Mediterranean Campaign (1943)

8/9/2019 Mediterranean Campaign (1943)

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HEADOUARTERS ROYALMIDDLRhlT

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Con tentsThe Conquest of Sicily - 10th July to 17th August, 1943.

I. Preparatory Measures............... ... Page 5II. The Assault... ...... .. :........ ..... 10III. The Enem~y's Stand at Catania... ........... , , 26IV. Reduction of th e Island ... ..... ....... , 34Diary of th e Sicilian Campaign. . .... , 43

Tables Showing Scale of Effort.. . ... ... 45Tables of Operations in th e Mediterranean ........... . 48Tables Showing Effor t from Malta... ................ ,, 54A ir Operations in th e Aegean......... ...... . ,, 59A ir Operations Against Sardinia an d Corsica...... ...... , 73Royal A ir Force Regiment... .... ....... ...... , 77Attack on Ploesti ........ ... ..... , 82In th e Wilderness.................................,, 89First A ir Attack on W iener Neustadt ....... ............. , 99Development-of Enemy Bombs and Offensive W eapo ns. . .. .. .. 103Medical Receiving Stations in the Western Desert............. 108Rescue by Night.................................. 122Flying Control: Part II............ ... ... ... ,, 123A ir Transport............... . .......... , 12 9A Difficult Rescue................ ... ... ......... 136From the 540s ................. ..................... 143Acknowledgment............. ................ . 147Maps: Th e Sicilian Campaign - 10th July to 17th August , 4

Italian Targets Attacked - Is t July to 17th August ,, 20The Aegean and Ionian Seas Area.. . ... ....... ,, 58-The Dodecanese Area.......................... 60A ir Operations Against Sardinia-July to September ,, 72The "Wilderness" , .,, ...... ..... ,, ' 88

137The s gm... .......... ,, . 142

Th e R.A.F. Mediterranean'Review is Secret (= American Secret). Itis intended for th e information of all officers and flying crews, under conditionsof security approved by th e Commanding Officer, wh o is to ensure that withinthose limits it has as wide a circulation as possible.

No quotation may be made from it without the authority of S.A.S.O., H.Q.,R.A.F., M.E.; neither are an y of it s contents to be communicated to anyone out-side th e Services.

All persons are hereby warned that the unauthorised retention or destruc-tion of this document is an offence against th e Official Secrets Act, 1911-1920.Any unauthorised person obtainin ssession of a copy should immediatelyforward it in a clo ed J ope to H.Q., R.A.F., M.E.


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ForewordA s announced in the Foreword-of the

last number of the Review, its name changes with this issue from theR.A.F. Middle East Review to the R.A.F. Mediterranean Review. Thetransition from a predominant Middle East viewpoint to the wider horizondemanded by a Mediterranean production must of necessity be gradual,and this number inevitably contains, apart from the historical narrative,articles more of Middle East than Mediterranean interest. No apologyneed be offered for that, however, for whereas Middle East may beregarded more-or-less as a pensioned warrior mainly employed on guardduty, it is true to say that the Mediterranean giant is"equipped in greatpart with the former's weapons and experience.

The Mediterranean aspect, therefore, will be more fully developedin the next number, and for that reason the commencement of the Invasionof Italy, which really falls within the quarter under review, has been leftover until Number 5. Additional to that reason is the fact that the Siciliancampaign, which may be regarded as a model combination of effort betweenthe three Services, land, sea and air, has been considered here in itsentirety.

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The Conquest Of Sicilyioth JULY TO 17th AUGUST, 1943

As the Tunisian campaign drew to its endin the first half of May, 1943, plans were formulated for the invasion of Sicily, amain bulwark of the southern defences, of Hitler's European "Fortress".Essential prerequisitesof the invasion included the reduction of Pantelleria andthe less important islands of Lampedusa, Lampione and Linosa; these were all inAllied hands by 13th June, as the result of a sustained aerial offensive, supplementedby naval bombardment. Details of the Allied air attacks were given in the previousnumber of the "Review", but it may be re-iterated here that against Pantelleria over5,650 effective sorties were flown by Allied bombers and fighter-bombers, in the courseof which approximately 6,500 tons of bombs were dropped, Against Lampedusa only30 air attacks were needed in which about 5 0o of the bomb tonnage expended onPantelleriawas dropped.Meanwhile, a strategic bombing programme had been carried out with the objectof interfering with the enemy's "build-up" in the Central Mediterranean area in generaland Sicily in particular. From the middle of May to the end of June constant attackswere delivered against the enemy's airfields in Sicily, Sardinia and Southern Italy, theenemy's ports and submarine bases in the same areas, the communications across theMessina Straits and industrial targets,particularlyat Naples and Bari. In addition, thebombing attacks from the United Kingdom against targets in Northern Italy weresupplemented by a few large-scaleraids on Leghorn and Spezia from North-west Africa.In the six weeks period mentioned Allied bombers and fighter-bombers of theNorth-west African Air Forces and Middle East Command (including Malta) flew 2,292effective sorties against the enemy's Central Mediterranean airfields and 2,638 againsthis ports, bases and lines of communication. These totals are exclusive of the effortagainst Pantelleriaand Lampedusa.The following account of the Allied air operations,1st July to 17th August, carriedout in connection with the Sicilian invasion, is divided into four sections:-

I. PreparatoryMeasures.II. The Assault.III The Enemy's Stand at CataniaIV. The Reduction of the Island.

I. PREPARATORY MEASURESPreliminary Bombing Programme from mid-May to the end of June against the

The successful invasion of Sicily implied major enemy's airfields, bases and lines of communi-commitments for the Allied air forces before, cation; for the week immediately prior to theduring and after the actual landings. Sicilian landings the Air Plan provided for an

Mention has already been made in the preface even greater effort against enemy airfields. By.above of the scale of bomber effort developed "zero hour" it was hoped that the sustained

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attacks on the airfields, coupled with the ca-sualties inflicted on the enemy's interceptingfighters, would have greatly reduced the enemy'sfirst line strength in the Sicilian theatre of war,especially in fighter aircraft. In addition, theenemy's ports and lines of communication wereto be attacked when necessary, in accordancewith the intelligence provided by air reconnais-sance.

Meanwhile, Home-based bombers were to con-tinue their offensive against Northern Italian in-dustrial targets, which, apart from the materialdamage caused, was certain to have an effecton the morale of the Italian people, which wasalready at low ebb.Malta Prepares

For Malta the wheel had turned full circle:from being a besieged fortress in 1942 it wasnow destined to become a major base for offen-sive operations.

As early as January, 1943, work had begun onthe task of improving the island's airfields.Existing airfields were extended and.extra land-ing strips were prepared. Thus, by the end ofJune Malta could maintain and operate nearly30 fighter squadrons. In addition, during thatmonth U.S. Army Engineers constructed a land-ing strip at Gozo from which a further threesquadrons could operate. The airfield on Pan-telleria was also put into order and wa s soonable to accommodate several American long-rangefighter squadrons.

Meanwhile, the provisioning of Malta went onapace and adequate stores, supplies and sparesnecessary for the operation and maintenance ofthe powerful air striking force were speedilyaccumulated.

Improvements were also made in the existingR.D.F. and fighter control facilities. In parti-cular, a new Fighter Control Room was hewnout of the rock, an enlarged Filter Room wasestablished, and additional R.D.F. stations wereset up. Fo r the battle period, also, a combinedWar Room was prepared with the object of pro-viding an hour by hour picture of ground, navaland air operations. Close at hand, also, werethe Army Support Centre and the Naval Co-bperation Operations Room. Thus, full care wastaken that during the period of the coming battlecontrol would be immediate and as faultless ashumanly possible.On the eve of the Sicilian invasion nearly 40squadrons were concentrated on Malta and thesatellites Gozo and Pantelleria. The Island wasready to pay off old scores.Main Features of the Air Plan

No radical change was necessary in the exist-ing organisation and system of command in theMediterranean theatre.Under the direction of the Air Commander-in-

Chief, Mediterranean, the Commandin

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North-west African Air Forces remained in com-mand of the North-west African Allied air forces.The operational formations, the North-west Afri-can Strategic, Tactical and Coastal Air Forceswere to remain unchanged in their basic organi-sation and functions, although it was envisagedthat some redistribution of units might be ne-cessary from time to time.

The provision of two subordinate Air Com-manders by the A.O.C. Tactical Air Force forair task forces operating in Sicily is consideredlater.

The Middle East air forces not already underthe operational control of the North-west Afri-can Air Forces (excluding, that is, No. 205Group controlled by the Strategic Air Force andthe Desert Air Force which was an integral partof the Tactical Air Force) were to remain underthe existing system of command. The forcesoperating from the North African mainland com-prised the Ninth U.S. Air Force (including thetwo R.A.F. heavy bomber squadrons under itsoperational control) and the A.H.Q. Air DefencesEastern Mediterranean and No. 201 (Naval Co-operation) squadrons. Malta, as already men-tioned, accommodated a large fighter force de-rived from the North-west African Tactical AirForce in additipn to the "garrison squadrons."

The A.O.C.-in-Chief, Middle East, was respon-sible for the administration of the air forcesoperating from the Middle East and Malta andthe Commanding General, North-west African AirForces had a similar responsibility in respect ofall other air forces operating in the Mediterra-nean theatre concerned with the Sicilian in-vasion. In the initial stage of the campaign,also, H.Q., R.A.F., Middle East was to hold it-self in readiness to assist in the maintenance ofair forces based in Sicily.

After due consideration it was decided thatthe assault on Sicily should be launched againstthe south-eastern corner of the island and eightsimultaneous pre-dawn landings were planned totake place on the beaches from Licata to eastof Avola. The British assaults were to be madeon the eastern seaboard and the American land-ings on the south-east shore. The immediate aimof the assault troops was the capture of the air-fields and ports in south-eastern Sicily and thedevelopment of an assault on the key position ofCatania. Subsequently, advances were to bemade on Palermo and Messina.

