Mindanao Peace Process

7/24/2019 Mindanao Peace Process

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The Mindanao Peace Process: Mediating Peace between the Philippine

Government and the Moro Fronts

By Fr. Eliseo R. Mercado, OMI

Notre Dame University – Philippines

Fl!ri"ht N#$ %&&' – (eor"eto)n University – *ashin"ton D#

The Mindanao Peace Process is not a ne) invention o+ or era. In +act, the presentrealities in Mindanao are +rits o+ varios peace processes )ith di++erin" +oci and

emphases dependin" on the mood and temper o+ the Manila !ased central "overnment.

istorically, the esta!lishments o+ Fort del Pilar in -am!oan"a #ity, the naval station at

Polloc in the present province o+ Ma"indanao, the intramros/ in the to)n o+ 0olo and

the military stations alon" the Rio (rande de Mindanao +rom 1aviran to Reina Re"ente

)ere +e) e2amples o+ containment pro"rams to !ild peace in the sothern Philippines.

1he so3called Moro pro!lem hanted the $panish "overnment in Manila +or more thanthree centries and hal+. 1he northern Mindanao and some parts o+ )estern Mindanao

)ere sccess+lly !ro"ht to the mainstream politics !y )ay o+ settlements !e"innin" thesecond hal+ o+ the 45th centry. Bt in sothern Mindanao, incldin" the islands o+ $l,

1a)i 1a)i, and Basilan, the $panish presence )as limited to military stations and

"arrisons, e2cept +or poc6ets o+ civilian settlements in the present city o+ -am!oan"a and#ota!ato #ity.

7ar"ely, the Moro poplace )as le+t on their o)n. 1hey lived nder their sltans anddats and )ere "overned accordin" to their la)s and traditions. 1he $panish "overnment

inter+ered in the Moro a++airs !y )ay playin" politics in several sccession isses in the

$ltanate o+ $l and in the t)o dominant sltanates in the mainland Mindanao 8Bayanand Ma"indanao9. o)ever, the Moro people al)ays re:ected $panish anointment andreco"nition.

1he political and economic con+i"rations in $othern Philippines )ere radically altereddrin" the ;merican occpation. It !e"an )ith a peace pact 6no)n as Bates 1reaty in

4<55, )ith the $ltan o+ $l reco"ni=in" the soverei"nty o+ the U$;. 1his )as the real

!e"innin" o+ a campai"n to inte"rate>assimilate the Moro people into the mainstream !ody politics in the )hole archipela"o. ;+ter the nilateral a!ro"ation o+ the Bates 1reaty,

the ;merican U$ colonial "overnment )ith its +ar sperior army !ro"ht the srrender o+

practically all Moro resistance to the ;merican rle.

1o pt the peace in $othern Mindanao on a more solid +ootin", several peace pro"rams

)ere n+olded. First )as the economic development o+ Mindanao?s +ertile land.

Plantations )ere opened and !siness )as esta!lished in ma:or tradin" posts, e.".-am!oan"a, #ota!ato, 0olo, and Ili"an. $econd, Mindanao )as opened to settlement

+rom 7=on and the @isayas. It !e"an )ith the esta!lishment o+ the a"ricltral colonies

in the +ertile plains o+ the then empire province o+ #ota!ato. 1his )as +ollo)ed !y amassive and a )ell planned settlement pro"rams drin" the #ommon)ealth period and

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contined na!ated in the post )ar era drin" the s!seAent administrations o+

Presidents Ro2as, irino, and Ma"saysay.

One o+ the pillars o+ the inte"ration pro"ram )as the edcational system esta!lished in

the )hole $othern Philippines. 1he t)o salient +eatres o+ this peace pro"ram )ere the

niversal/ p!lic school system and the pensionado/ 8scholarship9 pro"ram +or thescion o+ Moro rlin" +amilies. From the latter )old emer"e the ne)/ Moro leaders

8the Pian" !rothers, Pendatm, $insats, ;lonto, 76man, Cirams, etc.9 )ho advocated

the +ll inte"ration o+ the Moro people into Philippine !ody politics

1he $othern Philippines has also seen several administrative strctres +rom 4<55 to the

present. First, there )as the military rle +rom the time o+ (eneral *ood to (eneral

Pershin". 1hen, this )as +ollo)ed !y the esta!lishment o+ the Moro Province nder acivilian "overnor. 1hen came the creation o+ the Department o+ Mindanao and $l. ;+ter

this, the Brea +or the Non3#hristian 1ri!es )as esta!lished to !e +ollo)ed !y the

creation o+ re"lar provinces. 1he civilian "overnors )ere +irst appointed !y the President

and s!seAently elected nder the 45' #onstittion. 1his set p remained in place ntilthe con+la"ration o+ the early G&s.

Drin" the past 4&& years, Mindanao has seen a dramatic shi+t in poplation and

lando)nership that has contri!ted to the !e"innin" o+ the modern con+lict. In 45&& the

Mslim poplation in Mindanao made p more than 5&H o+ the island?s inha!itants, !t !y 45G&, the Mslims constitte !arely %&H o+ the poplation o+ Mindanao. 1he

poplation shi+t came a!ot thro"h policies that "ave #hristian poplation +rom 7=on

and the @isayas incentives to mi"rate to Mindanao. 1he ne) immi"rants, )ith le"al titles

issed !y the "overnment claimed and tilled lar"e tracts o+ land claimed !y the Moro andother indi"enos peoples as their homeland.

1he minoriti=ation/ o+ the Moro people )as componded !y )hat )as conceived aspolicy o+ ne"lect/ !y the Manila (overnment that led to poverty and +ailre to deliver

!asic services and in+rastrctre +or development. By the late 45&, the Moro peoples?

"roanin"/ and resentment reached a +ever pitch that eventally led to the +ormation o+ the Moro National 7i!eration Front nder the leadership o+ Nr Misari esposin" the

politics o+ separatism.

1he open )ar !et)een the Philippine (overnment and the MN7F callin" +or a separateand independent Islamic Rep!lic ensed +ollo)in" the declaration o+ Martial Rle on

$eptem!er %4, 45G4. It )as a crel and sectarian/ )ar that +ed on the historical and

reli"ios pre:dices and animosities !et)een #hristian settlers and the Mslims.

1he )ar in Mindanao attracted the attention o+ the Or"ani=ation o+ the Islamic

#on+erence. ;ttempts at reconciliation !et)een the MN7F and (RP )ere initiatedthro"h the OI# mediation. On Decem!er %', 45G, 1he Marcos (overnment and the

MN7F si"ned the 1ripoli Peace ;"reement as a concrete response to the Moro people?s

demand +or local sel+3rle in )hat )as reco"ni=ed as the Ban"samoro homeland/ )ithin

the soverei"nty and territorial inte"rity o+ the Rep!lic o+ the Philippines.

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1he Philippine "overnment came p )ith several strctral arran"ements to respond to

the Moro people?s demand +or sel+3rle nder the +rame)or6 o+ the 1ripoli ;"reement

Political Structures Adopted by GRP vis--vis Muslim Autonomy

1he Philippine "overnment nder President Marcos and President ;Aino came p )ith

di++erent political set ps to address the atonomy isse in sothern Philippines. It )ill !e

a "reat help to revie) this set3p in order to conte2tali=e the present de!ate or impasse !et)een the (RP and the MN7F and the on and o+ten o++/ peace tal6s !et)een the (RP

and the MI7F.

• PD GJ% and 7OI %5&. Prior to the historical 1ripoli ;"reement, then President Marcos

on 0ly G, 45G issed Presidential Decree GJ% and 7etter o+ Instrction %5&

esta!lishin" the O++ice o+ the Re"ional #ommissioner +or Re"ion IK and Re"ion KII.

e appointed tested administrators, Rear ;dmiral Romlo Espaldon +ormer (overnor

$imeon Datmanon", Re"ional #ommissioners +or Re"ions IK and KII respectively.1he "overnment !elieved that !y creatin" special Re"ional #ommissions in the areas

involved in the con+lict, the social as )ell as the economic cases o+ con+lict cold !e !etter addressed thro"h "overnment?s coordinated and +ast responses !y removin"

piece meal measres and red tapes.

• 1ripoli ;"reement 81;9L On Decem!er %', 45G, the (RP and the MN7F nder the

aspices o+ the Or"ani=ation o+ Islamic #ontries thro"h its adripartite

#ommission si"ned a peace a"reement in 1ripoli, 7i!ya. 1hey also si"ned an

a"reement +or immediate cessation o+ hostilities. Every!ody, then, )elcomed the

a"reement )ith mch +an+ares and cele!rations. For one, it )as the +irst peace+l

#hristmas since 45G%. 1hat piece o+ docment )or6ed ma"ic +or all, civilians andcom!atants ali6e. It pt an immediate stop to shootin"s, am!scades, 6illin"s, and

)ar. 1he environment o+ )ar )as trans+ormed into a hope3+illed e2pectation +or anendrin" peace settlement in the $othern Philippines.

• Proclamation 4%<L On March %, 45GG, President Marcos esta!lished a provisional

"overnment in the 4' provinces stiplated in the 1ripoli ;"reement. 7anao del $r

(overnor ;li Dimaporo )as appointed #hairman )ith all the "overnor in the said

provinces )ith the t)o Re"ional #ommissioners and Batasan ;ssem!lyman ssein

7oon" as mem!ers.

• 1he +irst Ple!isciteL On ;pril 4G, 45GG, a ple!iscite )as condcted in the 4' provinces. 1he people in the 4' provinces over)helmin"ly re:ected the mer"er o+ the

4' provinces into one atonomos re"ion. 1hey opted +or t)o separate re"ionalatonomos "overnments, one +or Re"ion IK and one +or Re"ion KII )ith the

provinces o+ Davao del $r, $oth #ota!ato, and Pala)an optin" +or e2clsion +rom

the atonomos re"ions. Follo)in" the reslt o+ the re+erendm, President Marcosissed Proclamation 4%<3; de+inin" the composition o+ the t)o ;tonomos

Re"ions.

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• Batas Bl". %&. Follo)in" the Presidential Proclamation, the Batasan Pam!an"sa

8National Parliament9 passed Batas Bl". %& provided +or the or"ani=ation o+ $an"nian" Pampoo6 8Re"ional 7e"islative #oncil9 and 7pon" 1a"apa"pa"anap

8E2ective #oncil9 in each atonomos re"ion.

• Presidential Decree 44<. President Marcos issed PD 44< on 0ly %, 45G5

implementin" the or"ani=ation o+ $an"nian" Pampoo6 and 7pon" 1a"apa"pa"anap

in the ;tonomos Re"ions IK and KII ths providin" the +inal political set p and

+rame)or6 o+ atonomos "overnance in Re"ions IK and KII.

The A!uino Presidency and the Moro Fronts

• 1he 45<G ;Aino #onstittion. On Fe!rary %, 45<G, the ne) #onstittion )as

nanimosly rati+ied. 1his constittion provides +or the creation o+ atonomos

re"ions in Mslim Mindanao and the #ordilleras !y and ;ct o+ #on"ress )ith the

assistance o+ a Re"ional #onsltative #ommission. President ;Aino convened theR## in #ota!ato #ity on March 44, 45<<. 1he R## )as mandated to come p )ith

a dra+t Or"anic ;ct to !e s!mitted to #on"ress +or enactment.

• On 45<5, the #on"ress o+ the Philippines passed Rep!lic ;ct G'J or the Or"anic

;ct +or the ;tonomos Re"ion in Mslim Mindanao and on ;"st 4, 45<5,

President ;Aino si"ned it into la).

• 1he $econd Ple!iscite o+ 45<5. Rep!lic ;ct G'J )as s!mitted to the people o+ the

4' provinces and nine cities as stiplated in the 1ripoli ;"reement on Novem!er 45,

455&. Only +or 8J9 ot o+ 4' provinces and nine cities rati+ied the Or"anic ;ct.

1hese )ere the Provinces o+ 7anao del $r, Ma"indanao, $l and 1a)i 1a)i.

• 1he First ;RMM Elections. 1he ;RMM elections +or all elected o++ices )ere held on

0ly 5, 455&. -acaria #andao and Ben:amin 7oon" )ere elected Re"ional (overnor

and @ice (overnor respectively. 1he ;RMM elections re"lari=ed and completed the45<G #onstittional steps in creatin" the atonomos re"ion in Mslim Mindanao.

"nder the Ramos Government

President Ramos on his ina"ral speech pon assmption to o++ice in 0ly 455%,

n+olded a policy o+ ni+ication and reconciliation/ !et)een and amon" the many re!el

+ronts in the contry. e esta!lished the National Uni+ication #ommission 8NU#9 andappointed ;tty. eidi orac as #hair. Pres. Ramos also tapped the personnel and

in+rastrctres o+ the t)o )ell3esta!lished instittions, the #atholic Bishops #on+erence

o+ the Philippines and the National #oncil o+ #hrches o+ the Philippines, in the )or6 o+ the #ommission. 1he stated "oal o+ the #ommission )as to condct a nation)ide

people?s consltation to +ind ot the root cases o+ re!ellion and nrest in the contry.

1he reslt o+ the NU# consltation shaped the Ramos peace policy.

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The #ision and Framewor$ o% Peace Process & '( )*+

Follo)in" the p!lication o+ the reslt o+ the national consltation, Pres. Ramos issedE2ective Order 4% on ;"st %, 455 articlatin" the vision and the +rame)or6 o+ the

peace process that his administration )old prse to address the three internal armed

con+lictsL 1he National Democratic Front 8NDF9, the Mslim $eparatist Movements in$othern Philippines and the Military Re!ellion.

1he peace process is anchored on three principles that de+ine (overnment policy and"oals. 1hey are the +ollo)in"L

4. 1he Peace Process mst !e commnity !ased and not de+ined solely !y

"overnment nor !y armed re!els, nor any sin"le sector, !t !y Filipinos as a

commnity%. 1he Peace Process mst lead to a ne) social compact +or a :st, eAita!le,

hmane and plralistic society, and ensre +ree and +air political competition and

'. 1he Peace Process mst see6 a principled and peace+l resoltion o+ the armed

con+licts )ith di"nity +or all concerned and not srrender.

1hese articlated principles led to the +ormlation o+ the +amos si2 paths to peace that !ecame, more or less, the ma"na carta/ that "ided "overnment in respondin" to the

isse o+ armed con+lict in the contry. 1hese are the +ollo)in"L

4. 1hat (overnment mst initiate and implement social, economic and politicalre+orms to address the root cases o+ re!ellion and social nrest

%. 1hat (overnment shall prse consenss3!ildin" and people empo)erment

thro"h mo!ili=ation and +acilitation o+ people?s participation and spport +or

commnity peace initiatives'. 1hat (overnment shall see6 peace+l and ne"otiated settlements )ith re!el "rops

)ith no srrender or shame !t )ith di"nity +or all concerned

J. 1hat (overnment shall initiate reconciliation )ith and re3inte"ration o+ +ormer com!atants and indemni+y civilian victims o+ the armed con+lict

. 1hat (overnment shall ensre the contined protection o+ civilians ca"ht in the

midst o+ armed con+lict, redction o+ violence in con+lict areas and prevention andmana"ement o+ con+lict and

. 1hat (overnment shall !ild and nrtre a climate o+ peace that incldes peace

advocacy and peace edcation.

The GRP and the M,F Peace Process .)//0-/12

• 1he #ipanas ;"reement 8*est 0ava, Indonesia9 o+ ;pril 4J345, 455' and the 0a6arta

Memorandm o+ ;"reement o+ Octo!er %3 Novem!er G, 455'. 1hese t)o docments

paved the )ay +or the ne) peace process !et)een the (RP and the MN7F. 1here

)ere +or !asic a"reements as stiplated !y these t)o docments si"ned !y the (RPand MN7F representatives. First )as the +ll implementation o+ the 45G 1ripoli

;"reement !oth in letter and spirit )ithin the realm o+ the soverei"nty and territorial

inte"rity o+ the Rep!lic o+ the Philippines. Second )as the interim cease3+ire

a"reement stiplatin" a cessation o+ provocative acts and armed hostilities +or the



dration o+ the +ormal tal6s and the or"ani=ation o+ a 0oint #ease3+ire #ommittee.

Third )as the convenin" o+ the Mi2ed #ommittee to )or6 the details le+t ot +or

+rther discssion as provided !y the 1ripoli ;"reement and the creation o+ $pport#ommittees to come ot )ith detailed stdies on the varios provisions o+ the 1ripoli

;"reement. Fourth )as the creation o+ the *or6in" (rop directly nder the (RP

and the MN7F panels. 1his "rop )as tas6ed to come pt )ith the transitionalimplementin" strctre and mechanism +or the implementation o+ the a"reements

+or"ed !et)een the (RP and the MN7F.

• 1he 455 (RP3MN7F Interim ;"reement. 1he third rond o+ +ormal tal6s in 0a6arta

ended )ith the si"nin" o+ the Interim ;"reements containin" all the a"reements so +ar

reached !y the t)o panels on Decem!er 4, 455. On the )hole, consenss )as

esta!lished in all the details le+t +or discssion !y the 1ripoli ;"reement e2cept +or the so3called contentios/ isses. 1hese )ere the +ollo)in"L 849 1he transitional

strctre and mechanism and>or Provisional (overnment 8%9 1he isse o+

#onstittional processes as stiplated !y the 1ripoli ;"reement and>or the isse o+

Ple!iscite in areas to !e covered !y the ;tonomos Re"ion 8'9 1he non consenss points on the inte"ration o+ the MN7F armed +orces into the ;FP, vs., proportionate/

representation, and the ran6s and Aali+ications o+ :oinin" MN7F +orces.

