~OB, C~te for t ~ Manufacture and Storage of Aerosol Products; NFPA 22, Standard for Water Tanks for Private Fire Protection; and NFPA 24, Standard for tiw Installation of Private Fire Seroic* Mains and t/w/r Appurtenans~s ) may provide additional factors that might increase the quantity of water required.

542

NFPA 1620 - - A 9 8 ROP

I1. Determination of water available (a) Test the existing water supply

1. Ideally, test the supply during peak per iod of use (b) Verify test results and supply 's reliability with the local water

and fire depar tments (c) Conduct follow-up testing to identify any changes in or

deteriorat ion of the water supply (d) References that specify or measure tank capacity and pressure

or combinat ion pump and supply requirements including the following NFPA standards:

1. NFPA 22, Standard for Water Tanks for Private Fire Protection 2. NFPA 24, Standard for the Installation of Private Fire Service

Mains and Their Appurtenances 3. NFPA 20, Standard for the Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps 4. NFPA 291, Recommended Practice for Fire Flow Testing and

Marking of Hydrants 5. NFPA 1231, Standard on Water Supplies for Suburban and Rural

Fire Fighting (e) When necessary, contact tank, pump, or o ther manufacturers

to obtain specifics. Labels or placards on the equ ipment normally contain flais information.

Ill. Comparison Once the evaluation of the available water supply is completed, the user can compare the figure of the water available to the water required that was compu ted in Step 1. ff the quantity and necessary pressure of the water required is less t h a n die amount available, there should be an adequate water supply for fire protect ion purposes, ff ei ther the quantity or necessary pressure requirements are greater than the water . . . . . . supply, the user can take dm necessary steps to address the deficmncy. Thin may include investigating ways to decrease the necessary water demands in addit ion to upgrading, supplementing, or replacing the deficient supply.

IV. Maintenance and testing of water supplies. Once the water supply is adequate to mee t dae needs of a site, it is essential that dais level of protect ion be maintained. This requires that users maintain file componen t s of the water supply under their control and per form regularly scheduled tests to verify its cont inued reliability.

A-5-2.2.1 Care should be exercised in interpret ing the test re.. .t~...~s only the available water supply in the water mains are dete..~ ~ The actual flow from the h y d m t will be less than the te~..-':~e: t ~ - s ~-" depending on the size of the hydrant lateral, length o f ~ ~ s lateral, tile type of hydrant, mad which outlet is used. ": "'~J~ ."-'

A-5-3 Information on tile design and i n s t a l l a t i o ~ ~ a t i ii'!~.~::.. sprinkler systems can be f o u n d in NFPA 13, ~ l a r d ~:: .~ ""~'":~":":~" Installation of Sprinkler Systems. I n f o r m a t i o ~ the iJ sp~!~$~:" ~ testing and maintenance of sprinkler s y s t ~ { ' ~ : ~ . b e 1 )und~i..~ ' r ~ e A

" " and Ma: ":':':':':" 25, Standard for the Inspectwn, Testmg, t ~ n . of l(~.'ter- Based Fire Protection Systems. ...: .:.:::...:...~i::.:~::

These systems play a vital role in providing adequat~ ~ e r a l l fire protection for many occupancies. If these systems f~] to control or extinguish the fire, it is quite possible that it will be impossible to

reVent deaths, injuries, and substantial proper ty losses, even with a rge commitment of manual fire-fighting forces.

A-5-3(b) Most systems installed today are hydraulically designed systems based on occnpancy or commodity classifications. Sprinkler contractors use a computer to custom-design the exact protect ion configuration to meet file facility's needs. Hydraulically des igned systems should have a placard posted on the riser indicating the specific design characteristics o f the system. A piping system where branch lines from a loop is always hydraulically designed, even though a hydraulic placard is not provided at die riser.

A-5-3(c) An important part of pre-incident planning is to anticipate potential sources of sprinkler system failure and to take action to correct any known or suspected problem areas. A fire protect ion engineer or o ther qualified individual might need to be consulted to identify any deficiencies.

Design deficiencies can occur when the water supply is not adeqnate to control or extinguish a fire, or when the sprinkler system is improperly des igned for the occupancy hazard. Each sprinkler system is des igned for a specific occupancy and any change in occupancy classification, building layout, contents, or storage array might render protect ion inadequate. Even seemingly minor changes can compromise existing sprinkler protection.

A-5-3(d) The leading cause for sprinkler system failure is closed or partially closed valves in the water supply system. Impairments to the sprinkler system can occur before a fire. This generally occurs where a sprinkler system is actually shut off during construction, renovations, or main tenance for legitimate reasons, but the control valves are either inadvertendy no t re-opened or no t opened fully. Impairments can also be the result of obstructions, such as rocks, working their way into sprinkler piping and blocking the flow of ~vater.

Impairments to the sprinkler system can also occur during a fire. A system can become impaired when any sprinkler control valve is shut off prematurely during a fire. This obviously turns off the water to the sprinklers. Well meaning occupants or responding personnel might shut off the valve to reduce products of combust ion or contaminants to improve visibility, or to control water damage. However, this action only prevents the sprinklers f rom gaining control of a fire in its critical development stage. Even if the valve is turned on again later, file fire might have grown beyond the point where sprinklers can control it.

A-5-3(e) See A-5-3(d).

A-g~4 Standpipe systems play a vital role in effective manual fire suppression evolutions. Standpipes can be found in low-, mid-, and high-rise buildings as...,.well as large area single-story buildings. It is crucial that these-sly." ~ be designed, installed, tested, a n d mainta ined in a c ~ d a n ' ~ - w i t h the appropr ia te standards. Failure of a s tandpipe ~ can h inder responding personnel operations and r e s u l t - i ~ - i i . . . . : : t . o lay out substantial quantities o f hose lines

A-5-4.i r e s ~

~ y s t a n d p i ~ i ~ t e m , even those without p.ressure- rices or pre..~ff]:e-reducing valves, it is possthle that the ~.!e at file s iandpipe outlet valve may be limited to 65

File pre-iniS~.~i!~lan should note the pressure available at the ~ . e . t of the " ~ d p i p e valves and a de terminat ion as to whether or ~ . . . " ~ ( e ~ i ~ ' e adequate for the anticipated hose evolutions [ l ~ : - ' ~ ' s i z e of hose lines and nozzle type) used by the ~pon4..i~'~g personnel . It may be necessary to provide alternative .~se evtlut ions with certain s tandpipe systems in order to ensure ~ iaate fire flows.

~ 4 . 2 Prior to tile 1993 edition of NFPA 14, Standard for the Installation of Standpipe and Hose S~stems, a min imum residual pressure of 65 psi at file top-most ~ l /2- in , hose valve outlet was permit ted. Beginning wida the 1993 edition, dae min imum residual pressure at the outlet was raised to 100 psi. Higher pressures are permit ted if specified by the authority having jurisdiction.

Determining the pressure available at the outlet is vital since many of the automatic nozzles require a min imum of 100 psi at the nozzle for p roper operation.

Almost a l l p ressure-reducing valves a n d p ressure-r estricting devices are de s ignedso that making adjustments dur ing emergency operations is extremely difficult, if not impossible.

A-5-5.1 Information on the design installation, testing and maintenance of fire protect ion signaling systems can be found in NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm Code. These systems can provide automatic detect ion through heat, products of combust ion or contaminants and flame detectors or may rely on manual detection and operat ion of manual pull stations. Systems may also be activated by water flow in automatic sprinkler systems or activation of odaer special extingafishing systems.

Many facilities, especially inside living units in residential occupancies, are provided with single/multi-stat ion products of combust ion or contaminants detectors. While flaese types of detectors may be in terconnected with one another , they do not provide antomatic emergency forces notification. These types of detectors are designed to provide occupant notification in only tbe areas where the detectors are located.

A-5-8 Smoke is recognized as a major killer in fires. Smoke often migrates to building locations remote from tile fire space, threatening life and damaging property. Stairwells and elevator shafts frequently become smoke-logged, thereby blocking evacuation and inhibiting rescue and fire fighting. The MGM G r a n d Hotel fire is an example of the smoke problem. The fire was limited to the

5 4 3

NFPA 1620 - - A 9 8 ROP

first floor, but smoke spread fltroughout the building. Some occupants on upper floors were exposed to smoke for hours before rescue. The death toll was 85, and the majority of fine deaths were on floors far above the fire•

The concept of smoke management was developed as a solution to the smoke migration. Smoke movement can be managed by use of one or more of the following mechanisms: compartmentation, dilution, airflow, pressurization, or buoyancy.

Compartmentation is die use of barriers with sufficient fire endurance to remain effective throughout a fire exposure. In fire compartmentation, tile walls, partitions, floors, doors, and other barriers provide some level of smoke protection to spaces remote from the fire• Many codes, such as NFPA 101®, Life Safa~ Cod~,

rOvide specific criteria for tile construction of smoke barriers cluding doors and smoke dampers in these barriers.

Dilution of smoke may be referred to as smoke purging, smoke removal, smoke exhaust, or smoke extraction. Dilution can be used to maintain acceptable gas and particulate concentrations in a compartment subject to smoke infiltration from an adjacent space• Tiffs can be effective if the rate of smoke leakage is small compared to eidler the total volume of the safeguarded space or file rate of purging air supplied to and removedfrom the space• Also, dilution can be beneficial to lhe responding personnel for removing smoke after a fire has been extinguished. Many people have unrealistic expectations about what dilution can accomplish in tile fire space. There is no theoretical or experimental evidence dmt using a building's HVAC system for smoke dilution will result in any significant improvement in tenable conditions within the fire space. It is well known that HVAC systems promote a considerable degree of air mixing within die spaces they serve. Because of this and tile fact flint very large qoantities of smoke can be produced by building fires, it is generally believed that dilution of smoke by an HVAC . . . . . . . . . . . . ~<.~.:.:,, system m tim fire space v~ll not result m any practical improvemeg~ in the tenable conditions in that soace. Thus it is recommended ~ :

• • . .~-':::. that smoke-purgang systems intencfed to improve hazardous ~i conditions within the fire space or in spaces connected to the fire '~ space by large openings not be used.

