Neighborhood Policy Ashok Behuria

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Does India Have a Neighbourhood

Policy?Ashok K. Behuria , Smruti S. Pattanaik & Arvind Gupta

Published online: 12 Mar 2012.

To cite this article: Ashok K. Behuria , Smruti S. Pattanaik & Arvind Gupta (2012): Does India Have

a Neighbourhood Policy?, Strategic Analysis, 36:2, 229-246

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2012.646440

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Strategic Analysis

Vol. 36, No. 2, March 2012, 229–246

Does India Have a Neighbourhood Policy?

Ashok K. Behuria, Smruti S. Pattanaik and Arvind Gupta

Abstract: The article argues that India does not have a well-defined neighbourhood policy. It makes a historical survey of the approaches of different Indian leaders to theneighbourhood and examines the reasons for the prevailing negative perceptions aboutIndia in the region. It argues that these negative perceptions have come about becauseIndia has largely adopted an ad hoc and bilateral approach vis-à-vis its neighbours and has allowed its policy to be guided by an overarching concern for security. In recentyears, India’s approach has changed considerably. However, it needs clearer articulation.The article suggests that India must effectively communicate its vision of regional inte-

gration to its neighbours, enable them to participate profitably in its growing economy,spell out its ‘non-negotiables’ in matters concerning its security and national interest,maintain linkages at the highest political level, open multiple tracks of communicationand take a leadership position in multilateral forums like SAARC and BIMSTEC to bring peace and prosperity to the region through greater cooperation in diverse areas.This will prove effective in improving its relations with its neighbours.

Our first priority should be to devote ourselves to building a structure of cooperativeand mutually beneficial relations with our neighbours. This is the basic objective of our

policies. . . . We have to remain alert about aberrations, strategic ambitions and

geo-political motivations in their policies, which can militate against our security and our vital interests.

(Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s address at the Combined Commanders’ Conference,October 26, 2004, New Delhi)

India is the pre-eminent country in South Asia in terms of size, population, economyand military power. Acclaimed as the largest democracy in the world, it accounts

for three quarters of the population as well as the geographical area of South Asia,80 per cent of the total GDP of the region, and spends five times more than the rest of the countries put together on its defence. Since the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of the Indian economy, India has come to be seen as aregional power on course to emerge as a global power in the next four decades. There isan increasing realisation in India that a ‘peaceful neighbourhood is mandatory for therealisation of [India’s] own vision of economic growth’.1 Keeping this in mind, India

Ashok K. Behuria and Smruti S. Pattanaik are Research Fellows at IDSA, New Delhi. Arvind Guptaholds the Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair at IDSA, New Delhi. The views expressed are those of theauthors.

The authors express their gratitude to I.P. Khosla, Sujit Dutta, Kanwal Sibal, Rajiv Sikri and theanonymous referees whose comments and suggestions have helped them immensely in modifying anearlier version of this article.

ISSN 0970-0161 print/ISSN 1754-0054 online

© 2012 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

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230 Ashok K. Behuria et al.

Figure 1.

has invited countries in the region to acquire stakes in India’s economy and contributeto regional growth and prosperity.2

In this context, India should ideally have emerged as the natural leader in the region.This has not happened. The response from the neighbours to Indian invitation to par-

ticipate in its economy has not been too encouraging. Many of these countries perceiveIndia as interfering, non-accommodative, selfish and overbearing. There is a tendencyto countervail India through overt or covert strategic relationships with extra-regional

powers. India’s relationship with its neighbours is marked by recurring tensions. Doesthis mean India has not accorded sufficient attention to this neighbourhood? Or is this

because of India’s inability to evolve a well-defined neighbourhood policy?

Objectives and hypotheses

There are concerns in India today, more than ever before, that India’s neighbourhood will become increasingly unstable and pose a critical challenge to its economic growth

and security.3 This calls for serious analysis and introspection. The Indian prime min-ister has, indeed, on many occasions expressed his concerns about the developmentsin the neighbourhood.4 In his address at the Combined Commanders’ Conference inSeptember 2010, he brought it out forcefully:

Some of our toughest challenges lie in our immediate neighbourhood. The fact is thatwe cannot realise our growth ambitions unless we ensure peace and stability in SouthAsia.5

His government’s new year’s resolution for the year 2011 was to focus on the

immediate neighbourhood.6

Against this backdrop, this article seeks to identify keyelements of India’s overall policy towards its neighbours, examine whether they have



Strategic Analysis 231

been adequate and fruitful, and suggest policy measures to overcome the challenges inan integrated manner.

The basic hypothesis here is that India has chosen the bilateral route to relateto its neighbours. However, there are certain common elements/strands which guideits approach towards each of them. This article attempts to examine the evolution of India’s neighbourhood policy since the time of the British, and compare and contrastthe different phases to understand the fundamental drivers of India’s neighbourhood

policy.

Views on India’s neighbourhood policy

The political leadership in India has defined India’s strategic neighbourhood as the areaextending from the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Strait. However, the ministry of exter-nal affairs (MEA) has traditionally deemed countries bordering India as neighbours inits annual reports. It is interesting to note that, initially, countries such as China, Iran

and even Indonesia featured in the section on neighbourhood. By the mid-1960s, Chinawas shifted to the East Asia section and Iran to West Asia. This article makes use of the MEA’s definition of India’s neighbourhood.

India has undoubtedly emphasised its relationship with its neighbours in its for-eign policy pronouncements, which emerge in the shape of repeated statements onneighbourhood as the ‘first circle’ of India’s foreign policy, prioritisation of it in theannual reports of the MEA and the appointment of senior diplomats as ambassadors toneighbouring countries, etc. However, no conscious attempt has been made to concep-tualise the problems confronting Indian diplomacy in the neighbourhood and evolvea comprehensive framework to deal with them. A glaring example of the lack of

attention to the neighbourhood has been the absence of regular high-level bilateralvisits to the neighbouring countries, which creates an impression of neglect. The resulthas been obvious—India has focused more on ‘managing [its] relationships with [its]neighbours rather than shaping it and giving direction to it with a long term objectiveand vision in mind’.7

Moreover, this has given rise to negative perceptions about India as a selfish hege-mon, seeking to maximise its power at the cost of others in the neighbourhood. A brief survey of the sparse literature available on the theme (mostly in the form of commentsin the media) reveals the disturbing fact that Indian foreign policy is often taken to bea tool to project India’s dominant status at the regional level. Many of the writings on

India’s approach towards the region are predicated on the presumption that India is ahegemon and whatever it does (including granting concessions to neighbours) is aimed at augmenting its power, capability and status in the region and the world, basicallydriven by its superpower ambitions.8

India’s neighbourhood policy has not received much attention outside the region.However, in the post-Cold War period there have been some assessments of India’sregional policy. Schaffer and Schaffer,9 for example, argue that in spite of India’semphasis on economics in its foreign relations, its neighbours ‘feel extremely vulner-able to Indian political, military, and economic pressures [and] perceive their domesticeconomies as [being] vulnerable to Indian whim’, and none of them would wish Indiato assume the role of the regional policeman. However, they acknowledge that ‘India

has not fully exploited its powerful position vis-à-vis its neighbours to develop aregional base for its own ambitions to play a major role on the global stage’ and ‘it has never tried to establish full-blown Indian regional hegemony’ (emphasis added).