1he a!ove contentios isses remained nresolved and the s!:ect o+ the Mi2ed

#ommittee meetin" in the last )ee6 o+ May 455. Mean)hile !oth panels loo6ed +or creative alternatives to resolve the impasse in the on"oin" peace tal6s in Mindanao. 1his

search +or alternatives prompted the (RP and the MN7F to condct )ider consltation

and consenss amon" Mindanao leaders and sta6eholders, particlarly in the 4'

provinces and 5 cities stiplated in the 1ripoli ;"reement.

;ll tal6s and de!ates on transitional implementin" strctres and mechanisms )ere)ithin the conte2t o+ +ll implementation, !oth in letter and spirit, o+ the entire a"reement !et)een the (RP and the MN7F. From the point o+ vie) o+ the MN7F, this transitional

implementin" strctre )as the Provisional (overnment that shall !e esta!lished in the

areas o+ atonomy immediately a+ter the si"nin" o+ the +inal a"reement in Manila 81;,;rticle ', $ection 49.

;ll parties concerned in 45GG a"reed that the "overned need to !e as6ed in a

consltation>ple!iscite +ollo)in" the constittional processes/ stiplated in the 1ripoli;"reement. It )as also a"reed that the Provisional (overnment had the competence to

condct sch constittional processes/. 1his )as the reason +or the Proclamation 4%<

on March %, 45GG esta!lishin" Provisional (overnment in the 4' provinces inclded inthe covera"e o+ atonomy as stiplated !y the 1ripoli ;"reement. o)ever, the MN7F

did not participate in the Provisional (overnment as )ell as in the re+erendm condcted

on ;pril 4G, 45GG.

1he OI# and a!ove all the (RP are clearly !ond !y the constittional reAirements in

readin" and interpretin" the 45G 1ripoli ;"reement. ;dherence to the entirety o+ the

Philippine #onstittion and to the entirety o+ 1; remained the +rame)or6 o+ the creation



o+ an atonomos re"ion in the $othern Philippines. It )as )ithin this principle that any

proposal +or a transitional strctre and mechanism had to con+orm. No party cold

simply ta6e a provision here and there dependin" on interest and>or sita!ility. ;nyattempt to resolve the impasse !et)een the (RP and the MN7F positions mst !e "ided

!y the entirety o+ the Philippine #onstittion and the 1ripoli ;"reement.

1here )ere t)o !asic isses that need to !e addressed in the $othern Philippines. First

)as the Aestion o+ real atonomy and "reater sel+3"overnance in local and re"ional

a++airs as demanded !y the MN7F and all 7ocal (overnment Units 87(U?s9. $econd )asthe Aestion o+ peace and development that )old involve reha!ilitation and

reconstrction, particlarly o+ the con+lict areas in Mindanao. 1he t)o )ere intimately

lin6ed or )ere intert)ined. 1hs any approach to peace )old involve t)o parallel

trac6s to the $othern Philippines pro!lem. 1he +irst )old address the "overnance andatonomy isses and the second )old address the economic reconstrction and

development isses.

The Final Peace Agreement o% )//1

1he 455 Peace ;"reement o+ $eptem!er %, 455. From ;"st %< to '&, 455, the(RP and the MN7F panels met a"ain +or the last time. It )as a marathon session !oth

+or the Ninth Mi2ed #ommittee Meetin" and the Forth Rond o+ Formal 1al6s. 1he

main a"enda )ere the re+inements/ that sr+aced drin" the varios consltations and$enate hearin"s in the areas o+ $P#PD covera"e. 1he $enate hearin"s reslted to a

$enate Resoltion that r"ed the (RP panel to consider +or inclsion in the +inal

docment.

;+ter three days o+ hard )or6, de!ates and compromises, !oth the (RP and the MN7F

panels a"reed on the +inal te2t o+ the Peace ;"reement in the early mornin" o+ ;"st

'&th. On the same day at a!ot 4&L&& a.m., the said +inal te2t o+ the peace a"reement )asinitialed at the Merde6a Palace !e+ore the presence o+ President $harto. 1here )ere

"reat :oys and hopes on all sides as ;m!assador Manel an and #hairman Nr Misari

)ith Pres. $harto, the OI# $ecretary (eneral amid ;l"a!id and Indonesian Forei"nMinister ;li ;latas "reeted the thron"s o+ dele"ates +rom the (RP and MN7F )ho )ere

present in 0a6arta.

On $eptem!er 4st, the Indonesian "overnment provided a Boein" G&G +or the (RP and theMN7F dele"ations and the +orei"n di"nitaries to !rin" home the initialed Peace

;"reement +or its +ormal si"nin" in Malacanan" the +ollo)in" day. 1he ne)s o+ the +inal

a"reement in Manila and Mindanao created an instant +estive mood. ;ll sectors hailedthe settlement as a )or6a!le +ormla to)ards an endrin" peace in $othern Philippines.

On $eptem!er %nd, !oth inside and otside the Presidential Palace, thron"s o+ people !othlo) and hi"h claimed the Peace ;"reement as their o)n )hen ;m!assador an and Pro+.

Misari +ormally in6ed the docment )itnessed !y the OI# $ec. (en. amid ;l"a!id

and Indonesian Forei"n Minister ;li ;latas in the presence o+ President Fidel @. Ramos.

In the )ords o+ Pres. Ramos, the si"nin" o+ the +inal peace a"reement !et)een the

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Rep!lic o+ the Philippines !rin"s to a close almost '& years o+ con+lict, at the cost o+

more than 4%&,&&& Filipino lives./ e hailed the Peace ;"reement as the !e"innin" o+ a

ne) era o+ peace and development +or the $othern Philippines, and +or Philippines as a)hole./ 1rly, a ne) era has !e"n, the era o+ re!ildin", o+ +or"in" partnership !et)een

and amon" diverse peoples o+ the land, and esta!lishin" one commnity and one +tre

+or all.

3mplementation o% the )//1 Peace Agreement

1here )ere t)o phases in the implementation o+ the Final Peace ;"reement o+ 455. 1he

+irst phase )as the esta!lishment o+ the $othern Philippines #oncil +or Peace and

Development or $P#PD and the #onsltative ;ssem!ly or #;. in the 4J provinces and

all cities therein. 1he 4J provinces and nine 8ten9 cities shall !e esta!lished as a $pecial-one o+ Peace and Development. *ithin the ne2t three years, these areas shall !e the

+ocs o+ intense peace and development e++orts.

1he $P#PD shall !e composed !y one 849 #hairman, one 849 @ice #hairman and three8'9 Depties, one each representin" the Mslims, #hristians and the 7mads. 1he #;

shall !e an <43mem!er !ody. ;ll the mem!ers o+ !oth !odies shall be appointed by the President upon recommendations of the MNLF and after due consultation with the

various leaders and sectors in the Southern Philippines. The MNLF Chairman, Nur

Misuari, shall chair both the Council and the C. ;ccordin"ly, the #oncil and the;ssem!ly shall spervise and coordinate the implementation o+ peace and development

pro"rams in the area.

1he po)ers and +nctions o+ the #oncil shall !e as +ollo)sL

•

1o ta6e a char"e in promotin", monitorin" and coordinatin" the improvement o+ peace and order in the area

• 1o +ocs on peace and development e++orts more particlarly in the depressed areas

and case the implementation o+ peace and development e++orts

• 1o provide spport to local "overnment nits as necessary

• 1o e2ercise sch other po)ers and +nctions necessary +or the e++ective

implementation o+ its mandate as may !e dele"ated !y the President

• 1o assist in the holdin" o+ elections, re+erenda or ple!iscite and people?s initiative in

the area depti=ed !y the #OME7E# pon recommendation !y the President

• 1o case the creation o+ sch o++ices or instrmentality as shall !e necessary +or the

e++ective and e++icient administration o+ the a++airs o+ the areas. 1here shall !e

approval +rom the O++ice o+ the President +or !d"etary prposes.

1here shall !e esta!lished a #onsltative ;ssem!ly )ith ei"hty3one mem!ers composed

o+ the +ollo)in"L

• 1he #hairman o+ the #oncil shall !e the ead and Presidin" O++icer

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• 1he ;RMM (overnor and @ice (overnor, the 4J (overnors o+ the provinces and the

4& #ity Mayor therein in the area

• Members from the MNLF and

• Mem!ers +rom varios sectors recommended !y N(Os and POs a+ter de

consultation with the MNLF .

1he #onsltative ;ssem!ly shall e2ercise the +ollo)in" +nctions and po)ersL

• 1o serve as +orm +or consltation and ventilation o+ isses and concerns

• 1o condct p!lic hearin"s as may !e necessary and to provide appropriate advice to

the $P#PD and

• 1o +ormlate and recommend policies to the President thro"h the #hairman o+ the

#oncil and ma6e rles and re"lations to the e2tent necessary +or the e++icient and

e++ective administration o+ the a++airs o+ the area.

1he po)ers and +nctions o+ the $P#PD and the #onsltative ;ssem!ly are

derivative and e2tension o+ the po)ers o+ the President. 1he tenre o+ the E2ective

#oncil and the #onsltative ;ssem!ly shall !e +or a period o+ three 8'9 years and

e2tendi!le !y the President pon the recommendation o+ the #oncil. 1he 7ocal(overnment Units in the area incldin" the ;RMM shall contine to e2ist and e2ercise

their +nctions in accordance )ith the e2istin" la)s.

