National Identity and Anti-Immigrant Attitudes:

The Multiple Patterns in Contemporary Democracies

Richard Johnston The University of British Columbia richard.johnston@ubc.ca

Stuart Soroka

University of Michigan ssoroka@umich.edu

Keith Banting

Queen’s University, Kingston keith.banting@queensu.ca

Will Kymlicka

Queen’s University, Kingston kymlicka@queensu.ca

July 2018

DRAFT: DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE AUTHORS

Prepared for presentation at the International Political Science Association 2018 World Congress, Brisbane, Australia, 21-25 July 2018. Support for the research in this paper comes from our respective universities and from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Earlier versions were presented to workshops at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and the University of California-Berkeley and at annual meetings of the Council for European Studies and the Canadian Political Science Association. Although we are grateful for the commentary and support, responsibility for the paper lies solely with the authors.

Abstract: Existing research suggests conflicting stories about the relationship between national identity and attitudes about immigrants: some work suggests that a strong national identity is associated with anti-immigrant attitudes, while other research indicates that it is possible to sustain both national identification and pro-immigrant sentiment. These possibilities are examined here across 19 countries, using the National Identity waves from the International Social Survey Program. We advance our understanding of the relationship between national identity and attitudes towards immigrants in two ways: (1) we extend research suggesting that there are different forms of nationalism, and then show that each has a quite different relationship with anti-immigrant sentiment, and (2) we explore the ways in which those relationships vary across national contexts, more specifically, across (a) levels of immigration and (b) the strength of multiculturalism policies. Results reconcile the various findings in past work, and suggest that both the type of national identity and the policy context matter to the relationship between national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes.

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This paper is motivated by two overlapping sets of conflicting stories. One is about the relationship between national identity and attitudes toward immigrants. Does the ability to identify with a nationality also promote a welcoming orientation toward its newest members, or is its effect mainly exclusionary? The other dispute is over immigration itself and the appropriate policy response to the community’s new members.

On one hand, there is plenty of evidence that national identity is associated with anti-immigrant sentiment. Recent empirical work indicates that a strong national identity is associated with out-group prejudice, with anti-immigrant sentiment, and with reduced support for redistribution (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995; Shayo 2009). Mere mention of nationality considerations primes suspicion of outsiders (Sniderman et al. 2004).

But another body of work points in the opposite direction. At a minimum, strong identification with the nationality and out-group tolerance are not fundamentally opposed (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Sniderman et al. 2000). Canada may be a case in point, where identification with the country is positively related to support for immigrants and moderates the connection between economic concerns and support for immigration (Johnston et al. 2010).

Some of this confusion, we argue, reflects tension at the core of identification with the nation. Its exclusionary potential is obvious, as nationality is a convenient cognitive boundary between “them” and “us.” But nations are also constructs, and identification with them requires overcoming localism and provincialism. This is especially obvious in federations, not just settler federations such as the US and Canada but old-world ones like Germany. It is only slightly less obvious for 19th-century composites like Belgium or Italy, and it extends to older entities like Spain or Britain, both of which are struggling against centrifugal pressures. In some federations, identification with the centre can be a potent force in overcoming exclusionary triumphalism on the part of local authorities. The tension is reflected inside citizens’ heads, as the same person can be led down and exclusionary path and an inclusionary one (de Figueirdo and Elkins 2003). We ask if different components of national identity have different implications for attitudes towards immigrants.

Concomitantly, the balance between components differs across countries. Two factors standout in potentially tilting the balance. One is the size of the foreign-born population itself: does the scale of immigration matter? The record already shows that it does for the welfare state and redistribution (Soroka et al. 2006, 2014). Second are the policies the state adopts in response to the growth in ethno-cultural diversity that comes with immigration. Countries vary in how if at all they have enacted multiculturalism policies (MCPs) designed to recognize, legitimate, and support ethnic diversity. The impact of MCPs on support for redistribution has been actively debated (Banting and Kymlicka 2006; Johnston et al. 2010), as has their impact on political trust (Citrin et al 2014). Here we ask if immigration and immigrant-oriented MCPs influence the very nature of the national identity and, in turn, its link to anti-immigrant sentiment.

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Attitudinal Foundations The dual nature of national identity has been a matter of record for some time.1 The two sides have been defined in various ways, not all of them useful for us. A starting point is Sides and Citrin’s (2007) description of “interests” and “identities.” “Interest”-based hypotheses focus on the role of material well-being in attitudes towards immigrants. Those more at risk financially are, in short, more likely to oppose immigration, since they are more likely to suffer financial loss as a consequence of increasing numbers of immigrants — through both heightened competition in the labour market and strain – real or imagined – on redistributive programs. (Citrin et al. 1997; Fetzer 2000; Scheve and Slaughter 2001.)2

“Identity”-based hypotheses focus on ethnic definitions of the nation:

Anti-immigrant sentiments should be more prevalent among people with a strong sense of national identity, and in particular a national identity that is predicated on an “ethnic” definition of the nation that emphasizes cultural homogeneity. (Sides and Citrin (2007:480).

This line of investigation has its roots in Adorno et al. (1950), Allport (1954) and Tajfel (1982). (In addition to the work above, see, e.g., Espendhade and Calhoun 1993; Citrin and Sides 2004; Davidov et al. 2008.)3

But impact from interests does not necessarily preclude impact from identities, and vice versa. For certain patterns, interest and identity theories point in the roughly same direction. For instance, economic pessimism leads to higher levels of anti-immigrant sentiment, but could so directly because of a persons’ economic position or because of a cultural concomitant that is not itself intrinsically about the economy. Although some work has probed mechanisms in some detail (for instance Citrin et al. 1997 on egotropic and sociotropic pathways for economic perceptions or Johnston et al. 2010 for how the impact of economic assessments is conditional on national identity itself) mostly this is poorly explored territory.

