GO R-n d9jji JcoWFIE

3OV -

UNIED SiN4E5RETt_ Vim

JULY-SEPTE

r)A

ECRET

l

MEDITERRANEAN

NO.4

HEADOUARTERS ROYALMIDDLRhlT

v IV'

Con tents

The Conquest of Sicily - 10th July to 17th August, 1943.I. Preparatory Measures............... ... Page 5

II. The Assault... ...... .. :........ ..... 10III. The Enem~y's Stand at Catania... ........... , , 26IV. Reduction of the Island ... ..... ....... , 34Diary of the Sicilian Campaign.. .... , 43

Tables Showing Scale of Effort.. . ... ... 45Tables of Operations in the Mediterranean ........... . 48Tables Showing Effort from Malta... ................ ,, 54

Air Operations in the Aegean......... ...... . ,, 59Air Operations Against Sardinia and Corsica...... ...... , 73

Royal Air Force Regiment... .... ....... ...... , 77

Attack on Ploesti ........ ... ..... , 82

In the Wilderness.................................,, 89

First Air Attack on Wiener Neustadt ....... ............. , 99

Development-of Enemy Bombs and Offensive Weapons........ 103Medical Receiving Stations in the Western Desert............. 108

Rescue by Night.................................. 122Flying Control: Part II............ ... ... ... ,, 123Air Transport............... . .......... , 129

A Difficult Rescue................ ... ... ......... 136From the 540s ................. ..................... 143Acknowledgment............. ................ . 147

Maps: The Sicilian Campaign - 10th July to 17th August , 4Italian Targets Attacked - Ist July to 17th August ,, 20

The Aegean and Ionian Seas Area... ... ....... ,, 58-The Dodecanese Area.......................... 60

Air Operations Against Sardinia-July to September ,, 72

The "Wilderness" , .,, ...... ..... ,, ' 88

137The s gm... .......... ,, . 142

The R.A.F. Mediterranean' Review is Secret (= American Secret). Itis intended for the information of all officers and flying crews, under conditionsof security approved by the Commanding Officer, who is to ensure that withinthose limits it has as wide a circulation as possible.

No quotation may be made from it without the authority of S.A.S.O., H.Q.,R.A.F., M.E.; neither are any of its contents to be communicated to anyone out-side the Services.

All persons are hereby warned that the unauthorised retention or destruc-tion of this document is an offence against the Official Secrets Act, 1911-1920.Any unauthorised person obtainin ssession of a copy should immediatelyforward it in a clo ed J ope to H.Q., R.A.F., M.E.

Foreword

A s announced in the Foreword-of the

last number of the Review, its name changes with this issue from the

R.A.F. Middle East Review to the R.A.F. Mediterranean Review. The

transition from a predominant Middle East viewpoint to the wider horizon

demanded by a Mediterranean production must of necessity be gradual,

and this number inevitably contains, apart from the historical narrative,

articles more of Middle East than Mediterranean interest. No apology

need be offered for that, however, for whereas Middle East may be

regarded more-or-less as a pensioned warrior mainly employed on guard

duty, it is true to say that the Mediterranean giant is"equipped in great

part with the former's weapons and experience.

The Mediterranean aspect, therefore, will be more fully developed

in the next number, and for that reason the commencement of the Invasion

of Italy, which really falls within the quarter under review, has been left

over until Number 5. Additional to that reason is the fact that the Sicilian

campaign, which may be regarded as a model combination of effort between

the three Services, land, sea and air, has been considered here in its

entirety.

DE CgL AiS S'N

tEAPFROG" LANDING. 'LEAPFROG" LAN DINGNIGHT I1/12TH AUGUST. NIGHT 14/15TH AUGUST.EAST OF CAPE ORLANDO SPADAFORA

'LAFOG" LANDING (F Q o .

Q"' PNIGHT 7/ 8TH AUGUST 0 */ k0 GEQ SCO A N

a NASO ,A B9 4~ 2

TRAPANI 11. P ' 63oDI FALCO 1 10'/ Csc 27 EG D51NC 5 ANTAGTAMq k0,? J~ " CALABRI

MA;SL - ,~I -, A

C1s4p ( £5 ^ PA69NN _jNG "1 C SI 11 RINA - Sy9O NU ,a i FIUM EPREDDO COMMANDO LAND-

qv LL('0EN - RIPOSTO L 10/I7TH AUG

MAZARA DEL VALLO -- ADRIANO 5G !; T AGIRA PO h LT

/ 9+ .0_ 19 Ms 1 So ,%Vp.6oASSOROL~T F S. MAIII w. *, kEAL SECOND --

,mooyENANUOVAEAL PARATROOP

PNNCPA ROAD - 121 ATR O0 CI CASTELLO NIGHUT

PRNCPA ROD 'O .3 4 * 12 09" ADDU5A - MIS ERBIAN p 1/4HJL

SECONDARY ROADS ERDIFL 0AT I IMSL

AND MOTORTRACKS--=-- o CATAN

INDICATES EXISTENCE OF LNIGAIRFIELD OR LANDING GROUND AGRIGENTO 593 /' I' MAZZARINO - IH /OHUY1

SC L NMLE L RAUA 6 *IS APEDI I4URO GLDER PROOP

oE +4~~~~PS ? kECQRLAGRNCALNIN D HONR. P .E-

Ii2 0Q0t6 P 5 e;l0,5 AGSASL OT

The Conquest Of Sicilyioth JULY TO 17th AUGUST, 1943

As the Tunisian campaign drew to its endin the first half of May, 1943, plans were formulated for the invasion of Sicily, amain bulwark of the southern defences, of Hitler's European "Fortress".

Essential prerequisites of the invasion included the reduction of Pantelleria andthe less important islands of Lampedusa, Lampione and Linosa; these were all inAllied hands by 13th June, as the result of a sustained aerial offensive, supplementedby naval bombardment. Details of the Allied air attacks were given in the previousnumber of the "Review", but it may be re-iterated here that against Pantelleria over5,650 effective sorties were flown by Allied bombers and fighter-bombers, in the courseof which approximately 6,500 tons of bombs were dropped, Against Lampedusa only30 air attacks were needed in which about 5 °0o of the bomb tonnage expended onPantelleria was dropped.

Meanwhile, a strategic bombing programme had been carried out with the objectof interfering with the enemy's "build-up" in the Central Mediterranean area in generaland Sicily in particular. From the middle of May to the end of June constant attackswere delivered against the enemy's airfields in Sicily, Sardinia and Southern Italy, theenemy's ports and submarine bases in the same areas, the communications across theMessina Straits and industrial targets, particularly at Naples and Bari. In addition, thebombing attacks from the United Kingdom against targets in Northern Italy weresupplemented by a few large-scale raids on Leghorn and Spezia from North-west Africa.

In the six weeks period mentioned Allied bombers and fighter-bombers of theNorth-west African Air Forces and Middle East Command (including Malta) flew 2,292effective sorties against the enemy's Central Mediterranean airfields and 2,638 againsthis ports, bases and lines of communication. These totals are exclusive of the effortagainst Pantelleria and Lampedusa.

The following account of the Allied air operations, 1st July to 17th August, carriedout in connection with the Sicilian invasion, is divided into four sections:-

I. Preparatory Measures.II. The Assault.

III The Enemy's Stand at CataniaIV. The Reduction of the Island.

I. PREPARATORY MEASURESPreliminary Bombing Programme from mid-May to the end of June against the

The successful invasion of Sicily implied major enemy's airfields, bases and lines of communi-commitments for the Allied air forces before, cation; for the week immediately prior to theduring and after the actual landings. Sicilian landings the Air Plan provided for an

Mention has already been made in the preface even greater effort against enemy airfields. By.above of the scale of bomber effort developed "zero hour" it was hoped that the sustained

IP ",S

attacks on the airfields, coupled with the ca-sualties inflicted on the enemy's interceptingfighters, would have greatly reduced the enemy'sfirst line strength in the Sicilian theatre of war,especially in fighter aircraft. In addition, theenemy's ports and lines of communication wereto be attacked when necessary, in accordancewith the intelligence provided by air reconnais-sance.

Meanwhile, Home-based bombers were to con-tinue their offensive against Northern Italian in-dustrial targets, which, apart from the materialdamage caused, was certain to have an effecton the morale of the Italian people, which wasalready at low ebb.

Malta Prepares

For Malta the wheel had turned full circle:from being a besieged fortress in 1942 it wasnow destined to become a major base for offen-sive operations.

As early as January, 1943, work had begun onthe task of improving the island's airfields.Existing airfields were extended and.extra land-ing strips were prepared. Thus, by the end ofJune Malta could maintain and operate nearly30 fighter squadrons. In addition, during thatmonth U.S. Army Engineers constructed a land-ing strip at Gozo from which a further threesquadrons could operate. The airfield on Pan-telleria was also put into order and was soonable to accommodate several American long-rangefighter squadrons.

Meanwhile, the provisioning of Malta went onapace and adequate stores, supplies and sparesnecessary for the operation and maintenance ofthe powerful air striking force were speedilyaccumulated.

Improvements were also made in the existingR.D.F. and fighter control facilities. In parti-cular, a new Fighter Control Room was hewnout of the rock, an enlarged Filter Room wasestablished, and additional R.D.F. stations wereset up. For the battle period, also, a combinedWar Room was prepared with the object of pro-viding an hour by hour picture of ground, navaland air operations. Close at hand, also, werethe Army Support Centre and the Naval Co-bperation Operations Room. Thus, full care wastaken that during the period of the coming battlecontrol would be immediate and as faultless ashumanly possible.

On the eve of the Sicilian invasion nearly 40squadrons were concentrated on Malta and thesatellites Gozo and Pantelleria. The Island wasready to pay off old scores.

Main Features of the Air Plan

No radical change was necessary in the exist-ing organisation and system of command in theMediterranean theatre.

Under the direction of the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, the Commandin

D ECA S

North-west African Air Forces remained in com-mand of the North-west African Allied air forces.The operational formations, the North-west Afri-can Strategic, Tactical and Coastal Air Forceswere to remain unchanged in their basic organi-sation and functions, although it was envisagedthat some redistribution of units might be ne-cessary from time to time.

The provision of two subordinate Air Com-manders by the A.O.C. Tactical Air Force forair task forces operating in Sicily is consideredlater.

The Middle East air forces not already underthe operational control of the North-west Afri-can Air Forces (excluding, that is, No. 205Group controlled by the Strategic Air Force andthe Desert Air Force which was an integral partof the Tactical Air Force) were to remain underthe existing system of command. The forcesoperating from the North African mainland com-prised the Ninth U.S. Air Force (including thetwo R.A.F. heavy bomber squadrons under itsoperational control) and the A.H.Q. Air DefencesEastern Mediterranean and No. 201 (Naval Co-operation) squadrons. Malta, as already men-tioned, accommodated a large fighter force de-rived from the North-west African Tactical AirForce in additipn to the "garrison squadrons."

The A.O.C.-in-Chief, Middle East, was respon-sible for the administration of the air forcesoperating from the Middle East and Malta andthe Commanding General, North-west African AirForces had a similar responsibility in respect ofall other air forces operating in the Mediterra-nean theatre concerned with the Sicilian in-vasion. In the initial stage of the campaign,also, H.Q., R.A.F., Middle East was to hold it-self in readiness to assist in the maintenance ofair forces based in Sicily.

After due consideration it was decided thatthe assault on Sicily should be launched againstthe south-eastern corner of the island and eightsimultaneous pre-dawn landings were planned totake place on the beaches from Licata to eastof Avola. The British assaults were to be madeon the eastern seaboard and the American land-ings on the south-east shore. The immediate aimof the assault troops was the capture of the air-fields and ports in south-eastern Sicily and thedevelopment of an assault on the key position ofCatania. Subsequently, advances were to bemade on Palermo and Messina.

By restricting the landing to the south-easterncorner of the island and ignoring the westernshore tactical surprise was more likely and thedispersion of the air effort in covering assaultsin the Palermo area was avoided.

In spite of the concentration of fighter squd-drons on Malta and the satellite aerodromes, for-ward airfields from which our short-rangefighters could effectively operate over the battlearea in the initial stages were still not over-plen-tiful; in particular, fighters based in northernTunisia could operate effectively over the most

westerly of the assaults only and could not assistlandings east of Licata.

As airfields were occupied in Sicily, however, itwas planned for fighter squadrons from Maltato move in and their places on the island were tobe taken by fighter-bomber squadrons, with-drawn, in the first instance, from Pantelleria.When room was available for the fighter-bombersin Sicily the landing grounds vacated by them inMalta were to be allotted to light bombers.These, in turn were to be established in Sicilywhen airfields became available.

A scheme was drawn up for an eastern air taskforce to support the Eighth Army and attachedunits and a western air task force to assist theU.S. Seventh Army. Until the eastern air taskforce was established in Sicily the greater partas already indicated was to be based in Malta;these squadrons were to be under the commandof the A.O.C. Malta until they were transferred toSicily, when the A.O.C. of the eastern air taskforce was to assume command. The Americansquadrons allotted to support the U.S. SeventhArmy were to be derived mainly from Tunisiaand accordingly came under the command of theA.O.C. of the western air task force forthwith.Both air task forces were to be under the controlof A.O.C. North-west African Tactical Air Force.The speedy establishment of the two air taskforces in Sicily was of vital importance in orderto provide continuous close support to our ad-vancing land forces.

- The Allied medium and heavy bomber squa-drons of the North-west African Air Forces (in-cluding No. 205 Group's Wellingtons) were tocontinue to operate from the North-west Africanmainland and the U.S. and R.A.F. heavy bombersunder the control of the Ninth U.S. Air Forcewere to function from Cyrenaica, as formerly.

The sailing of east and west-bound convoys toSicily implied increased shipping protection com-mitments. Fighter protection and anti-submarinepatrols were to be provided under the existingorganisations. That is to say, convoys passingwestwards through the Eastern Mediterraneanwere to receive protection from squadrons operat-ing under A.H.Q. Air Defences Eastern Mediter-ranean and No. 201 (Naval Co-operation) Group,and east-bound convoys in the Central Mediter-ranean were to be protected by the North-westAfrican Coastal Air Force. Wherever possible,the Sicily convoys were to be routed close to theNorth African coast and fighter squadrons engag-ed on shipping protection were to move up withtheir respective convoys, as far as practicable, inorder to economise the fighter effort. On theday prior to the landings the invasion craft con-verging on Malta were to be protected by fightersfrom the island to an extent of a circle of 50 nau-tical miles 'radius from Valetta.

During and immediately after the Sicilian land-ings, before anti-aircraft defences could beestablished ashore, the fullest fighter protectionwas to be provided over the beaches. During the

1 i ; i ̂ r l {

hours of darkness, moreover, arrangements weremade for night-fighters based in Malta and Tu-nisia to give the maximum protection to shipsunloading at the beaches and to captured ports.As soon as C.G.I. could be installed on selectedoccupied airfields in Sicily, also, certain night-fighter squadrons were to be established there.

Reconnaissance

The Air Plan made provision for a constantwatch to be kept on the enemy's strength andmovements. For the initial period, arrangementswere made for a detachment of the North-westAfrican Photographic Reconnaissance Wing tooperate from Malta in order to assist the workof No. 248 Wing. Other photographic reconnais-sance units were to continue to function fromNorth Africa.

Tactical reconnaissance requirements in theeastern area of the Sicilian battlefield were tobe met by No. 40 Squadron S.A.A.F., operatingfrom Malta; a similar commitment in respect ofthe western area was the responsibility of anAmerican observation squadron based in Tunisia.

The RBle of Air Transport

On the conclusion of the Tunisian campaignunits of the Troop Carrier Command commencedtraining for the carrying out of a large-scaleparatroop mission which was to precede thelanding of our sea-borne troops.

During the pre-invasion period, also, American,British and French air transport units wereavailable for the urgent transportation of person-nel and freight. In addition, when the battlewas joined the U.S. Transport Command was toundertake the evacuation of wounded as well asnormal transport commitments.

Relative Air Strengths

The Allied air forces in the Mediterraneanarea were infinitely stronger than those of theAxis. For all operations connected with the Si-cilian invasion it was estimated that a front-linestrength of approximately 4,000 aircraft wasavailable. This figure excludes the large Ame-rican glider force.

R.A.F. squadrons provided the majority of thesingle and twin-engined offensive and defensivefighters and coastal aircraft while the bomberand air transport forces were composed princi-pally of American units. With regard to thenight bomber force, however, it should be notedthat this consisted mainly of R.A.F. Welling-tons, Liberators and Halifaxes.

On the eve of the Sicilian invasion the Germanand Italian air forces had a total of 1,800 to1,900 aircraft, excluding transport types, basedin Italy, Sicily, Sardinia and southern France.

The enemy's fighters were based mainly inSicily, Southern Italy and Sardinia. In Sicilyand Italy (south of 41o north) it was estimatedthat the G.A.F. had approximately 260 sinle-engined fighters and" fi te

Italians 200 single-engined fighters; in Sardinia,there were about 130 German single-enginedfighters and fighter-bombers and 100 Italianfighters. The balance of the Italian single-engin-ed force-approximately 230 aircraft-was locat-ed in central and northern Italy. The Germantwin-engined fighter force, which comprisedsome 75 aircraft, was based half in Sicily (in-cluding Italy south of 41° north) and half inItaly (north of 41° north). Night-fighter JU.88sappeared to be based entirely in central Italy.

Apart from 50 JU.88 bombers in Sicily, theGerman long-range bomber force was basedprincipally in Italy (north of 40° north), with anadditional strong force in southern France;bomber reconnaissance JU.88s were also basedmainly in the two last mentioned areas. Italianbomber reconnaissance and torpedo bomber air-craft were located in central Italy, with detach-ments in Sardinia and Sicily.

In addition, in Greece, Crete and the Dodeca-nese there were approximately 265 German and180 Italian aircraft; °in particular, the Germantotal included about 130 bombers, dive-bombersand reconnaissance aircraft.

The serviceability of enemy aircraft in theMediterranean area in general was estimated toaverage 50%; in the battle area, however, theaverage serviceability was undoubtedly less.

The Opposing Land Forces

It was naturally impossible to gauge with ac-curacy the strength of the enemy's land forcesprior to the invasion, but by the end of the firstweek's fighting it transpired that the forcesready to repel our attack were approximately asfollows:-there were five Italian field divisions,two German field divisions, and five Italiancoastal divisions. The coastal divisions were madeup mainly of older men or men of low physicalcategory and included a high proportion of Si-cilians; in addition, their almost total immobi-lity and the simple nature of the defence worksrendered them unfitted to the task of opposingour assault troops. The Italian field divisionswere men of better calibre and more adequatelyequipped. The German divisions were the re-formed Herman Goering Division and an armour-ed formation which had been given the name ofthe 15th Panzer Division, "liquidated" in Tunisia.These two divisions were well equipped and in-cluded about 200 tanks; it became obvious thatthey would provide the hard core of resistance.

After considering all available evidence at theend of the campaign it was estimated that atthe beginning of hostilities the Italian field for-ces, coastal defence and anti-aircraft artilleryunits comprised in round figures 216,000 men.In addition, there were probably about 28,000

sectors, were estimated to comprise about 60,000men.

The Allied invasion forces were made up of are-organised Eighth Army, which now includedCanadian units, and the Seventh U.S. Army.Most of the Allied troops were veterans of theNorth African campaign, and backed by sea andair superiority they were confident from the startof making the first breach in the defences ofOccupied Europe.

Pre-Invasion Blitz on Sicilian Airfields

During the first nine days of July, in ac-cordance with the preliminary bombing planmentioned on page 5, the Allied air forcescarried out intensive attacks on the enemy's air-fields in Sicily. During this pre-invasion periodthe North-west African Air Forces carried out394 heavy, 1,255 medium and 377 light bombereffective sorties against Sicilian landing grounds.In addition, Cyrenaican-based Liberators of theNinth U.S. Air Force flew 126 effective sortiesagainst these objectives and Malta-based Spit-fire-bombers also made a few attacks.

The majority of the enemy's fighters in Sicilywas now based in the east, with Gerbini airfieldand its many satellites as the principal base.Accordingly, the greater part of the bomber ef-fort was directed against landing grounds in theGerbini area. From 4th to 9th July, inclusive,aircraft under the operational control of* H.Q.North-west African Air Forces flew 294 heavyand 560 medium bomber sorties against the Ger-bini landing grounds and U.S. Liberators of theNinth U.S. Air Force flew 79 sorties.

Some indication of the havoc wrought at Ger-bini is shown by the North-west African Photo-graphic Reconnaissance Wing's report on thedamage inflicted by 100 U.S. Fortresses on 5thJuly. Of the 54 aircraft present on the mainairfield during the raid all but four were destroy-ed and at two satellite landing grounds a totalof fourteen aircraft, mainly single-engined fighters,were destroyed. Widespread damage was caus-ed, also, on several other Gerbini satellites. Onthe 5th, moreover, enemy fighters were inducedto join battle. Approximately 100 enemy air-craft attacked a formation of 27 U.S. Fortressesand as a result of a long running fight 35 ofthe enemy were claimed as destroyed for theloss of two American bombers. Two furtherformations of heavy bombers, which attacked thesame objectives about 20 minutes later, met noenemy opposition, and an escorted formation ofU.S. Mitchells, which renewed the attack anhour afterwards, was also left unmolested. Itwas evident that the enemy's fighter force wasin no condition to challenge every Allied raid, butattacked spasmodically only, in an endeavour toconserve strength for the critical days ahead.

Italian second-line troops composed of depot In addition to the blitz on the Gerbini groupunits, carabinieri, and local militia, and a further of landing grounds, the following bomb loads50,000 in labour corps. German forces at the were dropped on the other principal eastern air-beginning of the Sicilian campaign, includin Biscari 335'6 tons: Comiso 300 tons (in-anti-aircraft and t s ci i 1 tons dropped by U.S. Liberators): Ca-

tU f

tania 139"4 tons. The majority of these attackswere carried out by N.A.A.F. medium bombers -U.S. Mitchells and Marauders operating by day,and Wellingtons by night.

The western Sicilian landing grounds also re-ceived attention, but the Allied attacks in thisquarter were not so intense as these landinggrounds were now of secondary importance.Sciacca was attacked nine times by N.A.A.F. air-craft, in the course of which 130.7 tons of bombswere dropped. Many of the raids took place atnight, and, in particular, R.A.F. and S.A.A.F.Bostons and Baltimores played a full part in thisactivity. Other western airfields attacked in-cluded those at Trapani/Milo and Bo Rizzo,against which 96 light and 45 medium and twelvelight bomber effective sorties were flown, respec-tively.

The Allied air forces' attacks on the Sicilianairfields during the first nine days of July ren-dered many of them unserviceable and about ahalf of the enemy's aircraft formerly based therewere either forced to withdraw to South Italy ormoved to newly constructed landing grounds. Inparticular, on the eve of the Allied landings themain Gerbini airfield, seven of its satellites, andComiso airfield were rendered unserviceable ; inthe west, also, as the result of the heavy attacksin June Bocca di Falco airfield appeared to beunserviceable and Castelvetrano was all butabandoned.

In addition to the great number of enemy air-craft destroyed on the ground in the course ofthe pre-invasion blitz on the Sicilian airfields,bombers operating under the control of the North-west African Air Forces claimed the destructionof 56 enemy fighters in combat for the loss ofseven aircraft shot down by anti-aircraft fire andenemy. air action and eight missing; escortingfighters accounted for another 45 enemy aircraftdestroyed at the cost of seven shot down and fivemissing, and Malta-based Spitfires acting as topcover to the N.A.A.F. bombers also accounted foran appreciable number of enemy fighters. U.S.Liberators of the Ninth U.S. Air Force encount-ered little enemy air opposition in the course oftheir attacks on Gerbini and Comiso airfields anddestroyed only one enemy fighter in combatwithout loss.

Attacks on Bases and Communications

As indicated in the preceding paragraphs themain activity of the Allied air forces prior to theSicilian invasion was directed against the enemy'sairfields. Attacks on his bases and lines of com-munication were consequently on a reduced scale.

In all, from 2nd to 9th July, inclusive, aircraftcontrolled by the North-west African Air Forcesflew 194 bomber and fighter-bomber sortiesagainst enemy ports bases and shipping and 698against his positions and lines of communication;fighters meanwhile carried out 88 sorties onground attacks and 68 on anti-shipping missions,in addition to their normal commitments of bom-

ber escort, offensive sweeps, shipping protection,and reconnaissance tasks.

The bomber attacks included 75 Wellingtonsorties against Palermo and 26 more against theimportant position at Catania and an attack by21 U.S. Mitchells on targets in the Caltagironearea on the day before the invasion.

The fighter-bomber effort was directed chieflyagainst the harbours of Porto Empedocle andMarsala, but there were also successful U S.Warhawk attacks on radar stations at Cape Pas-sero, Palazzo, Catania and Syracuse.

Shipping Protection

The protection of the convoys en route to Sicilyinvolved increased commitments for the North-west African Coastal Air Force (which was con-siderably enlarged particularly by the addition ofmore Beaufighter squadrons) in the Central Me-diterranean, and the Middle East squadrons con-trolled by Air Headquarters, Air Defences EasternMediterranean and No. 201 Group (reinforced bytwo long-range fighter squadrons loaned fromNorth-west Africa and one from Malta) in theEastern Mediterranean.

In the fighter protection of our east-boundconvoys during the first nine days of July squa-drons of the Coastal Air Force flew a total of1,426 sorties, including the record number of 574sorties on the 8th and 9th. In addition, 541 fightersorties were flown on local defence. Naval co-operation aircraft, meanwhile, carried out 258sorties on anti-submarine protection and sub-marine hunts.

Over our west-bound convoys the fighter squa-drons controlled by Air Headquarters, Air De-fences Eastern Mediterranean flew 1,421 sortiesand carried out 257 sorties on local defence. Coas-tal aircraft of No. 201 (Naval Co-operation)Group, meanwhile, flew 314 sorties on anti-sub-marine close cover, area patrols and submarinehunts.

As the great armada converged on Malta dur-ing the morning of 9th July fighter protectionwas provided from the island. About two-thirdsof the available fighter force was employed con-tinuously on shipping protection, carrying out 413sorties.

The only opposition of note to the massing ofour invasion fleet was the attack on Bizerta onthe night 6/7th July. Sixty-five enemy bombersdropped light explosive and incendiary bombs inan attempt to damage shipping in the harbour,but the harm done was negligible. One JU.88 wasdestroyed by night fighters and three more wereshot down by our anti-aircraft fire.

It was clear that the Allied air forces' intensiveattacks on the enemy's airfields had preventedthe concentration of an effective air striking forceand the combined naval and air force control ofthe Mediterranean sea-ways dissuaded the enemyfrom employing submarines on any appreciablescale. .. ... ..

ASSAULTThe Assault from the Air

The invasion of Sicily began shortly before mid-night 9/10th July, when British and Americanairborne units landed on the peninsulas northand south of Syracuse and on the coastal plainbetween Gela and Licata. The principal tasks ofthese troops were to harass the coastal defenceforces, destroy the enemy's lines of communica-tion to the coast and preserve those which wouldbe of use to the Allied armies scheduled to landon the morrow.

Glider troops, drawn from the British 1st Air-borne Division, operated in the Syracuse area andparatroops of the American 82nd Airborne Divi-sion were dropped in the Gela - Licata locality.Aircraft of the North-west African Troop Car-rier Command carried out 109 C.47 (Dakota), 21Albemarle and seven Halifax sorties in towingthe gliders and 226 C.47 sorties conveying theparachute troops.

The strong headwinds encountered forced anumber of gliders into the sea short of the targetarea but, on the whole, considering the difficultyof carrying out such a hazardous undertakingat night, the missions were satisfactorily com-pleted. Many of the set tasks were performed bythe airborne troops and the way was paved forthe landings from the sea.

Protection for the aerial armada was providedby R.A.F. night fighters and, in addition, cannonHurricanes of No. 73 Squadron preceded thetransport fleet across the Sicilian coast in orderto eliminate searchlights.

It was evident that the enemy had been takenby surprise and only slight anti-aircraft fire wasencountered.

The operations of the Troop Carrier Commandin connection with, the subsequent attacks ofAllied airborne troops are dealt with chrono-logically.

Bombing on the Night 9/10th July

On the night of the airborne assaults bombingattacks were delivered in order to soften re-sistence generally to our shock troops; as coverto the glider operations; to create a diversionwhile our airborne troops formed up for theattack, and to prevent enemy reserves beingrushed up to the threatened areas.

The attacks in the western area were carriedout by R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. light bombers andU.S. medium bombers under the operational con-trol of the North-west African Air Forces. Atotal of 22 S.A.A.F. and R.A.F. Bostons and Bal-timores attacked targets at Niscemi, Butera,Ponte Olivo airfield, and eastwards as far asCanicatti, causing many fires, and 25 R.A.F. andS.A.A.F. Bostons effectively bombed the air-fields at Sci~~acEs d~ilp inthewest. Mean-

while, 24 U.S. Mitchells made attacks over awide area, concentrating mainly on the PiazzaArmerina-Caltagirone-Biscari area in attacks onenemy reserves but extended their range toSciacca in the west and Floridia in the east.

Later that night a large force of No. 205Group Wellingtons (including North-west Afri-can Strategic Air Force Wellingtons now underits operational control) attacked targets in theSyracuse area, in order to create a diversionwhile British airborne troops formed up to assaultthe town, made a diversionary attack on Cata-nia, and bombed enemy reserve formations. Thescale of effort of these important attacks was asfollows:- 55 aircraft attacked targets in the Sy-racuse isthmus, dropping all bombs in the spe-cified areas, and nine successfully attacked theSyracuse' seaplane base; nineteen Wellingtonsbombed Catania, scoring hits on the town andthe docks, while dummy paratroops were droppedto create confusion; nineteen bombers attackedthe enemy's reserves at Canicatti, Caltanissetta,Caltagirone and Palazzolo Acreide; and six moreaircraft carried out other specific attacks.

The General Officer Commanding 1st AirborneDivision later informed the A.O.C. No. 205 Groupthat although his troops "were not in a positionto take immediate advantage of the bombing,Syracuse was easily captured during the follow-ing evening largely as a result of it".

In addition to the above-mentioned attacks,immediately prior to the landings mentioned inthe following paragraphs, eleven R.A.F. Cyrenai-can-based Liberators and Halifaxes bombed Avo-la, Noto and San Paolo, in order to weaken re-sistance to the Eighth Army's initial attacks.

The Landings

At 04.00 hours 10th July, British, Canadian andAmerican forces carried out landings all roundthe south-east coast of Sicily north of Syracuseto west of Licata, supported by Allied naval andair forces. Nearly 2,800 vessels of different sizestook part in this extensive amphibious operation,ranging from the largest battleship to the small-est landing craft, and the sea forces participat-ing included units of the Royal Indian, Nether-lands, Polish and Greek Navies in addition tothe Anglo-American forces. The adverse windswhich had already interfered with our airborneassaults, together with a slight swell, causeddelays in the arrivals of some of the smallervessels, but,' in the main, the landings wereexecuted according to plan.

British and Canadian' troops of the EighthArmy landed on three specified beaches betweenPozzalo and Cape Murro di Porco, and the Ame-rican Seventh Army landed at two beaches alongthe Gulf of Gela. The Eighth Army had as itsimmediate objective the capture of Pachino land-so"

Paratroops emplaning in full operational kit.

ing ground and Syracuse, to be followed by anadvance up the east coast to Catania and Messi-na; the Seventh Army's tasks were first to se-cure Licata and Gela and then to press on toCaltanissetta, in order to cut the roads leadingto the invasion areas.

At this initial stage contact was made onlywith the ill-trained demoralised Italian coastaltroops, who offered little resistance. Bridge-heads were quickly established on all beachesand supplies and reinforcements poured in.

By 13.30 hours the entire Pachino peninsula

was occupied and repairs to the ploughed-uplanding ground were under way. By the earlyevening forward troops of the Eighth Army hadcrossed the bay of Syracuse and by 21.00 hoursthe town had fallen intact. The Italians hadhad no time-or inclination-to carry out demo-litions and the majority of the civil population,moreover, proved friendly and willing to co-operate.

To the west, the U.S. Seventh Army also madegood progress. Licata was speedily captured andan adIvanc was made On Vtt ra.

E DAASSIFIED

Fl

an appreciable number of sorties in protectinglandings and unloading at the most westerlypoint, but, in general, the patrolling of the bea-ches was the responsibility of the R.A.F. Spit-fire squadrons based on Malta and U.S. fightersoperating from the satellites Gozo and Pantel-leria.

As the fighters based on Malta and its satelliteairfields were not numerous enough to provideconstant patrols for each of the five landingsthroughout the sixteen hours of daylight thefollowing programme was adhered to:-

(1) Throughout the hours of daylight fightercover was given to at least two of thebeaches concerned.

(2) All landing areas were provided with con-tinuous fighter patrols for the first twohours of daylight; from 10.30 to 12.30hours; from 16.00 to 17.30 hours, and forthe last one and a half hours of daylight.These periods were correctly anticipatedas the most likely times for enemy attacks.

(3) A reserve Spitfire Wing was held inreadiness to reinforce patrols which requir-ed assistance. In the event, these fighterswere not called upon for the task andsome were employed in escorting U.S. me-dium bombers in the attacks mentioned inthe following sub-section.

During the first day of the landings fightersbased on Malta and the satellite islands flew atotal of 1,092 sorties on beach patrol. The coverprovided proved extremely successful. The AlliedNavies were prepared for a loss of 300 shipsduring the day prior to and the actual day ofthe landings; in the event, up to nightfall of 10thJuly twelve ships only were successfully attack-ed from the air. Most of the enemy attackswere delivered against shipping lying off Licataand Gela, where the American troops were beingprotected by U.S. fighter squadrons. Many ofthe American ships in the area lay as far assix miles off the beaches and the fighters patrol-ling over the shipping were thus unable to affordfull protection to the beaches and small craftplying between the ships and the shore. Another

-'" ' . :* / *

Amphibious craft coming ashore.

fact which militated against 100% fighter pro-tection in all areas was the fact that Navalanti-aircraft guns so frequently engaged ourfighter patrols that squadrons were eventuallyobliged to fly as high as 10,000 to 14,000 feetinstead of 5,000 to 8,000, as ordered.

During the day of the initial landings Alliedfighters based on Malta and the satellite air-fields destroyed two JU.88s, one HE.111, andnine enemy fighters, and probably destroyed ordamaged fourteen more aircraft; Allied lossesthrough enemy action were eleven Spitfires shotdown and missing. No. 324 Group's U.S. War-hawks, operating from North-west Africa, intheir patrols over the most westerly point of thelandings accounted for another JU.88.

Air Attacks

While the landings on 10th July were in pro-gress the Allied bombers and fighter-bomberscontinued their attacks on the enemy's Sicilianairfields, positions and lines of communication.

The Gerbini satellites, the enemy's main Sici-lian landing grounds, received the heaviest at-tack, a total of 51 U.S. Fortresses operating

against satellites numbers four and five and 28against number nine. In each case the targetswere reported to be well covered with bombbursts. The enemy's western airfields at Sciac-ca and Milo (Trapani), meanwhile, were effecti-vely bombed by 71 U.iS. Mitchells.

The attacks on enemy targets at PalazzolaAcreide were continued by 36 U.S. Mitchells,which encountered no opposition either in the airor from the ground. Further north 24 U.S. Fort-resses and 28 Ninth U.S. Air Force Liberatorsbombed the marshalling yards at Catania, inorder to hinder the reinforcement of. the enemy'smain strong points. Explosions followed byhuge fires were caused and smoke from the lat-ter was visible for 80 miles on the heavy bombers'return journey.

During the day, also, North-west African U.S.A.36s carried out intensive attacks on theenemy's communications and positions. The A.36, a dive-bomber derived from the P.51 (Mus-tang) by the addition of bomb racks and divebrakes, had made its appearance in the Africantheatre of war in June. Although particularlyadapted for dive-bombing it was also employed

130

View of the landing from the air.

as a glider-bomber for attacks in broken country;it remained, however, fundamentally a fighter,and the usual formation was the fighter defen-sive formation of twelve aircraft line abreast.When the assigned targets were well describedgreat success was achieved by the A.36s. It isworth noting that at this stage it carried agreater bomb-load than any other fighter-bom-ber in use, excluding the P.38 (Lightning). Onthe 10th the A.36s carried out a total of 169sorties in bombing and straffing attacks in theAgrigento, Barrafranca, CaJtanissetta, Grwmmi-chele, and Vallelunga areas. The targets attackedincluded road junctions, bridges, railways, trains,gun positions and transport vehicles. These at-tacks greatly assisted the Seventh Army's ad-vance and hindered the movement of Axis troopsfrom the north-west of the island to the invasionarea.

In addition to the above-mentioned attacksU.S. Lightnings successfully straffed an R.D.F.station in south-west Sicily.

Meanwhile, 21 U.S. Liberators of the NinthU.S. Air Force effectively attacked the Italianairfield at Vibo Valentia, causing numerous fires

and scoring direct hits on hangars.

The enemy's air opposition to the Allied at-tacking aircraft. on the 10th was slight, and ofthe enemy fighters which attempted interceptionseventeen were shot down. Allied losses werethree U.S. Mitchells and two A.36s shot downor missing and a number of other aircraft dam-aged, including eighteen U.S. Mitchells; thesecasualties were believed to be caused entirely bythe intense flak encountered.

Air Activity Night 10/11th July

That night, 10/11th July, U.S. Mitchells, Bos-tons and Baltimores from North-west Africaoperated over the western and central areas ofthe island: the main target was Milo airfield,but Sciacca, Trapani and the enemy's centrallines of communications, particularly at Calta-

nisseta, also received attention. In, all, 79 U.S.

Mitchell and 58 light bomber effective sorties

were flown on these attacks. In addition, four-

teen Wellingtons attacked the Gerbini landing

ground over a period of three to four hours,encountering negligible opposition. No. 205

Group's effort on this night was limited owingto the fact that heavy attacks on Augusta and

Catania planned to support further airborne

Vdift

0landings were cancelled due to the postponementof these missions, and the scale of the attack onGerbini was limited by an accident on a runway.

By the evening of 10th July a G.C.I. stationhad been disembarked and was put into opera-tion during the night. This and G.C.I. stationsoperating in L.S.Ts (Landing Ships Tanks) prov-ed invaluable in extending the range of the Maltacontrol now that enemy night bombers were be-ginning to operate against our shipping lying offthe south-east coast of Sicily.

