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© G20040302
NCA COVID-19 Outbreak Control Process And Management
Background Between 10 – 20% of COVID-19 infections are thought to occur as a result of healthcare. Healthcare onset COVID-19 infection (HOCI) are associated with increased harm and mortality and reducing these is a clear patient safety issue. Early identification of increased incidences of infection and outbreaks are key components in reducing HOCI and are central to understanding COVID-19 transmission within healthcare , providing transparency on performance and supporting a focus on the culture of continuous improvement. The purpose of the document is to provide a clear process to aid the identification, management and reporting of HOCI cases. The process set out in this document must be adhered to ensuring that:
Outbreaks of COVID-19 are identified rapidly and managed according to national guidance
Patient Safety Incident Analysis or alternative investigation process, for post day 8 and day 15 are completed, with lessons learned identified and shared
COVID-19 cases are reported accurately via the daily covid sitrep for both patients and staff
Processes for management of COVID 19 cases are in line with national guidance
All potential outbreaks are escalated to the North West Incident Coordination Centre (ICC) via daily sit rep reporting (Appendix 6). Outbreak procedures in line with COVID guidance should be followed
Processes for management of COVID 19 cases are in line with national guidance
All actions are logged with completion dates
Identifying HOCI Although there are technically three categories for determining potential healthcare acquired cases, for the purposes of defining an outbreak NHSI/E advise that only probable and definite cases of HOCI will be considered as below:
1. Healthcare-Onset Probable Healthcare-Associated (HO-pHA) – First positive specimen date 8-14 days after admission to trust
2. Healthcare-Onset Definite Healthcare-Associated (HO-dHA) – First positive specimen date 15 or more days after admission to trust.
Each case falling within these categories will undergo a rapid Root Cause Analysis (rRCA – Appendix 2) to establish how the transmission has occurred, whether there are any other linked cases that might indicate ongoing transmission, and to establish and share learning. . Identifying an Outbreak of HOCI
An outbreak of HOCI is defined as two or more cases occurring within the same ward/ environment within 14 days of each other
The outbreak control process must be initiated when two or more cases are identified
NCA COVID-19 OUTBREAK CONTROL PROCESS AND MANAGEMENT
If two patients in a ward test positive the whole ward (both patients and staff) should be tested for COVID-19. If a healthcare worker tests positive for COVID-19, contacts should be determined and the colleagues who they have had significant contact with should be identified and tested. (Appendix 4). For management of an outbreak of HOCI please see (Appendix 3). COVID-19 is a notifiable organism and as such Public Health England (PHE) is made aware via laboratory reporting as routine. PHE and the senior leadership teams of the NCA should be notified promptly of COVID-19 outbreaks by the NCA IPC team, this will be communicated to the Consultant in Communicable Disease Control (CCDC). In addition, due to the additional pressures of the pandemic, the NCA should escalate information about their outbreaks to the CCG, CQC and NHSE/I as soon as they themselves are aware of them (Appendix 3 and 5). Untoward incident: a single inpatient who develops COVID-19 more than 7 days after admission. Cluster: the detection of unexpected, potentially linked cases. It is important that such cases are appropriately recorded and managed for audit purposes and to support surveillance and any future outbreak management. High prevalence: an above-average number of HOCI cases aggregated over the preceding 4 weeks. Organisations with high prevalence may be required to perform additional testing on request of NHSI/E/PHE. Management of COVID Outbreak Follow established outbreak control methodology for managing an outbreak (Appendix 3), in addition:
A post infection review or rapid RCA is completed on patients where a transmission has occurred (Appendix 2).
Staff contacts will be identified and managed in line with the national and NCA test and trace processes, and local occupational health processes.