‘. . . [It] has never attempted to organise a South Asian Warsaw Pact-like structureunder its control’. Despite this, India has ‘won little gratitude’ from its neighbourswho continue to focus on the occasions when it has ‘cracked the whip rather than onthe times it has refrained’.10

Interestingly, there is a vast body of literature on Indian foreign policy. Themore recent literature focuses on the policies India should adopt to become a legit-imate stakeholder in global affairs.11 Among these, only Malone deals with India’sneighbours in some detail and suggests that India has transited from an idealist foreign

policy to a hard-nosed realpolitik and later to economic diplomacy. However, its effortsto outgrow the region have not succeeded, primarily because it has not paid sufficientattention to its neighbourhood. It has to use either some charm or strength to make itsnatural pre-eminence acceptable to its neighbours.

In sum, Indian neighbourhood policy has received scant scholarly attention, butIndia’s bilateral relationship with each of its neighbours has been widely written about.Among the most notable books are an edited volume by Bajpai (1986),12 a practi-

tioner’s perspective by Dixit (2001),13 a compilation of views expressed at a seminar by the Association of Indian Diplomats (2003),14 a collection of articles edited byKhosla (2008),15 a contrarian perspective offered by Sikri (2009),16 and a thought-

provoking analysis of democracy promotion as a factor in India’s policy towards theneighbourhood by Muni (2010). Apart from this there are quite a few analytical articleson the theme by Muni (1993),17 Muni (2003),18 and Raja Mohan (2007).19

Among these works, Sikri (2009) puts forth the view that India has to maximiseits economic potential to sustain its rise as a global power, and for this it has totake its neighbours along, appeal to their self-interest, ‘keep the door open for dia-logue’, and take absolute care not to appear ‘boorish, overbearing and condescending’.

It is imperative therefore for India to evolve ‘a coordinated and coherent strategyvis-à-vis its neighbours’.20 Jagat Mehta, India’s former foreign secretary, in his mem-oirs, argues forcefully that Indian diplomacy needs to learn to adjust to ‘small countrynationalism’,21 address others’ fears of Indian hegemony, and take a long-term view of

bilateral relations through a ‘sensitive diplomacy of equality to overcome the reality of inequality’.22

Muni identifies the contradictions in the Indian approach and argues that there arefive problem areas in India’s approach towards the neighbourhood: (a) the lack of bal-anced political perspective; (b) the power differentials; (c) India’s economic clout;(d) extra-regional powers; and (e) mindsets, diplomatic styles and personalities. He

argues that undue insistence on (or even encouragement of) bilateralism evokes avoid-able fears and suspicions of Indian dominance and allows anti-Indian forces to exploitthem to their advantage. Bilateral goals can be best achieved through a multilateralroute especially because neighbours ‘feel more comfortable in a regional design thatincorporates bilateral priorities and concerns’.23

India’s neighbourhood policy began to receive greater attention following the artic-ulations of senior foreign service officials like Kanwal Sibal24 and Shyam Saran.25

In one of his two important addresses, Saran dwelt on the very ‘theme’ that this paper focuses on. Sibal and Saran isolate the challenges confronting Indian foreign policy in the overall context of the changes taking place at the regional and globallevels and argue the need for India to engage its neighbours more meaningfully.

Sibal is pessimistic and holds that given the temptation of the political classes in theneighbourhood to project India as a threat to legitimise their position, ‘India will not




be able to shape its immediate environment optimally for its interests in the foreseeablefuture’ even by offering non-reciprocal unilateral concessions.26 He echoes the viewof K. Subrahmanyam that it is natural and perfectly normal to expect ‘our neighbours[especially Pakistan] to build up or rely on forces that countervail India’.27

Saran reiterates the familiar argument that the ‘logic of geography is unrelenting’and ‘a stable, friendly and peaceful, neighbourhood’ would help ‘reduce . . . political,economic and military burdens’ on India. Instability in the neighbourhood is likelyto provide an opportunity for external powers ‘to interfere [in] and distort local rela-tionships’. In line with the neo-liberal thinking that characterises Indian foreign policytoday, he emphasises the need for India to stop looking at border areas or states as

buffer zones, and use them as ‘connectors’ and ‘transmission belts’ to allow the unin-terrupted flow of goods, people and ideas in order to bring India closer to its neighboursand create a stake in its economic prosperity. Saran also advocates use of culture as atool of foreign policy.28

In the light of these comments, it will be useful to critically analyse India’s pol-

icy towards its neighbourhood since independence, to discover how it has evolved through different phases under the leadership of different political actors in India. Thisis necessary for a better appreciation (both achievements and limitations) of India’sneighbourhood policy.

Foreign policy of India since independence

The neighbourhood policy of a country is usually regarded as a subset of its foreign policy. India’s leadership in the years following independence advocated a foreign pol-

icy that was a natural and organic outgrowth of the principles of non-violence and peace that informed the Indian freedom movement. It had a moral basis that was pro- jected into the international sphere by Jawaharlal Nehru, who was not only the primeminister and the foreign minister of India, but was also the main architect of India’sforeign policy.

Long before Nehru became prime minister, in his first speech on foreign policyin December 1927 at the annual convention of the Congress party, he stated that ‘the

people of India have no quarrel with their neighbours and desire to live at peace withthem’.29 Again on 7 September 1946 he outlined the basic principles of Indian foreign

policy, which emphasised Asian solidarity, non-alignment, decolonisation and pursuit

of international peace. His outlook was more global than local; he asserted that Indiawould no longer be a ‘passive spectator of events’ and ‘a plaything of others’ but would ‘make a history of [its] own choice’.30 Nehru’s policy has been hailed as ‘a balanced

blend of idealism and enlightened self-interest’,31 which combined ‘anti-imperialism,liberal internationalism, neutralism, neo-Marxism and Gandhism’.32

Nehru held his ‘practical idealism’ to be superior to crass realism.33 Interestingly,when his own party-men criticised him for diluting his position on neutrality in themid-1950s and tilting towards the communist bloc,34 he resolutely defended his stanceand held that it was a step in keeping with the reality. Remarkably, the foreign policyframework fashioned by Nehru—marked by autonomy and independence in strate-gic decision-making,35 preference for democratic socialism, strengthening of defence

without compromising on the principles of non-alignment, and universal nuclear dis-armament as a means to world peace—has survived to this day despite the changes inIndia’s economic policies, termed the ‘neoliberal impulse’ by some observers.36 Since




the 1990s, India has shown greater interest in strengthening its economic power and has adopted a more flexible approach to global affairs. However, the basic tenets of