By restricting the landing to the south-easterncorner of the island and ignoring the westernshore tactical surprise was more likely and thedispersion of the air effort in covering assaultsin the Palermo area was avoided.

In spite of the concentration of fighter squd-drons on Malta and the satellite aerodromes, for-ward airfields from which our short-rangefighters could effectively operate over the battlearea in the initial stages were still not over-plen-tiful; in particular, fighters based in northernTunisia could operate effectively over the most


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westerly of the assaults only and could not assistlandings east of Licata.As airfields were occupied in Sicily, however, it

was planned for fighter squadrons from Maltato move in and their places on the island were tobe taken by fighter-bomber squadrons, with-drawn, in the first instance, from Pantelleria.When room was available for the fighter-bombersin Sicily the landing grounds vacated by them inMalta were to be allotted to light bombers.These, in turn were to be established in Sicilywhen airfields became available.

A scheme was drawn up for an eastern air taskforce to support the Eighth Army and attachedunits and a western ai r task force to assist theU.S. Seventh Army. Until the eastern air taskforce was established in Sicily the greater partas already indicated was to be based in Malta;these squadrons were to be under the commandof the A.O.C. Malta until they were transferred toSicily, when the A.O.C. of the eastern air taskforce was to assume command. The Americansquadrons allotted to support the U.S. SeventhArmy were to be derived mainly from Tunisiaand accordingly came under the command of theA.O.C. of the western air task force forthwith.Both air task forces were to be under the controlof A.O.C. North-west African Tactical Air Force.The speedy establishment of the two air taskforces in Sicily was of vital importance in orderto provide continuous close support to our ad-vancing land forces.-The Allied medium and heavy bomber squa-

drons of the North-west African Air Forces (in-cluding No. 205 Group's Wellingtons) were tocontinue to operate from the North-west Africanmainland and the U.S. and R.A.F. heavy bombersunder the control of the Ninth U.S. Air Forcewere to function from Cyrenaica, as formerly.

The sailing of east and west-bound convoys toSicily implied increased shipping protection com-mitments. Fighter protection and anti-submarinepatrols were to be provided under the existingorganisations. That is to say, convoys passingwestwards through the Eastern Mediterraneanwere to receive protection from squadrons operat-ing under A.H.Q. Air Defences Eastern Mediter-ranean and No. 201 (Naval Co-operation) Group,and east-bound convoys in the Central Mediter-ranean were to be protected by the North-westAfrican Coastal Air Force. Wherever possible,the Sicily convoys were to be routed close to theNorth African coast and fighter squadrons engag-ed on shipping protection were to move up withtheir respective convoys, as far as practicable, inorder to economise the fighter effort. On theday prior to the landings the invasion craft con-verging on Malta were to be protected by fightersfrom the island to an extent of a circle of 50 nau-tical miles 'radius from Valetta.

During and immediately after the Sicilian land-ings, before anti-aircraft defences could beestablished ashore, the fullest fighter protectionwas to be provided over the beaches. During the

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hours of darkness, moreover, arrangements weremade for night-fighters based in Malta and Tu-nisia to give the maximum protection to shipsunloading at the beaches and to captured ports.As soon as C.G.I. could be installed on selectedoccupied airfields in Sicily, also, certain night-fighter squadrons were to be established there.ReconnaissanceThe Air Plan made provision for a constantwatch to be kept on the enemy's strength andmovements. Fo r the initial period, arrangementswere made for a detachment of the North-westAfrican Photographic Reconnaissance Wing tooperate from Malta in order to assist the workof No. 248 Wing. Other photographic reconnais-sance units were to continue to function fromNorth Africa.

Tactical reconnaissance requirements in theeastern area of the Sicilian battlefield were tobe met by No. 40 Squadron S.A.A.F., operatingfrom Malta; a similar commitment in respect ofthe western area was the responsibility of anAmerican observation squadron based in Tunisia.The RBle of Air Transport

On the conclusion of the Tunisian campaignunits of the Troop Carrier Command commencedtraining for the carrying out of a large-scaleparatroop mission which was to precede thelanding of our sea-borne troops.

During the pre-invasion period, also, American,British and French air transport units wereavailable for the urgent transportation of person-nel and freight. In addition, when the battlewas joined the U.S. Transport Command was toundertake the evacuation of wounded as well asnormal transport commitments.Relative Air Strengths

The Allied air forces in the Mediterraneanarea were infinitely stronger than those of theAxis. For all operations connected with the Si-cilian invasion it was estimated that a front-linestrength of approximately 4,000 aircraft wasavailable. This figure excludes the large Ame-rican glider force.

R.A.F. squadrons provided the majority of thesingle and twin-engined offensive and defensivefighters and coastal aircraft while the bomberand air transport forces were composed princi-pally of American units. With regard to thenight bomber force, however, it should be notedthat this consisted mainly of R.A.F. Welling-tons, Liberators and Halifaxes.

On the eve of the Sicilian invasion the Germanand Italian air forces had a total of 1,800 to1,900 aircraft, excluding transport types, basedin Italy, Sicily, Sardinia and southern France.

The enemy's fighters were based mainly inSicily, Southern Italy and Sardinia. In Sicilyand Italy (south of 41o north) it was estimatedthat the G.A.F. had approximately 260 sinle-engined fighters and" fi te


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Italians 200 single-engined fighters; in Sardinia,there were about 130 German single-enginedfighters and fighter-bombers and 100 Italianfighters. The balance of the Italian single-engin-ed force-approximately 230 aircraft-was locat-ed in central and northern Italy. The Germantwin-engined fighter force, which comprisedsome 75 aircraft, was based half in Sicily (in-cluding Italy south of 41 north) and half inItaly (north of 41 north). Night-fighter JU.88sappeared to be based entirely in central Italy.

Apart from 50 JU.88 bombers in Sicily, theGerman long-range bomber force was basedprincipally in Italy (north of 40 north), with anadditional strong force in southern France;bomber reconnaissance JU.88s were also basedmainly in the two last mentioned areas. Italianbomber reconnaissance and torpedo bomber air-craft were located in central Italy, with detach-ments in Sardinia and Sicily.

In addition, in Greece, Crete and the Dodeca-nese there were approximately 265 German and180 Italian aircraft; in particular, the Germantotal included about 130 bombers, dive-bombersand reconnaissance aircraft.

The serviceability of enemy aircraft in theMediterranean area in general was estimated toaverage 50%; in the battle area, however, theaverage serviceability was undoubtedly less.The Opposing Land Forces

It was naturally impossible to gauge with ac-curacy the strength of the enemy's land forcesprior to the invasion, but by the end of the firstweek's fighting it transpired that the forcesready to repel our attack were approximately asfollows:-there were five Italian field divisions,two German field divisions, and five Italiancoastal divisions. The coastal divisions were madeup mainly of older men or men of low physicalcategory and included a high proportion of Si-cilians; in addition, their almost total immobi-lity and the simple nature of the defence worksrendered them unfitted to the task of opposingour assault troops. The Italian field divisionswere men of better calibre and more adequatelyequipped. The German divisions were the re-formed Herman Goering Division and an armour-ed formation which had been given the name ofthe 15th Panzer Division, "liquidated" in Tunisia.These two divisions were well equipped and in-cluded about 200 tanks; it became obvious thatthey would provide the hard core of resistance.

After considering all available evidence at theend of the campaign it was estimated that atthe beginning of hostilities the Italian field for-ces, coastal defence and anti-aircraft artilleryunits comprised in round figures 216,000 men.In addition, there were probably about 28,000

sectors, were estimated to comprise about 60,000men.The Allied invasion forces were made up of are-organised Eighth Army, which now includedCanadian units, and the Seventh U.S. Army.Most of the Allied troops were veterans of theNorth African campaign, and backed by sea and

air superiority they were confident from the startof making the first breach in the defences ofOccupied Europe.Pre-Invasion Blitz on Sicilian Airfields

During the first nine days of July, in ac-cordance with the preliminary bombing planmentioned on page 5, the Allied air forcescarried out intensive attacks on the enemy's air-fields in Sicily. During this pre-invasion periodthe North-west African Air Forces carried out394 heavy, 1,255 medium and 377 light bombereffective sorties against Sicilian landing grounds.In addition, Cyrenaican-based Liberators of theNinth U.S. Air Force flew 126 effective sortiesagainst these objectives and Malta-based Spit-fire-bombers also made a few attacks.

The majority of the enemy's fighters in Sicilywas now based in the east, with Gerbini airfieldand its many satellites as the principal base.Accordingly, the greater part of the bomber ef-fort was directed against landing grounds in theGerbini area. From 4th to 9th July, inclusive,aircraft under the operational control of* H.Q.North-west African Air Forces flew 294 heavyand 560 medium bomber sorties against the Ger-bini landing grounds and U.S. Liberators of theNinth U.S. Air Force flew 79 sorties.

Some indication of the havoc wrought at Ger-bini is shown by the North-west African Photo-graphic Reconnaissance Wing's report on thedamage inflicted by 100 U.S. Fortresses on 5thJuly. Of the 54 aircraft present on the mainairfield during the raid all but four were destroy-ed and at two satellite landing grounds a totalof fourteen aircraft, mainly single-engined fighters,were destroyed. Widespread damage was caus-ed, also, on several other Gerbini satellites. Onthe 5th, moreover, enemy fighters were inducedto join battle. Approximately 100 enemy air-craft attacked a formation of 27 U.S. Fortressesand as a result of a long running fight 35 ofthe enemy were claimed as destroyed for theloss of two American bombers. Two furtherformations of heavy bombers, which attacked thesame objectives about 20 minutes later, met noenemy opposition, and an escorted formation ofU.S. Mitchells, which renewed the attack anhour afterwards, was also left unmolested. Itwas evident that the enemy's fighter force wasin no condition to challenge every Allied raid, butattacked spasmodically only, in an endeavour toconserve strength for the critical days ahead.