Airflow has been used extensively to mange smok...ej~! ~ in subway, railroad, and highway tunnels. Large flo~i~te,, ~;eded t° c°ntr°l sm°ke fl°w' and these fl°w rates ca~' ':~'~m~l~ ~ i oxygen to the fire. Because of extensive contro~ so extensively in buiMings. The control ~roblem cot avin~'~ very small flows when a door is closed fl

II p l

l a ~ . : ~ . l a v i u ~ ows increase significantly when that d o o r . ~ : ~ e n " " ~ t h , ~#~:" C O n c e r n ..::::::::: ....':'.:::':. ~'~::~ is that file airflow supplies : ~ e n to t h ~

Pressurization produced by n l ~ . ~ , fans is raft".::~ to4:':'::"as smoke control in NFPA 92A, Re~omm~.Practice fo:#..i~ 'moke-Control Systems. By the definition, stairwell pr~s~. '~ation, e t~ator pressurization and zoned smoke-control ~ i ' ~ . i . t ~ " l a f smoke control systems. Pressurization results in a i r~ : .~ . :~ high velocity in the small gaps around closed doors and in c .o .~uc t ion cracks, tl~ereby preventing smoke backflows througlf-$~mse openings. The pressurization systems most commonly used are pressurized stairwells and zoned smoke control. Elevator smoke control is less common. Many pressurized stairwells are designed and built with file goal of providing a tenable environment within the escape route in the event of a bui(ding fire.

Buoyancy of hot combustion gases is employed in both fan-powered and non-powered venting systems. Such fan-powered venting for large spa.ces is commonly employed for atria and covered shopping malls. Design analysis of these systems for malls is treated in NFPA 92B, Guide for Smoke Management S3stems in Malls, Atria. and Large Areas. There is concern that the sprinkler flow will cool the smoke, thus reducing its buoyancy and the smoke management system's effectiveness• There is no question that sprinkler flow does cool smoke, but it is unknoval to what extent the cooling reduces the etiL~ctiveness of fan-powered venting.

The following mechanisms are used by themselves or in combination to manage smoke conditions:

(a) Compartmentation

(b) Dilution

(c) Air flow

(d) Pressurization

(e) Buoyancy

A-fi-1 Many occupancies contain C.luantities of chemical, physical and biological hazards that pose mgnificant additional risk in a release or fire incident if not adequately recognized and addressed during pre-plarming and response.

These special hazard occupancies have been tim subject of substantial regulatory and consensus standards over tile past few decades. Plan developers should be familiar with the following documents before initiating pre-planning for special hazard occupancies.

(a) NFPA 471, Recommended Practice for Responding to Hazardous Materials Incidents; NFPA 472, Standard for Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents; and NFPA 473, Standard for Competencies for EMS Personnel Responding to Hazardous Materials Incidents

(b) CCPS (1989) AIChE, Center for !

al Process Quantitative Risk Analysis Process Safety, NY 1SBN 0-8169-0402-2

(c) MIACC ions Substance Risk Assessment: A and Industry, MIAACC Publication

¢ . ~ " ~ . ~ R e s p o n s e Team's i ~ l ~ ) T h e ~ . t i c e Integrated ;o,~,,gen.~ FRL-551 an Guidanc !-8, Federal ~!:"~ter/~...~J, 61, No 109/0~'~'une/1996

See Appendix E.

A-7-3 G~ nost-incid

on the development of emergency response and ~ e r y procedures can be found in the following

Recommended Practice for Disaster Management

600, Standard on Industrial Fire Brigades

NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and 'Program

(d) NFPA 471, Recommended Practice for Responding to Hazardous Materials Incidents

A-I I-1A To better help understand the functions performed in health care facilities, the development of thepre- incident plan should include a review of NFPA 99, Health Care Facilities and NFPA 101, Life Safay Code,

A-11-$.4 The pre-incident plan should address the following:

(a) HVAC. The control for this equipment is important. It may be designed for products of combustion or contaminant removal or may have a separate dedicated products of combustion or contaminant removal system.

(b) Utilities. Most health care facilities will be provided with an emergency power source usually consisting of an emergency generator operated from an on-site fuel source• The type of fuel, storage location, quantity, and emergency shutoff are important.

(c) Electric Power. Small facilities such as ambulatory health care centers may be provided emergency electrical systems capable of supplying a limited amount of lighting for egress and power service for the orderly cessation of procedures• Larger health care facilities may have expanded emergency electrical systems serving such filings as life support systems, intensive care units, and task lighting in cdtical areas. In addition, tile facility may have additional emergency systems serving equipment considered necessary for patient care. Such equipment may include central suction systems,

~ roducts of combustion or contaminants control and facility eating equipment• The operating features and controls should be

identified including wllat major functions each emergency system supplies.

(d) Water Supply• Shutoffs should be noted for domestic water supplies. Any equipment or operations which are critically dependent on water should be noted•

544

N F P A 1 6 2 0 ~ A 9 8 R O P

A-11-3.5 Special utilities might include the following:

(a) Gas and Vacuum Systems. Health care facilities may have p iped nonf lammable medical gas systems, f lammable and nonf lammable laboratory gas systems, and vacuum systems. The type of systems, control points and significance to pat ient care should be noted. Typical pat ient care gasses used in heal th care facilities include oxygen and nitrous oxide which are both s t rong oxidizers. These gases can be conta ined in individual compressed gas cylinders located in patient care areas or in bulk storage rooms, can be individual cylinders located on carts and h a n d trucks, or can be compressed tanks located on the exterior of the building and serving a closed pipe network. Similarly, non-pat ient care gases used in laboratories may be portable cylinders, fixed cylinders in the laboratory, bulk storage or individual cylinders, or bulk storage cylinders outside the building. Compressed gas systems used for pat ient care are usually zoned by t reatment or use areas with an emergency shut-off valve located in the zone served. Zone control valve locations should be no ted in the pre- incident plan. The pre- incident plan should note when it is necessary to shut-off compressed gases used for pat ient care, the operat ion should be per formed at file zone control valve. A shut-off valve at remotely located supply cylinders should never be used to shut-off medical gases in a heal th care facility, except as a qast resort".

(b) Environmental Systems. Large health care facilities may have dedicated exhaust systems for such areas as anesthetizing locations and laboratories. These systems may have been des igned for automatic venting of smoke and products of combustion. The areas served by dlese systems and associated manual controls should be noted.

A 11-4.2 In order to have a successful outcome of a fire emergency in a bealth care facility, tile emergency responders must work closely with the facility staff. Tile working relationship should be stressed in die pre-incident plan. ~{.~

Due to the nature of the occupants in a health care facility, the ":~ construction and built-in fire protect ion features of file facility have been des igned to minimize the probability that a fire would require the vertical movement of occupants. The building s t a . l ~ . ~ : . f o r health care facilities recognized that movement of p ~ : . . . ' ] , . ~ e s t is difficult, and practically impossible if l ife-support .~ipmen~iii .~ in use. Fire and smoke barriers in health care fac.~.'.~xhave I~ff~ ..... designed to limit occupants exposure to any sitd~l~::i~..~, ~ $ t barriers allow patients to remain in place or p r o v i d e n c e ""*~ili~

d O t . horizonhal movement of patients to areas .9..£~..f:.q~!ge o n ~ g . l e fl "" Tiffs pltilosophy is known as tile "defe..r2~. i:~'l't-,~i~.":~':~ "-':'~" cor~c6~ii~ertigal movement or exterior evacuation o f ~ B e n t s is ~!it~...,..a " l a s t ¢ ~ defense." ~ii-:.:'-:~:.. . . . . . . . ::~i!~ili i .¢~ii-;':"

.:~ ::~-..-:g...,..~, . . . . . "[~ii~ t ~ necessary in If vertical evacuation of occupa'nts e rmined

multi-story facilities, vertical movemen'~:'.:~.~, as far as:':.iiecessary to remove tile pat ient f rom the area of dan~"*i~hould . ~ considered. Relocation of patients to a lower floor, i ~ - ~ s far better than full vertical evacuation to the exterior, use An o~'~" to elevators should be evaluated in file deve lopment of t ~ p r e - i n c i d e n t plan, especially if different elevator banks are locat~:~ in different areas of refi~ge (smoke compar tments) .

Historically, fires in health care facilities have resulted in numerous injuries and deaths due to file decision to unnecessarily evacuate health care patients vertically or to die exterior. It is imperative that file emergency responders unders tand file concept of "defend in place" in healdl care facilities and that die pre- incident plan clearly represent this philosophy.

A-12-1.3 Use Conditions. The level o f restraint will fall into one of tile five following classifications. Different areas within a given facility may have different use conditions. Tile use condit ion of a facility or area within a facility dictates what life safety features have been provided in the facility.

(a) Use Condit ion 1 - Free Egress. Free movement is allowed f rom sleeping areas to o ther spaces wilere access or occupancy is permi t ted to the exterior via means of egress that mee t dxe requirements of the NFPA 101, Life Safety Code.

(b) Use Condit ion II - Zoned Egress. Free movement is allowed from sleeping areas and any other occupied smoke compar tment to one or more o ther smoke compartments .