During the night Malta-based Beaufighters des-troyed two JU.88s and one Cant. Z.1007 and pro-bably destroyed a JU.88 in the Augusta and Sy-racuse areas; intruder Mosquitoes also probablydestroyed a JU.88 south-east of Castelvetrano.

Bridgeheads Firmly Established

On the 11th, with bridgeheads firmly establish-ed, our land forces made further advances in thecoastal area. Progress was made northwards andwestwards from Syracuse along the roads lead-ing to Catania and Caltagirone, respectively,while to the south Avola and Noto fell and theescarpment to the west was occupied. Furthersouth Rosolini, Spaccaforno and Pozzallo were

M MaIFIEDcaptured and an advance was begun towardsModica and Ragusa. To the west of this areaAmerican troops advanced to within two milesof Vittoria, effected some penetration in the Gelaarea, and accupied the high ground east, northand west of Licata. The resistance offered to allthese advances was still feeble.

Throughout the day the maxifhum air supportwas afforded from the North African mainlandand Malta.

The North-west African heavy bomber effort,carried out by 83 U.S. Fortresses, was again di-rected against the marshalling yards at Catania.Explosions and huge fires were caused, the smokefrom which could be seen for 140 miles on thereturn journey, and many hits were registered onthe warehouses, repair buldings and oil storageinstallations. The attacks on the Gerbini landingground were continued by 47 U.S. Marauders andthe western airfields at Milo and Sciacca werebombed by 27 U.S. Marauders and 36 U.S. Mit-chells, respectively. Nearly 100 U.S. Lightningswere despatched on offensive sweeps and to bombtargets of opportunity in Central Sicily, and aneven greater number of A.36s attacked transportcolumns, trains and airfields, destroying or dam-

Note the open doors in the bows from which vehicles are driven out.

15 ~. .

aging 248 vehicles, two locomotives and several our forward units in the Gela area. The mis-grounded aircraft, particularly in the region of sion was less successful than its predecessor andSan Caterina, Caltanissetta and Porto Empedocle. out of 144 C.47s despatched 23 failed to return.Fighter escort for the bomber and fighter-bomber Difficulty was experienced in following theformations was provided by a total of 117 air- course through lanes of safe transit which hadcraft from North-west Africa, and 22 Spitfire to be determined in accordance with the opera-sorties from Malta acted as escort to bombers tions of the Allied sea and land forces. Theattacking Gerbini. unarmed transport aircraft encountered intense

The Ninth U.S. Air Force Liberator attacks flak and were attacked by enemy aircraft; onewere again concentrated against the enemy's air squadron, in particular, ran foul of anti-aircraftbases in the toe of Italy. Sixty-eight effective fire from our Naval vessels which were beingsorties were flown against the airfields at Vibo bombed by enemy aircraft from a high altitude.Valentia and Reggio di Calabria and widespreaddamage to airfield facilities and grounded aircraft Capture of Augustawas reported. Considerable air opposition was On 12th July Ponte Olivo landing groundencountered and two enemy fighters were des- to the north-west of Gela was captured; ele-troyed without loss to the Liberators. ments of the' Seventh and Eighth Armies made

Meanwhile, Malta-based Spitfires and U.S. contact in the Ragusa area; the advance west-Warhawks continued their beach patrols, flying wards from Syracuse went beyond Palazzolo872 sorties. A mixed bag of 28 enemy aircraft Acreide; and Naval units entered Augusta har-were shot down, five probably destroyed and bour, which had previously been subjected tosixteen damaged for the loss of one Spitfire and bombardment from the sea. The town itself wasone Warhawk. During the day, also, 58 Kitty- occupied in the early hours of the 13th, after ahawk-bombers, escorted by Spitfires, went into Commando raid on the 4 inch coastal defenceaction, bombing and straffing enemy transport battery, and port installations were found to bevehicles on the road between Augusta and Cata- almost intact.nia. T.,ack onf vehiclpe nreventPd the convevance of

Our main air attacks on Sicily during the night11/12th July were delivered against air andsupply bases in the west of the island. Forty-eight U.S. Mitchells effectively bombed Bo Rizzoairfield ard 30 Wellingtons attacked targets atTrapani, Marsala, and Mazzara de Vallo, causingfires and explosions. The Wellington attackspreceded a naval bombardment scheduled to com-mence at 01.00 hours and great care had to betaken to be off the target before this began andto keep clear of the Navy's formidable anti-air-craft fire. A further Wellington force of 26 air-craft bombed and machine-gunned hangars andgrounded aircraft at Porto Corvino Ravello air-field, near Salerno, at which enemy bombers werebased.

From Cyrenaica pressure was maintained dur-ing the night against the enemy's air bases acrossthe Messina Straits, twelve Liberators and Hali-faxes successfully attacking Reggio di Calabriaairfield.

Malta-based Mosquitoes continued their intru-der patrols over the enemy's air bases in north-eastern Sicily and southern Italy, shooting downan unidentified aircraft over Crotone. Nigntfighters were also active, shooting down twoJU.88s and an HE.111 which were operatingagainst our shipping off the landing beaches.

Our land forces were also on the move duringthe night; in particular, Seventh Army troops oc-cupied the important airfield at Comiso, whererepairs were begun immediately by moonlight.

The Second Paratrbop Assault

the infantry during this period and our troops hadto march and fight in extremely hot weather.

Heavy air attacks were made during the dayon the Messina communications in order to hinderthe enemy's reinforcement programme. TheNorth-west African heavy bombers carried out79 U.S. Fortress sorties against the Messina rail-way bridges and 72 Cyrenaican-based U.S. Libe-rators attacked the ferry slips and railway yardsat San Giovanni and Reggio di Calabria. In thefollowing days these attacks on the enemy's mainsupply line were intensified.

Gerbini airfield and its satellites received theirdaily attack, delivered by 36 U.S. Mitchells, andAgrigento and Canicatti were bombed by 27 and31 U.S. Marauders, respectively. In addition,nearly 1,000 sorties were flown by North-westAfrican-based fighters and fighter-bombers onsweeps and straffing missions against the enemy'srear lines of communications in southern andcentral Sicily, particularly in the vicinity of Cal-tanissetta, Enna and Casteltermini.

The main air effort from Malta was still direct-ed to the provision of fighter cover for the land-ing beaches and shipping in the occupied harbours.Spitfires and U.S. Warhawks carried out 897sorties on these duties and succeeded in shootingdown 24 enemy aircraft, probably destroying nine.and damaging a further 21 for the loss of eightSpitfires and one Warhawk. Escorted Kittyhawk-bombers, meanwhile, continued their attacks ongun positions and other targets on the Syracuse-Augusta road.

On the night of the 11/12th, also, the TroopCarrier Command carried out a further para- Good Nights Huntingtroop mission, which aimed at dropping troops During the night 12/13th July the Allied airof the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division in front of forces kept up their 24 hour bombing programme.

>AVE B

Results of bombing at Augusta.

Forty-six U.S. Mitchells attacked Termini docks,with light bombers acting as "path-finders", inorder to hinder the enemy's reinforcement and 45Wellingtons dropped 75 tons of bombs on enemyconcentrations at Caltanissetta and Enna; a lesserWellington effort was directed against the Ger-bini landing grounds and light bombers carried

out limited attacks on Sciacca landing groundand communications south-east of Palermo. In

addition, Cyrenaican-based R.A.F. heavy bombersattacked the enemy's air bases at Reggio di Cala-

bria and Vibo Valentia in the toe of Italy.The high-light of the night's air activity, how-

ever, was the success achieved by Malta-basedBeaufighters and Mosquitoes. Operating in clearmoonlight the night-fighters had an excellentnight's hunting, shooting down five JU.88s, threeHE.ills, two Cant. Z.1007s and one DO.217 with-out loss to themselves.

Further Airborne Missions

The same night, 12/13th July, two Albemarlesdropped a small detachment of the British 1stAirborne Division detailed to attack and harasscertain enemy lines of communication and rearareas in north-east Sicily; one Albemarle waslost in the course of this mission.

'A similar mission was attempted on the follow-ing night but the pre-arranged ground aids werenot visible and the aircraft were obliged to returnto base with their task unaccomplished.

Establishment of the Air Task Forces in Sicily

The success achieved by our land forces in oc-cupying enemy landing grounds and the assistan-ce afforded by the R.A.F. Servicing Commandoesallowed the transference of squadrons to Sicilyto commence on 13th July. On that day No. 244Wing Spitfires (less No. 417 Squadr6n whichfol ft h' urin the

~~ _ i.l$

ion,1j

next three days six mo"ir efi A.F. Spitfire squa-drons were installed at Comiso and six U.S. figh-ter squadrons moved in to Licata and PonteOlivo.

Thereafter, the transference of Tactical AirForce squadrons to Sicily in accordance with theAir Plan occurred at regular intervals, and fullair support to our advancing land forces wascontinued without a break.

Reduced Enemy Air Resistance

The 13th July proved to be the last day onwhich the enemy put up any effective air resis-tance in Sicily. His vital coastal radar posts hadbeen lost on invasion day and other key installa-tions were constantly attacked by fighter-bom-bers from North-west Africa; he now had recourseto spotty coverage only. Fighter control wascomplicated further by the elimination of estab-lished airfields and the occupation of new landinggrounds.

Malta-based Spitfires and U.S. Warhawks con-tinued their patrols of the beaches and harbours,carrying out 732 sorties. As the result of nu-merous combats 24 enemy aircraft were shotdown, three probably destroyed and 25 damagedfor the loss of one Spitfire. JU.87 dive-bombersagain showed their vulnerability to fighter at-tack ; No. 234 Squadron intercepted twelve un-escorted dive-bombers and shot down five ofthem and damaged the remainder.

Malta-based Kittyhawks were also active dur-ing the day, carrying out 54 sorties against theenemy's communications between San Micheleand Grammichele and at Curlentini and Lentini.

Targets attacked from North-west Africa onthe 13th included a total of 76 U.S. Fortress sor-ties against Catania and Milo/Trapani airfields,23 U.S. Marauder sorties against Carcitelialanding ground, and 108 escorted U.S. Mitchellsorties against enemy positions and communica-tions at Enna. Fighter-bombers, meanwhile,bombed and straffed targets in the Castelvetra-no, Termini, Corleone, Caltanissetta and SanCaterina areas, where a total of 118 transportvehicles were claimed as destroyed, and six loco-motives and 45 railway carriages and truckswere destroyed at Leonforte.

As a result of bombing the Gerbini and Catanialanding grounds (the latter also having been sub-jected to bombardment from the sea) were nowuntenable and the enemy's dwindling air activitywas further limited by successful attacks on hisair bases at Vibo Valentia and Crotone, in thetoe and heel of Italy, by a total of 73 NinthU.S. Air Force Liberators.

In addition, the trickle of supplies reaching theenemy's Sicilian forces was reduced by a success-ful shipping strike carried out by Coastal AirForce Beaufighters north-north-east of Palermo,which resulted in the sinking of a merchant ves-sel and the setting on fire of two escorting des-troyers.

yyy i F ,;

Paratroop Mission in the Plain of Catania

During the night 13/14th troops of the FirstBritish Paratroop Brigade were dropped over theplain of Catania in order to secure the key bridgeat Primosole over the Gornalunga river. Onehundred and five C.47s, seven Halifaxes; and 23Albacores were employed with nineteen glidersin tow, some of which transported Jeeps and six-pounder guns. The parachutists seized the bridge,removed the demolition charges placed there bythe enemy, and held their positions till 09.00hours on the following day when they had towithdraw owing to lack of ammunition.

The venture proved a costly one as ten C.47s,one Halifax and three Albacores were lost, butthe paratroop mission performed an extremelyvaluable piece of work.

Meanwhile, our air attacks were continuedagainst enemy positions and concentrations, par-ticularly at Enna, by U.S. Mitchells and lightbombers and the Wellington force flew over 70effective sorties in attacks on the marshallingyards at Messina and Palermo.

Malta-based Beaufighters and Mosquitoes tooktheir nightly toll of enemy bombers, shootingdown five aircraft.

The Advance Continued

On 14th July patrols of the Eighth Army werein contact with enemy rearguards in the areaChiaramonte-Monterosso. A German counter-at-tack had a flash-in-the-pan success in the earlymorning when enemy troops reached the seaplanebase at Augusta, but by noon the position hadbeen restored. The German troops which hadoriginally been in western Sicily had now movedeastwards and were concentrated in the north-eastern part of the island. On the Seventh Army'sfront, our troops captured Biscari airfield, Maz-zarino and Canicatti.

During the day Malta-based Spitfires made theirlast considerable effort on beach patrols. Theenemy's air resistance by day was now practi-cally negligible; only 40 enemy aircraft were re-ported airborne and of these the Spitfires shotdown four and probably destroyed two more with-out incurring any loss.

Close support was also provided by 34 escortedKittyhawk-bombers which operated against tar-gets in the Caltagirone ard Lentini areas, whereconsiderable resistance was being offered to ourland forces; and 24 U.S. Warhawk-bombers madetheir first appearance in the Sicilian campaignin bombing enemy transport vehicles near Lentini.

Attacks delivered from the North African main-land were chiefly concentrated on Messina, U.S.Fortresses, Mitchells and Marauders of the North-west African Air Forces flying a total of 179sorties and Ninth U.S. Air Force Liberators 73sorties. Large fires and explosions were causedin the vicinity, of the marshalling yards and harb-our and a big oil storage tank was blown up.These attacks were followed up that night by

ED,

ten Cyrenaican-based R.A.F. heavy bomber sortieAs a result of the combined attacks the ferryservice now appeared to be in disuse.

The key base of Enna, in the centre of theisland, was again heavily attacked by 60 U.S.medium bombers, and U.S. fighter-bombers, oper-ating at full intensity, attacked targets of opport-unity all over the battlefield, and hindered theintake of supplies into North-east Sicily byattacks on Milazzo docks and barges at Scaletta,south of Messina.

The continuous bombing of enemy transportand positions was continued during the night byBostons and Baltimores; in particular, enemy ve-hicles on the road south of Villarosa to Ennawere successfully attacked from 4,000 to 1,000feet; Lercara town was bombed, and traffic onthe main road to the west was .also attacked. Inaddition 48 U.S. Mitchells bombed the enemy'simportant base at Palermo and targets in thatarea generally.

Malta-based Mosquitoes and Beaufighters againhad an extremely successful night, shooting downtwelve enemy aircraft, including nine JU.88s.

The Wellington attacks in the Naples area dur-ing the night, which heralded the renewal of theoffensive against Italian targets, are consideredin the next column.

Ground Situation on 15th July

On 15th July our land forces re-captured theimportant Primosole bridge and by the eveningwe held the general line Primosole-Scordia-Gram-michele-Mazzarino-Riesi-Canicatti-Favara-Palma.

The whole of the Hyblean plateau, where de-termined troops might well have fought a de-laying action, was now in our hands, and theEighth Army was beginning to debouch on to theplain of Catania. The German forces had nowbeen reinforced to some extent by parachutistsacting in a ground r61e and it was clear thatstrong opposition could be expected.

Enemy Air Resistance Broken in Sicily

The enemy's air resistance in Sicily had nowbeen broken. Spitfires, which flew 171 sorties onoffensive patrols over the Catania and Gerbiniareas on the 15th, did not encounter a singleenemy aircraft, and few were seen by fightersescorting our bombers and fighter-bombers.

Throughout the day U.S. fighter-bombers con-tinued their attacks on enemy transport and posi-tions, concentrating particularly on hindering themovement of troops across Central Sicily to thethreatened areas in the east and south, attackingpositions and transport vehicles in the area aroundMt. Etna, and enemy vehicles west of Catania.Weight was also given to the attacks in the Ca-tania sector by U.S. Mitchell attacks on the townof Paterno. Meanwhile, the reinforcing of North-west Sicily was hindered by the bombing of Ter-mini railway station by U.S. A.36s and the straf-fing of truck convoys in the same area.

'ttacks on Enemy Shipping

During the first week of the Sicilian campaignthe Coastal Air Force scored successes againstenemy shipping in Central Mediterranean waterson almost every day.

The week's "bag" comprised two merchant ships(of unspecified tonnage) and one 4,000 ton tankersunk, two merchant ships totalling 12,000 tonsprobably sunk, and seven vessels damaged (in-cluding two transport ships of 9,000 and 12,000tons, respectively, and a destroyer).

The above-mentioned results include successesscored off Sardinia and Corsica in addition toattacks against the main stream of sea trafficoff Sicily and the Italian western seaboard.

Air Offensive Against Southern Italy

While the air attacks were continued at inten-sity against Sicilian targets the decision was takento strike increasingly heavy blows against theenemy's rail communications and supply and airbases in Southern Italy in order to prevent thereinforcement of the island and the building upof air resistance.

The renewal of the air offensive against theItalian mainland was initiated on the night14/15th July by No. 205 Group's Wellingtons. Thetwo Neapolitan airfields at Capodichino and Po-migliano were attacked by fifteen and sixteenaircraft, respectively, and many fires causedamong buildings and grounded aircraft. A great-er effort was directed against Naples docks, where44 Wellingtons caused considerable destruction inthe area west of the harbour, in spite of theenemy's attempt to obscure the target with asmoke screen. A feature of the attack on Capo-dichino was the dropping of 330,000 leaflets.

On the next day, 15th July, the Naples marshal-ling yards received a shattering blow from 79U.S. Fortresses, which dropped 212 tons of 1,000and 500 lb. bombs on their target. Photographstaken after the raid revealed that severe damagewas inflicted and much rolling stock was des-troyed. In the central part of the yards sixteentrains were hit and practically all the tracks inthis area were damaged and blocked. Otherdamage included the setting on fire of two oiltanks and damage to buildings in the vicinity ofthe oil refinery.

During the same day, Ninth U.S. Air Force'Liberators carried out 68 effective sorties against-the enemy's important air base at Foggia.

The following night, 15/16th July, the Welling-

ton force flew a total of 62 effective sorties

against the docks and marshalling yards at

Reggio di Calabria and San Giovanni, across the

Straits of Messina, and the airfields at Reggio,Vibo Valentia and Crotone. In addition 2,308,000leaflets were dropped in the areas attacked.

The attack on Crotone airfield was supplement-ed, also, by attacks delivered by seven Cyrenaican-based R.A.F. heavy bombers.

On the 16th the attacks across the Messinav on ue. t-

19 U

i..' ; '''

i:di

0 ~ SIREITALIANTARGETS

ATTACKEDBY

Al kG RAFTI1 JULY TO

17TH AUGUST

X943

0j CTANZMRO

SCALE IN MILES(APPROXIMATE)

0 25 50 5~ 1OO

PRINCIPAL ROADS --

ALASNAME OF PLACE UNDERLINEDINDICATES EXISTENCE OF AIR-FIELD OR LANDING GROUND.

AUSTICA ISLAND

O A .. v~s

resses which caused widespread devastation at

San Giovanni, particularly in the railway yardsand barracks area. One hundred and seventeenU.S. Mitchells and Marauders, meanwhile, con-

centrated on the airfield at Vibo Valentia. Photo-graphs taken after the attack showed that of 78aircraft present on the airfield, 50 were destroyedand two damaged.

During the night the Wellington force wasentrusted with the dropping of the joint Chur-chill-Roosevelt warning to the Italian people, in-forming them of the uselessness of continued re-sistance; 1,720,000 of these leaflets were distrib-uted over Rome and Naples and other towns inSouthern Italy. In addition, a total of 59 Wel-lingtons continued the attacks on the Naplesmarshalling yards and Capodichino airfield.

The following day, 17th July, was a fateful onefor Naples. In the morning 71 Ninth U.S. AirForce Liberators attacked the marshalling yards,and succeeded in placing a heavy concentrationof bombs in the target area, causing huge firesand explosions. Two Liberators were destroyedby anti-aircraft fire and considerable air opposi-tion was encountered.

The morning attack was followed up in theafternoon by 111 U.S. Fortresses, 108 U.S. Mar-auders and 72 U.S. Mitchells from North-westAfrica. Five hundred and forty-eight tons ofbombs were rained on the marshalling yards,shell and torpedo factory, repair and textile plants,and on the Royal Arsenal, where tremendous ex-plosions were caused. Huge fires were startedand after the third attack a pall of heavy smokespreading across the town obscured many partsof the target area. Although intense and heavyflak was encountered only six U.S. Marauderswere lost. Enemy fighter opposition during theselater attacks was on an extremely limited scale.

The intensive effort against Naples on 17thJuly had a great effect in dislocating the enemy'ssupply system; an even more far-reaching resultwas the shattering blow delivered to the sinkingItalian morale.

Further air attacks on Italian targets are con-sidered on page 22.

Fall of Caltagirone and Porto Empedocle

While the bombing of the Italian supply andair bases was in progress, our land forces, back-ed by full air support, were securing fresh objec.tives in every sector, of the Sicilian battlefield.

On 16th July, elements of the Eighth Armybegan to infiltrate across the river Gornalungaand threatened the Gerbini landing grounds. TheGermans attempted a counter-attack against ourpositions at the Primosole bridge, but this provedunsuccessful. Further west, Canadian troops took

Caltagirone and pushed along the road in thedirection of Piazza Armerina.

The following day the Eighth Army extendedits Primosole bridgehead north of the river againstdesperate German resistance, and continued toinfiltrate armoured units across the Gornalunga.

To the west, the ana n pt maccaand Piazza Armerina.

All of the enemy's effective forces-that is the

German units-were now north of the line Primo-

sole bridge-Piazza Armerina-San Caterina. The

Italians were fighting more half-heartedly than

ever and the whole weight of the main defencefell upon the stronger of the Axis brethren.

On the Seventh Army's front Pietraperzia, Serra

di Falco, Agrigento and Porto Empedocle fell into

our hands and a firm line was established northof these points.

During the two days under immediate review-

16th-and 17th July-Spitfires flew 235 sorties on

offensive sweeps over the Gerbini and Catania

areas in support of the Eighth Army's advance;

six enemy aircraft were shot down and two prob-

ably destroyed for the loss of one Spitfire.

Beaufighters and Mosquitoes during the nights16/17th and 17/18th on interception patrols in

eastern Sicily shot down a total of sixteen enemy

aircraft without loss to themselves.

Fighter-bombers, meanwhile, flew a total of

148 sorties on attacks on Sicilian targets. In

particular, the Leonforte marshalling yards, northof Enna, and road convoys at Randazzo, the

important supply base and road junction north

of Mt. Etna, were bombed by U.S. Lightnings;Kittyhawk-bombers attacked vehicles on the roadnear Paterno; U.S. Warhawk-bombers attackedthe radar station on Ustica island, which provid-ed early warning of raids in the north; and

numerous U.S. A.36s attacked targets of opport-unity in all sectors, bombing and straffing tanks,trucks, trains, railway stations, and shipping in

Termini harbour.

Already the air plan for reducing Catania by

the systematic bombing of the lines of approach

in addition to attacks on the position itself was

being implemented. Thus the bomber effort

against battlefield targets from the night 15/16th

to the night 17/18th July, inclusive, included an

attack on the night 15/16th by 46 U.S. Mitchells,

aided by Boston flare-droppers, on Randazzo;

the bombing of Vulguarnera, north of Piazza Ar-

merina, on the Canadians' front, by 24 U.S. Mit-

chells on the 16th; an attack on the enemy's

Catania positions on the night 16/17th by four

Bostons and 30 U.S. Mitchells; an attack on Pa-

terno, west of Catania, by 24 U.S. Mitchells on

the 17th; and the bombing of enemy positions

west of Catania by 42 U.S. Mitchells and four

Bostons, which also acted as illuminators, on

the night 17/18th.

The Advance in Central Sicily

On the Eighth Army's front heavy fighting was

continued north of Primosole bridge on the 18th.

Our troops continued to operate north of the

Gornalunga, however, and by the evening two

brigades had crossed the river Simeto. Further

west, Raddusa had fallen into our hands. On the

following day, 19th July, some.-progress was

made .in the area six miles south-west of Catania,

21 r tf.

'^-^*' 7si

and ac e a, supported by tanks, aimedat Primosole blidge was beaten off. In addition,the 51st Infantry Division in the face of deter-mined, opposition established two bridgeheadsacross the Dittaino river three miles south-westand four miles north-west of Gerbini. To the3west, in spite of considerable resistance an adv-ance was made to within fourteen miles of Enna.

On the Seventh Army's front Caltanissetta, Ca-terina and Aragona were captured on the 18th.

During the night, also, nine R.A.F. Cyrenaican-based heavy bombers continued the bombing ofSdn Giovanni across the Messina Straits.

In the early hours of the 19th four Wellingtonsdropped 864,000 special leaflets entitled "Citizensof Rome," which pointed out in no uncertainfashion the uselessness of Italian resistance andthe disaster awaiting the Italian people as a re-sult of their collaboration with the Germans.

The following day an advance was made in the The Attack on Romearea north-north-west of Caterina, and Mussomeli After full consideration of all likely repercus-was reached further west; in the coastal sector sions-military, political and religious-consequentthe American 82nd Airborne Division reached the on an air bombardment of Italy's capital, it wasarea north-west of Montallegro. decided that the time was now opportune for

In the course of the two days, 18th and 19th this long-awaited attack to be made.July, Allied fighters flew a total of 428 sorties Crews were carefully briefed for definite mili-on offensive patrols; two ME.109s and two ME. tary targets only in order that the minimum110s were destroyed and one ME.110 was prob- damage should be done to a city unique for itsably destroyed for the loss of one Spitfire; all religious and historical associations, and the popu-the interceptions took place in the Catania, Etna, .lation had been previously warned that an attackand Riposto areas. In addition, on the morning was imminent.of the 19th, Spitfires escorting a convoy of three The blow was delivered on the morning oftroopships and three destroyers into Augusta 19th July by a force of 158 U.S. Fortresses ofprevented four R.E.2001 bombers, escorted by the North-west African Strategic Air Force andsix other RE.2001s, from damaging the vessels 112 Ninth U.S. Air Force Liberators.and shot six of the enemy aircraft down. In the afternoon, also, 216 U.S. Mitchells and

Ground straffing and fighter-bomber attacks 105 U.S. Marauders, escorted by U.S. Lightnings,were carried out by a total of 224 Allied air- all of the North-west African Air Force, attackedcraft. The biggest effort was made by U.S. the Ciampino airfield, south of the city.A.36s. On the 18th attacks were concentrated Although our aircraft were traced to the Romeon Adrano, across the Simeto river, on the road area by radar and the attack was expected hour-leading south-east to Catania; in the Caterina ly the enemy air opposition was negligible. Notarea, in order to aid the attacking troops of the a single American aircraft failed to return fromSeventh Army; and on the supply base at Ter- the morning mission and two bombers only weremini, south-east of Palermo. The following day lost in the afternoon attack on Ciampino.successful attacks were made on trains being Excellent photographic coverage by the North-loaded at Fondaco. U.S. Warhawks also did west African Photographic Reconnaissance Winggood work in bombing railway yards at Alcamo revealed that all targets were attacked success-and Castelvetrano, western Sicily, and in attack- fully. The Lorenzo railway yards, engine housesing warehouses, petrol storage, and trains in and locomotive shops were devastated and largethe same areas; sheds in the main freight dep6t and much track

The main medium bomber effort in Sicily, and rolling stock were severely damaged. Themeanwhile, was directed against the enemy's posi- Tobonelli steel plant, a large chemical plant, thetions at Catania on the night 18/19th, when tram garage and the passenger car depot wereattacks were made by 25 U.S. Mitchells, aided all hard hit and damage was inflicted on indus-by Boston flare-droppers, and on Randazzo, on trial buildings to the south-west of the target.the 18th and 19th, when 17 American medium At the Littorio railway yards about 80 hits werebombers bombed the railway and road bridges scored along the entire length of the marshallingin order to hinder the enemy's reinforcement of yards and sidings, including" 50 direct hits onthe' Catania sector generally. rolling stock and tracks. In addition, the loco-

motive dep6t and workshops were badly damag-Air Offensive on Italy Continued ed. The Ciampino north airfield was rendered

Meanwhile, the air offensive against the Axis temporarily unserviceable and apart from 24supply and air bases in Southern Italy was con- grounded aircraft destroyed or damaged hits weretinued at high intensity, scored on ammunition dumps, administrative

On the night 17/18th a total of 62 Wellingtons buildings, hangars and barracks. At the southwere detailed to attack the enemy's air bases at airfield similar damage was done to airfieldMonte Corvino and Pomigliano, in the Salerno facilities and at least fourteen aircraft wereand Naples areas respectively,: Cloud and ground observed damaged or burnt out.haze made identification, of the" targets difficult In the city of Rome itself no damage wasbut bursts in each case were observed across the caused except to a few buildings in the immediatelanding grounds and large fires were started. In vicinity of the Lorenzo railway yards.addition, 1,401,000 leaflets were dropped in the Apart from the tremendous blow inflicted ontarget areas. . ' communications and air strength the

Lorenzo marshalling yards, Rome, under attack on 19th July, 1943.

23

Assessment of damage at Ciampino North airfield, Rome.1. Ammunition dump : two out of three storage 9. Barracks severely damaged by two possible direct

sheds damaged, hits and huts partially destroyed.2. Three buildings damaged and one big shed partly 10. Three sheds destroyed by fire.

destroyed.3. Two shed type buildings, one gutted and one 11. One shed destroyed by fire.4. d amaged the upper storeys o 12. Crater blocking road; direct hit on light rail-4. A direct hit has damaged the upper storeys of way; four trucks still burning.the Administrative block. way our trucs still

5. Blast damage to West Hangar. 13. Twenty aircraft damaged or burnt out.6. Blast damage to roof of Central Hangar. 14. Small dumps of stores burnt out.7. Roofing stripped and structure damaged of East There are nearly 600 large, medium or small

Hangar. ters on landing and dispersal areas, not8. Three direct hits on two-day spre A 2 I I i luding those made by fragmentation bombs.

1. Repair sheds damaged by fire and 4-5 direct hits.

2. Six-day hangar damaged.

3. Sheds and buildings damaged by two near misses.

4. Two shed type hangars damaged by eight bombson and between them ; one large aircraft blownin two by direct hit.

5. Small shed damaged.6. Presumed Recreation Hall damaged by direct hit.

Presumed kitchen and Mess Hall damaged by 2-3near misses. Five other small buildings damaged

7. Six-day hangar damaged by one or two direct hits.

8. Twelve damaged or destroyed aircraft on landing

field or dispersal area.

Nearly 200 craters on landing ground or dispersalareas, not including those made by fragmentation

a~~9~aoED

effect on Italian morale was incalculable. Thewar had been brought to the very heart of Italyand from this time the desire of the people tobe unfettered from the cracking German warmachine became more and more manifest.,

Liquidation of Enemy's Sicilian Air Bases

Of the few Sicilian airfields still in the enemy's

hands on 19th July all but two-Trapani/Miloand Bocca di Falco, in the north-west of theisland-were unserviceable. The only active air-craft were eleven single-engined fighters at Boccadi Falco. Two days later the enemy's air activityfrom Sicilian bases, which during the campaignhad never been particularly active, was definitelydead.

Ir I. THE ENEMY'S STAND AT CATANIAThe Occupation of Western Sicily and A.36s on the Partinico railway yards and

During the fourth week in July the Seventh the roads to the north: Meanwhile, U.S. A.36s

Army made spectacular progress which resulted bombed and straffed troops, vehicles and artillery

in the occupation of the entire western part of positions in the Petralia area.

Sicily. During the 25th and 26th the American troopsre-grouped for a further thrust eastwards. They

An advance westwards from Agrigento reach- repulsed an enemy attack eight miles north-wested Castelvetrano on 21st July and the western of Nicosia and on the northern coast reached aports of Marsala and Trapani fell like ripe fruit point eight mileswest of an Stefanoon the 23rd and 24th, respectively. An advance In order to soften resistance to this coastalto the north, meanwhile, from positions in Cent- push from the night 19/20th to 26th July lightral Sicily resulted in the occupation of Enna on bombers made two night attacks and U.S. A.36s,20th July and Palermo was reached by nightfall operating each day, bombed and straffed com-on the 22nd. The important base of Enna, in munications and supply dumps in the San Stefanoparticular, had been attacked by a total of 212 area and to the east and south-east.medium, 30 light and 107 fighter-bombers from By the end of July the Seventh Army had10th to 16th July, inclusive, advanced southwards to. Nicosia and eastwards

Actually, the Air Plan had envisaged the fall beyond San Stefano.of Catania before Palermo, but the delay in cut-ting the Central Sicilian roads enabled the enemy Fierce Fighting on Eighth Army's Frontto reinforce the Catania sector from the north- S atania fie f g c d

west. South of Catania fierce fighting continued but

in spite of the strongly defended positions heldThe troops opposing the Seventh Army were by the enemy in this sector heavy casualties

entirely Italians. These, now convinced beyond were inflicted on his forces. The Herman Goeringall doubt of certain defeat on the battlefield division was now holding on while the 15th Arm-and the further devastation of their homeland, oured Division came eastwards to form up on itsand realising at long last that they were mere right flank.pawns in the Nazi game, were only too eager-pawns in the Nazi game, were only too eager Even heavier fighting, however, took place onto pass into captivity for the rest of the war, Ev en avier fighting, however took place on

or slip quietly back to their Sicilian homes and t h e c e n t r a l

fr o n t t o t h e w e s t o f C a t a

na, where

ormslp qieti act tei iii esthe Canadians made steady headway in the facenormal peacetime activities of determined opposition. On the 21st and 22nd

Apart from the hopelessness of the military our troops engaged strong elements of the 15thposition Italian morale received another jolt, by Armoured Division south-west of Agira and inthe overthrow of Mussolini on, the 25th and the the region of Leonforte. The Germans here wereresultant uncertainty which followed the collapse fighting back grimly in order to keep .open theof the Fascist regime, road running eastwards and in the hope of re-

Owing to the nature of the Seventh Army's inforcing the north-eastern stronghold withadvance and the absence of enemy air opposition Italians. Assoro, south-east of Leonforte, fell toair support on a large scale was not necessary. the Canadians' assault on 22nd and on the fo'-Some of the most successful attacks in western lowing day Leonforte was captured.Sicily during the four days of spectacular advance The enemy's 15th Armoured Division was nowwere made on targets of opportunity by 44 U.S. forced to withdraw eastwards along the roadsWarhawks, including 28 carrying bombs, on 20th through Petralia, Nicosia, Troina and north andJuly. The railway yards at Partinico were at- east of Leonforte and Nicosia, under cover oftacked and the track was bombed from Alcamo heavy artillery fire and flak, to join up withalmost to Trapani; in addition, attacks were the Herman Goering Division. The German'unitsmade on gun positions south of Gastellamare, suffered heavy casualties on this and the suc-on ammunition dumps west of Vitta and a radar ceeding days at the hands of our land and airstation on the southern tip of Stagnone island, forces.On this and the following day, successful attacks Nicosia, ten miles north-east of Leonforte, waswere also made by a total of 32 U.S. Warhawks captured on the 24th, and in the face of strong

enemy opposition the Canadians, aided by Kitty-hawk bomber attacks, pushed on towards Agirawhich was still in Axis hands. The followingday our troops fought their way astride theAgira road but during the evening were forcedto withdraw.

During the 26th and 27th, however, the,Cana-dians continued to maintain pressure in the Agirasector, supported by the air attacks on the Regal-buto area mentioned in the following sub-section,and reached positions overlooking Agira on threesides. On the 29th the town was captured.

Further south a British force improved itspositions on the Dittaino river before Catena-nuova, aided by Kittyhawk bomber attacks, andoccupied the town on the same day as Agira fell.

Air Attacks in the Battle Area

Full air support was afforded by our air forcesduring the period of the stranglehold on theCatania area mentioned in the preceding para-graphs.

The air plan aimed at the isolation of themain Catania position by the systematic bomb-ing and straffing of every line of reinforcementand approach. The ring formed by Misterbianco,Paterno, Adrano, Regalbuto, Troina, Cesaro,Bronte, Randazzo, Fiumefreddo, Riposto andAcireale were kept under constant attack andthe connecting roads were also constantly straf-fed. Meanwhile, attacks were continued on Ca-tania itself.

From the night 19/20th July to the end of themonth aircraft under the control of the North-west African Tactical Air Force flew a total of 84medium, 705 light and 1,170 fighter-bombersorties against the targets mentioned in the pre-ceding paragraph. The fighter-bomber attackson the harbours at Catania, Riposto and Aci-reale are not included in the above total butare considered in the later sub-section, "Attackson Sicilian Harbours".

The Allied fighters, meanwhile, flew nearly1,000 sorties on offensive patrols on all sectorsof the battlefield but no conclusive engagementswith enemy aircraft were reported.

The most consistent effort was directed againstRandazzo, the important road junction whichconnected the Axis positions in the north withthose on the east coast. During the twelve daysunder review attacks were made by, 43 medium,46 light and 178 fighter-bombers on the town,bridges and roads in the vicinity. Perhaps themost successful raid of the series was that car-ried out by 36 U.IS. Warhawks on 22nd July,when 40 enemy vehicles were claimed as des-troyed and 25 damaged.

Of almost equal consistency were the attacksdelivered on the Troina area by twelve medium,97 light and 135 fighter-bombers; the bombersconcentrated on the town and main road junction,and the fighter-bombers (including 76 U.S. A.36s)attacked targets on the Troina-Randazzo road.

those made on Regalbuto, aofAgira, on the 26th and 27th while the Canadianswere making their thrust in the Agira sector.On the 26th R.A.F. and U.S. light bombers flewa total of 212 sorties in attacks on Regalbuto andthese were supplemented by 22 Kittyhawk-bombersorties; considerable damage was done to thetown and roads in the vicinity. On the followingday the attacks were renewed by 82 more lightbombers, These attacks, followed by 82 lightbombers and eleven fighter-bomber sorties onCenturipe, further east, on 28th and 31st Julymaterially helped our thrust eastwards fromAgira.

Catania itself, during the twelve days underconsideration, was attacked by a total of 150U.S. A.36s, U.S. Warhawks, and Kittyhawks;these attacks do not include the bombing ofthe harbour. Particular attention was paid tothe marshalling yards and railway bridges inorder to hinder the transportation of suppliesand troop movements.