Italian second-line troops composed of depot In addition to the blitz on the Gerbini groupunits, carabinieri, and local militia, and a further of landing grounds, the following bomb loads50,000 in labour corps. German forces at the were dropped on the other principal eastern air-beginning of the Sicilian campaign, includin Biscari 335'6 tons: Comiso 300 tons (in-anti-aircraft and t s ci i 1 tons dropped by U.S. Liberators): Ca-


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tania 139"4 tons. The majority of these attackswere carried out by N.A.A.F. medium bombers -U.S. Mitchells and Marauders operating by day,and Wellingtons by night.The western Sicilian landing grounds also re-ceived attention, but the Allied attacks in thisquarter were no t so intense as these landinggrounds were now of secondary importance.

Sciacca was attacked nine times by N.A.A.F. air-craft, in the course of which 130.7 tons of bombswere dropped. Many of the raids took place atnight, and, in particular, R.A.F. and S.A.A.F.Bostons and Baltimores played a full part in thisactivity. Other western airfields attacked in-cluded those at Trapani/Milo and Bo Rizzo,against which 96 light and 45 medium and twelvelight bomber effective sorties were flown, respec-tively.The Allied air forces' attacks on the Sicilianairfields during the first nine days of July ren-dered many of them unserviceable and about ahalf of the enemy's aircraft formerly based therewere either forced to withdraw to South Italy or

moved to newly constructed landing grounds. Inparticular, on the eve of the Allied landings themain Gerbini airfield, seven of its satellites, andComiso airfield were rendered unserviceable ; inthe west, also, as the result of the heavy attacksin June Bocca di Falco airfield appeared to beunserviceable and Castelvetrano was all butabandoned.In addition to the great number of enemy air-craft destroyed on the ground in the course ofthe pre-invasion blitz on the Sicilian airfields,bombers operating under the control of the North-west African Air Forces claimed the destructionof 56 enemy fighters in combat for the loss ofseven aircraft shot down by anti-aircraft fire andenemy. air action and eight missing; escortingfighters accounted for another 45 enemy aircraftdestroyed at the cost of seven shot down and fivemissing, and Malta-based Spitfires acting as topcover to the N.A.A.F. bombers also accounted foran appreciable number of enemy fighters. U.S.Liberators of the Ninth U.S. Air Force encount-ered little enemy air opposition in the course oftheir attacks on Gerbini and Comiso airfields anddestroyed only one enemy fighter in combatwithout loss.

Attacks on Bases and CommunicationsAs indicated in the preceding paragraphs the

main activity of the Allied air forces prior to theSicilian invasion was directed against the enemy'sairfields. Attacks on his bases and lines of com-munication were consequently on a reduced scale.In all, from 2nd to 9th July, inclusive, aircraftcontrolled by the North-west African Air Forcesflew 194 bomber and fighter-bomber sortiesagainst enemy ports bases and shipping and 698against his positions and lines of communication;fighters meanwhile carried out 88 sorties onground attacks and 68 on anti-shipping missions,in addition to their normal commitments of bom-

ber escort, offensive sweeps, shipping protection,and reconnaissance tasks.The bomber attacks included 75 Wellingtonsorties against Palermo and 26 more against theimportant position at Catania and an attack by

21 U.S. Mitchells on targets in the Caltagironearea on the day before the invasion.

The fighter-bomber effort was directed chieflyagainst the harbours of Porto Empedocle andMarsala, but there were also successful U S.Warhawk attacks on radar stations at Cape Pas-sero, Palazzo, Catania and Syracuse.Shipping Protection

The protection of the convoys en route to Sicilyinvolved increased commitments for the North-west African Coastal Air Force (which was con-siderably enlarged particularly by the addition ofmore Beaufighter squadrons) in the Central Me-diterranean, and the Middle East squadrons con-trolled by Air Headquarters, Air Defences EasternMediterranean and No. 201 Group (reinforced bytwo long-range fighter squadrons loaned fromNorth-west Africa and one from Malta) in theEastern Mediterranean.

In the fighter protection of our east-boundconvoys during the first nine days of July squa-drons of the Coastal Air Force flew a total of1,426 sorties, including the record number of 574sorties on the 8th and 9th. In addition, 541 fightersorties were flown on local defence. Naval co-operation aircraft, meanwhile, carried out 258sorties on anti-submarine protection and sub-marine hunts.

Over our west-bound convoys the fighter squa-drons controlled by Air Headquarters, Air De-fences Eastern Mediterranean flew 1,421 sortiesand carried out 257 sorties on local defence. Coas-tal aircraft of No. 201 (Naval Co-operation)Group, meanwhile, flew 314 sorties on anti-sub-marine close cover, area patrols and submarinehunts.

As the great armada converged on Malta dur-ing the morning of 9th July fighter protectionwas provided from the island. About two-thirdsof the available fighter force was employed con-tinuously on shipping protection, carrying out 413sorties.

The only opposition of note to the massing ofour invasion fleet was the attack on Bizerta onthe night 6/7th July. Sixty-five enemy bombersdropped light explosive and incendiary bombs inan attempt to damage shipping in the harbour,but the harm done was negligible. One JU.88 wasdestroyed by night fighters and three more wereshot down by our anti-aircraft fire.

It was clear that the Allied air forces' intensiveattacks on the enemy's airfields had preventedthe concentration of an effective air striking forceand the combined naval and air force control ofthe Mediterranean sea-ways dissuaded the enemyfrom employing submarines on any appreciablescale. .. ....


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ASSAULTThe Assault from the Air

The invasion of Sicily began shortly before mid-night 9/10th July, when British and Americanairborne units landed on the peninsulas northand south of Syracuse and on the coastal plainbetween Gela and Licata. The principal tasks ofthese troops were to harass the coastal defenceforces, destroy the enemy's lines of communica-tion to the coast and preserve those which wouldbe of use to the Allied armies scheduled to landon the morrow.

Glider troops, drawn from the British 1st Air-borne Division, operated in the Syracuse area andparatroops of the American 82nd Airborne Divi-sion were dropped in the Gela - Licata locality.Aircraft of the North-west African Troop Car-rier Command carried out 109 C.47 (Dakota), 21Albemarle and seven Halifax sorties in towingthe gliders and 226 C.47 sorties conveying theparachute troops.

The strong headwinds encountered forced anumber of gliders into the sea short of the targetarea but, on the whole, considering the difficultyof carrying out such a hazardous undertakingat night, the missions were satisfactorily com-pleted. Many of the set tasks were performed bythe airborne troops and the way was paved forthe landings from the sea.

Protection for the aerial armada was providedby R.A.F. night fighters and, in addition, cannonHurricanes of No. 73 Squadron preceded thetransport fleet across the Sicilian coast in orderto eliminate searchlights.

It was evident that the enemy had been takenby surprise and only slight anti-aircraft fire wasencountered.The operations of the Troop Carrier Command

in connection with, the subsequent attacks ofAllied airborne troops are dealt with chrono-logically.Bombing on the Night 9/10th July

On the night of the airborne assaults bombingattacks were delivered in order to soften re-sistence generally to our shock troops; as coverto the glider operations; to create a diversionwhile our airborne troops formed up for theattack, and to prevent enemy reserves beingrushed up to the threatened areas.

The attacks in the western area were carriedout by R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. light bombers andU.S. medium bombers under the operational con-trol of the North-west African Air Forces. Atotal of 22 S.A.A.F. and R.A.F. Bostons and Bal-timores attacked targets at Niscemi, Butera,Ponte Olivo airfield, and eastwards as far asCanicatti,causing many fires, and 25 R.A.F. andS.A.A.F. Bostons effectively bombed the air-fields at Sci~~acEs d~ilp inthewest . Mean-

while, 24 U.S. Mitchells made attacks over awide area, concentrating mainly on the PiazzaArmerina-Caltagirone-Biscari rea in attacks onenemy reserves but extended their range toSciacca in the west and Floridia in the east.

Later that night a large force of No. 205Group Wellingtons (including North-west Afri-can Strategic Air Force Wellingtons now underits operational control) attacked targets in theSyracuse area, in order to create a diversionwhile British airborne troops formed up to assaultthe town, made a diversionary attack on Cata-nia, and bombed enemy reserve formations. Thescale of effort of these important attacks was asfollows:- 55 aircraft attacked targets in the Sy-racuse isthmus, dropping all bombs in the spe-cified areas, and nine successfully attacked theSyracuse' seaplane base; nineteen Wellingtonsbombed Catania, scoring hits on the town andthe docks, while dummy paratroops were droppedto create confusion; nineteen bombers attackedthe enemy's reserves at Canicatti, Caltanissetta,Caltagironeand Palazzolo Acreide; and six moreaircraft carried out other specific attacks.

The General Officer Commanding 1st AirborneDivision later informed the A.O.C. No. 205 Groupthat although his troops "were not in a positionto take immediate advantage of the bombing,Syracuse was easily captured during the follow-ing evening largely as a result of it".

In addition to the above-mentioned attacks,immediately prior to the landings mentioned inthe following paragraphs, eleven R.A.F. Cyrenai-can-based Liberators and Halifaxes bombed Avo-la , Noto and Sa n Paolo, in order to weaken re-sistance to the Eighth Army's initial attacks.The Landings

At 04.00 hours 10th July, British, Canadian andAmerican forces carried out landings all roundthe south-east coast of Sicily north of Syracuseto west of Licata, supported by Allied naval andair forces. Nearly 2,800 vessels of different sizestook part in this extensive amphibious operation,ranging from the largest battleship to the small-est landing craft, and the sea forces participat-ing included units of the Royal Indian, Nether-lands, Polish and Greek Navies in addition tothe Anglo-American forces. The adverse windswhich had already interfered with our airborneassaults, together with a slight swell, causeddelays in the arrivals of some of the smallervessels, but,' in the main, the landings wereexecuted according to plan.

