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Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity Dr. Britt Cartrite Solomon Asch Center for Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict University of Pennsylvania Paper available at: http:// www.psych.upenn.edu/sacsec/abir /

Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity

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Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity. Dr. Britt Cartrite Solomon Asch Center for Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict University of Pennsylvania Paper available at: http://www.psych.upenn.edu/sacsec/abir/. Research Questions. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity

Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes:Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity

Dr. Britt CartriteSolomon Asch Center for Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict

University of Pennsylvania

Paper available at:http://www.psych.upenn.edu/sacsec/abir/

Page 2: Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity

Research Questions Why are authoritarian regimes

relatively successful in surviving succession crises (Brownlee 2002)? Do different types of authoritarian

regimes “survive” differently?

When regime breakdown does occur, are there regime-type specific patterns to the breakdown?

Page 3: Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity

Virtualstan’s “Slime Mold” Milieu

Activated identity Identities in repertoire Information:

local neighborhood + global “bias”

Agent evolution: Rotation Substitution Rotation + Substitution “Anger”

Page 4: Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity

Virtualstan’s “Slime Mold” Milieu

20 identities in the landscape, including:

State Identity

Loyal Opposition

Regional identities

Page 5: Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity

Types of Authoritarian Regimes

Bureaucratic Authoritarianism (O’Donnell 1973; Collier 1979)

Neopatrimonialism (Eisenstadt 1973; Bill and Springborg 1994; Bratton and van de Walle 1997)

Bureaucratic Feudalism (Baker 1978)

Page 6: Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity

Types of Authoritarian Regimes:Bureaucratic Authoritarianism

Clearly hierarchical

Allegiances of subordinates are to their immediate superiors

Political and social institutions are relatively distinct

Page 7: Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity

Types of Authoritarian Regimes:Neopatrimonialism

“Great Leader” linked to bureaucracy and various social elites at all levels, disrupting local hierarchies

Political and social institutions are relatively indistinct

Page 8: Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity

Types of Authoritarian Regimes:Bureaucratic Feudalism

More coherent institutions than NP, less than BA

Great Leader influences bureaucracy and regional elites, but not their subordinates

Political and social institutions are linked, but not deeply

Page 9: Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity

Operationalizing Authoritarian Regimes:Non-basic Agent classes

Lackeys (lower level bureaucrats)

Bureaucrats (higher level bureaucrats)

Vassals (regional/ethnic subordinate elites)

Lords (regional/ethnic prominent elites)

Great Leader

Page 10: Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity

Agent classes and distributions

Bureaucrats

Lackeys

Vassals Lords Total Basic

BA 22 (22)

201 (201)

64 (12)

16 (3)

303 (239)

3792 (412)

BF 0 209 (209)

64 (64)

16 (16)

289 (289)

3806 (418)

NP 0 185 (185)

63 (11)

16 (3)

263 (199)

3831 (580)

Page 11: Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity

Virtualstan Institutions

Great Leader

Lord

Vassal

Bureaucrat

Lackey

Page 12: Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity

Bureaucratic Authoritarianism Great Leader influence = 4 Bureaucrat: influence = 3; includes

GL in decision-making Lackey: influence = 2; sight radius =

2; includes GL in decision-making Lord: influence = 3 Vassal: influence = 2; includes

Lord(s) in a radius of 4 in decision-making

Page 13: Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity

Bureaucratic Authoritarianism

Page 14: Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity

Bureaucratic Feudalism

Great Leader influence = 4 Bureaucrat = n/a Lackey: influence = 2; sight radius =

1; includes GL in decision-making Lord: influence = 3 Vassal: influence = 2; includes

Lord(s) in a radius of 4 in decision-making

Page 15: Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity

Bureaucratic Feudalism

Page 16: Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity

Neopatrimonialism Great Leader influence = 4 Bureaucrat = n/a Lackey: influence = 1; sight radius = 1;

includes GL in decision-making Lord: influence = 3; includes GL in

decision-making Vassal: influence = 2; includes Lord(s)

in a radius of 4 in decision-making; includes GL in decision-making

Page 17: Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity

Neopatrimonialism

Page 18: Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity

Operationalizing Succession Crises:GL_gone_trigger

Effects of GL_gone_trigger = 1 Cell of Great Leader (28,29)

becomes empty at t=33 Bias ceiling for identity 5 set at -2

for 32<t<58 Bias for identity 5 set to 0 at t=58

(all models), allowed to vary normally thereafter

Page 19: Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity

Experimental Protocols 100 pairs of seeds used for each regime type (3) and

condition (succession / no succession) for 158 timesteps per run (100x3x2 = 600 runs)

Test of 100 random pairs of one type/condition against 100 seed pairs shows no significant difference

Virtually identical landscapes Some variation due to variation in non-basic agents

Bias range = 3,-3 Tests comparing conditions using 2,-2 range show

expected decrease

“Scramble” for 0<t<9 (bias volatility = 5000 (50%)), then set to 200 to allow the history to begin “in media res.”

Page 20: Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity

Comparing regime types:Seed pairs #26 at t=33

BureaucraticAuthoritarianism

BureaucraticFeudalism

Neopatrimonialism

Page 21: Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity

Comparing succession and non-succession:Neopatrimonialism (seed pairs #26)

t=33

t=58

t=158

Page 22: Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity
Page 23: Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity

Effect of Regime and Succession Crisis on Regime Identity Plurality

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Neopatrimonialism Bureaucratic Authoritarianism Bureaucratic Feudalism

Regime Type

Futures Featuring Regime Identity Plurality at T=158

Futures FeaturingRegime IdentityPlurality, NoSuccession Crisis

Futures FeaturingRegime IdentityPlurality,Succession Crisis

Cht-PluralityVirtualstancompiled.xls

Page 24: Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity