Civic Associations and Authoritarian Regimes in Interwar ... · can enable hegemonic authoritarian regimes to the extent that associations provide a congen-ial environment for the

Contemporary work on civic associationismfocuses mostly on democracy (Arato 1981

Paxton 2002 Putnam 1993 Wuthnow 1991)This analysis investigates instead the relation-ship between associationism and authoritarian-ism I explore how the strength of theassociational sphere influenced the degree ofregime hegemony in two cases of interwarEuropean authoritarianism the Italian fascist

regime and the Spanish dictatorship of MiguelPrimo de Rivera (1870ndash1930) By hegemony Imean the extent to which a regime politicizes theassociational sphere in accordance with its offi-cial ideology A hegemonic authoritarian regimeexists to the extent that official regime unionsemployersrsquoorganizations and professional asso-ciations exist In contrast economic-corporatedictatorships leave the preexisting association-al terrain intact I treat Italian fascism and deRiverarsquos Spain as instances respectively ofhegemonic authoritarianism and an economiccorporate dictatorship and I ask how thestrength of the associational sphere shaped thesedivergent outcomes

Classic scholarship in the Tocquevillian tra-dition suggests that a developed associationalsphere should preserve a realm of private non-regimendashdominated social relations (Arendt1958323 Friedrich and Brzezinksi 1966279Kornhauser 195930 76ndash90 Lerderer 194072)Therefore it should be difficult to establish ahegemonic authoritarian regime in the contextof a strong associational sphere I suggest incontrast that relatively strong associationalspheres in the preseizure of power period havesometimes rendered authoritarian regimes morehegemonic than they would be had associa-tionism been weaker To establish my argument

CCiivviicc AAssssoocciiaattiioonnss aanndd AAuutthhoorriittaarriiaann RReeggiimmeessiinn IInntteerrwwaarr EEuurrooppee IIttaallyy aanndd SSppaaiinn iinn CCoommppaarraattiivvee PPeerrssppeeccttiivvee

Dylan RileyUniversity of California Berkeley

What is the relationship between civic associations and authoritarian regimes While

Tocquevillian theories have concentrated mostly on the connection between civic

associationism and democracy this article develops a Gramscian approach suggesting

that a strong associational sphere can facilitate the development of authoritarian parties

and hegemonic authoritarian regimes Two countries are used for comparison Italy from

1870 to 1926 and Spain from 1876 to 1926 The argument here is that the strength of the

associational sphere in north-central Italy provided organizational resources to the

fascist movement and then party In turn the formation of the party was a key reason

why the Italian regime developed as a hegemonic authoritarian regime The absence of a

strong associational sphere in Spain explains why that regime developed as an economic

corporate dictatorship despite many similarities between the two cases

AAMMEERRIICCAANN SSOOCCIIOOLLOOGGIICCAALL RREEVVIIEEWW 22000055 VVOOLL 7700 ((AApprriill228888ndashndash331100))

2172-ASR 702 filename70205-riley

Direct all correspondence to Dylan RileyDepartment of Sociology University of CaliforniaBerkeley 410 Barrows Hall 1980 Berkeley CA94720-1980 (rileyberkeleyedu) This research wasfunded by an IIE Fulbright grant Many thanks toPerry Anderson Victoria Bonnell Michael BurawoyRebecca Emigh Carlo Ginzburg Chase Langford(who helped with the map) Michael Mann EmanuelaTallo and the students at the Center for ComparativeSocial Analysis at UCLA for their help on this arti-cle In addition the author thanks audiences at UCDavis Johns Hopkins University and colleagues inboth the Department of Sociology and SocialAnthropology and the Department of PoliticalScience at the Central European University BudapestThe author also thanks the ASR editor and anonymousreviewers for being both extraordinarily helpful andpatient

Delivered by Ingenta to University of California Berkeley

Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

I develop a historical and comparative analysisof Italian fascism and Spanish authoritarian-ism in the early 1920s My main argument is thatthe Italian fascist party could emerge only in thecontext of a relatively strong associationalsphere and the Italian fascist hegemonic author-itarian regime could emerge only because therewas a strong fascist party Radical right-wingforces were unable to constitute themselves asa fascist party in the Spanish case where civicassociationism was relatively weak Thus sig-nificant pockets of nonpoliticized social exis-tence remained in Spain The result was aneconomic-corporate dictatorship

TTHHEEOORRIIZZIINNGG CCAAPPIITTAALLIISSTTAAUUTTHHOORRIITTAARRIIAANNIISSMM CCIIVVIICCAASSSSOOCCIIAATTIIOONNIISSMM AANNDD HHEEGGEEMMOONNYY

Drawing on Gramsci (1971259) I use the termhegemony to refer to the political organizationof consent Some regimes devote considerableeffort to the political constitution of their sup-porting social interests while others adopt amore pragmatic bargaining orientation to theseHegemonic authoritarian regimes as a conse-quence of their concerted organization of con-sent tend to eliminate the distinction betweenpublic and private existence penetrating theassociational sphere and reducing the realm ofnonpolitically relevant activities In contrasteconomic corporate dictatorships tolerate andencourage nonpolitical organizations general-ly basing themselves on alliances with preex-isting groups that they neither create nor greatlyalter Thus the main theoretical puzzle here isldquoWhy do authoritarian regimes with similarbases of social support differ in their degree ofhegemonyrdquo I seek to relate these different out-comes to differences in the strength of the asso-ciational sphere prior to the seizure of power inthe cases of Spain and Italy in the early twenti-eth century (Gramsci 1971216 259)1 The asso-ciational sphere refers to a third sector betweenstates and markets comprised mostly of volun-tary associations such as mutual aid societies

and cooperatives employersrsquo organizationsunions chambers of labor and democraticallyoriented political parties (Paxton 2002 Schoferand Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001 Putnam200015ndash28 Skocpol and Fiorina 19992Wuthnow 19917)

I consider two theories of the relationshipbetween associationism and authoritarianismthe Tocquevillian view and the Gramscian alter-native for which I will argue Tocquevilliansargue that civic associationism protects thesphere of private existence making hegemonicauthoritarian regime formation difficult TheTocquevillian approach identifies two specificmechanisms insulation and organizational bal-ancing The insulation argument suggests thatthe more developed the sphere of associationsthe more difficult it will be to establish author-itarian party organizations because such organ-izations appeal primarily to persons who aresocially atomized and therefore lack well-structured interests (Arendt 1958311Kornhauser 195946 64 Tocqueville 1988523)The organizational balancing argument sug-gests that associations provide people the meansto act without invoking the state and such asso-ciations also balance state authority by creatingalternative power centers (Putnam 2000345Tocqueville 1988516) The Tocquevillian analy-sis of authoritarianism and civic associationismfollows logically from this view Strong asso-ciational spheres should present an obstacle tothe formation of authoritarian parties and hege-monic authoritarian regimes (Arendt 1958323Gannett 200311ndash12 Goldberg 2001Kornhauser 195976ndash90 Lerderer 194072Tocqueville 1988516)

The Gramscian view rejects the Tocquevillianclaim of a zero sum relationship between socialself-organization and political power (Bellamyand Schechter 1993123 Gramsci 1971160Laclau and Mouffe [1985] 2001xvii) ForGramsci the sphere of associations is importantbecause it produces technologies of politicalrule that potentially can extend the reach of thestate (Bellamy and Schecther 1993122Gramsci 1971259) More specifically Gramscirejects the two basic arguments of theTocquevillian position First for Gramsci asso-ciations are not necessarily opposed to author-itarian parties Such parties are based preciselyon an integration of local and sectoral inter-ests not on a socially atomized mass (Anderson

CCIIVVIICC AASSSSOOCCIIAATTIIOONNSS AANNDD AAUUTTHHOORRIITTAARRIIAANN RREEGGIIMMEESS IINN EEUURROOPPEEmdashmdashndashndash228899


1 Although generally not stated in Gramscian termsthis distinction is quite common in the literature onauthoritarianism (De Felice [1981] 199610ndash11Gentile 2000240ndash41 Linz 1970262 200329ndash4068 Pavone 199875)


Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

1965242 Gramsci 1971181) Second althoughassociations may start as opposed to the statethey can be reabsorbed by it Indeed inGramscirsquos view strong associational spherescan enable hegemonic authoritarian regimes tothe extent that associations provide a congen-ial environment for the construction of author-itarian parties which are both a key agent andcentral institutional feature of hegemonicauthoritarian regimes (Gramsci 1971221) Theassociational sphere in this scheme is a poten-tial transmission belt rather than a bulwark pro-tecting private existence It is worth emphasizingthat the Italian fascists themselves largely sharedthis Gramscian view of the associational sphere(Bottai 193429 Panunzio 1987272) AdrianLyttelton (1987205) neatly catches the pointwhen he contrasts de Tocqueville with thenationalist and then fascist theorist AlfredoRocco (1875ndash1925)

The lsquointermediate associationrsquo for De Tocquevillea necessary check on the power of the State whichwould otherwise overwhelm the isolated individ-ual for Rocco was instead to be a cog in themachinery which would ensure his [sic] subordi-nation

This leads to a relatively clear prediction Inhistorical contexts where an authoritarianseizure of power is likely one may expect theassociational sphere to facilitate the construc-tion of a hegemonic authoritarian regime Theabsence of a strong associational sphere shouldplace limits on authoritarian party formationand this should have consequences for the kindof authoritarianism that emerges Thus in con-trast to the Tocquevillian suggestion that theassociational sphere always constitutes a barri-er to hegemonic authoritarian regime forma-tion the Gramscian view suggests that it can bean enabling structure for this type of authori-tarian rule

CCAASSEE SSEELLEECCTTIIOONN AANNDD MMEETTHHOODD

This article develops a comparative and histor-ical approach to civic associationism and author-itarianism The relative strength of civicassociationism in Italy and its relative weaknessin Spain became causally relevant through theactivity of social agents who attempted to buildradical right-wing political movements andauthoritarian regimes in the specific historicalcircumstances of early twentieth century Italy

and Spain Thus in this study the cases shouldbe understood as members of the conceptualclass of sequences of ldquotransitions to authoritar-ian rulerdquo (for this use of case language seeAbbott 1983137 Abbott 199253) Myapproach is unusual because I synthesize aMillian comparative strategy (for examples seeBrenner 1985252 Emigh 1997651 Ertman1997 Gorski 1993 Skocpol 197937) with ananalysis of suppressed alternatives embedded inhistorical sequences (Moore 1978385ndash91Weber 1949172) I use Millrsquos comparativemethod to justify my focus on Italy and SpainSpecifically I use the method of differencewhich compares cases that are similar in theo-retically relevant respects but that differ in out-come (Mill 1971211ndash19 Skocpol and Somers1980184)

I do not however adopt a Millian approachto developing my own explanation The Millianapproach is particularly inadequate for socio-historical explanations because it does notdemand a specification of mechanisms and itleads to misleading generalizations particular-ly because the method obscures the possibilityof divergent causal pathways to similar out-comes (Burawoy 1989769ndash72 Lieberson 19911994 Steinmetz 1998173) I push beyond aconventional Millian approach because I showhow the associational sphere in Italy was con-nected to the formation of a fascist party whichthen became a central actor in the constructionof a hegemonic authoritarian regime in theItalian case The existence of the fascist partyin Italy blocked the possibility of the morerelaxed dictatorship that Benito Mussolini(1883ndash1945) tried to institute Conversely theabsence of a strong party actor in the Spanishcase explains why despite the existence offascistic currents in Spain the regime developedas an economic corporate dictatorship Thus mymethod emphasizes how associationism shouldbe understood in terms of the specific histori-cal trajectories through which authoritarianregimes consolidated in Spain and Italy in theearly 1920s This methodological strategy usespossibilities intrinsic to the historical sequencesthemselves to establish the importance of theconditions identified in the comparative sec-tion of the essay (Desai 2002 Elster1978175ndash232 Moore 1966108ndash10 Moore1978385ndash91 Weber 1949172 Zeitlin198418ndash20) This analysis produces a different