British and Canadian' troops of the EighthArmy landed on three specified beaches betweenPozzalo and Cape Murro di Porco, and the Ame-rican Seventh Army landed at two beaches alongthe Gulf of Gela. The Eighth Army had as itsimmediate objective the capture of Pachino land-so"


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Paratroopsemplaning in full operational kit.ing ground and Syracuse, to be followed by anadvance up the east coast to Catania and Messi-na; the Seventh Army's tasks were first to se-cure Licata and Gela and then to press on toCaltanissetta, in order to cut the roads leadingto the invasion areas.

At this initial stage contact was made onlywith the ill-trained demoralised Italian coastaltroops, who offered little resistance. Bridge-

was occupied and repairs to the ploughed-uplanding ground were under way. By the earlyevening forward troops of the Eighth Army hadcrossed the bay of Syracuse and by 21.00 hoursthe town had fallen intact. The Italians hadhad no time-or inclination-to carry out demo-litions and the majority of the civil population,moreover, proved friendly and willing to co-operate.


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Fl

an appreciable number of sorties in protectinglandings and unloading at the most westerlypoint, but, in general, the patrolling of the bea-ches was the responsibility of the R.A.F. Spit-fire squadrons based on Malta and U.S. fightersoperating from the satellites Gozo and Pantel-leria.

As the fighters based on Malta and its satelliteairfields were not numerous enough to provideconstant patrols for each of the five landingsthroughout the sixteen hours of daylight thefollowing programme was adhered to:-

(1) Throughout the hours of daylight fightercover was given to at least two of thebeaches concerned.

(2) All landing areas were provided with con-tinuous fighter patrols for the first twohours of daylight; from 10.30 to 12.30hours; from 16.00 to 17.30 hours, and forthe last one and a half hours of daylight.These periods were correctly anticipatedas the most likely times for enemy attacks.

(3) A reserve Spitfire Wing was held inreadiness to reinforce patrols which requir-ed assistance. In the event, these fighterswere not called upon for the task andsome were employed in escorting U.S. me-dium bombers in the attacks mentioned inthe following sub-section.

During the first day of the landings fightersbased on Malta and the satellite islands flew atotal of 1,092 sorties on beach patrol. The coverprovided proved extremely successful. The AlliedNavies were prepared for a loss of 300 shipsduring the day prior to and the actual day ofthe landings; in the event, up to nightfall of 10thJuly twelve ships only were successfully attack-ed from the air. Most of the enemy attackswere delivered against shipping lying off Licataand Gela, where the American troops were beingprotected by U.S. fighter squadrons. Many ofthe American ships in the area lay as far assix miles off the beaches and the fighters patrol-ling over the shipping were thus unable to affordfull protection to the beaches and small craftplying between the ships and the shore. Another


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Amphibious craft coming ashore.fact which militated against 100% fighter pro-tection in all areas was the fact that Navalanti-aircraft guns so frequently engaged ourfighter patrols that squadrons were eventuallyobliged to fly as high as 10,000 to 14,000 feetinstead of 5,000 to 8,000, as ordered.

During the day of the initial landings Alliedfighters based on Malta and the satellite air-fields destroyed two JU.88s, one HE.111, andnine enemy fighters, and probably destroyed ordamaged fourteen more aircraft; Allied lossesthrough enemy action were eleven Spitfires shotdown and missing. No. 324 Group's U.S. War-hawks, operating from North-west Africa, intheir patrols over the most westerly point of thelandings accounted for another JU.88.Air Attacks

While the landings on 10th July were in pro-gress the Allied bombers and fighter-bomberscontinued their attacks on the enemy's Sicilianairfields, positions and lines of communication.

The Gerbini satellites, the enemy's main Sici-

against satellites numbers four and five and 28against number nine. In each case the targetswere reported to be well covered with bombbursts. The enemy's western airfields at Sciac-ca and Milo (Trapani), meanwhile, were effecti-vely bombed by 71 U.iS. Mitchells.

The attacks on enemy targets at PalazzolaAcreide were continued by 36 U.S. Mitchells,which encountered no opposition either in the airor from the ground. Further north 24 U.S. Fort-resses and 28 Ninth U.S. Air Force Liberatorsbombed the marshalling yards at Catania, inorder to hinder the reinforcement of. the enemy'smain strong points. Explosions followed byhuge fires were caused and smoke from the lat-ter was visible for 80 miles on the heavy bombers'return journey.

During the day, also, North-west African U.S.A.36s carried out intensive attacks on theenemy's communications and positions. The A.36, a dive-bomber derived from the P.51 (Mus-tang) by the addition of bomb racks and divebrakes, had made its appearance in the African


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View of the landing from the air.glider-bomber for attacks in broken country;

however, fundamentally a fighter,the usual formation was the fighter defen-formation of twelve aircraft line abreast.the assigned targets were well describedsuccess was achieved by the A.36s. It isnoting that at this stage it carried abomb-load than any other fighter-bom-

in use, excluding the P.38 (Lightning). On10th the A.36s carried out a total of 169

in bombing and straffing attacks in theBarrafranca, CaJtanissetta,Grwmmi-

and Vallelunga areas. The targets attackedroad junctions, bridges, railways, trains,

positions and transport vehicles. These at-greatly assisted the Seventh Army's ad-and hindered the movement of Axis troopsthe north-west of the island to the invasion

addition to the above-mentioned attacksLightnings successfully straffed an R.D.F.

The enemy's air opposition to the Allied at-tacking aircraft.on the 10th was slight, and ofthe enemy fighters which attempted interceptionseventeen were shot down. Allied losses werethree U.S. Mitchells and two A.36s shot downor missing and a number of other aircraft dam-aged, including eighteen U.S. Mitchells; thesecasualties were believed to be caused entirely bythe intense flak encountered.Air Activity Night 10/11th July

That night, 10/11th July, U.S. Mitchells, Bos-tons and Baltimores from North-west Africaoperated over the western and central areas ofthe island: the main target was Milo airfield,but Sciacca, Trapani and the enemy's centrallines of communications, particularly at Calta-nisseta, also received attention. In, all, 79 U.S.Mitchell and 58 light bomber effective sortieswere flown on these attacks. In addition, four-teen Wellingtons attacked the Gerbini landing


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0andings were cancelled due to the postponementof these missions, and the scale of the attack onGerbini was limited by an accident on a runway.

By the evening of 10th July a G.C.I. stationhad been disembarked and was put into opera-tion during the night. This and G.C.I. stationsoperating in L.S.Ts (Landing Ships Tanks) prov-ed invaluable in extending the range of the Maltacontrol now that enemy night bombers were be-ginning to operate against our shipping lying offthe south-east coast of Sicily.

During the night Malta-based Beaufighters des-troyed two JU.88s and one Cant. Z.1007 and pro-bably destroyed a JU.88 in the Augusta and Sy-racuse areas; intruder Mosquitoes also probablydestroyed a JU.88 south-east of Castelvetrano.Bridgeheads Firmly Established

On the 11th, with bridgeheads firmly establish-ed, our land forces made further advances in thecoastal area. Progress was made northwards andwestwards from Syracuse along the roads lead-ing to Catania and Caltagirone, respectively,while to the south Avola and Noto fell and theescarpment to the west was occupied. Furthersouth Rosolini, Spaccaforno and Pozzallo were

MaIFIEDaptured and an advance was begun towardModica and Ragusa. To the west of this areAmerican troops advanced to within two mileof Vittoria, effected some penetration in the Gearea, and accupied the high ground east, nortand west of Licata. The resistance offered to athese advances was still feeble.Throughout the day the maxifhum air suppowas afforded from the North African mainlanand Malta.The North-west African heavy bomber efforcarried out by 83 U.S. Fortresses, was again drected against the marshalling yards at CatanExplosions and huge fires were caused, the smokfrom which could be seen for 140 miles on th

return journey, and many hits were registered othe warehouses, repair buldings and oil storaginstallations. The attacks on the Gerbini landinground were continued by 47 U.S. Marauders anthe western airfields at Milo and Sciacca webombed by 27 U.S. Marauders and 36 U.S. Michells, respectively. Nearly 100 U.S. Lightningwere despatched on offensive sweeps and to bomtargets of opportunity in Central Sicily, and aeven greater number of A.36s attacked transpocolumns, trains and airfields, destroying or dam


18/74

aging 248 vehicles, two locomotives and several our forward units in the Gela area. The mis-grounded aircraft, particularly in the region of sion was less successful than its predecessor andSan Caterina,Caltanissetta and PortoEmpedocle. out of 144 C.47s despatched 23 failed to return.Fighter escort for the bomber and fighter-bomber Difficulty was experienced in following theformations was provided by a total of 117 air- course through lanes of safe transit which hadcraft from North-west Africa, and 22 Spitfire to be determined in accordance with the opera-sorties from Malta acted as escort to bombers tions of the Allied sea and land forces. Theattacking Gerbini. unarmed transport aircraft encountered intense