(c) Use Condit ion III - Zoned Impeded Egress. Free movement is allowed within individual smoke compartments , such as within a residential uni t comprised of individual s leeping rooms and group activity space, wit1 egress impeded by remote control led release of means of egress from such smoke compar tment to ano ther smoke compar tment .

(d) Use Condit ion IV - Impeded Egress. Free movement is restricted from an occupied space. Remote controlled release is provided to permit movement f rom all sleeping rooms, activity spaces, and other occupied areas within the smoke compar tment to ano the r smoke compar tment .

(e) Use Condit ion V - Contained. Free movement is restricted from an occupied space. Staff control led manual release at each door is provided to permi t movement f rom all s leeping rooms, activity spaces, and other occupied areas within the smoke compar tmen t to anodle r smoke compar tment . (101: 14-1.4)

A-12-4.1 Due to tile security measures imposed on the residents in a de tent ion and correctional facility, the construction features of dae facility have been d e s j g ~ d to minimize the probability dlat a fire would require the ~f . . .~ .c , nt of occupants. The building standards for de ten t ion an.d:..~" rrectlb3~al facilities recognized that movement of residents, a t . , ~ : i s difficult, not only due to the security measures i m . ~ ~ ":::'<':"::~ . . . . ied "~'.:~]e residents, but the potenual impact imposed on%~Lers b~.-~. . :movement of residents. Fire and producl~iii~:~.c'~bustio'~i~-c.ontaminants barriers have been d e s i g r } ~ i ~ t i o n a n ~ ' ~ , ~ o n a l facilities that are in tended to allo~ilreisidents'to remain i~"e~{i~e or provide for the horizontal

l~i..~, residents to ~ m e r ~ of refuge on a single floor, limiting [e fire. ~ ts e ~ u r e to any sihg] This philosophy is known as

'~the .~:!,.~'-'/~"~.lace ~ concept.

In ort~[~:~ji:.~.:llave a successful outcome of a fire incident in a d e t e n t i o n " ~ . 9 . ~ ' e c t i o n a l facility, the municipal fire service must

~ o r k closel ~'the facility staff th roughout the incident. The ~ g rel y ~ I.~*~iSnship should be stressed in the p re - indden t plan. - :::.-~:ii~?:.:';.~:::,.:.....:.::i.:."

~ l ~ v a c u a t i o n Capability. NFPA 101, Life Safe9 Code, should "be r e f ~ e d to for fur ther explanation and methods of de termining die evacuation capabilities of a residential board and care facility.

~#:" I~17-5 Included are explosion suppression, local application and total-flooding gaseous systems, f ixed foam systems, dry chemical systems, as well as inert ing and vapor mitigating and recovery systems. A basic unders tanding of the system operational features, potential hazards involved, andavailabili ty of reserve agent supplies should be known.

A-17:/ Teams a n d / o r resources for hazardous materials response, confined space rescue, h igh angle rescue, and emergency medical services may be included. Note that different standards are used for fire response and hazardous materials response training. Consequently, a fire brigade is not necessarily a hazardous materials team nor is a hazardous material team a fire brigade. Where a facility has their employees respond to emergency releases of hazardous materials, government standards regulate emergency response plans and the training requirements for a hazardous materials team.

A-18-3.2 Stock stored in the aisles, internal control barriers such as wire cages in bonded warehouses or aerosol storage, or trucks parked at tile loading dock can contribute to this problem. Storage racks hundreds of feet long without cross aisles can reduce access to the interior of file building and dictate file use of exterior doors only at file rack ends for manual fire suppression operations.

A-18-6.4 Full scale fire tests in warehouse storage arrangements have shown that overhaul and final ext inguishment of fires occurring in warehouses require personnel t rained and equ ipped for manual fire suppression operations. This may be personnel f rom tile public fire depar tment , tile plant fire brigade or a combinat ion of both. The scope of final extinguishing operations are usually vastly underest imated. In a warehouse these operat ions must generally be conduc ted while the sprinkler system is operating. Moving pallets of b u r n i n g o r smoldering materials out o f file warehouse where they can b e b r o k e n open and overhauled requires tile use of lift trucks and other material-handling equipment . Equipment drivers will probably have to wear protective clothing and equipment including self-contained breathing apparatus. Training personnel in these skills must be accompl i shedbe fo re the fire. Likewise, in high-rack storage facilities that use computer ized stacking and retrieval systems

545

NFPA 1620 ~ A98 ROP

emergency response will require skilled equ ipment operators. Depending on the location o f tile control center, the operators may have to wear protective clothing and equ ipment including self- contained breathing apparatus. Procedures for operating the fire protect ion equ ipmen t under such condit ions must be practiced before an incident occurs.

Appendix B Case Histories of Warehouse Fires

This appendix is not a part of the recommendations of this document but is included for informational purposes only.

Case Histories - - Fire Barriers in a Distribution Warehouse, May, 1987

This warehouse was specifically des igned for storage of paints and related f lammable liquids. The main storage area was 180,000 ft 2. A fire wall subdivided the warehouse into two separate areas. Protection was provided by an automatic sprinkler system and a fire pump capable of delivering 2,500 gpm.

A relatively small amount of paints, resins, and solvents [(8 to 10 gal (34 L)] s tored in rile warehouse, were accidentally spilled while some of the s tored material was being moved by a lift truck. A spark from the lift truck ~gnited the liquid. Portable extinguishers and hose stations were available for employee first-aid fire attack while the fire depar tment was enroute. Water flow detect ion systems were in place to sound an alert and this system worked as planned. The automatic sprinkler system began operat ing before the fire depa r tmen t arrived.

Tile warehouse managers had developed and enforced a program to prepare employees for emergency response but this fire spread faster than expected. The clothes of one of the employees began to burn, diverting at tent ion from the extinguishing effort. Problems grew with the fire. Neither use of the portable e x t i n g u i s h e r s n o r - : ~ operation of the sprinkler system s topped the fire before it spread other storage. Employees began to evacuate, but some of tile nearl i 1 million 16-oz and 220,000 6-oz aerosol containers had already begun to explode :rod fall outside amid the evacuating e~p.J.0yees.

The fire depar tment pumpers arrived six minut dispatchers sounded the alarm, and fire fighters I~ preparations for ml offensive attack. When the . . . .~ the fire fighters encounte red huge clouds of ti~'Ick.": Worse, flames had already ex tended throulrougnh methe ro bundred feet into ,he air. ~ ) ~ ' i Fire fi hters h g.~::" 1o' inside tile warehouse, ,and aerosol ca .r..~.--~Zw~'? building. The intense heat f rom thg::~i:~:e.and t h ~ ' ~ ,

prevented ....... rocketing aerosol ~ n s ~ i ~ g i l t e r s trorrf:: building to hook up to rile sprir~|'~::"~:':~.tem siames~ connection. In the meantime, althol~i~.~).e buildil mainta ined adequate pressure, the spr~ii..~..~g systen to have any positive effect on the fire. ":~iiii::iii::?.- .......

lc.t . .~g the )el- p u m p lot appear

The fire spread th roughout file a p p r o x i m a t ~ q 8 0 , 0 0 0 ft ~ (16,700 q:.- m 2) of the building widtin 28 minutes of ignition. This rate was roughly equivalent to fire spreading completely over tile area of a football field in lem than 8 minutes. Although the fire depar tment was t rained for an aggressive attack where possible, in dais case it was forced into a defensive position to protect exposures. This decision was dictated by fire spread that had developed before the fire depar tment had even arrived. The loss - 49 million dollars - included damage to the building itself, all of the contents, and the cost of removiog the useless debris.

(Other factors: hazardous commodity, collapse, emergency o rganizafi on . )

Hazardous Commodity in a Grocery Warehouse in Edison, NJ, 1979

This sprinklered distribution center contained 290,000 ft 2 (27,000 m 2) of rack storage for supermarket , health and beauty aids, including many aerosol cans. The center supplied more than 100 stores. Employees discovered a small fire that spread rapidly through cardboard boxes containing aerosol cans. Exploding aerosol cans prevented employees from at tempting early extinguishment. Tile sprinkler system was overwhelmed, and an exterior wall collapsed soon ,after the fire d e p a r t m e n t arrived.

Estimated loss was 50 million dollars. More than 200 workers lost their jobs as a result o f the fire.

(Other factors: size, collapse.) Discount Store Warehouse, Falls Township, PA, June 1982

At the time of this incident, it was called "the most costly single building fire in U.S. history." The 5-year old sprinklered warehouse with 1.2 million ft 2 (85,750 m 2) of storage supplied 375 large discount stores from Maine to Virginia. Grading had been started for an additional 923,000 ft 2 of storage.

The fire began when some aerosol cans (among more than 1 million in the warehouse) fell, burst, and were ignited by a lift truck spark. An employee discovered the fire immediately after ignition and a t tempted to extinguish it with a portable extinguisher. It was no t effective, nor was the sprinkler system. Within three minutes of the arrival o f the fire depar tment , flames were repor ted to be coming through the roof. Exploding aerosol cans, some trailing flames, rocketed through the roof and doorways protected by deluge curtains. Complete e~..C~nguishment took seven days. The loss of the building and c o n t e ~ $ ~ e d e d 100 million dollars. .4.~ "~" ~X-:.::'~:.

(Other f a c t o ~ hazardous commodity, fire walls, collapse, ~ r o t e e t i o n inadequacy.) emergency o ~ ":~-. ?.'.-"::':~ ~ ~.,

im pair~.~.O~!~ ' • ":~:-.-~. • . . ~ r m l ~ w':.~..~..'O..cery Warehouse Fire, Boston, MA,

ce n E~..-: .~. over f ~

The bui

1969, fire I~ [oston. MA.

ion dollars.