The '4ecutive (rder 05) & as the 6ardstic$

1he E2ective Order 'G4 or EO 'G4 is the yardstic6 o+ the implementation o+ the 455Peace ;ccord. EO 'G4 otlines amon" others, t)elve speci+ic pro:ects to !e

implemented in the $-OP;D. 1hese are the +ollo)in"L

4. man development pro:ects, incldin" !t not limited to health and sanitation

services, edcational development, and )el+are services, to promote the )ell3!ein" o+

+amilies in depressed commnities and enhance their capa!ilities to participate in

economic pro"rams

%. $ociali=ed hosin" pro:ects to address hosin" !ac6lo"s in priority areas

'. *ater spply development to provide pota!le )ater especially to depressed

commnities in the $-OP;D

J. Roads and !rid"es to connect depressed commnities to centers o+ economicactivities and improve mo!ility o+ "oods and services )ithin the $-OP;D and

!et)een the $-OP;D and other "ro)th areas

. ;irports and seaports to address the needs o+ commters and +acilitate transport o+

prodcts in the priority areas

5



. 1elecommnications and po)er>electri+ication pro"rams to spport the increase in

economic activities in the $-OP;D

G. Development and promotion o+ torism to harness the torism potential and enhance

appreciation and a)areness o+ history and cltre in the $-OP;D

<. Environmental and marine resorces improvement pro"ram to protect and conserve

natral resorces in the $-OP;D

5. Enhancement o+ a"ricltral prodction thro"h irri"ation and post3harvest and

mar6etin" +acilities

4&. Esta!lishment o+ +ood processin" +acilities to "enerate employment and create+or)ard and !ac6)ard economic lin6a"es

44. Esta!lishment o+ Provincial Indstrial #enters and People?s Indstrial Enterprises to

serve as +ocal points o+ !siness activities and "enerate additional economicopportnities and

4%. People empo)erment pro"rams to ensre "reater participation o+ )omen and other disadvanta"ed "rops in "overnance and in the determination o+ their political,

economic and social destinies.

By the standards o+ these t)elve pro"rams speci+ically identi+ied in the EO 'G4, the

e++orts in the implementation o+ the Peace ;ccord )ere, indeed, )antin" 1he

constitents o+ the $-OP;D, particlarly o+ the ;RMM cold not +eel the concrete and

tan"i!le +rits o+ the Peace ;ccord, particlarly in depressed commnities. 1he people inthese areas )ere NO1 as6in" too mch. 1hey )ere simply as6in" +or immediate state

interventions in the delivery o+ !asic services that shold have already !een provided in

the re"lar pro"rams o+ the di++erent "overnment departments and line a"encies. $ome o+ these r"ent !asic services inclde amon" others, pota!le )ater, decent shelter,

+nctionin" clinics )ith Aali+ied personnel and ample medicines, decent and eAipped

classrooms )ith Aali+ied teachers and te2t!oo6s, re"larly maintained +arm to mar6etroads, commnal post3harvest and mar6etin" +acilities, access to so+t credit +or

a"ricltral and small !siness enterprises and appropriate s6ills and livelihood trainin"

pro"rams.

1he 455 Peace ;ccord )ith the esta!lishment o+ the $P#PD and the promised

reconstrction +nd )as perceived to !e the vehicle to accelerate the delivery o+ the

a!ovementioned !asic services and crcial "overnment interventions in the depressedareas )ithin the $-OP;D. Bt the (overnment, National 7ine ;"encies, ;RMM and

$P#PD, incldin" the (overnment Financial Instittions and corporations had +ailed to

"et their acts to"ether to case even the delivery o+ the !asic services that the peopleneeded most.

1he 455 Peace ;ccord had NO1 e++ected any chan"e )hatsoever in the pre ;ccord

con+i"ration )ithin $-OP;D. It appeared that the Peace ;ccord simply added

4&



additional !reacracies )hose +nctions and roles )ere already e2ercised !y e2istin"

re"ional !odies 8RD#, RPO#, 1as6 Forces, #ORD, etc.9 and "overnment nits 87(U,

;RMM, OP;MIN> P;RE#O9. 1he +ailre to e++ect strctral ad:stments !et)een andamon" re"ional !odies and mechanisms tas6ed to oversee peace and development

initiatives render the $P#PD and the #; as sper+los and alien/ !odies in an already

over cro)ded +ield.

1he tter +ailre to connect/ and inter+ace/ !et)een and amon" "overnment !odies,

a"encies and instrmentalities incldin" the $P#PD and #; )as, perhaps, one o+ the principal reasons +or the non delivery o+ the promised/ intense +ocs o+ peace and

development initiatives in the $-OP;D.

Moreover, real development and peace e++orts happen in local areas and commnities.1he +ailre to connect the $P#PD and #; to the local "overnment nits 8not)ithstandin"

the e2 o++icio mem!ership o+ the Provincial and #ity E2ectives to the #;9 )as a real

disaster not only +or the phase one o+ the implementation o+ the Peace ;ccord !t more

so +or the more crcial phase t)o o+ the Peace ;ccord.

One o+ the +irst challen"es that con+ronted the Philippine (overnment and the MN7F )asthe isse o+ the disposition o+ com!atants. Drin" the tal6s, there )as the specter o+ more

than '&,&&& MN7F com!atants see6in" inte"ration into the ;rmed Forces o+ the

Philippines 8;FP9 and the Philippine National Police 8PNP9. 1he Final ;ccord provided+or the inte"ration o+ ,G& MN7F com!atants into the ;FP and 4,G& MN7F elements

into the PNP or a total o+ G, && MN7F com!atants and elements. *hile the a"reement

also provided special socio3economic, cltral and edcational pro"ram to cater to

MN7F +orces not a!sor!ed into the ;FP, PNP and the $R$F and their +amilies, thedelivery o+ said pro"ram )as, indeed, almost nil. 1here )ere no !rid"in"/ pro"rams to

cshion the impact o+ the ;ccord on the MN7F com!atants and their +amilies. 1he

special socio3economic, cltral and edcational pro"ram remained letters in the Peace;ccord.

1here )ere three devastatin" e++ects o+ the +ailre in the proper implementation o+ the455 Peace ;ccord.

• First, the +ailre to e++ect concrete and immediately doa!le !rid"in" pro"ram +or the

MN7F com!atants and their +amilies reslted to the trans+ormation o+ the )hole$P#PD and ;RMM strctres and !reacracies into instant employment a"encies.

;nd since these !reacracies have limited a!sorption capacities, it is inevita!le that

those not a!sor!ed !y the ;RMM, $P#PD, ;FP and PNP, and +orei"n assisted pro"rams !ecame discontented and !e"an to dri+t a)ay, either as dis"rntled MN7F

or lost commands.

• $econd, the a!sence o+ "overnment !rid"in" pro"ram +or the MN7F non a!sor!ed

com!atants and +amilies had led the international donor commnities, particlarly

U$;ID, UNDP, #ID; and EU to DIRE#17 intervene into mainstreamin" o+ the

MN7F com!atants and +amilies sin" the MN7F $tate #ommand strctres and the

44



$P#PD $ecretariat. 1his )ay o+ actin" led to devastatin" reslts. Mana"in" and

coordinatin" the mlti3contry donor assistance had !ecome the main preoccpation

and almost sole )or6 o+ the $P#PD and its E2ective $ecretariat. 1he $P#PDa!andoned its speci+ic role to monitor, coordinate and promote development and,

peace initiatives in the $-OP;D. 1he mlti3donor pro:ects and pro"rams,

particlarly, the UNDP, EU, #ID; and the U$;ID had, in a )ay, I0;#CED/ thePeace ;ccord. 1ra"ically, this Qhi:ac6in"Q happened thro"h NED;s orchestration,

tho"h )ithot malice. It )as a simple case o+ seein" the small pictre and a +ailre

to see the !i" pictre.

• 1hird, there is no !rid"in"/ pro"ram +or transition in the important aspect o+

"overnance and p!lic administration. 1he paralysis and the lac6 o+ cohesiveness

that people e2perience in "overnment !reacracies )as a clear indication o+ lac6 o+ preparation in terms o+ capa!ility !ildin" o+ those tas6ed to rn the local, re"ional

and $-OP;D a++airs drin" the period o+ transition.

1he leadership o+ the ;RMM, $P#PD and the #; )as clearly "iven to the MN7F nder #hairman Nr Misari. $ad to say, the +ailre o+ the national "overnment )as eAally

matched !y the +ailre o+ leadership )ithin the MN7F ran6s to provide clear and decisiveleadership in the post ;ccord environment. In a society>commnity )here personal

presence conts most, the mar6ed a!sence o+ the person o+ the leader spelled a lot o+

di++erence +or the +ailre or sccess o+ the 1ransition Phase.