Evidence on national identity itself is divided, and seemingly opposed findings coexist. Some of the variance is across measures (Miller and Ali 2014). Measurement variance picks up a more fundamental divide inside citizens’ heads: national identity has two quite different components. The critical source is de Figueirido and Elkins (2003), who were among the first to distinguish what they called patriotism, “an attachment to the nation, its institutions, and its founding

1 For reviews of the relevant literatures in psychology, see Brewer (1999); Hewstone et al. (2002). 2 Similar distinctions are also made in Sniderman et al. (2004), Ceobanu and Escandell (2010, and Fortin and Loewen (2004). 3 In addition to the work above, see, e.g., Espendhade and Calhoun 1993; Citrin and Sides 2004; Davidov et al. 2008See also work on the “group threat” hypothesis, e.g., Quillian 1995; Scheepers et al. 2002.

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principles,” from nationalism, “a belief in national superiority and dominance” (p. 175).4 Others have distinguished between “ethnic” and “civic” nationalisms (Schildkraut 2005, 2011; Wright, Citrin, and Wand 2012; Verkuyten and Martinovic 2015) and between “blind” and “constructive” patriotism (Finell and Zogmeister 2015; Willis-Esqueda et al. 2017). Although we sign on to the basic intuition in these works, we think that the distinctions do not quite capture the essence of the matter. We supply our own nomenclature and its justification below, when we discuss measures.

The Context: Immigration and Multiculturalism The relative balance of these components may vary from country to country, as affected by history and policy. We focus on two factors: the scale of immigration; and the state’s policy approach to the ethnic diversity that immigration brings.

The volume of immigration varies significantly across counties, with major implications for how frequently members of the historic population interact with newcomers, day to day. Awkwardly, theories in social psychology make conflicting predictions about the implications of such interaction. Conflict theory suggests that the more the native-born population engages directly with newcomers, the more that competition over limited resources and indivisible public goods triggers distrust and exclusionary reactions. In contrast, contact theory suggests that direct encounter with newcomers builds understanding, undermines ignorance, and strengthens feelings of trust and tolerance among the native-born. 5 To the extent that both processes are in play, consistent prediction is not possible. The fact that we have three time points gives us leverage, however. Hopkins (2010) shows that within-country variance in the growth of the foreign-born share is a co-factor in the checkerboard of growth and stability in anti-immigrant attitudes. So might change in the cross-national pattern, which is much greater in some countries than in others and much greater over the second interval than the first.

It is not enough that immigration surges. Its implications must also be framed, and this framing could go in pro- or anti-immigrant directions. The idea that state policies influence national identities is hardly a new theme in the literature on nationalism. Although many analysts trace the roots of nationalism back to the invention of the printing press and the spread of capitalism (e.g.,

4 While our work has been influenced by this paper in particular, the arguments appear elsewhere as well. On distinguishing between various forms of nationalism, for instance, see Greenfeld (1992) and Hjerm (1998), as well as Heath and Tilley’s (2005) work on the UK, Brubaker’s (1992) work on France and Germany, and Huddy and Khatib’s (2007) work in the US. For recent reviews that capture the patriotism-nationalism divide, see Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) and Schildkraut (2014). 5 For instance, Sides and Citrin (2007) look at the role of information on attitudes about immigrants, suggesting that anti-immigrant sentiment is driven in part by over-estimation of the number of immigrants. Ceobanu and Escandell 2010 review work on the contact hypothesis (see, e.g., Binder et al. 2009) as an additional influence, alongside interests and identities. explore the role of cultural affinity in attitudes towards immigrants.

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Gellner 1983), in many countries the nation-building project in the 19th and early 20th centuries was clearly state led. In Mazzini’s Italy, the Risorgimento did not exist for the great bulk of the population; in the famous words of Massimo d’Azeglio, “We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians”.6 Similarly, Weber argues that the process of turning “peasants into Frenchmen” was powerfully shaped by public schools, new roads, and military service (Weber 1976); and Darden’s (N.d.) recent work on the role of schooling in producing durable national identities points to the same dynamic. Hobsbawm broadens the interpretation: states use all such instruments, above all primary schools, to spread the image and heritage of the nation, “often ‘inventing traditions’ or even nations for this purpose” (1992: 92). 7 It helps that such efforts built on pre-existing sentiments.

Some countries have deemphasized traditional groups and values, however, and moved to reshape the public culture of immigrants and ethnoracial minorities (Uberoi 2008). Affirmations of diversity embedded in the constitution or legislation, requirements that public broadcasters reflect diversity in their programming, and exemptions from dress codes represent powerful symbolic statements about the nature of the evolving political community. Similarly, the incorporation of multiculturalism in school curricula is intended to teach all children the value of cultural diversity and tolerance towards newcomers.

This pattern is perhaps most marked in Canada. According to most analysts, the adoption of the policies of bilingualism and multiculturalism in the 1960s and 1970s represented a state-led redefinition of national identity, an effort to de-emphasize the historic Britishness of the country and to build a national identity more accommodating of its cultural complexity (Igartua, 2006; Kernerman 2005; Champion 2010; Uberoi 2008). The original fight for MCPs was led by long-established immigrant groups, such as Ukrainians, who sought recognition in mainstream society – in its conception of history, in its public media and in its public schools. The policies were controversial at the time, eliciting resistance from those attached to an earlier symbolic order (Ryan 2010). But as Harell (2009) observes, over time multicultural norms helped to “normalize” diversity, especially for younger generations. They contributed to the tendency, noted at the outset, for those with the strongest sense of Canadian identity to be more sympathetic to immigrants (Johnston et al 2010). Similar dynamics, if in less pointed form, have been identified in Australia (Levey 2008) and Britain (Uberoi 2008).

Evidence on whether such policies succeed in promoting political incorporation of newcomers or the reshaping of historic groups’ perceptions of their society is thin on the ground. Much of the

6 Quoted in Hobsbawm 1992: 44). Mazzini himself spoke of using the state to develop “a national conception of life” (quoted in Uberoi 2008: 408). 7 While Benedict Anderson’s influential theory of nations as imagined communities places less emphasis on the state, political-administrative systems do emerge in his analysis. In Latin America, for example, he argues the administrative structures of Spanish rule created imagined communities which quickly became national in character (Anderson 1991).

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work strikes us as tendentious and polemical. The evidence from one of the few systematic comparative studies suggests that multicultural policies provoke persons who do not like immigrants to lose trust in the political system (Citirn, Levy, and Wright 2014), a finding that seems relevant in this decade. But a careful, systematic review is less pessimistic and sees the situation as more nuanced (Bloemraad 2017, 335ff). In any case, polemics to the contrary notwithstanding, MCPs mainly continue their forward march, as very few countries have retreated and many have deepened their commitment (Westlake 2017; Banting and Kymlicka 2013).

Measurement Group-Related Attitudes

All survey items are from the 1995, 2003, and 2013 waves of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), which focused on national identity. We are constrained by the countries that happen to be represented at each wave. Of the 20 OECD countries in this paper, seven appear in all three waves, eleven appear twice, and two appear only once. Fourteen countries appear in 1995, eighteen in 2003, and thirteen in 2013.

Our indicator of anti-immigrant sentiment combines aspects of international migration that, strictly speaking, might be considered as separate. Arguably, the moral claims of landed immigrants are different from those seeking entry (Ceobanu and Excandell 2010). But psychologically, the two groups are not distinct in the minds of survey respondents. This is shown by Table 1, which gives the wording of items in the index and attendant psychometrics. The one item on immigration levels is essentially indistinguishable from the four that capture positive and negative perceptions of immigrants.

[Table 1 about here]

Our measurement strategy for national sentiment is an explicit reflection of the duality in the literature. Rather than use a single item or scale — for instance, of unitary national “pride” — we measure the two faces of national sentiment directly. We are uneasy with the current nomenclatures – “ethnic-civic” and “patriotic-nationalist” – as they conflate certain things even as they falsely distinguish others. The identification of nationalism with superiority and dominance, for instance, obscures the possibility of liberal nationalism. The ethnic-civic distinction obscures the possibility that a country predicated on a civic self-definition can be chauvinistic in its outward expression. Besides, none of the ISSP items we deploy is ethnic in nature, and analysts who make the ethnic-civic distinction use the same items as we do. For that matter, none of the items uses the word, “nation.” We think the two forms of sentiment are best labeled by their psychological tone, as “patriotism” and “chauvinism.”

That said, both the conceptualization and the content of our indicators draw on de Figueirido and Elkins, as well as on Hjerm (1998), Heath and Tilley (2005), and Davidov (2009).8 The choice of 8 See also related work in psychology, e.g., Pehrson et al. 2009.

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items is our own, however. One difference is that where de Figueirido and Elkins use only the 1996 ISSP wave (in its US guise as the General Social Survey), we are constrained by availability of items in all three waves. Not all 1996 items were repeated. The other difference is that the indicator must travel to 20 countries and not every item that makes sense for the US can make the trip. The differences are modest, however.9 Both chauvinism and patriotism are captured by seven items, the details of which appear in Table 2. Each index has satisfactory internal reliability: Cronbach’s alpha for each measure is close to 0.70 and item-test correlations are high. Factor analyses of all fourteen items together (not reported here) also suggest two, rather than one, underlying dimensions.10

[Table 2 about here]

Table 3, which shows mean values by country for each of the scales does not reveal a simple pattern. Countries that are highest on the measure of anti-immigrant sentiment are not obviously higher or lower on the measures of chauvinism or patriotism. There are hints of New- versus Old-World differences, but these too are not entirely consistent. New-World settler countries exhibit higher percentages foreign-born (almost a definitional difference, arguably), higher levels of MCP, and more welcoming attitudes to immigrants and immigration. But they also exhibit higher levels of both chauvinism and patriotism. To tease out relationships among these variables, we clearly must turn to evidence about individuals.

[Table 3 about here]

Country-Level Factors

But we also need country-level variables, two in particular: the percentage foreign-born and the level of commitment to multicultural policy. It makes no sense to discuss attitudes toward immigrants without some sense of the level of immigration to the country in question. To this end, we use the percentage foreign-born that pertains to the ISSP year, as indicated by the United Nations Population Division. Immigration is also relevant backdrop to multicultural policy, and this we capture with the Banting-Kymlicka Multicultural Policy (MCP) Index for immigrants (as 9 The differences between our measures and those used by de Figueirido and Elkins are as follows. For chauvinism, we are forced to drop (1) “If you could improve your work or living conditions how willing would you to move out of your country?,” which is not available in the 2003 data set, (2) “When my country does well in international sports it makes me proud,” though attitudes about sports are captured in another item included in the measure, and (3) “How important is it that your country remain one nation?,” which in de Figueirido and Elkins’ analysis is relatively weakly related to both factors. For patriotism, we exclude: (1) the “one nation” question (listed above): (2) Are there things about your country that make you ashamed?” and (3) How close to you feel to your country?” 10 The two orientations are not completely independent. Given the common referent (not to mention, measurement covariance), this would be implausible. The individual level correlation between the two measures is 0.53.

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opposed to national minorities or aboriginal peoples), which represents each country’s willingness to recognize and accommodate nascent cultural diversity. The MCP score is for the year of the survey.11 This may seem to presuppose that attitudinal effect of policy shifts is immediate. In fact, trends in MCP are quite sticky: gains tend to be preserved (but see below for Austria and the Netherlands) and movement tends to gradual (Westlake 2017).

The variables are indeed related, as Figure 1 indicates. Japan, with virtually no immigration, also has adopted not so much as one multicultural policy. The highest achievers, Canada and Australia, are near the top in percentage foreign-born. But the relationship is hardly one-to-one, and a high level of immigration is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for an aggressive MCP. Where Britain and Sweden have committed strongly to MCP relative to their immigration level, Denmark and Austria have done the opposite. The biggest negative outlier is Switzerland, with the OECD’s highest percentage foreign-born but one of the lowest levels of MCP. At the other extreme is Finland, with a relatively low percentage foreign-born and but a level of MCP commitment to rival New Zealand. Such slippage should not surprise us. A country’s willingness to adopt MCP is not simply a product of a pre-existing history of solidarity. More likely the habit is formed in struggles among subnational groups. As Bloemraad (2017, 329-30) puts it:

… immigrant-directed policies generate solidarity in the face of diversity, but such outcomes are not organic off-shoots of social cohesion.