~cl a 460,000 ft 2 (43,000 m 2) he building was the principal supply in the New England area. The loss was

tilt in 1959. It was 800 ft long and 575 ft wide. with a 25-ft-high roof. The building had ~oured gypsum roof suppor ted on unprotec ted ilding was a single fire area.

Wet~ tpe sprinklers systems were provided th roughout the building q.~.an ordinary hazard pipe schedule with 120 ft 2 per head spacing. W e water supply for tile sprinkler system was f rom a 10-in. yard inaln, which was fed f rom an 8-in. public water main and a 1000- g~al m (3785-Lpm) electric fire p u m p taking suction from a 250,000-

(946,000 L) reservoir. Sprinkler water flow alarms were transmitted directly to tile public fire depar tment , and security guards made unrecorded rounds th roughout the facility. However, at the time of the fire, the fire alarm system had been inoperative for about four months.

Stock was stored to about 20-ft (ft.1 m) in height with minimal aisles. Such an a r rangement p romoted good traffic flow in the warehouse, but l imited access in tile event of an emergency. In addit ion to the normal grocery stocks, the warehouse also contained a variety of f lammable and combustible liquids in aerosol cans. This storage was mixed in with the ordinary storage for ease of handling.

At about 10:00 PM, an employee discovered smoke in tile warehouse. Instead of turning in an alarm, he went to the site o f the smoke to investigate. By the time he arrived, sprinklers in tile area had already fused and were operating. On hearing the sprinkler alarm ringing, a supervisor pulled the fire alarm system, but realizing it was inoperative, he went to the phone to call the fire depar tment . Unfortunately, the p h o n e was dead.

A security guard was instructed to drive to the nearest fire station and turn in the alarm. At 10:26 PM, the alarm was turned in at tile fire station. On arrival, fire fighters were directed to tile area of rile building where employees were a t tempting to direct a hose stream into the area where the fire was located. A small fire involving some paper products had been control led by the s.prinklers, and fire fighters used a hose stream to overhaul the debns and effect final extinguishment.

At 10:50 PM, file district chief in charge of the fire signaled that the fire was out. He then ordered that the sprinklers b e shut down. Because the fire fighters were not familiar with rile building, riley did no t know which valves to close to isolate the spr ink le rs tha t had been operating. As a result, four valves covering 25 percent of the building were closed down. Fire fighters remained on tile scene while cleanup operat ions commenceO.

546

NFPA 1620 - - A 9 8 ROP

At about 11:20 PM, an employee reported another fire in the center of the building. The district chief and several fire fighters went to investigate. Encountering heavy smoke and heat, the chief ordered the building evacuated. Fire fighters dove out of the building just ahead of a massive wall of flames and smoke.

The maintenance foreman sent a man to open the sprinkler valves that had been closed, but he did not identify them. On the way to open tile valves, the maintenance man checked on the fire pump, found that it was not running, and started it. Using matches to read the valves in the dark, he found all of die closed valves and opened them. By tile time he was finished there were flames coming through the roof of the building. There were also aerosol cans rocketing around the building.

The fire department tried to use the private hydrants, which were fed from thep lan t underground, but found the pressure too low. A check of tile fire pump found it running slowly, apparently running on a single phase. Fire fighters could not locate the sprinkler system connection and, thus, could not supplement tile water supply to the sprinkler system. Within an hour, the roof had collapsed and the building was a total loss.

The exact cause of the fire was not determined. It was found that the insulation board used on the underside of the roof deck burned readily. One theory advanced was that tile insulation board, ignited by the first fire, smoldered some time before hreakinginto open flaming. It was also suspected that the fire may have been set.

(Other factors: improvements, physical size, storage commodity, protection familiarity.)

Protection Inadequacy, Cold Storage Warehouse, Madison, WI, May 3, 1991

This cold storage complex consisted of five buildings with a t o t a ~ of 224,000 ft 2 (20,800 m2). The building of origin, building ~ a r e a

1, bad an area of approximately 62,000 ft 2 (5760 m 2) and one story .2..-'..~1 .~ racks' 55 ft high. Tile storage racks consisted of double and multiple

with up to 50 ft high storage. Computer controlled ~J ~xe~. t p l a c e d a n d m o v e d s tocks o f cheese , butter, cranberr i .~:t[)er food products in tile modern high-rack storage fa "~ ( ]'~'...'.~f the five buildings were sprinklered by two wet-pipe ~ ~" t (~p..e systems. The system in building # 1 was desi .'. ~ - 6 ~ . . x . 0.15 gpm/ft 2 over the most remote 2600 ft 2 area usir i ~ "::g~t (141°C) sprinklers. There were no in-ra~.,sg(~.~klet ~Jumn sprinklers, and the ceiling sprinkler s ) ~ ~ , I ~ . . ~ occupancy. ..~!~

A forklift operator heard a sou.~"~i~.~.a "torch be , d noticed a fire involving a batter~}"'po'~/'~forklift- A., nployees discharged portable extinguishers, t h e ' ~ c fire dt rtment was notified. The first-due engine c o m p ~ e d I.X¢ y smoke and fire conditions from the station just one b l ' ~ An interior attack was initiated as the fire departmenl co~i~ifion to the sprinkler system was supplemented. Hazard~.':~s material concerns included tile buildings ammonia refrigeration system, several acids, and various other chemicals.

The interior sector officer reported that sprinklers were operating, and that visible fire had been "knocked down ." Roof level personnel reported intensifying conditions and interior operations were moved back to tile dock area of the building. The roof of tile warehouse collapsed witltin the first hour of f i re- department operations. The fire extended to building # 2, a nonsprinklered, high-piled storage warehouse, within 4 1/2 hours of the initial dispatch. Extensive mutual aid was requested to maintain coverage of the city, as a majority of file departxnent was committed to the fire. The fire was declared under control almost two days later and final extingatishment completed two additional days later. Damage to the bml"ding and contents totaled over 75 million dollars. Extensive cleanup of tile melted residue from fire department equipment and the surrounding area cost several million dollars.

(Other factors: hazardous materials, roof collapse, size, emergency operations.)

Multiple Floors at Grade, Distribution Warehouse, January 1995

This incident occurred in buildings with below grade levels. Responders approaching the buildings from different sides came to

different conclusions about how many stories tall the building was, due in part to a lack of communication on tile fireground. Additionally, substantial time elapsed between the initial call for assistance to the fire department and the tragedies on the fireground was noted as a contributing factor.

At 7:02 PM on January 5, 199.5, members of a rock band practicing on the lower level of the warehouse called the fire department to report a fire. The multi-occupancy building had no sprinkler, smoke detection, or fire alarm systems.

The original one-story building was build in 1901 and had been modified a number of times over file years using a variety of construction materials. At some point, the street on the east side was raised, and a second story was added. Additions to the building had also been made to its west and north sides, and what had once been the street level of the building was now its basement. From the east side, tile warehouse looked like a one-story structure, but was really two stories. As a result, the first crew to arrive, which approached from the east side, inaccurately concluded that the building had only one story. They began fighting the fire on the assumption that it h a . ~ e d on tile exterior and spread to file interior, despite t h ~ { ~ , t one crew member later told an investigator t h a t ~ f l o o i " ~ so hot he couldn't kneel on it.

. ~::~:'t~.-.'~.~. - ~ - - A c c o r d i n g . ~ t a t ~ t s from the interior crews, they believed that

riley were ~ n g o / ~ l i d concrete floor. Events would prove "~'~:|~.~hra after the initial 38 minutes alarm, fire them

bume~ji poring !i," wllich had been built to modificatio This sbo

s n of:.~.. 1 was constru p of small dimension wood, about 4 ft h~.. .~n, d didn't h~'~. ~-the same fire-resistive characteristics

• as m ~ : ~ . c t u r a i system of heavy timber construction.

The f l ~ it turns out, was actually made of wood planking, floor j o i s t ~ x , ~ b e r covered by a layer of concrete about 1/2 in.

~fick. At tl he?~"e of failure of this section, 13 fire fighters were .~.(¢~&~.g.the s~gi~ture and nine were on the roof.

( ~'~ou~"'~:'~fighters who had been operating directly over the main ~ody o~"the fire fell through tile hole in the floor.

,.......:.Despite rescue attempts, all four fire fighters died of !~phyxiation. Three due to air depletion in their SCBAs, and one d u e to exposure to combustion products. The structure was so badly damaged that it took several days to extricate the fallen crew members.

Confusion over the number of levels and the location of the main body of fire allowed the crews to operate longer than they should have. They thought they were making headway and were hitting spot fires, unaware that the main body of the fire was actually working below them.

Had tile crews involved in fire-fighting operations made ongoing progress radio reports, the incident commander might have realized earlier that they were on two different levels. Upon arrival, he had sized up the building as two stories high, but this information wasn't transmitted to all fireground personnel. This lack of communication also contributed to confusion about the location of the fire and where the crews were in relation to it.

The fire was determined to have been set in the building's lower level, directly below the area in which fire crews were conducting interior fire operations. It spread to the upper story along the building's exterior and through interior penetrations.

Adequate Sprinkler Protection, AT&T Warehouse, New York, 1978

The warehouse was over 500,000 ft 2 (46,450 m 2) in area. The 27-ft (8.2-m) high storage racks contained pallets of rubber cable products. Sprinkler protection consisted of ceiling and in-rack sprinkler heads supplied by the public water system and a 2500 gpm (9500 Lpm) fire pump with a 300,000-gal suction tank.