Regular outbreak meetings will take place where minutes are recorded and at the end of the outbreak a report is provided, in line with established PHE guidance on outbreak management
There is evidence that the Infection Prevention and Control Board Assurance Framework is completed (organisational responsibility)
There is evidence that the Infection Prevention and Control COVID-19 Management Checklist has been used
Evidence of completed actions are recorded on action plan template, with identified action owners and dates of completion (outbreak meeting minutes, action log and report)
Lessons learned are collated and disseminated within the organisation and regionally
There is evidence that risk assessments have been undertaken for black and minority ethnic (BAME) staff
Governance The national challenge due to COVID-19 requires absolute clarity in the ongoing management and recognition of HOCI incidents. All COVID-19 outbreak incidents must be escalated through the standard organisational governance processes up to Board level. In addition, these incidents will be escalated to NHSE/I via the agreed EPRR command and control arrangements through the Northwest Incident Control Centre (NW ICC) Single Point of Contact (Appendix 3). Outbreaks are then reviewed by a weekly NW governance panel. Organisations identified as high outliers will be contacted and asked to complete further actions. Incident Reporting Cases of HOCI should be reported via the Datix route Serious Incident Reporting Serious incidents can extend beyond incidents that affect patients directly and include incidents, which may indirectly impact patient safety or an organisation’s ability to deliver ongoing healthcare. In terms of Patient safety incident reporting during the COVID-19 Pandemic, organisations should continue to report anything of concern. Clinical and professional judgement should be used when considering what to identify as a Serious Incident (SI). The 2015 SI Framework promotes identification and reporting of SIs based on the potential for learning, future risk reduction and the consequences of any recurrence of the incident. Where there is any evidence that the COVID-19 infection may have been healthcare -acquired and a death from COVID-19 has resulted, this is potentially a Serious Incident if the infection was acquired due to problems in healthcare care provision, such as problems with IPC processes. Whether SJR, RCA or some other method is the right one to generate that learning is dependent on the circumstances and is therefore for local decision. The scale and scope of resultant investigations should be proportionate to ensure resources are effectively used. Organisations will need to be sure that any decision making is defensible and taken openly and transparently, including in discussion with relevant patients’ families and the staff involved.
Appendix 1 Identification of a Case of Healthcare Onset COVID-19 Infection (HOCI)
Identification of a case of HOCI *
Clinical team and IPC team informed. Clinical team conducts a rRCA and
completes a Datix
Any other linked cases identified
2 or more cases = Outbreak Control Process Initiated by IPC
team (Appendix 3)
Senior Leadership Team Informed.
NCA IPC team informs relevant key stakeholders (e.g NHSE/I,
NW ICC, PHE)
No other identified linked cases =
untoward incident. Monitor area closely
and have a low threshold for further suspicion/testing for
COVID-19. Consider other
aspects of patient that may increase the risk of onward transmission from the positive patient such as delirium
and ability to adhere to IPC measures. Discuss with IPC team if additional
risks identified
Management of Positive Patient
Transfer positive patient to single room or COVID-19 positive cohort area.
If patient in a bay with others close bay (ward if Nightingale) to new admissions. This is now a COVID-19 contact. No transfers out to other wards unless to a contact cohort area or urgent clinical lead
Terminal clean of the area required.
All patients now commence 14 days isolation: document start date in all patients’ notes Swab all exposed patients immediately. Re-swab all exposed patients between days 5 to 7 after exposure irrespective of symptoms
Re-swab and isolate any patient who becomes symptomatic within the 14 days isolation.
Re-swab all patients between days 13 to 14.