In short, neither variable is simply the other by a different name. From a modelling point of view, this is good news as multicollinearity does not prevent us from separating the effects of immigration and multiculturalism.12 Indeed, the slippage between the two enables us to consider what happens when policy leads or lags demographic reality.

[Figure 1 about here]

It is also critical that both country-level factors move. Obviously, no movement can be captured in countries that appear in the ISSP only once. Even for countries with two ISSP appearances highly consequential movement is missed. Finland, for instance, entered the ISSP after it dramatically increased its MCP commitments in advance of gains in immigration. The Netherlands is notable for backing off on multicultural policy but it did so after its last ISSP appearance. Even so, six countries in the data set exhibit upward movement in MCP values and one, Austria, moved in the

11 For details on the Multiculturalism Policy Index, see www.queensu.ca/mcp. The yearly data were added by Daniel Westlake and can be found at a subdomain of the Queen’s site, https://www.queensu.ca/mcp/annual_data. See Westlake (2017). 12 This does not preclude the possibility that MCPs covary across a number of other, related, factors — including a country’s history of migration and prior cleavage structure. We discuss this issue further below.

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other direction. 13 All countries with multiple ISSP appearances experienced gains in the percentage foreign-born. For Japan the gain was miniscule. At the other extreme are Spain and Ireland, whose foreign-born shares grew by 10 percentage points. For Norway, the growth was eight points. Britain, Sweden, and Switzerland saw six-point gains. Twenty years ago, the picture was dominated by the contrast between “settler” countries and others. The only non-settler country to rival the overseas anglophone countries was Switzerland. Now several European countries have foreign-born shares in the mid-teens even as Switzerland has – by quite a margin – the largest share of all.

The Impact of Immigration and Multiculturalism on National Sentiment And immigration and multicultural policy shape national sentiment. That is, they shape patriotism; chauvinism seems less attached to contemporary context. Table 4 shows this with regression models that combine basic individual-level demographics with the country-level variables. Demographics include: gender, captured by a dummy variable equal to 1 for women; age, represented by three dummy variables; education, as a simple binary variable equal to one for those who completed some level of schooling beyond high school; and income, as a 0,.5,1 measure for income terciles.14 Note that we are working with multilevel data, where individuals are nested with both countries and years. We account for the multilevel structure of the data by estimating mixed effects models that include random effects for both country and year. Doing so provides estimates of our fixed effects, allowing for level differences across both space and time. For the estimations below, we use three-level models in which years are nested within countries.15

[Table 4 about here]

Table 4 makes clear the difference between patriotism and chauvinism. Although age has a positive impact on both, education and income diverge. Each increases patriotism but decreases chauvinism. The negative impact of education on chauvinism is particularly strong—those with more than a high school education are on average 0.06 points lower on the chauvinistic nationalism scale, fifteen times the oppositely-signed effect on patriotism. The contrast for age, although

13 For patterns in movement, see Westlake (2017), Chapters 3 and 4. For retrenchment in particular, see his Table 4.1 and accompanying text. 14 There are more sophisticated ways of measuring both education and income, of course, but they tend to be less comparable across countries. Given the wide range of countries in our analysis, then, we opt for relatively simple measures. Income terciles are determined using the distribution of income in the ISSP data set. This procedure means that the terciles used here may not match up perfectly with the actual populations, but it has the statistical advantage of producing three groups of similar size for analysis. For Belgium, income had to be imputed. 15 We believe that this is the most sensible hierarchy, but reversing the order affects the results only modestly and not substantively.

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masked in the table by the tiny coefficients, is similar: older respondents are both more patriotic and more chauvinistic than younger ones, but the gain over the life course is about 2.5 times greater for chauvinism. In sum, the impact of all demographics is stronger for chauvinism than for patriotism, and the former is much more structured overall than the latter.16

Although chauvinism is more structured overall, country-level variables matter more for patriotism, as indicated by the coefficients at the top of Table 4.17 Chauvinism is quite firmly rooted in social structure and yields neither to policy nor to immigration patterns. There is a hint that immigration provokes chauvinism, but the effect is unstable – barely larger than its standard error. For patriotism the impact from the percentage foreign-born is clear. Across the realistic range of foreign-born shares, as shown in Table 3, the predicted range of effect on patriotism is about 0.12 points, one-eighth of the distance between extremes. Striking for its absence is any effect from multicultural policy.

Policy, National Identity, and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment

The ultimate target is opinion on immigrants and immigration, and here the story is more complex – but again, not perverse. This is the message of Table 5. The table proceeds by stages. First is to assess the average impact of the country-level factors, roughly on the model of Table 4. Then we examine the average effects of patriotism and chauvinism. Finally, we show how these effects are conditioned by MCP and the foreign-born share.

Country-Level Factors The summary effect of both country-level factors, as shown in estimation (1), is roughly nil. There is a hint that MCPs provoke an anti-immigrant reaction, as is also the case for immigration. And there is a final hint that the impact of each country-level variable is conditional on the other, so as to neutralize, or possibly even overcome, the “main” effects. If these are only hints, they do foreshadow robust relationships in the interactions with patriotism and chauvinism.18

16 The Wald test for chauvinism (not shown in Table 4) yields a χ2 value seven times greater than for patriotism. 17 The interaction between MCPs and percent foreign born was also included in initial models, but is excluded here as it was not significant, and made the interpretation of the direct effects much more difficult. 18 The rest of this basic model echoes the patterns in Table 4. Those at economic risk show greater levels of anti-immigrant sentiment. A one-unit upward shift in income terciles is associated with an average decline in anti-immigrant sentiment of 0.004. This is a relatively small amount, to be sure, but recall the bluntness of the income variable. Additionally, much of the income effect may be masked by the much stronger effect in the same direction from education. Part of this impact may be attributable to the economic security that comes with higher levels of education, but must also reflects the liberalizing effect of education on attitudes toward outgroups (e.g., Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Hello et al. 2002; Hjerm 2001). Both of these findings are in line with past work with the ISSP (Citrin and Sides 2008; Ceobanu and Escandell 2010), and in line with the interest-based, or “material,” model of group relations.