An arson fire activated three ceiling and three in-rack sprinklers during the nonoperating hours of the facility. The sprinkler water flow alarms activated at the guard station, and tile guard alerted the fire department. Fire department operations were limited to salvage and overhaul. Damage was limited to three pallet loads of product, about $20,000.

547

N F P A 1 6 2 0 ~ A 9 8 R O P

AT&T Warehouse, February 1981

The warehouse wa~ over 500,000 ft 2 (40,450 m 2) in area. The 27- (8.2-m) ltigh storage racks containedpallets of electronic

components and packaging materials. Sprinkler protection consisted of ceiling and in-rack sprinkler heads supplied by two 2000-gpm (7600 Lpm) fire pumps with two separate 300,000~d (1,135,500-L) suctic.n tanks.

A maintenance employee was repairing a lift truck in the warehouse and heard a "crackling" sound. He investigated, saw fire and smoke, and saw an in-rack sprinkler in operation. A 1 1/2-in. (38-mm) hose line from a nearby hose station was used to attack file incipient fire. As outlined in the facility's emergency action plan, a fire evacuation alarm was sounded, a sprinkler water flow alarm was actuated at the guard station, a back-up phone call was placed to the guard station, the plant emergency organization (PEO) responded and the public fire department was notified.

The PEO personnel connected a large hose line to a yard hydrant and stretched the line inside the warehouse. Tills 2 1/2-in. (65-m) line supplied two 1 1/2-in. (38-ram) back-up hose lines. These operations were completed within 10 minutes of file discovery of the fire and before the fire department 's arrival. The fire had been controlled and the fire department operations were limited to salvage and overhaul. Damage was limited to several pallet loads of product that totaled approximately $10,000.

Good Pre-Incide~t Planning, Paper Products Warehouse, Enfield, CT, May 26, 1991

The warehouse was 408 ft x 388 f tx 75 ft (124 m x 118 m x 23 m) high and of light r.oncombustible construction. The storage racks supported the roof of the warehouse and contained 11 tiers of gift ana greeting card products. Ceiling sprinklers and eight levels of in- rack sprinklers were provided.

During an overnight shift, employees working on an automatic stacker crane in the warehouse beard a loud noise and saw spar~k~:,a.t

ndei tile ceiling. Power ~ lost to the warehouse and the remai ~ tile facility. Tile fire department and PE P were alerted as a fire ~g~::,~ developed at the top of the rack. PEP members met and directe , % the fire department to the fire area. ~.,~

The fire department connected to a yard :~ h ydr an t ~:...a..d.van ce d two 1 3/4-in. (44-ra) hose lines into the w a r e h o ~ ' : ~ . ' ~ l ~ g h t e r s used a ladder on file stack crane to access the.:.(~i~; whi~:_."~gs 75 ft (23 m) above the lloor. Tile fire was extin~.,.~u~l;ied in less'~n,,.~ 30 minutes and prior to the operation of th~g~.i-~x~aatic sp~61ers . ~

Fire and water damage was limited to dwee ~ ~ . of ~..'~i~!~ i Tile operation of the warehouse was partially i n t " ~ : $ . e d for tli~¢~.~i

..~:~:::.,. days while repairs were made to ~L~-..c.~cal syste ~9tal damage "" ~ : ' ~ i : - " ~ ' :':':':':'- f r o m tile fire was less than $10,~"-':.- .~..-:..:::. .~...-.::i:~:~:~:i::.. .,..~:~

This appendix is not a~part"~:.~.',..gexommendatio~i~f this NFPA document but is inc!uded for i n ~ [ ~ n a l purpos~i~ly.

"~.]~iii.~k.. .<#: C-I General. The level of detail 6~. .glata . . .~t lected is determined by the level of pre-incident planning"'~'.. '~-'!~ be developed Effective pre-in'cident plans 'of simpl~e 's]~!~:i~r facilities mZa plan with simple objectives can be developed w~#i:minimal amounts of data. Additional data is required for pre-inc~ident planning of more complex sites or facilities, facilities with more numerous potential hazards, plans with more complex objectives, or for potential incidents with greater risks. Data flint may be useful should be collected with the understanding flint it can be filtered out later if not needed in file final plan.

If a plan developer intends to prepare a single pre-incident plan, the recommendations provided in Chapters 1-8 and applicable occupancy chapters can be followed to aid in determining the types of data that may be needed. Alternatively, data collection forms can he developed to aid in the efficient and consistent collection of data for pre-incident plan development. A sample data collection form is provided in Appendix E.

It is helpful to understand the intended audience for the final pre- incident plan and to obtain consensus regarding the information that is needed and the threshold of information that the pre- incident plan user can effectively utilize once an incident has occurred. These considerations should govern the scope of the data collection effort.

C-2 Selection and Prioritization. The collection of data may be limited by several factors such as available resources, time, proprietary information, privacy concerns, and so forth. It will be necessary for the plan developer to determine which data will be most critical and to prioritize due data collection effort to obtain tile largest data set given the established constraints. A successful strategy for pre-iucident plan development is an incremental process where simple pre-incident~-~uas are developed and issued (in lieu of having none) and s u ~ t l y revised and enhanced.

As an example, a .L '~munic ip / i l i ty could prepare simple pre- ,itals incident plans f o ~ . ' . ~ . . . e hosp in its community for a given

ionai resource e x p e , ~ ~ N d i ~ resources become available, the p r e - i n c i d e t ~ a n s f 6 ~ . ~ the hospitals can be brought up to

~referable to expending a l /o f another le.v...~.>... ~ . m e t h o ~ [ . ~ e F , tlre availa~ii~.~p'~'~es to p r e / ~ . ~ co~.plex and comprehensive p r e - i n ~ f i i i pJ~.~Si: one hospi~cl~f.::.i..~ave the other hospitals

are lnteucl have been or inciden

~ e n t s and Site ~onsiderations. The objective when ~'..-i~hysical elements and site considerations is to f th~i~ould be expected to influence the emergency ~cident outcome. The items identified in Chapter 3 b~prompt t hep l an developer to notice features that ~ / ~ . ~ i e n t i f i e d as impacting emergency responses ~ ] The listing is not all-indnsive and should be . ~ " specific information for unique circumstances.

. ~ . . ~ [ ~ Construction and Operational Features. Data ?~ga rd i~ .~ i l d ing construction and operational features are i m p o ~ ( w h e n specific features exist that would impair or impede emerg~cytcy respo~ase, or protective features that have been provided ao..d are intended to support managing an emergency, features that

'sent danger to emergency responders, or operational msiderations (for example, process controls, life support systems,

and so forth) that are vital to successful incident outcome.

C-3.2 Site Conditions. Data regarding site conditions is intended to identify features that would aid or impede emergency response (such as security measures) and features that may affect the outcome of the incident(s) for which the pre-incident plan is being prepared.

C,-4 Occupant Considerations. Data regarding the occupants that should be collected identifies unusual or unique concerns which may need to be addressed in the pre-incident plan for emergency responders' use. These needs may vary widely depending on occupancy of tile facility. Additional guidance is provided in the specific occupancy chapters 9-18.

C-5 Emergency Action Plan. Sites/facilities may already have some type of emergency action plan that can become a good source of data for the pre-incident plan developer. While some duplication may be unavoidable, the pre-incident plan should dovetail existing emergency action plans.

548

N F P A 1 6 2 0 ~ A 9 8 R O P

C-6 Protection Systems and Water Supplies. Data regarding protection systems and water supplies is important to allow emergency responders to maximize their use of existing protection systems and to support the effectiveness of such systems by understanding the water supply available and needed. Recognized hazards are frequentiypro~aded with specificprotection to reduce the severity potential of a n incident. Knowledge of these features can reduce the risk to emergency responders and significantly effect in the positive resolution of the incident.

As the risks and hazards become greater and more complex, the protection systems and their interaction become more elaborate. If necessary, additional teclmical assistance should be sought.

C-7 Special Hazard Considerations. Data regarding special hazards shou ldbe sought to identify unique conditions or materials that present hazards or risks to the emergency responders or incident outcome that are not commonly encountered. Items meeting this criteria will vary based on the intended user of the pre-incident plan.

For example, a pre-incident plan prepared for an industrial fire brigade at a nuclear generating facility would not necessarily identify radioactive material concerns as a special hazard. A pre-incident plan for off-site (fire department) response to the same facility would need to specify tltis risks/hazards at a facility should be included in tiffs data.

Information flint may mitigate the risks/hazards at a facility should be included in tiffs data. Examples of this would include special protective equipment, chemical neutralization techniques, purging procedures, medical intervention, and so forth.

C-8 Emergency Operations. Data regarding emergency operations should be obtained to identify the emergency response resources that are available to respond to the incident and how they are accessed.

C-9 Plan Testing and Maintenance. Testing the plan and periodic review of the plan may identify the need for additional data that is needed. :~. : : !

C-10 Specific Occupancy Data. Data specific to a particular "~ '~ occupancy dmt may need to be collected is identified in ti~e speci .~ occupancy chapter. Pre-incident plan developers for specific occupancies should consult these chapters for guidance. .-.:

responder. It cannot be t should have the final ~-~ examples of pre-incid.~ plan format is the s ~ £

r~!'~ incident plan fol

(1) T h e pr ~:::::::den e m e rge n ~.:,,~..¢,sk;~e ~ i n f o r m a t ~ f ~ d

lnforrr ~ x t e ~ e tex~::pictu res) .k.:~hes w

A • p e n d i x D Data Reduction and re-Incident Plan Presentation

This appendix is not a part of the recommendations of this NFPA document but is included for informational purposes only.