Among the other strategic strong points guard-ing the approaches to the enemy's north-easternarea of resistance, Misterbianco, Adrano, Paternoand Cesaro received the main weight of the airattacks.

The attacks on Riposto, on the coast to thenorth of Catania, are more properly regardedas part of the plan to limit the reinforcing andsupplying of the Catania position and are con-sidered later.

Allied Forces Re-group for Final Attack

The Allied forces, now re-grouping for thefinal assault, had a formidable task in front ofthem. In the southern Catania sector the enemyheld strongly defended positions which had beenimproved by wiring and digging and the wholeof the Germans' right flank was in difficultmountainous country, easily defended and giv-ing no scope for mobile tank warfare. Therewere three main roads only in North-easternSicily along which large-scale Allied attackscould be developed:- that circling Mt. Etna, theCatania-Messina coast road; and the northerncoastal road.

The beginning of the end was in sight, but theway was still hard and .hazardous.

Attacks on Sicilian Harbours

While the air attacks on battlefield targetswere in progress constant air attacks were de-livered on the few remaining harbours in north-east Sicily still in Axis hands. Such craft asescaped our sea forces, which were operatingat times even in the Messina Straits, were oftencaught in the enemy's Sicilian reinforcing ports,and the damage inflicted on harbour facilitiesfurther limited the scanty supplies reaching theenemy's hard-pressed army.

The previous heavy air attacks on the Messinaferry terminal and those across the Straits

. 27BE t-

U S. Mflchells of the N A T A F. on low level bombtng of Sicilian roads.

DEBOlD

had ended the train ferry service, and theenemy had recourse mainly to the employmentof small craft such as "F"-boats, Siebel ferriesand barges in his attempt to pass supplies acrossto Messina. During the last twelve days inJuly 59 U.S. Warhawks and A.36s attacked Mes-sina harbour: the A.36 attacks resulted in dam-age to a cruiser and two destroyers, and theWarhawks scored near misses on a 400 foottransport and two patrol boats, in addition tothe bombing of two barges, two ferries and asteamer with unobserved results.

Riposto harbour, to the north of the Cataniaposition, was attacked by a total of 111 U.S.Warhawks and Kittyhawks. Considerable dam-age was inflicted on the docks and jetties anddirect hits were scored on barges and smallfreighters.

Acireale, further south, was also attacked onone occasion by eleven U.S. Warhawks whichcaused damaged to the harbour facilities.

The heaviest attacks, however, were madeagainst Milazzo, at this stage the enemy's busiestharbour. From 24th to 31st July, inclusive, 38medium, 160 light, and 211 fighter-bombers madeattacks on the harbour and 48 fighter-bombersattacked the marshalling yards, the main bridgesand roads in the vicinity. Apart from the mediumbomber attacks, carried out by U.S. Mitchells,aided by flare-dropping Bostons, the effort wasmade by day. The bomber attacks resulted inwidespread damage to the harbour installationsand near misses on a tanker and several smallvessels. The fighter-bomber attacks, deliveredalmost entirely by U.S. A.36s and U.S. War-hawks, resulted in direct hits being scored ontwo 1,000 ton vessels, a 500 ton vessel, a "largeship" of unreported size and two freighters, inaddition to numerous near misses on other ship-ping in the harbour and damage to the quaysand docks.

Attacks on Enemy Shipping at Sea

During the last week in July, also, aircraftof the North-west African Air Forces flew 106effective bomber and fighter sorties against enemyshipping at sea.

Of the twelve attacks delivered the most suc-cessful were those made by Coastal Air ForceBeaufighters. A 2,000 ton merchant vessel wassunk and a schooner probably sunk west ofNaples on 24th July, and a barge was left ablaze;a 1,500 ton merchant vessel was sunk off theSardinian coast on the 26th; and on the 29th amerchant vessel of 8,000 tons was probably sunkand a destroyer and an M.T.B. were set on firenorth of Licosa Point, the southern extremity ofthe Gulf of Salerno.

Destruction of Air Transport

In addition to the attacks on the enemy's sea-borne supplies and Sicilian harbours successfulblows were also struck at the enemy's air trans-port force. In particular, on 25th July 33 Spit-

fires of No. 322 Wing, operating "f the air-field at Lentini, south of Catania, shot down 21JU.52s and four escorting ME.109s off Milazzo.

Attacks on Italian Communications Continued

Simultaneously with the air attacks on theenemy's shipping at sea, air transport and Sicil-ian harbours, the offensive against Italian basesand communications was maintained at highintensity.

Photographic coverage revealed that as a re-sult of the shattering blow to Naples on 17thJuly, mentioned on page 21, rail traffic throughthe Naples marshalling yards was still complete-ly stopped. Traffic could by-pass the city, how-ever, through the junctions at Cancello andCaserta. Accordingly heavy attacks were nowmade on the railway junctions at Salerno, Batti-paglia, and Foggia to prevent supplies reachingSouthern Italy and Sicily.

Concerted attacks were made on all three junc-tions on 22nd July, when 71 U.S. Fortresses at-tacked Foggia, 52 U.S. Mitchells attacked Salernoand 48 more U.S. Mitchells bombed Battipaglia.In addition, 39 Wellingtons had previously attack-ed Salerno on the night 21st/22nd July and 66more Wellington sorties were flown against thistarget on the nights 22nd/23rd and 23rd/24th.At Salerno all rail traffic through the junctionwas stopped and great damage was done to rol-ling stock. All main lines were destroyed atBattipaglia, and rail traffic through Foggia wasalso definitely stopped owing to the cutting ofthe main lines. Rail traffic to Southern Italywas consequently bottle-necked pending repairs.to the three junctions attacked.

Additional attacks on southern Italian com-munications were made by 35 Wellingtons onthe night 23rd/24th, when the San Giovannidocks were bombed; by a total of 48 U.S. Mit-chells on 24th and 26th July when the marshal-ling yards at Paola were attacked; and by elevenR.A.F. Cyrenaican-based heavy bombers on thenight 20th/21st July when the Reggio di Oalabriarailway yards were bombed.

In the north, also, a heavy blow was struckat the Bologna marshalling yards by 51 U.S.Fortresses on 24th July. At least seventeentracks were put out of commission and muchdevastation was caused to rolling stock by theblowing up of an ammunition train in the northforwarding sidings. Locomotive depots and storeswere hit, the through lines east to west werecut in several places, the main line northwardswas blocked, and the northern loop line wasdamaged.

The subsequent attacks on Italian bases andcommunications during the last fortnight of theSicilian campaign are considered on page 34.

Intensive Bombing of Italian Airfields

The air attacks, meanwhile, on the series ofairfields in Italy were continued unabated.

29

four main classes according to their locality:-airfields in the foot of Italy, in the Naples area,in the Rome area, and those to the north of Rome.

In the toe of Italy Vibo Valentia airfield wasattacked by eight Cyrenaican-based R.A.F. heavybombers on the night 19/20th July and on thefollowing day 71 escorted U.S. Mitchells andMarauders renewed the attack with loads of 20lb. fragmentation bombs. Crotone, to the north-east, was attacked by 26 Wellingtons on the night20th/21st and by 72 U.S. Mitchells on the 23rd.Meanwhile, our reconnaissance aircraft reportedincreasingly large concentrations of single-en-gined aircraft at Leverano airfield in the heel ofItaly. This airfield was accordingly bombed by69 U.S. Fortresses on 23rd July, when 828 x 500lb. bombs were dropped plumb on the target. Thebombers were attacked by a force of enemyfighters, twelve of which were destroyed with-out loss incurred by the Fortresses. The airfieldwas rendered unserviceable and our reconnais-sance aircraft on the following day reported thatof 38 ME.109s around the perimeter at leasteighteen were damaged or burnt out and theremainder must have been damaged owing totheir proximity to bomb craters. Grottaglie air-field, also in the heel of Italy, was attacked by46 U.S. Fortresses on 30th July; apart from thedestruction of grounded aircraft the two mainhangars were completely gutted.

Further north, in the instep of Italy, the land-ing ground at Scalea had come into use as asingle-engined fighter base. This airfield waseffectively bombed by 36 escorted U.S. Mitchellson the 27th.

The vulnerability of the enemy's landinggrounds in the foot of Italy induced him totransfer more and more aircraft further northand during the last week of July there was anoticeable reluctance to replace destroyed anddamaged fighters, particularly in the Italian"heel."

Attacks on the enemy's airfields in the Naplesarea included that on Aquino, north-north-westof Naples, on which JU.52s, JU.88s, ME.llOs andsingle-engined fighters had been seen by recon-naissance aircraft; the important Neapolitan airbase at Capodichino, which was used particular-ly by JU.52s and ME.110/210s; Capua airfield,a JU.52 base; and Monte Corvino airfield, onwhich single-engined fighters and ME.llOs werebased. In all, attacks were delivered by seven-teen heavy bombers and 395 medium bombers(including 216 Wellingtons). Some indication ofthe destruction caused during these raids is givenby the evidence of photographic reconnaissance.At Aquino airfield, for example, attacked by 65Wellingtons on the night 19/20th July consider-able damage was done to hangars and adminis-trative buildings, about 100 craters were apparenton the landing area and 36 aircraft were damagedor burnt out on the ground.

At Monte Corvino airfield, attacked by 72 U.S.

aircraft were damaged or destroyed, includingthirteen ME.llOs and six large aircraft.

In the Rome area, Pratica di Mare airfield,to the south of the city, was attacked on twooccasions by a total of 69 Wellingtons and U.S.Mitchells and the airfield at Viterbo, north ofRome, was bombed by 54 U.S. Fortresses on29th July. In particular, the American mediumbombers destroyed or damaged 25 grounded air-craft at Pratica di Mare and the heavy bomb-bers caused heavy damage to all three hangarsat Viterbo and 36 medium and large aircraft wereburnt out and six others seriously damaged.

To the north of Rome, half way to Pisa, theimportant air base at Grosetto was attacked by70 U.S. Fortresses on 21st July: cloud cover pre-vented an accurate estimate of the damage in-flicted but it was evident that at least one ME.323 and four medium bombers were destroyed onthe ground and barracks, repair shops, adminis-trative buildings and a hangar received manydirect hits.

The intensive air attacks oi the Italian airfieldsmentioned above, and the subsequent bombingindicated on page 40, further reduced the ene-my's declining air resistance and paved the wayfor the subsequent invasion of the Italian main-land.

Negligible Enemy Air Effort

The enemy's air effort during the last week inJuly continued to be on a small scale and, apartfrom a daylight raid on Palermo and some dive-bombing at Enna, Agrigento and Sciacca, wasmade mainly at night.

On the night 24/25th July JU.88s attackedAugusta and Syracuse; Beaufighters succeeded inshooting two of the raiders down. On the samenight 25 JU. 88s and HE.111s made the firstattack on Malta since the beginning of the cam-paign. Six JU.88s were destroyed-three byBeaufighters and Mosquitoes and three by anti-aircraft fire.

The enemy's fighter opposition to our intensiveair attacks on Italian targets remained negligible.

Early Attacks on Evacuation Shipping

During the last week in July there were signsof a limited evacuation by sea, particularly fromthe Catania, Messina, Milazzo and Orlando areas.The merchant vessels, barges, freighters, Siebelferries, and other small craft employed by the ene-my were attacked with considerable success bya total of 226 U.S. A.36s, U.S. Warhawks andKittyhawks.

When the evacuation was in full swing in Au-gust the fighter-bomber effort against evacuationshipping was intensified. These later attacksare considered on page 39.

Fall of Catania

During the first few days of the fourth weekMitchells on the following afternoon 6 rfuil of the campaign, Catania, the enemy's main

C ; . 3

A[ r IML

ec k FF : Fa$a ra x

x@ tx rr o a c

zON

} ; 9

kr

a z a ua

as Ra s*

Fs.Xv M,

b' F

.lip

a

g

Xxx ::j

iM,F .;. f0 2

?max k

b X

F t

'

W F

K.z g,g t< y c C,

c> A

p8 aQ

A' typical bombing attack on a'Sicilia-n airfield right up the runway.

31

centre of resistance, showed -signs of becominguntenable. The fall of Catenanuova on 29thJuly and the capture of Regalbuto four dayslater threw the enemy back on the road Paterno-Adrano-Cesaro-San Fratello while providing ourtroops with excellent lateral communications.The thrust from Centuripe and Regalbuto towardsAdrano now threatened the entire Catania posi-tion. On 3rd August preparations for the with-drawal of the Herman Goering Division werereported and two days later, together with Mis-terbianco to the west of the town, the positionwas in our hands.

Our land forces entered Catania at dawn on5th August without any enemy opposition, theCommanding Officer of the IEighth Army ad-vanced troops having received a notice typed inEnglish to the effect that "the authorities andfunctionaries of the city... were awaiting or-ders". Our troops were met by a seething mobof citizens who expressed delight at the depar-ture of the Germans and begged for food.

The intensive air attacks on all approaches toCatania mentioned on page 27 had been con-

tinued in the early days of August and had vir-tually isolated the position. During the firstfour days in August, in fact, attacks on targetsin the Troina-Randazzo-Paterno triangle exceed-ed the 250 mark for medium bomber sorties andnearly 400 for light and fighter-bombers, res-pectively. In particular, heavy attacks were de-livered on Adrano in support of the thrust fromRegalbuto. Our advance in this area is consi-dered in the following section, IV-"Reductionof the Island".

From the beginning of the Sicilian campaign

to the fall of Catania the Seventh U.S. Army

captured 91,600 prisoners; during the same period

the Eighth Army, which had come up against

the main resistance, took 28,000 prisoners.

Eighth Army casualties (including Canadians)

killed, wounded and missing were 9,353 and the

Seventh Army's casualties totalled 7,700.

With the fall of Catania the enemy's forces

were obliged to withdraw to their final bridge-head. The end was now in sight.

Bologna marshalling yards under attack, 24th July, 1943.

'M SbMSTIEO

British troops entering Catania.

Attack by U.S. Fortresses on Foggia railway communications in progress, 22nd July, 1943.

33.

iEo

IV. REDUCTION OF THE ISLANDCapture of Troina

While the enemy was evacuating the Cataniaposition the Seventh Army advanced steadilyeastwards along several parallel roads and captur-ed Troina on 6th August.

During the first six days in August our airattacks on Troina comprised twelve medium and130 fighter-bomber sorties in addition to straf-fing attacks. This air support greatly assistedthe Seventh Army's advance.

Troina and roads in the vicinity had been pre-dominantly a fighter-bomber target, 265 sortiesbeing made by fighter-bombers from 18th Julyto the time of its fall as compared with twelveby medium and 97 by light bombers.

Fall of Adrano

Meanwhile, in the central sector of the EighthArmy's front our troops had captured Paternoand threatened Belpasso. On the 6th furtherpressure in the central sector resulted in thecapture of Biancavilla and by the afternoon ourland forces had reached the outskirts of Adrano.The town finally fell in the evening after a de-termined resistance.

As our thrust against Adrano drew ever nearerthe air offensive against this most importantstrong-point was intensified. From 1st to 6thAugust 129 medium, 223 light and 24 fighter-bomber sorties were flown in attacks on thetown, troop and gun concentrations, ammunitiondumps and. roads in the vicinity as comparedwith 58 medium, 142 light and 82 fighter-bombersorties during the last fortnight in July.

With the fall of Adrano the German schemeto establish a firm line south of Mount Etna wasimpossible to fulfil, and a withdrawal in thecoastal sector north of Catania became neces-sary to conform with the right flank which wasbeing pushed back towards Bronte. The enemy'sline now ran south-east from the foothills ofMount Etna through Nicolosi to a point on thecoast between Catania and Acireale, while to thenorth-west the line ran through Bronte and Ce-saro to San FratelTo.

On both the Seventh and Eighth Army fronts,however, the enemy was making full use ofmining and demolitions which rendered our ad-vance in the difficult country of north-east Sici-ly slow and hazardous. Above all, it must befreely admitted that the German units were fight-ing with the grimmest determination.

Air Attacks on Tactical Targets

In addition to the air attacks on Adrano andTroina intensive attacks were made during thefirst six days in August on other tactical targetsii the battlefield and rear areas. Seven attackswere made on north-east Sicilian roads in thecourse of which nearly 153 tons of bombs weredropped: this total, however, included some at-

tacks in the Troina area, already mentioned, andsome in the Messina area which are consideredin the following sub-section. One hundred andforty tons of bombs were dropped on targetsof opportunity in north-east Sicily includingsuch targets as enemy transport vehicles andencampments. Specific gun positions receiveda load of nearly 30 tons and the enemy's posi-tions at Bronte, Paterno, Centuripe (on 3rd Au-gust only) Randazzo, St. Maria, Francavilla,Cesaro and others points of resistance were sub-jected to attacks involving the expenditure of atotal bomb load of 343 tons.

Attacks on Messina, Cape Peloro and Milazzo

While the air attacks against battlefield tar-gets were being carried out at full intensity dur-ing the first week in August, attacks were re-newed on a large scale against the harbour,marshalling yards, bridges, roads and troopsat Messina and towards the end of the weekagainst the beaches extending westwards to CapePeloro. The attacks had a dual aim:-to preventlast-minute supplies reaching the enemy's hard-pressed forces and to strike at his main evacuationpoint.

From 1st to 7/8th August,; inclusive, attackswere delivered by a total of 121 U.S. Fortresses,269 Wellingtons and 225 R.A.F. and U.S. fighter-bombers. The heavy bombers concentrated onthe town of Messina itself (hitting amongst otherobjectives the gas works and commercial build-ings) and on the cross-roads and highway brid-ges. The Wellingtons struck first at the mar-shalling yards and later at targets on the eva-cuation beach between Messina and Cape Peloro.The main fighter-bomber effort was directedagainst shipping in the harbour; supplies piledon the docks were destroyed and an appreciablenumber of small craft were sunk or damaged.

Meanwhile, over 200 U.S. Warhawks and Kit-tyhawks supplemented our Naval operations inthe Messina Straits by attacks on small craftalready described as "evacuation shipping"; inparticular, several Siebel ferries and barges weresunk or set on fire and near misses were scoredon numerous other small vessels. Air attackswere also continued on Milazzo. Against theharbour itself attacks were delivered by a totalof 24 medium, 23 light and 91 fighter-bombersand additional attacks on the town, marshallingyards and nearby camps were carried out by 34fighter-bombers.

Attacks on Italian Bases and Communications

As part- of the plan -to force the enemy toabandon his Sicilian bridgehead attacks werecontinued on Naples and vital rail communicationsin Southern Italy.

During the first week in August Naples wasattacked twice by U.S. Fortresses and on threenights by Wellingtons.

DECU S ED

The American heavy bomber attacks weremade on the 1st and 4th of, the month. On the1st 23 aircraft operated against the docks and47 concentrated their attacks on the nearby airbase at Capodichino. In all, 181 tons of bombswere dropped and both targets were reported tobe well covered by bomb bursts. In particular,photographs revealed that at least 29 groundedaircraft were destroyed or damaged at Capo-dichino. On the second occasion 77 U.S. Fort-resses attacked the docks and submarine base,again reporting a good covering of the target.A feature of the Fortress attacks on Napleswas the increased enemy fighter opposition. On1st August the bombers were attacked by ap-proximately 25 German fighters and their escort,consisting of 50 U.S. Lightnings, was engagedby about 35 Italian fighters; seven enemy fight-ers were destroyed for the loss of one Fortress.During the attack on the 4th the Fortressesclaimed the destruction of one ME.109, one MC.202 and one FW.190 and the probable destructionof eleven other aircraft; two Fortresses wereshot down and 49 others were damaged by heavyaccurate flak.

The Wellington attacks on Naples were aimedat the marshalling yards against which a totalof 170 effective sorties were flown; two air-craft only failed to return from these missions.On several occasions some of the aircraft operat-ing acted as "path-finders" and in every raidfires were started which were often accompaniedby explosions. These attacks greatly hindered theenemy's attempts to put the marshalling yardsin commission again after the heavy July at-tacks. A feature of the attacks was the drop-ping of 180,000 "Mothers of Italy" and 1,200,000"Italiana Soldati" leaflets on the night 6/7thAugust.

Further south railway targets at Battipaglia,Marina Catanzaro and Paola were heavily at-tacked. By night a total of 147 Wellingtonsbombed all three targets and day attacks weremade by 135 U.S. medium bombers on MarinaCatanzaro and Paola. Particularly heavy dam-age was inflicted on the railway yards andbridges at Marina iatanzaro, against which 137effective sorties were flown.

From Cyrenaica R.A.F. heavy bombers flew27 effective sorties against the marshalling yardsand railway bridges at Reggio di Calabria andSan Giovanni in the toe of Italy. The Liberatoreffort of the Ninth U.S. Force, meanwhile, wasdirected against the Ploesti oil refineries in Ru-mania: this attack is described elsewhere in theReview.

Enemy Air Attacks on Palermo

During the first week of August the enemyattempted to hinder our recommissioning ofPalermo harbour as a supply-base.

In the early hours of the 1st, 25 JU.88s andDO.217s made a successful attack, rendering thebest dock temporarily unserviceable;. in addi-

tion, rations and petrol suppli er destroyed,an ammunition train- was blpwn aund a dieselvessel was sunk. The second raid, however,Carried out on the 4th, achieved little success.

In the first raid seven enemy aircraft, and inthe second four, were destroyed.

The Advance Continues

On the Eighth Army front our troops followedup the enemy's retreating troops in the coastalsector: Aci Castello fell into our hands on the7th August and Acireale on the following day.

Meanwhile, to the west our seizure of Adranowas exploited for operations northwards, and adecisive threat to the enemy was developed alongthe Adrano-Bronte-Randazzo road on the heels ofthe air blitz mentioned below. Bronte was cap-tured on the 8th and on the next day our troopswere already several miles on the road to Ran-dazzo, the last road junction connecting the Axispositions in the north with those on the east coast.

As our troops approached Randazzo the posi-tion was attacked from the air with ever-increas-ing intensity. On the 7th Randazzo town andits approaches were attacked by 104 U.S. Mit-chells, 142 U.;S. Bostons and R.A.F. and S.A.A.F.Bostons and Baltimores; intense heavy flak was en-countered; two U.S. Mitchells failed to return andmany aircraft were damaged. At the same timea small R.A.F. Boston force straddled Maletto,seven miles to the south-west, with bombs. Mean-while, U.S. A.36s and Warhawks continued tocarry out straffing attacks in close support ofour land forces and other R.A.F. and U.S. fighter-bombers helped them in this activity when re-turning from bombing Messina.

Sea and Air Landings behind Enemy Lines

The Seventh Army was also advancing. Beforedawn on 8th August units made sea and air land-ings behind the enemy's lines south-west of CapeOrlando on the north coast and, by establishingthemselves on high ground overlooking the coast,now harassed the enemy lines retreating beforethe advance of the main Seventh Army. Thelatter had captured San Fratello and Sant' Agatain the coastal sector on the 8th and forces ad-vancing from Troina occupied Cesaro by the even-ing of the same day. The next morning thelatter troops advanced along the Cesaro-Randazzoroad and made contact with elements of theEighth Army moving along the parallel roadBronte - Randazzo.

The Seventh Army's advance was materiallyhelped on the 7th by U.S. A.36s and Warhawk-bomber sorties on the Agata railway tunnel, gunpositions, and road junction to the north-west ofthe town. On the same day, also, heavy damagewas done to artillery emplacements and casualtieswere inflicted on troops by an U.S. A.36 attackeast of Fratello. Further south other A.36s sof-tened resistance to the advance on Cesaro by at-tacks on roads and enemy transport vehicles.

35

Second Le vance along the East CoastDuring Simultaneously with the attack on Randazzo,

troops made another surprise landing east of Cape Eighth Army troops in the east coast sector,Orlando. By the following evening contact was although hindered by mines and demolitions, suc-established with the land forces at Naso. Air at- ceeded in reaching Gioeni and Riposto by the 12thtacks in support of the Seventh Army's advance and were advancing beyond Fiumefreddo on thealong the northern coast road were particularly following day.heavy against Patti, to the east of Naso. From The main bombing support at this stage for8th to 12th August a total of ten medium, twelve the advance along the east coast road was provid-light, and 126 fighter-bomber sorties were flown ed on 11th August by 36 U.S. Mitcell sorties inin attacks on gun positions, the cross roads, a attacks on the railway and road near Fiume-bridge, railway junction, a suspected headquar- freddo nd 36 R.A.F. Baltimore and U.S. Bostonters and the town itself. The medium and light sorties on troop and vehicle concentrations in thebomber sorties mentioned above were all flown same area. Further south on the 12th 23 U.S.on 11th and 12th August and during those two Bostons attacked the town of Nunziata. In ad-days, also, U.S. A.36 attacks were particularly dition, the rear areas at Scaletta and Gesso weredevastating. Further east, from 8th to 12th successfully attacked by Allied light and mediumAugust, a total of twelve medium, twelve light bombers.and 41 fighter-bombers attacked the town ofBarcellona and roads and railway in the vicinity. Second Attack on Rome

The Allied line now-ran from Naso to within On 13th August, following the dropping oftwo miles of Randazzo, round Mount Etna and warning leaflets on the city during the previousnorth-eastwards to Riposto, on the east coast. It night by Wellingtons, heavy and medium bomberswas clear that the reduction of the island would of the Strategic Air Force revisited the Italiannow be accomplished in a few days. capital. Once again marshalling yards were the

Enemy Resistance Broken main objectives attacked in order to ensure theparalysis of rail communications in Southern and

A two-pronged attack, meanwhile, had been Central Italy.developed against the key position of Randazzo, In all, effective sorties were flown by 91 U.S.units of the Eighth Army approaching the town Fortresses, 66 U.S. Mitchells and 202.U.S. Ma-from Bronte and units of the Seventh Army from rauders, which dropped a bomb-load of approxi-Cesaro. The enemy resisted both of the assaults mately 500 tons. Escort was provided by 145with the utmost obstinacy, but the strain of U.S. Lightnings.battle and our intensive air attacks coupled with Photographs revealed that the following dam-the absence of reinforcements and air support age was inflicted in the course of this large-scaleforced him to give ground and Randazzo was oc- raid. At the Lorenzo marshalling yards a largecupied on 13th August. crater was made in the centre of the tracks on

The peak air effort against Randazzo on 7th the Naples line and much rolling stock was dam-August, mentioned on page 35, was never ap- aged and burnt out. On the eastern perimeterproached again, but the attacks were continued many repair shops and industrial buildings wereat high intensity. From 8th August to the time hit and the sidings were put temporarily out ofof its fall U.S. Mitchells flew a total of 190 ef- use. Heavy damage, also, was again inflicted onfective sorties against the positions, and the Al- the Tabonelli manufacturing plant. Damage atlied light bombers and fighter-bombers flew 86 the Littorio yards included the blocking of theand 44 sorties respectively. Except for a few through lines, the destruction of rolling stock inS.A.A.F. Boston sorties on the night 9/10th Au- the reception sidings, and hits on railway build-gust all the attacks were delivered by day and ings and repair shops. At the Rome Littorio air-proved most successful, field, the buildings hit included the airframe and

In all, from the beginning of the Sicilian cam- engine repair shops, five hangars and the admi-paign to the final reduction of Randazzo 561 me- nistrative buildings; fresh craters were made indium, 324 light and 321 fighter-bomber effective the eastern part of the landing area and groundedsorties were flown against this position. During aircraft were destroyed and damaged.July the town and roads in. the vicinity were Damage to non-industrial and historic build-treated primarily as a fighter-bomber target, but ings was again negligible.in the first fortnight of August, when resistance Four formations of our bombers were engagedstiffened in this area, more weight was given to by approximately 75 enemy fighters, but fewthe air attacks by medium and light bombers, were aggressive in their attacks, concentratingwhich flew nearly 700 effective sorties. on the medium bombers and leaving the heavies

Amongst other attacks in the vicinity of Ran- alone. The American bombers claimed the des-dazzo may be mentioned the attacks by 36 U.S. truction of two enemy fighters and three "pro-'Warhawks on Francavilla, to the north-west, on bables" and the escorting U.S. Lightnings report-the 12th which resulted in hits on the road junc- ed the shooting down of three more and two "pro-tion and a bridge, thus helping to cut the enemy's babies". Two U.S. Marauders failed to returnretreat northwards, from this mission.

~ TT:;ljIr;

I rJ "~ - i'ir:

"jx;,:

The other attacks on Italian communicationsduring the last stage of the campaign in Sicilyare mentioned below.

The Last Phase

As a result of the fall of Randazzo on 13thAugust the enemy was left with only one lateralcommunication road, that running from Taormi-na through Francavilla and Novara to the northcoast west of Barcellona. Some attempt wasnow made to hold the road while the tempo ofthe enemy's evacuation was quickened.

On the 15th, however, the enemy withdrewafter a token resistance and our troops enteredTaormina, Castiglione, Novara and Mazzarra. Inthe coastal sector the enemy's retreat was acceler-ated by the threat of an amphibious landing inthe vicinity of Scaletta. On the same day ele-ments of the Seventh Army, profiting by thespeedy retreat in the north and helped by theirthird leapfrog landing on the previous night,reached Spadaforo, twelve miles west of Mes-sina.

On the evening of 16th August advanced ele-ments of the Seventh Army entered Messina andin the early morning of the following day forwardunits of the Eighth Army, moving up from Sca-letta, also reached the town.

An extraordinary feature of the last days of theenemy's withdrawal was the screening of thecrack German units by second-class Italian coastalregiments so that the Germans could make goodtheir escape.

Organised resistance ceased on 17th Augustand Sicily was in Allied hands. It was estimatedthat enemy casualties, killed and wounded,amounted to approximately 32,000 men, of whom25,000 were Germans. At least 132,000 prisonerswere taken (including 125,000 Italians) and manySicilian troops had donned civilian clothes andreturned to their homes.

During the last four days of the 'Sicilian cam-paign practically the entire air effort, as indicat-ed below, was directed against the enemy's eva-cuation beaches on either side of the MessinaStraits and communication targets in SouthernItaly. Milazzo was attacked by fighter-bombers,however, until its occupation on the 15th and atotal bomb load of 90 tons was dropped on the fewremaining roads in Sicily in enemy hands and ontargets of opportunity generally.

The "Milk Run" to Messina

Mention was made on page 34 of the bombingof Messina and attacks on evacuation shipping inthe first week of August. During the last tendays of the campaign the attacks on the enemy'sSicilian evacuation beaches and shipping werecontinued at high intensity. In all, attacks weredelivered by 21 heavy, 404 medium, 20 light and278 fighter-bombers.

The heavy bomber sorties were all flown onthe 9th when the cross-roads at Messina werebombed; poor visibility, however, prevented the

complete observation of the results achieved.Apart from 35 U.S. Mitchell sorties flown on the16th August against harbour installations atMessina and troop concentrations at Cape Pelora,all the medium bomber attacks were carried outat night by Wellingtons. Night after night theR.A.F. medium bombers continued to pound theevacuation beaches from south of Messina to westof Cape Pelora and these nightly trips inevitablybecame known as the "milk run". Innumerablefires among transport vehicles on the roads andbeaches and in the villages and camps were start-ed and the widespread havoc and confusion causedgreatly hampered the enemy's night evacuationmoves. In addition, the Wellingtons dropped con-siderable numbers of leaflets in the target area.During the last few days of the evacuation theWellington attacks were switched to the beachesacross the Messina Straits. These attacks areconsidered in the following sub-section.

The fighter-bomber attacks in the Messina area,apart from the attacks on evacuation shippingconsidered later, were carried out mainly byU.S. Warhawks and Kittyhawks and included thebombing and straffing of the railway, bridges,supply dumps, storage buildings and harbour faci-lities. In particular, from 15th to 17th August,inclusive, the fighter-bombers flew a total of 222sorties against these targets.

Attacks on Italian Communications and Beaches

Meanwhile, heavy air attacks were continuedagainst Italian rail and road communication andthe reception beaches across the Messina Straits.

During the last ten days of the campaign,apart from the devasting attack' on the Romemarshalling yards on 13th August, already con-sidered, the main attacks specifically aimed atrailway yards were delivered against those atTerni, north of Rome, Lamezia, in the foot of Italy,Viterbo, north-north-west of Rome, Battipaglia,south-east of Salerno, Sapri in the foot of Italy,and San Giovanni on the Italian side of the Mes-sina Straits.

Terni railways yards and industrial area wereattacked by 72 U.S. Fortresses on llth Augustand considerable destruction of rail traffic anddamage to jute and wool mills, steel works andbarracks was caused.

The marshalling yards at Lamezia were mostsuccessfully attacked on the nights 13/14th and14/15th by a total of 42 Wellingtons, which leftthe whole target area ablaze. On the followingtwo nights the Wellingtons struck further northat the Viterbo marshalling yards, carrying out 76effective sorties; on each occasion mist renderedthe target difficult to locate but the area waswell covered with bombs. The attack on Batti-paglia marshalling yards was delivered by 36 U.S.Marauders on 17th August and the target areawas reported to be "completely blanketted". Themarshalling yards at Sapri were effectivelybombed on the 15th by 24 U.S. Marauders; manyof the 245 coaches present were believed to be

3(T::1

~<5i.

Photograph taken a few hours after the attack on Istres Le Tube airfield, 17th August, 1943.(1) Roofs of four large hangars slightly damaged.(2) Roofs of two :large workshops slightly damaged.(3) Roofs of barracks damaged.(4) Roof of large hangar damaged.(5) Shed to north-east of workshops damaged by fire.(6) Extensive area covered by fragmentation bomb craters.

D~s~srtu

destroyed and two oil fires were started withsmoke rising to 5,000 feet. Meanwhile, Cyrenai-can-based R.A.F. heavy bombers carried out threenight attacks on the railway siding at San Gio-vanni, flying 39 effective sorties.

The most striking attacks on bridges werethose delivered against the important railwayand road bridges across the Angitola river, whichflows into the Gulf of Eufemia. From 7th to 17thAugust day attacks on these bridges and targetsin the area generally were made by a total of319 U.S. medium bombers. When temporarybridges were constructed to take the place ofthose destroyed attacks were continued againstthese also by U.S. and R.A.F. medium bombersoperating by day and night, respectively. Trafficacross the Angitola river was seriously impededby these determined attacks and at times wasbrought to a standstill.

An intense air effort, meanwhile, was directedagainst the many landing points on the westernseaboard to which the enemy's small evacutioncraft made their perilous trip. By day the beachesand harbours were attacked continuously by Al-lied fighter-bombers and where necessary weightwas given to the attacks by U.S. medium andR.A.F., S.A.A.F. and U.S. light bomber sorties.During the last few nights of the campaign,also, the Wellingtons switched their attacks fromthe Messina-Cape Pelora beaches to landingpoints across the Straits.

Some idea of the day effort may be given byconsidering the attacks on Palmi. From 9th to14th a total of 71 effective U.S. Warhawk-bombersorties were flown against this landing point andbarges and warehouses were bombed and straff-ed. On the 14th 47 U.S. Mitchells and twelveR.A.F. Baltimores dontinued the attacks somewhatinland, concentrating particularly on the roadjunction to the north-west of the town in orderto harass and hinder troop movements.

Similar attacks, meanwhile, were going onagainst landing craft, supply dumps, warehousesand roads at Pizzo, Reggio di Calabria, Scilla, Ni-castro, and numerous other points in the foot ofItaly.

Amongst the attacks delivered specificallyagainst roads, vehicles, bridges and railway com-munications, as distinct from beaches, may bementioned 88 U.S. A.36 sorties against "targetsof opportunity" in the Gioia Tauro area on the13th, 14th and 15th; the bombing of roads andvehicles at Piedimonte, north of Naples, by 21U.S. medium and twelve U.S. Bostons on the13th; and attacks by 42 Kittyhawks and U.S.Warhawks aimed at supply dumps and railwaycommunications on the Italian south-east andsouth-west coasts on the 14th.

The fighter-bomber effort directed solelyagainst "evacuation shipping" is considered later.

The night effort against the Italian beacheswas carried out by the Wellington force whichswitched its effort against the Messina beaches

e Straits on the night 13/14th

On that night 23 aircraft found the beachesfrom San Giovanni to Palmi clearly identifiable inthe moonlight and accurate bombing was report-ed. Twenty-three more Wellingtons concentrat-ed on the beaches in the Pizzo area, furthernorth, dropping bombs around Marina di Valen-tia harbour and village and on vehicles threemiles north-east of Pizzo. The following nightthe same beaches were attacked; sixteen Wel-lingtons attacked the San Giovanni to Palmibeaches, 34 bombed the beaches, roads and townsof Palmi, Bagnara and Scilla and nineteen bomb-ed barges at Pizzo and villages to the south. Onthe night 15/16th 40 Wellingtons successfullyattacked the landing points, barges and marshal-ling yards at Paola, Scalea, Sapri and Cetraro.The following night 40 Wellingtons attacked thebeaches from Palmi to Maratea, with railwaycommunications as secondary targets. Theweather and visibility were excellent and speci-fic objectives could be selected for attack; eigh-teen fires were caused over the whole area, in-cluding four in the Pizzo marshalling yards. Onthe night 17/18th attacks on barges, railwaycommunications and bridges were made in theCape Suvero-Briatico area by 47 Wellingtons andgood visibility again greatly aided the selectionof targets.

Meanwhile, intruder Mosquitoes from Maltacarried out night bombing attacks on enemyports, bases and lines of communications in Southand Central Italy, flying 27 effective sorties from8th to 17th August, inclusive.

The Wellington Effort

During the closing phase of the :Sicilian cam-paign No. 205 Group's effort had been stepped-up to the maximum intensity so that the beatenenemy was subjected to unslackening round-the-clock air attacks. In addition to the magnifi-cent bombing record an interesting feature of theWellingtons' activity was the dropping of greatquantities of "nickels" (leaflets) over a tremen-dous stretch of enemy territory from Messina inSicily to Modena, Northern Italy.

Owing to the hazardous nature of the mediumbombers' attacks, and, in particular, the dangerfrom concentrated flak casualties were inevita-ble, but considering the scale of the attacks andthe damage inflicted these were comparativelyslight.

Attacks on Evacuation Shipping

In addition to the fighter-bomber effort againstthe enemy's principal evacuation points inten-sive, attacks were delivered against the enemy'sevacuation shipping in transit and off the bea-ches. From 8th to 17th August, inclusive, atotal of 1,170 effective sorties were flown in thisactivity, almost entirely by Kittyhawks and U,S.Warhawks. In particula, oveh hal f the' hbvetotal wv fo"rn n e I5th, 6th and 17th.

ta sy^i ^l*ai ^L,. H-''!.^, ^n~ ̂ ^'^^.'i~ is*

*..~~~~~~~ .* Sa^*"' ^^T* * '*" ^* >

The majority of the attacks was made on ves-sels in the Messina Straits, but an appreciablenumber were carried out on craft along thesouth-west Italian seaboard.

It is impossible to give an accurate estimateof the damage and casualties inflicted on theenemy's evacuation craft in the course of theseattacks: in many cases results were not fullyobserved and the harm caused by near missesvaried according. to circumstance.

The peak effort was reached on 16th August,when twelve light and 191 fighter-bomber ef-fective sorties were flown against shipping cros-sing the Messina Straits and nineteen fighter-bomber sorties against craft off the Italiansouth-west coast. The following typical reportsindicate the nature of the attacks and resultsachieved. The light bomber sorties mentionedwere flown by twelve Baltimores against two7,000 ton vessels off Messina; the brief reporton the bombing stated, "No direct hits but onenear miss". The reports of Kittyhawk-bombersincluded the following:- "All bombs fell within30 yards of Siebel ferry; vessel stopped". "Twolarge 200 foot barges attacked on Palmi beach;direct hit on each". "Direct hits scored on two100 foot barges, both were destroyed." The fol-lowing are typical of the U.S. Warhawks' re-ports:- "Nine near misses scored on two mer-chant vessels in Messina Straits". "One hit andone near miss scored on large Siebel ferry withtroops aboard. Another Siebel ferry boxed byfour misses. Four bombs dropped astern barge,which seemed to. stop". "Three near misses on"F"-boat, believed damaged". "Two hits seenamong barges; large clouds of smoke only re-sults observed".

Headquarters North-west African Air Forces'conservative estimate of casualties inflicted onenemy shipping in the Straits of Messina and offthe western Italian seaboard from 8th to 17thAugust, inclusive, was as follows:- four landingcraft, three barges, one Siebel ferry and one"E"-boat sunk; five landing craft, two bargesand one "E"-boat probably sunk; and eight bar-ges, seven Siebel ferries, five landing craft, threemerchant vessels, two. "E"-boats, two "F"-boatsand one tug damaged.

Partial Success of Enemy's Evacuation

In spite of the rigorous Naval and air actionagainst the enemy's evacuation points and ship-

ping, and the bombing of the enemy's southernItalian rail and road communications, the Ger-mans had considerable success in withdrawingpersonnel and equipment to the Italian mainland.

This was due to many factors. The evacua-tion was not a last-minute rush job but had beenmethodically carried out during the last days ofJuly and on a larger scale from 8th August on-ward. The narrowness of the Messina Straitsand the heavy concentration of enemy anti-air-craft and coastal guns made our Naval and airoperations hazarsjclad .aings and the ap-

proach of our armies to the final Sicilian bridge-head was rendered difficult by the obstacles ofthe terrain and expert mining and demolitions.Not an inconsiderable factor, also, was the goodmorale and discipline of the German units con-cerned.

On the other hand, the Germans' ruthless dis-regard for the safety of those Italian formationswhich had continued to help them in the strug-gle fanned into flame the fires of resentmentlong smouldering against an overbearing andnow hated "ally".

Offensive Against Enemy Air Bases

During the last eleven days of the campaigna heavy offensive was again launched on someof the enemy's key airfields.

On the 7th, 8th and 12th August U.S. Mitchellsflew a total of 116 effective sorties in attacks onCrotone airfield, at this stage the enemy's mostimportant air base in the toe of Italy. Barracksand the runways were hit and at least twelvegrounded fighters were reported as destroyed ordamaged.

Further north the single-engined fighter base atGrazzanise (near Naples) was attacked on 12thAugust by 48 U.S. Marauders. An analysis ofphotographs showed that twelve aircraft wereput out of action on the ground and of the land-ing area only a strip in the centre and to thesouth-east remained free of bomb craters. Afeature of the attack was the opposition put upby 24 to 30 enemy fighters which took off fromCapua airfield and made their attacks prior tothe bomb run. Some "air to air" bombing wasunsuccessfully attempted and seven of the at-tacking aircraft were destroyed,

On the 16th came Foggia's turn for anotherfull-scale attack; this time the blow was deliver-ed from Cyrenaica by 85 Ninth U.S. Air ForceLiberators. The whole surface of the landingground at San Nicola was well covered withbursts and at Tortorella oil fires were started andbursts were observed in the dispersal areas.Enemy fighters, estimated at 75 to 100 strong,attacked the Liberators which claimed to havedestroyed 45 aircraft (including 29 M.E.109s)and probably destroyed seven others. Eight ofthe heavy bombers failed to return.

First Attacks on Airfields in Southern France

The following day, 17th August, U.S. Fortres-ses of the Strategic Air Force made their firstattack on the enemy's main South of France air-fields, where long-range bombers and torpedo-bombers were based. In addition, the airfieldswere packed with transport aircraft and glidersas this area was a base for paratroop forma-tions. One hundred and forty-four sorties wereflown against the Istres airfields (comprising 92sorties against Le Tube airfield and 52 againstthe Les Patis and Group I airfields) and 38sorties against the nearby Salon airfield. Strikephotographs showed that a total of at least 94 air-

craft were destroyed on the ground and about28 others damaged. Reconnaissance photographstaken after the attacks revealed that all the han-gars in the north group of landing grounds atIstres were damaged and two hangars and four-teen large workshops in the south group wereseverely damaged and administrative buildingswere hit at Salon. At both the Istres and Salonairfields the landing areas were well coveredwith craters caused by fragmentation bombs.

Enemy Air Attacks

During the last week of the campaign enemyair attacks on our Central Mediterranean ship-ping were on an increased scale and four of ourmerchant ships were damaged.

Bizerta was raided on four nights, including alarge-scale attack on the night 17/18th when 75long-range bombers operated over the port.Beaufighters of the Coastal Air Force interceptedthe bombers and destroyed two JU.88s and oneH.E.111. On the following night the attack wasrenewed by over 60 bombers; on this occasion theBeaufighters shot down two HE.1ls and damag-ed another.

The long-range bombers which made the at-tack on Bizerta were apparently based at air-fields in the South of France. Accordingly, asmentioned in the preceding sub-section, attacks'were delivered on the landing grounds concern-ed at Istres and Salon.

Protection of Shipping and Harbours

Reference has already been made on page 9to the intensive air effort directed to the pro-tection of Allied convoys and harbours in thenine days immediately before the invasion ofSicily. During the campaign itself the effortrequired for carrying out these tasks was stillon a necessarily high scale.

From 10th July to 17th August, inclusive,fighter aircraft of the North-west African AirForces flew a total of 6,572 sorties on the pro-tection of shipping in the Central Mediterraneanand Middle East fighters during the same periodflew 2,613 sorties over convoys in the EasternMediterranean. This air cover ensured practi-cally complete immunity from enemy air attackson our shipping in transit.

Full fighter defence was also provided for ourharbours and land lines of communication. Theenemy's effort against the Middle East harbourscontinued to be negligible, but, as already men-tioned, attacks were periodically made on theCentral Mediterranean harbours in Allied hands.Some of the high lights of the North-west Afri-can and Malta-based night-fighters' activity incountering the threat of the enemy's long-rangebombers have already beep indicated.

The submarine menace was most effectivelykept in check, the Allied Naval co-operation air-craft helping and supplementing the work of oursea forces. From 10th July to 17th August the

Middle East Naval co-operartioi squadrons (in-cluding Malta) flew a total of 1,421 sorties onclose cover anti-submarine protection and areapatrols and those of the Coastal Air Force car-ried out 1,238 sorties on these activities. Malta-based Wellingtons damaged two submarines atnight east of Catania in the middle of July andby day two Hurricanes of No. 336 (Hellenic)Squadron scored strikes on a surfaced submarineoff Sidi Barrani. In Central Mediterraneanwaters aircraft of the Coastal Air Force duringthe first half of August sank one submarine andprobably sank another.

A number of other submarines were attackedduring the period under review but as is mostoften the case in submarine attacks definite re-sults were not observed. The lack of successattending the enemy's U-boat warfare during thisperiod is shown by the fact that only seven mer-chant ships of an appreciable size were sunk inthe whole of the Mediterranean during the monthsof July and August by submarine action.

The air/sea rescue effort is indicated in thetable on page 53. In previous issues of the Re-view accounts have been given of the MiddleEast's activity in this interesting and most va-luable work and the Coastal Air Force's air/searescue effort will be considered in a subsequentnumber.

Air Reconnaissance

The success of our air attacks in the CentralMediterranean theatre of war could not havebeen achieved without the necessary "spadework" of the reconnaissance squadrons based inNorth-west Africa and Malta. Tactical recon-naissance Spitfires and strategic reconnaissanceU.S. Mustangs, photographic reconnaissance air-craft and sea reconnaissance Wellingtons, Balti-mores and Marauders all played a vital part inspot-lighting every aspect of enemy activity.

Tables indicating the scale of the reconnais-sance effort are given on page 45.

Comparative Aircraft Casualties

In the course of the operations 1st July to 17thAugust, inclusive, the Allied air forces destroyedover 740 enemy aircraft in combat. The totalAllied losses through enemy action, in spite of animmeasurably greater effort, were roughly 50%of the enemy total.

In addition, the havoc caused by our air attackson the enemy's Sicilian airfields is indicated by-the fact that enemy aircraft of operational typesleft abandoned in varying degrees of unservice-ability .exceeded the 1,100 mark. A breakdownby types showed that German casualties amount-ed to 57% of this total. The most prevalent typesfound abandoned were ME.109s (280 aircraft),MC.202s (100), ]C.200s (85), JU.88s (80), FW.190s (70), and S.79s (44). The types abandonedalso pointed to the increased use of the ME.210and a lesser employment of the ME.110; 29 of the

Sun and only fourteen of the lat-

i 4 i41

S\ter. The limited use of the HE.129 "tank buster",pointing to its ineffectiveness, was illustrated bythe fact that only one specimen was found in thewhole of the island, and the decline of the JU.87dive-bomber, the scourge of the skies in the earlyGerman campaigns, was shown by the paltryfigure of eight only left abandoned.

The Air Factor

The Sicilian campaign was in many respectsa model one-a strongly held island was com-pletely occupied in the space of five and a halfweeks, due to the successful combined opera-tions of sea, land and air forces.

The pattern of the Allied air activity in con-nection with the Sicilian campaign may be sum-marised as follows:-

(1) The reduction of enemy air resistanceprior to the assault by the methodicalbombardment of his airfields.

(2) The limiting of supplies reaching theenemy's land and air forces by constantattacks on his supply lines and shipping.

(3) The protection of our shipping before,during and after the assault.

(4) The transportation of airborne assaulttroops.

(5) A concentrated effort against the enemy'slines of comunication to prevent the spee-dy transfer of reinforcements to threaten-ed areas.

(6) The isolation of centres of enemy resis-tance by tactical bombing and straffingbefore the advance of our land forces.

(7) The effort against the enemy's evacuationmovements.

(8) The switching of the strategic bombing ef-fort to the enemy's next series of air-fields, bases, and supply lines in prepa-ration for the subsequent advance intoItaly.

A well-thought-out plan had been ably execut-ed: the battle could now be carried still furtherinto Hitler's Europe.

e sina wharves at conclusion of the campaign.

Minw I~*Lo

DIARY OF THE SICILIAN CAMPAIGNPage

I. Preparatory Measures, etc.

5 Reduction of Pantelleria and smallerislands.

SStrategic bombing programme againstthe enemy's Central Mediterranean "buildup" mid May to end of June, 1943.

6 Preparation of Malta as offensive base.SMain features of Air Plan.

7 Air reconnaissance arrangements., Role of air transport.

SRelative air strengths.8 The opposing land forces., Pre-invasion blitz on Sicilian airfields.

9 Reduced effort against enemy bases andcommunications.Pre-invasion shipping protection.

II. The Assault

10 The airborne assaults night 9/10th July.,Bombing on the night 9/10th July.

The landings 10th July.12 Beach fighter patrols 10th July.13 Air attacks on enemy's Sicilian airfields,

positions and lines of communications, 10thand night 10/llth July.

15 The Eighth and Seventh Armys' initial ad-vance.Allied air activity on 11th and night11/12th July.Seventh Army capture Comiso airfield night11/12th July.Second paratroop assault night 11/12thJuly.Naval units enter Augusta 12th July.Air attacks on Messina communications,12th July.Air attacks on enemy communications andpositions in southern and central Sicily12th July.Malta-based . aircraft successes againstenemy air forces over the beaches 12thJuly.

17 Air effort against Termini docks and con-centrations at Enna and Caltanissetta night12/13th July.Success of Malta-based Mosquitoes andBeaufighters night 12/13th July.Third airborne mission night 12/13th July.

,Early establishment of Task Air Forces inSicily.

18 Reduced enemy air resistance in Sicily13th July.Success of Malta-based fighters on beachpatrols 13th July.Air attacks on Catania and Milo/Trapaniairfields and enemy positions, etc. at Enna13th July.Beaufighters' success against enemy ship-ping off Palermo 13th July.

SFourth paratroop mission night 13th July.

18 Air attacks continued against Enna, Cata-nia and Palermo night 13/14th July.

,Eighth Army patrols in contact with enemyrear guards in Chiaramonte-Monteroso area14th July.

,German counter-attack in Augusta arearepulsed 14th July.

,German forces complete move from westernSicily to south-east of the island 14th July.

19 Air attacks on Enna continued 14th andnight 14/15th July.

,Air attacks on Palermo 14/15th July.,Success of Malta-based Mosquitoes and

Beaufighters night 14/15th July.,Eighth Army recapture Primosole bridge

15th July.Allied armies' line on evening of 15th Julyran:- Primosole - Scordia - Grammichele- Mazzarino - Riese - Canicatti .-- Fa-vora - Palma.

,Enemy air resistance in Sicily broken 15thJuly.Fighter-bomber attacks continued on ene-my's central Sicilian communications andCatania position 15th July.

, .A.A.F. successes against enemy shippingduring first week of Sicilian campaign.

,Air offensive against Southern Italian railcommunications and supply and air basesnight 14/15th July to 17th July, inclusive.

21 Elements of Eighth Army infiltrate acrossthe river Gornalunga 16th July.German counter-attack against EighthArmy's positions at Primosole bridge fails16th July.

,Canadians capture Caltagirone 16th July.Canadians occupy Rammacca and PiazzaArmerina 17th July.

,Seventh Army capture Pietraperzia, Serradi Falco, Agrigento and Porto Empedocle17th July.

,Spitfire sweeps over Gerbini and Cataniaarea 16th and 17th July.

,Beaufighters and Mosquitoes shoot downsixteen enemy aircraft over eastern Sicilyon the nights 16/17th and 17/18th July.

.Air attacks on Randazzo, Paterno, Val-guarnera and Catania 16th to night 17/18thJuly, inclusive.

SAir attacks on air bases in Naples and Sa-lerno areas 17/18th July.Capture of Raddusa 18th July.

22 Air attacks on Adrano 18th July.

,Seventh Army capture Caltanissetta, Cate-rina and Aragona 18th July.

,German counter-attack against Primosolebridge position beaten off 19th July.

,Eighth Army establish bridgeheads acrossthe Dittaino river 19th July- - - :

Page

PageI~

22 American airborne troops reach area north-west of Montallegro.Spitfire patrols 18th and 19th July overbattle area.

,, Intensive U.S. A.36 attacks on battlefieldtargets 18th and 19th July.Air attacks on Randazzo 18th and 19thJuly.

26 First air attack on Rome 19th July.SEnemy's Sicilian airfields virtually liqui-

dated by 19th July.

II. The Enemy's Stand at Catania

26 Northern advance of Seventh Army resultedin capture of Enna on 20th July.

. Summary of air effort against Enna.SWestern advance of Seventh Army reached

Castelvetrano on 21st July.,Seventh Army reach Palermo 22nd July.

Canadians capture Assoro 22nd July.29 Heavy/air attacks on railway junctions at

Foggia, Salerno and Battipaglia 22nd July.26 Seventh Army's westward drive resulted

in capture of Marsala on 23rd and Trapanion 24th July.Canadians capture Leonforte 23rd July.

29 Heavy air attack on Bologna marshallingyards.

,, Spitfires destroy 21 JU.52s south of Cata-nia 25th July.

27 Canadians capture Agira 29th July.Eighth Army capture Catenanuova 29thJuly.Fullest air support which aimed at isola-tion of the Catania position night 19/20thto 31st July.

29 Heavy air attacks on Italian airfields night19/20th July to 30th July.

27 Air attacks on enemy's Sicilian harbours19th to 31st July.

29- Successful air attacks on enemy ship-ping during last week in July.

30 Air attacks on limited evacuation shippingduring last week in July.Enemy evacuates Catania 5th August.

32 Air attacks on Troina-Randazzo-Paternotriangle 1st to 4th August.

IV. Reduction of the Island

34 Seventh Army capture Troina 6th August.,Air effort against Troina.

, Eighth Army occupy Adrano 6th August.,Air effort against Adrano.

Enemy's line on 6th August ran south-eastfrom foothills of Mount Etna through Ni-colosi to the coast between Catania andAcireae; to the north-west from MountEtna the line ran through Bronte and Ce-saro to San Fratello.Air attacks on Messina, eCapelo ropMilaozq during firstWeek in August j

4 , -k

Page

34 Heavy air attacks on Italian bases andcommunications during" first week inAugust.

35 Eighth Army in east coast sector captureAci Castello on 7th and Acireale on 8thAugust.Eighth Army advance along Adrano-Bron-te-Randazzo road.Heavy air attack on Randazzo 7th August.Eighth Army capture Bronte 8th August.

. Units of Seventh Army's leapfrog landingbehind enemy's lines south-west of CapeOrlando before dawn on 8th August.

,Main forces of Seventh Army capture SanFratello, Sant' Agata on north coast andadvancing from Troina occupy Cesaro on8th August.

36 Units of Seventh Army make another sur-prise landing east of Cape Orlando on night11/12th August.

., Air attacks on Patti and Barcellona 8thto 12th August.Allied line on 12th August ran from Nasoto within two miles of Randazzo, roundMount Etna and north-eastwards to Ri-posto on the east coast. Eighth Armytroops in east coast sector capture Gioineand Gesso on 12th August.

STwo-pronged attack on Randazzo by unitsof Eighth Army approaching from Bronteand units of Seventh Army from Cesaroled to fall of the position on 13th August.Air effort against Randazzo.Second air attack on Rome.

37 Third leapfrog landing by Seventh Armytroops on north coast night 14/15th August.Fall of Taormina, Castiglione, Novara andMazzara 15th August.Commando landing in the Scaletta area onnight 15/16th August.

.On the evening of 16th August advancedelements of Seventh Army reached Messina.

, On 17th August forward units of EighthArmy entered Messina.Air effort against the Sicilian evacuationbeaches during the last ten days of thecampaign.

, Air effort against the Italian receptionbeaches and lines of communication duringthe last ten days of the campaign.

39 Air attacks on enemy's evacuation craftduring last ten days of the campaign.

40 Air offensive against enemy's air bases inItaly during last eleven days of campaign.

,, Attacks on airfields in south of France17th August.

41 Air protection of shipping and harboursduring the campaign.

,, Importance of air reconnaissance duringthe campaign.

, Pattern of Allied air activity during thecampaign.

RECONNAISSANCE BY R.A.F. AND ALLIED AIRCRAFT OF THE NORTH-WESTAFRICAN AIR FORCES, THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND AND MALTA

(3/4 July - 28 August, 1943)

Tactical and StrategicalI ey N.A.A.F. and MALTA

Ke MIDDLE EAST

FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS Tac/R. Strat/R. TOTALS

3/4 -17 July....................167 264 431-47 47

1/8-3Juy370 1281 1651

171 -3 Jl....................... ...-67 67

31 July/i Aug - 14 Aug. ........ ........... 262 1488 1750

75 75

180 352 58214/15 - 28 Aug................... ....

-85 85

GRAND TOTALS.................979 8 38,6 4364

274 .274

Mediterranean

SubmarineFORNIGHTLY PERIODS Anti-shipping (area and ,close TOTALS

cover searches)

3/4 -17 July...................191 509 700

37 514 551

17/18 - 31 July.....................329 509 838

10 487 497

31 July/i Aug. - 14 Aug...................199 383 582

11 372 383

14/15 - 28 Aug......................175 393 568

17 426 443

GRAND TOTALS..................894 1794 2688

75 1799 - 1874

45

F.R

ATTACKS ON LAND TARGETS BY R.A.F. AND ALLIED BOMBER AND MINELAYING AIRCRAFT OF THE NORTH=WEST AFRICANAIR FORCES, THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND AND MALTA

(3/4 July - 28 August, 1943)K N.A.A.A.F. MALTA

Key : MIDDLE EAST

FORTNIGHTLYPERIODS

- 31 July ...

31 July/1 Aug. - 14 Aug......

14/15 - 28 Aug ............

GRAND TOTALS ..

PORTS, BASES and LINESOF COMMUNICATION(including minelaying)

514

459

277

145

748

456

436 I 876

250

340

294

1567

1148

7

1542

5

3622

12

174

23

88

295

3

0

541

3

394

25

1543

39

1009

20

3487

87

0H

1813

462

1301

173

2878

296

2979

319

8971

1250

AIRFIELDS andLANDING GROUNDS

521

454

256

28

47

396

101

1220

583

1817 1 390

983

3166 390

.0pS0

3

3

H

2731

457

17 1256

4 32

- 259

550

102

4796

591

ENEMY CAMPSand POSITIONS

1989

47

1

3373

1

292

1117

2616

0

1348

2007

1

2040

985

/18

I,

0H

2403

3

3178

1

5146

1642

FORT-

NIGHTLY

TOTALS

6947

922

5735

206

8283

296

5171

422

86136

1846

6380 1112369

-- I

- - -II- L

~ _ Ir i, I I I Il II-- -

OPERATIONS OVER LAND AND SEA BY R.A.F. AND ALLIED FIGHTER AND FIGHTER-BOMBER AIRCRAFT OF THE NORTH-WEST

AFRICAN AIR FORCES, THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND AND MALTA

(3/4th July - 28th August, 1943)S.A.A.F. and MALTA

Key: MIDDLE EAST

FORTNIGHTLY

PERIODS

3/4 - 17 July ...

- 31 July

Aug. - 14 Aug.

28 Aug . ........

i .-

RECONNAISSANCE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN BY R.A.F. AND ALLIED AIRCRAFT OF THE

NORTH-WEST AFRICAN AIR FORCES, THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND AND MALTA

(3/4 July - 28 August, 1943)

Key : N.A.A.F. andMALTAKy:)MIDDLE EAST

Submarine

FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS Anti-shipping (area and TOTALS

close cover)

191 509. 700

3/4 - 17 July ................37 514 551

329 509 838

17/18 - 31 July.....10 487 11 497,

199 383 582

31 July/1 Aug. - 14 August ............11 3732 ( 383

175 393 568

14/15 - 28 Aug............17 1 426 11 443

894 1794 2688

GRAND TOTALS ......75 1799 1874

SORTIES FLOWN BY AIRCRAFT ON PROTECTION OF FRIENDLY SHIPPING

IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

(3/4 July - 28 August, 1943)

By aircraft of the N.A.A.F. and MALTA ...... :................... 10,767

By aircraft of the MIDDLE EAST COMMAND 4,3824,382

_ N 4I ti

EFFECTIVE SORTIES-;AGAINST ,SHIPPING AND SUBMARINES AT SEA IN THE MEDITERRANEAN BY R.A.F. AND ALLIED

AIRCRAFT OF THE NORTH-WEST AFRICAN AIR FORCES, THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND AND MALTA

( l Attacks on Shipping

- Aittacks on Submarines,,,i (3/4 July - 28 A ugust, 1943) K ey : At a k onS b ri e

{J

~4* P. t-. 4'

NUMBERS OF EFFECTIVE SORTIES

FORTNIGHTLY HEAVY MEDIUM LIGHT F/BOMBER TOTALS

PERIODS

N.A.A.F. N.A..F. N.A.A.F. N.A.A.F N.A.A.FMiddle Middle Middle Middle Middle a

and and and and andad East ad East and an East ad EastMalta Malta Malta East Malta Malta

91 2 - - 117 - 208 2 210

3/4 - 17 July ...................- 1 - 9 1 - - 10 1 11

= - 3 6 - 1 154 1.3 157 20 177

17/18 - 31 July .....................3 - 3 1 - . 6 1 7

-2 4 - 1 102 5 104 10 114

31 July/i August - 14 August......

8 1 3 2 i 11 2 13

19 8 - - 67 6 86 14 100

14/15 - 28 August .. ......

- - 115 20 - 2 440 24 555 46 601

GRAND TOTALS ...............4y -;; 2 2 3 2 1 27 4 1) 31

RESULTS OF ATTACKS (BY EFFECTIVE SO]

BY R.A.F. AND ALLIED AIRCRAFT OF THE

(3/4 July - 38 August, 1943)

iR S AT SEA IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND AND MALTA

Key: ShippingSubmarines

RESULTS OF ATTACKS FROM N.AFRICA/LEVANT/MALTA

FORTNIGHTLYPERIODS

n 3/4 - 17 July ...o

17/18 - 31 July

31 July/1 Aug. - 14 Aug.

14/15 - 28 Aug.

RESULTS OF ATTACKS ON SHIPPING (BY TYPES OF VESSEL) AND SUBMARINES AT SEA

BY R.A.F. AND ALLIED AIRCRAFT OF THE NORTH-WEST AFRICAN AIR FORCES, THE MIDDLE

EAST COMMAND AND MALTA

(3/4 July - 28 August, 1943)

ey N.A.A.F. and MALTAy MIDDLE EAST

RESULTS OF ATTACKS ON L) bUR BY R.A.F. AND

ALLIED AIRCRAFT OF THE NORTH-WEST AFRICAN AIR FORCES, THE MIDDLE EAST

COMMAND ANI MALTA

(3/4 July - 28 August, 1943)

SKey: jN.A.A.F. and MALTA

MIDDLE EAST

TYPE OF VESSEL Sunk IProbably Damaged ResultsSunk Unknown I TOTALS

CARGO VESSELS

Merchant Vessels...............

Tankers

Trawlers........ ............

Coasters and Freighters

"F"-Boats .

Siebel Ferries and T.L.C..........

Barges and Tugs ...............

Schooners and Sailing Vessels ...

Miscellaneous and Unidentified ...

NAVAL VESSELS

Battleships

Cruisers

Destroyers. ........... .

Submarines

Minelayers and M.T.Bs .... .......

"E"-Boats

Escort Vessels, etc..............

TOTALS.

3 - 24 33 60

1 7 6 - 14

-- 1 1

- 1 - 1

1 1 2

- - 1 - 1

1 1 9 5 .161 - 1

1 2 7 5 15

9. 4 16 36 65

26 12 40 53 131

1 -- 1

1 1 12 145 2 24 9 40

9 19 19 476 2 8

1

41-n'a amw7 Aft

- 11

- 3

- 2

- 21

- 22

29 I 1273 45Em am_

N, zp nu E IE JD 1

5

1

1

4

2

5

1

10

2

373

70

1

2

8

176

17

DUi 11 tU

AIR/SEA RESCUE OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN BY R.A.F. AND ALLIED AIRCRAFT OF THE NORTH-WEST AFRICAN

AIR FORCES, THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND AND MALTA

(3/4 July - 28 August, 1943)

Total number of personnel rescued during this period:- 143. : N.A.A.F. and MALTA

Ke:MIDDLE EAST

FORTNIGHTLY

PERIODS

3/4 - 17 July ...

~ d78 31 July ...

31 July/i Aug. - 14 A

14/15 - 28 August

GRAND TOTALS

ug.

Number of Sorties

Bomber

262

141

Fighter

230

187

17

107

22

226

2

750

41

TOTALS

287

23

247

78

154

59

324

22

1012

182

Effective location of aircrew

or wreckage

Rescues(1 or morepersons)

6*

58

11

2

44 *

4*

Wreckage,

emptydinghy, etc.

* Includes co-operation with H.S.L.aircraft on search.

in certain cases. In addition certain of these rescues were effected by Naval vessels directed to scene by

TOTALS

17

3

22

8

21

5

37

4

97

20

i

;3 "%IL"ifi:Lr

ii

II:-

j"

1~1

i -

1_S1--- --- --.

i:

- I-- - . -I --- I

--------------------- --- --------. ; --- - ----- --- -- ----------- ---------

------------~-ea;s~ ~-- --- ! ( l~c~ ~clo--~er~l -------- - --- ------- ~~.. --I-------- IIC-i-~~

I- ~ ~ l -~r~cmp-- r ZI~I~^ C3 - II~ . ~hl~ a ~ ~ -~Wl~ ~--- i~l~ bl~kP~ L U~ ~/ l ~--~.--~~Y ~ L...I

- - - I -- - -I - - - - - --

RECONNAISSANCE BY R.A.F. GARRISON AIRCRAFT BASED ON MALTA

(3/4 July - 28 August, 1943)

LAND AND HARBOUR

FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS LAND HARBOUR TOTALS

3/4 - 17 July .. ................... .. 49 59 108

17/18 - 31 July... .. .......... ".......45 56 101

31 July/i Aug. -- 14 Aug. ............. 43 53 96

14/15 - 28 Aug....... .......... ... 44 42 86

GRAND TOTALS..............181 210 391

In addition to the above, 93 sorties were flown on Special Tasks.

EASTERN AND CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN

Submarine (area

FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS Anti-shipping and close cover TOTALS

searches)

3/4 - 17 July.........................48 17 65

17/18 - 31 July.............. ....... 39 96 135

31 July/i Aug. - 14 Aug. ............ 23 83 106

14/15 - 28 Aug...................... 28 74 102

GRAND TOTALS

- ra

408

ATTACKS ON LAND TARGETS BY R.A.F. BOMBER AND MINE-LAYING AIRCRAFT GARRISONING MALTA

(3/4 July - 28 August, 1943)

PORTS, BASES AND LINES

OF COMMUNICATION

(including Mine-laying)

u ,c 4,w

w 0.6~ ~H

AIRFIELDS and

LANDING GROUNDS

I--I 1------9 Il---II- --- i

0

H

ENEMY CAMPS

and POSITIONS

-I-NO 0

3/4-17 July............... - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

17/18 - 31 July. ... ......- - - 14 14 - - - - - - - - 14

.31 July/l Aug. - 14 Aug.........- 4 - 25 29 - - 29

14/15 - 28 Aug. ............. ...- 3 ; -- 26 29 - - - - - 29

___________ - I -- . - ___________ _____________________

GRAND TOTALS....... 72

OPERATIONS OVER LAND AND SEA BY R.A.F. FIGHTER AND FIGHTER-BOMBER GARRISON AIRCRAFT BASED ON MALTA

(3/4 July - 28 August, 1943)

Local-Defence Ground Offensive BomberFORTIGHTLY (including attack- Ground Oei K Bomber

Niht Fighters S & T/E 'Attack- Recce. Intruder and Anti- Shipping TOTALSPERIODS and cover, to Land and Patrol Recce. Shipping Protection

retng offensive (including F/Bomber Sea EscortRecce.) Cannon)

3/4 -17July... .............. .. 90 45 - 712 53 481 1 180 1562

17/18 - 31 July ........ ... ...... 213 19 14 193 32 21 9 65 566

31J uly/1 Aug.-14 August 181 15 25 35 14 - o 80 358

14/15-28 August ... ... 194 5 26 10 27 - 1 97 360

GRAND TOTALS ... ... 678 84 65 950 126 502 19 422 2846

FORTNIGHTLY

PERIODS

FORT-

NIGHTLY

TOTALS

m

0

-' -1:-:~ -- ,r

I:.~ ;~c ~~ s

L-'

~i:~-~l"~.j

3~i~ -

Lo-LII_-ll;.rli..i-1

-"a iI-i

1-- -;-,--;-.-;

PIT,

EFFECTIVE SORTIES AGAINST SHIPPING AND SUBMARINES AT SEA IN THE EASTERN AND

CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN BY R.A.F. GARRISON AIRCRAFIT BASED ON MALTA

(3/4 July - 28 August, 1943)

:Attacks on SubmarinesS Attacks on Shipping

For results of attacks on enemy shipping and submarines see TABLE on page 57.

DR K I5

RESULTS OF ATTACKS (BY EFFECTIVE SORTIES) AGAINST SHIPPING AND SUBMARINES

AT SEA IN THE EASTERN AND CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN BY R.A.F. GARRISON AIRCRAFT

BASED ON MALTA

(3/4 July -- 28 August, 1943)

IKy Attacks on SubmarinesKe Attacks on Shipping

RESULTS OF ATTACKS

FORTNIGHTLY Effective_________.

PERIODS Sorties Snor Probably Damaged Results TOTALS

Beached Sunk Unknown

2- - 2 -23/4 - 17 July.... ...

9 - - 2 8 1017/18 - 31 July ...

5 - -2 1 3

10 1 - 5 1731. July/i Aug. -14 Aug.

1 - - - - -

5 -- 1 - + 114/15 - .28 August..

26 1 - 10 9 20GRAND TOTALS

6 -, -,2 1,3

Q ~'LEM NOS

!AR/SSACORFu

CEVAPE CAAL *XWALK

00 CEflLOIAAKEm~h EURIPO CHANNEL IO

%C//J*AHENUS ANkO ADVzNC~iTAAZUAD0 SAMO

4WOS QEA. ITWS KAPJA

4n MKONOSKYTI1NOS 9 SYRDS NAQ

ON lA N PAO EIPHOS 4 KALE

IINz NTIPARO0S d'4 C AMORLOS

S AaMEOS O K~o 17 ? TA P

PHOL O WEs TiIERA SAP

lowAL pwl zv Q APIE 'ShRJNAA

ANTIKYTHERA

Air Operations In The AegeanJANUARY TO SEPTEMBER, 1943

COMPARED WITH MORE portentous events furtherwest, the operations carried out this year by theMiddle East Command in the Aegean and IonianSeas seem relatively insignificant. Yet, when thereason for them is understood, they have an im-portant bearing on the war in the Mediterraneanarea as a whole.

As the enemy lost the initiative after the VIIIthArmy's advance from Alamein in October, 1942,retention of some foothold on the northern side ofthe Mediterranean became increasingly necessaryto him if he were to keep the back-door to NaziEurope - Greece and the Balkans - shut. Ger-man strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean wasaccordingly based on a strong "outer ring" ofdefence consisting of Crete, Scarpanto and Rhodes.Retention of these strategically vital islands, withtheir air and sea bases, denied us the possibilityof single-engined fighter cover over the Aegeanand thus rendered a landing on the mainlandbehind them impracticable. Behind this "outerring", in order to keep the lines of communicationopen, the enemy maintained a number of smallerisland outposts in the Aegean.

Garrison duty was, until the collapse of Italy,largely in the hands of the Italians. Nevertheless,by September, 1943, the Germans had some 35,000troops in Crete, 7,000 in Rhodes and 4 - 5,000scattered around the other islands - and werestrong enough to seize complete control within afew days after Italy had signed the Armistice.

This, however, is anticipating events, but it isnecessary to indicate the importance placed byGermany on the Aegean situation and the prepa-rations that had been made to meet trouble inthat quarter.

Even towards the end of 1942 the increase inshipping around Greece, bringing extra stocks offood, fuel and ammunition from Italy, showedthat action by us was anticipated. The ships usedwere mainly small - seldom more than three orfour thousand tons - and for plying betweenGreece and the island outposts the enemy stillhad a large fleet of caiques, schooners, trawlersand barges.

First Patrols by MaraudersOur policy was to cause the maximum disloca-

tion of this sea-borne traffic as a preliminary topossible future offensive activity against the"outer ring." Plans were accordingly laid by

No. 201 (Naval Co-operation) Group. By the endof 1942, as the tide of war had receded fromEgypt, many of the Group's units had been trans-ferred to Malta, where they could operate moreeasily against Axis convoys bound for North-westAfrica. Since our own convoys, however, had tobe protected, certain units or detachments - re-connaissance, twin-engined fighters and torpedo-bombers - continued to be based in Egypt.Among them was a recently arrived Maraudersquadron and these aircraft flew the first fewtentative offensive reconnaissance patrols in theAegean.

A single Marauder, armed with a torpedo, madethe actual debut three days after Christmas, butbad weather forced it to return before any sight-ings were made. The next patrol was on the lastday of the year, when two Marauders saw a fewsmall craft south of Antikythera Island.

No attacks materialised, however, until NewYear's Day. Two Marauders, on an offensivesweep, made a machine-gun attack on a stationarythree-masted sailing vessel west of Lesbos, withunobserved results, and later scored hits on atrawler or drifter of 3/400 tons further to thesouth.

Altogether during January Marauders flew 31sorties - 29 in the Aegean and two in the IonianSea. Twenty sightings were made, normally ofsmall craft. Seven torpedo attacks followed, butonly one vessel - of 750 tons - was claimed assunk. iines were also laid on three occasions byMarauders and Wellingtons in the Euripo Chan-nel, between Euboea and the mainland.

Enemy Counter-Measures

The effect of these attacks went beyond thedamage done to actual shipping. The possibilityof attack at any moment and in any quarterforced the enemy to give his ships more protec-tion, both by air and surface craft, and the threatto the island outposts themselves necessitatedadditional defensive fighter effort.

No. 201 Group continued its activity throughoutFebruary, and by now various sections of theAegean area had been selected and numbered forfuture reference when briefing armed reconnais-sances. Suitable prey, however, was still hardto find. In sixteen sorties Marauders made fivesightings, but in no case was the vessel largeenough to warrant a torpedo.

*"2*

_ ___I_ I

More substantial results came from a daylightattack on the harbour at Melos Island by sixbomber and three torpedo Marauders on 21st Fe-bruary. Two vessels of-1,500 tons each were hitby torpedoes, one sinking and the other beingleft ablaze. Other activity in February consistedof further mine-laying in the Euripo Channel andthe taking of many valuable photographs.

At the end of February the Marauder squadronwas transferred to North-west Africa, so was nolonger available for strikes in the Aegean. InMarch, although striking forces of Beaufighterswere at readiness, no suitable targets were foundby reconnaissance.

Successful Beaufighter Strikes

In April, in spite of the increasing number offriendly convoys moving through the EasternMediterranean - 122 convoys were given protec-tion as against 94 during March - offensive ac-tivity was resumed in the Aegean and along thewest coast of Greece.

The transfer of the Marauders was balancedby the arrival of an extra Beaufighter squadron.These aircraft and, occasionally, Baltimores ope-rated by day, and torpedo Wellingtons joined inthe hunt by night. The Wellingtons and the Bal-timores were unlucky, but the Beaufighters car-ried out cannon and machine-gun attacks on fiveoccasions. On the 24th they set a 120 tonsschooner on fire; on the 26th one caique was seento go down and another was left on fire andsinking; and next day a 125 tons caique was leftsmoking and abandoned by its crew.

These successes, however, were insignificantcompared with the records of May and June. InMay there was again an increase in the numberof convoys that had to be given protection - atotal of 133 - but as many aircraft as possiblewere spared for harassing the enemy in theAegean. Under the threat of invasion, the enemynaturally strove to reinforce and supply his gar-risons at all vulnerable points and, consequently,sea traffic increased by leaps and bounds allround Greece.

200 TONS

p--

CAIQUES

LARGE MERCHANT VESSEL 500FT-9,000 TONS

Note prominent derricks and several hatches

GERMAN "F" BOAT 156 FT-SPEED 8 KNOTS

Note parallel sides, downwards slope of topsides and wheelhouse aft

SMALL MERCHANT VESSEL

Note" reduced number of hatches

61 -

LINER-TROOP TRANSPORT 450 FT-7,000 TONSNote full superstructure and large number of boats carried

Taking full advantage of this, No. 201 Group'saircraft put up 183 sorties on offensive sweeps.The Wellingtons were unable to find suitabletargets for torpedoes, but the Beaufighters andBaltimores made up for this by their successes.Of the steam ships sighted, five were attacked.One 800 tons merchant vessel was sunk; anotherof the same size was left with its deck cargo ofhay on fire; a small steamer of 150 tons was sunkand another of 250 damaged with cannon shells;and finally a mine-sweeper was hit and set alight.

Of the smaller fry, 50 sailing vessels totalling4,500 tons were attacked and hit with cannon ormachine-gun fire; fourteen totalling 1,120 tonswere sunk and 36 totalling 3,385 tons were da-maged.

During these operations Beaufighters also shotdown seven enemy aircraft that attempted to

interfere with them and damaged another. TwoBeaufighters were lost and a third was damagedand had to land in Turkey.

Two Attacks on Submarines

Other operations in May included two attackson submarines by aircraft returning from Aegeanpatrols and an attack on the seaplane base atPreveza, 4n the west coast of Greece betweenCorfu and Cephalonia.

The first submarine attack occurred on the 7thwhen one was sighted on the surface by threeBaltimores. The submarine immediately crash-dived and only one Baltimore was able to bomb,dropping two x 250 pounders from 200 feet, whichovershot by 50 yards as the periscope was sub-merging. On the 25th an Italian submarine wasseen by two returning Beaufighters. Cannon hits

NAVAL AUXILIARY 200FT-800 TONSiED

I

DESTROYER 350 FT-1,900 TONSNote, older types often have two or three funnels

were scored before it could submerge and a secondattack was made while it was at periscope depth.An oil patch observed next day in approximatelythe same position suggests that damage mayhave been done to oil tanks or pipes.

The first attack on the Preveza seaplane basewas planned for the 16th after photographic re-connaissance had shown that normally somefifteeen seaplanes were moored there or drawn upon the beach. Six Beaufighters were briefed, butwere foiled by thick clouds. Nine days later,however, another six Beaufighters were morefortunate and found fourteen seaplanes and flyingboats waiting for them. Their cannon fire des-troyed a Cant.501 and two Cant.506s, set on fireand probably destroyed another Cant.506, andbadly damaged five more. A fuel dump on shorewas also hit and set alight. On the night of the

26/27th a Wellington, briefed to attack the sea-plane base, was unable to locate, so dropped sixx 100 lb. bombs on the slipways, with unobservedresults.

The Levkas Canal Blocked

In June activity around Greece was again con-siderable - 144 sorties being flown - althoughsuccesses were not up to the May standard,The Wellingtons at night once more drew a blank,but by day Beaufighters and Baltimores sanksixteen sailing vessels totalling 1,840 tons, pro-bably sank two and claimed a further 29; damaged.

They made seven attacks on larger vessels, buthad only one definite result - although this wasa good one. On the 27th four Beaufighters caughta passenger-type vessel of 3,800 tons passingthrough the Levkas Canal, dividing the island of

COASTER 200-250FT-1,000 TONSNote derricks and hatches, and bridge amidships or just forward of engine room i

nDECLAS-+ rU+t-l +,+t+ 1

1-

1

LARGE TANKER 500 FT-1,000 TONS

Note, usually engines aft; no derricks or hatches, prominent catwalk and ventilation boxes

Levkas from the west coast of Greece. They

scored two direct hits amidships with 250 lb.

bombs as well as a number of near misses and

also straffed the. vessel with cannon fire. Smoke

was seen to be rising from it as they left and

subsequent reconnaissance showed it aground and

listing 45 degrees to port, blocking the northern

entrance to the canal. One Beaufighter struck

the ship's aerial with its port bomb-rack and took

nine feet of the wire back to base.

The first assignment in July - on the 1st -

was to try to do more damage to the helpless

vessel. Two Beaufighters were briefed and

aimed four bombs at the target. They straddled

it with two of them, while the others fell 25 - 30

yards short.

Later in the day four more Beaufighters carried

out another offensive sweep over the canal, their

ITALIAN "'E" BOAT

Note u

objective being a number of dredgers that wereworking there. All the aircraft attacked the

largest dredger, of 250 - 300 tons, two bombs

scoring very near misses and two overshooting

by about ten yards. This dredger and a smaller

one of some 125 tons were also straffed with

cannon and machine-gun fire. One Beaufighter

failed to return and another, hit by A.A. fire,

made a belly-landing at base.

On the nights of 13/14th and 14/15th July

three Wellingtons made further attempts to finish

the vessel off. On the first occasion each drop-

ped eleven x 250 lb. bombs, but results were un-

observed. One crew reported coloured lights seen

along the coast - possibly the work of patriots-

as being a useful navigational aid.

On the following night one of the Wellingtons

dropped its bombs from only 50 feet and explo-

FT-SPEED 42 KNOTS

s amidships

ra~ Eta~ 6

A tug leaving Preveza harbour attacked by Beaufighters, 22nd August, 1943.

A coaster of 1/2,000 tons attacked by cannon fire, 22nd August, 1943.

A merchant vessel of 1/2,000 tons under attack by Beau fighters south of Preveza.

A minelayer or patrol vessel under attack in Syros (Kyklades) harbour.

sions were seen in the target area, although thevessel was obscured by smoke. The other twoaircraft bombed from 4,500 - 5,000 feet, withunknown results. At the end of the month sal-vage work appeared to have ceased - and thecanal remained blocked.

Wellingtons Find Targets

In general in July Wellingtons, Baltimores andBeaufighters continued the aggressive policy inthe Aegean, although commitments in connectionwith friendly convoys made it impossible to keepup the scale of the two previous months. In all,86 sorties were put up on offensive reconnaissan-ce.

In this month the Wellingtons came into theirown at last. Apart from the Levkas Canal ope-rations described above, they found suitabletargets on three other occasions. On the night of24/25th four Wellingtons sighted a single vesselon a northerly course east of the island of Nisero,between Cos and Rhodes. One aircraft droppedits torpedoes and a second attack was made withbombs, both with unknown results. At Alimniaanchorage, just off Rhodes, two merchant vesselsof 1,000 and 2,000 tons were also attacked andnear misses scored.

On the following night two Wellingtons, on asweep in the Rhodes - Leros area, bombed a mer-chant vessel, escorted by three destroyers. Thefirst stick of five bombs was aimed at the mer-chant vessel, with unobserved results, and thesecond stick of six scored near misses across thestern of one of the destroyers.

On the 28/29th three Wellingtons made areturn visit to Alimnia harbour, where shippinghad been attacked the previous day by four Beau-fighters. Two merchant vessels, of 3,000 and2,500 tons, were present, and two of the Beau-fighters had scored direct hits with four bombson the- smaller vessel, leaving it listing and emit-ting smoke and flames, while the other two scor-ed cannon and machine-gun strikes on the largervessel. The first Wellington lit up the two shipswith flares and then dropped six x 500 lb. bombsfrom 4,500 feet, causing a column of smoke toissue from the port side of the larger vessel. Theother two aircraft each dropped eleven x 250 Ib.bombs from 1,200 feet, straddling the targets.

SThe most successful Beaufighter strikes, apartfrom the attack on Alimnia mentioned above,were against the lesser craft, A Titano-typevessel was left listing to port and shrouded insmoke on the 27th; on the 29th four near misseswere scored on a 250 tons schooner, which wasalso raked with cannon and machine-gun fire;and next day two Beaufighters, returning froma sweep in the Alimnia area-where they hadseen the 2,500 tons vessel, attacked on the 28th,lying almost completely submerged in the ancho-rage-caught a 500 tons tug-type vessel and setit alight with cannon and machine-gun fire. Inaddition, during the month seven sailing vesselstotalling 705 tons were claimed as sunk, one of

250 tons probably sunk, and fourteen totalling1,100 tons damaged.

Apart from the shipping strikes in the Aegeanand off the west coast of Greece, No. 201 Group'saircraft also turned their attention to a numberof land targets. These included a train hiddenin a clump of trees (one of the Beaufighters re-turned to base festooned with fir branches); abridge carrying a railway track; A.A. and ma-chine-gun posts; cars and trucks; and Kalamataairfield in the south of Greece. For the specialoperation carried out by A.H.Q., A.D.E.M., overCrete on 23rd July, No. 201 Group provided eightBaltimores and seven Beaufighters, of which sixBaltimores failed to return to base.

Trouble with Bombs

Towards the end of July began the first of aseries of claims of bombs failing to explode thatgrew into something of an epidemic in August.On the first occasion Beaufighters claimed a di-rect hit with a 250 lb. bomb on the bows of a110 tons schooner anchored in Kyllene, on thewest coast of Greece opposite the island of Zan-te. The bomb apparently did not explode, al-though others were seen to burst on the shore.Reports of other failures of both 250 and 500pounders were brought back by Beaufighters aidWellingtons on 5th, 7th, 11th, 11/12th, 14/15thand 15th August.

These reports were investigated by the Arma-ment Section of H.Q., R.A.F., M.E., and thefailures were attributed mainly to the fact thatin most cases direct hits had not been made onthe ships attacked and that bombs had not ex-ploded on hitting the sea owing to the low heightfrom which they were dropped; or if they didstrike the target, they had not had time to sta-bilise and consequently glanced off. The troublepractically ceased after the middle of the month.

In spite of these bomb troubles, Beaufightersand Wellingtons had a comparatively satisfactorymonth, flying, with occasional Baltimores, a totalof 202 sorties. Wellingtons found only a fewtargets worthy of torpedoes, the most successfulattack taking place on the night of the 12/13th.One aircraft of two engaged on an anti-shippingsweep aimed a torpedo at a 2,000 tons merchantvessel west-south-west of Melos Island. A hitwas scored on the port side, causing a cloud ofsteam and smoke.

Beaufighters on the 5th scored numerous can-non hits on a 300 tons trawler anchored by thequayside at Preveza; near misses with bombs andhits with cannon on a corvette-type vessel nearGithion, in the Gulf of Laconia, on the 8th; com-pletely destroyed an 80 tons caique in Paros Bayon the 12th with a bomb that burst five yardsaway; bombed the landing ground and harbourat Kalamata on the 15th; claimed a bomb hit onthe stern of a 500 tons coaster in Vonitsa Bay,Preveza, on the 18th; and on the 30th scorednear r isses with bombs and strikes with cannonon a 2,500 tons merchant vessel off Levkas.

67

i~i~ s *a *B'i- ".

During the Preveza attack on the 5th, one o Occupy Aegean Islands

Beaufighter's fuselage struck the forward mast In September came an elaboration of our ag-of the trawler and snapped off several feet. The gressive policy in the Aegean. After the seizing

aircraft made base safely, but others were not so of control at Rhodes by the Germans following

fortunate in the later part of the month. On the the Allied Armistice with Italy, it was decided to

19th a Beaufighter, believed hit by A.A., crash- occupy the Aegean islands of Castelrosso, Cos,.

landed near Missolonghi, on the west coast of Leros and Samos. Cos, with its landing ground,

Greece; two were missing from sweeps on the and Leros, with its harbour, could then be used

22nd; one was shot down next day by intense as bases on which to build up a force capableA.A. fire during an attack on Zante harbour; on of seriously threatening communications withthe 28th another, with engine trouble, came down Rhodes and other German-held outpost and, even-in the sea off Cyprus, the crew being rescued; tuall, as possible springboards for more am

and, finally, in the Levkas attack on the 30th one tually, as possible springboards for more ambi-

Beaufighter was caught by A.A. fire and crashed tious undertakings. Castelrosso would be a useful

in the sea. intermediate supply base and Samos a valuable

an attack on two M/VsThis

... Direct hits were scored from low level in face of strong anti-aircraft fire.

advanced outpost. The three services were to co-operate in these operations.

In the early part of the month R.A.F. activityin the Aegean and Ionian Seas continued nor-mally. On the 2nd one of four Beaufighters, at-tacking shipping anchored off Cos, struck themast of a caique and crashed into the sea. Fourother Beaufighters on the same day caused ex-plosions and fires among a group of 30 M.T.,which they found parked on a road near Preveza,and also scored a bomb hit amidships on a 1,500tons merchant vessel outside the harbour there.On the 7th three Baltimores seriously damagedan 80 tons caique with bombs and machineguln .fire off Naxos Island. On the 11th a single Bal-timore, on reconnaissance for shipping off Crete,

claimed one hit and two near misses on a 300 tonsvessel unloading its cargo off Gavdos Island, leav-ing it on fire and down at the stern.

Later on the same day, in connection with theinvasion of Cos and Leros, a short series of di-versionary bombing attacks began against Rhodesairfields. Shortly after dusk five Beaufightersvisited Maritza airfield, but owing to the dark-ness no enemy aircraft could be seen and theBeaufighters had to be content with bombing andmachine-gunning the hangars. Shortly after-wards four Wellingtons attacked Calato airfield,starting':many fires in the dispersal area.

Next day a more shatteriing a1 k on the twoairfields took place. Forty-three .T.S.A.F. Libe-rators were briefed, of which five -returned early.

69 E

fires, burbd si lfTwenty-three bombed Mart W s 1covered by bursts. Fires were started ithpersal area and about six aircraft were reckonedto have been destroyed on the ground. In all, theLiberators dropped 340 x 500 lb. bombs between10.16 and 10.25 hours.

On the 13th the first British troops landed inCos. The operations that took place betweenthen and 3rd October are, however, outside thescope of this article and will be dealt with in thenext issue of the Mediterranean Review.

The Period in Retrospect

Roughly nine months had now passed since thebeginning of our operations in the Aegean andIonian Sea areas. What had been accomplished?Was the effort worth while?

On examination, it becomes clear from the re-cord of those nine months that the effort wasworth while. This is proved by the number and

tonnage of ships sunk and damaged alone-163ships with a tonnage of approximately 53,580 tons.But the value of the operations went beyond merefigures, taking in such subsidiary factors that theenemy had to maintain a large defensive air forcein the Aegean, and, eventually, to augment it inface of the threat of our landings; that outlyinggarrisons had to be reinforced by troops thatwould have been useful in the main theatres of ac-tivity; and that a continuous state of tension wascaused among the Germans forming the garrisons.The importance placed by Germany on our unwel-come intrusions is shown by the energetic measu-res taken to seize Italian-held islands when Italysigned the Armistice and when, a few day later,it was learned that our troops were in Cos andLeros.

At the end of September Germany's "outerring" still stood intact. Nine months' effort byNo. 201 Group's aircraft had not, however, madethe position of the garrisons manning it anymore enviable - and offensive operations in theAegean still continued.

GERMAN "E" BOAT90-1i 1O FT SPEED 36 KNOTS

Note straight sides, square sternand torpedo tubes forward.

70

*.'":::::i::"::ii.uiii)iii.i/:>§.iiiliiriiliiiiijiijiiiiliiiil :::::: ::::-::: :.:i:::::::::_::::iiiiiiii::i :::::: iiiiiiii :iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii ; iiliiii . " ...l: iit ii i:iiii iiiiilii: :

Siiiiiiiiiiiilili~ililiiiijiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii

.............. : i : ' . .: .. s:.:: .:::

GERMAN SIEDEL FERRY75x54 FT.

i $iiiiiiiiiiir~i ::: ' ::: i::::::::::- i''' '::::::::::::::::::::: ::: '" '" :::::::::::: :::::::::::::::::::-:?iliiii}iii ii -

i :::::::::::::::::::::::::::

:::::::: , i::: i [ " :

:i::::::::i~i::::::::::. ::. :. -::...... ::::::::::::::::::::::::::

• ::::: ::::::: ::i:::::::::::::

GERMAN SIEBEL FERRYiiiiiiiiiii::,iiiiliis i5z54iii FTl.

Note twin pontoons joined by flat platform,with central deckhouse

PARTICULARS OF SHIPPING SUNK OR DAMAGED IN THE AEGEAN

BY R.A.F. AIRCRAFT

1 Jan. - 30 Sept., 1943 ey: Shipping at Sea

Key: Shipping in Harbour

TYPE OF VESSEL

CARGO VESSELS, etc.

M .Vs. ... .... ... ... ...

"F"-Boats and Barges ...

Schooners and Trawler

Coasters ..... ...

Tugs ... ... ... ...

NAVAL VESSELS.

s .. .. ...

o... ... .. o ... ...°

Destroyers ... ..................

M .T.Bs ... ... ... ... ... ... ...

"E"-Boats ... ... .. .. . .. ...... .. .

Escort Vessels (unspecified) .........

GRAND TOTALS

Sunk orBeached

11'15

ProbablySunk

Damaged

- 1

1 2

4269

Approximative Tonnage

Combined Totals

Sunk ... ... ... ... ... ..... . ... 3385 45701185

Probably Sunk ........ 16800 198503050

Damaged ... ... .. .. ... ... .. 110 29160. 11040

GRAND TOTALS 38305 53580158275

TOTALS

113

2

5975

12

11

11

1

1

13

7588

-I -I -II -

i ~II

il~bAIR OPERATIONS AGAINST SARDINA

TRVDLA _D LAAUSANIA

SHO DOWN.N/RDJUY

SCLEINMIEMITCHELLS~3 WELLGTN 6ATUAI *8006MAOD

Q- YARDSCOADLWY RTOD

ORIANDSTORE

30HJULY. ATAKA2FED3DSETME1ENOMYAIRCRAFT DESETEBR ATAKRAA N

WAHAWS SW TK S ENWE ST AATIONS

OVE 'GTHRb AIRFIELD~L

3RD JULY 2NL/AN OPS RECORDS. H.Q, SM.

k 7

Air perans

Sardinia AndAgainst

CorsicaJULY TO OCTOBER, 1943

A GLANCE AT the map is enough to indicatethe strategic value of Sardinia to the enemy inthe Mediterranean. From the air aspect, in particu-lar, it provided good bases for the operation oftorpedo-bombers against our Central Mediterra-nean shipping and for aircraft engaged in pro-tecting enemy shipping en route to Tunisia.After the loss of Tunisia, Sardinian airfields wereused as the bases from which long-range bom-bers attacked our North-west African ports.

In addition to the island's strategic position itslead and zinc industries provided the major partof the Italian output of those essential minerals.

From February onwards, the attacks by theNorth-west African Air Forces on Sardinianports, bases and airfields were continuous andon an ever-increasing scale until July, whenevents obliged the enemy to concentrate his mainCentral Mediterranean air forces in Sicily andItaly - and later on the Italian mainland exclu-sively - leaving a depleted garrison force onlyin Sardinia.

Some idea of the scale of the North-westAfrican Air Forces' bombing effort against themain Sardinian ports during the first half of1943 is given by the following high-lights of theair activity against the port of Cagliari.

Forty-six U.S. Fortresses attacked the port on28th February; 24 U.S. Fortresses on 31st March;and 107 U.S. Mitchells on 13th May, followed upby 22 Wellingtons during the night. The at-tacks on the 13th and the night 13/14th Maypractically neutralised Cagliari as a port.

Meanwhile, the harbours at Terranova, LaMaddalena, Carlo forte, Golfo Aranci, Alghero,Porto Scuso, and Porto Torres also felt theweight of Allied bombs,

The bombing of Sardinian airfields was parti-cularly intensive during April and the weekfollowing the completion of the Tunisian cam-paign, 15th to 21st May. During April, forexample, 130 tons of bombs were dropped onDecimomannu airfield and during the week 15thto 21st May the airfield received a bomb load ofnearly 90 tons. Similarly, the Elmas, Monserra-to, Milis, Venafiorita (Olbia), and Alghero air-fields were all heavily attacked. In particular,the May attacks on the Sardinian airfields forc-

r w t " -

A"w ;.4 V^ & 5B ;, a iM

ed the enemy to remove his long-range bomberforce, which had been amassed for attacks onour ports at Bone, Djidjelli and Oran, to saferbases in Southern Italy.

The attacks on Sardinia from February toJune, inclusive, seriously impeded the provisioningof the island, dislocated to some extent the rail-way communications, and greatly reduced theenemy's air strength. The following account coversour air effort during the closing stages of theenemy's occupation of both Sardinia and Corsica,from 3rd July to 4th October.

Reduced Bomber Effort

The heaviest bombing of Sardinian targetsduring the period under review occurred on 3rdJuly, when concerted attacks were made on someof the enemy's main airfields. These attacks,however, should be considered as the finale ofthe May and June effort and constituted thelast big "crack" at Sardinian airfields before themore pressing commitments of the Sicilian cam-paign and subsequent invasion of Italy demand-ed the almost exclusive attention of the Alliedand enemy air forces alike. On the 3rd, U.S.Fortresses flew 38 sorties against Chilivani air-field; U.S. Mitchells flew 68 and 36 sortiesagainst the airfields at Milis and Alghero, res-pectively; and 25 U.S. Marauders attacked Ca-poterra airfield. The estimate of the damagecaused was not so precise as for previous at-tacks because haze prevented the taking of pho-tographs suitable for interpretation. Resultswere unobserved in the Chilivani raid but consi-derable damage appeared to be inflicted on theother three airfields attacked and strike photo-graphs taken over Milis showed that of 43 air-craft present on the ground two medium bom-bers and four single-engined aircraft were des-troyed. A Mitchell and a Marauder failed toreturn from these missions, but on the assetside Mitchells reported the shooting down offive enemy fighters over Alghero. Two nightslater came Villacidro airfield's turn for a visitfrom seven Wellingtons and the attack was re-newed the next night, 5/6th July, by eighteenmore R.A.F. medium bombers; on each occasionthe target seemed to be well covered by bombbursts.

}

The enemy's Sariiin. ai~t&fdtce,"hwver,kiai& y en considerably reduced. Our air

reconnaissance of the principal airfields at thebeginning of July indicated that the German AirForce on the island numbered about 155 to 170aircraft of operational types and the Italian air-craft 125 to 140, excluding a few Army co-ope-ration and coastal aircraft; the above totals in-cluded approximately 150 ME.109s and FW.190sand about 120 MC.202s, 200s and RE.2001s. Atthe end of the following week, on the eve of theSicilian invasion, air reconnaissance revealed afurther reduction in air strength; in particular,the combined total of German and Italian fighterand fighter-bomber aircraft had fallen to about230. By the end of the next week (16th July)it was clear that the fighter strength had beenstill further reduced; as there had been no Al-lied air attacks on the Sardinian landing groundsduring that period, and aircraft had not beenmoved to new unknown landing grounds, it wascertain that fighters had been removed from theisland. From 16th July to the end of the Sici-lian campaign, 17th August, the enemy's Sar-dinian air strength remained practically stable:the total number of operational aircraft (ex-cluding a few Italian CA.311/313 Army Co-ope-ration and CZ.501, 506 and RS.14 coastal air-craft) averaged about 190, of which 65 wereME.109s and FW.190s and 100 MC.202s, 200sand RE.2001s.

It followed that heavy bomber attacks on theenemy's Sardinian airfields were not necessaryand the fighter sweeps and fighter-bomber at-tacks, mentioned in the following section, weresufficient to keep down the strength of the Sar-dinian defensive fighters.

Similarly, heavy attacks on the Sardinian portscould be dispensed with as our air reconnaissan-ce made it clear that the enemy was employingonly La Maddalena harbour, in the northern tip ofthe island, on a considerable scale and thewide dispersal area of the roads there presentedan unsatisfactory target. The Wellington at-tacks on the barracks and railway station atCagliari on the nights 30th June/ist July and1st/2nd July, when 71 effective sorties were car-ried out, and the bombing of Olbia marshallingyards and military stores by 36 Wellingtons on thefollowing night represented the finishing touchesto the previous series of attacks before theentire Wellington effort was required againstSicily and Italy.

The Warhawks Take Over

In the latter part of July fighter sweeps overSardinia by U.S. Warhawks of the Strategic AirForce became increasingly frequent and on se-veral occasions the enemy's fighter oppositionwas on a greater scale than that encountered onmissions over Sicily and Italy during the sameperiod.

On 22nd July, for example, 48 U.S. Warhawksstraffed gun emplacements and the railway sta-tion at La Maddalena, south of Cagliari, set

some large factories on fire south of Villasorand straffed schooners and road transport atother points. Twenty-five to thirty enemy air-craft were encountered of which seventeen werereported destroyed: two Warhawks failed to re-turn. Four days later a force of 48 U.S. War-hawks again swept over Sardinia and of the tenMC.202s and two ME.109s encountered over theCagliari area, one German and four Italian fight-ers were destroyed without loss. On the 28tha similar force continued their activity over theisland and destroyed two MC.202s and probably'destroyed another; one Warhawk was shot downby flak, but the pilot baled out, The following day52 Warhawks swept over southern Sardiniawithout incident.

On 30th July the Warhawks of the 325thFighter Group scored really sensational victoriesover the enemy's intercepting fighters. Thestory deserves to be told in some detail. Twen-ty Warhawks of the 317th Squadron took off at08.00 hours and flew up the west side of Sardi-nia and then across the coast to due west ofSassari. As they turned to fly southwards overwestern Sardinia they were attacked near Sas-sari, about 20 miles to the north of a point fixedfor a rendezvous with Warhawks of the 319thSquadron which were to arrive from the east.The attack was made at 09.35 hours by 25 to30 ME.109s which were reinforced by nearly 20more fighters, including some MC.202s, as thebattle went on. The enemy first attacked fromthe north-west at the same height as the War-hawks were flying-9,000 feet. Almost imme-diately four ME.109s were seen to crash and inthe next few minutes several more were shotdown. As a result of a 20 to 30 minutes run-ning fight 21 ME.109s were destroyed and threeME.109s and two MC.202s probably destroyed forthe loss of one American fighter: The latterwas believed to have accounted for four of theenemy before going down. The enemy pilotswere courageous but undoubtedly "green", astheir tactics and evasive action were poor in theextreme. It is possible that the enemy forma-tion was made up of students from a trainingunit: at any rate, it was a veritable "slaughterof the innocents".

When the U.S. Warhawks made their next of-fensive sweep over Sardinia on 2nd August nota single fighter was airborne to meet them. Thesame tale was true of several other sweeps dur-ing the month.

Of the August offensive sweeps which result-ed in combats with enemy fighters two of themost successful were carried out on the 7th and28th, respectively. On the former occasion theWarhawks shot down two ME.109s without in-curring any loss and on the latter enemy fightercasualties anounted to six ME.109s destroyedand four probably destroyed for the loss of oneWarhawk which crash-landed in Tunisia.

For the first week in September, as indicatedin the next section, the U.S. Warhawks concen-trated on bombing and straffing attacks; during

trtd o o bi g a d srffn ta k ; uigI

"

i

X$"

the next week several offensive fighter sweepswere carried out, but enemy fighters, which werenow almost entirely confined to the central andnorthern landing grounds, refused to rise to thebait. Enemy air resistance over Sardinia wasto all intents and purposes extinct.

Fighter-bomber and "Cannon Mitchell" Attacks

On a number of occasions the U.S. Warhawksweeps over Sardinia were carried out with theprimary object of delivering fighter-bomberattacks.

On 20th July, for example, seventeen escortedWarhawk-bombers successfully attacked dispers-ed aircraft on Decimomannu airfield and, in ad-dition, shot down five of the twelve enemy fight-ers which intercepted them at the cost of oneaircraft missing. The most successful of thefighter-bomber attacks in the following monthwas that delivered by 44 U.S. Warhawk-bomberson a factory and smelting plant at Fluminimag-giore on the 28th ; a by-product of the raid wasthe shooting down of six ME.109s without loss tothe Warhawks.

During August, also, occurred the first "can-non Mitchell" (B.25 G) attack in the Mediterra-nean theatre of war. The attack in question wasmade on 5th August by four U.S. Mitchells,equipped with 75 mm. guns, on the large electricpower switching station near Guspini. Threepower lines entered the station and it was believ-ed that these lines provided power for a largearea in south-west Sardinia. The Mitchells, es-corted by U.S. Warhawks, approached the target"on the deck", pulling up to 300 feet at a se-lected point about 4,500 yards north of the tar-get; the building could not be identified, how-ever, until the Mitchells were within 2,000 feetof it and fire was opened at this range. Ninerounds of high explosive shells were fired anddirect hits were scored on the target; a ball offire and flashes like lightning were seen to comeout of the building and flashes and sparks ranalong the power lines.

In early September the U.S. Warhawk-bombersturned their attention to Pabillonis landingground, north of Villacidro, which accommodateda number of single-engined aircraft. In. all, on

5th, 7th and 8th September a total of 112 U.S.Warhawk-bombers dropped 672 x 20 lbs frag-mentation bombs on the dispersal area and run-ways with good results.

Fighter-bomber attacks, meanwhile, were madeon industrial and other targets, and Wellingtonsextended their leaflet dropping activity to theSardinian east coast and over Cagliari and Sas-

sari. On 1st September a small force of U.S.Warhawk-bombers scored direct hits with 500 lb.G.P. bombs on the Iglesias zinc plant. Twodays later thirteen U.S. Warhawk-bombers at-tacked the radar installations at Pula and CapeCarbonara; one and a half tons of bombs weredropped at Pula, scoring five near misses, andslightly more at Cape Carbonara, where four

direct hits were claimed on what was believedto be a Freya surrounded by a blast wall. Onthe 5th the attacks on the Pula installations wererenewed by four U.S. Mitchells (B.25 Gs), escort-ed by 36 U.S. Warhawks, which dropped a smallnumber of 30 lb. bombs and fired sixteen roundsof 75 mm. shells. The attack was deliveredfrom a height of approximately 200 feet andcannon fire was opened at 5,000 yards conti-nuing to the target, where the bombs were drop-ped at minimum altitude. Direct hits were scor-ed with the bombs but the result of the shellingwas unobserved.

Attacks on Enemy Shipping

While the attacks on land targets in Sardiniamentioned in the above section were in progress,sea reconnaissance Wellingtons, Baltimores andMarauders kept up a continuous watch for enemyshipping off the Sardinian and Corsican coastsand according to the information collected airand sea forces were briefed to deliver attacks.

The most successful shipping strikes off Sardi-nia in July were made on the 26th. Shortly be-fore noon three Beaufighters of No. 415 (U.S.)Squadron on armed reconnaissance along theeast coasts of Sardinia and Corsica sighted andattacked seven barges covered with canvas awn-ings; as a result of cannon strikes one bargewas left with smoke rising from it and anotherwith its cargo on fire. A few minutes later fourtorpedo and four anti-flak Beaufighters of No.144 Squadron on "rover strikes" in the same areadestroyed a couple of ME.323 transport aircraftat the cost of one Beaufighter shot down by es-corting enemy fighters. The torpedo-Beaufigh-ters carrying on with their patrol then sightedand attacked an enemy convoy; one merchantvessel of 1,500 tons was blown up.

One of the most successful air attacks in Sar-

dinian waters during August was that deliveredby U.S. Strategic Air Force Warhawks on the

5th, when returning from escorting the "cannonMitchell" (B.25 G) attack on Guspini switchingstation. A surfaced enemy submarine was sight-

ed off the south-west tip of Sardinia and two

Warhawks went in to attack; hits were scored

on the conning tower causing a big explosion

which was followed by flames and smoke visible

at 5,000 feet. The submarine listed 20 degrees

to starboard and went down by the bows with

the stern pointing upwards. A third Warhawk

then made an attack and the submarine disap-

peared, leaving a streak of yellow-green foam

and oil. The submarine was chalked up as a

"probable".

The :September attacks on enemy shipping en-

gaged in the evacuation of Corsica are mention-

ed later.

The Evacuation of Sardinia

The first definite signs that the enemy was

getting ready to evacuate Sardinia were provided

by the 3rd Photographic Group's coverage of the

V K -

Fi 7 i~i~l::r d ;;,,-,I:::::!

Sardinian airfields on 25th August. It was clearthat the landing grounds at Elmas, Monserratoand Capoterra in the south had been renderedunserviceable and the reduced fighter force wasthen almost entirely concentrated in the northof the island. Later, after the capitulation ofItaly, steps were taken to make all airfields andlanding grounds unserviceable or ready for speedydemolition. Immediately prior to the evacuationof the island, also, the Germans destroyed suchaircraft as could not be flown out; in particular,air photographs taken on 19th September re-vealed 47 additional destroyed aircraft onOlbia/Venafiorita airfield, including 40 believedto be Italian fighters. Later evidence suggestedthat these aircraft were destroyed when Italianpilots refused to fly them to Corsica

Photographic coverage of the Sardinian portsin September also pointed to an imminent eva-cuation. During the first week of the month farless merchant shipping was reported to be enter-ing La Maddalena and during the week ending17th September an increased traffic in "F"-boatsand Siebel ferries heralded the evacuation of theisland, Corsica being used as a steppihg stone tothe Italian mainland.

During the week ending 25th September theGerman evacuation of Sardinia was completedand Allied troops and officials were landed. Ofthe three Italian infantry divisions on the islandonly one elected to co-operate with the Germansafter the announcement of the Armistice and wasevacuated first to Corsica and then to Italy.

Attacks on the Corsica Evacuation Route

In the latter part of September when it becameevident that Corsica, also, was in process ofbeing abandoned, the Strategic Air Force struckheavy blows at the enemy's evacuation route fromCorsica to the Italian mainland. In particular,the Corsican port of Bastia, the port of departurefor enemy troops (including those previously inSardinia), and the reception port of Leghorn,Northern Italy, were heavily attacked. On the21st, the newly-arrived U.S. Liberators made theirfirst attacks from North-west Africa; 32 of theheavy bombers dropped 95 tons on Leghorn, hitt-ing several of the small craft plying the evacua-tion route and damaging harbour installations,and 20 more dropped a bomb load of 55 tons onBastia harbour, scoring hits on several vessels.The attack on Bastia was continued during the

night by 75 Wellingtons, which dropped 125 tonsof bombs starting fires visible for 70 miles on thereturn journey.

In the last days of September a further attackwas made on Bastia by 36 U.:S. Mitchells, whichattacked the airfield, and 80 Wellingtons bombedLeghorn harbour. On the 4th of the followingmonth 35 U.S. Mitchells made the last attack onBastia, dropping 53 tons of bombs on shippingand harbour installations.

Meanwhile, attacks were carried out on theenemy's evacuation craft in transit from Corsicato the mainland. In this connection the activityof U.S. "cannon Mitchells" (B.25 Gs), attachedto the Coastal Air Force for shipping strikes, wasparticularly interesting. The method of attackwas for four of these aircraft to approach thevessel selected for attack simultaneously. Cannonattacks were made at a height of 100 feet atabout 5,000 yards closing in to 1,500 or 1,000yards before a sharp break-away. Each aircraftalso carried two 500 lb. bombs for skip bombinglightly defended vessels. During the week ending24th September, in particular, the Mitchells flewfourteen sorties firing thirty-six 75 mm. shellsat shipping targets between northern Corsica andElba and scored hits on a destroyer and manysmall craft.

At the same time Coastal Air Force Beau-fighters and Marauders attended to the enemy'stransport aircraft playing their part in the eva-cuation. Thus on 24th September, in particular,Beaufighters of No. 242 Group shot down a totalof nineteen JU.52s at various points between Cor-sica and the Italian mainland.

The Allies Take Possession

While the Germans were defending their finalbridgehead around Bastia in the early days ofOctober the Italian forces on Corsica, in the main,co-operated with the local patriots and resistedthe German attempt to disarm them. Meanwhile,French reinforcements from North-west Africawere landed to increase the pressure on the with-drawing German forces. On 4th October Bastiawas captured while the final evacuation took placefrom Marmi di Luri, twelve miles north of thecity.

The four main island bulwarks - Pantelleria,Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica - were now in Alliedhands.

-ira,7 '

THE ESSENTIAL TASK of protecting the basesfrom which air forces work, driven home so ter-ribly in Europe in the early stages of the war, led

to the formation of the Royal Air Force Regiment.

In the critical days after Dunkirk the R.A.F.formed its own Station Defence Force to assistthe Army to defend the airfields of Britain, thengravely threatened. This force, composed thoughit was of excelllent material with a good leaven-ing of ex-Army Officers and N.C.Os, was neces-sarily a make-shift expedient. It had neither theup-to-date training nor the equipment needed tomeet the expected attack by the German Army.It was an alleviation of the situation, but Armygarrisons still had to be maintained on importantairfields.

The Regiment Formed

In order to release troops for the Field Army,however, the R.A.F. took over the whole respon-sibility for local defence of its airfields in Bri-tain, and in February, 1942, the Station DefenceForce was expanded into the R.A.F. Regiment.The R.A.F. still acted as agent of the Army andonly within the radius of its airfields. The localMilitary Commander was still in supreme control.