229900mdashmdashndashndashAAMMEERRIICCAANN SSOOCCIIOOLLOOGGIICCAALL RREEVVIIEEWW



Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

type of generalization than a standard Milliantheory of explanation would demand I do notaim to discover a covering law ie a statementof the type ldquoIn all instances where a relativelystrong associational sphere combines with apolitical crisis hegemonic authoritarianism willbe the outcomerdquo (for critiques of covering lawmodels see Bashkar 199841 Steinmetz1998176ndash7) Rather I seek to show that in thecontext of postndashWorld War I Italy a strong asso-ciational sphere was a crucial mechanism inthe construction of the fascist party which wasequally a crucial mechanism leading to a hege-monic authoritarian regime

The structure of my analysis is in terms ofbackground conditions and sequences of eventsThe trajectories that I select are Italy from 1870to 1926 and Spain from 1876 to 1926 I estab-lish the rough comparability of Spain and Italyin terms of their class structures and states at thebeginning of the twentieth century I then dis-cuss regional and cross-national differences inassociational strength in the two cases FinallyI show how these differences mattered forauthoritarian movements and regimes in thetwo countries Specifically I trace the diver-gent forms of political organization that simi-larly placed radical right-wing forces hit uponin different regions of Spain and Italy and in thetwo national cases

TTWWOO PPEERRIIPPHHEERRAALL CCAAPPIITTAALLIISSMMSS

An agro-industrial bloc closely connected tothe state supporting high tariffs and politicalauthoritarianism began to consolidate in Spainand Italy by the late nineteenth century Manyscholars suggest that this was major reason forauthoritarianism in both cases Big holdingsand a politically dependent labor force werecommon in preunification southern Italy and theproblem was exacerbated in the late 1860s whenthe Italian state sold off public lands mostly inthe south (25 million hectares out of a total of3 million hectares privatized) (Castronovo197558 Zamagni 199321ndash2 56 175)Southern agrarians generally pushed for tariffprotections rather than cost-cutting to supporttheir economic position Key sectors of Italianindustry (railroads steel shipbuilding cottoncloth manufacturing and sugar refining) alsodemanded and received substantial state support

(Federico 1996771ndash2 Zamagni 199389 95162)

Labor repressive large landlords in Spainconcentrated in the south and west of the coun-try (Simpson 1992108ndash9) and a huge late nine-teenth century land sell-off (10 million hectares)enlarged this group (Simpson 199544 Tortella200056 Trebilcock 1981327ndash8) As in Italyan alliance of industry and labor repressive agri-culture pushed tariff protection in the late nine-teenth century Catalan textile producers andCastilian wheat growers pushed for a total pro-tective tariff which the government enacted inDecember of 1891 (Tortella 2000199)

Thus both Italy and Spain possessed one ofthe classic preconditions of authoritarianism anascent state-dependent group of industrialistsand a significant sector of large landholderssocially dependent on the political subordina-tion of the agrarian masses These key interestscoalesced around tariff protection in both casesIn Italy landed interests in the south and the val-ley of the Po allied with the nascent steel indus-try to support a state-led industrial developmentunder the leadership of Prime Minister AgostinoDepretis (1813ndash1887) (Carocci 197574ndash5) Asimilar industrial and agrarian bloc based on analliance among Catalan textiles Basque miningand southern agriculture developed in Spain inthe late nineteenth century (Tusell 199014ndash20)

The political institutions of the two regimesalso made the development of democracy dif-ficult Neither the Italian nor the Spanish par-liament was based on an alternation betweenparties that won competitive elections Rathergovernments emerged on the basis of gentle-menrsquos agreements among deputies In liberalItaly governments were based on big parlia-mentary majorities of the center rallying behindleaders of various political hues Depretis ini-tiated this system of political co-optation calledtrasformismo (transformism) in the aftermathof the elections of 1882 when he invited mem-bers of the opposition to transform themselvesinto members of the majority (Chabod196141ndash3 Salvemini [1945] 1960xviii)Spanish liberalism was based instead on a sys-tem of party alternation between the conserva-tive liberals and the liberals called el turno (theturn) (Lyttelton 197398 Goacutemez-Navarro199160) When a turn was exhausted themonarch (1875ndash1885 Alfonso XII 1886ndash1902Mariacutea Cristina the Queen regent and




Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

1902ndash1923 Alfonso XIIrsquos posthumous sonAlfonso XIII) would appoint a new governmentfrom the loyal opposition This governmentwould then fix the elections with the complic-ity of the outgoing party giving retroactivelegitimacy to the alternation (Boyd 19794 Carr1982356ndash7) In both cases however there waslittle relationship between elections and gov-ernments

Both liberalisms also had imperfect suffrageIn Italy suffrage was limited to about two per-cent of the population until 1882 when Depretisexpanded it to seven percent Prime MinisterGiovanni Giolitti (1842ndash1928) introduced uni-versal suffrage in 1912 and a proportional elec-toral system was established in 1919 Electoralcorruption confined mostly to the south playeda key role in maintaining liberal dominance InSpain the liberal parliamentarian PraacutexedesMateo Sagasta (1825ndash1903) introduced uni-versal suffrage in 1890 (Carr 1982359 Linz1967202) Laws in the late 1880s and 1890salso guaranteed freedom of association and theright to strike (Payne 1973475 Tusell 199026)But these precocious laws were largely violat-ed in practice by local political bosses whocoerced and manipulated the population intovoting for official candidates

The two countries then started the twentiethcentury in a similar position as peripheral cap-italist societies with large regional disparitiesand powerful agrarian eacutelites In both cases thelanded aristocracy and industrial interests fusedinto a state dependent agro-industrial bloc in thelate nineteenth century Both countries werealso ruled by oligarchic liberal states It shouldcome as no surprise then that scholars haveoften stressed the similarities between the Italianand Spanish cases in terms of their politicalinstitutions and class structures (Stephens19891060ndash61) Since these two factors werequite similar in the Italian and Spanish cases itis unlikely that they can explain the divergentregimes that emerged in the 1920s

CCIIVVIICC AASSSSOOCCIIAATTIIOONNIISSMM IINN IITTAALLYY AANNDD SSPPAAIINN

On the basis of these relatively similar classand state structures Italy and Spain developeddifferently structured associational spheres Inboth cases associationism increased in a region-ally uneven pattern in the late nineteenth cen-

tury driven by early industrialization and thedevelopment of capitalist agriculture Thisregional variation shaped radical right-wingmovements in the postndashWorld War I period inboth countries However Spain and Italy differedat the national level Associationism in Spainwas generally weaker and specifically moreregionally fragmented than in Italy

From the 1890s two kinds of associations inItaly were particularly important at the popularlevel cooperatives and mutual aid societies(Bonfante 1981203ndash5 Carocci 197113ndash418ndash9) By encouraging their developmentItalian liberal eacutelites aimed to give the workingclass and peasantry a stake in the liberal systemwhile stimulating owners to fend for themselves(DeglrsquoInnocenti 198136 Fornasari andZamagni 199779) Most cooperatives wereeither consumer cooperatives providing lowcost goods or producersrsquo cooperatives distrib-uting jobs among their members(DeglrsquoInnocenti 198128ndash9 Fornasari andZamagni 199783) Using cooperatives Giolittiwanted to relieve unemployment especiallyamong the agricultural proletariat and to weak-en the socialists (Bonfante 1981205) The pol-icy encouraged the development of associationsAccording to the Lega nazionale delle cooper-ative italiane (National League of ItalianCooperative Societies) the number of Italiancooperatives increased from 2199 in 1902 to7429 in 1914 while the number of membersexpanded from about 05 million to 15 million(Fornasari and Zamagni 199781) Cooperativeswere regionally concentrated in the north andcenter of Italy in the three provinces of theEmilia Romagna Tuscany and Lombardy(Fornasari and Zamagni 199783)

The early part of the twentieth century wasa period of associational development in Spainas well As in Italy this development was region-ally uneven In north-central Spain where smallproperty holders predominated agrarian syn-dicates presided over by clergy and providingcredit for seeds machinery and equipmentestablished a strong base of operations Forexample the Catholic Agro-Social of Navarreincluded a vast network of cooperatives leisurecenters small rural mutual aid and insurancefunds and youth organizations (Muntildeoz199277) There were also Catholic mixed ownerand worker syndicates and numerous rural banksand farmersrsquo circles (Perez-Digraveaz 19917)




Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

In Spain lay popular associationism took avariety of forms from cooperatives to mutualaid societies to Casas del Pueblo (peoplersquoshouses) (Carr 1982454ndash55 Vives 1959211ndash32) Alejandro Lerroux (1864ndash1949) aRepublican politician brought the model of theCasas del Pueblo to Spain from Belgium wherethe socialists latter copied it These were part-ly political and partly cultural institutions withcommittee rooms and lending libraries (Brenan2000219) An associational census conductedby the Instituto de reformas sociales (Instituteof Social Reforms) demonstrates the explosionof popular associationism at the turn of thenineteenth century The survey included asso-ciations that were founded between 1884 and1904 and it showed that 78 percent of all work-ersrsquo associations were founded in the yearsbetween 1899 and 1904 (Instituto de reformassociales 1907286) Associationism in Spainwas regionally uneven as in Italy Most evi-dence suggests that popular associationism wasmost developed in Old Castile Navarre theBasque country and Catalonia In the first threeprovinces in north-central Spain Catholic asso-ciations of very small proprietors dominated

Associationism was restricted to workers andsmall property holders in neither case As indus-try developed in northern Italy the industrial-ists formed a syndicate called the Legaindustriale di Torino (Turin Industrial League)in 1906 (Adler 199575) Associations pursuingvarious industrial and professional interestsappeared also during the tariff struggles of the1880s (Banti 1996162) Agrarian associationswere quite important Many of these grew outof older agrarian academies established for thepurpose of protecting the economic interestsof their members and spreading technicalknowledge (Ridolfi 1999130) By the late nine-teenth century they had developed into agrari-an committees (Ridolfi 1999131ndash2) In theearly twentieth century these became more mil-itant After a series of bitter strikes led by therevolutionary syndicalists a form of radicalprecommunist socialism in 1907 and 1908landowners began to organize self-defenseleagues In 1910 these merged into the agrari-an confederation which controlled 10 subas-sociations had over 6000 members andcontrolled the Bolognese newspaper Il Restodel Carlino (Banti 1996294ndash5) White-collarprofessionals produced a version of associa-

tionism that followed the same municipal pat-tern In 1903 a federation of white-collar work-ers was established These processes intensifiedin the immediate postwar period as the organi-zational model of the trade union extended intothe ranks of white-collar workers In the peri-od immediately before the rise of fascism anew round of associational development amongwhite-collar workers took place In 1919 newassociations of lawyers and prosecutors doctorsand engineers formed (Turi 199420) From1906 to 1910 northern industrialists establishedthe Confederazione italiana dellrsquoindustria(Italian Confederation of Industry) (Banti1996300)

Upper class associationism in Spain was driv-en partly by protectionist sentiment in Cataloniaand partly by disgust over the consequences ofthe loss of Cuba in 1898 (Balfour 199780ndash3Tusell 199047 Vilar 198771) As was alsotrue of Italy one of the most active periods ofupper class associationism was during the tar-iff struggles of the 1880s (Vilar 198777ndash8)Upper class associationism in Spain tendedhowever to be fragmented by regional nation-alist sentiment This was particularly true inCatalonia and the Basque countries where itdeveloped in close relationship with regionalseparatism (Payne 197135ndash6 Payne 1973579Vilar 198776ndash7) Employersrsquo organizationswere also qualitatively weaker in Spain than inItaly As Payne (197038) says in the following

Spanish entrepreneurs were not accustomed tospending time and money on cooperative profes-sional endeavors unless faced by dire necessityEmployersrsquoassociations thus tended to be local andlimited for these groups lacked the money andinfluence of their American German or evenFrench and Italian counterparts

The role of the Catholic Church in the asso-ciational sphere also differed in Spain and ItalyThe church in Spain was a highly privilegedofficial institution and tended thus to be less pro-ductive of associationism than in Italy (Payne1973603) During the late nineteenth centuryCatholic religious orders proliferated (Callahan200052 Carr 2000232) However these espe-cially the Jesuits were wealthy and closely con-nected to political power (Brenan 200047)Grassroots Catholic organizations in Spain wereconfined mostly to the north and the east andthey were associated with Basque nationalismand Carlism Attempts to break out of the north-




Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

eastern stronghold were largely unsuccessfulpartly because of the power of the church hier-archy (Carr 2000232 Tusell 197488ndash7)Catholic workersrsquo circles originally promotedby the Catalan industrialist Claudio Loacutepez Brumarques de Comillas (1853ndash1925) and theJesuit father Antonio Vincent (1837ndash1912) weregenerally unsuccessful (Tussell 197440 87ndash8)The church in Spain thus tended to be muchmore an organization of the state than an organ-ization of society The following are Brenanrsquos(200052) scathing words

Instead of meeting the Socialists and the Anarchistson their own ground with labor organizationsfriendly societies and projects for social reform[the church] concentrated its efforts upon thesearch for a government that would suppress itsenemies by force

The position of the church in Italy differedRelations between church and state werestrained from the unification of Italy to at least1909 Indeed the papal injunction known asthe non expedit (meaning ldquoit is not expedientrdquo)formally banned Catholics from participation innational level Italian political life As a conse-

quence Catholicism in Italy tended to be muchless of a state-centered eacutelite phenomenon thanin Spain and it tended to have a stronger grassroots organization The Catholic reformersRomolo Murri (1870ndash1944) and Luigi Sturzo(1871ndash1959) imitated the methods of thereformist socialists and established coopera-tives unions mutual aid societies and popularlibraries especially in north-central Italy(Webster 19609) Ragionieri (1972294) writesthe following

The lsquowhitersquo [Catholic] workers leagues flankedmutualistic and cooperative institutions in theurban centers and in the countryside diffusingmostly in northern Italy but also in some zones ofcentral Italy and in Sicily

Thus precisely because of its difficult rela-tionship with the Italian state the church tend-ed to produce more associations in Italy than inSpain The similarities and contrasts between thetwo cases can be briefly summarized with quan-titative evidence

Table 1 shows five indicators of regionalvariation in the strength of civic associationismin prefascist Italy and it suggests a fairly clear



Table 1 Regional Variation in Civic Associationism in Italy

Members of Literate PersonsCooperatives Leagues Leagues () Periodicals

Region 1915 1912 1912 1911 1905

Basilicata 36 0 0 35 2Abruzzo and Molise 68 0 0 42 5Sardinia 64 1 321 42 3Calabria 117 1 102 30 4Campania 231 4 613 46 10Sicily 374 6 1087 42 5Marche 225 5 496 49 8Apulia 263 5 2104 41 5Umbria 104 5 646 51 11Veneto 669 5 664 75 6Piedmont 620 8 930 89 12Lazio 447 9 1002 67 26Tuscany 770 12 1116 63 13Lombardy 1477 15 1316 87 12Emilia-Romagna 1575 100 7886 67 8Liguria 389 16 1873 83 12

Note Data shown as number per 100000 inhabitants except where indicated Sources Capecchi Vittorio and Marino Livolsi 1971 La stampa quotidiana in Italia Milan Italy BompianiDeglrsquoInnocenti Maurizio 1977 Storia della cooperazione in Italia 1886-1925 Rome Italy Riuniti ForgacsDavid 1990 Italian Culture in the Industrial Era 1880ndash1980 Manchester and New York St Martinrsquos PressMinistero di agricoltura industria e commercio 1913 Statistica delle organizzazioni di lavoratori Rome ItalyOfficina poligrafica


Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

north-south split Veneto Piedmont LazioTuscany Lombardy Emilia-Romagna andLiguria had among the highest number of coop-eratives per 100000 inhabitants in 1915 high-est densities of leagues and highest densities ofmembers of leagues per population All of theseprovinces also had literacy rates of well over 50percent (ranging from 51 percent in Umbria to89 percent in Piedmont) and relatively highdensities of periodicals when controlled forpopulation

Three associational censuses redacted in1904 1913 and 1928 give a similar picture forSpain The Instituto de reformas sociales gath-ered the information for the first two censusesThe information for the third census was gath-ered in preparation for elections to de Riverarsquosnational assembly (Table 2)

This evidence like the Italian evidenceshows sharp regional imbalances in the Spanishassociational sphere The de Rivera surveyincludes information on three main kinds ofassociation associations of riches and produc-tion workersrsquo associations and cultural asso-ciations The other surveys include informationon workersrsquo employersrsquo nonprofessional asso-ciations (like choral groups) and mixed work-ers and employersrsquo associations The boldedfigures in each column represent the top five

regions on each one of these associational indi-cators Catalonia and the Basque countries inevery survey for every indicator were among thetop five regions in associational density This isparticularly important because these were pre-cisely the areas with the strongest regionalnationalist movements Valencia followed theseregions It was in the top five on five of the indi-cators and scored sixth in the density of employ-ersrsquo associations Old Castile was in the topfive on four indicators Navarre three indicatorsAragon two indicators and Galicia Leon andAsturias one each Andalusia Murcia andExtramadura were not in the top five on any ofthese indices Even in its areas of greateststrength the Spanish associational sphere wasprobably weaker than its Italian counterpart

Table 3 compares the two associationalspheres in terms of five indicators In Italy by1915 there were about 21 cooperatives per100000 inhabitants In Spain the correspondingfigure was about 3 In Italy the socialist partyhad entered parliament already by 1900 andplayed an important role in the struggles aroundthe turn of the century In Spain the socialistparty did not enter parliament until 1910 andit did not play an important political role until1931 with the rise of the second republic By thepostndashWorld War I period approximately 5 per-



Table 2 Regional Variation in Civic Associationism in Spain

Workersrsquo Workersrsquo Bossesrsquo Mixed NonprofessionalAssociations Associations Associations Associations Associations Associations

Region 1928 1904 1913 1913 1913 1913

Galicia 8 4 34 17 1 5Leon 9 6 18 25 1 21Aragon 10 4 15 46 2 18Andalusia 10 8 26 13 1 5Asturias 10 7 41 34 2 3Murcia 11 4 29 21 1 11Estremadura 12 8 11 19 1 10New Castile 16 11 28 22 2 13Catalonia 25 23 49 45 3 96Valencia 26 13 44 40 5 21Basque Country 28 20 82 47 4 33Old Castile 29 10 30 52 4 13Navarre 44 7 16 64 4 9

Note Data shown as number of associations per 100000 inhabitants Numbers in italic represent the top fiveregions within each of these associational indicatorsSources Instituto de Reformas Sociales 1915 Avance al censo de asociaciones Madrid Imprenta de laSucesora de M Minuesa Instituto de Reformas Sociales 1907 Estadiacutestica de la asociacioacuten obrera MadridImprenta de la Sucesora M Minuesa Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsioacuten 1930 Censo corporativo electoralMadrid Imprenta de los hijos de M G Hernaacutendez


Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

cent of the population was enrolled in the social-ist unions in Italy and only about 1 percent inSpain In postwar Italy about 1 percent of thepopulation was enrolled in one of the two massparties (the socialists or the popolari) while inSpain the corresponding figure was 2 percentIn Italy 1 copy of the major daily newspaper Ilcorriere della sera circulated a day for every 60Italians who could read whereas in Spain 1copy of El debate circulated for every 143Spaniards Finally literacy was about 12 percenthigher in Italy than in Spain in 1910

The evidence then suggests two conclusionsAssociationism was regionally uneven in bothcountries In Italy associations concentrated inLombardy Veneto Emilia Romagna andTuscany In Spain associations concentrated inCatalonia and the Basque countries Howeverin Spain the associational sphere was general-ly weaker and split by regional nationalismwhile this was not the case in Italy

TTHHEE PPOOSSTTWWAARR PPOOLLIITTIICCAALL CCRRIISSEESSAANNDD AAUUTTHHOORRIITTAARRIIAANNIISSMM IINN SSPPAAIINN AANNDD IITTAALLYY

Spain and Italy entered into similar politicalcrises in the postwar period The biennio rosso(red two years) in Italy from 1918 to 1920resemble the triumlenio bolchevista (Bolshevikthree years) in Spain Both were periods ofsocial unrest following a failed attempt to sig-

nificantly extend political and civil rights Inboth cases conflicts pitting an alliance of rad-icalized urban and rural workers against a coali-tion of powerful industrial and agrarian rulingclasses and small landowners undermined apostwar democratic trend A countermovementwhich emerged after the defeat of the revolu-tionary threat but presented itself as a defenseagainst revolution formed the basis for anauthoritarian seizure of power in each countryBut differences in the strength of the associa-tional sphere affected the organization of author-itarianism within and between the two countriesIn Italy where associationism was well devel-oped fascists developed a mass party organi-zation In Spain associationism had similareffects but since the associational sphere wasless developed only regionally bound proto-fascist movements were possible

Italy emerged from World War I with a deeplyshaken conservative government facing a broaddemocratic coalition based on demobilizedrecruits (Tasca 195020) Most historical evi-dence indicates that the majority of the war vet-erans were interested in an expansion of Italiandemocracy and the establishment of a con-stituent assembly This political mood grew outof democratic interventionism the movementthat had pushed Italy to join the war on the sideof the allies against the reactionary central pow-ers De Felice ([1965] 1995469) writes ldquotheidea [of a Constituent assembly] circulated a lit-



Table 3 Civic Associationism in Italy and Spain Compared

Indicators Italy Spain

Cooperatives per 100000 inhabitants in 1915 21 03Date of the entrance of the Socialist Party into Parliament 1900 1910Percentage of the Population Enrolled in Socialist Unions in the post WWI period 5 1Percentage of the Population enrolled in a political party in the post WWI period 10 02Number of Literate Persons per copy of the major daily around 1914 60 143Percent of the Population who could sign their names in 1910 62 50

Sources Forgacs David 1990 Italian culture in the industrial era 1880ndash1980 Culture industries politicsand the public Manchester and London St Martinrsquos Press Desvois Jean Michel 1978 ldquoLas trasforma-ciones de la prensa de la oligarquia a principios del siglordquo La crisis del estado espantildeol 1898ndash1936 editedby M Tuntildeon de Lara Madrid Editorial Cuadernos para el Diaacutelogo DeglrsquoInnocenti Maurizio 1977 Storiadella cooperazione in Italia 1886ndash1925 Rome Italy Riuniti Istituto de reformas sociales 1915 Avance alcenso de asociaciones Madrid Imprenta de la sucesora de M Minuesa de los Rios Linz Juan 1967 ldquoFiveThe Party System of Spain Past and Futurerdquo Party Systems and Voter Aligments Cross NationalPerspectives edited by Seymour M Lipset and Stein Rokkan New York Free Press Seton-Watson Hugh1967 Italy From Liberalism to Fascism 1870ndash1925 London England Methuen Tortella Gabriel 2000The Development of Modern Spain Cambridge MA Harvard University Press


Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

tle in all quarters of democratic and revolu-tionary interventionism and was not lackingsupporters even among the non-maximalistsocialistsrdquo For example the main veteransrsquoorganization the Associazione nazionale dicombattenti (The National Association ofCombatants) made this a central plank of itsprogram (Tasca 195020)

The immediate postwar period in Spain andparticularly in Catalonia bears many similari-ties to the Italian case Here the conservativeLliga Catalan spearheaded an assembly move-ment that linked socialists Catalan regional-ists and army reformers in a coalition thatpushed for a constitutional convention TheLliga Catalan dominated the movement whichalso included political representatives ofAsturian and Basque heavy industry (Harrison1976912) As Boyd (197978) remarks thiswas an ldquoattempt at bourgeois revolutionrdquo Inboth cases however an in part real and in partperceived red threat scuttled the possibility ofa gradual extension of democratic rights Menof property in both cases perceived this mobi-lization as especially threatening because itincluded both agrarian and industrial workersand because it came on the heels of the Russianrevolution

Italy seemed on the brink of social revolutionbetween 1918 and 1920 A mass socialist partywhich had rejected collaboration in World WarI and was explicitly committed to socialist rev-olution seemed poised to win parliamentarypower Strike activity increased dramaticallyfrom 1918 to 1920 in both industry and agri-culture (Elazar 1993189) The old liberal eacuteliteswere without political instruments to deal withthese pressures Trasformismo had basicallyceased to operate by 1913 but a truly bour-geois party had not yet developed (Chabod196141ndash2)

The situation in Spain was similar Since1917 strikes shook both Barcelona and theAndalusian countryside The high point of thisstrike wave in Barcelona was the strike againstan electrical firm called La Canadiense (TheCanadian) which shut down 70 percent of thepower to the city for over a month (Tusell1990167) During the so-called Bolshevik threeyears from 1918 to 1920 massive strikes brokeout across Andalusia and in Catalonia the anar-chists socialists and right-wing organizationsfought one another in the street (Tusell

1990169) The agrarian unrest was as threat-ening as the anarchist agitation in BarcelonaEsdaile (2000241) writes ldquoAndalusia experi-enced a wave of strikes that brought an increasein wages a reduction in working hours therecognition of anarchist unions as de facto laborexchanges and the abolition of piece worksrdquo Insome places the strikes were so successful thateven the servants and the wet nurses of thelandowners joined forces with the day laborersand men of property fled their estates to thecities (Esdaile 2000245) The monarchy cameto terms with the army organized as the Juntasde defesa an organization formed in 1916 toprotect the interests of junior officers whosesalaries had been undermined by postwar infla-tion and who resented ldquospecial promotions forafricanista officersrdquo (Payne 1967184 Boyd197976) The Spanish king Alfonso XIII metthe demands of the military reformers andimmediately used the army to crush the social-istndashanarchist alliance (Boyd 197982ndash5 Brenan200065ndash9 Tusell 1990159ndash60)

TTHHEE CCRRIISSEESS CCOOMMPPAARREEDD

Thus in Spain and Italy the basic social con-ditions for right-wing mass mobilization werepresent (Ben-Ami 198333ndash48) Preston(199013) writes ldquoIn many respects the Spanishcrisis of 1917ndash23 is analogous to the Italiancrisis of 1917ndash22rdquo The combined effects ofWorld War I and the Bolshevik revolution rad-icalized the industrial and agrarian proletariatin both cases (Carr 1982509) In different waysthe political systems of both cases faced whatwere apparently insurmountable crises (Carr1982489ndash97 Tusell 199094ndash8)

There was however a crucial differencebetween the biennio rosso and the triumleniobolchevista In Italy the crisis was intimatelylinked to the countryrsquos participation in WorldWar I Spain as a neutral country did not facethis problem Given that fascism initially aroseprecisely as a war veteransrsquo organization thisdifference is crucial One of the main conse-quences of Italyrsquos participation in World War Iwas precisely to exaggerate the differencesbetween Italian and Spanish associationalspheres already present in the prewar periodEspecially after the defeat at Caporetto in whichthe Austrians pushed the Italian army deep intoits own territory the war set off a wave of asso-




Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

ciationism that continued into the postwar peri-od (De Felice [1965] 1995388ndash9 Gentile198970ndash1) Italyrsquos postwar experience was thusan instance of the broader phenomenon thatparticipation in mass mobilizing warfare tendsto be civic association building (Skocpol199954ndash60)

In part as a result of this development in theassociational sphere the Italian state faced achallenge of a different magnitude from itsSpanish counterpart In Italy the strike wave of1918ndash1920 combined with a serious electoralchallenge by the socialist party and to a lesserextent the Catholics In Spain no such directpolitical challenge to the Restoration systememerged At no point in postwar Spain did anypolitical force challenge the monopoly of thetwo dynastic parties (Linz 1967212) The twocrises were thus socially similar but political-ly different

CCIIVVIICC AASSSSOOCCIIAATTIIOONNIISSMM AANNDDRRAADDIICCAALL RRIIGGHHTT PPOOLLIITTIICCAALL PPAARRTTIIEESSIINN SSPPAAIINN AANNDD IITTAALLYY

How then did differences in the strength ofthe associational sphere at both the regionaland cross-national levels relate to differences inthe development of fascist movements andregimes in the two cases A relatively strongassociational sphere provided the indispensableorganizational environment for the develop-ment of radical right-wing movements in bothItaly and Spain But the relative weakness andespecially regional fragmentation of theSpanish associational sphere meant that onlyregionally bound protofascisms could emerge inthis case

IITTAALLYY

Figure 1 is an overlay of fascist cell organiza-tions per 100000 people in 1921 on a mapadapted from Robert Putnamrsquos indicators ofcivic associationism from 1861ndash19202 SincePutnamrsquos approach is explicitly neo-Tocquevillian the striking correspondence

between fascist cell organizations and thestrength of civic associationism provides strongevidence for my argument (for a similar argu-ment see Kwon 2004) What explains this sur-prising relationship between the strength ofcivic associationism and fascism This sectionidentifies two mechanisms First a relativelystrong associational sphere facilitated recruit-ment In this context fascists could expand byforming a federation of allied organizations andpenetrating enemy organizations Second a rel-atively strong associational sphere providedorganizational techniques that the fascist move-ment and party adopted

RECRUITMENT The strategy for fascist expan-sion established by Umberto Pasella the firstgeneral secretary of the fascist party was tomultiply the number of cell organizations (fasci)as rapidly as possible Pasella would contact alocal sympathizer who would then organize afounding meeting The movement at the begin-ning was internally highly democratic Eachorganization was autonomous in its policiesand there was little formal doctrine constrain-ing the members (Gentile 198940ndash1) EmilioGentile (1984253) writes the following

As a self-styled lsquolibertarianrsquo movement the Fascidi combattimento had no statute or detailed regu-lations organizations and methods of strugglewere dictated by circumstances There were noties of leadership and members could also joinother parties so long as they were patriotic and anti-Bolshevik During this period [1919ndash1920] theideology and organization of fascism were formedspontaneously or by imitation thanks to local ini-tiatives often on the part of individuals and whichfrequently proved ephemeral

Fascism in Italy thus became a mass move-ment precisely by providing an alliance frame-work for various preexisting associations Twoof these were especially important patrioticassociations and agrarian associations Patrioticassociations had a prominent place in the north-central Italy from the 1860s (Ridolfi 1999156)They undertook various kinds of activities suchas dedicating monuments and conducting funer-al services Wartime mobilization basicallyfrom 1915 gave a massive push to this form ofassociationism These organizations werealready in place well before the emergence ofthe fascist party in 1921



2 An earlier draft of this paper presented in addi-tion to the Putnam map a map using the indicatorsin Table 1 Please contact the author for further infor-mation


Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937



Figure 1 Fascism and the Strength of Civic Associationism

Note Region names have been abbreviated as follows AB = Abruzzi AP = Apulia B = Basilicata CA =Campania CL = Calabria E-R = Emilia-Romagna LA = Lazio LI = Liguria LO = Lombardia MA = MarcheMO = Molise P = Piemonte SA = Sardinia SI = Sicily T = Tuscany V = Veneto Sources Adapted from thefollowing Putnam Robert D 1993 Making Democracy Work Princeton NJ Princeton University PressReprinted by permission of Princeton University Press The information on fascist cell organizations is from thefollowing Gentile Emilio 2000 Fascismo e antifascismo I partiti italiani fra le due guerre Florence Italy LeMonnier


Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

Archival documents provide some sense ofthe Italian world of patriotic associationismamong which the fascists f irst expandedConsider a political meeting that Mussoliniattended in January of 1919 two months beforehe decided to found his own organization Thiswas a meeting of various Milanese patrioticassociations to constitute a Milanese associationfor the League of Nations The Italian NationalLeague and the Wilsonian Propaganda groupcalled the meeting to which they invited theheads of 24 patriotic organizations (ACS MIDGPS 1919 Milano Document 564) Themeeting resolved to found a new association andentrusted a committee to draw up a statute andprovide for f inancing In April 1919 theCommittee for the Defense of the Rights ofItaly met to decide what kind of relationship itshould have to Mussolinirsquos newly formed fas-cio di combattimento Approximately 200 peo-ple were at the meeting and there was livelydebate in which the committee decided to coop-erate with Mussolinirsquos organization to formpropaganda squads (ACS MI DGPS 1919Milano Document 2523) In May 1919Mussolinirsquos organization was cooperating witha larger umbrella group called the fascio ofpatriotic associations (ACS MI DGPS 1919Document 15933) Across northern Italynumerous such associations formed in the peri-od from 1915 to 1919 At Cremona VeniceMilan Turin and Modena groups with nameslike the League for Civil Defense the PatrioticLeague Social Renovation the New Contractand The Italian League for the Protection ofNational Interests formed the core of subse-quent fascist cell organizations (Gentile198970ndash4)

The fascist movement expanded precisely byproviding a loose umbrella organization thatwelded these groups together IndeedMussolinirsquos initial aim in founding what hecalled the fascio di combattimento was ldquoto unitein a single fascio with a single will all the inter-ventionists and the combatants to direct themtoward a precise aim and to valorize the victo-ryrdquo (Chiurco 192998ndash9) In line with this strat-egy the fascist movement first burst onto thenational political scene as an electoral bloc andthen as a federation of local militia organiza-tions Fascism formed as a political party onlyin November 1921 (Gentile 1989316ndash84 Milzaand Berstein 1980113)

But fascism did not arise just as an allianceof patriotic associations The decisive expansionof the movement occurred in the first six monthsof 1921 as a result of its alliance with agrarianorganizations These organizations as I indi-cated previously emerged in response to daylaborer and sharecropping organizations in theearly twentieth century They organized strike-breaking funds financed local newspapersestablished banks that funneled money to smallholders (in an attempt to alter the agrarian classstructure) and financed cooperatives and insur-ance for ldquofree laborersrdquo who agreed not to jointhe socialist leagues (Ministero di AgricolturaIndustria e Commercio 191213) The fascistmovement grafted itself on to this association-al terrain This gave it an anarchic and decen-tralized character Despite the efforts of theurban leadership to control the financial basisof the movement agrarian fascism was self-financing The fascists set up informal taxationat the local level and did not transfer funds tocentral committee in Milan The agrari financedlocal fascist organizations and newspapers notthe Milanese leadership (De Felice [1966]199545 Gentile 1989166ndash8) In that senseagrarian fascism was simply a re-edition of theagrarian organizations of the prefascist period(Gentile 1989166) Fascism in the first instancewas a broad alliance of two main kinds of asso-ciations veteransrsquo associations and agrarianassociations

In addition to providing an alliance frame-work for the agrarians and the patriotic associ-ations fascism penetrated the preexistingstructure of working class associationism Forexample Roberto Farinacci (1892ndash1945) sec-ond only in importance to Mussolini amongfascist leaders used his contacts in the railroadunions which he had established as a socialistto build up a powerful local organization(Cordova 199045ndash53 De Felice [1966]1995506 Lyttelton 1987171) Further manyof the rural leagues and chambers of labor gen-erally under the pressure from the fascist mili-tia passed over in their entirety to the fascistsin the early 1920s This provided fascism withan immediate mass organization in preciselythose areas where socialist associationism hadbeen most developed in the prefascist period(Ridolf i 1997340ndash2 Tasca 1950164)Regarding the case of Ravenna Italian histori-an Maurizio Ridolfi (1996262) writes that there




Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

ldquowere several examples of self-dissolution [ofagrarian leagues] often passing directly over thefascist syndicate organizationsrdquo From Februaryto April 1921 masses of peasant leagues andunion organizations shifted as a bloc to the fas-cists (Cordova 199042ndash3) The fascists alsotook over the entire structure of cooperativesocieties erecting in 1926 the Ente nazionale dicooperazione (National Institute of Cooperation)(DeglrsquoInnocenti 198151) Fascists purged theseorganizations of their previous leadership andthen converted them to institutions linked tothe party (DeglrsquoInnocenti 198153) In 1928after the operation of purging there were stillover 3000 cooperative societies in Italy withover 800000 members (DeglrsquoInnocenti198156) The fascists did not dismantle thesocialist organizations they penetrated themand used them to build their own mass organi-zations

ORGANIZATIONAL TECHNIQUES The Italianassociational sphere in addition to facilitatingrecruitment provided specific organizationaltechniques that the fascists used in constructingtheir own party organization Many of the asso-ciations discussed previously undertook threemain types of activity resource collection cul-tural activities and social assistance Fascistparty federations conducted all three of theseactivities in ways that were strikingly similar toprefascist associations

The agrarian organizations discussed in thepreceding section depended upon contributionsfrom local owners Specifically these usuallytook the form of ldquoordinary contributionsrdquo basedon the area of land held and income andldquoextraordinary contributionsrdquo collected at fixedrates for all the members (Ministero diAgricoltura Industria e Commercio 191213)This was exactly the principle method ofresource collection used by the fascist federa-tions The fascist party secretary Achille Starace(1889ndash1945) codified the distinction betweenordinary contributions based on ability to payand extraordinary contributions in an adminis-trative act in 1935 (PNF 1935191ndash7)Administrative documents from the federationsthemselves show that this distinction was wide-ly used from the early 1930s Further prefascistItalian associations (both elite and nonelite)were often linked to a newspaper Funding anewspaper was also one of the principle activ-

ities of all fascist federations In addition to thebig national fascist papers such as Il PopolodrsquoItalia each federation had its regional publi-cation Finally the fascist federations distributedconsiderable social assistance both in the formof small loans and in kind (this information isbased on budgets contained in ACS AF PNFDN Servizi Series I boxes 708 714 827829 1123 1128 and Series II boxes 10911181 1584)

Further the fascist party used specific polit-ical techniques especially drawn from thesphere of socialist associationism to establishcontrol over the working class The clearestexample of such a technique was the laborquota One of the key achievements of social-ist organizations in the Po Valley was the impo-sition of a labor quota on employers that wouldease cyclical unemployment among day labor-ers Fascist unions generally kept labor quotasas a means of threatening agrarian employersand winning some mass support (Lyttelton1987223)

Given the continuities between fascism andthe prefascist associational sphere in terms ofrecruitment mechanisms and organization it isnot surprising that where civic associationismwas less developed especially in the south ofItaly the fascist party had enormous difficultyconsolidating Southern Italian fascism tendedto be one of three things a criminal organiza-tion tied to the agrarians a superficial politicalcover for personalistic clienteles or an apoliti-cal reform movement based on the militaryThe weakness of southern fascism wasexpressed in the greater power that prefects hadin relation to the federal secretaries in theseregions Fascism as an autonomous party organ-ization remained a phenomenon of north-cen-tral Italy (Colarizi 1977156ndash63 Corvaglia1989822 Lyttelton 1987189ndash90) The rela-tively strong associational sphere in northernItaly then provided key organizationalresources for the development of the fascistmovement and then party Thus in the Italiancase a relatively strong associational sphere farfrom constituting a barrier against the devel-opment of an authoritarian party provided thematerials out of which the fascist party wasconstructed




Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

SSPPAAIINN

The same general relationship holds for Spainwith the fundamental difference that de Riveradid not come to power on the basis of a partymovement but rather he created a state partyafter the seizure of power To the limited extentthat fascist-like movements emerged in Spain inthe early 1920s they were located in the areasof the country with dense associational spheresDe Riverarsquos state party the Unioacuten Patrioacutetica(UP) developed in part as an attempt to copyItalian fascism and in part as a union of vari-ous spontaneous efforts to support the dicta-torship Spontaneous support for the de Riveracoup concentrated in Catalonia and theprovinces of Old Castile In Catalonia the mili-tia organizations reorganized themselves into theFederacioacuten Ciacutevico-Somatenista A group ofCatholic conservatives in Valladolid in OldCastile formed the Unioacuten Patrioacutetica Castellanain November 1923 When de Rivera formallylaunched the state party in April 1924 a ldquopow-erful network of Catholic syndicates newspa-pers and ecclesiastical lay associationsrdquo formedthe initial basis of many party cells (Ben-Ami1983130) The relationship between Catholicassociationism and the UP is particularly strik-ing As the research of Goacutemez-Navarro showstwo different types of UP cell organizationemerged after 1926 In the south in the areas oflarge landholding the old political bosses fromthe liberal period penetrated the UP In the cen-ter and north however it was men coming fromsocial Catholicism either as union organizers orleaders of local Catholic political organizationssuch as the Partido Social Popular (PSP) whodominated the UP (Goacutemez-Navarro 1991255)

But these pockets of authoritarian mobiliza-tion were isolated and they could not support thedevelopment of a mass national party as in theItalian case The UP was never a dynamic partyorganization Its central office was run out of theMinistry of the Interior Furthermore many ofits members were state employees who had beenforced to join in order to keep their jobs Inaddition former political bosses of the el turnosystem flocked into the party in order gain jobsand patronage (Ben-Ami 1983140) Thusregional differences affected the UP as much asthey had the parties of the el turno The Castilianand Catalan groups competed to gain control ofthe new state party The dictatorrsquos approach tothese conflicts was to make the UP politically

ecumenical including everyone from the fasciststo the old dynastic liberals (Ben-Ami 1983131Goacutemez-Navarro 1991255ndash60) The UP had noaffiliated professional organizations little doc-trinal base and an extremely weak party pressTo join the party one had simply to be recom-mended by a member and pay an annual fee ofa single peseta (an incredibly small amountconsidering that the wages of a day laborer inthe late 1920s were between three to five pese-tas a day) (Goacutemez-Navarro 1991231ndash3) TheUP was basically a new organization for theold political bosses or caciques This was clear-ly not an organization that provided the regimewith structured support One of the mostremarkable features of the de Rivera regime isthat the dictator did not appeal to support for theUP when his other sources of support began todecline in the late 1920s (Ben-Ami 1983388)

TTHHEE RREEGGIIMMEESS CCOOMMPPAARREEDD

The existence of a strong authoritarian party inItaly and the absence of such a political forcein Spain in part determined the differencesbetween the two regimes In both Spain andItaly authoritarian regimes consolidated onlyseveral years after the seizure of power By themid 1920s both had broken with even formalconstitutional legality (De Felice [1968] 19953Goacutemez-Navarro 1991264) But the two regimesassumed an opposite stance toward their soci-eties Italian labor unions professionalsrsquogroupsand industrialistsrsquo groups were forced either todissolve or to become fascist organizationsThis entailed formal politicization of a range ofpreviously nonpolitical organizations Thus theItalian regime tended to become a hegemonicauthoritarian regime because it expanded therealm of politically relevant activity (Milza2000800) The Spanish regime by contrasttended to depoliticize the associational sphereGoacutemez-Navarro (1991394) writes the follow-ing

The regime of Primo de Rivera sought and pro-moted working class and professional associa-tionism while repressing and curtailing politicalassociationism

One key reason for these different outcomeswas the strength of the party organization in Italycompared to Spain




Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

FFRROOMM lsquolsquoLLIIBBEERRAALL FFAASSCCIISSMMrsquorsquo TTOO FFAASSCCIISSMM AASS

RREEGGIIMMEE

It was only from January 1925 (three years afterthe seizure of power in October 1922) thatMussolinirsquos government began systematically toeliminate legal opposition and subordinate asso-ciations to the fascist party (De Felice [1968]1995220ndash1 Lyttelton 1987269) The drivingforce of this process was the fascist party whichmobilized against Mussolinirsquos attempt to estab-lish a personalistic regime closely resemblingthe parliamentary dictatorships of prefascistItaly The party thus constitutes the link betweenassociationism and hegemonic authoritarian-ism in the Italian context By the end of the1920s the party established control over Italiansociety Only approved fascist unions employ-ersrsquo organizations and professional organiza-tions remained in effective existence(Rosenstock-Frank 193480ndash1) Opposition par-ties were outlawed Citizenship was now con-sidered a privilege reserved only to those whodemonstrated political loyalty to the regimeLike all hegemonic authoritarian regimes itrequired citizens ldquoto participate and specialrights and privileges [were] reserved to thosewho demonstrate[d] their active commitment byjoining the partyrdquo (Lyttelton 1987149) Thefascist regime thus demanded active rather thanpassive consent

This outcome was in part the result of thedefeat of Mussolinirsquos initial postseizure of powerstrategy of establishing a personal dictatorshipwhich resembled in many ways the transformistgovernments of Giolitti After the March onRome Mussolini moved to eliminate the fascistparty as a major player by establishing analliance with the bureaucracy the GeneralConfederation of Labor (CGL) the confedera-tion of Industry and a number of major politi-cal leaders of liberal Italy (Cordova 1990177)The effort came close to succeeding The CGLinitially seemed open to collaboration In earlyOctober 1922 the reformist unions renouncedtheir alliance with the socialist party (Milzaand Berstein 1980180) For the next two yearsan alliance between Mussolini and a depoliti-cized labor movement seemed not only possi-ble but likely (Cordova 1990168ndash78 De Felice[1966] 1995617) Many of the leaders of lib-eral Italy also seemed willing to cooperateMussolinirsquos first government was a formallyconstitutional coalition government in which

his own party had only 35 of the more than 400seats (De Felice [1966] 1995479) His entirepolicy from 1923 to 1924 was devoted to estab-lishing a Giolittian style big majority and thenpassing an electoral law that would further solid-ify this majority In order to govern Mussoliniused exactly the same techniques that Giolittihad perfected during the previous two decadesHe worked to establish a big majority of the cen-ter by appealing to individual deputies to joinhis project for a big national list which most ofthe liberal deputies joined (De Felice [1966]1995575 Sabbatucci 200366ndash7) The regimethat would have emerged from such an alliancewould clearly have been much less hegemonicthan the fascist regime actually was and it prob-ably would have closely resembled the de Riveraregime in Spain as Lyttelton (1987236) sug-gests

That Mussolini was unable to establish aregime of this type is closely linked to the factthat it ran contrary to the basic interests of thefascist party The formation of the party creat-ed a social agent whose vital interests consist-ed in politically incorporating ever-larger chunksof Italian society The more unions professionalorganizations and cultural activities came with-in orbit of the fascist party the more posts therewere for party members and the more dueswould flow into the organization (Lyttelton1987236 Pombeni 1984487) Even relative-ly limited political pluralism threatened theseinterests Mussolinirsquos maneuvering in 1922through 1924 had the predictable political con-sequence of creating an intransigent fascistalliance made of up the militia organizationsheaded primarily by Farinacci and the unionorganizations led by Edmondo Rossoni(1884ndash1965)

From 1923 to 1925 the FarinaccindashRossoniaxis organized a second wave of mass mobi-lization along two parallel lines militia squadmobilization and a union offensive Squadristmobilization throughout the summer fall andwinter 1924 combined with a series of delega-tions to Mussolini demanding a radicalizationof the regime constitute the immediate back-ground for Mussolinirsquos speech on January 31925 This indicated the end of the parliamen-tary regime in Italy From 1924 to 1926 a par-allel mobilization of the fascist unions achieveda fascist monopoly on labor representation inApril 1926 (De Felice [1966] 1995453 457




Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

Gentile 1984259ndash60 Lyttelton 1987245ndash67Milza and Berstein 1980180ndash7 Uva19701031 1052ndash3)

This analysis suggests then that the partywas the key agent establishing a hegemonicauthoritarian regime in the Italian case Asshown in the previous section the partyrsquos devel-opment in the Italian case depended upon theexistence of a strong associational sphere Thusthis institution constitutes the key link betweenassociationism and hegemonic authoritarian-ism in the Italian context