The Ninth U.S. Air Force Liberator attacks flak and were attacked by enemy aircraft; onewere again concentrated against the enemy's air squadron, in particular, ran foul of anti-aircraftbases in the toe of Italy. Sixty-eight effective fire from our Naval vessels which were beingsorties were flown against the airfields at Vibo bombed by enemy aircraft from a high altitude.Valentia and Reggio di Calabriaand widespreaddamage to airfield facilities and grounded aircraft Capture of Augustawas reported. Considerable air opposition was On 12th July Ponte Olivo landing groundencountered and two enemy fighters were des- to the north-west of Gela was captured; ele-troyed without loss to the Liberators. ments of the' Seventh and Eighth Armies madeMeanwhile, Malta-based Spitfires and U.S. contact in the Ragusa area; the advance west-Warhawks continued their beach patrols, flying wards from Syracuse went beyond Palazzolo872 sorties. A mixed bag of 28 enemy aircraft Acreide; and Naval units entered Augusta har-were shot down, five probably destroyed and bour, which had previously been subjected tosixteen damaged for the loss of one Spitfire and bombardment from the sea. The town itself wasone Warhawk. During the day, also, 58 Kitty- occupied in the early hours of the 13th, after ahawk-bombers, escorted by Spitfires, went into Commando raid on the 4 inch coastal defenceaction, bombing and straffing enemy transport battery, and port installations were found to bevehicles on the road between Augusta and Cata- almost intact.nia. T.,ack onfvehiclpe nreventPd the convevance ofOur main air attacks on Sicily during the night11/12th July were delivered against air andsupply bases in the west of the island. Forty-eight U.S. Mitchells effectively bombed Bo Rizzoairfield ard 30 Wellingtons attacked targets atTrapani,Marsala,and Mazzara de Vallo, causingfires and explosions. The Wellington attackspreceded a naval bombardment scheduled to com-mence at 01.00 hours and great care had to betaken to be off the target before this began andto keep clear of the Navy's formidable anti-air-craft fire. A further Wellington force of 26 air-craft bombed and machine-gunned hangars andgrounded aircraft at Porto Corvino Ravello air-field, near Salerno, at which enemy bombers werebased.

From Cyrenaica pressure was maintained dur-ing the night against the enemy's air bases acrossthe Messina Straits, twelve Liberators and Hali-faxes successfully attacking Reggio di Calabriaairfield.Malta-based Mosquitoes continued their intru-

der patrols over the enemy's air bases in north-eastern Sicily and southern Italy, shooting downan unidentified aircraft over Crotone. Nigntfighters were also active, shooting down twoJU.88s and an HE.111 which were operatingagainst our shipping off the landing beaches.

Our land forces were also on the move duringthe night; in particular, Seventh Army troops oc-cupied the important airfield at Comiso, whererepairs were begun immediately by moonlight.The Second Paratrbop Assault

the infantry during this period and our troops hadto march and fight in extremely hot weather.

Heavy air attacks were made during the dayon the Messina communications in order to hinderthe enemy's reinforcement programme. TheNorth-west African heavy bombers carried out79 U.S. Fortress sorties against the Messina rail-way bridges and 72 Cyrenaican-based U.S. Libe-rators attacked the ferry slips and railway yardsat San Giovanni and Reggio di Calabria. In thefollowing days these attacks on the enemy's mainsupply line were intensified.

Gerbini airfield and its satellites received theirdaily attack, delivered by 36 U.S. Mitchells, andAgrigento and Canicattiwere bombed by 27 and31 U.S. Marauders, respectively. In addition,nearly 1,000 sorties were flown by North-westAfrican-based fighters and fighter-bombers onsweeps and straffing missions against the enemy'srear lines of communications in southern andcentral Sicily, particularly in the vicinity of Cal-tanissetta, Enna and Casteltermini.The main air effort from Malta was still direct-ed to the provision of fighter cover for the land-ing beaches and shipping in the occupied harbours.Spitfires and U.S. Warhawks carried out 897sorties on these duties and succeeded in shootingdown 24 enemy aircraft, probably destroying nine.and damaging a further 21 for the loss of eightSpitfires and one Warhawk. Escorted Kittyhawk-bombers, meanwhile, continued their attacks ongun positions and other targets on the Syracuse-Augusta road.

On the night of the 11/12th, also, the TroopCarrier Command carried out a further para- Good Nights Huntingtroop mission, which aimed at dropping troops During the night 12/13th July the Allied airof the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division in front of forces kept up their 24 hour bombing programme.


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Results of bombing at Augusta.Forty-six U.S. Mitchells attacked Termini docks,with light bombers acting as "path-finders", inorder to hinder the enemy's reinforcement and 45Wellingtons dropped 75 tons of bombs on enemyconcentrations at Caltanissettaand Enna; a lesserWellington effort was directed against the Ger-bini landing grounds and light bombers carriedout limited attacks on Sciacca landing groundand communications south-east of Palermo. Inaddition, Cyrenaican-based R.A.F. heavy bombersattacked the enemy's air bases at Reggio di Cala-bria and Vibo Valentia in the toe of Italy.

The high-light of the night's air activity, how-ever, was the success achieved by Malta-basedBeaufighters and Mosquitoes. Operating in clearmoonlight the night-fighters had an excellentnight's hunting, shooting down five JU.88s, threeHE.ills, two Cant. Z.1007s and one DO.217 with-

Further Airborne MissionsThe same night, 12/13th July, two Albemarles

dropped a small detachment of the British 1stAirborne Division detailed to attack and harasscertain enemy lines of communication and rearareas in north-east Sicily; one Albemarle waslost in the course of this mission.

'A similar mission was attempted on the follow-ing night but the pre-arranged ground aids werenot visible and the aircraft were obliged to returnto base with their task unaccomplished.Establishment of the Air Task Forces in Sicily

The success achieved by our land forces in oc-cupying enemy landing grounds and the assistan-ce afforded by the R.A.F. Servicing Commandoesallowed the transference of squadrons to Sicilyto commence on 13th July. On that day No. 244Wing Spitfires (less No. 417 Squadr6n which

ion,1j


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next three days six mo"irefi A.F. Spitfire squa-drons were installed at Comiso and six U.S. figh-ter squadrons moved in to Licata and PonteOlivo.

Thereafter, the transference of Tactical AirForce squadrons to Sicily in accordance with theAir Plan occurred at regular intervals, and fullair support to our advancing land forces wascontinued without a break.Reduced Enemy Air Resistance

The 13th July proved to be the last day onwhich the enemy put up any effective air resis-tance in Sicily. His vital coastal radar posts hadbeen lost on invasion day and other key installa-tions were constantly attacked by fighter-bom-bers from North-west Africa; he now had recourseto spotty coverage only. Fighter control wascomplicated further by the elimination of estab-lished airfields and the occupation of new landinggrounds.

Malta-based Spitfires and U.S. Warhawks con-tinued their patrols of the beaches and harbours,carrying ou t 732 sorties. As the result of nu-merous combats 24 enemy aircraft were shotdown, three probably destroyed and 25 damagedfor the loss of one Spitfire. JU.87 dive-bombersagain showed their vulnerability to fighter at-tack ; No. 234 Squadron intercepted twelve un-escorted dive-bombers and shot down five ofthem and damaged the remainder.

Malta-based Kittyhawks were also active dur-ing the day, carrying out 54 sorties against theenemy's communications between San Micheleand Grammichele and at Curlentini and Lentini.

Targets attacked from North-west Africa onthe 13th included a total of 76 U.S. Fortress sor-ties against Catania and Milo/Trapani airfields,23 U.S. Marauder sorties against Carcitelialanding ground, and 108 escorted U.S. Mitchellsorties against enemy positions and communica-tions at Enna. Fighter-bombers, meanwhile,bombed and straffed targets in the Castelvetra-no, Termini, Corleone, Caltanissetta and SanCaterina areas, where a total of 118 transportvehicles were claimed as destroyed, and six loco-motives and 45 railway carriages and truckswere destroyed at Leonforte.

As a result of bombing the Gerbiniand Catanialanding grounds (the latter also having been sub-jected to bombardment from the sea) were nowuntenable and the enemy's dwindling air activitywas further limited by successful attacks on hisair bases at Vibo Valentia and Crotone, in thetoe and heel of Italy, by a total of 73 NinthU.S. Air Force Liberators.

In addition, the trickle of supplies reaching theenemy's Sicilian forces was reduced by a success-ful shipping strike carried out by Coastal AirForce Beaufighters north-north-east of Palermo,which resulted in the sinking of a merchant ves-sel and the setting on fire of two escorting des-troyers.

yyy i F ,;

Paratroop Mission in the Plain of CataniaDuring the night 13/14th troops of the FirstBritish Paratroop Brigade were dropped over theplain of Catania n order to secure the key bridge

at Primosole over the Gornalunga river. Onehundred and five C.47s, seven Halifaxes; and 23Albacores were employed with nineteen glidersin tow, some of which transported Jeeps and six-pounder guns. The parachutists seized the bridge,removed the demolition charges placed there bythe enemy, and held their positions till 09.00hours on the following day when they had towithdraw owing to lack of ammunition.

The venture proved a costly one as ten C.47s,one Halifax and three Albacores were lost, butthe paratroop mission performed an extremelyvaluable piece of work.Meanwhile, our air attacks were continuedagainst enemy positions and concentrations, par-ticularly at Enna, by U.S. Mitchells and lightbombers and the Wellington force flew over 70effective sorties in attacks on the marshallingyards at Messina and Palermo.Malta-based Beaufighters and Mosquitoes tooktheir nightly toll of enemy bombers, shootingdown five aircraft.

The Advance ContinuedOn 14th July patrols of the Eighth Army werein contact with enemy rearguards in the areaChiaramonte-Monterosso. A German counter-at-tack had a flash-in-the-pan success in the earlymorning when enemy troops reached the seaplanebase at Augusta, bu t by noon the position hadbeen restored. The German troops which hadoriginally been in western Sicily had now movedeastwards and were concentrated in the north-

eastern part of the island. On the Seventh Army'sfront, our troops captured Biscari airfield, Maz-zarino and Canicatti.