The newly-formed Regiment was supplementedby the machine-gunners of the A.A. flights, whichhad long been established on R.A.F. Stations. TheArmy gave generously of experienced officersand N.C.Os, of training facilities and of equip-ment. The Regiment was constituted, h6wever,as an integral part of the R.A.F., so that its offi-

7EPr F "I

cli t rlW~rei would fit harmoniously into thegeneral life of the station. Its units were givenAir Force names and its personnel carried AirForce ranks.

In Britain the functions of the R.A.F. Regimentwere, and still are, chiefly to garrison static air-fields against ground or low-flying attack. Theunits are trained in mobile defence, not on theold lines of a pill-box scheme. In these days ofman-power shortage, it is impossible to strengthenthem sufficiently to make the defence of everyairfield their sole charge. The station personnel,officers and men of the Air Force, engaged in themany ground tasks, are also trained and armedto defend their own airfield in time of need. TheRegiment works alongside them, as the hard coreof the defence, and administratively it is orga-nised in common with all other Air Force unitson a station basis.

Misemployed in the Middle East

In the Middle East the R.A.F. Regiment wasrather slow in getting into its stride. From theend-of October, 1941, to the beginning of 1942there were approximately 5,000 ground gunnersin the command, who formed a useful nucleus.During February and March, 1942, drafts fromthe United Kingdom brought the strength up toapproximately 8,000 men. Little training, how-ever, could be carried out, as the gunners werenormally used as static guards by night and mis-employed - even in such capacities as mess orlatrine orderlies - by day.

Better progress was made after September,when a Middle East Order formed the 8,000 oddgunners into 226 flights. The establishment foreach flight was one P/O or F/O and 360 N.C.Osand airmen. The gunners were armed with rifles,light machine-guns and Sten guns. This forma-tion into flights enabled mis-employment to bestamped out and organized training to begin.

One of the facts brought out by the formationof the gunners into flights was an acute shortageof officers - a deficiency of 65 per cent. AnR.A.F. Regimental O.C.T.U. was, therefore,formed at Amman in October, and the officershortage gradually lessened.

Conditios are Different

When he Regiment was founded in the MiddleEast its personnel were scattered over an im-mense territory, on airfields in such widely sepa-rated places as the Western Desert, Iraq and theSudan. To weld them into an unified force witha regimental pride was a. task indeed in such cir-cumstances; moreover, the officers in commandhad to suffer all the growing troubles of lack ofequipment, shortage of officers, and so on. Thesedifficulties were all met, and though they haveby no means yet been entirely overcome, theR.A.F. Regiment in the Mediterranean area hasbeen turned already into something much morethan a generic name for a number of scatteredunits.

As in Britain, the Army was generous in itshelp, providing first-class officers and N.C.Os toconduct training, and the highest standards wereset for the training of the men.

In the Middle East, where conditions weredifferent from those in England, the functions ofthe R.A.F. Regiment varied considerably. Air-fields in this theatre for the most part were notstatic bases. They moved with the speed of anexpeditionary force. In the Middle East andNorth Africa, therefore, the Regiment has re-garded as its duty the performance of every pos-sible service on the ground in the protection ofthe mobile squadrons of the R.A.F.

The primary aim the Regiment set itself wasto speed up the advance of the air forces by giv-ing their ground convoys protection on the move,and by going ahead of them to clear landinggrounds of the enemy. To these functions theylater added that of clearing runways of landmines. It was found that complete clearance ofthe mines was impossible for the sappers, whowere compelled always to be moving on; specialunits of the R.A.F. Regiment were, therefore,trained in this essential task.

The October Advance

The manoeuvres in which flights were trainedwere put into operation in the Western Desertautumn offensive of 1942. They advanced overthe desert with the squadron convoys to protectthem en route. As they approached to 'withinsome twenty miles of the target airfield, thetrucks of the Regiment moved on ahead. A shortdistance from their destination the men left theirvehicles, deployed, and went forward as infantryto secure the landing ground. Once they had se-cured the landing grounds on the advance, theflights of the Regiment threw protective screensaround them. Other small parties went on aheadto assist in the location of new landing groundsor, sometimes, in their rapid construction.

More than once, notably at Daba and Fuka,they found themselves opposed by strong pocketsof the enemy, of whom they successfully disposed,taking their first prisoners, some 350, mostlyGermans. The battles they fought were smallengagements, but none the less intense, ard theRegiment suffered casualties at Mersa Matruhand elsewhere.

The Regiment also won its first award, whichis referred to in the following message from theUnder Secretary of ,State for Air to No. 1459700A.C.1. Bullen:- "I would like to congratulateyou on the award of the Military Medal for yourgallantry in action in November, 1942, andagain in December, 1942. I have seen the citationand your achievements are in accord with thefinest traditions of the R.A.F. Regiment whichhave been so well laid in the comparatively shorttime which the Regiment has been in existence.You are the first man of the Regiment to receivean award for gallantry and this registers a land-mark of which you and your fellow members of

D

R.A.F. Regiment recruits undergo stiff training.

A lesson in tough tactics.

Live ammunition is used in exercises.

Sighting one of the Regiment's double purpose guns.

the Regiment can justifiably be proud. All god/luck to you and your fellow members of the Re-giment in the coming months."

The desert flights of the R.A.F. Regimentmarched with the VIIIth Army throughout theadvance to Tunis. They contributed greatly, evenin those early days of their formation, to thespeed with which the squadrons of the Allied airforces were able to move forward over the desert,and thus to keep always within range of the re-treating enemy.

Units of the Regiment also took part in the1st Army's operations from the other side ofNorth Africa. In the landing one of the Regi-ment's transports was torpedoed, so the baptismof fire came early. In the first few days of thecampaign the A.A. flights had several successesto their credit and suffered casualties themselves.Generally speaking, their role was the same asit was with the VIIIth Army. When not activelyengaged in protecting the landing grounds, squa-dron personnel were often sent up to the linewith the 1st Army to gain battle experience.

Preparing for a New Role

In the desert campaign, the R.A.F. Regimentwas equipped and trained principally as a mobileinfantry force. With the cessation of hostilitiesin North Africa in May, 1943, it was foreseenthat another role would be required of the Regi-ment in Sicily and elsewhere. A Middle East Or-der formed the flights into squadrons-the esta-blishment being one S/Ldr. and one F/Lt. onheadquarters and six flights to a squadron - andtraining and equipping of selected squadrons wasbegun for the formation of special Field Squa-drons and A.A. Squadrons, for mobile and staticdefence duties.

The Field Squadrons provide a mobile strikingforce against possible paratroop landings andtheir role requires that, in addition to normalinfantry weapons, they are equipped with recon-naissance cars and anti-tank guns. The establish-ment of a Field Squadron is : three Rifle Flights,one Armoured Flight (six armoured cars) andone Support Flight (four two-pdr. or six-pdr.guns).

The role of the A.A. Squadrons is to give staticdefence against low-flying attack. Each squadronconsists of three flights, each armed with eight20 mm. Hispano cannons.

Both types of squadron go through an intensivetraining up to commando standard, the battledrill being conducted with ball ammunition.

The Invasion of Sicily

When the Sicilian campaign opened on 11thJuly, the Regiment was soon in the picture. OneA.A. squadron was among the first troops to landand the balance followed in the second wave.

A Altogether, -nine squadi'ons took part in the cam-paign; three sailed from the Middle East and tencame specially from the United Kingdom, fourof which were held as reserves in North Africa.

Even before they landed, some of the squa-drons came under fire when the ships bringingthem over were attacked off Sicily. Two squa-drons lost most of their M.T., stores and equip-ment when a transport went down in Syracuseharbour. In the early days, however, more ca-sualties were caused by malarial mosquitoes thanby enemy action.

Although the Regiment's role was entirely A.A.defence, its personnel had the distinction of beingthe first British troops on Catania airfield. Squa-drons saw their most concentrated action on 11thAugust during heavy bombing attacks on Lentini,San Francesco, Scordia and Agnone landinggrounds. One squadron defending Lentini lost sixmen killed by direct hits on their posts and threeseriously injured, who died later. In anothersquadron four men were killed and three injured.Several personnel who kept their guns goingunder extremely difficult circumstances were re-commended for awards. Altogether, in the Sici-lian campaign the Regiment had two officerswounded, thirty-one other ranks killed, twelvemissing and fifteen wounded.

Operations in the Aegean

From Sicily, when the time came, squadronsmoved into Italy with the rest of the invasionforce, and are still doing good work there. An-other of the Regiment's commitments was in con-nection with the operations in the Aegean Sea.Six squadrons were detailed and one of themthat went to Cos was the first R.A.F. Regimentunit to be transported into action complete withits weapons by air.

Pride of Regiment

It is obvious from this brief account that theR.A.F. Regiment in the Mediterranean area hasmade great strides in the last year. At the endof September, 1943, total strength in the Me-diterranean was approximately 10,800 men.

The Regiment is an integral part of the R.A.F.,and though it is organized and trained primarilyas a fighting force for the defence of airfieldsagainst attack, it must be ready and willing toturn its hand to any task that will assist theR.A.F. to maintain its operational efficiency. Theexigencies of war may make a variety of demandson the Regiment; these demands will be freelymet, provided that the primary role of the unitis not thereby interfered with.

In a word, the Regiment is developing into a

well-trained, disciplined body of men, and a verynoticeable pride of regiment is showing itself.

i..

mom

THE FIRST ASSIGNMENT of the U.S.A.F. heavybombers in the Middle East was a raid on theRumanian oil refineries at Ploesti, near Bucharest.This operation, known as "Halpro," was carriedout in June, 1942, by thirteen Liberators of Col-onel Halverson's detachment. Unorthodox tac-tics were used. No attempt was made at concen-trated bombing, but aircraft were briefed to fly atgreat height and bomb individually through breaksin the cloud or when they were estimated to beover the target. The damage inflicted by thesemethods was not thought to be extensive and fiveof the Liberators forced-landed in Turkey on theway home.

Over a year passed before the next attempt wasmade to smash this vital target. Some idea asto how vital it is to the Axis may be understoodwhen it is known that the Rumanian oilfields

FEWI ,lt....

produce some 5,200,000 tons of crude oil a year-approximately a third of the total output from allsources in enemy-occupied Europe. Of this totalthe six main Ploesti refineries produce about fourmillion tons. In addition to the refining andcracking plants, Ploesti houses Rumania's onlyparaffin wax plant and considerable facilities forthe production of lubricating oils. Thus, seriousdamage to Ploesti would deal a devastating blowto the Axis war machine.

The Attack Carefully Planned

Every effort was, therefore, made to ensurethat the second attack was as successful as pos-sible. Plans began to be laid as far back asApril, 1943. Among the factors that had to betaken into consideration were the number of air-craft that could be available in view of other

IED

operational commitments; the type of attackmost likely to succeed; the forecasting of mostsuitable weather conditions; the extent of pos-sible air and ground opposition in the target area;and the provision of the best reconnaissance air-craft for assessing the damage after the attack.

As regards the aircraft available, there werealready two U.S.A.F. Bombardment Groups, Nos.98 and 376, flying Liberators, in Cyrenaica in theearly summer. For the operation three more Lib-erator Groups-Nos, 44, 93 and 389-flew outfrom the United Kingdom. Between them theyrepresented a formidable maximum striking forceof some two hundred aircraft.

It was decided that the type of attack mostcertain of success was from as low a level aspossible, a hundred feet being the minimum, using1,000 and 500 lb. H.E. bombs, fused from 45 sec-onds to six hours delay, and four lb. British and100 lb. American incendiaries. The attack wasto be as concentrated as possible-a complete re-versal of the tactics employed in the previousyear. It was estimated that to achieve the effectof one concentrated low-level attack twenty high-level attacks would be necessary.

The weather, according to the meteorologists'was likely to be most propitious in late July orearly August, and the attempt was finally sche-duled for 1st August.

Enemy opposition was reckoned by Intelligenceto comprise 80-100 fighters, 60-100 balloons,strong A.A. defences and smoke screens.

For subsequent reconnaissance, two long-rangeMosquitoes were made available. In addition, forassessing the damage, an American authority onthe effects of explosives on oil installations, whohad a close knowledge of the Ploesti refineries,came over specially from Washington.

Training the Aircrews

An intensive training course was prepared forthe air crews. A motion film demonstratingmethods of low-level attack was flown over fromEngland for the crews to study. Models of themain Ploesti plants were made and photographedfor use as target maps. Various types of bombswere experimented with arid, of course, all crewscarried out as much low-level approach andbombing practice as possible.

One of the most stressed points in the briefingwas that aircraft should arrive simultaneouslyover the target area, in order not to lose thevalue of surprise and to reduce the possibility ofeffective counter-measures being taken by the de-fenders. Crews were ordered to withdraw afterthe attack at low-level until the aircraft wereclear of the ground defences. It was reckonedthat the aircraft would be airborne for approxi-mately twelve or thirteen hours in order to coverthe two thousand odd miles to Ploesti and back.

Groups of aircraft were each given a specialobjective to deal with in the target area, both atPloesti itself and at Campina, fifteen miles to the

north-west, and at Brai, four miles to the south ;.where certain of the refineries were situated.

The Raid Carried Out

Between 04.00 and 04.30 hours on 1st August aforce of 177 Liberators took off, made up of 37aircraft of the 44th Bombardment Group, 37 ofthe 93rd, 46 of the 98th, 28 of the 376th and 29of the 389th.

The weather on the way out was on the wholefavourable, although over mountain areas inAlbania and Yugo-Slavia there was a considerableamount of cloud or haze, with scattered showers,which at times made visibility poor. While fly-ing over Yugo-Slavia and parts of Rumania,crews observed people waving, signalling "V"swith torches and flashing mirrors; this use ofmirrors had been reported a few weeks earlierduring a raid on airfields nearAthens.

Out of the 177 aircraft briefed, 127 are thoughtto have reached the target area. Unfortunately,the cloudy conditions encountered caused some cfthe Liberator formations to split up. As a result,a few aircraft arrived half an hour before themain force, thus lessening the shock of completesurprise and stirring up something of a hornet'snest. A smoke screen was put into operation,but was ineffective; balloons were rushed up, butnot more than about fifteen; light A.A. and ma-chine gun fire was intense and heavy A.A. wasused in low cross fire; and ME. 109s and 110s,FW. 190s, JU. 88s and even some unidentified andobsolete biplanes engaged the attacking force.

The Mission Completed

In spite of these counter-measures, the Liber-ators dropped 197 X 1,000 lb. H.E., 292 X 500 lb.H.E., 202 S.B.C. 4 lb. incendiaries and 107 X 100 lb.incendiaries, from heights varying from 100 to700 feet. Those that came back reported a suc-cessful attack, the 'estimated result of which,after the reconnaissance Mosquitoes had return-ed, is given below.

The five bombardment groups involved metwith varying fortunes. The 37 aircraft of the44th Group all reached the target and deposited64,640 lbs. of bombs from 120-250 feet. In ad-dition to the A.A. fire, they were tackled byfighters, of which they claimed thirteen destroy-ed and one damaged.

Of the 37 from the 93rd Group, five returnedwith technical trouble and the other 32 dropped113,300 Ibs. of bombs from 150-300 feet. Someeight enemy aircraft were encountered, four mak-ing attacks near Bucharest. One ME. 109 andone FW. 190 were claimed as destroyed.

Of the 46 aircraft from the 98th Group, fivehad to return early to base. Those that reachedthe target dropped 55,640 lbs. from an altitudeof from 200-250 feet. They were more heavilyattacked by enemy aircraft than any other group,and out of a total of approximately 5Q._engaged,they-claimed 33 shot down.\ il 'i::

SlI-.B^A~ff C-1'

^;':ti: :i,:i}:,":iilSi?:: is{;;: ?:3.°,:ri~cti,: EY:- :::" S ^' ... k. : ., ... v..:".:::

v: r:: {{!{ ::;}':.}Wri~r6{C;:;:j::iii~i:}}+ki::?:.'''.':v: ::: .:;;::: }y:: ' "w:f::'.:.} t.;, " v:: L...... :fj -::: n.:v . .... ... . . .... rM ... .. . .. :::: :: i:: . i.;: i x : ":::;;;fi:

iii iiiwiiiisiiiiiiii

tra iii:iii:::ii-~ii :::::::::::::::::::: :: :::::::

::tir~i~l i--:-:::i::::::::::

iii'iiiiiiiiiiiiii~iiiiMi :-- ::: :i::::::: k: : :::::::: :::: :::::::: :-::::---:::---::---:: :.-.::::i::::::::j:j:j::: :iiil)liiijitliiiiiii{i

jjiji~~- jj jj_:_j j::-li ~jj~jjj:jjji~~-l-:i~ii~~i-i-~iii ii-~ iliiiii--~ -iiii-jj :~ii:i~lli~iii~iii~ i~ i ::::::::::::: : ::::::::::: :::::::::: .' ...

ti""Si ir:-:::::: ::::::::::::. : .. -V::::::

-...--. iii.. . . . iii-ii-i i i:::::::::: : ::::::::::::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ::::::::-: :::::::::::::i:::::::::::::}

: ::::::: :::::::-: ::::::::::-rliijijj iiiiiiiii

::::::::::::::::::::::::::3lj i v+:4.jj~ii-i;i i~~lil~iiiiiiiii~iiii

i- : iii:. iiiiiii iiiiiiii~i iiiiiiiiiiiiiiii~ii ..... i~siii~iiiii iiiii iiiiiiiir4 a'jiiiiijiii

...:. -liiii,-ii: ....-....._iiiii'iiiili'iiiiiiiii'il iiii:W-Niiiiiii:::-:::li~:-::i:::: i~iil~iiiii-iii:i--iilii-~i- :::-:> . .:i::

illiiiiiiiii~i-iii l~~i ii~l-iiil'-iij ... jji~~~lii~~~j il-liii-ii ii7c iiii

:k.i~: ...::-:--:-:.iiiii~~::iiii~lii.iii;iiii iiiiii~i~~i~iii~-ii iiiii::-::::::: ~l:iiii:i:ii:~~iii~

i lawol~ss~t

phplotograph taken during the attack on the I I / I lil Re 1 Iy

whichrszle in extensive damage necessitating almost complete re-bzilding.

A striking photograph showing the low height at which' the Liberators,

attacked the P 1 E:

85

x

Direct hits on the power and boiler houses in Mhe Steaua-Romana oil refinery

at Campina.

~liIED

":in

~ : rp~ ii~

All except two of the 28 aircraft from the 376thGroup reached Ploesti, dropping 62,000 lbs. of K'iH.E. bombs and ten clusters of incendiaries from125 feet. A few ME. 109s and F.W. 190s wereseen, but they were not keen to attack the Lib-erators and one ME.109 was claimed to be des-troyed.

Nineteen out of 29 from the 389th Group drop-ped 67,000 lbs. of bombs on targets, at Campinafrom 200-700 feet. They claimed two enemy air-craft destroyed.

The final assessment gave 54 Liberators lost,including eight that landed in Turkey, twentyover the target, two in the sea and twenty-fourunaccounted for. Five more were written-offlanding in friendly territory. Between them, theLiberators claimed 51 enemy aircraft destroyedand one damaged.

Adventures of an H.S.L. Crew

One of the eight aircraft regarded as landingin Turkey actually landed in the sea just off theTurkish coast near Manavgat in the Gulf of An-talya, north-west of Cyprus. The crew were spot-ted on the shore by an Air/Sea rescue Wellingtonon 2nd August and a high-speed launch was des-patched. The officer in charge of the launch, onlearning that the Americans were injured, wentashore with four men to assist them.

The five members of the H.S.L. crew wereinterned by the Turkish authorities along withthe Americans, and the launch was ordered toleave the shore. The corporal in charge, on reach-ing base, reported what had happened.

On official representation being made, the fivemembers of the crew were released and an H.S.L.was allowed to pick. them up from Mersin a fewdays later.

The Damage Assessed

To augment the preliminary estimates andphotographs of damage brought back by the at-tacking force, a Mosquito was briefed to carry

AottB !C|f|alp lltthie"gBl| similar

'reconnasance was made on the 19th. On thefirst occasion the Mosquito did the 2,000 milereturn trip in six and a half hours; on the secondoccasion in three quarters of an hour less.

A study by experts of all the available reportsproduced the following estimate of damage done:-

In general, although a certain amount ofspeculation is necessary, a high degree of short-term damage and a promising degree of long-term damage was caused.

Over 40% of the cracking capacity put out ofaction for at least 4 - 6 months. The originalrefining capacity of 24,275 tons of crude oil perday probably reduced by 10,360 tons.

The most heavily damaged refineries werereckoned to be the Creditul Minier at Brazi, theSteaua Romana at Campina, and the ColombiaAquila and the Astra Romana at Ploesti itself.Damage was also done to the Orion and Concor-dia Vega refineries.

In addition, Rumania's only paraffin wax plantwould be immobilised for. a long period and thelubricating oil supply position at least temporari-ly jeopardised.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, in acongratulatory message, described the attack as"a big job magnificently done." A RumanianCabinet Minister remarked that "it was as ifthe bombers were postmen each with a letter forits particular address to which it was duly de-livered." The German radio quoted a Bulgarianpaper as saying that the American governmenthad had to offer the aircrews 10,000 ,dollars,medals and leave to induce them to take part inthe raid, and that as so many aircraft did notreturn to base, the government would be saveda lot of money....

It may certainly be said that the operationcompensated amply for the disappointment of thefirst attack on the Ploesti refineries and thatone more heavy blow was added ,to the manybeing dealt against Nazi Europe.

MED IT[R AN [A-N

S E A

BEERSH1EBA

ASLUJ'

V

o fS / IV A /

MAIN ROADS - -SECONDARY ROADSWU. ROUTE - -W U. RETURN ROUTE - -

FRONTI ERS """

z

0

The Wilderness

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE was originally supplied,neatly bound in book form with photographs fac-ing the typescript, as an appendix to the Opera-tions Record Book of No. 29 Wireless Unit forJune, 1943. It is reproduced in this number ofthe R.A.F. Mediterranean Review as an accountof the, life and work typical of many isolated butessential units of the R.A.F., and is of specialinterest to those engaged in more active theatres,unaware of the monotonous routine unselfishlyand patiently borne by personnel less fortunate.

The story is the visit by the Commanding Of-ficer to the six Observer Outposts in north Sinaiunder his control; it is reproduced, with but slightessential modifications, as written by him.

The Start to Post FB.

We leave our Headquarters at 17.30 hours afterdinner, and at 19.45 hours we are passing throughBeersheba. The first post, FB, is now only sevenmiles along the road to Bir Asluj.

The party consists of the C.O., a Corporal, whois the unit topographical expert, and an L.A.C.who combines the duties of travelling canteenmanager and cameraman. This is a pay andmail run, but apart from the pay our most valu-able cargo is the canteen, which includes twocrates of beer that we are taking to the mem-bers of our tribe who thirst in the wilderness.

It is dusk when we reach Post FB. We arebringing both pay and letters and parcels fromhome and are therefore welcome visitors.

The post personnel are paid, and our Corp-oral goes off to inspect the observer site andcheck the post lay out; the L.A.C. is taking abulk order for canteen supplies from the seniorwireless operator and the C.O. sits talking withthe Post Commander, discussing hurricane lamps,primus stoves, how to treat scorpion bites, thenew reporting procedure, the.relative qualities ofcharpoys and table tops for sleeping purposesand a variety of other topics. The Post Com-mander gives the C.O. his written report on thePost activity for the preceding week. He iscomplimented on the condition of his Post whichis particularly clean and well organised.

It is getting late. Two of the Ground Observ-ers sit playing draughts. We have a cup of teaand then turn in.

The next morning the Post guard wakes ussoon after five o'clock. The duty wireless operat-or must be on watch by five minutes to six andwe wish to make an early start in order to travelin the cool hours of the day.

As we leave for Bir Asluj, the duty observer isreporting a Sunderland. This is a regular plot,and one that is looked for daily.

Bir Asluj, 20 miles further on, is a stagingpoint for military traffic travelling betweenEgypt and Palestine. Here is the D.I.D. fromwhich all the post rations and petrol are drawn.By rationing locally and not from Base, freshsupplies of meat and vegetables and even ice canbe issued daily to all posts.

At Post FC.

Post FC is on a hill overlooking this encamp-ment. The Post is provided with transport andthe Post Commander is responsible for lookingafter the airmen at Post FB. He sends themrations and water daily and brings each man inturn to Bir Asluj to have a shower or to see oneof the occasional cinema shows down at the Stag-ing Post.

As we climb up the hill in bottom gear, we seethe observer with his binoculars trained to theheavens. Perhaps he wishes to impress us byan assiduous performance of duty.

In present deployment, the Posts form a sec-ondary screen supplementing existing cover onthe coast, in the Canal Area, and along theGulf of Suez. Air traffic follows the coastline and aircraft are very rarely observed in the"other parts of Sinai. It says much for these air-men that they should cheerfully and conscientious-ly remain at their observation posts during thehours of daylight looking around at a sky thatremains disappointingly empty. "They also servewho only watch and wait."

At Post FC, we find the Sergeant i/c GroundObservers. The routine visits of the senior N.C.Os,either the Sergeant i/c Ground Observers or theSergeant Wireless-Operator-Mechanic, involvemuch more detail than the C.O's inspection.

Each senior N.C.O. works to a planned pro-gramme and the following are a few of the dutieswhich he carries out: examines all paybooks andverifies that their safe custody is ensured; checksconditions and custody of arms; arranges forrespirators to be tested and worn for ten minutesby all personnel; carries out aircraft recognitiontests for all personnel; checks post copy of unitstanding orders to ensure that the amendmentshave been entered and signed; examines Postcomforts, football, gramophone and records,draughts, books, chess, etc.

But those are only six of the duties; the fullcatechism for the visiting Sergeant with his as-sisting Corporals and airmen combines forty-twoseparate detailed instructions! The visiting Ser-

t at

In

Airiig i en to allpersonnel, including Wireless Operators and M.T.Drivers, a report being given to the C.O. of theresults obtained by each airman.

Knowledge of aircraft recognition can only betested by using standard test papers, silhouettes,photographs, etc. Ground Observers with two orthree years overseas experience, posted in fromother wireless units, where they have undergonereal active service conditions, and have observedmany types of both hostile and allied aircraft,comment on the high standard of recognition ofour original ground observers who are,, of course,very much less experienced.

The morse test which follows is not only givento Wireless Operators but to Ground Observers.At present, four practice buzzers have been issuedto the six Posts. Although progress is not veryrapid, there are a few who can boast their eightwords a minute and one Corporal Ground Observ-er, with civilian experience, has reached the dizzyheight of fifteen words per minute.

Each Post has been issued with a copy of A.P.1762 "Electrical and Radio Notes for WirelessOperators." This is provided to assist the Wire-less Operators in improving their technical know-ledge. Operators on an Observer Post are at adisadvantage as compared with those employedon a main station, where the advice and assist-ance of N.C.Os is constantly available to helpthem improve their trade proficiency. The unitoperators, however, receive oral tests from thevisiting Wireless Operator N.C.Os and the Ser-geant Wireless Operator Mechanic. This is tomake sure that they are reading and can under-stand the text book issued to them.

The Corporal Wireless Operator touring thePosts with the Sergeant i/c Ground Observersis now making a 50 hour test inspection of an"Alco" petrol electric generating set. Until re-cently, the unit was using very low capacity ac-cumulators (twelve volt fifteen a.p.h.) and allPosts were handling a great deal of W/T traffic.The maintenance of these generators then con-stituted a very difficult problem. Breakdownswere frequently occurring primarily due to theexcessive running, which necessitated constantre-charging.

As he overhauls the generator, the Corporalexplains to the Senior Wireless Operator what he

is ,doing, advises him on the maintenance andrefers him to the operating instructions containedin the unit standing orders.

The aim of all Post training is to reduce themaintenance required from Headquarters to aminimum. Preparation is being made for the

day when it may be impossible for help to be sent

out from Base immediately a Post is "off the air."

When the Ground Observers can tap out an emer-

gency W/T message and the Wireless Operatorscan diagnose and deal with simple faults in their

equipment,; thisambitfon ill ave ieeaclhieve

Leaving that hive of industry, Post FC,, wedrive on to Auja.

d f~l

Post FD at Auja

Auja, which is a frontier post of the PalestineGovernment, was a former Byzantine town. Thereare the ruins of a chufch and a monastery and,of more recent origin, the disused buildings of aTurkish hospital of the last war.

The observer personnel are accommodated insome permanent buildings, and as we approachalong the road, which sweeps round to the. fron-tier barrier, the duty observer, high up on theruins on the hill, overlooking the Police Post,notes our arrival. We are too far away to seehim lift the receiver of his field telephone butthere is no doubt that already he will have warn-ed the Post Commander that the C.O. is coming.With two or three minutes warning of our arriv-al, there is time to put the kettle on, or, perhaps,what is more urgent, there will be time to carryout some very hurried straightening up beforewe pull up at the door. Thus does an efficientwarning system work !

At this Post a sub-control is operated. Threelarge rooms in the police outbuildings are occu-pied, one is for sleeping quarters, another is thesignals room and the third is used as, a W/Tequipment store.

W/T communication with Ismailia Filters, towhich the unit report, is exceptionally good fromhere, and a twenty four hour watch is maintained.

The unit airman wireless mechanic is stationedhere and can quickly proceed from this con-venient sub-headquarters to carry out repairs.The unit signals Sergeant and the Corporal wire-less operator, whom we met on Post FC, remaindown here, staying for alternate weeks and areresponsible for- the general technical supervisionof the screen.

The absence of plots in this area has been re-ferred to before and it seems particularly un-fortunate, when an excellent frequency for W/Tcommunication has been allotted, that thereshould be so little traffic.

The set in use at this post is a ground stationpattern and is very useful for continuous operat-ing. It would be very cumbersome in a 180 lb.tent but in present circumstances where there isample room it is ideal.

The Post Commander of FD is responsible forobtaining water, rations and petrol from Asluj forhis own post and the remaining three, sited atintervals of twenty to twenty five miles alongthe road running south from Auja down to theGulf of Aqaba.

On to Post FG.

We leave the tarmac Sinai road and follow thetrack down to Post FG; this is rutted, with oc-casional- patches so bad that the Dodge, bouncingon its hard springs, lifts us six inches from ourseats. Any speed above 20 miles per hour is sheerpurgatory.

Then, following the old Turkish railway trackwe arrive eighteen miles from Auja at El Qusei-

2' '

~' ~

ID

The first Post, FB.

Observer on duty at Post PC.

Aircraft recognition training.

Observer on ruins at Post FD, Auja.

ma. This is another frontier post. The surround-ings are not quite so arid as the country we havepassed through. There is a spring and a smallgrove of eucalyptus and palm trees. We havebeen warned not to use this water and the trailerBowser, which we use for the Posts in this area,is filled at Auja.

After signing our names at the frontier wetake the left hand fork, the road to Kuntilla, andone mile further we come to the site of Post FG.

Even in the wilderness it is possible to createorder if only on a small scale. The neat planningof this little camp seems to cry a brave defianceagainst the rude chaos of the rugged surround-ings.

The Post Commander advances from the tentdoor. He stands between two small cairns adorn-ed with bunches of camel thorn. For a momentwe think that these are two gate posts, and theline of stones on each side is a garden wall. In-stinctively' we look through the gate along theshort path, expecting to see the door of a suburb-an villa bearing the legend: -

"The Cedars. "

It is after one o'clock and getting very hot.Perhaps the heat accounts for our hallucinations.At any rate, we feel our early rising has justifieda siesta. With the Post Commander's permissionwe occupy three of the neatly made up beds anddoze contentedly until half past three.

Post FG is at the foot of a hill named El Jeisi,rising to 444 metres. The observation point is ontop of the hill, some ten minutes rough goingfrom the camp.

We telephone to the duty observer telling himthat we are coming up to see him. It is quite astiff climb and we are much too short of breathto do anything except observe our surroundingswhen we reach the summit.

It is really an excellent observer site, the viewto the south extending nearly 30 miles. Thereare higher hills to the north, east and west butthese are so far away that, in this generallysomewhat hazy atmosphere, aircraft would notin any case be discernible at such a distance.

The observer seems pathetically glad to see us.This is not very surprising since the poor devilmust feel very detached from human intercourseall alone on this barren peak. This observer, oneof our crack recognition experts, has seen neitheran aircraft nor even a bird in eighteen days.

Instructions were sent out from Unit Head-quarters to these three southern Posts to keep arecord of the details and time of passing of alltransport proceeding along the road. The unitwill be able to furnish information therefore inthe event of vehicles being delayed or breakingdown along this route.

Halfway down the hill we see the camp iingbefore us.

The three 180 lb. tents are joined together withtheir flaps fastened up. The one tent thus form-

ed is sited so that the prevailing breeze in thevalley will blow right through. The tents arenot dug in; drills and dynamite would be requiredfor parts of this ground which is granite hard.The normal scale of iissue of tents for each Postis two. By collecting those which were issuedfor Post FD, and not' required by them, and sup-plying two extra from Base, four Posts in theisolated sites now have quite spacious accommo-dation.

In the foreground is the latrine surrounded bya screen. This is of the deep trench variety andin our view the most satisfactory for these con-ditions. The Medical Officer, R.A.F., Ramleh,whom we consulted, advised us that the altern-ative variety, the bucket latrine, should only beemployed if proper incineration facilities areavailable. The complete freedom from gastro-intestinal complaints in the unit may, perhaps,be taken to indicate that the sanitary arrange-ments have so far been satisfactory.

To the right we can see the G.M.C. truck newlyarrived from Post FD. It must be getting nearfive o'clock, for the ration truck always arrivesabout this time.

Food is a matter of interest for all mankind butto the airman on an observer post it is the sup-reme factor in life.

We have already said that the Posts are sup-plied daily with fresh rations, and each holds anup-to-date scale of ration entitlement. Each PostCommander therefore is able to verify that a fullissue is made for the personnel of his post.

All the Posts report that their rations are ex-cellent. Indeed, airmen returning to Headquartersafter being on a Post for some weeks complainbitterly of the quality of rations at Base, makinginvidious comparisons between the efficiency ofthe commissariat organised on their Post andthat at the Unit Headquarters.

The main explanation, of course, is the verygenerous supplementary allowance which theD.I.D. makes in rationing small numbers. Fur-thermore, on the majority of Posts additional ra-tions are bought from local sources if suppliesare available.

In a few moments the transport will have ar-rived from Post FH to collect the supplies forPosts EH and FJ. At seven o'clock the truckfrom post FJ will be waiting at Post FH to pickup their supplies when the Post FH transportreturns. In this manner the rations are shuttleddown the line.

The truck from Post FH has arrived and thewater camels are being filled. These containersare not very satisfactory for carrying water invehicles over rough country. Although they arefastened in the lorries and sandbags placed be-tween them they quickly wear thin at the edgesand are difficult to repair.

No rationing of water has been attempted. Solong as adequate supplies ,can be obtainec5heposts are generously suplie E'atue of \thi,,'** *;. h«,,*B .a Rn a m t i^ ~ e itati

Morse training for ground observers.

Observer on duty at Post FG.

I O ;-~ -II

i

ED

The C.O. arrives at Post PG.

Panoramic view of Post PG.

DCLAfI

however, they are expected to maintain a scrup-ulous standard of cleanliness, not only personal-ly but of the Post equipment as well. During theroutine visits all utensils, tables, clothing, etc. areexamined to ensure that they are being keptthoroughly clean.

The trailer Bowser is not designed for travel-ling long distances over these roads. The C.O.was shown a Bowser of similar type completelywrecked in two months after servicing the postsof a wireless unit deployed in this area. It is inan effort to preserve the vehicle that the wateris distributed in water camels, the Bowser onlydoing the short trip to Auja to collect water andreturning to Post FG where it is based.

No millionaire ever boasted so enthusiasticallyof his French chef as does the Post Commanderwith an efficient cook. Because of the importanceof well-cooked and appetizing meals, all PostCommanders are advised to employ as cook anyairman who has a natural "flair" for the job.To follow a regular roster of the personnel usual-ly results in moderate meals from average cooksand extremely bad meals from unwilling cooks.

From the Post Commander's eulogy, it is ap-parent that the airman in question is undoubtedlyan unrecognised "cordon bleu."

We are invited to inspect the "Mayfair Grill."This is a deep depression painfully hollowed outwith picks and shovels, enclosed on three sides bysand-bagged walls, the whole covered with sheetsof corrugated iron weighted down with stones.There is a curtain of sacking at the doorway.We enter. The blast of hot air that greets us isappalling. A petrol stove splutters furiously inthe corner. We are too polite to say so, but tous it is nothing less than a miniature hell and wemake our exit as rapidly as possible.

Soon, however, we are sitting down to a suc-culent joint, nicely browned potatoes and ex-quisitely cooked cabbage. Our host is compli-mented on the excellent results of his cook'ssweated labour. Corporal asks the secret of theparticularly piquant sauce which is served withthe sweet. It is clear that this enquiry is a grosssolecism, for we are told that such informationmay only be passed to one of the fraternity.

We stayed the night at Post FG.... After dinner wediscussed the prowess of professional footballersand the quality of various brews of beer. Thelatter aroused considerable local patriotism evok-ing a wealth of nostalgic reminiscence until final-ly it was time to go to bed.

Earlier in the evening, a message from PostFJ to Base was intercepted reporting the visitof the Wireless Unit Liaison Officers from Head-quarters, Middle East, and from Air Headquart-ers, Eastern Mediterranean. The C.O. was in-formed that both these officers would be at ElArish on the following night, if he desired tosee them.

To visit the remaining two posts and go on toEl Arish in one day meant very early rising.

Canteens and P.S.I.

The next morning the guard called us at quarterto four, and after a hurried cup of tea we madestraight for Post FJ.

Off we went in the cool morning air along the59 mile stretch of desert track, through wildand hilly scenery until we arrived at Kuntilla.

Here, at Post FJ, as a preliminary to all otheractivity, we had a shave. The unit standingorders make rather point of this, insisting thatall personnel be shaved by half past seven. Itwas then well after seven o'clock.

While we perform our ablutions the Post cookis preparing the eggs which we handed in.

Major C.S. Jarvis in his book "Yesterday andToday in Sinai" states that Kuntilla is the idealspot for a sanatorium or hotel. Personally, wethink that the amenities of the neighbourhood aresomewhat limited. But the atmosphere is cer-tainly bracing and we eat our fried eggs withgood appetite.