D-I Data Reduction. The data collected during the initial phase of Pdre-lncident planning will need to be evaluated to determine what

ata is critical to the plan user and will be included in the plan. For dfis effort, it is critical that die plan developer and user(s) interact. An overabundance of information can be as detrimental to a pre-incident plan user as a lack of information if the user cannot easily distinguish critical information. Additionally, the specifics of any particular incident cannot be exhaustively anticipated. Therefore, the pre-incident plan should not attempt to perform incident command. . or management, functions (such as p?)lacing apparatus, specifying attack strategies, and so on), although this ma) be desirable in certain instances.

D-2 Information Format. The format of the information is the culmination of the data collection and reduction process and results in the final product that will be used by the emergency

~ . e r s t a t e d that the pre-incident plan user ~ : . .~ : fo rmat . Appendix E provides several ~ t ~ ' ~ a t s . User acceptability of the factor tJ~:~t qualifies as a satisfactory pre- ~ ral points-need to be identified here:

~ : : j . n t e n d e d primarily for use by dae B ~ : : . p f this, it its critical that the e reI~; . . . .c lear~ concise, and complete. It

dil .y r e s p ' ~ l have the time to read ,te~.~ ... ion shouf~!:..~;::presented graphically

(3) SymbOl. consistent am

~.~.~...:!:that will not be of use to the emergency t]'ld":~ reserved for other uses and should not be :ter the pre-incident plan.

~ . d . . , ~ pre-incident plan sketches should be ~ - i n c i d e n t plan users. The symbols provided in ~ d for Fire Safety Symbols, should be utilized where ~ " not adopted an alternative set of symbols.

u ld utilize "bullet" format and be unambiguous to the

. ~.:..-'.-...-~.,..:.

549

NFPA 1620 --A98 ROP

Appendix E Sample Pre-Incident P l a n s and Data Collection F o r m s

This appendix is not a part of the recommendations of this NFPA document but is included for info~natlonal purposes only.

Anytown Fire Company Pre-lncident Plan ,~ddress: 1875 Robert Road

I Pre-Plan #

Emergency Contacts:

Occupancy and Hazards:

Construction:

Water Supplies:

Nam': I Maoor ts [ 0 ' = Manager: Apt. C101 James Carr 885-4444

Apartments on 1st and 2nd floors - - 1 and 2 bedrooms

Basement: Used for storage and utilities

Roof: Shingles on wood trusses Corridor doors are wood No interior fire barriers; common attic truss space j~Iiiiiii~.,:,

Hydrant on Wanamaker Road has a low volume: < 500 gp~=:..:.:':. '":~.~i~-., Drafting supply is limited from creek ,:~..., ~i!iik '%!!~:i Nearest strong water supply: Robert Road and H i g h l a ~ : L 250~ii~ii~st

Protection: Fire alarm panels for each building *':';~:':~ili--., ~i~.,.:~, " Detectors in commons areas and basement "" ~-::.

• "~:';$i~.

Water Supply - - Needed Fire Flow "~.~: J n ' ; ( ~ ,K~.~:$f':"

Involvement gpm Station U n i t ~¢':?':"i~i iii~ StatiC:, ~" Units Station . ~';i." "!~i :~ii:-- ----':

50% Bldg G: 1700 1 ~E~i~ .*: . . . . . . ;~i::" ~:~.:~~!~:,3"% ~" 2E 1R 4

lOW/, Bldg G: 3400 J ~ : : , . ~ '%iii ii!iii!ii!:i:#:: .....

~::;: "%l:, d: -:.~:

".N...::.;.:~}~!:.~: :~

Exposures: Building to building exposures

Railroad - - East of parking lot near Buildings E and F

Special Resources:

Strategies:

Comments:

Rescue: Aerial access to Buildings D and J, ground ladders needed

Utilities: Individual shutoffs for all buildings; boilers in basements

D -5 -99

Units

2E 1L

5 5 0

NFPA 1620 - - A 9 8 ROP

~ ) Address i 1875 Robert Road

Name

Manor Apartments District

1

PREPLAN #

D-5-99

Railroad tracks

_J

[ ] BLDG B =~ [ ] m

[ ] BLDG A =u t n .~4¢"

N

400 ft ~'~'~ At # 566 Wanamaker Road ~ ,

# ,,

%:': :?.: .~e"

B a e d e r Creek .:.:-:....~- [ ]

BLDG G [ ]

[ ] Truss roofs on each building

~ - ~ Basement In each building BLDG H [ ] [ ]

,~ I~ BLDG J

B & 2 B & 2 ~f-8 in. at #560 Baeder Road

• 800 ft.

I,I. O a ._1

[ ] m

[ ]

B & 2

Baeder Road

B & 2

tR o D. x gJ

"o o n-

..o o Q:

=$ 8 in.

D , ~ ) - - Pine Tree Road

551

N F P A 1 6 2 0 ~ A 9 8 R O P

Fire Company Pre-lncident Plan i

Address: 479 GUmer Road

Emergency Contacts:


Construction:

I Name: I

Manager: Kevin Thomas 713-1989

Luggage storage

Basement unused

LPG tank on Rice Ave. side

Wood frame

II Pre-Plan # 112- 4~- B I Luggage Unlimited District: I 2

ABC Alarms 555-1234

Protection: Alarm panel on GUmer Ave. side

Heat detection throughout ~ ~

Water Supplies: ~ u " ~ ~ s ~ e d supply

~e are~t, ar°o vo,u~o ~u.o,~:...,e . , v o ~ ~, to ~ 0 .

Involvement gpm Engines

50% 3600 2,3

J

Ladders ~ ~ f s ~,~:" Special Units .. ~ % ~

uires three lengths of hard suction.

1oO°/o 7200

100% Special Resources: Draft site

Exposures:

Strategies:

east

EMS Others

Side 2: Severe exposure to wood frame goods warehouse

Side 3: LPG tank m 1000 gal

Exposure protection to LPG tank on Side 3 and warehouse on Side 2.

Comments:

552

N F P A 1 6 2 0 ~ A 9 8 R O P

A d d r e s s P R E P L A N #

479 Gilmer Avenue

l ~ ) p 2.41B N a m e Distr ict

Luggage Unlimited 2

i +

[ - - 500 ft to Apple River

4 in, i

Warehouse .J ...... ~-~

6in. 10 ! .x~ 5~, =: . E) :.,0..SUr~2

' ~ : Wood f rame t'f" " ~ ' ~.~...~

.4,~.--%~ ~:-~:.: ~-~ - e~$: : :~ . ~:~.~

"::L<:::'~ +

.~ Luggage % e- / warehouse \

0

- - " 100 ftx 175 ft o 0

NN 5 6~in, ~ / \ 41~

in. - - 1 & B Wood f rame

553

N F P A 1 6 2 0 ~ A 9 8 R O P

Pre-lncident Planning Form

Company Name: Date:

Street Address: Telephone:

Site Access and Restrictions: Fences: height and construction; Security: guard service; Guard House location: Number on duty, knowledge, areas where guards do NOT have access; Guard dogs:

Lockbox: Fire Command Center: Emergency Operations Center: Remote Annunciator: Fire Alarm Panel:

Life Safety and Occupant Considerations Number of Occupants: Days, 8-4: Evenings, 4-12: Nights, 12-8:

Handicapped/Special Needs:

Areas of Refuge: (defend in place strategy): ..:&.

Emergency Contact: Name: Title: Telephone: ,~i:~,,,

Site Emergency Response Plan..=,.~. Emergency Coordinator: . #~ . . . . . . . .":~ ' %i i i i~ .#"

.~ - : .& "% : . ~..'::,

Occupancy or Special H a z : a ~ '':% Type of Hazard: Location: %@~:. :%:-i~ii~ii~j :

Spemal Shutdown Procedures (complex or extended o p e r ~ t j o i ~ . . # ;

Controlled Environments: . ~ i - - . ~ "~!if "¢" fi:i:i" ':E;" ~:;:;w;~ "~

..:~'~i~i:: .$'::~ ........ .~...:"~-~::" B u i I d in 0'!~..~tr~.t.[.~ fi ~ ..:~:~,......~,..~.:

Building Access: Doorways, locking d~..v:~c~Jble...windows, fire escapes, tunnels, breechable walls ....-..-#~:' ":~~{~i!~. "%iiii~# i:'"

Length:Width:Height:Number~ie. . .~s: y i i ""

Walls: Interior finish materials: Floors: (ra~ff~)ors): Ceilings (multiple/suspended ceilings): Roof: (concealed spaces/multiple levels) Roof Ce~r ing:

Vertical and horizontal openings: Large undivided areas, unprotected openings between floors, stairwells, elevator shafts, utility shafts, escalators; Type of Fire Doors:

Smoke and Heat Venting or Smoke Management: (manual) (automatic); Control locations:

Atriums: Location in the building, number of stories connected, number of stories open to atrium

Bui ld ing Uti l i t ies Electricity: Enters property (overhead) (underground) at; Disconnects located at; Transformers: (PCB)

Emergency Power Supplies:

Natural Gas: for (building heat) (processes); shutoff located at

LPG: for (building heat) (processes); storage tank(s) located at; shutoff located at

Fuel Oil: for (building heat) (processes); storage tank(s) located at; shutoff located at

554

NFPA 1620 - - A 9 8 R O P

Domestic Water:

Steam:

Elevators: number, floors served, type, restrictions and location, fire service override, location of keys

North: South: East: West:

Environmental Concerns:

Exposums

Protection Systems

Automatic Sprinklers: Ceiling/roof: In-racks: Other: System demand: gpm @ psi

Water Supplies: Type of supply: Fire pump: (diesel) (electric) Rat[E4g: gpm @ psi ..:.,...~ -.-.~.:

Available Flow: Static: Residual: Flow: Available @ psi residu..~f~%~ -:~...-:..~ ~:~& Required Fire Flow" ~%~.:~ ,.-:-:~::.~....:~.