FFRROOMM TTHHEE MMIILLIITTAARRYY DDIIRREECCTTOORRAATTEE

TTOO TTHHEE CCIIVVIILL DDIIRREECCTTOORRAATTEE

As in the Italian case it was initially unclear ifde Rivera intended to break with the constitu-tional set up of 1876 and the old two-party sys-tem associated with it The transition to a regimein the Spanish case occurred between December1925 and September 1926 (Ben-Ami 198357Goacutemez-Navarro 1991265) There is little doubtthat Italian fascism constituted a model for theSpanish De Rivera and the Spanish kingAlfonso XIII traveled to Italy in November of1923 (two months after the pronunciamento) ToVictor Emmanuel III (1869ndash1947) the king ofItaly Alfonso reportedly introduced de Riveraas ldquohis Mussolinirdquo and both stated that theyhoped to ldquofollow the path of fascist Italyrdquo(Goacutemez-Navarro 1991129ndash30) The historicalconnection between the two regimes makestheir comparison especially interesting becauseit demonstrates how similar political projectsproduced different regimes in different histor-ical contexts

The establishment of the civil directorate anda national consultative assembly were the keymoments in the turn toward a regime in SpainThe UP played no role in this turn The drivingforce was de Riverarsquos desire to establish struc-tured civilian support (Goacutemez-Navarro1991267) The lack of a strong authoritarianparty meant that large areas of society remainedoutside any regime organizations For exam-ple the corporativist organizations of the deRivera regime in contrast to fascist Italy left anonly marginal role for the state party The basicprinciple of de Riverarsquos consultative assemblywas representation on the basis of ldquointerestsrdquorather than individual representation There werefour groups of representatives those of the

state those of the provinces those on their ownaccount and those of ldquoactivitiesrdquo All of theserepresentatives were selected from these fourgroups and state employees and UP party mem-bers made up a substantial part of the assemblyHowever highly specific interests such as theBasque and Catalan bourgeoisies the orangegrowers of Valencia and olive and wheat grow-ers all had men in the Assembly without hav-ing any formal relationship to the UP(Goacutemez-Navarro 1991277) The point of thisassembly was largely to represent importanteconomic interests socially but not politically(Goacutemez-Navarro 1991282)

The de Rivera Spanish regime set up a sys-tem of labor relations that was modeled onItalian fascism But there was a huge differ-ence between them The fascists establishedregime organizations for all interest groupsThe de Rivera regime pursued a different strat-egy The regime repressed communist and anar-chist organizations and compromised withsocialist and Catholic ones The split betweenthese two strategies is apparent from the dif-ferent way that strikes were handled accordingto who led them If the striking organizationswere affiliated with the communists or anar-chists then they were turned over to generalSeveriano Martiacutenez Anido (1862ndash1938) at theMinistry of the Interior and therefore dealt withas a police matter If the striking organizationswere affiliated with the socialists and thus con-sidered politically safe Eduardo Aunoacutes Peacuterez(1894ndash1967) at the Ministry of Labor dealt withthe strike as a matter of social policy (Goacutemez-Navarro 1991412ndash3) Thus the de Riveraregime institutionalized the division betweenpolitical and apolitical activity a distinctionthat the Italian fascist regime deliberately soughtto erase Thus while the Mussolini regime after1926 drilled workers professionals and own-ers into organizations controlled by the politi-cal organization of the fascist party in deRiverarsquos regime the workers could belong toany organization they liked and owners inter-acted with the regime largely through their ownorganizations (Ben-Ami 1983292) Furtherunlike in fascist Italy in de Riverarsquos Spain work-ers could strike as long as they made no polit-ical demands (Ben-Ami 1983309)

The Italian regime by 1926 consolidated asa hegemonic authoritarian regime In contrastthe de Rivera regime consolidated as an eco-




Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

nomic-corporate dictatorship relying on the tra-ditional instruments of the police and the armyand a system of informal cooptation of interestgroups The relationship of the regime to itskey supporting interests was quite differentfrom the case of the fascist regime The deRivera regime established a sharp divisionbetween social and political organizationswhereas the fascist regime overcame this divi-sion to a certain extent

DDIISSCCUUSSSSIIOONN

The analysis developed in the previous sectionsuggests that a fascist regime in Italy emergedpartly as the result of a relatively strong asso-ciational sphere in the prefascist period Whileassociational development occurred in Spainas well it was weaker These differences in theassociational sphere affected the strength ofauthoritarian party organizations in the twocases I show that fascist membership and cellorganizations closely followed associationalstrength in Italy The same general relationshipheld in Spain Where the associational spherewas relatively strong in Spain the UP was amore viable organization than it was in areas ofweak associational development Howeverbecause of regional differences and a generallack of associational development the partyorganization in Spain was weaker Differenttypes of authoritarian regimes resulted In Italya hegemonic authoritarian fascist regimeemerged partly as a result of the fascist partyrsquosstruggle against the central leadership In Spainthe absence of a strong party allowed the regimeto develop as a more relaxed economic corpo-rate dictatorship This evidence challenges theTocquevillian account of authoritarianismAssociationism in Italy enabled both authori-tarian party formation and indirectly the con-solidation of a hegemonic authoritarian regimeIn Spain precisely the weakness of the associ-ational sphere undermined both processes

Other studies point in a similar direction(Berman 1997 Hagtvet 1980 Kaufman 1999Koshar 1986 Kwon 2004) The research ofKoshar (198696) Hagvet (1980) and Berman(1997) has effectively demonstrated that theWeimar Republic in Germany had a dense asso-ciational sphere Hagtvet (1980) shows that theconstituencies among which the NationalSocialists drew the most support white-collar

employees and small peasants had among thestrongest intermediate associations in theWeimar period Further the regional distribu-tion of Spanish mass right-wing mobilization inthe Second Republic is interesting Historianssuggest that mass right-wing mobilization con-centrated in the Basque Provinces and inNavarre (Payne 1980428) As I show thesewere also provinces that had among the high-est levels of civic associationism in Spain Somework on contemporary Eastern Europe sug-gests that a strong associational sphere cansometimes aid parties of the radical right (Fisher200391) The relationship between associa-tionism and radical political parties does notseem to be restricted to right-wing radicalismFor example Bonnell (1983444) shows thatthe most organized craft conscious sections ofthe workforce not deracinated rural migrantswere most susceptible to radical political ideasin late Tsarist Russia Service (197936) alsoemphasizes the importance of working classself-organization to the ascendancy of theBolsheviks

These findings imply important theoreticalconsequences for theories of civic association-ism As I indicate at the beginning of this arti-cle Tocquevillian work emphasizes twomechanisms by which associations block thedevelopment hegemonic authoritarian regimesinsulation and organizational balancingTocquevillians tend to argue that strong asso-ciational spheres insulate populations from overpoliticization (Kornhauser 195997) Thusscholars in this tradition suggest that by aggre-gating interests around local concerns civicassociationism promotes political moderation(Putnam 1993 16ndash38 Tocqueville 1988523)The absence of local level interest aggregationleaves the way open for totalitarian movementsthat appeal to mythical and inherently unreal-izable political projects (Arendt 1958311Kornhauser 195946 64) Tocquevillians alsosuggest that a dense associational sphere shouldinhibit hegemonic authoritarian regime forma-tion by substituting private initiative for state ini-tiative and by balancing state power Both ofthese claims seem untenable on the evidencepresented here and in much other workMembership in associations oriented towardlocal and readily understandable political proj-ects not only seems compatible with but anessential ingredient of the organization of anti-




Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

democratic mass party formation in a variety ofhistorical contexts Furthermore strong asso-ciational spheres can operate as highly effectivetransmission belts for the consolidation of hege-monic authoritarian regimes after an authori-tarian seizure of power

The Tocquevillian argument is based on atwo-sector model in which the associationalsphere and the sphere of states and mass partiesact to a certain degree as alternatives It is pre-cisely this model that Gramsci (1971258ndash9)implicitly challenges For Gramscirsquos work focus-es on the relationship between the association-al party and state spheres rather than parsingthem into separate conceptual boxes TheGramscian argument emphasizes the impor-tance of political context in shaping the rela-tionship between the associational sphere andregime formation Civic associations forGramsci are an organizational layer of modernsociety that may be mobilized for various polit-ical projects None of this is to suggest thatassociationism is unimportant For as this arti-cle shows associationism can shape authori-tarian regimes In this sense my argument hasimplications for theories of regime variationThe categories of dictatorship and democracy(or for an earlier period constitutionalism andabsolutism) miss important dimensions of vari-ation within each type Much recent work on thestate challenges these conceptualizations eitherby focusing on the microprocesses of politicalpower such as discipline (Gorski 2003) or bystressing the relative independence of adminis-trative infrastructure from regime form (Ertman1997) In the spirit of this work this articlestresses hegemony as an independent axis ofregime variation One of the most importantways that authoritarian regimes vary is in thedegree to which they politicize the population(that is achieve hegemony) rather than basingthemselves on a pragmatic bargain with keysocial groups It is in trying to understand thisaspect of regime variation that scholars shouldtake the development of civic associationismseriously As I show in two cases that were like-ly to generate some kind of authoritarianism thedegree of associational development explainsthe specific form that authoritarianism took Inthis sense my argument is a plea to bring the lit-erature on civic associationism directly to bearon the problem of regime variation This linksto a final objective of this article to develop ana-

lytically and to demonstrate the empirical use-fulness of Gramscirsquos political sociologyGramscirsquos reception in the social sciences andspecifically in sociology has been narrowlyfocused around culturalist and economisticinterpretations of hegemony But Gramsci alsohad a highly original and empirically usefulpolitical sociology His central innovation wasto develop a typology of regimes based on theconcept of hegemony that breaks radically withthe standard distinction between democracyand dictatorship The key point is that hege-mony constitutes an analytically distinct axis ofregime variation connected to the strength of theassociational sphere Future scholarship shouldattend to the interrelationship of associationismand hegemony in both authoritarian and dem-ocratic contexts

Dylan Riley is Assistant Professor of Sociology at theUniversity of California Berkeley His main interestis the relationship between associationism and pol-itics which he has examined in a variety of histori-cal and national contexts He is currently working ona book manuscript investigating the role of civicassociationism and authoritarian regime variation ininterwar Europe

MMAANNUUSSCCRRIIPPTT SSOOUURRCCEESS

Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACS) MinisterodellrsquoInterno (MI) Direzione generale pubblicasicurezza (DGPS)

mdashmdashmdash Archivi Fascisti (AF) Partito NazionaleFascista (PNF) Direttorio nazionale (DN) ServiziSeries IndashII

RREEFFEERREENNCCEESS

Abbott Andrew 1983 ldquoSequences of Social EventsConcepts and Methods for the Analysis of Orderin Social Processesrdquo Historical Methods16129ndash47

mdashmdashmdash 1992 ldquo2 What Do Cases Do Some Noteson Activity in Sociological Analysisrdquo Pp 53ndash82in What is a Case edited by Charles C Ragin andHoward S Becker Cambridge EnglandUniversity of Cambridge Press

Adler Frank 1995 Italian Industrialists fromLiberalism to Fascism Cambridge MACambridge University Press

Anderson Perry 1965 ldquoProblems of SocialistStrategyrdquo Pp 221ndash90 in Towards Socialism IthacaNY Cornell University Press

Arato Andrew 1981 ldquoCivil Society Against theState Poland 1980ndash81rdquo Telos A Quarterly Journalof Radical Thought 4723ndash47




Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

Arendt Hannah 1958 The Origins ofTotalitarianism Cleveland OH World PublishingCompany

Balfour Sebastian 1997 The End of the SpanishEmpire 1898ndash1923 Oxford England ClarendonPress

Banti Alberto 1996 Storia della borghesia ital-iana Rome Italy Donzelli

Bashkar Roy 1998 ldquo2 Philosophy and ScientificRealismrdquo Pp 16ndash47 in Critical Realism EssentialReadings edited by Margaret Archer New YorkRoutledge

Bellamy Richard and Darrow Schechter 1993Gramsci and the Italian State New YorkManchester University Press

Ben-Ami Shlomo 1983 Fascism From Above TheDictatorship of Primo de Rivera in Spain1923ndash1930 Oxford England Clarendon Press

Berman Sheri 1997 ldquoCivil Society and the Collapseof the Weimar Republicrdquo World Politics49401ndash29

Bonnell Victoria E 1983 Roots of RebellionWorkersrsquo Politics and Organizations in StPetersburg and Moscow 1900ndash1914 BerkeleyCA University of California Press