Nehruvian foreign policy remain largely unchanged. Nehru’s successors in the Congress party (Lal Bahadur Shastri, Indira Gandhi,

Rajiv Gandhi, P.V. Narasimha Rao and Manmohan Singh), quite expectedly, stuck to Nehruvian principles while articulating the foreign policies of their governments. Evenduring the years when the non-Congress governments were in power (1977–1980,1989–1991, 1996–2004) Nehruvian principles were invoked regularly to legitimisetheir stance on many tricky international issues. Morarji Desai sought to practise gen-uine ‘non-alignment’ by also warming up to the US37 and later the governments of V.P. Singh, Chandrasekhar and I.K. Gujral—all ex-Congressites—conformed to the

Nehruvian values. Even Atal Bihari Vajpayee, leader of a right wing coalition, stated in 1978: ‘Continuity is more pronounced and the change is more subtle’,38 borrowingheavily from the Nehruvian paradigm.39

Approach towards the neighbourhood

It is commonly acknowledged that there was an obvious contradiction in Nehru’s for-eign policy when he and his successors applied it to India’s immediate neighbourhood.While Nehru rejected all vestiges of colonial policy and made ‘freedom from the colo-nial yoke’ the leitmotif of his policy, he largely followed the British policy towards itsimmediate neighbours.40 His idealism became hard realism when it came to dealingwith the neighbours.

The Nehru era Nehru had to deal with an unstable and ill-defined neighbourhood right from indepen-dence. He was confronted with the problems of Kashmir, Junagadh and Hyderabad,which had a bearing on India’s neighbourhood policy. The Kashmir issue remains unre-solved to this day. Nehru had concerns about both an assertive China (in relation to theHimalayan states) and intrusive Western powers (in relation to Pakistan and Sri Lanka)during the Cold War.

Himalayan states: concern for security

The British colonial policy of ensuring tranquillity along the borders through treatieswith neighbours to protect its security and commercial interests was retained by Nehruin his approach to the Himalayan kingdoms of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim.41 This wasfollowed by his successors with minor exceptions. Nehru was aware of the contradic-tion and acknowledged that ‘[m]uch as we stand for independence of Nepal, we cannotallow anything to go wrong in Nepal or permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened,

because that would be a risk to our own security’.42 Some analysts hold India’s friend-ship treaty with Nepal in 1950 ‘as a unilateral guarantee offered by India against anyexternal attack on Nepal’.43

In the wake of the Chinese incursion into the north-eastern part of India, Nehrudeclared in parliament that India was ‘responsible for the protection of the borders of

Sikkim and Bhutan44 and any aggression against [them] would be considered aggres-sion against India.45 As the Chinese threat grew in the 1950s and 1960s, India becameincreasingly involved in building up the defence capabilities of both Nepal and Bhutan,




specifically in training and equipping their armies. The headquarters of the IndianMilitary Training Team (IMTRAT) were established at a strategic location in the HaDistrict of Bhutan, adjacent to the Chumbi Valley of Tibet, at the tri-junction of Bhutan,India and China.

Policy towards other neighbours

Nehru’s approach towards Pakistan was partially coloured by his experience of the political tussle between the Congress and the Muslim League and the communal polar-isation in the subcontinent in its wake. Even then, he demonstrated flexibility in mattersconcerning minority rights and refugee rehabilitation. He held fast to his stand of the

popular ratification of Kashmir’s accession to India until he realised that Pakistan wasentering into a military alliance with the big powers, who were in turn weaving Kashmir into the Cold War power politics by 1949. Even if he turned away from the UN and uni-laterally held elections in Kashmir in 1951 to ascertain the popular view on accession,

he remained open to discussions at all levels and hoped that Pakistan ‘will see reason atlast’.46 In his numerous deliberations on the India–Pakistan question, he underplayed the problem, referring to it as ‘not too serious’, a ‘family issue’ and even a ‘domesticquarrel’.47

In the case of Sri Lanka, Nehru showed some interest in the people of Indian ori-gin (PIO) in the island nation, and was somewhat concerned about Western influencethere. However, the geo-strategic importance of Sri Lanka and the Maldives in theoverall context of the Indian Ocean did not find much mention in his articulations.He advocated friendship with the people of Afghanistan and Burma and emphasised old and civilisational contacts. As regards Burma, true to his anti-colonial stance, he

worked actively with General Aung San and U Nu and even mobilised military and international support for Burma. He did not dwell much upon the maritime dimensionsof India’s security, although leading historians of his time, such as K.M. Pannikar,48

considered it to be India’s natural zone of influence.

The post-Nehru period

India continued with the Nehruvian paradigm even after Nehru’s demise and the seem-ing failure of his policy in the 1962 Sino-Indian war. India’s approach to the smaller Himalayan neighbours remained largely unchanged. India secured, in some cases,

through unilateral concessions, commitment from these states to respect India’s secu-rity interests. For example, when King Mahendra warmed up to China, India entered into a bilateral understanding with Nepal in 1965, which went beyond the terms of the 1950 treaty and obliged India to ‘supply arms, ammunition and equipment for theentire Nepalese Army’. However, this understanding was annulled in deference to the

popular sensitivity to the issue in Nepal in 1969.Lal Bahadur Shastri, who succeeded Nehru as prime minister, had to confront a

direct military assault from Pakistan in 1965. He led the country successfully outof the war, but did not live long enough to effect any changes in India’s foreign or neighbourhood policy. Nevertheless, he proved through words and deeds that nationalsecurity interests would be paramount while dealing with Pakistan and China. Given

India’s economic and defence vulnerabilities, Shastri was pragmatic enough to acceptSoviet mediation in Indo-Pak relations. In the aftermath of China’s nuclear test in1964, he continued with the policy of keeping India’s nuclear option open while




seeking international guarantees against a nuclear China. He made a modest attemptto institutionalise foreign policy making by setting up a policy planning divisionin the MEA. However, he continued with the Nehruvian approach towards India’sneighbours.

India doctrine: no to external influence

Indira Gandhi, who succeeded Shastri, lived up to her character as the ‘boss-lady’,49

and her policy towards the neighbouring countries was certainly more assertive thanthat of her predecessors. She was more concerned than Nehru about external influ-ence in the region. She took note of the changes taking place in the regional securityenvironment, especially the Sino-Pakistan strategic relations since the early 1960s and the Sino-US rapprochement which started in 1971, and signed a strategic agreementwith the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in August 1971 to counter these challenges. She felt that India did not dilute its strategic autonomy in any manner

through this treaty. She sent the Indian army into East Pakistan (after being attacked on the western front) in December 1971 and was under great pressure from the Westnot to intervene in East Pakistan. Subsequently, she engaged Pakistan and signed theShimla agreement in July 1972, which emphasised bilateralism in the India–Pakistanrelationship. She went ahead and conducted the nuclear tests in 1974.