Hydrants: Fire Department Connection: Location: ~ . s ~ l i e s : " ~i.:'.*..~.

Standpipes and Inside Hose Connections: T y ~ f s y s t e r ~ e outlets, pressure available, control and sectional valves, FDC, risers: ~ ...... ~:~ ....

. . , ~ . ~ . . . . ~ ".',:i.~ ~ Fire Extinguishers: ~ ! ~ . :"% ¢~ A ~]~ %:¢

Special Protection Systems: (CO2,~9:n~;:.~.~:~}xtinguishing agents, foam-water, dry chemical and wet chemical]: type of syst.em., h ~ ~ a protected by the system, location of control panels, location of all p r o t e c t i v ~ ~ p p ~ . . ~ d reserve containers, activation method, personnel

• . . ~ ~ : ~ . ~ : . ~.~.~:.

hazards of protecbve agent ,~-..:~,--L %:,'-::..-..:. ,::).

F i r ~ ] ~ n d Communication Systems • "~ :~ . : ; . ~ : : . . . . . .

Detection System: Method of syst~.~i activation (manual, automatic), area of coverage, fire alarm control panel (FACP) and remote a~"nunciator panels, type of automatic detectors provided (smoke, heat, other), off-site alarm transmission, name of and contact number for off-site monitoring agency:

Voice Alarm or Public Address System: Method and extent of occupant notification

Stairwell Telephone System:

Contact Person or Company Responsible for System Maintenance: (telephone number)

Contact information for person(s) responsible for maintaining the system:

555

NFPA 1620 - - A 9 8 ROP

Pre-lncident Planning Form

Company Name: Distribution Company, Inc. Date: August 1996

Street Address: 123 Main St., Hometown, USA Telephone: (800) 555-1212

Site Access and Restrictions: Vehicle access from Main Street at NW and SW corners of property; from Cross Street at NE c.orner of property. Fences: 8-ft chain link fence much of perimeter with locked gates. Cigarette room fenced in and locked when not in use. Security: Single security guard makes recorded rounds inside building Sat- urday 4:30 p.m. to Sunday 10 p.m.; exterior rounds during evenings; otherwise posted at guard house located at Spring St. entrance. Guard dogs: None.

Lockbox: Adjacent to fire pump house; scan card keys for door and gate access inside box. Emergency Operat- tions Center': None specified. Remote Annunciator: West side of warehouse next to fire pump house (building indication ONLY). Fire Alarm Panel: Inside warehouse at maintenance dept ...;-_....

~.-.:~ -,-:<~.:~. Life Safety and Occupant Consi~ti~ns~, : ~ , : ~

Hours of Operation: Continuous operations Sunday 11:30 p.m. to Sat..u. ~ . y 4~ii~_.,m.

Number of Occupants: Days, 6-2:30: 110; Evenings, 3-11:30: 7.~l,'c"=~'o.r~o~ate o f f i c e ~ F 9 a.m.-5 p.m. Supervisors to account for evacuated employees using daily ro~.~:. ~ii.:.::~.~ ,.:¢::

Handicapped/Special Needs: 1 part-time employee in warehouse,%~!i-:.:~.:...

Emergency Contact: John Smith, Facility Manager, ( 8 0 G ~ . ! 2 x 1 ~ ~ : ; : . .~U-:::I'.-'::'::':::::,.,:; :~

Site Eme~:g~cy "~d~sp~'se Plan Emergency Coordinator: John Smith, Fac}~ i i :Man~.~ M~. ~ " : a n d emergency plan on file in maintenance department office entrance nearest to fire ~ : u m " ~ i ~ i ~ . ! ~ e of warehouse.

.....::.:::':-:':':'~ ~:~::.:. ':.~-~!i~::, Q ~ ~ . ~ cy~-~:'S pec ia I Hazards • ".<:::: "::~:i:i::-:~:. ::iS::

Racked Storage: Mostly doubl~.~: : l lu l t i row' i~cke~ storage of grocery products. No aerosol product storage. 500 gal waste oil storage in ma in te r~ :~ shop.~i~lotor oil and cooking oils stored in protected racks old freezer area SW corner of warehouse. "%!~.'.::.:~::.....:.f::

Diesel Fuel Oil: t 0,000 gai above-groun~!:tank with single pump adjacent to guard shack, NE corner. Spill containment and absorbent in cabinet next to tank.

Controlled environments: No freezers or perishable storage; no refrigeration system.

Building Construction Bui ld ing Access: Exterior access by personnel and overhead doors.

Length: apwox. 700 ft; Width: approx. 600 ft; Height: 30 ft to 35 ft; Number of Stories: 1 + mezzanine; Office Building: 3 stories, 90 ft x 140 ft, same construction as below.

Walls: insulated metal panel on steel floors: concrete; Ceil ings: mineral tile; Roof: rubber membrane on metal deck on bar joist on steel beams.

Vertical and horizontal openings: Warehouse subdivided into three fire areas with 4-hr-rated fire walls with Class A, 3-hr-rated doors.

Smoke and Heat Venting: Manual exhaust fan with controls in transportation office.

556

N F P A 1 6 2 0 ~ A 9 8 R O P

Building Utilities Electricity: Warehouse: enters property overhead at center of west wall to 3-1000 kva transformers located between fire pump house and railroad tracks. Reportedly no PCBs. Disconnects immediately inside warehouse. Of- rice: electricity underground parallel to driveway to transformer; disconnect inside.

Emergency Power Supplies: 1750 H P diesel generator located outside along west wall of warehouse; supplies entire warehouse and office building. Uninterruptible power supply for computer room located on mezzanine of warehouse northwest corner of warehouse powers computers and telecommunications.

Natural Gas: Warehouse: Johnson aerotator heaters for building heat; shutoff located at east center part of warehouse north side. Office: Trane rooftop units. LPG: None.

Fuel Oil: For (building heat) (processes); storage tank(s) located at; shutoff located at

Domestic Water: Warehouse: service enters warehouse center of west wall adjacent to fire pump house; shutoff immediately inside building. Office: service entrance NW corner with shutoff inside.

Steam: None. Elevators: Office: single hydraulic elevator.

Compressed Air: Maintenance shop and cigarette room for packaging purpose~i~:, .

Exposures ~iF' ""~ii~!i~ ..... North: wooded land; South: wooded land; East: trailer parking; W e ~ m ~ b i l e p ~ . ~ i ~ n d Laurel St.

Environmental Concerns: Wetlands south and east sides of b u i k ~ ~ i ! ~ t ~ drains C:~nnected to public storm drain system.

p ro t e ct i o n~i~,:t.:.em s:::iiii!i~iy Automatic Sprinklers: Hydraulically designed ceiling and in~C~i i~ ! ,~ :sys tems throughout.

Water Supplies: Single, automatic 2500 gpm @ . . - ~ i diesei":~post#iire pump licated in pump house west side of warehouse supplies warehouse sprinklers.,~ p r i v ~ hydrar~::#illy.

Hydrants: Private hydrants spaced 250ft t0'300::~:. ~ u n : ~ - e t e r - " - : : : ::~~ " - : : : : - ~ : ~~ of warehouse;public hydrants spaced 500f1 on Laurel Street, Fire Department C Q ~ : V~f~.bo~e: at fire pump house supplies entire underground fire system. Office: FDC at NW corner ~ ~ l e r ~ ' r n .

inside Hose Connections: Cla~'~'~i~i..kx in. h ~ stations in warehouse.

Fire Extinguishers: complement provid~i.tbr.~hout office and warehouse.

Special Protection Systems: Automatic I~ion 1301 system within computer room, mezzanine level of warehouse building, NW corner. Shuts down air conditioning. Pre-discharge alarm for occupant evacuation. Serviced by Advanced Safety Systems, Peabody. Do NOT enter room when system has discharged; keep all doors closed.

Fire Alarm and Communication Systems Detection System: Warehouse: smoke detection in computer room, mezzanine level NW corner of building; Of- rice: smoke detection throughout. Smoke detection for each Trane rooftops HVAC units. Single alarm connection to EBFD for distribution center and corporate office. FA system deactivates door alarm system.

Occupant Notification: Klaxon horns with flashing lights.

Public Address System: telephone access

Two-Way Radios: All guards, mechanics and supervisors have two-way radios with in-house repeater; extra radios and batteries in Facility Manager's office near maintenance.

557

Pre-lncident Plan Data Sheet Location Address:

N F P A 1 6 2 0 ~ A 9 8 R O P

Date:

Page: 1

Pre-lncident Plan Data Sheet Fire Company District: Date: Pre-Plan#: - -

Location Info Address: Building Name:

Phone #:

Operating Info and Access .::/4~if :% Emergency Contacts and Titles: ...... ~ e ( ~ . . g Hours:

Primary Access: Side l~;~i:~:Pi:~&Purpos!~i

Key Box: Yes No Key Box Locations: ~ii~::~- ..... '~!#~ ....