1he ;RMM cold have !een the sho)case o+ the pcomin" atonomy in the Phase t)o

o+ the Peace ;ccord. 1he mar6ed +ailre in providin" clear and decisive leadership that

shold have !ro"ht intense development and peace initiatives in the ;RMM had !ecomethe conter ar"ment o+ the oppositors to the $-OP;D.

The )//1 GRP-M,F Peace Accord was a Good Peace Agreement

For all its +ailres and )ea6nesses, the (RP3MN7F Peace ;ccord )as, indeed, a "ood

peace a"reement. It too6 peace and development as its +rame)or6 )ith the hope that)hen development )old ta6e place, the a"reement on political isses shall not !e

di++iclt to achieve. 1he Peace ;ccord esta!lished a -one o+ Peace and Development ot

o+ the contested provinces and cities in the $othern Philippines. 1he approach )as

innovative and +ollo)ed the trodden path in resolvin" con+licts involvin" territories, !orders and +rontiers. 1he esta!lishment o+ the $pecial -one o+ Peace and Development

consistin" o+ the 4J Provinces and 5 cities provided +or a ne) +rame)or6 o+ identity and

consolidation on the !asis o+ intense peace and development initiatives. Re"ardless o+ the +ailres mentioned in the precedin" part o+ this paper, the 455 (RP3MN7F Peace

;ccord remained a solid and sond !asis +or resolvin" the con+lict in the $othern

Philippines. I+ properly implemented, it cold provide +or lastin" and :st peacea"reement not only in the $othern Philippines !t also +or the )hole Mindanao.

4%



Phase Two: RA /7+8

*ith the ne) la), R; 5&J, the isse o+ the Ple!iscite as mandated !oth !y the Peace;"reement and !y 7a) !ecame the one sin"le isse that dominated the de!ates !et)een

the (RP and the MN7F and amon" the MN7F leaders. In +act, the ple!iscite isse

e2acer!ated the split )ithin the leadership o+ the MN7F. 1he o!:ections on the holdin"o+ the Ple!iscite )ere !ased on the +ollo)in" reasonsL

• First, the 7a) or R; 5&J is a violation o+ the 455 Final Peace ;ccord !et)een the

(RP and the MN7F. 1he MN7F has no participation in the cra+tin" o+ the 7a). It is

a nilateral act and an imposition o+ the (RP on the MN7F and the peoples o+ the

$-OP;D.

• $econd, the 7a) itsel+, that is, R; 5&J is NO1 the Qle"islationQ o+ the 455 Final

Peace ;ccord as a"reed pon !y the (RP and the MN7F. ;s a matter o+ +act, the

Philippine #on"ress needs only to le"islate the Peace ;"reement and let the people

decide to approve or disapprove the same in the Ple!iscite.

• 1hird, #on"ress has NO athority 8tho"h it !elieves to !e $O@EREI(N... in

le"islation9 to Qman"le, select provisions or do anythin" otside the commitment o+ the (RP that incldes the E2ective and the 7e"islative as contained in the 455

Peace ;"reement. 1he $enate and the ose )ere !oth represented in the ne"otiation

o+ the 455 ;"reement. 1he athority is only to re:ect or accept the a"reement !y the people in a ple!iscite ... this is the #onstittional process contemplated and a"reed

pon in 0a6arta and 1ripoli.

• Forth, R; 5&J does NO1 re+lect in toto the Final Peace ;ccord. 1his +act is a

violation !oth in letter and the spirit o+ the 1ripoli as )ell as 0a6arta ;"reements. 1hisis the position o+ the MN7F. Bein" participant o+ the 0a6arta 1al6s and a )itness !oth

to the initialin" and si"nin" o+ the 455 Final Peace ;ccord, I !elieve that the MN7F

position is :sti+ied and )ith stron" !asis in +act.

1he (RP had the responsi!ility to le"islate the Final Peace ;"reement in toto !oth in

letter and spirit. 1his )as NO1 an ordinary e2ercise o+ le"islative po)er o+ #on"ress... !t it )as rather the e2traordinary po)er o+ #on"ress to )or6 )ith MN7F to deliver the

(RP?s commitment in le"islatin" a 7;* that )old !e +aith+l to the Final ;"reement

!oth in letter and spirit. 1he commitment !oth o+ the (RP and the MN7F )as to s!mitthe ne) la) to the soverei"n people o+ the concerned areas +or rati+ication or non3

rati+ication. 1his )as the #onstittional Process contemplated !oth in 1ripoli as )ell as0a6arta ;"reements. On the !asis o+ this +act, the MN7F held that the la), R; 5&J, )as

alien to the 1ripoli ;"reement and its de+initive interpretation in detail as contained in the0a6arta ;ccord si"ned in Manila on $eptem!er %, 455.

I personally !elieve that the (RP has violated its commitment as to its responsi!ility inthe process o+ le"islatin" the said la). 1he so called p!lic hearin" is the civil societys

participation )hich is reAired in any le"islation... !t the partnership )ith the MN7F in

4'



le"islatin" an amendatory la) to R; G'J that shall incorporate in toto the 455 Final

Peace ;"reement has NO1 !een nderstood !y #on"ress and ths it has violated the

internationally reco"ni=ed a"reement in the e2ercise o+ )hat #on"ress !elieves itssoverei"n prero"ative. In many )ays, this soverei"nty is compromised a !it )hen (RP

enters into the 1ripoli and 0a6arta ;"reements in as mch as MN7F also compromised its

position !y acceptin" the constittional processes o+ Ple!iscite in dra)in" the "eo"raphyand covera"e o+ atonomy in $othern Philippines.

1he Nr3led MN7F re:ected the la), R; 5&J and re:ected in trn the holdin" and resltso+ the ple!iscite. It did not reco"ni=e !oth the la) and the reslt o+ the ple!iscite on the

premise that !oth )ere violative o+ the 455 Final Peace ;"reement.

On the Ne) ;tonomy 7a). 1he ne) atonomy la) or R; 5&J is solely a prodct o+ Philippine #on"ress )ithot the participation o+ the MN7F, the party in the 455 Final

Peace ;"reement. 1he very prpose o+ amendin" R; G'J or the ;RMM Or"anic ;ct is

the +act that the said la) and the s!seAent ple!iscite in 455< )ere nilateral

impositions o+ the Philippine (overnment )ithot the participation o+ the MN7F. 1he455% Peace Process !et)een the (RP and the MN7F that !ore +rit in 455 )as the

REMEDI;7 political settlement as opposed to the t)o attempts 8Marcos and ;Aino9 o+ nilateral imposition o+ ;tonomy 7a) and Ple!iscite. $ad to say the ne) atonomy la)

and the ple!iscite on ;"st 4Jth, %&&4 proves tre the clich that says, history repeats

itsel+/

First, the ne) 7a), R; 5&J, violates the Peace ;"reement !oth in letter and spirit.

$econd, #on"ress, in its e2ercise o+ its le"islative prero"ative, has not nderstood theinternational commitment and o!li"ation entered into !et)een the (RP and the MN7F

on $eptem!er %, 455. 1he (RP re+erred to in the a"reement is NO1 only the E2ective.

It incldes #on"ress since it has actively participated in the cra+tin" o+ the said FinalPeace ;"reement thro"h their representatives, desi"nated advisers and #on"ressional

Resoltions.

1hird, I do not !elieve that the 7a) is :st and +air, !ecase it deprives the peoples o+ the

present ;RMM the choice to rati+y or re:ect the ne) 7a), R; 5&J. Frther, the peoples

o+ other provinces in the $-OP;D are NO1 votin" on the 7a) !t on )hether they )ant

or not to !e inclded in the e2panded ;RMM. 1he #onstittional Provision on thematter pholds the Qsoverei"ntyQ o+ the concerned people and provinces and cities to

approve or re:ect the 7a). Only the provinces and cities that the ma:ority voted +or the

ne) 7a) shall constitte the Ne) (eo"raphy o+ the ;tonomos Re"ion in MslimMindanao. Provinces and cities that re:ected the 7a) atomatically are e2clded in the

covera"e.

R; 5&J deprives the peoples o+ the ;RMM to accept or re:ect the ne) ;tonomy 7a).

;nd the same la) deprives the peoples o+ the non3;RMM provinces and cities )ithin

$-OP;D to accept or re:ect the ne) ;tonomy 7a). It is the acceptance or re:ection o+

4J



the ;tonomy 7a) that determines the covera"e o+ the ;tonomos Re"ion. 1his is tre

in the #ordillera as )ell as in Mslim Mindanao.

Forth, I !elieve that the ne) 7a), R; 5&J, and the Ple!iscite are nilateral impositions

o+ the (RP. 1he ;"reement e2plicitly stiplates the contrary. 1he Marcos PD and

Ple!iscite )ere nilaterally imposed !y the Philippine "overnment that is contrary to theletter and spirit o+ the 45G 1ripoli ;"reement. ;"ain drin" the time o+ President

;Aino, the "overnment li6e)ise nilaterally imposed the ;RMM 7a) and the Ple!iscite

that is a"ain a violation o+ the 1ripoli ;"reement !oth in letter and spirit. No) )e are+aced )ith the same dilemma 1he Philippine "overnment is doin" it a"ain +or the nth

time, that is, nilaterally impose a ne) atonomy la), R; 5&J, and the Ple!iscite on

;"st 4J, %&&4.