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National Sentiments And these two components of national sentiment have sharply contrasting implications for anti-immigrant sentiment. Model (2) treats patriotism and chauvinism unconditionally and compares their average effects. Chauvinism is positively related to anti-immigrant sentiment. Moving across the range (0-1) for chauvinism increases anti-immigrant sentiment by nearly one quarter (0.24) of the total scale. The impact of patriotism is the opposite, but not as strong; a shift across the patriotism span decreases anti-immigrant sentiment by about one-sixth the possible distance.

[Table 5 about here]

The Full Model

The unconditional treatment in model (2) masks country-level heterogeneity, even as the country-level estimates in model (1) mask within-country heterogeneity. Model (3), accordingly, allows impact from the percentage foreign-born, from multicultural policy, and from national sentiments to condition each other. The multi-level model includes, alongside all “main” effects, four two-way interactions, and two three-way ones. Given the size of the dataset and the relative independence among patriotism, chauvinism, immigration levels, and MCP values, the model is not overcome by multicollinearity. Indeed, almost all of effects are statistically significant. The model is subjected to further testing in the Appendix.19

Start at the top of the table, with the national-level factors. With patriotism and chauvinism in the setup, the meaning of the country-level coefficients has changed. Now they indicate how each operates, and how each interacts with the other, in a hypothetical world in which nobody expresses so much as a particle of patriotism or chauvinism.20 The pattern in model (1) is preserved and sharpened. In such a world, increasing MCP commitment exacerbates anti-immigrant sentiment. Increasing the foreign-born share seems to do the same, although the latter effect is nowhere near statistically significant. The joint operation of the two makes the relationship more negative for the foreign-born share and less positive for MCP; this interaction is easily passes the conventional threshold for statistical significance.

The patriotism-chauvinism contrast in the simple model persists into the more complex one. The so-called “main” effects are smaller: the estimated direct impact of patriotism is just under one-third lower (the coefficient drops from 0.15 to 0.11), and of chauvinism, about 15 percent lower (a drop from 0.24 to 0.21). This reflects the fact that impacts are now made conditional on levels of immigration and MCP. The “main effects” coefficients, just described, now estimate impact for countries with no immigrants and no multicultural policy commitments, that is, countries that score

19 The appendix can be found at https://www.dropbox.com/home/Datasets for Web/IPSA 2018 robustness. 20 Of the more than 50,000 respondents underlying Table 5, 24 persons fit this description.

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zero on both variables. Japan is a close approximation to such a country. The two-way “interaction” terms for patriotism and chauvinism show what happens to the slope of effect from sentiment when one country-level variable shifts as the other is held at zero. The three-way interactions show what happens to the slope when MCP and the foreign-born share both move.21

Impact from patriotism is conditional on both multicultural policy and the foreign-born share. Consider first the two-way interaction with MCP. Moving from no multicultural policies to the full suite doubles the negative slope of relationship between patriotism and anti-immigrant sentiment. Doing the same for the percentage foreign-born (now holding MCP at zero) seems to treble the slope. This exaggerates the real effect as the coefficient represents a shift from no immigrants to a society in which every resident – except the survey respondent – is foreign-born. As the effective range in the dataset (Table 3) is slightly under 30 percent, the maximum estimated impact would about 0.06, taking the original relationship, a slope of -0.11, to one of -0.17. The key point so far is that upward movement each country-level variable makes patriotism more critical to support for immigrants, not the opposite.

For chauvinism, conditioning by the country-level variables has a simpler structure but the opposite effect. Recall that for chauvinism the basic relationship is positive: the more chauvinistic, the more anti-immigrant – no surprise. Increasing the percentage foreign-born strengthens the link: the relationship steepens by a factor of 150%. Again, however, the real range in the foreign-born share is about 30 percent, so the effective augmentation is more like a factor of 50%, taking a slope of 0.21 and lifting it to a slope of about 0.30.

That is not the end of the story, however. What was just described is the not entirely plausible story of massive increase in one factor, either MCP or the foreign-born share, while the other is not merely held constant, but is fixed at zero. Once both factors start to move – and movement is generally upward – then each starts to condition the other. And for both patriotism and chauvinism, the conditioning is offsetting: as both country-level factors increase, each dampens the effect of the other.

If the table reassures us that the apparent action is real, it does so through a formidable array of interactions. To grasp their implications, we need to simulate combinations of values and to do so graphically. Figures 2 and 3 do this for chauvinism and patriotism respectively. Each is based on simulations in which the percentage foreign-born, multiculturalism policy, and national sentiment are allowed to vary while all other variables are held at their means.22 Each setup focuses on how national sentiment is conditioned jointly by country-level variables, with a further focus on now

21 Two-way interactions can always be understood in two ways, and for multi-way interactions the range of possibilities is even wider. The version in the main body strikes us as the most intuitively reasonable as well as the most attuned to the point of this paper. 22 Plots are derived from the margins and marginsplot routines in Stata 15.

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MCP conditions the impact of immigration. We could have arranged the estimations in other ways, but this seems the most sensible. Also, where both chauvinism and patriotism move sluggishly in the aggregate, MCP and the foreign-born share are highly dynamic.23 The setup also presupposes that MCP responds to immigration, not the other way around. In particular, no element in the Banting-Kymlicka index captures the ease of entry to the country, so it cannot be said that MCP is directly facilitative of immigration. Where the foreign-born share has increased in every country, MCP commitments have retreated in Austria, increased in some places, but mostly remained unchanged.24 And Figure 1 reveals major exceptions to the weak positive relationship between immigration and MCP, with Finland and Switzerland as especially notable outliers.

For chauvinism, the mechanisms appear in Figure 2. The first thing to notice is that the relationship is always positive – chauvinism goes with anti-immigrant sentiment – regardless of conditions. MCP weakens the relationship: at highest percentage foreign-born share the slope is 0.31 where there is not one multicultural policy in place (basically the situation in Switzerland) but only 0.23 where all eight policy dimensions are fully occupied. More important, however, is what to happens the height of the lines. In the absence of any multicultural commitments, an increasing foreign-born share provokes anti-immigrant opinion, and the more effectively so the more chauvinistic the individual. As MCP kicks in, however, these relationships reverse. If MCP expands in the absence of mass immigration, opinion sours (compare the solid lines between subgraphs). More dramatic, however, is what happens when the foreign-born share and MCP increase in tandem: the overall height of the anti-immigrant line drops as the foreign-born share grows, and the drop is greater as MCP is greater. So there is evidence of backlash, but it reflects a policy misfit: where the foreign-born share is large and MCP is non-existent or where MCP is maximal and immigration is non-existent. These are extreme cases, not the norm.