Her assertive policies provoked more fear than respect among the neighbours. 50

Although she made it clear in 197251 that India did not want to carve out any ‘spheresof influence’ or erect any ‘cordon sanitaire’ around itself, political analysts at homeand abroad interpreted her policy as the ‘India doctrine’ (some even called it the Indiradoctrine),52 a ‘Brahmanic framework of power’53 or a ‘regional Monroe doctrine’.54

Interpretations aside, Indira’s image as a ‘tough and unbending politician’ sometimesmakes analysts overlook the pragmatic side of her personality— her show of flexibilityat Shimla in 1972, her position on the Kachativu islands in 1974 and her readiness todeal with Zia-ul-Haq, the military dictator. She also helped the Sri Lankan governmentin putting down a Marxist rebellion in 1971.

Indira was caught up in the whirlpool of domestic politics and lost much of her shine in foreign policy matters during 1974–1977. The Janata government, whichcame to power in 1977, advocated a friendly and accommodative policy towards theneighbours. India signed a five-year river water-sharing treaty with Bangladesh in1977. Vajpayee, the then foreign minister, visited Pakistan in 1978 and revived bilateral

contacts. Agreements on trade, cultural exchanges and communication were signed.India also showed its readiness to accept the Nepalese demand to sign separate treatieson trade and transit in 1978. Indira Gandhi, then out of power, took exception to such

policies and held that the Janata government was so craven that even small states likeBhutan demanded a revision of the treaty it had signed with India. After coming back to power in 1979, Indira went ahead with her policy of assertion on one level and readiness for bilateral negotiations on the other.

Rajiv Gandhi: dealing with defiance?

After Indira’s assassination, her son, Rajiv Gandhi, rode a sympathy wave to secure

a brute majority in the 1984 elections. He took the ‘India doctrine’ forward towardsthe close of the Cold War years. Interestingly, despite India’s relative prominence inthe region following the 1971 war with Pakistan, both Nepal and Bhutan demanded a




review of their respective treaties with India and asserted their independence in sev-eral ways during the 1970s and 1980s.55 Nepalese defiance prompted Rajiv Gandhi’sgovernment to take measures which hurt Nepal immensely. India refused to renew the1978 trade and transit treaties with Nepal in 1989 and closed all but two of its 17 border transit points, leading to shortages of fuel, salt, cooking oil, food and other essentialcommodities imported from India. In addition, this policy strengthened the popular movement against the King and acted as a catalyst to Nepal’s transition to democracyin 1990.

Rajiv wanted to make a new beginning with Pakistan and China. His visit toChina (19–23 December 1988), the first by an Indian prime minister in 34 years,marked a new beginning in India–China relations. He made attempts to improve theIndia–Pakistan relationship, but a routine exercise by the Indian army (November 1986–March 1987), code named ‘Operation Brasstacks’, led to a lot of bilateral ten-sion as Pakistan responded by mobilising its forces close to the international border.Rajiv and Zia-ul-Haq defused the crisis through the famous ‘cricket diplomacy’. It was

around this time that Pakistan strategically leaked the information about its nuclear capability. After Zia’s death in a crash in August 1988, Rajiv sought to improve India– Pakistan relations by closer engagement with the democratic dispensation headed byBenazir Bhutto, and in December 1988 went to Islamabad and signed an important

bilateral agreement on non-attack of nuclear installations. The beginning of militancyin Kashmir around this time came in the way of sustaining the process of normalisation.

Rajiv deviated from Indira’s approach towards Sri Lanka and tried to work withJayawardane on the ethnic issue. When the latter insisted on a military solution to theethnic problem, Rajiv decided to intervene in May/June 1987 and forced Jayawardaneto sign the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord to resolve the ethnic issue in Sri Lanka. Such

a muscular neighbourhood policy led analysts to argue that he was a Bonaparte in themaking.56 Rajiv was also concerned about foreign military and intelligence presence inSri Lanka and through an exchange of letters preceding the accord, Sri Lanka pledged to take care of India’s security concerns and prohibit the military use of its territory

by any country in a manner prejudicial to India’s interests. Subsequently, India acted promptly to avert a coup in Maldives in November 1988, which in a way established India’s status as a regional superpower.57

The post-Rajiv period

Following a change of government in India and the success of the democratic move-ment in Nepal in the early 1990s, the relationship between the two countries improved.The non-Congress coalition government of V.P. Singh (especially his foreign minister,I.K. Gujral) adopted a relatively moderate policy towards Nepal and normal trade rela-tions were restored. However, in view of Nepal’s reluctance to be sensitive to India’ssecurity concerns, India’s approach largely remained the same, i.e., tighten the screwsif Nepalese policy ran counter to Indian interests, and create and nurture pro-Indiaconstituencies within Nepal.

The coalition government of V.P. Singh did not last long. The Congress-led coali-tion came to power in the 1991 elections. Sufficient attention has not been paid tothe fact that Rajiv fell to LTTE assassins because of his policy on the ethnic issue in

Sri Lanka. The LTTE was paranoid that Rajiv’s return to power could lead to a moreaggressive policy vis-à-vis the LTTE. The subsequent Congress-led coalition govern-ment, under the prime ministership of P.V. Narasimha Rao, adopted a policy of more




or less benign neglect with regard to Pakistan and sought to bring about significantshifts in India’s overall foreign policy orientation. Rao was the first prime minister toestablish diplomatic ties with Israel and build on Rajiv’s overtures to China, and hefashioned his Look East policy to establish ties with the fast developing economies of South East Asia.

Gujral doctrine and beyond

The successive coalition governments of Deve Gowda (June 1996–April 1997) and I.K. Gujral (April 1997–March 1998) had short stints but they introduced significantchanges in India’s neighbourhood policy. I.K. Gujral, who had generated some trustamong the neighbours during his earlier stint as foreign minister in V.P. Singh’s gov-ernment (1989–1990),58 served as foreign minister in the Deve Gowda cabinet. Hehandled the water issue with Bangladesh and Nepal with caution.59 Gujral’s policyof non-reciprocal accommodation led to the signing of a 30-year treaty between India

and Bangladesh on December 12, 1996. He even ensured Bhutanese consent for thedigging of a canal from a Bhutanese river to augment the flow of water into the Gangaand revised the controversial Mahakali treaty, which was well received in Nepal.