1he !asic Aestion that "overnment shold as6 hersel+ is )hether she pholds !oth the

45G 1ripoli ;"reement and the 455 Final Peace ;ccord initialed in 0a6arta on ;"st

'&, 455 and o++icially si"ned on $eptem!er %, 455 are international commitment and

o!li"ations. $econd, #on"ress and Policy advisers need to thoro"hly stdy theconseAences o+ these international a"reements. 1he "overnments assrance that it

remains )ithin the am!it o+ the #onstittional processes and territorial inte"rity is the+act that the peoples o+ the concerned areas are the soverei"n... to rati+y or re:ect in a

ple!iscite the Political $ettlement as contained in the Final Peace ;"reement and shall !e

translated into 7a) in toto )ith NO deletion and NO addition. 1he provisions havealready !een NE(O1I;1ED *I1 1E ;#1I@E P;R1I#IP;1ION OF #ON(RE$$.

*hat really remain is to rati+y or re:ect the said political settlement in a ple!iscite. Bt as

it is, the ne) atonomy la) does NO1 re+lect in toto the 455 Final Peace ;"reement.

Meanin"+l or meanin"less atonomy MN7F chair and ;RMM (overnor Nr Misari

claims that R; 5&J is +ll o+ QimpritiesQ meanin" that it does not +aith+lly adhere to

the provisions o+ the 455 Final Peace ;"reement !et)een the (RP and the MN7F.#hairman Misari and the MN7F vie) the ne) atonomy la), R; 5&J, as approved !y

!oth the lo)er ose and the $enate, cannot "ive the "enine atonomy as contained

!oth in the 45G 1ripoli ;"reement and the 455 Final Peace ;ccord initialed in 0a6artaon ;"st '&, 455 and +ormally si"ned n Manila on $eptem!er %, 455.

$ec. %a o+ the 455 FP; provides that the ne) atonomy la) amendin" R; G'J Qshall

inclde the pertinent provisions o+ the Final Peace ;"reement and the e2pansion o+ the present ;RMM area o+ atonomy.Q R; 5&J contains 4< ;rticles and %'5 sections. R;

5&J is actally a ne) atonomy la) yet presented as ;n ;ct to $tren"then and E2pand

the Or"anic ;ct +or the ;tonomos Re"ion in Mslim Mindanao, ;mendin" +or thePrpose R; G'J, Entitled S;n ;ct Providin" +or the ;tonomos Re"ion in Mslim

Mindanao.?

1he tra"edy )as the +act that the ne) atonomy la) made NO direct or indirect re+erence

to the 455 Final Peace ;"reement. 1he very prpose o+ the ne) la) )as to #OMP7

)ith the o!li"ation and imperative o+ the political settlement a"reed pon in the 455

Final Peace ;ccord !et)een the (RP and the MN7F. No one cold divine the motive o+

4



#on"ress +or sch omission. 1he act o+ le"islatin"/ the 455 Final Peace ;ccord )as

NO1 le+t to the initiative o+ #on"ress alone. 1he international commitment and

o!li"ations made !y the (RP )ith the concrrence o+ #on"ress in the 455 Final Peace;ccord 7IMI1ED the po)ers o+ #on"ress to simply translate into la) the a"reed

provisions as contained in the said political settlement. 1he +inal ar!iter +or the said

amendatory la) to correct the nilateral e2istin" la), R; G'J, )old !e the peoples o+ the concerned areas in a ple!iscite that )old rati+y or re:ect the ne) la) containin" the

provisions o+ the 455 Final ;"reement !oth in letter and spirit. Follo)in" the

constittional processes laid do)n in $ection 4<, ;rticle K o+ the #onstittion only the provinces and cities votin" +avora!ly on the ne) atonomy la) shall constitte the

covera"e o+ the ;tonomos Re"ion in Mslim Mindanao. Provinces and cities that shall

NO1 rati+y the ne) atonomy la) shall atomatically !e e2clded +rom the covera"e o+

the atonomos re"ion.

By some "ly trn o+ event, the ne) la), R; 5&J, did not only set aside the 455 Final

Peace ;ccord !t also interpreted/ the constittional process in condctin" the

ple!iscite +or the prpose !y concoctin" t)o di++erent Aestions, one +or the provincesalready mem!ers o+ the ;RMM and the provinces and cities otside o+ ;RMM. ;s it

)as +ormlated, the peoples otside the ;RMM )ere actally votin" +or inclsion or e2clsion in the covera"e o+ ;RMM. 1hey )ere not votin" +or the ne) atonomy la).

On the other hand, the peoples o+ the ;RMM )ere only votin" on the amendments to R;

G'J, )ithot tochin" the isse o+ inclsion or e2clsion dependin" on the rati+icationor non3rati+ication o+ the ne) atonomy la).

1hs )ith the ne) R; 5&J havin" !een rati+ied in +ive provinces 8Basilan, 7anao $r,

Ma"indanao, $l and 1a)i 1a)i9 and in one city 8Mara)i9, the Philippine (overnment prsed the creation o+ the Ne) E2panded ;RMM and condcted an election +or the

prpose o+ +illin" p the o++icials o+ !oth the E2ective and 7e"islative departments o+

the so3called Ne) ;RMM. *ith the ne) o++icials installed on the Gth o+ 0anary o+ %&&%,the Philippine (overnment declared that it has +l+illed the +inal o!li"ation and

reAirement o+ the 455 Final Peace ;ccord !et)een the (RP and the MN7F.

The 9on and o%ten o%% Peace Tal$s between the GRP and the M3F

1he Moro Islamic 7i!eration Front or the MI7F is a !rea6a)ay +action o+ the Moro

National 7i!eration Front. 1he !irth o+ this +action occrred in 45G< )hen #hairman Nr Misari e2pelled $alamat ashim +rom the MN7F. $alamat and his "rop named this

!rea6a)ay "rop the Moro Islamic 7i!eration Front. 1he )ord Islamic/ replaced the

)ord National/ to indicate the ideolo"ical shi+t that this "rop )old li6e to adopt.

$alamat ashim, the MI7F chair and its ideolo"ical !rain, de+ines the ideolo"y o+ the

MI7F as la ilaha illa!llah wa Muhammadul!rasullallah./ 1his ideolo"y is actally theIslamic con+ession o+ +aith that states that there is no deity !t ;llah and Mhmmad is

the Messen"er o+ ;llah. 1he retrn to the Islamic rle is 6ey the re3or"ani=ation o+ the

Mslim commnity. 1he Islamic re+orm is the ans)er to the seclar and "odless society.

4



1he re+orm is militant and a""ressive and at times violent in a!ro"atin" the lon" line o+

development.

1o nderstand this movement, there is a need to sitate it )ithin the historical matri2 that

"ave !irth to this type o+ Islamic movement. 1)o prominent Mslim theolo"ians "ave

the theoretical principles to this radical Islamic movement. First )as al Ma)ddi 845&'345G59, +onder o+ the "ami#atul!al!$slamiyya and second )as $ayyid al t! 845&3459

o+ the $%wan al Muslimun 8Mslim !rotherhood9. Both advocated stron"ly the e2clsive

soverei"nty o+ ;llah and :ihad 8holy str""le9 a"ainst the so3called conspiracy o+ the*est to destroy Islam. Modern civili=ation is la!eled as a ne) era o+ :ahiliyya/

8i"norance9. 1he three principles that "overn society are seclarism, nationalism and

democracy. 1hese are a"ainst the very !elie+s and principles o+ Islam. For al3Ma)ddi

and al3t!, seclarism is an idea that e2cldes (od )hile democracy arro"ates ntoitsel+ the soverei"nty that is e2clsive to (od. $eclar democracy is a deli!erate

violation o+ divine la) and a reversion to the era o+ pa"an i"norance.

Both al3Ma)ddi and al3t! are the ma:or in+lences o+ the MI7F. 1he Islamicideolo"y cited earlier, that is, the oneness o+ (od and Mhammad is the messen"er o+

(od, points to the desire and o!:ective to reinstate Islam as a political system. 1heassertion o+ the a!solte soverei"nty o+ (od ne"ates the concept o+ the le"al and political

soverei"nty o+ hman !ein"s and nations.

By its chosen name, the MI7F pts emphasis on R'3G3(,. It e2plicitly esposes the

esta!lishment o+ an Islamic #ommnity 8mmah9 and Islamic rle in areas nder its

control and>or in+lence. 1his has !een the !e"innin" o+ its articlated "oal o+ creatin" a

$eparate and Independent Islamic $tate/ in the $othern Philippines. o) this Islamic$tate shall ta6e shape is a continin" de!ate amon" the Mslims scholars and the MI7F

constitency. 1he MI7F claims as the $O7E and 7E(I1IM;1E REPRE$EN1;1I@E/

o+ the Ban"samoro people still in re!ellion a+ter the si"nin" o+ the Peace ;"reement in455.