During the day Malta-basedSpitfires made theirlast considerable effort on beach patrols. Theenemy's air resistance by day was now practi-cally negligible; only 40 enemy aircraft were re-ported airborne and of these the Spitfires shotdown four and probably destroyed two more with-out incurring any loss.Close support was also provided by 34 escortedKittyhawk-bombers which operated against tar-gets in the Caltagironeard Lentini areas, whereconsiderable resistance was being offered to ourland forces; and 24 U.S. Warhawk-bombers madetheir first appearance in the Sicilian campaign

in bombing enemy transport vehicles near Lentini.Attacks delivered from the North African main-

land were chiefly concentrated on Messina, U.S.Fortresses, Mitchells and Marauders of the North-west African Air Forces flying a total of 179sorties and Ninth U.S. Air Force Liberators 73sorties. Large fires and explosions were causedin the vicinity, of the marshalling yards and harb-our and a big oil storage tank was blown up.These attacks were followed up that night by

ED,


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ten Cyrenaican-based R.A.F. heavy bomber sortieAs a result of the combined attacks the ferryservice now appeared to be in disuse.

The key base of Enna, in the centre of theisland, was again heavily attacked by 60 U.S.medium bombers, and U.S. fighter-bombers, oper-ating at full intensity, attacked targets of opport-unity all over the battlefield, and hindered theintake of supplies into North-east Sicily byattacks on Milazzo docks and barges at Scaletta,south of Messina.

The continuous bombing of enemy transportand positions was continued during the night byBostons and Baltimores; in particular, enemy ve-hicles on the road south of Villarosa to Ennawere successfully attacked from 4,000 to 1,000feet; Lercara town was bombed, and traffic onthe main road to the west was .also attacked. Inaddition 48 U.S. Mitchells bombed the enemy'simportant base at Palermo and targets in thatarea generally.

Malta-basedMosquitoes and Beaufighters againhad an extremely successful night, shooting downtwelve enemy aircraft, including nine JU.88s.

The Wellington attacks in the Naples area dur-ing the night, which heralded the renewal of theoffensive against Italian targets, are consideredin the next column.Ground Situation on 15th July

On 15th July our land forces re-captured theimportant Primosole bridge and by the eveningwe held the general line Primosole-Scordia-Gram-michele-Mazzarino-Riesi-Canicatti-Favara-Palma.

The whole of the Hyblean plateau, where de-termined troops might well have fought a de-laying action, was now in our hands, and theEighth Army was beginning to debouch on to theplain of Catania. The German forces had nowbeen reinforced to some extent by parachutistsacting in a ground r61e and it was clear thatstrong opposition could be expected.Enemy Air Resistance Broken in Sicily

The enemy's air resistance in Sicily had nowbeen broken. Spitfires, which flew 171 sorties onoffensive patrols over the Catania and Gerbiniareas on the 15th, did no t encounter a singleenemy aircraft, and few were seen by fightersescorting our bombers and fighter-bombers.

Throughout the day U.S. fighter-bombers con-tinued their attacks on enemy transport and posi-tions, concentrating particularly on hindering themovement of troops across Central Sicily to thethreatened areas in the east and south, attackingpositions and transport vehicles in the area aroundMt. Etna, and enemy vehicles west of Catania.Weight was also given to the attacks in the Ca-tania sector by U.S. Mitchell attacks on the townof Paterno. Meanwhile, the reinforcing of North-west Sicily was hindered by the bombing of Ter-mini railway station by U.S. A.36s and the straf-fing of truck convoys in the same area.

'ttacks on Enemy ShippingDuring the first week of the Sicilian campaign

the Coastal Air Force scored successes againstenemy shipping in Central Mediterranean waterson almost every day.The week's "bag" comprised two merchant ships(of unspecified tonnage) and one 4,000 ton tankersunk, two merchant ships totalling 12,000 tonsprobably sunk, and seven vessels damaged (in-cluding two transport ships of 9,000 and 12,000tons, respectively, and a destroyer).

The above-mentioned results include successesscored off Sardinia and Corsica in addition toattacks against the main stream of sea trafficoff Sicily and the Italian western seaboard.Air Offensive Against Southern Italy

While the air attacks were continued at inten-sity against Sicilian targets the decision was takento strike increasingly heavy blows against theenemy's rail communications and supply and airbases in Southern Italy in order to prevent thereinforcement of the island and the building upof air resistance.

The renewal of the air offensive against theItalian mainland was initiated on the night14/15th July by No. 205 Group's Wellingtons. Thetwo Neapolitan airfields at Capodichino and Po-migliano were attacked by fifteen and sixteenaircraft, respectively, and many fires causedamong buildings and grounded aircraft. A great-er effort was directed against Naples docks, where44 Wellingtons caused considerable destruction inthe area west of the harbour, in spite of theenemy's attempt to obscure the target with asmoke screen. A feature of the attack on Capo-dichino was the dropping of 330,000 leaflets.

On the next day, 15th July, the Naples marshal-ling yards received a shattering blow from 79U.S. Fortresses, which dropped 212 tons of 1,000and 500 lb. bombs on their target. Photographstaken after the raid revealed that severe damagewas inflicted and much rolling stock was des-troyed. In the central part of the yards sixteentrains were hit and practically all the tracks inthis area were damaged and blocked. Otherdamage included the setting on fire of two oiltanks and damage to buildings in the vicinity ofthe oil refinery.During the same day, Ninth U.S. Air Force

'Liberators carried out 68 effective sorties against-the enemy's important air base at Foggia.The following night, 15/16th July, the Welling-ton force flew a total of 62 effective sortiesagainst the docks and marshalling yards atReggio di Calabriaand San Giovanni, across theStraits of Messina, and the airfields at Reggio,Vibo Valentia and Crotone. In addition 2,308,000leaflets were dropped in the areas attacked.

The attack on Crotone airfield was supplement-ed, also, by attacks delivered by seven Cyrenaican-based R.A.F. heavy bombers.

On the 16th the attacks across the Messinavn ue. t-19 U

i.. ' '''i:di


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0 ~ SIREITALIANTARGETSATTACKED

BYAl kG RAFTI1 JULY TO17TH AUGUST

X943

0j CTANZMRO

SCALE IN MILES(APPROXIMATE)

0 25 50 5~ 1OOPRINCIPAL ROADS --ALASNAMEF PLACE UNDERLINEDINDICATES EXISTENCE OF AIR-FIELD OR LANDING GROUND.

AUSTICA ISLAND

O A .. v~s


23/74

resses which caused widespread devastation atSan Giovanni, particularly in the railway yardsand barracks area. One hundred and seventeenU.S. Mitchells and Marauders, meanwhile, con-centrated on the airfield at Vibo Valentia. Photo-graphs taken after the attack showed that of 78aircraft present on the airfield, 50 were destroyedand two damaged.

During the night the Wellington force wasentrusted with the dropping of the joint Chur-chill-Roosevelt warning to the Italian people, in-forming them of the uselessness of continued re-sistance; 1,720,000 of these leaflets were distrib-uted over Rome and Naples and other towns inSouthern Italy. In addition, a total of 59 Wel-lingtons continued the attacks on the Naplesmarshalling yards and Capodichino airfield.

The following day, 17th July, was a fateful onefor Naples. In the morning 71 Ninth U.S. AirForce Liberators attacked the marshalling yards,and succeeded in placing a heavy concentrationof bombs in the target area, causing huge firesand explosions. Two Liberators were destroyedby anti-aircraft fire and considerable air opposi-tion was encountered.

The morning attack was followed up in theafternoon by 111 U.S. Fortresses, 108 U.S. Mar-auders and 72 U.S. Mitchells from North-westAfrica. Five hundred and forty-eight tons ofbombs were rained on the marshalling yards,shell and torpedo factory, repair and textile plants,and on the Royal Arsenal, where tremendous ex-plosions were caused. Huge fires were startedand after the third attack a pall of heavy smokespreading across the town obscured many partsof the target area. Although intense and heavyflak was encountered only six U.S. Marauderswere lost. Enemy fighter opposition during theselater attacks was on an extremely limited scale.

The intensive effort against Naples on 17thJuly had a great effect in dislocating the enemy'ssupply system; an even more far-reaching resultwas the shattering blow delivered to the sinkingItalian morale.

Further air attacks on Italian targets are con-sidered on page 22.Fall of Caltagirone and Porto Empedocle

While the bombing of the Italian supply andair bases was in progress, our land forces, back-ed by full air support, were securing fresh objec.tives in every sector, of the Sicilian battlefield.

On 16th July, elements of the Eighth Armybegan to infiltrate across the river Gornalungaand threatened the Gerbini landing grounds. TheGermans attempted a counter-attack against ourpositions at the Primosole bridge, but this provedunsuccessful. Further west, Canadian troops tookCaltagirone and pushed along the road in thedirection of Piazza Armerina.

The following day the Eighth Army extendedits Primosolebridgehead north of the river againstdesperate German resistance, and continued toinfiltrate armoured units across the Gornalunga.

To the west, the ana n pt maccaand Piazza Armerina.

All of the enemy's effective forces-that is theGerman units-were now north of the line Primo-sole bridge-PiazzaArmerina-San Caterina. TheItalians were fighting more half-heartedly thanever and the whole weight of the main defencefell upon the stronger of the Axis brethren.

On the Seventh Army's front Pietraperzia, erradi Falco, Agrigento and Porto Empedocle fell intoour hands and a firm line was established northof these points.

During the two days under immediate review-16th-and 17th July-Spitfires flew 235 sorties onoffensive sweeps over the Gerbini and Cataniaareas in support of the Eighth Army's advance;six enemy aircraft were shot down and two prob-ably destroyed for the loss of one Spitfire.