This policy of accommodation was termed the ‘Gujral doctrine’ by some analysts.60

In his famous Chatham House address in June 1996, and later at the BandaranaikeCentre for International Studies (BCIS), Colombo, on January 20, 1997, Gujral laid out five points that defined his policy towards the neighbours and in a way reflected the

persisting security concerns of India.61 Much of what the Indian foreign office has tosay about India’s neighbourhood policy later was contained in this particular address,where he said:

A peaceful, stable and constructive environment in our neighbourhood is vital for usas we pursue the goals of accelerated development for ourselves and the region . . .I would stress that our hand of friendship will always be stretched out to our neighbours.We are ready to work to build up confidence and establish cooperation in all facets of our relationships.

Interestingly, Pakistan did not feature in the list of countries Gujral identified inhis later speech as being fit for non-reciprocal treatment. Noorani, a perceptive analystof South Asian politics, terms such measures ‘cosmetic’ and ‘deceptive’62 and saysthat the Gujral doctrine excluded Pakistan and was thus not a wholehearted effort to

generate trust with the neighbours.Some analysts hold that Gujral was unable to bring about any change primarily because of his inability to ‘convert the foreign policy bureaucracy’, which was firmlywedded to the principles of security, national interests and major power status at theglobal level, ‘to the basic art of friendliness’. It was alleged that mandarins of theforeign office were more comfortable with Rajiv Gandhi’s language of ‘hegemonic

power’ than ‘Gujral’s language of friendship and détente’.63

The Vajpayee government

The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government (1998–2004),64 headed by Atal

Bihari Vajpayee, pledged to work towards a ‘strong India’ that was recognised asan ‘autonomous power centre in the world’ and to stop ‘bending under pressure’ toneighbouring countries and big powers. In the official pronouncements of this timeone detects echoes of the Gujral doctrine urging neighbours to shed their inhibitions




and ‘participate in India’s economy, rather than be apprehensive about it’65 and work towards a South Asia ‘unshackled from historical divisions, and bound together incollective pursuit of peace and prosperity’.66

Vajpayee spent more energy in shaping India’s relationship with Pakistan than withany other state in the neighbourhood. He undertook his famous bus journey to Lahorein February 1999 and visited the Minar-e-Pakistan, which had tremendous significancein the sense that it was interpreted as the right-wing BJP’s acceptance of Pakistan asa sovereign entity. His Lahore initiative suffered a setback due to the Kargil misad-venture in May–June 1999. Later, he initiated talks on Kashmir with Musharraf whocame to power in October 1999 despite his role in Kargil and the terrorist attacks onthe Indian parliament in December 2001. In fact, he called off almost a year-long mas-sive army deployment along the Indo-Pak border (‘Operation Parakram’), which had followed the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament, in October 2002 to start the pro-cess of a structured dialogue with Pakistan from January 2004. The activation of a

back channel by this government was also an innovative way of approaching the out-

standing issues between India and Pakistan. The NDA government could perhaps notdevote as much attention to other neighbours because it was preoccupied with other issues. Nevertheless, it tried to extend the hand of friendship to the government of Khaleda Zia in Bangladesh, overlooking the post-electoral violence committed againstthe Hindu minorities in 2001. It was during this period that the neighbourhood received its due attention from the strategic community.

The UPA government

The United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government led by the Congress party, since

May 2004, has continued with the policy of inviting the neighbours to share the eco-nomic prosperity of India. It has laid emphasis on connectivity and the building of mutually beneficial relations with neighbours and showed its enthusiasm to deepenintra-regional trade and to enhance the prosperity of the South Asian region ‘throughsocial development and regional economic integration’.67

The first five years of the UPA government were marked by efforts to deal withthe neighbours in a prudent manner. The government adapted the peace process withPakistan and took it forward despite grave provocations by Pakistan-sponsored ter-rorists. It also dealt with the longstanding demand of the Bhutanese government for revision of the 1949 treaty and duly revised it in 2008 with the Bhutanese commit-

ment to remain mindful of Indian security concerns. It also played a role in the processof political transformation in Nepal and facilitated the comprehensive peace agree-ment of 2006 which brought the Maoists into the political mainstream.68 The UPAgovernment’s decision to enter into framework agreements with Bangladesh and theMaldives, as well as an important strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan in2011, is indicative of its intent to smoothen its relationship with most of its neighboursat the bilateral level. The areas of engagement identified in these agreements indi-cate India’s interest in economic, developmental and security cooperation with itsneighbours.

The neoliberal turn?The regional political and security dynamics have changed considerably since the early1990s. These have brought about visible changes in India’s foreign policy. Raja Mohan,




in his much acclaimed book Crossing the Rubicon, analyses this transformation of India’s world view since the end of the Cold War and explains how India took the pathof economic liberalisation, shed its anti-West, Third World outlook and repositioned itself in the world as an important global actor.69

Today, a more self-confident India no longer considers American or Western influ-ence in the region as detrimental to its interests. The neo-liberal emphasis on buildingmutual economic interdependencies has become the hallmark of India’s foreign pol-icy. This is reflected in India’s neighbourhood policy as well. India has overcome itsearlier inhibitions about SAARC and sought to use it effectively to promote regionaleconomic cooperation/integration. Without being upset by the negative role played byPakistan within SAARC, India has encouraged other regional and sub-regional initia-tives (BIMSTEC, IORC etc.). At the bilateral level, it has also entered into economiccooperation agreements with other countries in the region like Sri Lanka, Bhutan,

Nepal and Bangladesh. However, this change in India’s approach has largely goneunreciprocated and unnoticed.

While it is true that India is less sensitive to Western presence in the region, inrecent years there has been a growing concern in the country about China’s effortsto establish closer political and economic ties with India’s neighbours. Even if Chinadismisses such concerns, its reaction to the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal indicatesthat it will seek to expand its relationship with all countries in the region (includingIndia), without bothering about Indian sensitivities. While India has agreed to increase

bilateral trade with China from $60 billion in 2010 to about $100 billion by 2015,it is faced with a challenge to convince its neighbours that it is in their interest towork together to bring collective prosperity to the region through greater cooperationrather than waste their energy in playing the China card against India. It is a challenge

that Indian diplomacy has to grapple with in the coming days if it wants to retain its pre-eminence in the region and protect its security interests.

Concluding observations

The broad inferences drawn from the above discussion suggest that India has dealtwith its neighbours in an ad hoc fashion, allowing the relationship to be conducted on a country-by-country basis. It has to evolve a long-term, forward-looking visionfor the region and adopt a strategy spelling out its priorities and concerns clearly and openly declaring its expectations from its neighbours. This will help India in engaging

its neighbours more meaningfully.Security concerns have dominated India’s policy towards its neighbours. That iswhy India has followed a realistic policy vis-à-vis its neighbours, which is often con-trary to the ideals enunciated by its leaders in the realm of foreign policy. This has

been occasioned by its experience of direct military conflicts in the past, the existentialthreat of terrorism directed against it from within its immediate neighbourhood as wellas its sensitivity to external influences in the region.