[Figure 2 about here]

Broadly speaking, the same patterns hold in reverse for patriotism, according to Figure 3. Patriotism is strongly and negatively related to anti-immigrant sentiment. Levels of anti-immigrant sentiment drop markedly as the foreign-born percentage increases. That is, they drop when multicultural policy lets them: as with chauvinism, the impact of the foreign-born share is amplified as MCP commitment grows. Also as with chauvinism, backlash may occur, but not because of some reinforcement by MCP: large foreign-born shares shift anti-patriots25 in the anti-

23 In regressions on the year of the survey, the average level of chauvinism does not change and the average level of patriotism grows 0.0026, on the range from 0 to 1, per year. By contrast, in similar regressions, MCP grows by 0.0068 points per year and the foreign-born share by 0.0035 per year. 24 To be sure, some of the stasis in our dataset reflects the fact some countries appear only once or appear only before or after the critical change. The Netherlands, like Austria, cut back on MCP but only after 2003. Finland went dramatically the other way but did so before 2003. 25 Recall that most persons scoring low on patriotism also score low on chauvinism. We return to this in the conclusion.

13

immigrant direction but only where no multicultural policy is in place. There is a stronger hint of backlash where MCPs are strong, but, as with chauvinism, only where immigrants are few and far between.

[Figure 3 about here]

Validation and Robustness

The core of our argument rests on a contestable empirical foundation. Although it is clear that national sentiment has two overlapping but competing elements, our claim about variation in their relative power required heroic staging of data and estimation. In this section we report on several further tests of the claims. First is a question of verisimilitude: Do the effects for patriotism and chauvinism that we predict for each country actually resemble the observed values? The demonstration is also a useful visualization of our main claims. The other tests are robustness checks. As they require dense and repetitive data analysis, we only summarize the results here. Detailed evidence appears in the appendix.

Verisimilitude We want to confirm that the unified estimation adequately summarizes rather than obfuscates simpler, country-by-country results. To this end, Figure 4 compares the estimated effects of patriotism and chauvinism on anti-immigrant sentiment, as they are derived from (a) the full, interactive hierarchical estimation, taking into account each country’s values for MCPs and immigration, and (b) country-specific OLS models, which include only individual-level predictors. (Country-specific models are included in full in the online Appendix.) All estimations are specific to the year, to allow over-time variation in both factors to express itself. The x-axis shows the magnitude of the estimated coefficient using the multi-level model; the y-axis shows the estimated magnitude of the same coefficient using OLS on the data for each country-year separately. As visual aids, each chart has reference lines at the vertical and horizontal means and a regression plot of the relationship between modelled and observed values.

[Figure 4 about here]

Figure 4 tells stories for patriotism and chauvinism that differ only in the subtleties. For patriotism, the pattern produced by the multilevel estimation corresponds to that from separate country-specific estimations. By a cruder classification, majority of the readings lie in the bottom left or top right quadrants, with only one observation in three located in an off-diagonal quadrant. Many of the latter are still quite close to the regression line. Country-specific estimates are more dispersed than the derived ones; compare the vertical and horizontal scales. A few countries are strikingly out of order: France is predicted to have middling coefficients but instead has quite low observed values. That is, French patriotism strikingly reduces anti-immigrant sentiment, far more so than we expect from the modelled value. In the French case, it is tempting to hear echoes of Brubaker’s (1992) emphasis on French universalism. The other notable outlier is Spain: patriotism

14

is predicted to have a modestly negative impact on anti-immigrant sentiment (rather as in France), in fact it has a strikingly weak effect.

The pattern for chauvinism coefficients is similar, but weaker. Predicted values follow a path quite like that for patriotism, although displaced toward higher values, that is toward a positive link with anti-immigrant sentiment. But much less of the total variance in observed coefficients is captured by predicted ones. A big part of the problem is that the predicted values do not vary much. The range of predictions for chauvinism rivals that for patriotism, but most predictions cluster tightly around the mean. Switzerland is a worrisome outlier.

Outliers The dataset has a few notable outlier countries, Finland and Switzerland especially. How stable are the results when we drop individual countries? To test for this we perform bootstrap estimations, dropping one country at a time. To the extent that there are any noticeable effects, they tend to be at the country level and principally in the “main” effects. Dropping Australia, for instance, nullifies the “main effect” for MCP but boosts the effect from immigration. Dropping Switzerland affects relative weights among the interactions. No other exclusion has a material effect beyond chance variation.

As a check on consistency across years, we also bootstrapped the year of the survey. The direct effects of patriotism and chauvinism are unchanged; the complex of interactions varies a little. Dropping 2003 makes the direct effect of MCPs narrowly miss statistical significance. The biggest effect is on impact from the foreign-born share, reflecting the shifts in immigration levels from year to year.

Alternative Estimation Strategies Finally, we estimated the basic relationships in different ways. Most importantly, we recast model (3) as a standard OLS estimation, with errors clustered by country-year. The direct effects of patriotism and chauvinism are essentially unaffected, but the direct effect of MCPs now narrowly misses statistical significance and the interactions also fall below the conventional threshold for statistical significance. By implication, the robustness of our findings hinges on a claim that the proper setup is a multi-level one.

Most important, in our view, is that multi-level setup allows for errors within years to be connected across countries, and errors across countries to be connected across years. In contrast, clustering in OLS treats every country-year combination as an independent panel. Moreover, the multilevel model – specifically, a three-level model with random intercepts by country and year – allows for level differences across countries and time. Accordingly, we stand by our results.