Beaufighters and Mosquitoes during the nights16/17th and 17/18th on interception patrols ineastern Sicily shot down a total of sixteen enemyaircraft without loss to themselves.

Fighter-bombers, meanwhile, flew a total of148 sorties on attacks on Sicilian targets. Inparticular, the Leonforte marshalling yards, northof Enna, and road convoys at Randazzo, theimportant supply base and road junction northof Mt. Etna, were bombed by U.S. Lightnings;Kittyhawk-bombers attacked vehicles on the roadnear Paterno; U.S. Warhawk-bombers attackedthe radar station on Ustica island, which provid-ed early warning of raids in the north; andnumerous U.S. A.36s attacked targets of opport-unity in all sectors, bombing and straffing tanks,trucks, trains, railway stations, and shipping inTermini harbour.

Already the air plan for reducing Catania bythe systematic bombing of the lines of approachin addition to attacks on the position itself wasbeing implemented. Thus the bomber effortagainst battlefield targets from the night 15/16thto the night 17/18th July, inclusive, included anattack on the night 15/16th by 46 U.S. Mitchells,aided by Boston flare-droppers, on Randazzo;the bombing of Vulguarnera, north of Piazza Ar-merina, on the Canadians' front, by 24 U.S. Mit-chells on the 16th; an attack on the enemy'sCatania positions on the night 16/17th by fourBostons and 30 U.S. Mitchells; an attack on Pa-terno, west of Catania, by 24 U.S. Mitchells onthe 17th; and the bombing of enemy positionswest of Catania by 42 U.S. Mitchells and fourBostons, which also acted as illuminators, onthe night 17/18th.The Advance in Central Sicily

On the Eighth Army's front heavy fighting wascontinued north of Primosole bridge on the 18th.Our troops continued to operate north of theGornalunga, however, and by the evening twobrigades had crossed the river Simeto. Furtherwest, Raddusa had fallen into our hands. On thefollowing day, 19th July, some.-progress wasmade .in the area six miles south-west of Catania,

21 rf.

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and ac e a, supported by tanks, aimedat Primosole blidge was beaten off. In addition,the 51st Infantry Division in the face of deter-mined, opposition established two bridgeheadsacross the Dittaino river three miles south-westand four miles north-west of Gerbini. To the3west, in spite of considerable resistance an adv-ance was made to within fourteen miles of Enna.

On the Seventh Army's front Caltanissetta,Ca-terina and Aragona were captured on the 18th.

During the night, also, nine R.A.F. Cyrenaican-based heavy bombers continued the bombing ofSdn Giovanni across the Messina Straits.

In the early hours of the 19th four Wellingtonsdropped 864,000 special leaflets entitled "Citizensof Rome," which pointed out in no uncertainfashion the uselessness of Italian resistance andthe disaster awaiting the Italian people as a re-sult of their collaboration with the Germans.

The following day an advance was made in the The Attack on Romearea north-north-west of Caterina,and Mussomeli After full consideration of all likely repercus-was reached further west; in the coastal sector sions-military, political and religious-consequentthe American 82nd Airborne Division reached the on an air bombardment of Italy's capital, it wasarea north-west of Montallegro. decided that the time was now opportune forIn the course of the two days, 18th and 19th this long-awaited attack to be made.July, Allied fighters flew a total of 428 sorties Crews were carefully briefed for definite mili-on offensive patrols; two ME.109s and two ME. tary targets only in order that the minimum110s were destroyed and one ME.110 was prob- damage should be done to a city unique for itsably destroyed for the loss of one Spitfire; all religious and historical associations, and the popu-the interceptions took place in the Catania,Etna, .lation had been previously warned that an attackand Riposto areas. In addition, on the morning was imminent.of the 19th, Spitfires escorting a convoy of three The blow was delivered on the morning oftroopships and three destroyers into Augusta 19th July by a force of 158 U.S. Fortresses ofprevented four R.E.2001 bombers, escorted by the North-west African Strategic Air Force andsix other RE.2001s, from damaging the vessels 112 Ninth U.S. Air Force Liberators.and shot six of the enemy aircraft down. In the afternoon, also, 216 U.S. Mitchells andGround straffing and fighter-bomber attacks 105 U.S. Marauders, escorted by U.S. Lightnings,were carried out by a total of 224 Allied air- all of the North-west African Air Force, attackedcraft. The biggest effort was made by U.S. the Ciampino airfield, south of the city.A.36s. On the 18th attacks were concentrated Although our aircraft were traced to the Romeon Adrano, across the Simeto river, on the road area by radar and the attack was expected hour-leading south-east to Catania; in the Caterina ly the enemy air opposition was negligible. Notarea, in order to aid the attacking troops of the a single American aircraft failed to return fromSeventh Army; and on the supply base at Ter- the morning mission and two bombers only weremini, south-east of Palermo. The following day lost in the afternoon attack on Ciampino.successful attacks were made on trains being Excellent photographic coverage by the North-loaded at Fondaco. U.S. Warhawks also did west African Photographic Reconnaissance Winggood work in bombing railway yards at Alcamo revealed that all targets were attacked success-and Castelvetrano,western Sicily, and in attack- fully. The Lorenzo railway yards, engine housesing warehouses, petrol storage, and trains in and locomotive shops were devastated and largethe same areas; sheds in the main freight dep6t and much trackThe main medium bomber effort in Sicily, and rolling stock were severely damaged. Themeanwhile, was directed against the enemy's posi- Tobonelli steel plant, a large chemical plant, thetions at Catania on the night 18/19th, when tram garage and the passenger car depot wereattacks were made by 25 U.S. Mitchells, aided all hard hit and damage was inflicted on indus-by Boston flare-droppers, and on Randazzo, on trial buildings to the south-west of the target.the 18th and 19th, when 17 American medium At the Littorio railway yards about 80 hits werebombers bombed the railway and road bridges scored along the entire length of the marshallingin order to hinder the enemy's reinforcement of yards and sidings, including" 50 direct hits onthe' Catania sector generally. rolling stock and tracks. In addition, the loco-motive dep6t and workshops were badly damag-Air Offensive on Italy Continued ed. The Ciampino north airfield was rendered

Meanwhile, the air offensive against the Axis temporarily unserviceable and apart from 24supply and air bases in Southern Italy was con- grounded aircraft destroyed or damaged hits weretinued at high intensity, scored on ammunition dumps, administrative

On the night 17/18th a total of 62 Wellingtons buildings, hangars and barracks. At the southwere detailed to attack the enemy's air bases at airfield similar damage was done to airfieldMonte Corvino and Pomigliano, in the Salerno facilities and at least fourteen aircraft wereand Naples areas respectively,: Cloud and ground observed damaged or burnt out.haze made identification, of the" targets difficult In the city of Rome itself no damage wasbut bursts in each case were observed across the caused except to a few buildings in the immediatelanding grounds and large fires were started. In vicinity of the Lorenzo railway yards.addition, 1,401,000 leaflets were dropped in the Apart from the tremendous blow inflicted ontarget areas. . ' communications and air strength the


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Lorenzo marshalling yards, Rome, under attack on 19th July, 1943.


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Assessment of damage at Ciampino North airfield, Rome.1. Ammunition dump : two ou t of three storage 9. Barracks severely damaged by two possible directsheds damaged, hits an d huts partially destroyed.2. Three buildings damaged and one big shed partly 10. Three shed s destroyed by fire.destroyed.3. Two shed type buildings, on e gutted an d one 11. One shed destroyed by fire.4. d amaged th e upper storeys o 12. Crater blocking road; direct hit on light rail-4. A direct hit has damaged the upper storeys of way; four trucks still burning.th e Administrative block. way ou r trucs still

5. Blast damage to West Hangar. 13. Twenty aircraft damaged or burnt out.6. Blast damage to roof of Central Hangar. 14. Small dumps of stores burnt out.7. Roofing stripped an d structure damaged of East There are nearly 600 large, medium or smallHangar. ters on landing an d dispersal areas, not8. Three direct hits on two-day spre A 2 I I i luding those made by fragmentation bombs.


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1. Repair sheds damaged by fire an d 4-5 direct hits.2. Six-day hangar damaged.3. Sheds an d buildings damaged by two near misses.4. Two shed type hangars damaged by eight bombson and between them ; on e large aircraft blownin two by direct hit.5. Small shed damaged.6. Presumed Recreation Hall damaged by direct hit.Presumed kitchen an d Mess Hall damaged by 2-3near misses. Five other small buildings damaged

7. Six-day hangar damaged by one or two direct hits.8. Twelve damaged or destroyed aircraft on landing

field or dispersal area.Nearly 200 craters on landing ground or dispersal

areas,not including those made by fragmentation


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effect on Italian morale was incalculable. Thewar had been brought to the very heart of Italyand from this time the desire of the people tobe unfettered from the cracking German warmachine became more and more manifest.,Liquidation of Enemy's Sicilian Air Bases

Of the few Sicilian airfields still in the enemy's

hands on 19th July all bu t two-Trapani/Miloand Bocca di Falco, in the north-west of theisland-were unserviceable. The only active air-craft were eleven single-engined fighters at Boccadi Falco. Two days later the enemy's air activityfrom Sicilian bases, which during the campaignhad never been particularly active, was definitelydead.