India’s presence is so huge that it is likely to evoke fear among its neighbours unlessIndia adopts a proactive diplomacy vis-à-vis its neighbours. Its diplomacy has not sofar matched its size, capability and intentions and has failed to inspire the necessaryconfidence in its neighbours to deal with India as a friend and not as a power eternally

planning to subjugate them.India has to make use of its soft power and devise an innovative as well as coop-

erative economic agenda to convince its smaller neighbours of the advantages of




cooperating with India. The economic content of India’s foreign and neighbourhood policy has increased substantially over the last decade. However, the complex interdependencies being built up by the growing economic ties among the countries have notdispelled the fear of India in the neighbourhood. Each country in the neighbourhood has a constituency that is opposed to the idea of friendship with India. The perceptionof India as a bully and as a hegemonic power dominates the discourse. Due care hasto be taken to disseminate relevant information relating to the benefits of cooperation,and especially India’s initiatives in this regard.

Unresolved political issues (border disputes, differences over sharing/managingthe global commons, connectivity promotion, energy cooperation, etc.) tend to vitiatethe atmosphere of good neighbourliness in the region. India has managed to establishsound economic ties with Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh (especially under the

present Hasina regime) but basic suspicions about Indian intent and popular antipathytowards India remain in each of the states, mainly due to unsettled political issues.India has to take proactive steps (through active diplomatic engagement) to minimise

such areas of divergence and potential conflict and resolve less contentious ones.India’s neighbours have felt more comfortable dealing with non-Congress govern-

ments than Congress governments in the past. The dynamics may change only if thelatter makes an effort to generate a domestic consensus on India’s approach to theneighbourhood and fashions a policy in active consultation with all political parties.It has to be recognised that India’s immediate geographical neighbours pose particu-lar problems because of the cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious overlaps betweenIndia and its neighbours, with the same ethnic groups straddling political borders and sharing a common history. Tackling these problems is not just a foreign policy issuefor India. As the government’s experience on the Teesta water-sharing agreement with

Bangladesh showed recently, it has important domestic dimensions as well.The demographic pressures, i.e., the youth bulge and urbanisation, are compelling

states to look for external help to build infrastructure, augment economic activity and boost development at all levels. This will naturally provide an opportunity for extra-regional powers to enter the neighbourhood on the pretext of development and extend their strategic influence. In order to retain its influence, India has to think seriouslyin terms of investing in developmental projects in the neighbourhood to convince oth-ers of its intent to bring peace and prosperity to the entire region. India must play a

proactive role in multilateral regional bodies like SAARC, BIMSTEC and IORC togenerate regional consensus on issues of common concern which will involve security

and economic development and help change negative perceptions about India in theneighbourhood.At the political level, the neighbourhood has not received the kind of response it

deserves in India. There is a need to sustain linkages at the political level, both withinfluential political parties and personalities in the neighbourhood. High-level visitsfrom the Indian side must take place on a regular basis, as without these the neighboursnaturally feel neglected. By appointing a special envoy to focus on neighbourhood issues and undertaking a periodic review of Indian diplomacy in the neighbourhood,India can highlight its benign intentions in a sustained manner.

Indian interest in the neighbourhood has been rather sporadic, driven either bycritical internal developments in neighbouring countries or the growing influence of

some external power. In the absence of any innovative measures, the existing problemsencountered by India in the neighbourhood may worsen, given the persisting antipathy




towards India in almost every country in the region. Therefore, there is a need to evolvean overarching policy framework to guide India’s relationship with its neighbours.

This will necessitate a clear and unambiguous articulation of its non-negotiable positions in matters concerning its security and national interests. Simultaneously, itmust find ways of enabling its neighbours to participate profitably in India’s economy.India’s vision of an integrated South Asian economic union needs to be fleshed out and made an important constituent of its neighbourhood policy. Enabling measures towardsthis end, such as improved communication, physical connectivity and people-to-peoplecontacts, must be unilaterally promoted and catered for. In all this, India has to move

beyond rhetoric and prove that it really means what it says.

Notes

1. Address by Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao at Harvard on ‘India’s Global Role’,September 20, 2010, at http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id =550316512

2. See Annual Report 2004–2005, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, p. 1.3. Already, Afghanistan (ranked 6th), Pakistan (10th), Myanmar (16th), Bangladesh (24th), Sri

Lanka (25th) and Nepal (26th) are seen as fragile or even failing states in global surveys (Failed States Index Scores 2010 by Fund for Peace).

4. This was done most recently on June 29, 2011, when he stated that the ‘. . . neighbourhood wor-ries me a great deal, quite frankly’. For details, see http://www.outlookindia.com/printarticle.aspx?277433.

5. ‘Excerpts of Address by the PM at the Combined Commanders’ Conference’, September 13,2010, in New Delhi. For details, see http://pmindia.nic.in/speech/content.asp?id =957

6. As reported in the Times of India, December 30, 2010, at http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-12-30/india/28244159_1_maoists-foreign-minister-political-understanding.

7. Association of Indian Diplomats, India’s South Asian Neighbours: The Options for

Comprehensive Engagement , Printocraft, New Delhi, 2003, p. 19.8. Such a view is offered by Manisha Gunasekera, ‘“Geostrategic Neoliberalism” and India’s New Neighbourhood Policy: Examining the Geopolitical Drivers of the Indo-Lanka Free TradeAgreement’, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, 2007, at http://oaithesis.eur.nl/ir/repub/asset/7182/Manisha%20Gunasekera%20IPED.pdf .

9. Teresita C. Schaffer and Howard B. Schaffer, ‘Better Neighbors?: India and South AsianRegional Politics’, SAIS Review, 18(1), 1998, pp. 109–121. They say that ‘generations of diplo-mats of other South Asian countries have complained in private to outsiders that their Indiancounterparts act as if they were the inheritors of the British raj’.

10. They go to the extent of arguing that ‘Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and the Maldives have been free to independently pursue their own international roles and project their own identities, provided they did not offer to outside powers an opportunity to play a significant political or security role. They were otherwise under no obligation to toe India’s line in either foreign or domestic policy’. Ibid.

11. David Malone, Does the Elephant Dance: Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011; Rajiv Kumar and Raja Menon, The Long View from Delhi,Academic Foundation, Delhi, 2011; Rajiv Kumar and Santosh Kumar, In the National Interests:

A Strategic Foreign Policy for India, Academic Foundation, Delhi, 2010; Teresita Schaffer, India and the US in the 21st Century: Reinventing Partnership, CSIS Press, Washington, 2009.

12. U.S. Bajpai, India and its Neighbourhood , Lancer International, New Delhi, 1986.13. J.N. Dixit, India’s Foreign Policy and Its Neighbours, Gyan Books, New Delhi, 2001.14. Association of Indian Diplomats, India’s South Asian Neighbours: The Options for

Comprehensive Engagement , Printocraft, New Delhi, 2003. This makes a plea for developing aframework for neighbourhood policy. However, the discussion in the book takes up individualcountries and identifies the issues affecting their bilateral relations with India.