Bay may re-open once 14 days has elapsed since exposure and no further positive patients
Appendix 2 COVID-19 Rapid Root Cause Analysis (rRCA)
DEMOGRAPHICS
Organisation where Specimen Taken
Ward/area Date of Positive Specimen
Date of Result
Patient identifier
Date of Birth Gender Date of Admission
Screened on admission
Y/N
Reason for Admission
Past medical History
Ethnicity
Date of Discharge/Death COVID on death certificate
COVID infection
Symptoms: Y/N Date started
Cough Y/N Temperature Y/N Anosmia Y/N
Category of Infection:
Probable 8-14 days Healthcare Acquired 14+ days
Risk Factors:
CHRONOLOGY
Patient Journey
Isolation
Date Isolated Treatment
Patient Contacts
Staff Contacts if PPE breached:
Environmental
Cleaning Audit Date Score Hand Hygiene Audit Date Score
Personal Protective Equipment
Audit Y/N Score Compliance Issues
Organisational Issues
Availability of Supplies
Staffing Availability
Bed Capacity
Lessons Learned and Where Learning Shared (e.g safety huddles, meetings etc)
Communication and Escalations
IPCC
PHE
NHSE/I
CQC
Appendix 3 Outbreak Control Process COVID-19
Probable Confirmed
IPC Team Inform Senior
Leadership Team
Convene an Outbreak
Control Group (OCG)
OCG
Collate outbreak timeline and review cases
Review IPC measures and checklist
Advise on outbreak control measures including: -contact tracing -patient testing -staff testing -operational measures (ward closure etc) -cleaning -communications plan -frequency of meetings -re-opening of any closed areas
Identifies and confirms outbreak information submitted to correct source
Declares when outbreak is over (no new cases within 14 days).
Ensures outbreak information is submitted for 28 days as per PHE guidance
OCG Membership
DIPC
DoN
Lead Nurse IC
Consultant Micro
Governance
Clinical leads for area
Clinical/operational manager
Domestic services manager
PHE
Comms team
OH if staff
Co-opted staff members as appropriate
Outbreak Information Required
At outbreak start completed IIMarch* to be sent to DoN IC and once approved to: [email protected] [email protected]
Daily Sit-rep* to : [email protected] [email protected]
Minutes of OCG
Completed IIMarch* once outbreak declared over
Outbreak report summary and learning identified to be presented through Care Organisation Infection Prevention and Control Committees
*Lead Nurse/Outbreak manager responsibility. Sit reps must be submitted no later than 9am daily, 7 days a week for 28 days following commencement of outbreak. If
no outbreaks a nil return must also be made daily.
Management of Outbreak of COVID-19 Patients and/or Staff
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]
Appendix 4 Staff Contact Tracing and Management
Staff notified they are a contact of
a confirmed case in the community by NHS test and trace
Staff notified that they are a contact of a co-worker who is a
confirmed case
Inform their line manager
Self-isolate for 14 days from date of positive contact .
If symptoms develop during this time get tested for COVID-19.
Follow Test and Trace flowchart
above
Wearing PPE?
Any breeches in PPE identified?
Direct Contact: Face to face contact
within 1m for 1 minute or more
Proximity Contact: within 2m of someone
for 15 minutes or more
Yes No
Line manager assess nature of contact
Yes No
No further action
required
14 day self-isolation
period required
14 days over? return to work
if well
Appendix 5 HOCI Escalation Process
NCA identifies HOCI case
Clinical lead completes rRCA
Any other linked cases identified
if 2 or more cases outbreak control
process instigated
Senior leadership team informed.
Relevant stakeholders in
formed (ICC NW/PHE/CCG etc)
Learning disseminated interanlly and
externally
Sit reps submitted
Results reviewed by
NHSE/I
Trusts with outlier staturs
requested review of
information
NCA completes management
checklist
Submit checklist via governance
processes and up to NHSE/I
GM HOCI panel review
information submitted
Appendix 6 COVID-19 Outbreak SitRep
Daily Sit-Rep Date of Report:
Date Outbreak Declared
Care Organisation
Ward/Area
New or Continuous
No Staff Positive this Outbreak
No Staff in Isolation (neg or awaiting test)
No of Patients Positive
No Patients in Isolation (neg or awaiting test
Number Probable HOCI (8-14 Days)
Number Definite HOCI (>15 Days)
Operational Impact (e.g bay closed/ward closed)
Date Outbreak Declared Closed
RAG rating (red/amber/green)
UPDATE or NIL Return delete as appropriate
Nil further to Report Updated
Appendix 7 IIMarch Template for Reporting to ICC NW COVID-19 Outbreak Ward: Care Organisation: Date:
Element Key questions and considerations Action
I Information What, where, when, how, how many, so what, what might?