IrI.THE ENEMY'S STAND AT CATANIAThe Occupation of Western Sicily and A.36s on the Partinico railway yards and

During the fourth week in July the Seventh the roads to the north: Meanwhile, U.S. A.36sArmy made spectacular progress which resulted bombed and straffed troops, vehicles and artilleryin the occupation of the entire western part of positions in the Petraliaarea.Sicily. During the 25th and 26th the American troopsre-grouped for a further thrust eastwards. TheyAn advance westwards from Agrigento reach- repulsed an enemy attack eight miles north-wested Castelvetrano on 21st July and the western of Nicosia and on the northern coast reached aports of Marsala and Trapani fell like ripe fruit point eight mileswest of an Stefanoon the 23rd and 24th, respectively. An advance In order to soften resistance to this coastalto the north, meanwhile, from positions in Cent- push from the night 19/20th to 26th July lightra l Sicily resulted in the occupation of Enna on bombers made two night attacks and U.S. A.36s,20th July and Palermo was reached by nightfall operating each day, bombed and straffed com-on the 22nd. The important base of Enna, in munications and supply dumps in the San Stefanoparticular, had been attacked by a total of 212 area and to the east and south-east.medium, 30 light and 107 fighter-bombers from By the end of July the Seventh Army had10th to 16th July, inclusive, advanced southwards to. Nicosia and eastwardsActually, the Air Plan had envisaged the fall beyond San Stefano.of Catania before Palermo, but the delay in cut-ting the Central Sicilian roads enabled the enemy Fierce Fighting on Eighth Army's Frontto reinforce the Catania sector from the north- S atania fie f g c dwest. South of Catania fierce fighting continued butin spite of the strongly defended positions heldThe troops opposing the Seventh Army were by the enemy in this sector heavy casualtiesentirely Italians. These, now convinced beyond were inflicted on his forces. The Herman Goeringall doubt of certain defeat on the battlefield division was now holding on while the 15th Arm-and the further devastation of their homeland, oured Division came eastwards to form up on itsand realising at long last that they were mere right flank.

pawns in the Nazi game, were only too eager-awns in the Nazi game, were only too eager Even heavier fighting, however, took place onto pass into captivity for the rest of the war, Ev en avier fighting, however took place onor slip quietly back to their Sicilian homes and t h e c e n t r a l f r o n t t o t h

e w e s t o f C a t a na, whereormslp qieti act tei iii esthe Canadians made steady headway in the facenormal peacetime activities of determined opposition. On the 21st and 22ndApart from the hopelessness of the military our troops engaged strong elements of the 15thposition Italian morale received another jolt, by Armoured Division south-west of Agira and inthe overthrow of Mussolini on, the 25th and the the region of Leonforte. The Germans here were

resultant uncertainty which followed the collapse fighting back grimly in order to keep .open theof the Fascist regime, road running eastwards and in the hope of re-Owing to the nature of the Seventh Army's inforcing the north-eastern stronghold with

advance and the absence of enemy air opposition Italians. Assoro, south-east of Leonforte, fell toair support on a large scale was not necessary. the Canadians' assault on 22nd and on the fo'-Some of the most successful attacks in western lowing day Leonforte was captured.Sicily during the four days of spectacular advance The enemy's 15th Armoured Division was nowwere made on targets of opportunity by 44 U.S. forced to withdraw eastwards along the roadsWarhawks, including 28 carrying bombs, on 20th through Petralia,Nicosia, Troina and north andJuly. The railway yards at Partinico were at- east of Leonforte and Nicosia, under cover oftacked and the track was bombed from Alcamo heavy artillery fire and flak, to join up withalmost to Trapani; in addition, attacks were the Herman Goering Division. The German'unitsmade on gun positions south of Gastellamare, suffered heavy casualties on this and the suc-on ammunition dumps west of Vitta and a radar ceeding days at the hands of our land and airstation on the southern tip of Stagnone island, forces.On this and the following day, successful attacks Nicosia, ten miles north-east of Leonforte, waswere also made by a total of 32 U.S. Warhawks captured on the 24th, and in the face of strong


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enemy opposition the Canadians, aided by Kitty-hawk bomber attacks, pushed on towards Agirawhich was still in Axis hands. The followingday our troops fought their way astride theAgira road but during the evening were forcedto withdraw.

During the 26th and 27th, however, the,Cana-dians continued to maintain pressure in the Agirasector, supported by the air attacks on the Regal-buto area mentioned in the following sub-section,and reached positions overlooking Agira on threesides. On the 29th the town was captured.Further south a British force improved itspositions on the Dittaino river before Catena-nuova, aided by Kittyhawk bomber attacks, and

occupied the town on the same day as Agira fell.Air Attacks in the Battle Area

Full air support was afforded by our air forcesduring the period of the stranglehold on theCatania area mentioned in the preceding para-graphs.

The air plan aimed at the isolation of themain Catania position by the systematic bomb-ing and straffing of every line of reinforcementand approach. The ring formed by Misterbianco,Paterno, Adrano, Regalbuto, Troina, Cesaro,Bronte, Randazzo, Fiumefreddo, Riposto andAcireale were kept under constant attack andthe connecting roads were also constantly straf-fed. Meanwhile, attacks were continued on Ca-tania itself.

From the night 19/20th July to the end of themonth aircraft under the control of the North-west African Tactical Air Force flew a total of 84medium, 705 light and 1,170 fighter-bombersorties against the targets mentioned in the pre-ceding paragraph. The fighter-bomber attackson the harbours at Catania, Riposto and Aci-reale are not included in the above total butare considered in the later sub-section, "Attackson Sicilian Harbours".

The Allied fighters, meanwhile, flew nearly1,000 sorties on offensive patrols on all sectorsof the battlefield but no conclusive engagementswith enemy aircraft were reported.

The most consistent effort was directed againstRandazzo, the important road junction whichconnected the Axis positions in the north withthose on the east coast. During the twelve daysunder review attacks were made by, 43 medium,46 light and 178 fighter-bombers on the town,bridges and roads in the vicinity. Perhaps themost successful raid of the series was that car-ried out by 36 U.IS. Warhawks on 22nd July,when 40 enemy vehicles were claimed as des-troyed and 25 damaged.

Of almost equal consistency were the attacksdelivered on the Troina area by twelve medium,97 light and 135 fighter-bombers; the bombersconcentrated on the town and main road junction,and the fighter-bombers (including 76 U.S. A.36s)attacked targets on the Troina-Randazzo road.

those made on Regalbuto, aofAgira, on the 26th and 27th while the Canadianswere making their thrust in the Agira sector.On the 26th R.A.F. and U.S. light bombers flewa total of 212 sorties in attacks on Regalbuto andthese were supplemented by 22 Kittyhawk-bombersorties; considerable damage was done to thetown and roads in the vicinity. On the followingday the attacks were renewed by 82 more lightbombers, These attacks, followed by 82 lightbombers and eleven fighter-bomber sorties onCenturipe, further east, on 28th and 31st Julymaterially helped our thrust eastwards fromAgira.

Catania itself, during the twelve days underconsideration, was attacked by a total of 150U.S. A.36s, U.S. Warhawks, and Kittyhawks;these attacks do not include the bombing ofthe harbour. Particular attention was paid tothe marshalling yards and railway bridges inorder to hinder the transportation of suppliesand troop movements.

Among the other strategic strong points guard-ing the approaches to the enemy's north-easternarea of resistance, Misterbianco, Adrano, Paternoand Cesaro received the main weight of the airattacks.

The attacks on Riposto, on the coast to thenorth of Catania, are more properly regardedas part of the plan to limit the reinforcing andsupplying of the Catania position and are con-sidered later.Allied Forces Re-group for Final Attack

The Allied forces, now re-grouping for thefinal assault, had a formidable task in front ofthem. In the southern Cataniasector the enemyheld strongly defended positions which had beenimproved by wiring and digging and the wholeof the Germans' right flank was in difficultmountainous country, easily defended and giv-ing no scope for mobile tank warfare. Therewere three main roads only in North-easternSicily along which large-scale Allied attackscould be developed:- that circling Mt. Etna, theCatania-Messina coast road; and the northerncoastal road.

The beginning of the end was in sight, but theway was still hard and .hazardous.Attacks on Sicilian Harbours

While the air attacks on battlefield targetswere in progress constant air attacks were de-livered on the few remaining harbours in north-east Sicily still in Axis hands. Such craft asescaped our sea forces, which were operatingat times even in the Messina Straits, were oftencaught in the enemy's Sicilian reinforcing ports,and the damage inflicted on harbour facilitiesfurther limited the scanty supplies reaching theenemy's hard-pressed army.

The previous heavy air attacks on the Messinaferry terminal and those across the Straits

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had ended the train ferry service, and theenemy had recourse mainly to the employmentof small craft such as "F"-boats, Siebel ferriesand barges in his attempt to pass supplies acrossto Messina. During the last twelve days inJuly 59 U.S. Warhawks and A.36s attacked Mes-sina harbour: the A.36 attacks resulted in dam-age to a cruiser and two destroyers, and theWarhawks scored near misses on a 400 foottransport and two patrol boats, in addition tothe bombing of two barges, two ferries and asteamer with unobserved results.Riposto harbour, to the north of the Catania

position, was attacked by a total of 111 U.S.Warhawks and Kittyhawks. Considerable dam-age was inflicted on the docks and jetties anddirect hits were scored on barges and smallfreighters.

Acireale, further south, was also attacked onone occasion by eleven U.S. Warhawks whichcaused damaged to the harbour facilities.

The heaviest attacks, however, were madeagainst Milazzo, at this stage the enemy's busiestharbour. From 24th to 31st July, inclusive, 38medium, 160 light, and 211 fighter-bombers madeattacks on the harbour and 48 fighter-bombersattacked the marshalling yards, the main bridgesand roads in the vicinity. Apart from the mediumbomber attacks, carried out by U.S. Mitchells,aided by flare-dropping Bostons, the effort wasmade by day. The bomber attacks resulted inwidespread damage to the harbour installationsand near misses on a tanker and several smallvessels. The fighter-bomber attacks, deliveredalmost entirely by U.S. A.36s and U.S. War-hawks, resulted in direct hits being scored ontwo 1,000 ton vessels, a 500

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Mediterranean Campaign (1943)