15. I.P. Khosla (ed.), Spotlight on Neighbours: Talks at the IIC , Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd, New Delhi, 2008. This provides a useful discussion on India’s bilateral relationships with allcountries.

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16. Rajiv Sikri, Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India’s Foreign Policy, Sage Publications, NewDelhi, 2009.

17. S.D. Muni, ‘India and Its Neighbour: Persisting Dilemmas and New Opportunities’, International Studies, 30(2), 1993.

18. S.D. Muni, ‘Problem Areas in India’s Neighbourhood Policy’, South Asian Survey, 10(2), 2003.

19. C. Raja Mohan, ‘India’s Neighbourhood Policy: Four Dimensions’, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal , 2(1), 2007.20. Ibid., p. 23. He would suggest that India needs to shun its soft image and ‘firmly and unam-

biguously, define for its neighbours the goalposts of India’s non-negotiable national interests’.Ibid., p. 285.

21. Jagat S. Mehta, Negotiating for India: Resolving Problems through Diplomacy, Manohar, NewDelhi, 2006, pp. 24–25.

22. Ibid., p. 25.23. Muni, ‘Problem Areas’, pp. 187–188.24. Kanwal Sibal, address (while he was foreign secretary) at IFRI, Paris, on December 17, 2002,

at http://www.outlookindia.com/printarticle.aspx?218365. ‘India and Its Neighbours’, Indian Defence Review, 25(1), 2010, at http://www.indiandefencereview.com/geopolitics/India-and-its-neighbours-.html.

25. Shyam Saran, ‘India and Its Neighbours’, Talk given at India International Centre, February 14,2005, at http://idsa.in/node/1555; ‘Does India Have a Neighbourhood Policy?’, Talk given atICWA, September 9, 2006, at http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id =550311843.

26. He argued that ‘[v]irtually all our neighbours, by choice or default, by acts of commission or omission, compulsions of geography and the terrain, have been or are involved in receiving,sheltering, overlooking or tolerating terrorist activities from their soil directed against India’.Kanwal Sibal’s address (while he was foreign secretary), IFRI, December 17, 2002.

27. K. Subrahmanyam, ‘India and Its Neighbours: A Conceptual Framework of Peaceful Co-existence’, in U.S. Bajpai, India and its Neighbourhood , p. 136.

28. Saran, ‘India and Its Neighbours’.29. Nehru, quoted in A. Appadorai, ‘India’s Foreign Policy’, International Affairs (Royal Institute

of International Affairs 1944–), 25(1), 1949, p. 38.

30. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, Publications Division, Delhi, pp. 2–3.31. G.S. Bajpai, ‘Ethical Stand on World Issues: Cornerstone of India’s Foreign Policy’, The Hindu,

26 January 1950, reproduced in S.P. Verma and K.P. Mishra, Foreign Policies in South Asia,Orient Longmans, New Delhi, 1969, pp. 91–96.

32. Paul F. Power, ‘Ideological Currents in India’s Foreign Policies’, in K.P. Misra (ed.), India’s Foreign Policy, pp. 21–36.

33. In response to criticism of his policy as idealistic, Nehru stated in parliament: ‘Idealism is therealism of tomorrow. It is the capacity to know what is good for the day after tomorrow, or nextyear and to fashion yourself accordingly. The practical person, the realist, looks at the tip of thenose and sees little beyond; the result is that he is tumbling all the time’, Nehru, India’s Foreign

Policy, p. 51.34. Acharya J.B. Kripalani argued that Nehru set the principles so high that it was difficult on his

part to conform to them. To quote Kripalani: ‘There is always a danger in overemphasizingmoral and ideological principles in international affairs . . . Moral platitudes can be mouthed by politicians once in a while, but if they are repeated frequently, without appropriate action, their authors cannot escape the charge of hypocrisy’. See his article, ‘For Principled Neutrality: A New Appraisal of Indian Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, October 1959.

35. It is fashionable to criticise India’s non-alignment policy today, when the strategic environmenthas changed significantly with the end of the Cold War. However, Indian public opinion con-tinues to emphasise the need for India to exercise ‘strategic autonomy’ in foreign policy, whichwas a basic element of non-alignment. In fact, the governments of the day have been at painsto stress that the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal did not compromise the strategic autonomy of India.

36. Since the 1990s, especially after the end of the Cold War, when India liberalised itseconomy and invited foreign capital, the Nehruvian economic agenda has been revised to

suit the needs of the changing times. Achin Vanaik wrote about the neoliberal turn inhis article ‘Post Cold War Indian Foreign Policy’, Seminar , January 2008. Sanjaya Baru,Manmohan Singh’s ex-media adviser, dwelt on this issue in his article ‘In a Time of




Wave Change, Indian Foreign Policy Stands’, in The Jakarta Globe, March 31, 2009. KantiBajpai also advocates this view in his writings and has held that India’s growth in power calls for a rethink of strategic policies. See, for instance, Kanti Bajpai, ‘India’s Growthin Power Calls for a Rethink of Strategic Policies’, The Independent , February 26, 2010,at http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/professor-kanti-bajpai-indias-growth-

in-power-calls-for-a-rethink-of-strategic-policies-1911098.html.37. Desai reportedly criticised Nehru’s daughter for not following Nehru’s policies: ‘Her father never became subservient to anybody, but she has done so. When she signed a treaty withRussia and not one with America also, this was not proper’. This struck favourable chordselsewhere. Carter, for example, said on the eve of his visit to India in the new year of 1978 thatit was a country ‘that in recent years has turned perhaps excessively toward the Soviet Union, but under the leadership of Prime Minister Desai is moving back toward us and assuming a good role of, I would say, neutrality, and we have a strong friendship with India’ (emphasisadded). Both Desai and Carter have been quoted in A.G. Noorani, ‘Foreign Policy of the JanataParty Government’, Asian Affairs, 5(4), 1978, pp. 216–228.

38. Cited in A.G. Noorani, ‘India’s Foreign Policy’, Asian Affairs, 6(4), 1979, p. 231.39. For a detailed discussion, see Sreeram S. Chaulia, ‘BJP, India’s Foreign Policy and the “Realist

Alternative” to the Nehruvian Tradition’, International Politics, 39, 2002, pp. 215–234.

40. The borders of India were shaped mostly during the British period through a series of treaties,which were signed essentially to safeguard British India’s security and commercial interests.The British signed agreements with Nepal (Sigauli Treaty, 1816), Bhutan, Tibet, Burma and Afghanistan (1893). They were very often compromises of convenience, made in specific geo-strategic and regional security environments. Many were continued and have created problemsfor India. Nehru adopted British policy towards India’s neighbours and in the process inherited the problems associated with them.