Bonfante Guido 1981 ldquoLa legislazione coopera-tivistica in Italia dallrsquoUnitagrave ad oggirdquo Pp 191ndash252in Il movimento cooperativo in Italia Storia eproblemi edited by Giulio Sapelli Turin ItalyEinaudi

Bottai Giuseppe 1934 Esperienza CorporativaFlorence Italy Vallecchi editore

Boyd Carolyn P 1979 Praetorian Politics in LiberalSpain Chapel Hill NC The University of NorthCarolina Press

Brenan Gerald 2000 The Spanish Labyrinth TheSocial and Political Background of the SpanishCivil War Cambridge England CambridgeUniversity Press

Brenner Robert 1985 ldquoThe Agrarian Roots ofEuropean Capitalismrdquo Pp 213ndash327 in The BrennerDebate edited by TH Aston and C PhilpinCambridge England Cambridge University Press

Burawoy Michael 1989 ldquoTwo Methods in Search ofScience Skocpol versus Trotskyrdquo Theory ampSociety 18759ndash805

Carocci Giampiero 1971 Giolitti e lrsquoetagrave giolittianala politica italiana dallrsquoinizio del secolo alla primaguerra mondiale Turin Italy Giulio Einaudi edi-tore

mdashmdashmdash 1975 Storia drsquoItalia dallrsquoUnitagrave ad oggiMilan Italy Feltrinelli

Callahan William J 2000 The Catholic Church inSpain 1875ndash1998 Washington DC The CatholicUniversity of America Press

Carr Raymond 1982 Spain 1808ndash1975 OxfordEngland Oxford University Press

mdashmdashmdash 2000 ldquoLiberalism and Reactionrdquo Pp

205ndash242 in Spain A History edited by RaymondCarr Oxford England Oxford University Press

Castronovo Valerio 1975 La storia economica IStoria drsquoItalia vol 4 DallrsquoUnitagrave a oggi TurinItaly Giulio Einaudi Editore

Chabod Federico 1961 LrsquoItalia contemporanea(1918ndash1948) Lezioni alla Sorbona Turin ItalyEinaudi

Chiurco GA 1929 Storia della rivoluzione fascistaVolume I anno 1919 Florence Italy Vallecchieditore

Colarizi Simona 1977 Dopoguerra e fascismo inPuglia (1919ndash1926) Rome Italy Laterza

Cordova Ferdinando 1990 Le origini dei sindacatifascisti 1918ndash1926 Florence Italy La NuovaItalia

Corvaglia Ennio 1989 ldquoTra sviluppo e consensodalla crisi del blocco agrario al corporativismodipendenterdquo Pp 812ndash900 in Storia drsquoItalia LeRegioni dallrsquoUnitagrave ad oggi La Puglia Turin ItalyEinaudi

De Felice Renzo [1965] 1995 Mussolini il rivo-luzionario 1883ndash1920 Turin Italy Einaudi

mdashmdashmdash [1966] 1995 Mussolini il fascista La con-quista del potere 1921ndash1925 Turin Italy Einaudi

mdashmdashmdash [1968] 1995 Mussolini il fascista IILrsquoorganizzazione dello Stato fascista 1925ndash1929Turin Italy Einaudi

mdashmdashmdash [1981] 1996 Mussolini il duce II Lo Statototalitario 1936ndash1940 Turin Italy Einaudi

DeglrsquoInnocenti Maurizio 1981 ldquoGeografia e strut-ture della cooperazione in Italiardquo Pp 3ndash87 in Ilmovimento cooperativo in Italia Storia e proble-mi edited by Giulio Sapelli Turin Italy Einaudi

Desai Manali 2002 ldquoThe Relative Autonomy ofParty Practices A Counterfactual Analysis of LeftParty Ascendancy in Kerala India 1934ndash1940rdquoAmerican Journal of Sociology 108616ndash57

Elazar Dahlia Sabina 1993 ldquoThe Making of ItalianFascism The Seizure of Power 1919ndash1922rdquoPolitical Power and Social Theory 8173ndash217

Elster Jon 1978 Logic and Society New YorkWhiley

Emigh Rebecca 1997 ldquoThe Power of NegativeThinking The Use of Negative Case Methodologyin the Development of Sociological TheoryrdquoTheory and Society 26649ndash84

Ertman Thomas 1997 Birth of the LeviathanBuilding States and Regimes in Medieval andEarly Modern Europe Cambridge MACambridge University Press

Esdaile Charles J 2000 Spain in the Liberal AgeLondon England Blackwell

Federico Giovanni 1996 ldquoItaly 1860ndash1940 A Little-Known Success Storyrdquo The Economic HistoryReview 49764ndash86

Fisher Sharon 2003 ldquo5 Contentious politics inCroatia The war veteransrsquomovementrdquo Pp 74ndash92in Uncivil Society Contentious politics in post-




Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

communist Europe edited by Petr Kopecky andCas Mudde New York Routledge

Fornasari Massimo and Vera Zamagni 1997 Il movi-mento cooperativo in Italia Un profilo storico-economico (1854ndash1992) Florence Italy VallecchiEditore

Friedrich Carl J and Zbigniew K Brzezinski 1966Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy NewYork Frederick A Prager

Gannet Robert T 2003 ldquoBowling Ninepins inTocquevillersquos Townshiprdquo American PoliticalScience Review 971ndash16

Gentile Emilio 1984 ldquoThe Problem of the Party inItalian Fascismrdquo Journal of Contemporary History19251ndash274

mdashmdashmdash 1989 Storia del Partito fascista1919ndash1922 Movimento e milizia Bari ItalyLaterza

mdashmdashmdash 2000 Fascismo e antifascismo i partitiitaliani fra le due guerre Florence Italy Felice LeMonnier

Goldberg Chad Allan 2001 ldquoSocial Citizenshipand Reconstructed Tocquevillerdquo AmericanSociological Review 66289ndash315

Goacutemez-Navarro Joseacute Luis 1991 El reacutegimen dePrimo de Rivera Reyes dictaduras y dictadoresMadrid Spain Ediciones Caacutetedra

Gorski Philip S 1993 ldquoThe Protestant EthicRevisited Disciplinary Revolution and StateFormation in Holland and Prussiardquo AmericanJournal of Sociology 99265ndash316

mdashmdashmdash 2003 The Disciplinary RevolutionCalvinism and the Rise of the State in EarlyModern Europe Chicago IL University ofChicago Press

Gramsci Antonio 1971 Selections from the PrisonNotebooks New York International Publishers

Hagvet Bernt 1980 ldquoThe Theory of Mass Societyand the Collapse of the Weimar Republic A Re-Examiniationrdquo Pp 67ndash117 in Who Were theFascists Social Roots of European Fascism edit-ed by Stein Ugelvik Larsen Bernt Hagtvet and JanPetteryOslo Norway Univertetsvorlaget

Harrison Joseph 1976 ldquoBig Business and the Failureof Right-Wing Catalan Nationalism 1901ndash1923rdquoThe Historical Journal 19901ndash18

Instituto de reformas sociales 1907 Estadiacutestica dela asociacioacuten obrera Madrid Spain Imprenta dela sucesora de M Minuesa de los Rios

Kaufman Jason 1999 ldquoThree Views ofAssociationalism in 19th-Century America AnEmpirical Examinationrdquo American Journal ofSociology 1041296ndash345

Kornhauser William 1959 The Politics of MassSociety Glencoe IL Free Press

Koshar Rudy 1986 Social Life Local Politics andNazism Marburg 1880ndash1935 Chapel Hill NCThe University of North Carolina Press

Kwon Hyeong-Ki 2004 ldquoAssociations Civic

Norms and Democracy Revisiting the ItalianCaserdquo Theory and Society 33135ndash66

Laclau Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe [1985] 2001Hegemony and Socialist Strategy Towards aRadical Democratic Politics New York Verso

Lerderer Emil 1940 State of the Mases the Threatof the Classless Society New York W W Nortonamp Company Publishers

Lieberson Stanley 1991 ldquoSmall Nrsquos and BigConclusions An Examination of the Reasoning inComparative Studies Based on a Small Number ofCasesrdquo Social Forces 70307ndash20

mdashmdashmdash 1994 ldquoMore on the Uneasy Case for UsingMill-Type Methods in Small-N ComparativeStudiesrdquo Social Forces 721225ndash37

Linz Juan J 1967 ldquoThe Party System of Spain Pastand Futurerdquo Pp 197ndash282 in Party Systems andVoter Alignments Cross-National Perspectivesedited by Seymour M Lipset and Stein RokkanNew York The Free Press

mdashmdashmdash 1970 ldquoAn Authoritarian Regime SpainrdquoPp 251ndash83 in Mass Politics Studies in PoliticalSociology edited by Erik Allardt and SteinRokkan New York Free Press

mdashmdashmdash 2003 Fascismo autoritarismo totali-tarismo connessioni e differenze Rome ItalyIdeazione editrice

Lyttelton Adrian 1973 ldquoEl patronazgo en la Italia deGiolitti (1892ndash1924)rdquo Revista de Occidente12794ndash117

mdashmdashmdash 1987 The Seizure of Power Fascism inItaly 1919ndash1929 London England Weidenfeldand Nicolson

Mill John Stuart 1971 A Logical Critique ofSociology Edited by Ronald Fletcher LondonEngland Michael Joseph

Milza Pierre 2000 Mussolini Rome Italy Caroccieditore

Miliza Pierre and Berstein 1980 Le fascisme ital-ien 1919ndash1945 Paris France Seuil

Ministero di Agricoltura Industria e Commercio1912 Le organizzazioni padronali1 ndash Le agrarieRome Italy Officina poligrafica italiana

Moore Barrington 1966 Social Origins ofDictatorship and Democracy Lord and Peasant inthe Making of the Modern World Boston MABeacon Press

mdashmdashmdash 1978 Injustice The Social Bases ofObedience and Revolt White Plains NY MESharpe

Muntildeoz Manuel Ferrer 1992 Elecciones y partidospoliticos en Navarra durante la segundaRepublica Pamplona Gobierno de NavarraDepartamento de Educacion y Cultura

Panunzio Sergio 1987 Il fondamento giuridico delfascismo Rome Italy Bonacci

Partito Nazionale Fascista (PNF) 1935 (XIV) Attidel PNF Rome Italy Fratelli Palombi

Pavone Claudio 1998 ldquoFascismo e dittature prob-




Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

lemi di una definizionerdquo Pp 67ndash86 in Nazismofascismo comunismo Totalitarismi a confrontoedited by Marcello Flores Milan Italy BrunoMondadori

Paxton Pamela 2002 ldquoSocial Capital andDemocracy An Interdependent RelationshiprdquoAmerican Sociological Review 67254ndash77

Payne Stanley 1967 Politics and the Military inModern Spain Stanford CA Stanford UniversityPress

mdashmdashmdash 1970 The Spanish Revolution New YorkWW Norton and Company

mdashmdashmdash 1971 ldquoCatalan and Basque NationalismrdquoJournal of Contemporary History 615ndash51

mdashmdashmdash 1973 A History of Spain and Portugal inTwo Volumes (2) Madison WI The University ofWisconsin Press

mdashmdashmdash 1980 ldquoSocial Composition and RegionalStrength of the Spanish Falangerdquo Pp 423ndash34 inWho Were the Fascists Social Roots of EuropeanFascism edited by Stein Ugelvik Larsen BerntHagtvet and Jan Petter Myklebust Oslo NorwayUniversitetsvorlaget

Perez-Digraveaz Victor 1991 Structure and Change ofCastilian Peasant Communities A SociologicalInquiry into Rural Castile 1550ndash1990 New YorkGarland

Pombeni Paolo 1984 Demagogia e tirannide unostudio sulla forma-partito del fascismo BolognaItaly Il Mulino

Preston Paul 1990 The Politics of Revenge Fascismand the Military in Twentieth-century SpainLondon England Unwin Hyman

Putnam Robert 1993 Making Democracy WorkCivic Traditions in Modern Italy Princeton NJPrinceton University Press

mdashmdashmdash 2000 Bowling Alone The Collapse andRevival of American Community New York ATouchstone Book