Timeline and history (if applicable), key facts reported using
M/ETHANE
I Intent Why are we here, what are we
trying to achieve? Strategic aim and objectives, joint
working strategy
M Method How are we going to do it? Command, control and co-
ordination arrangements, tactical and operational policy and plans,
contingency plans
A Administration What is required for effective,
efficient and safe implementation? Identification of commanders, tasking, timing, decision logs, equipment, dress code, PPE,
welfare, food, logistics
R Risk assessment What are the relevant risks, and what measures are required to
mitigate them? Risk assessments (dynamic and analytical) should be shared to
establish a joint understanding of risk.
Risks should be reduced to the lowest reasonably practicable level by taking preventative measures, in
order of priority. Consider the hierarchy of controls.
Consider Decision Controls
C Communications How are we going to initiate and
maintain communications with all partners and interested parties? Radio call signs, other means of
communication, understanding of inter-agency communications,
information assessment, media handling and joint media strategy
H Humanitarian issues What humanitarian assistance and human rights issues arise or may
arise from this event and the response to it?
Requirement for humanitarian assistance, information sharing and
disclosure, potential impacts on individuals’ human rights
Appendix 8 COVID-19 Measures ImplementationChecklist
COVID-19 MEASURES IMPLEMENTATION CHECKLIST
Standard Infection Control Precautions-Applies to all staff, in all care settings Patients, staff and visitors are encouraged to minimise COVID-19 transmission through: • Good hand hygiene and respiratory hygiene • Social distancing wherever possible In addition, all staff are requested to: • Adhere to social distancing, particularly when in non-clinical areas eg during work breaks and in communal areas. • Stagger breaks to limit the density of staff in any one specific area(s).
Patient placement/assessment of risk/cohort area
Comments/notes
Emergency department, admission and waiting areas Patients are triaged rapidly to segregate and maintain separation in space and/or time between possible and confirmed COVID- 19 patients and non-COVID-19 patients. Suspected cases are asked to wear a face mask. There is physical separation of reception staff eg perspex screens. On admission Possible cases (awaiting lab confirmation) and confirmed cases are isolated in a single room with clinical wash hand basin and en-suite facilities. If single rooms are in short supply, priority is given to patients who have excessive cough and sputum production. Single rooms in non-COVID-19 areas are reserved for patients requiring isolation for other (non-influenza-like illness) reasons. Prioritising of patients for isolation other than suspected or confirmed COVID-19 patients is decided locally, based on patient need and local resources. Possible cases (awaiting lab confirmation) should be cohorted separately (ideally in single rooms) until confirmed. Patients with new onset symptoms are isolated immediately and contacts traced. Cohort areas are established for multiple cases of confirmed COVID-19, ideally in a designated, self-contained area. Patients should be separated by at least 2 metres and privacy curtains/screens used between bed spaces to minimise opportunities for close contact. The segregated area is not being used as a thoroughfare by other patients, visitors or staff. Doors to isolation/cohort rooms/areas are closed and signage is clear.
Patient placement is reviewed daily as the care pathway changes
Staff cohorting Dedicated teams of staff are assigned to care for patients in isolation/cohort rooms/areas for their entire shift. There is consistency in staff allocation, reducing movement of staff and the crossover of care pathways between planned and elective care pathways and urgent and emergency care pathways; reducing movement of staff between different areas.
Ensure all patient placement decisions and assessment of infection risk (including isolation requirements) is clearly documented in the patient notes and reviewed throughout inpatient stay
Personal protective equipment (PPE)
General ward All staff working in designated COVID-19 areas routinely wear fluid resistant surgical masks (FRSM). Staff providing direct care within 2 metres of a possible/confirmed case are wearing disposable aprons, gloves, FRSM and eye/face protection, when in the patients’ immediate care environment. Link to PPE table.