1he 455G ;"reement on the (eneral #essation o+ ostilities !et)een the (overnment o+ the Rep!lic o+ the Philippines and the Moro Islamic 7i!eration Front. ;+ter series o+

hi"h3level consltation !et)een the (RP and the MI7F, !oth a"reed to constitte their

respective peace panels to !e"in the +ormal peace tal6s. *ith the decision to enter into a

+ormal peace tal6 )as the si"nin" o+ the ;"reement on the (eneral #essation o+ ostilityon 0ly 4<, 455G. 1he Peace 1al6s !et)een the (RP and the MI7F )ere pro"ressin"

)ell al!eit !eset !y di++iclty and pro!lems, particlarly on the implementation o+ the

#ease+ire ;"reement.

The 'strada Presidency

In 0ly 455<, 0oseph Estrada !ecame the President o+ the Philippines. Initially, he

+ollo)ed the Ramos peace initiative. Bt pset !y series o+ la)lessness in the soth,

speci+ically the )anton 6idnappin" o+ +orei"ners !y the ;! $ayya+ "rop and their

reported crelties, his (overnment pon the advise o+ his ;FP #hie+ o+ $ta++, (en.

4G



;n"elo Reyes 8no) De+ense $ecretary9 adopted a military soltion that led to the so3

called a total )ar/ policy a"ainst the MI7F.

From the second )ee6 o+ March %&&&, the National De+ense and the ;rmed Forces o+ the

Philippines 8;FP9 "ot into the +la" raisin" rital/ in all MI7F #amps that conclded in

the ta6e over o+ the MI7F Main #amp ;!!a6ar )ith the President himsel+ leadin" the+la" raisin" and the +eastin" o+ roasted pi"s and !eer +or the victorios/ ;FP.

(n The ASG

1he "rop that has !ecome notorios in the $oth is the Abu Sayya% Group 8;$(9

nder the :oint leadership o+ 0an:alani and ;n"eles !e"innin" 455%. 1he hei"ht o+

terrorism !y this "rop reached a ne) pea6 drin" the +amos !rnin" o+ the to)n center o+ Ipil, -am!oan"a del $r in 455. It )aned drin" the rest o+ the term o+ Pres. Ramos,

especially a+ter the death o+ 0an:alani and ;n"eles. Its "ly +ace has resr+aced this year

8%&&&9 nder the leadership o+ the yon" adda+i 0an:alani in Basilan and the erst)hile

MN7F #ommander Ro!ot in the Province o+ $l. 1he 6idnappin" o+ school childrenand Fr. Rhoel (allardo, #MF in Basilan and the hosta"e ta6in" o+ +orei"n torists in

$ipadan, $a!ah, Malaysia have made the ;! $ayya+ an international 1errorist (rop.Bt even !e+ore these t)o internationally covered terrorism, the ;$(, !y all calclation,

has !ecome notorios +or 6idnappin" and other la)less activities in the island provinces

o+ Basilan and $l and in the -am!oan"a Peninsla.

1here has al)ays !een a sspicion that the ;! $ayya+ and the MI7F are some)hat

connected/, especially )hen the ;$( has !e"n esposin" some ma:or aspirations o+

the MI7F. 1he MI7F o++icially denies any connection to the ;$( and the leadership o+ the MI7F, particlarly the reli"ios, openly has condemned the la)less and 6idnappin"

activities o+ the ;$( as ",-3SAM3;/. Bt even )ith the denial and open

condemnation, there are people )ho still !elieve that these t)o "rops are some)hatconnected. 1here are ,( proo+s on the "rond that )old spport this sspicion. Bt

the contined se o+ Islamic slo"ans !y the ;! $ayya+ simply con+irms, to many, the

sspicion.

1he very comple2 isse o+ the Ban"samoro people is NO* a hosta"e to three dan"eros

crrents in the Philippine society. First is the crrent o+ over3simplistic vie) o+ the

pro!lem and the prsit o+ an instant/ soltion to the centries3old pro!lem. 1he prevailin" cltre o+ instant/ co++ee ma6es people loo6 +or an easy +i2 to the pro!lem in

the $oth. *hat ma6es this crrent very dan"eros is the perception that this easy +i2

and instant soltion is the MI7I1;R OP1ION to the Ban"samoro isse. 1he second

dan"eros crrent is the natral proclivity o+ many to lmp all Mslims to"ether into one

!as6et. 1he third crrent is cased !y the stron" anti3;! $ayya+ sentiments +ollo)in"

the !rtal mrder o+ Fr. (allardo, and the contined a"onies over )hat seem to !e endlesscases o+ criminalities and la)lessness. 1he la)less activities o+ the ;! $ayya+ are the

ma:or o!stacles in the nderstandin", today, o+ the Ban"samoro isse.

4<



1he %&&& Estrada3Reyes led3Mindanao *ar )ith its massive displacement +rther

complicated the Peace Process !et)een the (RP and the MI7F. 1he trama o+ that )ar

rns very deep, !ecase o+ the massive displacement o+ people and destrction o+ homes,incldin" the plveri=ation/ o+ the MI7F camps, particlarly #amps ;!!a6ar, Bshrah

and Ra:ah Mda. 1he ;FP contines its massive presence in all the overran MI7F

#amps. 1heir 8;FP9 presence in those camps "arantees contined armed s6irmishes/ !et)een the ;FP and the MI7F in and arond those camps.

1hen there is the pro!lem o+ the displaced. 1here is a common nderstandin" that thedisplaced are MI7F partisans. 1he nm!ers o+ the displaced ran"e +rom &&,&&& 8N(O

estimate9 to '&&,&&& 8(overnment?s estimate9. 1hey are hosed in school !ildin"s and

tent cities/ in the Provinces o+ #ota!ato, Ma"indanao, and 7anao del $r. 1he a"onies

and s++erin"s o+ the displaced are !eyond any description, especially in terms o+ healthand sanitation needs. *hile the "overnment is reported to spend t)enty3three millions

pesos a day in the condct o+ the Mindanao *ar, it spends a measly million pesos a )ee6

+or the needs o+ the evacees. In contrast, 1a!an" Mindana), an N(O, spends t)o

millions a )ee6 +or the evacees. 1o date, there are 4<G deaths recorded in the variosevacation centers cased !y varios illnesses de to the lac6 o+ adeAate !asic +acilities.

1he lot o+ the evacees is "ettin" )orse as "overnment assistance !e"in to d)indle de tolac6 o+ +nds.

1he ;FP has !ecome a Force o+ Occpation. 1his +act, in a )ay, has made the ;FP?sclaim o+ li!eratin" the areas and hi"h)ays <((=. 1he displaced )ill ,(T retrn

to their villa"es and homes )hile the ;FP contines to occpy those villa"es. 1he ;FP

has !ecome a F(R;' o% (;;"PAT3(, +or these people. 1his is a dan"eros

development, )hen the true war to win is the ,(T over areas and territories but

hearts and minds o% the people that constitute the >angsamoro people. 1he only )ay

+or (overnment to avoid this natral pit+all is to trans+orm the role o+ the ;FP in these

occpied territories. #an the ;FP !ecome !ilders/ and development )or6ers. I+ the;FP contines to !e perceived as occpationary +orces/, the )hole military operations

)old !e in vain and shall only +el the hatred and animosity o+ the Mslim poplation

a"ainst the (overnment and the ;FP.

Peace and =ar under Pres? Arroyo

In 0anary %&&4, the ne)ly installed Pres. ;rroyo once a"ain lanched the Peace Process)ith all the re!el +ronts. $he reconstitted the Peace panels to !e"in the peace tal6s !oth

)ith the National Democratic Front and the Moro Islamic 7i!eration Front. $he coined

the )ord all3ot peace/ 8contrastin" it to Estrada3Reyes? all3ot )ar policy9 to de+ine her administration?s peace impets. 1he ne) ;rroyo "overnment and the re!el +ronts 8NDF

and the MI7F9once a"ain re3a++irmed/ all the ne"otiated and si"ned a"reements drin"

the Ramos and Estrada administrations.

*ith the MI7F, the peace process )as on trac6 and very promisin" )ith Malaysia actin"

as the !ro6er. Both parties a"reed to prse, :ointly, the relie+, reha!ilitation and

reconstrction o+ the livelihood o+ the displaced as )ell as the commnities in con+lict

45



areas even !e+ore the si"nin" o+ the Final Peace ;ccord. 1he creation o+ the

Ban"samoro Development ;"ency and its inter+ace and coordination )ith all "overnment

development and service a"encies loo6ed !ri"ht +or a ne) era da)nin" on the victims o+ )ar !oth individals and commnities. It )as also heart )armin" to !ehold the

enthsiasm o+ the MI7F to !rin" development and reconstrction to the rava"ed

commnities.

1he +ormal peace tal6 )as schedled +or early March )hen the ;FP, a"ain nder the

leadership o+ the same (en. ;n"elo Reyes 8no) $ecretary o+ National De+ense9 attac6edand assalted the headAarter/ o+ MI7F #hairman, Ustad= ashim $alamat, on

Fe!rary 44, %&&' – the Islam?s holiest Feast o+ the $acri+ice 8Idl ;dha9.