Discussion and Conclusions In an age defined by large-scale international migration, understanding the sources of anti-immigrant sentiment represents a compelling research agenda. This paper advances our understanding by unpacking the concept of national identity and by exploring the role of important

15

mediating policy factors. Our findings are both sobering and optimistic. Sobering because the connection between chauvinism and exclusionary attitudes is clear. Optimistic because patriotism has the opposite effect, because the adoption of MCPs by the state may actually reduce the negative impact of the chauvinistic side of national identity, and because immigration itself may in the long run be a solvent for anti-immigrant sentiment, echoing the intuitions of contact theory.

The finding that national identity is not necessarily related to rising anti-immigrant sentiment is a product of our having relied on more nuanced measures of national identity than have been used in some past work. The old, single national pride measure seems to conflate two quite different components of national identity; a two-pronged approach reveals that national identity has two faces. We are certainly not the first to make this claim. But our results make clear that notions originally developed to explain national identity in the US context travel well. Across OECD countries, patriotism and chauvinism have fundamentally different relationships with attitudes towards immigrants.

Those relationships are not immutable. Immigration seems to provide its own solvent. Its impacts on each face of national identity – muting the positive impact of chauvinism on anti-immigrant sentiment and augmenting the negative impact of patriotism – suggest that contact is they key after all. We are not blind to the recent burst of anti-immigrant sentiment – the surge of populism in Europe and recent events in the US. But these bursts conform to the pattern identified by Hopkins (2010), with a toxic combination of localized events and media politicization. What our data show, we believe, is the power of the quotidian, of the steady accumulation of opportunities for cross-cultural exposure, most of it free of negative charge.

But our findings also indicate that the state can play an independent role in framing the import of immigration. The chauvinistic potential of identification with the nationality will probably never go away. But whether or not it is cashed out in public expressions of xenophobia is another matter. One way to dampen this possibility, to liberate the better angels of our nature, is to hew to the line of cultural recognition. The results are not automatic and may not provide a guarantee against flashpoints. Lack of fit is a problem. It may be unwise to be preemptive, to travel far down the road of ethnocultural recognition in advance of actual ethnic diversification. But the opposite strategy is no less unwise. Admitting large numbers of foreign-born without official acknowledgement of the new reality seems to license xenophobia.

16

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Table 1. Anti-Immigrant Sentiment

Question Mean StDev Item-Test Correlation

There are different opinions about immigrants from other countries living in [country]. (By “immigrants” we mean people who come to settle in [country]). How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? (Agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly):

Immigrants increase crime rates 0.582 0.293 0.707

Immigrants are generally good for [country’s] economy 0.508 0.258 0.716

Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [country] 0.480 0.292 0.691

Immigrants improve [country nationality] society by bringing in new ideas and cultures

0.586 0.262 0.721

Do you think the number of immigrants to [country] nowadays should be...increased a lot, increased a little, remain the same as it is, reduced a little, reduced a lot, can’t choose?

0.302 0.256 0.726

Alpha 0.780

Based on 1995, 2003, & 2013 ISSP surveys, citizens and native-born in OECD countries only. Items scaled to 0,1 interval and scale calculated as average across all items, list-wise deletion of cases.

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Table 2. National Sentiment: Chauvinism and Patriotism

Mean StDev Item-Test Correlation

Chauvinism

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (Agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly):

I would rather be a citizen of [country] than of any other country in the world

0.767 0.258 0.650

The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the [country nationality]

0.493 0.279 0.676

Generally speaking, [country] is a better country than most other countries

0.634 0.271 0.691

People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong

0.419 0.296 0.569

How proud are you of [country] in each of the following?:

its political influence in the world 0.532 0.261 0.436

its achievements in sports 0.657 0.289 0.512 [country’s] armed forces 0.613 0.306 0.604

Alpha 0.682

Patriotism

How proud are you of [country] in each of the following?:

the way democracy works 0.651 0.268 0.644

[country’s] economic achievements 0.594 0.270 0.600

[country’s] social security systems 0.560 0.292 0.680 its scientific and technological achievements 0.638 0.236 0.575

its achievements in arts 0.662 0.242 0.526

its history 0.692 0.273 0.549 its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society 0.569 0.292 0.682

Alpha 0.679

Based on 1995, 2003, & 2013 ISSP surveys, citizens and native-born in OECD countries only. Items scaled to 0,1 interval and scale calculated as average across all items, list-wise deletion of cases.

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Table 3. Sentiment, Immigration, and Multicultural Policy, by Country

Country Anti-Immigrant Sentiment1

Chauvinism1 Patriotism1 % Foreign Born, range2

MCP Index, range3

“Settler” Societies

AU 0.415 0.686 0.653 0.226 -0.223 1.000 CA 0.393 0.645 0.699 0.169-0.194 0.938

NZ 0.434 0.675 0.635 0.161-0.205 0.688

US 0.442 0.689 0.693 0.107-0.153 0.375

Mean 0.422 0.677 0.672 0.177 0.708

Non’”Settler” Societies

AT 0.463 0.637 0.672 0.114-0.140 0.188-0.125

CH 0.448 0.566 0.664 0.233-0.293 0.250

BE 0.517 0.580 0.634 0.107 0.688

DE 0.452 0.524 0.570 0.085-0.125 0.063-0.250

DK 0.466 0.600 0.643 0.083-0.106 0.000

ES 0.452 0.591 0.618 0.026-0.127 0.125-0.438

FI 0.471 0.584 0.625 0.036-0.056 0.688-0.750

FR 0.479 0.534 0.615 0.110-0.125 0.250

GB 0.482 0.610 0.634 0.073-0.132 0.625-0.688

IE 0.428 0.614 0.678 0.065-0.165 0.125-0.438

IT 0.463 0.495 0.507 0.033 0.188

JP 0.516 0.600 0.611 0.011-0.016 0.000

NL 0.447 0.494 0.620 0.092-0.107 0.438

NO 0.468 0.581 0.628 0.053-0.138 0.000

PT 0.473 0.577 0.503 0.072-0.085 0.438

SE 0.436 0.535 0.571 0.109-0.167 0.625-0.875

Mean 0.462 0.567 0.613 0.104 0.328 1 Based on 1995, 2003, & 2013 ISSP surveys, citizens and native-born in OECD countries only. 2 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2009, Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2008). Range for 1995-2013 where available. IT 1995 only; AU, AT, NL, NZ, CA, JP 1995-2003; FR, PT, DK, CH, FI 2003-2013; BE 2013 only. Earlier values always lower than later ones. 3 Banting and Kymlicka index, compressed to 0,1 interval. For dates see note 2. As earlier values are sometimes higher than later ones, the range also shows direction.