Ragionieri Ernesto 1972 La storia politica e socialeStoria drsquoItalia vol 4 DallrsquoUnitagrave a oggi TurinItaly Einaudi

Ridolfi Maurizio 1996 ldquoCircoli associazioni e ritidel consensordquo Pp 223ndash83 in Storia di Ravenna VLrsquoetagrave Risorgimentale e Contemporanea VeniceItaly Marsilio editori

mdashmdashmdash 1997 ldquoLa terra delle associazioni Identitasociali organizzazione degli interessi e tradizionicivicherdquo Pp 276ndash371 in Storia drsquoItalia Le regionidallrsquounita a oggi LrsquoEmilia-Romagna edited byRoberto Finzi Turin ItalyEinaudi

mdashmdashmdash1999 Interessi e passioni Storia dei parti-ti politici italiani tra lrsquoEuropa e il MediiterraneoMilan Italy Bruno Mondadori

Rosenstock-Frank L 1934 Lrsquoeconomie corporativefasciste en doctrine et en fait Paris FranceLibraire Universitaire J Gamber

Sabbatucci Giovanni 2003 Il transformismo come

sistema Saggio sulla storia politica dellrsquoItaliaunita Rome Italy Laterza

Salvemini Gaetano [1945] 1960 ldquoIntroductoryEssayrdquo Pp xiiindashxxii in Italy in the Giolittian EraItalian Democracy in the Making 1900ndash1914edited by A William Salamone Philadelphia PAUniversity of Pennsylvania Press

Schofer Evan and Marion Fourcade-Gourinchas2001 ldquoThe Structural Contexts of CivicEngagement Voluntary Association Membershipin Comparative Perspectiverdquo AmericanSociological Review 66806ndash28

Service Robert 1979 The Bolshevik Party inRevolution A Study in Organizational ChangeLondon England Barnes and Noble

Simpson James 1992 ldquoLos liacutemites del crecimentoagrario Espantildea 1860ndash1936rdquo Pp 103ndash37 in Eldesarrollo ecoacutemico en la Europa del Sur Espantildeae Italia en perspectiva histoacuterica Madrid SpainAlianza Editorial

mdashmdashmdash 1995 Spanish agriculture the long Siesta1765ndash1965 Cambridge England CambridgeUniversity Press

Skocpol Theda 1979 States and Social RevolutionsA Comparative Analysis of France Russia andChina Cambridge England CambridgeUniversity Press

mdashmdashmdash 1999 ldquoHow Americans Became CivicrdquoPp 27ndash80 in Civic Engagement in AmericanDemocracy New York Brookings Institution Pressand Russell Sage Foundation

Skocpol Theda and Morris P Fiorina 1999 ldquoMakingSense of the Civic Engagement Debaterdquo Pp 1ndash23in Civic Engagement and AmericanDemocracyNew York Brookings Institution Pressand Russell Sage Foundation

Skocpol Theda and Margaret Somers 1980 ldquoTheUses of Comparative History in MacrosocialInquiryrdquo Comparative Studies in Society andHistory 22174ndash197

Steinmetz George 1998 ldquoCritical Realism andHistorical Sociology A Review ArticlerdquoComparative Studies in Society and History40170ndash86

Stephens John 1989 ldquoDemocratic Transition andBreakdown in Western Europe 1870ndash1939 A Testof the Moore Thesisrdquo American Journal ofSociology 941019ndash77

Tasca Angelo 1950 Nascita e avvento del fascismolrsquoitalia dal 1918 a 1922 Florence Italy La NuovaItalia

Tocqueville Alexis 1988 Democracy in AmericaNew York Perennial

Tortella Gabriel 2000 The Development of ModernSpain an Economic History of the Nineteenthand Twentieth Centuries Cambridge MA HarvardUniversity Press

Trebilcock Clive 1981 The Industrialization of the




Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

Continental Powers 1780ndash1914New YorkLongman

Turi Gabriele 1994 Libere professioni e fascismoBari Italy Laterza

Tusell Javier 1974 Historia de la democracia cris-tiana en Espantildea Tomo I antecedents y CEDAMadrid Spain Edicusa

mdashmdashmdash 1990 Manual de historia de Espantildea SigloXX Madrid Spain Hermanos Garcia Noblejas

Uva Bruno 1970 ldquoGli scioperi dei metallurgici ital-iani del marzo 1925rdquo Storia Contemporanea11011ndash77

Vilar Pierre 1987 Cataluntildea en la Espantildea moder-na Investigaciones sobre los fundamentoseconoacutemicos de las estructuras nacionales 1Introduccioacuten El medio natural y el medio histoacuteri-co Barcelona Spain Editorial Criacutetica

Vives J Vicens 1959 Historia social y econoacutemico

de Espantildea y America vol IV Barcelona SpainEditorial Teide

Weber Max 1949 The Methodology of the SocialSciences New York Free Press

Webster Richard 1960 The Cross and the FascesChristian Democracy and Fascism in ItalyStanford CA University of Stanford Press

Wuthnow Robert 1991 ldquoTocquevillersquos QuestionReconsidered Voluntarism and Public Discoursein Advanced Industrial Societiesrdquo Pp 288ndash308in Between States and Markets the VoluntarySector in Comparative Perspective edited byRobert Wuthnow Princeton NJ PrincetonUniversity Press

Zamagni Vera 1993 The Economic History of Italy1860ndash1900 Oxford England Clarendon Press

Zeitlin Maurice 1984 The Civil Wars in Chile orThe Bourgeois Revolutions that Never WerePrinceton NJ Princeton University Press




Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

I develop a historical and comparative analysisof Italian fascism and Spanish authoritarian-ism in the early 1920s My main argument is thatthe Italian fascist party could emerge only in thecontext of a relatively strong associationalsphere and the Italian fascist hegemonic author-itarian regime could emerge only because therewas a strong fascist party Radical right-wingforces were unable to constitute themselves asa fascist party in the Spanish case where civicassociationism was relatively weak Thus sig-nificant pockets of nonpoliticized social exis-tence remained in Spain The result was aneconomic-corporate dictatorship

TTHHEEOORRIIZZIINNGG CCAAPPIITTAALLIISSTTAAUUTTHHOORRIITTAARRIIAANNIISSMM CCIIVVIICCAASSSSOOCCIIAATTIIOONNIISSMM AANNDD HHEEGGEEMMOONNYY

Drawing on Gramsci (1971259) I use the termhegemony to refer to the political organizationof consent Some regimes devote considerableeffort to the political constitution of their sup-porting social interests while others adopt amore pragmatic bargaining orientation to theseHegemonic authoritarian regimes as a conse-quence of their concerted organization of con-sent tend to eliminate the distinction betweenpublic and private existence penetrating theassociational sphere and reducing the realm ofnonpolitically relevant activities In contrasteconomic corporate dictatorships tolerate andencourage nonpolitical organizations general-ly basing themselves on alliances with preex-isting groups that they neither create nor greatlyalter Thus the main theoretical puzzle here isldquoWhy do authoritarian regimes with similarbases of social support differ in their degree ofhegemonyrdquo I seek to relate these different out-comes to differences in the strength of the asso-ciational sphere prior to the seizure of power inthe cases of Spain and Italy in the early twenti-eth century (Gramsci 1971216 259)1 The asso-ciational sphere refers to a third sector betweenstates and markets comprised mostly of volun-tary associations such as mutual aid societies

and cooperatives employersrsquo organizationsunions chambers of labor and democraticallyoriented political parties (Paxton 2002 Schoferand Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001 Putnam200015ndash28 Skocpol and Fiorina 19992Wuthnow 19917)

I consider two theories of the relationshipbetween associationism and authoritarianismthe Tocquevillian view and the Gramscian alter-native for which I will argue Tocquevilliansargue that civic associationism protects thesphere of private existence making hegemonicauthoritarian regime formation difficult TheTocquevillian approach identifies two specificmechanisms insulation and organizational bal-ancing The insulation argument suggests thatthe more developed the sphere of associationsthe more difficult it will be to establish author-itarian party organizations because such organ-izations appeal primarily to persons who aresocially atomized and therefore lack well-structured interests (Arendt 1958311Kornhauser 195946 64 Tocqueville 1988523)The organizational balancing argument sug-gests that associations provide people the meansto act without invoking the state and such asso-ciations also balance state authority by creatingalternative power centers (Putnam 2000345Tocqueville 1988516) The Tocquevillian analy-sis of authoritarianism and civic associationismfollows logically from this view Strong asso-ciational spheres should present an obstacle tothe formation of authoritarian parties and hege-monic authoritarian regimes (Arendt 1958323Gannett 200311ndash12 Goldberg 2001Kornhauser 195976ndash90 Lerderer 194072Tocqueville 1988516)

The Gramscian view rejects the Tocquevillianclaim of a zero sum relationship between socialself-organization and political power (Bellamyand Schechter 1993123 Gramsci 1971160Laclau and Mouffe [1985] 2001xvii) ForGramsci the sphere of associations is importantbecause it produces technologies of politicalrule that potentially can extend the reach of thestate (Bellamy and Schecther 1993122Gramsci 1971259) More specifically Gramscirejects the two basic arguments of theTocquevillian position First for Gramsci asso-ciations are not necessarily opposed to author-itarian parties Such parties are based preciselyon an integration of local and sectoral inter-ests not on a socially atomized mass (Anderson



1 Although generally not stated in Gramscian termsthis distinction is quite common in the literature onauthoritarianism (De Felice [1981] 199610ndash11Gentile 2000240ndash41 Linz 1970262 200329ndash4068 Pavone 199875)


Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937












Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937












Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937












Region 1915 1912 1912 1911 1905




Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Region 1928 1904 1913 1913 1913 1913




Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937














Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937












Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937





IITTAALLYY










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937








Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

SSPPAAIINN











Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937


RREEGGIIMMEE









Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937













Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937












Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937












Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937












Region 1915 1912 1912 1911 1905




Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Region 1928 1904 1913 1913 1913 1913




Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937














Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937












Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937





IITTAALLYY










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937








Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

SSPPAAIINN











Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937


RREEGGIIMMEE









Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937













Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937












Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937












Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937












Region 1915 1912 1912 1911 1905




Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Region 1928 1904 1913 1913 1913 1913




Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937














Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937












Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937





IITTAALLYY










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937








Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

SSPPAAIINN











Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937


RREEGGIIMMEE









Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937













Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937












Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937












Region 1915 1912 1912 1911 1905




Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Region 1928 1904 1913 1913 1913 1913




Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937














Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937












Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937





IITTAALLYY










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937








Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

SSPPAAIINN











Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937


RREEGGIIMMEE









Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937













Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937












Region 1915 1912 1912 1911 1905




Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Region 1928 1904 1913 1913 1913 1913




Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937














Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937












Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937





IITTAALLYY










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937








Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

SSPPAAIINN











Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937


RREEGGIIMMEE









Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937













Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937












Region 1915 1912 1912 1911 1905




Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Region 1928 1904 1913 1913 1913 1913




Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937














Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937












Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937





IITTAALLYY










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937








Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

SSPPAAIINN











Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937


RREEGGIIMMEE









Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937













Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Region 1928 1904 1913 1913 1913 1913




Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937














Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937












Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937





IITTAALLYY










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937








Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

SSPPAAIINN











Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937


RREEGGIIMMEE









Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937













Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937














Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937












Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937





IITTAALLYY










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937








Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

SSPPAAIINN











Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937


RREEGGIIMMEE









Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937













Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937












Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937





IITTAALLYY










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937








Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

SSPPAAIINN











Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937


RREEGGIIMMEE









Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937













Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937





IITTAALLYY










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937








Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

SSPPAAIINN











Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937


RREEGGIIMMEE









Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937













Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937








Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

SSPPAAIINN











Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937


RREEGGIIMMEE









Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937













Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937








Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

SSPPAAIINN











Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937


RREEGGIIMMEE









Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937













Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

SSPPAAIINN











Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937


RREEGGIIMMEE









Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937













Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

SSPPAAIINN











Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937


RREEGGIIMMEE









Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937













Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937


RREEGGIIMMEE









Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937













Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937













Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937










Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937











































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937






































Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

















Fri 31 Aug 2007 231937

Documents

Civic Associations and Authoritarian Regimes in Interwar ... · can enable hegemonic authoritarian regimes to the extent that associations provide a congen-ial environment for the