1he present environment !ro"ht !y the resmption o+ hostilities !et)een the ;FP andthe MI7F does not )arrant the continance o+ the FORM;7 Peace 1al6s !et)een the

(RP and the MI7F. 1he ne) )ar created ne) conditions and realities that )old prevent

the Formal peace 1al6s to move +or)ard. ;"ain as drin" the administration o+ President

Estrada, the Formal Peace 1al6s is one o+ the casalties o+ the on "oin" *ar. 1he po)er+l sym!ol o+ the continance o+ the all3ot )ar policy +rom Estrada to ;rroyo is

no less than (en. ;n"elo Reyes )ho served as #hie+ o+ $ta++ o+ the ;FP drin" theEstrada administration and no) servin" as $ecretary o+ National De+ense nder President

;rroyo.

1he recently conclded 1al6s/ !et)een the (RP and some representatives o+ the MI7F

in Cala 7mpr has re3a++irmed !oth parties? commitment to prse the peace process.

o)ever, they, too, ac6no)led"e the di++iclties and the hrdles to pt on tract, once

a"ain, the peace process. 1his intent/, hope+lly, )old lead to more INFORM;7PE;#E 1;7C$ 89 !et)een the (RP and the MI7F in order to contine the discssion

over the isses already raised !et)een the (RP and the MI7F Panels.

1he 3,F(RMA P'A;' TA@S )old !e more prodctive and can prepare the

"rond thro"h mtal con+idence !ildin" measres +or the evental resmption o+ the

Peace 1al6s dependin" o+ the reslt o+ the %&&J National and 7ocal Elections. 1here is aneed +or a lot o+ con+idence !ildin" measres/, !ecase the present )ar has shot do)n

the +e) remainin" trst and con+idence !ilt in the initial months o+ the ;rroyo

Presidency.

1he total !rea6do)n o+ trst and con+idence necessitates the NEED +or a ne) 1E;M or

P;NE7 !oth +or the (RP and the MI7F. For the (RP Panel, the Mindanao #onstitency

advocates +or a top-level negotiators )ith easy access to the Presidency to #;IR the(RP Panel. 1he contined se o+ military +orce !y the ;FP to prse its a"enda also

dictates the need +or a trly ;3#33A, leadership in the ;rmed Forces o+ the

Philippines.

1he "ly +ace o+ a resmed all3ot )ar/ n+olded ane) in Fe!rary %&&' on the Feast o+

SId3l ;dha. 1he alle"ed attac6s a"ainst civilian commnities and the !om!in" o+

civilian tar"ets, particlarly the Davao International ;irport a )ee6 a+ter the nprovo6ed

%&



military attac6 a"ainst Blio6/, Pi6it 8tho"h o++icially denied !y the MI7F9 are

!elieved !y the ;FP and the PNP to !e the )or6 o+ the MI7F. 1he civilian casalties

once a"ain revealed the !rtal and "ly visa"e o+ a resmption o+ an all ot )ar/ !et)een the (RP and the MI7F. $everal sectors in Mindanao, particlarly the reli"ios

and !siness, appealed the (RP and the MI7F to "o !ac6 to the ne"otiatin" ta!le or to

limit the +i"hts !et)een and amon" com!atants. ;t no time, shold the civilians and their commnities !e tar"ets o+ military actions, either o++ensive or de+ensive.

In the continin" !lea6 reality o+ the Mindanao )ar, the peace advocates and people o+ "ood)ill hope that sanity, in the end, )old prevail over the prevailin" madness in

Mindanao.

1he entrenched ;FP?s !elie+ or doctrine that allo)s the so called limited se o+ military+orce to so+ten the re!el +ront?s position in the ne"otiation is erroneos and is repeatedly

proven to !e )ron". 1he massive displacement o+ civilians and the contined s++erin"s

o+ people +eed on the discontentment and disillsionment o+ people in the peace process.

Once the peace process loses credi!ility and constitency, e2tremism ta6es over. 1hespecter that this is already happenin" is not +ar +etched.

*e !elieve that )hen sanity retrns, the t)o parties )ill eventally resme the "enine

search +or a peace+l ne"otiated settlement. It may !e more di++iclt this time, !t there

is no alternative to a peace+l and principled ne"otiated settlement )ith no srrender andshame.

In 0ly %&&', an am!i"os cease+ire )as once a"ain si"ned !et)een the (RP and the

MI7F. In principle, they are still committed to the peace+l settlement o+ the pro!lem in$othern Philippines. ;t one time, people !elieved that a peace+l settlement )as near at

hand, !ecase President ;rroyo )as not rnnin" +or re3election ths she )old not !e

distracted !y )hat are poplar/ isses +or electioneerin" a"enda.

Moreover, there are interestin" developments that +avor a political settlement. First is the

accession o+ a more pra"matic people in the top leadership o+ the MI7F late 0ly+ollo)in" the death o+ #hairman ashim $alamat. $econd is the seemin" retreat/ and

de+ensive stance o+ the military ha)6s resltin" +rom the military re!els? direct

accsations that top !rass in the ;FP insti"ated the series o+ !om!in" in Mindanao to

pro:ect the terrorist/ ima"e o+ the MI7F. 1hird is the sympathetic psh o+ the OI#, particlarly o+ Malaysia, to)ards an earlier settlement o+ the (RP and MI7F peace tal6s.

1he +avora!le conditions +or a sccess+l settlement o+ the (RP and MI7F Peace 1al6sremained conditions. 1he entry o+ the election +ever into the scene and the trn arond o+

President ;rroyo to see6 a ne) mandate in May %&&J have chan"e the eAation in peace

ma6in". *hat has !ecome paramont to the top leadership in the contry is the politicala"enda related to the May national elections.

1here is no do!t that the (RP – MI7F Peace 1al6s and the possi!le peace settlement

)old !e !ond to !e controversial. 1he mood and the pre:dice o+ the #hristian

%4



ma:ority a"ainst the tal6s and any settlement )old !e seriosly )ei"hed in the eAation

o+ votes +or a ne) mandate o+ President ;rroyo.

;t this sta"e o+ the increasin" intensity o+ electioneerin"/ I !elieve that peace )ill not

!e a priority in the remainin" months o+ Pres. ;rroyo not)ithstandin" the lip service that

is o+ten heaped on the isse. Once a"ain, the peace a"enda is s!smed to the electorala"enda.

In the end, we peace advocates can only continue to hope pray and wor$ %or

peaceBbelieving in miracles

Selected >ibliography

Abinales, Patricio N. Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-State. Manila: Ateneo deManila University Press, 2000.

Che Man, W.K. Muslim Separatism: The Moros of the Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand. Oxord:Oxord University Press, !""0.

#eor$e, %.&.'. evolt in Mindanao: The ise of !slam in Philippine Politi"s. K(ala )(*+(r: Oxord University Press, !"0.

#o-in$, Peter #. Mos#ue and Moro: $ Study of Muslims in the Philippines. Manila: Phili++ine ederation o ChristianCh(rches, !"/.

11111. Muslim Filipinos % &eritage and &ori'on. (e3on City: Ne-4ay P(blishers, !"5".

#o-in$, Peter #. and 6obert 4. McA*is. The Muslim Filipinos.Manila: 'olidaridad P(blishin$ 7o(se, !"5.7er*osa, &es(s 6. 8%he Mindanao Con9ict. The National Se"urity

evie(, 5;!<: =>!". !"0. &(bair, 'alah. )angsamoro: $ Nation *nder +ndless Tyranny .

)ahore: ?sla*ic 6esearch Acade*y, !". &ones, #re$$ 6. ed evolution: !nside the Philippine ,uerilla

Movement. @o(lder, Colorado: Westvie- Press, !"".McKenna, %ho*as M. Muslim ulers and ebels: +veryday Politi"s

and $rmed Separatism in the Southern Philippines. @ereley:University o Caliornia Press, !"".

Mercado, Bliseo. %he 'o(thern Mindanao (estion. Cotabato City.Notre 4a*e Press !""5.

Millian, 'i*eon Mast(ra, Michael ;eds.<. %he Cotabato 4irectory.Cotabato City Daliant Press !"0.

M(sli*, Maca+ado A. 8Understandin$ and 6esolvin$ the Con9ict inMindanao. #(est lect(re delivered at #eor$eto-n Universityin Nove*ber 2002.

%%



6osenber$, 4avid A. ;ed.<. Mar"os and Martial a( in the Philippines.?thaca: Cornell University Press.

%an, 'a*(el K. The Filipino Muslim $rmed Struggle. /011-/023.Manila: ili+inas o(ndation, !"55.

11111. Sele"ted +ssays on the Filipino Muslims. Mara-i City:

University 6esearch Center, Mindanao 'tate University, !"2. Ee$ar, Moshe. )et(een !ntegration and Se"ession: The MuslimCommunities of the Southern Philippines. Southern Thailand.and 4estern )urma5Myanmar . Ne- Eor: )exin$ton @oos,2002.

Documents

Mindanao Peace Process