A pay clerk accompanies the C.O. on the payparade, his principal duty being to deal with allot-ments and remittances. A large number of air-men save by having deductions of their pay cre-dited to a Post Office Savings Account. The ma-jority, however, are saving by increasing theirallotments or by sending remittances to theirparents or families in U.K., to be put away forthem there. The remittances in some weekshave amounted to as much as £60 out of a payroll of £300.

A unit P.S.I. was begun in September, 1942. Aninitial grant of £30 was received and very quickly,by means of all types of profit-making activities,whist drives, housey-housey, etc., and by openinga canteen, a considerable sum was accumulated.When the unit went into operation a sufficientamount of money had been obtained to providestock for the canteen at Headquarters and thetravelling canteens which tour the posts eachfortnight.

Every commodity which can be bought fromN.A.A.F.I. is sold: e.g. tinned pies, pipes, collarstuds, beer, jellies, hair cream, soap, chocolate,etc., etc.

The canteen is operated on a strict accountingbasis. The balance sheet, which is prepared eachmonth and forwarded to Air Headquarters, is cir-culated round the unit, to be seen by all person-nel. The present monthly turnover amounts tobetween £200 and £300.

Special efforts have been made for the efficientconduct of the travelling canteens. A stock listshowing all items, with separate columns for thepurchases of each Post, is given to the airmanin charge. This is drawn up in such a way that,at the conclusion of the journey, the quantity andvalue of stock to be returned can be rapidly cal-culated. The airman signs a receipt before hisdeparture for the amount of stock which he istaking out. Such discrepancies which have arisen

The Mayfair Grill.

Observer site at Posit PH.

have been Filter table-and the complete processes which

of Posts i oye the total receipts from a lead, via the Operations Room, to actual inter-

journey may amount to £50. ception.

The profits from the canteen are utilised forthe purchase of sports gear and the other expen-diture involved by unit welfare. The unit wasalready well provided with gramophones, playingcards and other in-door games before the incep-tion of the P.S.I. In the last three months thefollowing items have accounted for the bulk ofthe money expended:- footballs; baseball equip-ment; books; gramophone records; completecricket equipment; supplementary rationing tocelebrate R.A.F. Jubilee; Unit sports day prizes;M.T. charges; swimming parties.

All personnel take a very great interest in theP.S.I. since the results of its administration aremuch more obvious on a small unit than they areon a large station. Feeling develops very stronglyif it is considered that one section of the unit hasbenefited more than another by some P.S.I.scheme.

Every effort is made, therefore, to obtain widelyrepresentative opinion before any P.S.I. plans areadopted or purchases made. All the Post Com-manders are encouraged to forward P.S.I. sug-gestions in their reports.

Now that the Posts are adequately providedwith comforts, it is proposed to adopt the sug-gestion of the Wireless Unit Liaison Officer, AirHeadquarters, Eastern Mediterranean. In future,a note will be made of the purchases by indivi-dual Posts and goods equivalent to a 10% dis-count on that amount will be given to the Poston the next routine run.

At Kuntilla

On top of the Fort at Kuntilla is the duty ob-server. His view extends for many miles around.All he can see is the barren plain and the distanthills. Occasionally a military truck will pass ina cloud of dust or a camel train go slowly by.

When the Posts were deployed, all the person-nel in the present screen were warned that theymight be on their Posts for a considerable timewithout spotting a single aircraft. From somesites it was certain that no aircraft would be seenat all unless they were hostile, or friendly planesfar off course or investigating. Vigilance wastherefore especially important.

The principles of wireless unit reporting havebeen thoroughly ingrained and the whole schemeof reporting, as a vital part of the air defenceorganisation, is understood by all of these obser-vers. They understand the operation of the warn-ing system and the relative roles of civilian re-port centres, wireless units and R.D.F. -They are

familiar with the functions of a Filter Room-many of them having been detached for duty at

An Unpleasant Spot

Leaving Kuntilla, we return north along thetrack we followed in the early morning.

Post FH is almost mid-way between Post FGand Post FJ. It is a grim isolated spot and thesite has gained an unsavoury reputation for theremarkable size, variety and number of scorpionsand snakes that abound.

The arrival of the mail is a very cheerful occa-sion. Letters from home prove a most effectivepanacea for the discomforts of the surroundings.

Every effort is made to effect a rapid distribu-tion of mail and no vehicle leaves Headquartersfor any Post without taking what letters andparcels there may be. These are shuttled alongthe line to the Posts concerned. The maximumdelay is fourteen days and it is usually very muchless.

There is no delay in the despatch of outgoingmail. This is sent daily on the ration vehiclefor censoring by the ever obliging Camp Com-mandant at No. 1 R.S.P. Asluj.

The observer on duty at Post FH is probablyone of the best ground observers in the unit. Heis a former ACH/GD, who has been employedin a Watch Office. His knowledge of aircraft re-cognition is extremely good and he remusteredto Ground Observer in the rank of Leading Air-craftsman with the greatest ease.

Having no aircraft to observe, he sits drawingthem. The skill with which he produces recog-nisable sketches of different types is quite re-markable.

All these Ground Observers were previouslyemployed on a very busy screen, but they realisethat one plot in three months in an area suchas this may very well have much greater signi-ficance than the plotting of 70-80 aircraft daily,as was customary on their coastal sites.

Time presses. The C.O. has sent a messageto El Arish via the unit control at Ismailia, stat-ing that he will be there at 19.00 hours. After a

light tiffin we set off again along the desert

track.

* * *

Our tour of the Posts is complete. We have

seen them out on their lonely encampments in the

desert; the duty observers in solitary isolation at

their observation points. So far as we can judge

they are doing their job conscientiously and in

some cases with surprising enthusiasm.

At Ismailia, we shall learn what Filters think

of them.

First AirWiener

AttN eustadt

ON 13TH AUGUST aircraft from Cyrenaica drop-ped bombs on Greater Germany for the first timesince the beginning of the war. The target wasthe Messerschmidt assembly works at WienerNeustadt, south of Vienna, and Liberators of fiveBombardment Groups of the Ninth U.S.A.F. werebriefed.

This event marked another step forward in thewar against Germany. It was no random attack,but part of the general bombing scheme, linkingup with attacks on similar fighter manufacturingworks in other districts of Germany. Thus, on17th August British-based U.S.A.F. Fortressesbombed the Messerschmidt plant at Regensburgin Bavaria and carried on across the Alps to landin North Africa; on 9th October other Fortressesfrom Britain visited the Focke-Wulf assemblyworks at Marienburg in East Prussia, almost onthe Polish frontier. The aircraft of the Luftwaf-fe, having already lost control of the skies, werenow being hounded even before they could taketo the air.

These crushing blows aimed at the centres ofGermany's fighter aircraft production were, inturn, all part of the wider bombing patternspeading inexorably over Nazi-controlled Europe.By now Germany has realized that nowhere canGerman war industry - in Greater Germanyitself, in Norway, in Rumania or anywhere else- carry on its work unmolested. From Britainor the Mediterranean the heavy bombers canreach out to every corner.

Preparing for the Attack

The attack on Wiener Neustadt was planned totake place shortly after the heavy daylight attackon the Ploesti oil refineries near Bucharest. Threeextra Bombardment Groups had flown out to theMiddle East for that operation and were retainedfor the Wiener Neustadt raid.

Contrasted tactics were employed in the twooperations. At Ploesti the aircraft went in atvery low level - between 100 and 700 feet - andthe attack was as concentrated as possible. AtWiener Neustadt the bombing was done from17,500 to 22,500 feet, and extreme concentrationwas not attempted. American 500 lb. and 1,000 lb.H.E. bombs and clusters of incendiaries were used.

A total of 101 aircraft were despatched - 26of the 44th Bombardment Group, 20 of the 93rd,5 of the 98th, 27 of the 376th and 23 of the 389th.These were the same groups that had attackedPloesti.

The intention was that two-thirds of the effortshould be directed against the Steyr-Daimlercomponent factory and the remaining one-thirdagainst the final fighter airframe assembly plant.

The Attack Carried Out

The weather was an important factor andowing to unsuitable conditions the operation hadto be postponed once. On the 13th the weather,although it did not prevent the attack fromtaking place, affected its success adversely.

En route 10/10th cloud was encountered andthe target itself was covered by 4/10th cumulus.Consequently, owing to this and to engine troubleonly 61 of the Liberators reached Wiener Neu-stadt.

Twenty aircraft of the 44th Group got throughand dropped 90,000 lbs. of bombs from 22,000 to22,500 feet; the target was. well covered withbursts and many fires and explosions were noted.Fourteen of the 93rd Group's aircraft dropped50,900 lbs. from 20,000 to 21,000 feet; hits wereobserved on the assembly plant and repair shops,None of the 98th Group's aircraft made thetarget; one developed mechanical trouble and theother four were forced by the weather to turnback 100 miles south of their destination. Nineaircraft of the 376th Group, dropping 36,000 lbs.of bombs from 17,500 to 19,000 feet, saw directhits on buildings, followed by fires and explosions,one rising to 10,000 feet. Good results were alsoreported by the eighteen aircraft of the 389thGroup that reached the target, where they drop-ped 74,000 lbs. of bombs from 17,800 feet.

Losses were extremely light, only one aircraftfailing to return and being last seen losingaltitude and heading towards Switzerland. SuchA.A. fire that was encountered was said to beinaccurate. Enemy fighters were few and farbetween and one FW. 190 and one ME. 109 wereshot down.

Results of the Attack

Photographic evidence showed that results ofthe attack were fairly good. All the main build-ings in each target were hit at least once. Inthe Steyr-Daimler factory four hits were madeon the large workshop in the south-east cornerand one on the boiler-house. Each of the threemachine-shops on the south side received at leastone hit and the machine-shop on the north sidetwo hits as well: .nin 1tav s'qs, which also

DE j.I

1'g;i-

probably damaged several adjac 1fire developed in the extreme south of the targetarea, possibly among stores.

In the final assembly plant there were at leastone or two direct hits on each of the fourassembly shops and one on the repair shop. Onehangar was set on fire and the hutted camp inthe south-east received eight hits. Many bombsburst among parked aircraft on the factory air-field and some twenty were believed to havebeen written off.

In addition, numerous bursts were seen on theHenschel and Sohn factory, (reported variouslyas producing locomotives, tanks or aircraft com-ponents) that lies between the two main targets,and there were also bursts on the factory railwaysidings and four hits on the main railway lineto, Vienna.

Wienier Neustadt was to experience otherattacks, but these lie outside the period coveredby this issue "of the Mediterranean Review, andwill be considered later.

Wiener Nei~stadt under attack, 13th August, 1943.

*LASSWIEB

Details of damage at Wiener Neustadt.

1. Alrfrcarme works - West Wing, damage to

31,000 sq. ft., roof, and to offices. Damage

to roof of vaulted shop in centre. Shop to

the east has two direct hits, and blast damage

over 16,000 sq. ft. A shed and stores damag-

ed. Hits on tarmac and taxi track.

8. Aircraft Assembly Shop - (Approximately

1 3/4 acres, with 8 gun A.A. position on roof).

Two hits in centre. Two large holes and blast

damage over more than half the area. Cra-

ters on tarmac and blast damage to small

building.

8. Compass Swinging Base. Hit on edge, air-

craft damaged.

4. raters on landing are.

5. Blast damage to Gunnery Synchronisation

station.

6. Aircraft Assembly Shop - Similar to Item

(2) - More than one third destroyed, with

roof damage over whole area. Escaped oil

and debris on ground behind.

7. Large L-shaped stores building (88,000 sq. ft.)Destroyed over 4,500 sq. ft. by direct hit,

with blast damage over more than half roof

area.

8. Unidentified building. Damage from blast.

9.' Two sheds destroyed by fire.

10. Flight hangar and one aircraft destroyed by

fire.

11. Small building damaged.

4 (C~oftinu t onagj1QjL . m I

101

(Continued from page 101)12. Aircraft destroyed on tarmac.18. R.R. damaged, but still in service.14. Damage to huts in Labour camp, south-east

of works.15. Damage to south-west corner of Labour

camp.16. Thirty hits on Labour camp towards east

end.17. Sixteen hits in area between R.R. and road.18. Henschel and Sohn Werke (Heavy Engineer-

ing). Damage to long stores building bydirect hit and two near misses.

19. Severe damage over one third of total areato workshop (110 x 385 ft.).

Aircraft - damaged or destroyed, one me-dium and at leasLaiwk Hll. A

53f ER **LTaao!i

Steyr-Daimler-Puch A.G. (Engineering)20. Two sheds damaged by blast.21. Machine and Assembly Shops (four and three

quarter acres). Two or more direct hits incentre and blast damage to roof.

22. Long shop at item 21, covering 22,500 sq. ft.Three quarters of roof damaged by blast.

23. Hit in courtyard, and blast damage.24. Power Station damaged by blast.25. Machine and Assembly Shop (over three

acres). Direct hit near centre causing hole4,500 sq. ft. Extensive damage to roof.

26. Machine and Assembly Shop (four and threequarter acres). One shed gutted; slightdamage to roof area.

27. Workshop (over two acres). Hole in roofapproximately 4,200 sq. ft. and other damage

Ib pW llI e-quarters of roof area.

Det~t~Y

I

Development Of Enemy BombsAnd Offensive Weapons

No. 1 - RADIO CONTROLLED BOMBS

THE MOST IMPORTANT innovation in recentGerman bombing technique has been the intro-duction of radio controlled bombs. The Germanshave produced these new weapons as a resultof their relative lack of success in ordinary forms.of bombing and torpedo attacks and by reasonof the casualties sustained by their aircraft usingthese methods.

The basic idea of the radio controlled bomb isto enable the attacking aircraft to remain outsidethe range of effective A.A. fire, and still obtainthe necessary accuracy. Since the chief targetof these attacks is shipping, the additional ad-vantage of the ability to counter any avoidingaction vessels may take, is of great value.

Up to the present two different types of radiocontrolled bomb have been encountered, namelythe P.C.1400 F.X. armour-piercing type of slightlyover 3,000 lb. which is used mainly against largewarships, and the H.S.293 jet propelled gliderbomb, believed to weigh 1,760 lb. and intendedprimarily forattacks on merchant shipping.

A considerable amount of information aboutthese weapons and their operation has now beenobtained from P/W sources, eye-witness reports,examination of fragments of the bombs them-selves and from inspection of wrecked specimensof the parent aircraft abandoned on capturedItalian landing grounds. This has enabled thefollowing details to be given and provisionaldrawings to be made.

The P.C. 1400 F.X.

The P.C.1400 F.X. is a normal 3,000 lb. armour-piercing bom6, adapted for radio control. Themodifications, consist of the attachment of fourwide fins to the body of the bomb at the centreof gravity and the provision of a new lengthenedtail cone housing the batteries, radio receiver andcontrol unit. At the rear of the tail cone is arectangular tail drum mounted on four wide strutsof aerofoil section which incorporate the moveablesurfaces directing the flight of the bomb. Atracer tube or electric lamp is fitted in the tailto enable the bomb aimer to follow its fall andapply the necessary corrections. The overalllength of the bomb is 11', and the span of thefins 5' and that of the tail drum approximately 4'.

The DO.217 K-2 is the only aircraft at presentin service which is known to have been used to

103

carry these bombs, being specially modified byincreasing the span from 62' 5" to 80' 6" to enablethe load to be carried to the necessary height,and having also a redesigned nose to give a betterstreanilined form combined with improved visi-bility for pilot and observer. Two large externalfaired racks are fitted, one under each wingbetween the fuselage and engine nacelles, al-though often only one bomb is carried, in whichcase a 200 gallon jettisonable fuel tank may befitted on the opposite side to the bomb.

The bomb aimer's equipment consists essential-ly of a normal Lotfe 7D level bomb sight whichcan, however, be tilted fore and aft slightly, anda control box and transmitter unit. The controlsare quite simple, merely giving left or right andfore and aft deflection.

The operational procedure with this weapon isas follows:- After the target has been found(some machines may be equipped with A.S.V. forthis purpose) the aircraft climbs oi 15,000 -25,000 ft., this height being necessary in brder.toobtain the full penetrative effect of the bomb andto give the bomb aimer time to apply lhe requir-ed corrections during its fall.

The radio control system is then switched on,aim taken through the sight and the bomb re-leased in the usual way. As soon as it has leftthe aircraft, the pilot throttles back to enable thebomb aimer, who tilts his sight if required, tokeep the bomb in view. Tables carried define theprecise amount of deceleration necessary- '

After the bomb has fallen freely fo' 2' secondsor more, according to the height of rlase, thebomb aimer may begin to control it, keeping, thetrace or light in the tail directly over'the targetthe whole time. The limits of control are saidto be approximately 500 yards fore and aft and350 yards laterally, and 80% direct hits areclaimed to have been made with this bomb inpractice, although this figure is hardly likely tobe obtained under operational conditions.

The H.S.293

The H.S.293 differs considerably from a normalbomb, resembling closely a small aircraft in actualfact. The span is about 11' and the length10'. The airframe is constructed almost entirelyof light alloy, the nose, however, consisting ofa normal 1,100 lb. thin case bomb, whichprobably forms a rigid attachment point for the

wings. The batteries, radio receiver and control

DEC m I

___~

'1 d 'f o 2 w r a '! J d dVLift!'44 Lh to x N v }

.. f.. Yx ;a"Y a..x...::.r.:?d '? ^A{S..Go' ^r:}t.. 'r+.'? r'n: JA,} ". :rJ.f;^: Atr

1 ;: .:: .::'. :.: rv..i}r... .. .,+.. rY. :.:.. {.+ .. rf ;n ., ,F+w., r~ ~r.:,;:r;x

ra'x. tn'"r.nfYt xYZ x . Ip

.. x ,, .. , r , r..x.r .Y}N} r 'v} f ,>.k. rd "V".'.

,4 d . ,,;r.. !.. {.qY ;Y?:; {,~.4!. v:>3A Y, ,. }iork rr . Y

,d }A. e.ka Es y,.'"<kd':'x r Y.rr'^L9' .f -'a : YzfSvdfd.. 3. asd::i!YYrN.w i::f+., xsy:::''tic ,^ ' 'rkw^

aka' +V xx''

L^:" df%,ad. .;: :n". '?J+ ^i.'ar",rss,". .:C"i, .r ,w nr,.G" 'r ,5

r ,Y A r>>t.x.. x {"'f Yx / xr.. .+}:.;iii^v .,"f....f{ r"" L .fy 3 ..4..

,.ra ". ^,G .. rtY4ixl'c ra:YY rv^4t rt..d xxL }.rr.+;: Ydr 't" v:r:t.^4.x4 :r.r ?, { ;':; yr.. }, .Y: ,:Sw: k.tv' . x. K;r: .>"!: c,. rl. ritf' ir'^x . .. r" ... +al, "w4:a'r rx' .' '%k" Jf:Y'JN' rf .. .. y .r r.. /?"{.{k t... wS. v; C. fG': r'eu! !: ;r n.:f.4 N r4 "'Y.. .V. 3,r^ fr. ... y 5Caxx;^ Yk : L4b. Fx..y+J.. . ,Yt' f rri rr ~%r :+K d: :. brrxrd? .,.

a v\r a,^i 4 . ., .. .. vy ... x 5): r ?"":. rdk":' xt: , .k:.x{. Fv :'^Y:r' fd , ' ' y:;Yy Y . .. } xY"/.i:'f+' r".'f: (. v'tr <d M *AS!

v.. .Y: J'Y }a;,"i: V::,x,.:" 'i.f '}.iY.} IN{y .v.:+.y ,. .. v v;L rr rfy iw

.. Sqi

.,/firr

r+,t

" Y. Y. err

.. , .,..., .. , ,. ~\arr .r rv ... ) ."x,. ..... F, .,, *, ,^! vlr r.Y L. :MY~l,.'., '"l . v}Mfr ... x+. :,r b. .. "r2 . i. k .::, .v. , .. ...... rS. ^d rr..... l . ... r. x... l. n .r.. t.s ":G} . r xrf .ht :Jfr: q:rJy f.r, 4, .4 ,.+3;',, NC! ,s..da ., ,P..t . xx" Y rF..; {.N}'r . .xc^:<i d;N: y6"''wL "{? %N'xd, ~Gr F.. ,,yy^b : md.. ,{ rf . ra"i tx .. K ? "wr. >r:' .. d ,, nA,: .3J.. it J 'Jat." ,+. 'fY: .t;.. F.,:w;fv f+3 Yo-. ~1..

"a x. . r';Av ' d.

..dd

Y", . x,.. .o{r .' .. .. v. +. r 1Y'. .1:!r \k4 .. r.. .vY"{rtz x. ,Y. ""Af, . , x . n\,y. {: :k' %' f., '9Jr:::r ,}. x .xc, J:,^ Y :. ,,.,. ,. .,ff n ~xr:y.,,,nn,. s.atd+ rx. ,.4:x!nt . ; a;C,{r,.: x;y r^nY^^:::. ::, ::'xz?. "^ 'i;:.kt, ,YYk4A .i. x ~: }'Yr;. r X,^S:rt . :t .4 .kr ti:.. .. r v nm. f a x r,..s.' r A.A,.rrr."..;; ."";NO ,. xec:'.,x; r r .}. < y:;.:x SSM, a" 'x"2" : ,.ti.{f-}.dt ?,.. v J.r o ;r:1, ~ .. ar...:Ybr. :. . ; y:." ,rt."W d ^vd' ,a^. ,3:+.. ': +~ , ..,. :;. nr,+{. sr .{., r. r:Y.. .... {.. ... r::, .,.}k ,. ,... +. Yt"x n.. + .: :' :frxY, :. ... ..'. .3 ,'F l rYt. ", 3L .r2., .vn art''f<rdc .Yr

S, f..:. .hr rx,.. a7" C., r. nlya\f"n.. kd . vY.s...Na. .. 5. ,x r,. Ntv.,.rrr.:y;:fd,,,Y y , d., u. x ;Y,4 txr.}J.. ,d. ;,a "+4:v dY:f '";<,t. r:y.rc . ;s,:: \, r x. r ;a :^rJ.': r: rri G ,c cx. + {,. ,,k... ;J: .. ' rfr c. ':%:. £.:<f t,.f,'". :n, ' i.Rn+... e . x+ nJY , ' :. s+.ai , { t+ r x ,. ra, >! dr r:Y }+}Y.v.a " '} G iv ,M1} , t.2. :; rl^:w! xx" .. lL .ftSM.'as. . . .'L, 4,", .ri;jt{. ,, : .ft}"' "M r"rl r ':p ,ap'"+;' , ~, . } ' .,wt' rx:,, .i.4 ax . ip.%".,

., '' p"r;... xr. . 4t:rq,. v. ^''vrY. 1M.+ J /,C ̂ + :Yrvv'i, ^:xr..Y r r "t%.;;Y: vw.": < ; ; fi.. ,.. -0:E .. 3J}"r'>+x. .: ,.tf.. :"r.,a : va' tix.: ,,n. .:itJYyrrV,'t: .,{ , bdv...r{:'ia.:. r x 4 xny +, ,.xfaJ!;X ". d.Y :v' l . xr. r J/.. kt..{L .. ... ,r, 'xk;Yn' .{,,c 1"''nn.:=rf" r .rL .fLy"xLf4? .Y "w ". a,'rt: '..il:.r ,'rM. A..t. tx. ,x{,;.. .C' " .c:.N.

r.3 a . d+". f.. rF.. Y.r " ^,r t:\ .. NS S ''G{..t,;{ax.}y!t .yr .,.xYr'w. , n / . cta nr,. 4"r. .>. f.rr. .Y.:rx. v:9a ,rv k r SN

G\".'+:arr^> Sy' .{ .nyynn, y.+ .. :.r.r:!y} ., ,} f M} iof, ;..?n'y" %'"w4'''. v4{ , %. x rt .. .".1, . f. d. . NV"'";'+JNa rr

tt?; .:ev. 'txf:ar,., ce .2.xYr4kr." .. dfft~Y. r(. ^' :}""{, " ,}> x.5de .. "a' ts/..,fa ,,Gn. Md9'.n>^ n}, :iysG SLCt. r ".fr 'C! .dk . rx \

,.:L '; ZF : Su'" : .'ft.r{n!. Y, r''zsr ... t." .}si { a :u'. .L'v$~ ,. d;: ̂ ;^s . + xp .. t. (jt, pl ..vlfvr ':'':"+ra; ; " ;:;.;;:SLx^v'kvy s' ,'^"" .t' 9" r;w}h. ;.'k 'i'4 ,v, ! I w':.or' 1. .\,; rrfy4\a+r..r ,s. ;{;ly t,((.;r rf.. .n }r,'d rarrLGr, t .t r.'I+1' RdY.a;i.}fiak }..a,,S'1M~.. J{Iryk'id :jt^.. :rvaT,}',i, , gll} t ;y

M1;ti1t'"^\'L': '+'f~ . 1 ' f >d . },, :rNx ;,")j,}(d4M.,,"; ay ,,V1

k-F x%,?x rL a^': LI,. .cLr>;a:%r',n 4 'Jnw:':4, .",,.;{k. .r;,rr;.tx {r { rd

:a .':.S.tl;'N4' St'"' . s 4:. x 'Grt rJv, .. s+:'" ° ' .;, ; r

b' dkl 1 fi fk r b); .; x f:rr'" '. tr 'k"'" .. r

A t r",t.fu%;c k;r }." :., }r,1Y^ u.

!Xx :... .... NW';'

..:,f" " .r sae;L ^ >.F.1ro",.k , ,

e s n"xx! n

Ib + ~ daf t wI r, t r< P S }3 1 i . w ., n3" . ';?#',fy .ds.'afj, .t },; f,^: r"N r t } f, { al

,,r. f^i,' '+'f; .; ' rA as , JX',w .' '"Ni. '.r".{ a rrr :4 vL}' .:1f'N{"1{ fYy lAd^'} i:'s?,u;5,:. u 1 r ~77 ' +, J f:. frb k

,{ iGy }rx J'tF,.,, .a:Y.!gy: fsyfy .i +{kn; N u+. ;,1" \Cxc " ".tt .x ':fv :fr t;.GY, .. }'{?,,,a.;'.'r.eJVC:.;w 'xx\.+.''e "' fidP{!Yk x,+." .i r'^i!' M

"e ft

.:.}f. .;.d. a,, tb{,.Y:fr: . JyJ sp v'r^'' ky, Y'ttr". '^ :ti}

fi, ,.{ 4{ A')' , d >Fxf N. ^Y:'y., Sak' 2'+'Y4:,g n" ;rr F

'<.':S ;.A' .("'Y"rY', rtY;r

SRS yr r' 1.

1 Y v ,:; fk f \ '{; F,,. ,F ; " kft9yk.. c { ",, fi r bs ? 1

,rt,.w}4,rVJ :U4x :"yk ;a ,..."P "d:'YYkr a3'+r, ;. f.4'f xY aY.+(f .,rfy { L"~/~vi: Qr a.. .. ;k i+n " ras,':s.M1 .,, ', ' v,. "drt.: 1 , .

r a :xr{3?tv+.."" ',"Y..:;rxr w ,.ra.:..t!~.";:t!,".'~ .ay::::.,t,,. 3ak,^^,,' tZt..r !: ^{,..;ip^ '< f,..: '{. ,}.VA ~x. ,: ., ,a:^ :. \, ,.at..." ,.2 :i ,,y,.,.,t, Sp:(>,Y;S"'. Y,.: , 1 '}, }! :

'f vL" r . 1.,4.t1 «tL ." .vx .i^0'" x;.f. .;}\. ,f,'^" l x !.}i, 't dL, Y,. f... Z. N .' ti,..; :C"+ 43{1.'.k.r. .. 1A,", .,N? LdY f'.,.w .v ra". }Y'. ̂{,'ra'J,^ ,ytk:.. ,.}4 'x"JM1 ,,y i:. k ' lv .. tY.r it'C1: x:'i,. ." ,"f.; ,a Y.,+'^SS'k'"L'+: xA. r:> " . a" ,n',:: ,. r~." :xh^,. x ey:. '.x: , }.Y.fra. {.,. wr7Y; n'>'f.:: :.::. .. 'Y .a1. ^'.''.. 3. J. , .{sY f+.' t J. % k .m+ l'::::". ~,Y .:Tr

;a,.r \' '\, " M rtli rrx,:. },y... r . lt: +"A. lYYt'' w.. dYv J.(r:a+ . :,': d ,f %.;%,>

+.. ,:: '" a .d , Fs .:. .Y'";;;+;..k .r ..+n+ v^ r:: .. .. nnr? '' r ", xc. rfi k:, r.M1. , :',aa .. , "ca: r. a rwJ+. Grr. .:t.. , TvY x..+f. b . kd,4 .. e4 . x

1" 3sc J ,c.. .GS"r.4J

! xn .:rrt'r nrx \ >xf''t.y. ::rY.u

n'irL:."R

SrY . n

;s ^"x:, ur ik 'YS+. x-": 4. :

{.d^, .r., , .. r .;dk.n,.i4^+,,x<,rr+;,x;, "{~4: ':.i.'':''}i' r.+x' f..sa4 n,r r xN..

y I yr.d , .. r. ; Jro^

;nrd.: rrL At r

vik+xj"r :f. .l.+r;ox r:.. xaao ii. 'fa'' Yr:kr

vA r C 'rtNr' r5 d Trrhx r"3 }xr . xr y '

ry. rd Yxw x<.rk t

As rs"1 %:Y +f .{r d; ' r

}jtYvv J

f1 riyGSa

:rrS. . f ><\, k

i:Yr fjk'? 'x'

" F

r r r 1. . }{ rV r

v w

rxxf .YVS" J .

.A x. ' 7K +r

b r: '".G k S: x 9 R} L fJ? y. ., ,. , ':fr:,f. M.r f

i

,.v !

Provisional drawing of HS 293 in flight

unit are mounted in the fuselage behind the ex-plosive portion, and the fuselage terminates in atail unit similar to that of an ordinary aircraftexcept that no moveable rudder is fitted, controlbeing carried out by elevator and ailerons only.Below the fuselage is mounted a streamlinednacelle housing the jet propulsion unit with itsfuel tanks. A 100 watt electric lamp is carriedin the tail to enable the observer to follow thebomb's course without difficulty.

The H.S. 293 has so far been used by DO 217E-5s with the normal wing span of 62' 5", andHE. 177s are also reported to have been inaction for the first time carrying these bombs.Two bombs may be carried on the DO.217, oneunder each wing 12' 8" inboard of the wing tipson large faired racks, or as in the case of theP.C.1400 F.X. a jettisonable fuel tank may re-place one of the bombs.

The control apparatus both on the aircraft andon the bomb is the same as that used with theP.C.1400 F.X., with only slight modifications, butthe method of attack with this weapon differsconsiderably. The aircraft usually flies parallelto the course of the ship to be attacked, eitherin the same direction or on a reciprocal courseand at a distance of 3- 5 miles, i.e. beyond ef-fective A.A. range, and at a height of 2,000 ft.to 6,000 ft., varying according to the distancefrom the ship, which may be measured accurate-ly by the use of A.S.V. No bomb sight is used,the bomb being released by judgment only. Itfirst falls freely for a second or two before thejet propulsion unit starts up and propels it for-ward, so that it forges ahead of the parentaircraft. The bomb aimer now turns it towards

the target and keeps it heading steadily on itscourse. The power jet is exhausted after aboutsix seconds, at the end of which period the bombhas reached a speed of 350 - 400 m.p.h. It nowcommences to glide at an angle of 15° - 20° andthe observer counters any evasive action the shipmay take. If the bomb is seen to be overshootingit can be made to dive on to the ship, while ifit is falling short, the glide can be flattened tosome extent. A short delay fuse is fitted tomake the bomb burst inside the ship, but in somecases the bombs have passed right through andexploded on the far side, or have failed to de-tonate at all.

Owing to the short period during which thetransmitter is working, and the fact that thereceiver is fitted with separate explosive chargesto ensure self-destruction even in the event ofthe bomb itself failing to go off, the Germansbelieve it will be very difficult for us to discoverthe frequencies used and jam them.

The individual operation of the various controlson the bomb is effected by means of very select-ive vibratory relays, and it is likely that twodifferent carrier wave frequencies may be em-ployed, on which can be superimposed severallow frequency modulations, which through therelays select the required controls.

Further developments in radio controlled bombsmust be expected and, in addition to those al-ready mentioned two other versions are reportedto exist, namely the H.S.294, which is believedto be similar to the H.S.293 but larger, beingabout 15' in span and 17' long, and the H.S.293"H", said to be intended for attacks on hea

105 DECLASS

Hs._293SCALE: A2 IN, =I FT.

bomber formations, as it can be exploded at anydesired point in its flight.

Counter Measures and Tactics

Apart from radio counter measures, which arethe subject of research at present, the bestmethods of defence against radio controlled bombswould appear to be the provision of adequatefighter cover at all times when attacks are im-minent. If this is not available the parent air-craft should be engaged with heavy A.A. beforeand after release of the bomb and, in the case of

the H.S.293, light A.A. fire should be brought tobear on the bomb itself during its approach.Violent evasive action should also be taken bythe ship, and the use of searchlights directed atthe parent aircraft to dazzle and confuse thebomb aimer might be seriously considered.

These weapons have not so far been identifiedin attacks on land targets, probably owing to thedanger of fighter opposition and the wish to pre-serve the secrets of construction, but it is possiblethat they will be used against important landtargets in the future.

DE A L

ON 9th MAY, 1943, a Middle East Administra-tion Order was issued to the effect that Nos. 21,22, 24 and 25 Medical Receiving Stations wereto be known henceforth as R.A.F. Mobile FieldHospitals. This date marked the end of an out-standing chapter in the history of the R.A.F.Medical Service.

The Medical Receiving Stations have long beenfamiliar to many R.A.F. operational unitsthroughout the various phases of the MiddleEast campaigns. Their original conception beforethe War was to serve as Clearing Stationsto a chain of operational units in the field, andtransport their casualties to railheads in the rear.But as the campaign in the Middle East unfoldeditself, they soon developed into something quitebeyond the original ideas of their creators, andbecame fully equipped hospitals, mobile to keeppace with swiftest moving R.A.F. ground units,able to cope with any type of casualty, andprepared for every emergency.

They served functions specific to the R.A.F.Medical Service, unattainable by any ArmyMedical unit in the field. Not only did theyprovide aircrew casualties with the means of be-ing restored to health in the atmosphere of theirown Medical Service-no mean factor in dealingwith patients keyed-up to operational fervour,often highly strung, and restless to get back totheir squadrons--hut they were also the means

to their units in the shortest possible time. Thus,they were often able to effect a saving of manyweeks or even months, which would have other-wise been lost, had these R.A.F. patients beentransported through a chain of Army units fromCasualty Clearing Stations to Base Hospitalsin the Canal Zone or the Levant.

Numerous cases were inevitably transferredfrom the Medical Receiving Stations back tobase. But these were cases involving prolongedconvalescence, e.g. severe fractures, burns, chron-ic diseases, or cases where rehabilitation wasrequired. Such cases invariably do better farremoved from the forward areas. But in allthese instances, the time factor no longer exists.Their period of non-effectiveness will often runinto many months, and the one factor to beconsidered is the patient's ultimate restorationto some degree of active service. The moststriking tribute that can be paid to the workof the M.R.Ss lies in the high percentage ofpatients returned direct to their units, after aminimum period of non-effectiveness.

The following account deals separately withthe progress, life and vicissitudes of the fourMedical Receiving Stations in chronological se-quence.

No. 21 Medical Receiving Station

Pride of place must be accorded to No. 21of returning essentai mmnbers of o i M.R.S., self-styled "The Old Firm-Western De-

0 *t}L t I- D-

U tlll~nE

sert, 1940-41-42-43" on its signboard. Formedoriginally at Helwan on 8th April, 1940, with"sufficient equipment for six hospital beds, and20 stretchers," the unit received its number on15th May, 1940. Two months were spent in as-sembling equipment, acquiring transport, andtraining personnel. It first began to function on17th June, within a week of Italy's entry into theWar, and pitched its camp at Fuka, a locationthat often recurs in the history of all the MedicalReceiving Stations.

The First Phase : June, 1940 - January, 1941

No. 21 M.R.S. remained at Fuka for sevenmonths until 12th January, 1941, when the speedof General Wavell's advance necessitated itsmove forward into Cyrenaica. During thesemonths of fruitful activity, the unit passedthrough many initial difficulties and gained awealth of desert experience. Conditions, how-ever, were far from ideal. The Operating Theatrewas dug in at first barely four feet below thesurface, with a flooring of old wood and duck-boards, and its walls built up of petrol tins andsandbags. The Sterilising Room was built inwith 'sandbags, and roofed over with old sleep-ers. Fuka was, unfortunately, rarely free fromsandstorms at any time of the year, and in themonths of June, July, and August, conditionswere at their most trying. The sand blew east-wards from the escarpment at Fuka Satellitelanding ground, and enveloped the M.R.S. in awhirling canopy that settled on everything with-in reach. Sandstorms raged for hours on end,sometimes continuing incessantly for two orthree days. The heat was intense, with thatsearing quality so peculiar to the Khamseen, theburning wind that blows with gale force acrossthe desert. Visibility was often nil, rarely morethan a few feet at a time. After each gale, thesand lay piled up across the entrances, and co-vered instruments, drugs, patients and staffalike. Rarely indeed, can major surgery havebeen performed under less promising conditions.

By the end of July, further equipment had ar-rived, and accommodation now consisted of sixteenbeds, eight surgical and eight medical. In Augusta large increase in personnel took place, two ad-ditional officers and 45 airmen arriving at theM.R.IS. on posting from the U.K. With them, anotable expansion of activity followed, 61 casesbeing admitted during the month, of whom lessthan 20% had to be evacuated to base hospitals.The Air Evacuation of casualties had alreadybegun to function successfully. Seriously woundedpatients were loaded on to a Bombay, and flownfrom Fuka Satellite landing ground with the mi-nimum of disturbance to base at Heliopolis.

The activities of the M.R.S. grew so rapidlythat early in September a new site had to befound, lying immediately south of the Daba-Matruh road, near the point where it meets theroad to Fuka station. This site, in view of past.experiences, was carefully chosen andi prepared.

A small army of native labourers were employedto excavate the site, to dig in wards, operatingtheatre and reception room well below theground surface, so that nothing could be seenabove, to lay down concrete floors and ap-proaches, to instal adequate ventilation, andprotection against sandstorms. The new siteserved admirably. Despite the intense heat, itwas found to be remarkably cool. The surround-ings were cleaner and more free from dust. Inits new home, the unit was able to settle down tofour months of useful activity till its onwardmove in January, 1941.