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Table 4. The Structure of National Sentiment

Patriotism Chauvinism

Fixed Effects

MCPs -0.01 (0.03) 0.04 (0.03) % Foreign born 0.40*** (0.14) 0.23 (0.17)

Female 0.004** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.001)

Age 30-49 0.003 (0.002) 0.016*** (0.001)

Age 50-64 0.022*** (0.003) 0.049*** (0.002) Age 65+ 0.049*** (0.003) 0.100*** (0.003)

Education (more than HS) 0.002 (0.002) -0.058*** (0.002)

Income (terciles) 0.007*** (0.002) -0.004*** (0.001) Constant 0.55*** (0.018) 0.52*** (0.03)

Random Effects

Year — variance 0.000 n.a. 0.001 (0.001)

Country — variance 0.003 (0.001) 0.004 (0.001)

Residual 0.024 (0.002) 0.023 (0.000) N (individuals) 54345 54725

N (countries) 20 20

Cells contain coefficients from multilevel (crossed-effects) ML models with standard errors in parentheses.

Based on 1995, 2003, & 2013 ISSP surveys, OECD countries, native-born citizens only. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

25

Table 5. National Sentiment, Immigration, Multiculturalism, and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment

(1) (2) (3)

Fixed Effects

MCPs 0.05 (0.04) 0.14** (0.04)

% Foreign born 0.07 (0.14) 0.14 (0.17)

MCPs * % Foreign born -0.44 (0.26) -0.78** (0.30)

Patriotism -0.16*** (0.003) -0.11*** (0.01) * MCPs -0.14*** (0.02)

* % Foreign born -0.20* (0.10)

* MCPs * % Foreign born 0.48** (0.16)

Chauvinism 0.24*** (0.003) 0.21*** (0.01) * MCPs 0.02 (0.02)

* % Foreign born 0.34*** (0.10)

* MCPs * % Foreign born -0.32* (0.16)

Female -0.004*** (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) -.003*** (.001) Age 30-49 -0.003 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) Age 50-64 0.009*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) Age 65+ 0.017*** (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) Education (more than HS) -0.05*** (0.001) -0.04*** (0.001) -0.04*** (0.001) Income (terciles) -0.012** (0.001) -0.009*** (0.001) -0.009*** (0.001) Constant 0.47*** (0.02) 0.43*** (0.02) 0.40*** (0.02)

Random Effects

Country — variance 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) Year — variance 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) Residual 0.010 (0.000) 0.009 (0.000) 0.009 (.000) N (individuals) 54674 54096 N (countries) 20

Cells contain coefficients from multilevel (crossed-effects) ML models with standard errors in parentheses.

Based on 1995, 2003, & 2013 ISSP surveys, OECD countries, native-born citizens only. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

26

Figure 1. Foreign-born share and commitment to multicultural policy MCP score and 95% confidence interval as predicted from the current-year proportion of foreign-born residents. MCP scale compressed to 0,1 range. Estimation by OLS, N= 45 country-year combinations. Markers are for one year only and, where possible, represent observations for 2003, the year with the largest number of countries.

JP NO

AT

FR IE CHES

US

PT NL

NZGBFI

SE

CA

AU

DK

DE

BE

IT

MCP = 0.14 + 2.24 * %FB R-sq adj = 0.180.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

Imm

igra

nt M

CP

Scor

e

0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30

Proportion Foreign Born

27

Figure 2. Impact of Chauvinism, conditional on foreign-born share and MCP Plots of values for anti-immigrant sentiment predicted from chauvinism at different combinations of foreign-born share and number of multicultural policies in place. Based on estimation (3) in Table 5.

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.0 0.5 1.0

0.0 0.5 1.0

MCP=0 MCP=.5

MCP=1

0 10%20% 30%

% Foreign born

Ant

i-im

mig

rant

sen

timen

t

Chauvinism

28

Figure 3. Impact of Patriotism, conditional on foreign-born share and MCP Plots of values for anti-immigrant sentiment predicted from patriotism at different combinations of foreign-born share and number of multicultural policies in place. Based on estimation (3) in Table 5.

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.0 0.5 1.0

0.0 0.5 1.0

MCP=0 MCP=.5

MCP=1

0 10%20% 30%

% Foreign born

Ant

i-im

mig

rant

sen

timen

t

Patriotism

29

Figure 4. Multi-Level vs OLS Estimates of Impact of National Sentiment Predicted values are derived from model (3) in Table 5 with margins and marginsplot in Stata 15. Observed values are from OLS estimations as in model (2) of Table 5, country by country.

AU

AU

US

US

US

GB

GB

GB

AT

AT IT

IE

IE

IE

NLNL

NO

NONO

SE

SESE

NZ

NZ

CA

CA

JP

JP

ES

ES

ES

FR

FR

PT

PT

DKDKCH

CH

FIFI

BE

DEDE

DE

Obs = 0.04 + 1.20*Pred R-sq adj=0.30-0.25

-0.20

-0.15

-0.10

-0.05

0.00

Obs

erve

d fr

om c

ount

ry-s

peci

fic O

LS

-0.20 -0.18 -0.16 -0.14 -0.12 -0.10

Predicted from multi-level model

Patriotism

AUAU

US

US

US

GB

GB

GB AT

AT

IT

IE

IE

IE

NLNL

NO

NO NO

SE

SE

SE

NZ

NZ

CA

CA

JPJP

ESES

ES

FRFR

PT

PT

DK DK

CHCH

FI

FIBE

DE

DE

DE

Obs = 0.06 + 1.21*Pred R-sq adj=0.03

0.00

0.10

0.20

0.30

0.40

Obs

erve

d fr

om c

ount

ry-s

peci

fic O

LS

0.20 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.30

Predicted from multi-level model

Chauvinism