High risk areas A filtering facepiece (FFP) respirator gown/coveralls is in place and risk assessed. Where an aerosoal generating procedure (AGP) is a single procedure, PPE is single use.
PPE must be: • Available at point of use and stored in a clean dry area. All staff (clinical and non-clinical): • are trained in putting on and removing PPE. • know what PPE they should wear for each setting and context. • have access to the PPE that protects them for the appropriate setting and context. • perform hand hygiene following removal of PPE. Single/sessional use Gloves and aprons are single use as per standard infection control precautions (SICPs), with disposal after each patient contact, task or procedure. Respiratory and eye/facial protection may be used for a session of work. Gown/coverall may be worn for a session of work in high risk areas
Surgical facemasks All possible/confirmed inpatients wear a surgical facemask (if tolerated and does not compromise clinical care).
Safe management of care equipment
Single-use items are in use where possible. Dedicated, reusable, non-invasive care
equipment is in use and decontaminated between each use and prior to use on another patient. See Routine decontamination of reusable non-invasive patient care equipment flowchart. Fans that re-circulate the air are not in use.
Decontamination of the care environment
Domestic teams are assigned to COVID-19 cohort area/wards. All areas are free from non-essential items and equipment.
Isolation room/cohort area (cleaning of isolation areas is undertaken separately to the cleaning of other clinical areas.)
There is at least twice daily decontamination of the patient isolation room/cohort area, toilet and bathroom and staff areas, including areas where PPE is removed. Manufacturers’ guidance and contact times for cleaning and disinfection products are followed. There is decontamination of ‘Frequently touched’ surfaces at least twice daily and when they are known to be contaminated with secretions/blood/bodily fluids. Frequently touched surfaces include: • Toilets and commodes (particularly if patients have diarrhoea). • Door/toilet handles, locker tops, over bed tables, bed rails, desktops and electronic equipment – eg mobile phones, desk phones and other communication devices, tablets, keyboards; particularly where these are used by used by many people. • Rooms once vacated by staff following AGP (clearance times in isolation room 10-12 ACH wait minimum 20 minutes or single room with 6 ACH wait minimum of 1hr). ‘Terminal’ decontamination is undertaken following transfer, discharge, or once the patient(s) is no longer considered infectious. Communal cleaning trollies are not taken into patient rooms.
Hand hygiene
Staff undertake hand hygiene as per WHO 5 moments, using either an alcohol-based hand rub (ABHR) or soap and water. Hands are dried with soft absorbent, disposable paper towels from a dispenser are available for use to dry hands, located close to handwash sinks and beyond risk of splash contamination. How to wash and dry hands posters are clearly displayed in all public toilets and staff areas. Staff are aware of the importance of skin care.
Movement restrictions/transfer/discharge
Moving patients within healthcare Patients with possible/confirmed COVID are not moved to other wards/departments unless for essential care. If necessary: • Staff at the receiving destination are informed that the patient has possible or confirmed
COVID-19. • Patient is wearing a surgical face mask during transportation. • Patients are taken straight to and returned from clinical departments. • If possible, patients are placed at the end of clinical lists.
Waste
Disposal and transport of all waste related to possible/confirmed cases is classified as Category B clinical waste (orange bag).
Linen
All linen is managed as ‘infectious’ linen. Disposable gloves and apron are worn when handling infectious linen. All linen is handled inside the patient room/cohort area. A laundry receptacle is available as close as possible to the point of use for immediate linen deposit. All linen bags/receptacles are tagged with ward/care area and date. All used/infectious linen is stored in a designated area whilst awaiting collection
Respiratory Hygiene
Patients are supported with hand hygiene and provided with disposable tissues and a waste bag. Symptomatic patients may wear a surgical face mask if tolerated: • In common waiting areas. • During transportation. • In clinical areas. A surgical face mask should not be worn by patients if there is potential for their clinical care to be compromised.
Visitors
Signage regarding any visitor restrictions is clearly visible.
Version 3 - 6 October 2020