41. A perceptive analyst of the British Indian government’s policy, Madhavi Yasin, writes: ‘thesecurity of the kingdom [was assured if it were] surrounded by a ring of territories with which powerful neighbours must not meddle. [As per this] principle . . . [for] the security of the Indiandominion . . . border states adjoining India were taken as protectorates whether they desired itor not.’ For details, see Madhavi Yasin, India’s Foreign Policy: The Dufferin Years, pp. 68–117.

42. The India–Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed on July 31, 1950 (on the eveof China’s attack on Tibet in October 1950) and it was followed by an exchange of letterswhich defined the security relations between the two. It held that ‘neither government shalltolerate any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor’. The treaty (Article 2) alsoobligated both countries ‘to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding withany neighbouring state likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations . . . between the twogovernments’.

43. K. Subrahmanyam, ‘Asian Balance of Power in the 1970s: An Indian View’, IDSA Paper,Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, 1968, p. 28.

44. It is pertinent to mention here that the friendship treaty signed between India and Bhutanon August 8, 1949 had provisions which mirrored the colonial arrangement whereby Bhutanwould ‘be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations’(Article 2).

45. Statement in Lok Sabha, August 28, 1959. Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy, p. 339.46. The talks and exchange of letters between him and Liaquat Ali Khan (1950–1951), Muhammad

Ali (prime minister of Pakistan April 17, 1953–August 12, 1955) during June–September 1954,negotiations with Feroze Khan Noon (prime minister of Pakistan December 16, 1957–7 October 1958) on September 12, 1958, as well as the seven rounds of Bhutto–Swaran Singh talks during1963–1964, bear testimony to Nehru’s keenness for an amicable solution through dialogue.

47. In his letter to US president John F. Kennedy in October–November 1962, seeking military help, Nehru indirectly refers to the India–Pakistan squabble over Kashmir: ‘The Chinese threat as ithas developed involves not merely the survival of India, but the survival of free and independentGovernments in the whole of this sub-Continent or in Asia. The domestic quarrels regardingsmall areas or territorial borders between the countries in this sub-Continent or in Asia haveno relevance whatever in the context of the developing Chinese invasion.’ Quoted in Inder

Malhotra, ‘Letters from the Darkest Hour’, Indian Express, November 17, 2010, at http://www.indianexpress.com/news/letters-from-the-darkest-hour/712359/0.

48. K.M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1945.

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49. Life, March 16, 1959, p. 75.50. When Indira came back to power in 1980, one leading Indian journal titled its discussion on

Indira’s foreign policy on the editorial page as ‘Nervous Neighbours’ ( Economic and Political Weekly, 15(10), 1980, p. 490).

51. Indira Gandhi, ‘India and the World’, Foreign Affairs, October 1972, pp. 65–77.

52. Bhabani Sen Gupta, ‘The Indian Doctrine’, India Today, August 31, 1983.53. Aniruddha Gupta, ‘A Brahmanic Framework of Power in South Asia’, Economic and Political Weekly, 25(4), 1990, p. 712.

54. Analysts like C. Raja Mohan would argue that Nehru was the founder of the regional Monroedoctrine. See his article, ‘Beyond India’s Monroe Doctrine’, January 2, 2003, at http://www.thehindu.com/2003/01/02/ stories/2003010200981000.htm. Also see Devin T. Hagerty,‘India’s Regional Security Doctrine’, Asian Survey, 31(4), 1991, pp. 351–363. However, schol-ars like Surjit Mansingh and Raju G.C. Thomas had contested this view and held that Indianever articulated her regional policy as a regional Monroe doctrine and its policy was marked by ‘flexibility and ambivalence’. Surjit Mansingh, India’s Search for Power: Indira Gandhi’s Foreign Policy, 1966–1982, Sage, New Delhi, 1984, p. 292; and Raju G.C. Thomas, IndianSecurity Policy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1986, p. 14.

55. Nepal violated the 1950 treaty provisions by issuing work permits to Indians (despite its

treaty commitments to treat them on an equal footing with the citizens of Nepal), imposinga 55 per cent tariff on Indian products and purchasing arms from China.

56. Bhabani Sen Gupta, ‘A Bonaparte in the Making?’, Economic and Political Weekly, 23(1/2),1988, pp. 11–12d.

57. Dilip Bobb, ‘Cautious Optimism’, India Today, August 31, 1987, p. 69.58. A leading political analyst had hailed Gujral’s approach during his first stint as a welcome

departure from earlier policies: ‘Gujral is a very friendly person, willing to listen, soft-spoken,and capable of establishing vibrations of give and take with his counterparts . . . [his] languageof foreign policy is homespun and . . . he is able to relate global change to thrusts of Indian for-eign policy’. Bhabani Sen Gupta, ‘Supping with Neighbours’, Economic and Political Weekly,March 10, 1990.

59. The 1977 treaty on water sharing (after extensions in 1982 and 1985) had lapsed in 1988 and

negotiations could not succeed because of inflexibility on both sides.60. Bhabani Sen Gupta, ‘India in the Twenty First Century’, International Affairs, 73(2), 1997,

pp. 308–309.61. The five principles were: (i) with its neighbours like Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal

and Sri Lanka, India does not ask for reciprocity, but gives and accommodates what it canin good faith and trust; (ii) no South Asian country should allow its territory to be used against the interests of another country of the ; (iii) none should interfere in the internal affairsof another; (iv) all South Asian countries must respect each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; and (v) they should settle all their disputes through peaceful bilateral negotia-tions. I.K. Gujral, ‘Aspects of India’s Foreign Policy’, speech at the Bandaranaike Center for International Studies (BCIS) in Colombo, Sri Lanka, on January 20, 1997, at http://as.stimson.org/southasia/?sn=sa20020116302.

62. A.G. Noorani, ‘Of Indo-Bangladesh Distrust’, Frontline, 18(17), 2001, at http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1817/18170730.htm.

63. Ibid., p. 477.64. It had to contend with the after-effects of the nuclear tests of 1998, which had subjected India to

international opprobrium. It had to engage with other issues like the Kargil attacks, OperationParakram, etc.

65. See, for instance, Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s address at the Third SAARC Information Ministers’Conference, November 11, 2003, at http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id =55037313.

66. Speech by External Affairs Minister Ashanti Sunhat at Harvard University, September 29, 2003,at http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id =55037013.

67. Opening Remarks by Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao at the 38th Session of theSAARC Standing Committee at Thimpu, February 6, 2011, at http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart. php?id =550317143.

68. However, critics argue that this trend was sustained during the second UPA government, whichcould be due to domestic reasons, i.e., the change in the composition of the coalition. Left

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parties as alliance partners in the earlier coalition had played a crucial role in the govern-ment’s policy. Since they pulled out of the alliance, the government’s policies have been lessaccommodative of the Maoists.

69. C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy , PalgraveMacmillan, 2004.

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