Exterior Access Concerns: Yes N~¢~:::::~:~":"ii!!iiiii!i Obs~u.Qtio~ns to Aerials: Yes Locations: ,.#41iiiiiiiii::..::: . I ~ ~,O,,9.a..~:n s:

Exterior Door Concerns: Ye$ii!~ ~== N0"~:.~iii~. ':~iiii~ocation:

Interior Roof Access: Yes No'==~!!~4i~iij ~~" Location: .::...~::-"

Occupancy Overall Occupancy:

Open:

No

Closes:

High Fire Load Areas: Yes No

Life Saftey Concerns:

Evacuation Assembly Plan Yes No Assembly Point Location:

Hazards

Trash and Waste Hazards: Incinerator or Compactor Inside: Yes

Incinerator or Compactor Chutes: Yes

No Locations:

No Chutes Sprinklered: Yes No

558

Pre-lncident Plan Data Sheet Locatio n Address:

N F P A 1 6 2 0 m A 9 8 R O P

Date:

Page: 2

Chute Locations:

Outside Compactors or Dumpsters: Yes Locations:

No Attached or Exposure to Interior: Yes No

Hazardous Materials Present: Yes No Location of MSDS Sheets:

HazMat Inventory Attached: Yes No Air, Water, or Other Reactive Materials: Yes Typical Locations:

Location for Use in an Emergency: No Types of Materials

Closes:

Radioactive Materials: Yes No Typical Lo.~tiq.ns~:

Process Hazards:

Construction Number of Floors: or Partial:

Average Square Footage

Penthouse: Yes No (3

Roof: Truss Roof: Yes No Construction Type:

Floors: Truss Roof: Yes No Construction Type:

Walls: Construction Type:

Combustible Concealed Spaces: Yes No Location:Attic Cockloft Crawl Space Other

Interior Fire Barriers and Walls: Yes No Locations:

Wall Penetrations: Yes No Locations:

Openings Protected By: Doors Shutters Sprinklers None

559


NFPA 1620 - -A98 ROP

Date:

Page: 3

Interior Stairs: Location and Number: Obstructions to Stairway:

Elevators: Location and Number: Areas Served: Full or Partial

Fire Service Mode: Yes No Elevator Key Location: Controls Location:

Unprotected Vertical Openings: Yes No Type and Location:

Water Supply Primary Water Supply:

Test Results: Location: Static PSI: gpm Flow:

Alternate Supplies: Private Supply: Yes No Type: Gravity Tank Oth

Fire Pump: Yes No Supplied By:

Number and Location

PSI:

1 Process System Reservoir Other

Automatic Manual

On-Site Hydrants: Yes Private Size of Threads: Location:

Which system supplies what systems:

Nearest Large Volume Supply>2000 gpm:

Need Fire Flow Calculations:

Largest Single Fire Area:

Is there another area with hazard factors to consider? Yes No

Needed Fire Flow Factors Area Measurements

Building or Area Length Width Height

Hazard Factors: Low, Moderate, High, or S e v e r e

Fire Load Life I Exposure !

Total Flow

560


N F P A 1 6 2 0 ~ A 9 8 R O P

D a t e :

P a g e : 4

Factor Hazard Factor Needed Factor

Protection Systems Fire Alarm System: Yes No Panel Location: Annunciator Location:

.¢::..

Type of Alarms: Extent of Coverage: ....J-:~i~i~>

Monitored System: Yes No Fire Alarm Company: ~i + %~--~;~< Co. Phone Number: Sprinklers: Yes No Location for FDC: ]ze..~i~.."~.C TI]"<~..ds..;.

Type of Systems: Extent of Coverage.~ull:~.~Partial: J " • ,=...,.:~:...~.:=:...<~>~='::':~.:..:.

"-.'::-~:::.:£~ ~ : : ~ .

Areas Protected (if partial): <~:<.. "::=~@~j:"

Location of Main Valves: ~ i i ] k L o t i o n el>Sectional Valves: .4#" ~!~= '%#

--<~>'%>-."-'-%- -~1!.-'..+ % ~+ System Coverage Plan at Valve: Yes No ",~.~;;,. --~.:

Standpipe and Inside Hoses: Y~l~.~:.NoCo..~b~ned w~th Spnnkler System: Yes No FDC Same as Sprinklers: Yes N~ii%.. L~ation of FDC: Size of FDC Threads:

Type of Standpipes: ~Extent of Coverage - - Full or Partial:

Outlet Locations: Stairways Open Floor Other Outlet Size and Type:

Special Protection Systems: Type of Systems: Locations: Extent of Coverage - - Full or Partial:

Utilities

Natural Gas: Yes No LP Gas:Yes No Fuel Oil: Yes No

561


NFPA 1620 - - A 9 8 ROP

Date:

Shutoff Location: Shutoff Location: Shutoff Location:

Page: 5

Electric: Yes No Shutoff Location:

Emergency Power: Yes No Heating: Yes No Shutoff Location: Shutoff Location:

Water: Yes No Shutoff Location:

Hot Water: Yes No Steam: Yes No Shutoff Location: Shutoff Location:

A/C and Ventiliation: Shutoff Location:

Specialty Gases Yes No Types: Shutoff Location:

Occupant Concerns for Utilities: Yes No

Process Concerns for Utilities: Yes No

Responsible Co n t a ~ . . ~Z~iiiiiii!!.~:.

Responsible Co nt~...2~; '%~}~.,,.,

Exposures

Exposure! #

Separation (ft)

Life Hazard Fire Load ~ f - . , ~ ~ i o n

"%ii~

!

Sprinklered Priority (Low = 5)

Other Exposure Concerns:

Special Resource Considerations

562


NFPA 1620 - -A98 ROP

Date:

Page: 6

Technical Rescue Exposures: High Angle: Yes No Locations:

Confined Space: Yes No Locations:

Remarks

563

N F P A 1620 - - A 9 8 R O P

I Fire ComPanY Pre-lncident Plan Address:

= Emergency Contacts:


Construction:

Water Supplies:

Nearest Large Volume Supply:

Water Supply w Needed Fire Flow

Involvement gpm Station Units

50%

!00%

100%

Special Resources:

Exposures:

Name:

II Pre-Plan # District:

*1

Strategies:

P

Station Units

Comments:

564

District

IW' Address

Name

o# .,~% . ~ .-...-'..-'.,~'...~.::, .~!~ . . . .

. ~ . ~ . ~ .,.,..~- • , : : ~ . :~ .% • ~.:....-,.-..

%i~.~.~:"

~.-:i",--

..Y%-%

N ,.'., A ~ Y '

# - !t~..:.~.,,-

. ~ . ~ , ~ -

NFPA 1620 - - A 9 8 ROP

Pre-Plan #

5 6 5

N F P A 1620 - - A 9 8 R O P

Appendix F Referenced Pubfications

F-I The following documents or portions thereof are referenced within this recommended practice for informational purposes only and are dins not considered part of its recommendations. The edition indicated here for each reference is the current edition as of the date of the NFPA issuance of rids recommended practice.

F-I.1 NFPA Pubfications. National Fire Protection Association, 1 Batterymarch Park, PO. Box 9101, Quincy, MA 02269-9101.

NFPA 14, Standard for the Installation of Standpipe and Hose Systeras, 1996 edition.

NFPA 16, Standard for the Installation of Dduge Foara-WaWt Sprinkler and Foam-Water Spray Systems, 1995 edition.

NFPA 16A, Standard for the Installation of Closed-Head Foam-WaWr sprinkler Systems, 1994 edition.

NFPA 20, Standard for the Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps, 1996 edition.

NFPA 22, Standard for Water Tanks for Private Fire Protection, 1996 edition.

NFPA 24, Standard .for the Installation of Private F/re Service Mains and The/r Appu~nces, 1992 edition.

NFPA 25, Standard .for the Inspection, Testing and Malntcnanc~ of Water-Based Fire Protection Systems, 1995 edition.

NFPA 30, Flanunabk: and Combustlbb Liquids Cod~ 1996 edition.

NFPA 30B, Code for the Manufacture and Storage of Aoros¢l Products,

N-FPA 99, Standard for Health Care Facilities, 1996 edition.

NFPA 101@, Life Safe 9 ~ , 1997 edition.

NFPA 170, Standard for Fi~ Safety Symbols, 1996 edition.

NFPA 231, Standard for Gowral Storag~ 1995 edition.

NFPA 2MC, Standard for Rack Storage of Matoials, 1995 edition.

NFPA 291, Recommended Practic~ for Fire Flow Testing and Marking b~ Hydrants, 1995 edition.

NFPA 471, Recommended Pruct/ce for Respond/ng to Hazardous Materials Incidents, 1997 edition.

NFPA 472, Standard for Professional ~ of Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents, 1997 edition.

NFPA 473, Standard for Competoncies for EMS Personnd l ~ o n d i n g t~ Hazardous Materials Inddonts, 1997 edition.

NFPA 1231, Standard on Water Supplies for Suburban and Rural Fire Fighting, 1993 edition.

NFPA 1500, S ~ 4 ~ f ~ n Fire Departragat Occupational Safay and Hea/th P r o g r ~ ec~ion.

F o l ~ r ~ b l i c a f i o ~ ~

~ ~publ ica t ion . Center for Chemical Process Safety, NY. 1994 edition. • Chert ~Process Quantitative Risk Analysis AIChE, 1989.

NFPA72, National Fire Alarm Cod~1996 edition. ~ M ~ C Publkation.

NFPA 92A, Recomm,~da/Pract,ce" for Smoke Control Systems, 1996 ... . ~ ~ a z a ~ ts Substance Risk Assessment: A Mini-guide for eomon. ~ ~ V [ u n i ~ ;ditles and IndusUy, 1994.

NFPA 92B, Guide for Smoke Management Systems in Make. Atria'fKsut ~ . . . . aft . . . . . . . . . . Large Areas 1995 editio n ~ J_~ ~ ~ . z . 3 I ne r~ Ohm t<esponse xeam s tntegratea ~ontmgency rtan

6 . . . . ~ " ~ 3 u i d a n c . ~ w . ~ e; Notice FRL-5512-8, 1996

566

Documents

NFPA 1420 --A98 ROP