It is axiomatic that a hospital throws open itsdoors to all comers. The call of suffering, fromtime immemorial, has known no distinction ofcolour or creed. Very early in its history, No. 21M.R.S. was able to record that its patients "nowinclude members of all three services." Hardlyhad it begun to function, before its first Italianprisoner-of-war was admitted. Army units inthe vicinity regularly sent their patients to itsWards and Sick-Parades, and Egyptian Armyunits availed themselves equally of its facilities.Indians patients were accorded skilled surgicalassistance, and later seen safely to their ownhospital at Daba. In October there occurred astriking incident which demonstrated the servicethat No. 21 M.R.S. was already performing, andits response to the wider calls of humanity.

On the night of 13/14th October, a train filledwith native refugees, fleeing to Alexandria fromGraziani's invading forces, was bombed by Ital-ian aircraft. Not only was the train crowdedwith natives, but with them were also their wivesand children, their livestock and other posses-sions, and, while halted at Fuka station, itprovided an easy target. Immediately on receiptof the news, a rescue party from 21 M.R.S.

Sproceeded to their assistance. A scene of indes-scribable carnage presented itself. Determina-tion of the correct number of casualties wasrendered difficult, as the carcases of dead ani-mals were heaped with dead and severely injur-ed natives. At least five people had been killedoutright, and the work of extricating the wound-ed was greatly hampered by the fact that enemyaircraft were continually circling low in the vi-cinity, and no light could be used. Over thirtyvictims, including many women and children,received treatment at 21 M.R.S. that night. Atleast two had multiple compound fractures, onwhich life-saving operations were performed im-mediately. Both were given Blood Transfusionsobtained from voluntary donors among theR.A.F. personnel on the unit. Despite their se-rious injuries, they both stood a favourablechance of survival when transferred to a civilianhospital. The work of 21 M.R.S., on behalf ofthe native victims, elicited not only a tributefrom the A.O.C.-in-C., but also a letter of gra-titude from the Egyptian Ministry of PublicHealth, Cairo, expressing :through the UnderS eretary of State, "apirsci tion for the promptuaI n nd skil l iassistancen rendered to

the Bedouin refugees on the night of 13/14th ditions,October." the M.R

In October, the number of admissions rose to rigours

202, and the operations performed to 57. An tions.

interesting development was the formation at overha

21 M.R.S. of a mobile Surgical Team, complete brackish

with crash kit and full surgical equipment, for tween e

transport by air to the scene of any accident. rock.was ag"

In November, 1940, the facilities available at occupiedoccupied21 M.R.S. were extended by the construction of Tobruk.a Resuscitation Ward for the early treatment of promisirshock in severely injured patients. This lay be- settledtween the Reception Ward and the Operating the signTheatre, and was built of concrete floor and advancewalls.. Three teams of four nursing orderlies Benghazeach, selected for their skill and keenness, were facilitiesspecially trained in giving intravenous trans- Italian bfusions, and were always available in the Resus- materialcitation Ward. These methods were soon. firm- move wly established, and became generally adopted as to returthe routine treatment of severely injured cases. arrived

During the bitter cold of the winter months, to refit.when blinding sandstorms and high winds alter- struck,nated with heavy rainstorms and drenching turnedshowers, the unit enlarged its site, erectedpermanent buildings for the accommodation of D u r npersonnel, and still further extended its equip- Septemment. All the Wards, as well as Operating of whic

Theatre, Laboratory, X-Ray Room, and Resu- ganisaticitation Ward were now dug-in at a depth of 828 cas

eight feet below the surface, and well-built with personn

concreted floors. units, I]ians. T

No. 21 M.R.S. Moves into Cyrenaica and the

The enemy air attacks became more and more Eight d

insistent with the long winter nights. Embold- native

ened by their forward sweep over the frontier, with se'

and their advance as far as Sidi Barrani, 56 R.A.F.

miles inside Egyptian territory on 16th Sep- this fig

tember, Marshal Graziani's air force made siderabl

many raids on our landing grounds east of Mersa hospital

Matruh. Early in December, however, the pen-dulum swung back with a vengeance. On theenight of 8/9th December, General Wavell launch- EARL!ed his offensive, and within a week our Army of 21 Mswept into Cyrenaica on the heels of an Italian fully eqarmy in full retreat. work ex

The elation of victory soon communicateitself to the M.R.S. Italian prisoners-of-war filtered in for treatment, and rumours rapidly spreacof an impending forward move. By 10th Januarthe main party of 21 M.R.S. had been transferred to Solla.. with full surgyical enui

d side, wiwork pe

d rule in jextra ethe uni

. plete fii

amid severe gales and sandstorms,R.S. gradually established itself. To theof the weather were added other tribula-Tents were blown down, transport neededI, rations were short, the water-supplySand unsuitable, and the soil varied be-extremes of too-soft sand and too-hardWithin two weeks, however, the M.R.S.ain on the move, and by 25th JanuaryI a Rest-House some 15 miles east ofHere the accommodation was far more

ig, and soon .the unit was comfortablyand in full operation. Again, however,al to move forward was received, and anparty proceeded on 12th February to

zi, where a prospective site with excellents was found in the headquarters of anbank. These hopes, unfortunately, did notise, for on 15th February the forwardas cancelled, and the advance party hadn to Tobruk. A few days later, a signalauthorising the unit's return to Helwan

On 1st March, camp at Tobruk wasand by the 3rd, the whole unit had re-to its base at Helwan.

g the five and a half months fromber, 1940, to February, 1941, several daysch had been spent in transit and or-on, No. 21 M.R.S. admitted a total ofes, of whom well over 60% were R.A.F.el. The remainder consisted of Armyndian troops, Egyptian troops and civil-he average daily bed state was seventeen,number of operations performed was 239.eaths were recorded, of whom three wereArabs, and two Italian prisoners-of-war,vere multiple injuries. Over 42% of thecases were discharged to their units, buture would have been improved upon con-y had not mass discharges to bases been necessitated by the unit's moves.

cond Phase: April, 1941 - January, 1942

Y IN APRIL 1941, a small Advance Party.R.S. moved again to its old site at Fuka,uipped to work as a surgical unit. The:panded rapidly, especially on the medicalhich soon tended to outstrip the surgicalrformed; an experience which became thefuture campaigns. Further personnel andquipment were added, and by mid-Junet was functioning efficiently as a com-eld hospital.

ment, ambulances and tenders, and on the 11th Owing to the large numbers of Army person-the Operating Theatre dealt with several air-raid nel arriving for treatment, an R.A.M.C. Fieldcasualties. The houses of Sollum, however, prov- Ambulance was sent to Fuka, and took over most.ed unsuitable as a locale for the M.R.S. Heavy of the out-patient work. 'Army cases, however,traffic lumbered by on the main road, trailing still continued to be admitted to 21 M.R.S. forclouds of dust, and the whole area, already foul- surgical treatment. For the quarter endinged by Italian troops and prisoners, soon became June, 1941, of a total of 816 admissions, overa large Army supply dump, and a vulnerable 60% were R.A.F. personnel, and the remainingmilitary objective. A move was therefore made 40% Army and other units. The average dailyto the top of the 1 ad now'increased by over 100% fromof Sollum. Here, .s e 36.

Bench for Microscopy andinner compartment for Sero-

logical work

Refrigerator Plant

Locker for blood bottles

Rear compartment with in-cubator, hot air oven, and

steriliser

During the following our , Imove forward began in November, 1941, the workat the unit was well maintained. An averageof over 203 admissions per month was recorded,of whom R.A.F. personnel constituted 83%. Thedaily Bed State continued to average over 30,and the number of operations 50 per month.The main incidents during this period alternatedbetween frequent air-raids and severe sandstorms.One event of note was the celebration of theUnit's first anniversary by a Dinner held on 26thSeptember, and the taking of a Cine News-Reelof the Unit at work.

On 12th October, Fuka station was severelybombed by seven JU. 88s, which dived low over21 M.R.S. in making their approach runs. Apetrol and ammunition train was hit, and aseries of explosions continued throughout thenight. The main water-point was damaged, andan acute water shortage resulted. On 25th Oct-ober further heavy raids occurred on Fuka station,with the explosion of a main petrol dump. Offour cases of severe burns subsequently admittedto 21 M.R.S. three were employees of the Egyp-tian State Railways, one of whom died early thenext morning.

The Second Move Into Cyrenaica

News came through at the end of Octoberthat a forward move was imminent, and on 1stNovember, an advance party of 21 M.R.S. pro-ceeded to L.G. 215, its new site in the centre ofseveral forward landing grounds, situated in theopen desert, about 50 miles due south of SidiBarrani. No. 22 M.R.S. arrived at Fuka on No-vember 4th to taxe over the site. As its convoyhalted on the main road, the arrival was hailedby a party of four JU.88s, which dived out ofthe low cloud, and dropped several bombs in theimmediate vicinity. An hour later, the greetingwas again renewed by flares and further salvoesof bombs. Only one casuality resulted, however.By 6th November, the site had been handed over,all the patients transferred, and No. 21 M.R.S.was away in full convoy. Next day saw the unitwith all its tents erected on the new site, andfully operational. Its stay, however, was ofbrief duration. In less than a fortnight, orderscame through for a further move forward. On18th November, General Auchinleck launched his"Crusader" Offensive, which at first achieved adramatic success. Within two months, Benghasiwas once again in our hands, and the enemydriven back to El Agheila. On November 21st,No. 21 M.R.S. moved to a new site near FortMaddalena, six miles east of the Frontier wire,and about 40 miles due south of SoZlum. It wasfully operative almost immediately and on thethird day no fewer than 27 patients were ad-mitted.

These were exciting days. Enemy raids were

expression to an opinion that "the Germans arerespecting the Red Cross in this campaign. Bri-tish wounded recaptured by our troops andbrought to 21 M.R.S., stated that their treat-ment at German hands was excellent. Alsocertain Army Medical Units who fell into enemyhands stated that they received considerationfrom their captors." These were destined, how-ever, to be isolated incidents. A notable eventduring this period was the evacuation of 81 ca-sualties by air from 21 M.R.S. during the lastweek of November, practically all Army cases.Few severe battle casualties were dealt withduring the month, and even more striking stillwas the small number of R.A.F. personnel re-porting sick, and the trivial nature of their in-juries.

During the month of November, consequentupon the frequent moves and the increasingtempo of operations, the number of admissionsfell to 157 (60% R.A.F., 40% Army.) The ave-rage daily Bed State fell from 34 at Fuka toeleven at L.G. 110, and fifteen at L.G. 122. Thetotal number of operations for the month was 34.

Forward to El Adem, and Back to BaseEarly in December, orders were received for

a new move to a site near Tobruk. By 11thDecember, all tents and equipment had beenpacked, and the remaining patients evacuatedby air in a Bombay to Heliopolis. The unitreached its new site at El Duda on the 12th,eight miles east of El Adem, and was operatingwithin a few hours.

Normal activity was resumed, although thenumber of admissions declined. Many of the ca-sualties consisted of injuries resulting from thehandling of grenades, and wandering into mine-fields. Christmas, 1942, was celebrated in a heavyrainstorm, but salvaged Italian soup, Roast Pork,Tinned Beer, and Christmas Pudding on the menulent a seasonable atmosphere.

The year ended amid a downpour of rain, withbitter cold gales blowing dontinuously. Early inthe new year, the order came again to return tobase. On 14th January, after a five days' ordeal,buffetted by severe sandstorms and delayed bypersistent breakdowns of transport, the convoyfinally crawled into Helwan.

The early months of 1942 saw the creation ofR.A.F. Hospital, Egypt. A newly-built hospitalat Abbassia was re-adapted and fully equip-ped for the reception of R.A.F. aircrew casualtiesrequiring base hospital treatment. For thelaunching of this new enterprise, the skill andexperience of 21 M.R.S. proved invaluable. To theQuartermaster of the unit was allotted the re-sponsible task of initiating the Hospital and ar-ranging for its equipment and medical stores; alarge number of Nursing Orderlies and airmenfrom 21 M.R.S. were also posted to the new Hos-pital.

Irequent, ani air battles took place in full viewof the camp. Valuable stores were salvaged No. 21 M.R.S. at Dabafrom the s o e Ip 3 During the four following months, the remain-abandoned e . i of 21 M.R.S. at. Helwan was engaged in re-

. . _

newing its equipment and reorganising itschanged personnel. Among noteworthy itemsof new equipment were three Army-type Hospi-tal marquees, which could be expanded by theaddition of extra central-sections, and enlargedto accommodate as many as thirty patients in asingle ward. On 17th May, 1942, the unit left itsbase in a convoy of 24 vehicles and three trailers,nearly all of uniform type to facilitate mainte-nance, and arrived next day at its new site nearDaba.

A very useful period was spent at Daba.The unit was favourably impressed with its newequipment, and relieved to exchange the mo-notony of four months at base for the exhil-aration of full activity in the Western Desert.The work expanded rapidly during June, when263 admissions were recorded. During this month,the percentages of R.A.F. and Army admis-sions were reversed, for of this total, only41% were R.A.F. personnel, the remainder con-sisting of Army and allied units. These figuresare accounted for by the absence of fully-equip-ped Army units in this area, although the situa-tion was partly relieved by the arrival of an ArmyField Ambulance towards the end of June. TheM.R.S. still continued, however, to perform majorsurgical duties for Army personnel. ThroughoutJune, the average daily Bed State was 21, andthe number of operations performed totalled 73.Many of these were surgical emergencies, theresult of enemy action during the anxious days ofthe withdrawal.

The Move to Amriya

On 24th June, large numbers of R.A.F. unitspassed through the Daba area, retreating afterthe fall of Tobruk. A movement of 21 M.R.S. tothe rear was thus anticipated, and a partial pack-up begun. The portable crash kit and trans-fusion apparatus were taken on several occasionsto the scenes of bombing, and used with goodeffect. A train smash near Daba occurred on thenight of 26th June, and eight seriously injuredcases brought to 21 M.R.S. for operation. Both22 and 24 M.R.S. had already withdrawn well tothe rear, and No. 21 alone remained to serve theforward fighter units. As the scene of fightingdrew nearer to the M.R.S., cases had to be evac-uated quickly, and the admissions consisted al-most solely of surgical emergencies.

On 29th June, the order came to move at onceto Amriya, but the actual departure had to bedelayed for two hours, while an urgent operationwas performed for removal of a bomb fragmentfrom the abdomen. Amriya, however, was reach-ed safely late that night, and the convoy drawnup off the road. A new site was selected nearL.G.90 the next day, about 12 miles south ofAmriya, and 21 M.R.S. continued throughout thefollowing four months to serve the forward fighterwings.

During this static period, a vast expansion tookplace of all the R.A.F. units in the vicinity. Newfighter and bomber wings arrived, and the M.R.S.

found itself coping with a large increase in itsnumber of patients. During the four months, anaverage of 482 cases per month were admitted,of whom 79% were R.A.F. personnel. Of theseover 50% were returned to their units directly,or through No. 22 M.R.S., which served as theR.A.F. holding unit.

Cold statistics, however, convey but little ideaof the manifold activities of 21 M.R.S. duringthese critical months. Every effort was made toprevent R.A.F. casualties, especially aircrewsand ground personnel, from being evacuatedthrough Army lines of communication. Ina period of intensive preparation for the finalonslaught every man counted. Of the R.A.F. cas-ualties who. were unavoidably evacuated to Armyhospitals, the majority were afterwards ex-ceedingly difficult to trace. Several weeks andeven months elapsed before they were eventuallyable to return to their units, and then, almostwithout exception, only after having first beenevacuated to base. Here No. 22 M.R.S., stationedat Wadi Natrun as a holding unit, rendered incal-culable service. Thither were sent most of thecases of Malaria and Infective Hepatitis, whichat one time constituted more than 25% of thetotal admissions. These required longer treat-ment than could be given in a forty-bedded unit,but could be saved from the maelstrom of eva-cuation to Army hospitals at base. Medical admis-sions, of great variety and considerable clinicalinterest, continued to predominate over surgical,and, as noted always during a static period, therelative incidence of operational wounds fellamong the latter group. Yet the work of theunit increased so enormously that an average ofno fewer than 104 operations was performed eachmonth, 37% of a major character.

The relative proximity of all three M.R.iSs toeach other, and to Air H.Q., Western Desert, prov-ed of great value. Periodic conferences wereheld, problems were discussed, ideas exchanged,and a helpful spirit of close working co-operationevolved. Frequent meetings were also held forunit Medical Officers attached to R.A.F. Squa-drons, at which matters of clinical interest werediscussed, and demonstrations given of BloodTransfusion technique and M.R.S. equipment. Anew departure was also undertaken by each ofthe M.R.Ss, in their constitution as sub-depotsfor the distribution of medical stores to anyR.A.F. unit in transit through the Western De-sert.

The Advance to Tripoli

Early in November came the news of theVIIIth Army's break through at El Alamein,and the wholesale German and Italian re-treat. After a rapid pack-up, No. 21 M.R.S. movedforward to Daba on 6th November and there-after moved speedily with the advanced fighterunits, keeping in close communication with theAir Transport Centre, in order to maintain fullair evacuation facilities for its patients. MersaMatruh, Sollum, Gambut, Gazala, Martuba and

:i' ii<~a.V

Barce were passed through the static, 214 during theand by 1st December the unit was installed inthe Italian Colonial Hospital at Benghasi.

The Rear Section remained here attached to22 M.R.S. to form an enlarged holding unit, whilethe Advance Party sped onwards, keeping pacethe whole time with the forward fighter wings.By the end of the year, 21 M.R.S. had coveredno fewer than 1,200 miles, halting at innumerableposts en route, treating sick and wounded withunremitting care, and arranging their evacua-tion by air from the various landing groundsnearby.

It had originally been intended to leap-frog theM.R.Ss in the event of an advance. The rapidityof the pursuit, however, soon led to the abandon-ment of the original plans. No. 21 M.R.S. had.by now become an almost integral part of theadvanced fighter wings, and was far ahead ofNos. 22 and 24 M.R.S' in the rear. The speed ofthe chase spurred it on. Morale was high, andwith it also a keenness to be in the very fore-front of the R.A.F. advance to Tripoli. The air-men took a pride in the speed with whichoperational tentage could be dismantled, re-erect-ed on its new site, and rendered fully function-ing again. Non-medical personnel took a livelyinterest in the work of the unit, and were oftenseen rendering useful help in the wards, duringtheir off-duty hours. Appreciative messages onthe work achieved were received from, amongothers, the Principal Medical Officer and theD.M.S. of the South African Forces. But thesatisfaction of having kept pace with the ad-vanced fighter wings without any loss of efficien-cy brought its own reward.

It was learnt from experience that the M.R.S.could move forward more quickly in sections,than in one whole party. Usually on arrival atany location, the majority of admissions wereof a surgical nature, such as mine casualtiesor wounds from enemy action. After a few days,however, medical cases were again in the ascen-dant. Thus, on receipt of a movement order, theSurgical Unit would strike off at once, and leaveat early dawn for the new location, usually 100miles in advance. The Medical Section and rearparty would then evacuate all the remainingpatients, including surgical cases, by air trans-port to base, and follow on in 24 hours' time.Thus, by the time the rear party were leavingthe old site, the forward party were alreadyreceiving sick or wounded cases at their newlocation. The advance party of 21 M.R.S. con-sisted of the Operating Theatre and ResuscationRoom, one Surgical Ward and full X-Ray equip-ment, with the C.O. Surgeon, Anaesthetist, and22 personnel in attendance, conveyed in sixvehicles, including two ambulances.

The chain of R.A.F. Air Evacuation Centresworked well in the forward areas, casualtiesbeing ferried back to base by No. 1 AustralianAir Ambulance Unit (flying D.H. 86s) or byBombays or Lodestars. No f r t pt~atientswere thus evacuated during as noi s

mobile period) from No. 21 M.R.S. alone.The end of 1942 found 21 M.R.S. operating at

Marble Arch. By 11th January, it had movedbeyond Sirte to Hamraiet, and on 23rd Januarythe unit celebrated the fall of Tripoli at Darragh,40 miles south-west of Misurata. The unit re-mained here until 13th February, when it movedsteadily forward past Tripoli, El Assa and Zuara,to reach Medenine, close to the Mareth Line, on21st February, 1943. During the month ofFebruary, the unit operated only 20 beds in theforward areas, owing to the fall in the numberof admissions, and left a rear party behind atTripoli, to assist in the opening up of No. 24M.R.S. as a holding unit.

Medenine was welcomed as the first pleasantsite since leaving Helwan ten months previously.The unit was not, however, destined to remainthere for long. The site proved to be too nearthe front line. Considerable aircraft activitygreeted the unit on its arrival, including ground-straffing of an adjacent landing ground, and lowswoops by ME.109s over the camp. The ground-straffing continued by day and night. Artilleryduels and bombing were heard incessantly, andeven the Air Ambulances were reluctant toventure thus far forward. On 2nd March, theorder came to withdraw to a site 25 miles tothe rear, as a German counter attack was ex-pected. Next day found the unit fully operationalat Neffetia, and here it remained almost threeweeks.

The number of admissions during March rose"to nearly three times that of the previous month,and the two wards of twenty beds were fullyextended. Out of 197 admissions, no fewer than59% were surgical, and of these nearly 80% werebattle injuries. Several of the admissions werecases of severe multiple wounds from enemybombing raids, which continued at Neffetiascarcely less than at Medenine. As a result ofenemy fighter-bomber attacks on Neffetia land-ing grounds on 6th March, 15 casualties wereadmitted, of whom 11 were A.A. gunners. NineA.A. gunners were also admitted the next day.

For ten successive nights, the enemy airactivity continued. On the night of 15th March,bombs were dropped all around the M.R.S., thenearest stick being 200 yards away. Next evening,an intense artillery barrage, continuing from dusktill dawn, signified the start of the VIIIth Army'soffensive against the Mareth Line. A severe thun-derstorm broke during the following night, withheavy downpour of rain, and part of the surgicalward was blown down. Vehicles had to be broughtat 03.30 hours to be moored against thetents. Meanwhile, the VIIIth Army's offensivehad been crowned with success, and on 22ndMarch the unit again moved forward toMedenine, near to its former site. Here a stripof ground 900 yards long was laid out as a, run-away for visiting Air Ambulances, which werethus enabled to land alongside the M.R.S. itself.

M of having several different

types of stretchers were demonstrated, as pa-tients with severe fractures had to be loaded onto the special Lodestar cradle stretcher from thestandard type, and unloaded again to the standardtype of stretcher on arrival at base, an anomalywhich has since been rectified. On 25th March,the unit was visited by the Director-General ofthe R.A.F. Medical Service, Air Marshal SirHarold Whittingham, accompanied by the P.M.O.,R.A.F., M.E.

The next move forward took place on 5th-April,when the unit advanced to Gabes. A continuousheavy artillery barrage announced the VIIIthArmy's' offensive at Wadi Akarit, and soon theAxis forces were again in full retreat. By 11thApril, No. 21 M.R.S. had reached Fauconnerie,where contact was made with American troops.Three days later, the unit moved to Kerker,and on 21st April reached its ultimate point inthe Tunisian campaign, at Sidi Hani, a pleasantsite lying between Kairouan and Msaken.

Here it remained for a full month, dealingmostly with medical cases, mainly of Malaria andDysentery. At Sidi Hani on 15th May, one weekafter the fall of Tunis, notification was receivedthat No. 21 Medical Receiving Station had ceasedto exist, and No. 21 Mobile Field Hospital wasborn.

Thus the "Old Firm" continued its existenceunder a new name. For exactly three years ithad operated continuously in the field, with theexception of two breaks at base. From its ex-periences have been learned the Medical andSurgical problems of a Mobile Air Force in thefield, serving under a variety of geographical,climatic and operational conditions. From mo-dest beginnings, as a unit with "sufficientequipment for six hospital beds, and twentystretchers to be held in reserve," it had nowgrown into a Field Hospital of fifty beds, withfifty stretchers in reserve. Its personnel hadincreased from fourteen to 80, its vehicle strengthfrom six to 27. Within four hours of arrival ata new site, all its departments were fullyoperational, and any surgical procedure, anyexamination, Radiological, Microscopic, or Bio-chemical, could be carried out. During the threeyears of its existence, No. 21 M.R.S. had admittedupwards of 6,000, patients, exclusive of largenumbers of cases who attended its out-patientclinics.

* * *

No. 22 Medical Receiving Station

The fact has often been commented on thateach of the four R.A.F. Medical ReceivingStations operating in the Middle East, despitenumerous interchanges of personnel, locale, mo-bility and function, possessed a character es-sentially its own. Although No. 22 M.R.S. re-ceived its title on the same day as No. 21, thehistory of this unit is in striking contrast to thatof the "Old Firm." Formed on 15th May, 1940,at the R.A.F. Medical Training Establishment atHalton, Bucks, it embarked for the Middle East

on fl an eac e Suez on 23rd August.After several weeks spent in assembling equip-ment and training personnel, it left Helwan on28th October, 1940, for service in the Sudancampaign. Here, covering vast distances andoperating hundreds of miles away from its base,conditions were vastly different from those con-fronting 21 M.R.S. in the Western Desert.

The East African Campaign

The Italian Colonial armies, flushed with theiroccupation of the frontier posts of Kassala andGallabat on 4th July, 1940, had settled down to

.prepare for a frontal advance northwards intothe Sudan. They found themselves initially in astrong position. British Somaliland had beeninvaded early in August, and by the end of themonth was wholly in Italian hands. They thuscontrolled the southern entrance to the Red Sea,and a large part of the Western shore of oursole route to Egypt. Italian units soon beganto mass in force along the frontier, but wereskilfully held at bay for two months duringOctober and November, 1940, by lively patrolskirmishes and artillery duels.

By January, 1941, however, disaster had over-taken the Italian armies in Libya, and all hopesof further reinforcements for their vast Empirein East Africa had vanished. The strategic planof the Allies to oust the Italians was alreadygathering momentum, and British reinforcementswere moving southwards from Port Sudan. On18th January the attack commenced: Kassala fellthe next day, and by 2nd February both Agordatand Barentu were in our hands. Long weeks ofintensive mountain fighting followed, until thefall of Keren on 26th March led to the capitula-tion of the whole of Eritrea.

No. 22 M.R.S. in the Sudan

After halts -at various landing grounds in theSudan, notably Wadi-Gazouza, near Erkowit,during November, and at Gordon's Tree, nearKhartoum, until the end of February, No. 22M.R.S. passed through Kassala on 5th March,1941, and arrived at Agordat on the followingday. They remained here seven weeks, during.the first three of which operations were proceed-ing at Keren, about thirty miles away.

At Agordat No. 22 M.R.S. were attached toNo. 3 C.C.S., whose operating team had beenmoved further forward during the battle forKeren. The unit was located in the Italian mi-litary hospital, and the personnel housed in dou-ble-ridge tents in a wadi bed. Convoys of cas-ualties arrived daily by road, and the medicalstaff of 22 M.R.S. was kept working at fullpressure. Accommodation was available for over200 cases, and a large number of hospital bedsand considerable medical supplies had been leftbehind by the Italians. In the brief period fromthe 5th to 29th of March, no fewer than 771 Bri-tish wounded and 119 Italians, a total of 890cases, passed through No. 3 C.C.S. The majo-

t ver, wvreatadmttd but ievacuated

41t

Mobile Field Laboratory atNo. 25 M.R.S., near El Djem,

May, 1943

Reception tent at No. 25M.R.S., El Djem, May, 1943

Main bench showing filterpump and auxiliary water

tank

Reception tent at No. 21M.R.S., Ben Gardane, May,

1943

t6

to Tessenei, an eight-hour journey by road, asinstructions had been received for the C.C.S. tobe kept as empty as possible for contingencies.

During the seven weeks' stay at Agordat, over300 admissions were recorded, involving 60 ma-jor and 40 minor surgical operations. The X-Ray apparatus proved of considerable value andwas employed in 70 eases. All the wards werewell equipped, and were staffed by personnelfrom No. 3 C.C.S., assisted by six Nursing Order-lies from 22 M.R.S. The administrative workwas carried out by No. 3 C.C.S., although thesurgical work was performed entirely by the staffof 22 M.R.S., which functioned only as a smallOperating Section, and possessed less than halfthe complement of staff and equipment normallycarried by an M.R.S. The work performed inEritrea, however, was interesting and extremelyvaluable, but during the whole of the campaign,very few R.A.F. casualities were treated, fully90% of admissions being from Army units.

The Second Phase: November, 1941 - July, 1942In April, the unit moved to Egypt, where it re-

mained non-operational at Helwan for the nextsix months. Most of its personnel were trans-ferred to other units, and the whole of its trans-port and equipment were overhauled. On the eveof the British offensive in November, 1941, how-ever, it became fully operational once more. Itspersonnel were increased to full establishmentfrom 24 to 74, its vehicles from eight to 20, andall its equipment brought up to scale for servicein the field. On 3rd November No. 22 M.R.S.left Helwan and arrived at Fuka, where it settleddown on the site previously occupied by 21M.R.S., and took over its remaining sixteenpatients.

Forward Into Cyrenaica

The stay at Fuka lasted for six weeks' until14th December, when the M.R.S. moved forwardinto Cyrenaica. Sidi Rezegh was passed on 17thDecember, and Tmimi reached on the 21st. Herethe unit halted for ten days at an Italian block-house, and by 30th December was again on themove. During the 42 days of November andDecember, 1941, on which the unit operated, atotal of 135 admissions were recorded, and 32major operations performed.

New Year's Eve, 1941, was spent in a desertedfarmhouse five miles east of Barce, and by 14thJanuary, Agedabia had been reached, where theItalian school was taken over as a hospital, andserved its purpose admirably. At this location,,No. 22 M.R.S. was the most forward R.A.F. unitin Libya. The surrounding, area had beenheavily mined, and many severe casualties wereadmitted. Within a week, however, confusedand conflicting reports were received from Armysources of the approach of enemy armouredcolumns.

Withdrawal at Speed

On 21st January, the main party of No. 22M.R.S. left for Benghasi, but a surgical team

rem a to operate ontwelve rious casualties urgently requiring treat-ment. This party moved from Agedabia on thenext day with 20 patients, one hour before enemyforces occupied the town. All the patients tra-velled well and were transferred to a Field Hos-pital at Benghasi in a satisfactory condition. Asall communications with Air Headquarters, Libya,had been cut off owing to the rapid withdrawalnecessitated by Rommel's advance, it was decid-ed to return to Tmimi, which was reached on24th January. Within a few days, orders werereceived to move still further back to Gazala,where the unit arrived on 29th January.

At Gazala, however, No. 22 M.R.S. was permit-ted a breathing-space only. By 4th February, itarrived at Gambut, and by 8th February at Maa-ten Bagush. Rommel's advance had meanwhilespent itself, and the new line was consolidatedsouth of Gazala. Although its transport was nowsadly in need of overhaul, No. 21 M.R.S. re-ceived instructions to move forward again toGambut, and by 19th February it had reachedthere safely and was fully operative.

The Static Period: February - June, 1942

The next four months were spent at Gambutand much useful work accomplished. No. 22M.R.S. was situated well in the forward area,within six miles of fourteen R.A.F. squadrons,and many other units. It also served largenumbers of Army personnel in the vicinity, beingthe only medical unit of its kind between Bardiaand Tobruk, a radius of 35 miles. Enemy airactivity was on a reduced scale, and the majordisturbances were heavy rainstorms, which fora while paralysed all transport movements.

Throughout the months of March, April andMay, the work continued to increase steadily.It is worthy of note that flying and battle casual-ties formed but a negligible proportion of thetotal cases admitted. On 26th May, followingnews of a heavy armoured battle in the Bir Ha-kim-Tobruk-El Adem area, immediate stepswere taken to evacuate all cases, and render thefull bed strength available for casualties. Atthe same time, the unit was placed on a highlymobile basis, ready to move at short notice.Eleven Army cases, severely injured by firefrom enemy armoured patrols, were admitted in-to the wards on 27th May.

Back to Helwan

On 14th June, following the fall of Bir Hakim,orders came to move once more, and by 15thJune, L.G. 75, 30 miles south of Sidi Barrani,was reached. On 24th June, No. 22 M.R.S. with-drew to Maaten Bagush, and four days later ar-rived at Amriya, where it encamped in the vici-nity of 21 M.R.S. Early in July, instructionswere received to proceed to base for refit, andby 5th July the unit had again reached Helwan.

From 3rd November, 1941, until 5th July, 1942,the unit had been operating continuously foreight months in the Western Desert. During

117 'v

this period the total admissions numbered 973,of whom 63% were R.A.F. personnel. The totalnumber of surgical operations performed was 231,of which 142 were of a major character.

The Third Phase: The "Holding" M.R.S.'October, 1942 - May, 1943

With the German lines at El Alamein, and theprospect of an intensive winter campaign ahead,No. 22 M.R.S. was completely, re-formed and re-equipped to serve as a "Holding" Unit. The in-tention was to utilise it well in the rear of Nos.21 and 24 M.R.S. for the reception of any of theircases requiring a moderately long period of hos-

'pitalisation, but not of sufficient gravity to ne-cessitate invaliding to Base. It was thus hopedto conserve essential man-power in the opera-tional units of the R.A.F. Many weeks of non-effectiveness could thus be avoided in numerousmedical cases such as Acute Gastro-Enteritis,Infective Hepatitis, non-specific Dysenteries, andB.T. Malaria. In the surgical wards, also, amplescope would be found for the treatment ofwounds, minor burns, sprains, simple fractures,desert sores, and numerous types of sepsis. Sta-tistics afford eloquent testimony of the resultsachieved. In October, of 218 admissions, 78%were returned direct to their units. In Novem-ber, of 244 R.A.F. admissions, the figure was77%, while in December with 442 admissions, itrose to no fewer than 87%. Of the October ad-missions, fully 50% were transferred from Nos. 21and 24 M.R.S,

SOn 4th October, 1942, No. 22 M.R.S. was est-ablished in the vicinity of Rear A.H.Q., WesternDesert, at Wadi Natrun, on an 80 bed basis, soonafterwards increased to 100 beds. The organisa-tion was well-planned in the form of four ward-units of 20 beds each, accommodated in a largeextending hospital marquee, sixty feet long,with four centre sections. It was found practi-cable later to extend the marquee to six centralsections, and thus accommodate thirty patientsunder one roof.

On 5th November, No. 22 M.R.S. moved toAmriya, 40 miles northwards, just east of theCairo-Alexandria road, in the wake of the ad-vancing R.A.F. units, where it remained for twoweeks. A further move was then made to ElAdem, 423 miles westwards, and completed, aftersundry transport mishaps, in three days. On25th November, an advance party of 'the unitwas in occupation of the Italian Colonial Hospi-tal at Benghasi, while its rear party was atTmimi Roadhouse. During the next threemonths, No. 22 M.R.S. functioned in conjunctionwith the rear party of 21 M.R.S. as a holdinghospital at Benghasi. The combined bed stateof 125 rose rapidly to 350, and the hospital render-ed magnificent service in the treatment of num-erous casualties from the forward areas, and as aclearing station for cases to be transported byhospital ship. During the month of Decemberalone, 455 of the latter e ro hhands.

M.R.S. Into Hospital

A valuable precedent was created by the ar-rival at 22 M.R.S. during December of seven hos-pital sisters of the P.M.R.A.F.N.S. from Cairo.Their splendid pioneer work soon had its effect,and on 8th March, 1943, R.A.F. Hospital, Cyre-naica, fully equipped and complete in every de-tail, came into existence.

Another innovation, arising partly out of theseverity and frequency of enemy air raids overBenghasi, was the creation of a ConvalescentCamp at Apollonia. Hither were sent caseswho were not yet fit to return to their units, butrequiring treatment or convalescence in a morepeaceful atmosphere than existed at Benghasi.Within two months, the camp was reconstitutedas No. 1 Middle East Rest Centre.

The early days at Benghasi were full of in-cident. The town had been almost completelydestroyed by two and a half years of ceaselessbombing, and appeared a mass of ruins. Ships,docks and wharehouses lay battered in the har-bour area, and a petrol tanker, blazing away inthe port, enveloped the town in a pall of smoke.On arrival at the Colonial Hospital, eighteen Bri-tish prisoners, including an R.C. padre, werefreed from captivity.

Many of the Hospital buildings bore marks ofItalian occupation. Walls, floors and ceilingswere so infested that in one instance a Crusadertank was employed in effecting demolitions. Dif-ficulties were also encountered with the Italiannuns and priests, who were at first decidedlynon co-operative. Many Italian and German pri-soners-of-war were found being treated undertheir care, and on four occasions were encoun-tered loose in the compound at night, fully armed,and supplied with food and clothing by the nuns.Action followed by the Military Authority, whichleft the M.R.S. in exclusive occupation of aclearly-demarcated Service area.

Enemy air raids were continuous from dusk toearly dawn throughout the month of December,for which, for a time, the burning tanker in theharbour provided an excellent guide. As thedefences improved, the A.A. barrage became ofgreat intensity. Five bombs fell in the hospitalarea,, leaving huge craters, and completely de-molishing the house of the Mother Superior. Twoof the nuns were buried in the debris, and had tobe dug out. No casualties were sustained, how-ever, and the R.A.F. Nursing Sisters set anexample of cool courage, which had a steadyinginfluence among the patients.

Mobile Once More

No. 22 M.R.S. ceased to function as a statichospital at Benghasi on 5th March, 1943, whenan advance party of 60 beds left to reform as afield unit in 'the Misurata area. The main partyfollowed on 28th March, and was soon activelyfunctioning at Gardabia, and during the month

d 131 admissions, of whom 75%I e i ha back to their units. During

yy

Nr' 31 a . I 4 ,; t, _rl-

May, the numbers fell to 99, of whom nearly allwere returned fit for duty.

No. 22 M.R.S. was operating near Misurata,serving No. 205 Bomber Group and other R.A.F.units in that area, when, on 9th May, its title waschanged to No. 22 Mobile Field Hospital, and ashort while after, with 205 Group, it movednorthwards into the Kairouan area of Tunisia,near the site which No. 21 M.R.S. had formerlyoccupied.

* * *

No. 24 Medical Receiving Station

One and a half years after the constitution ofNos. 21 and 22 M.R.S., No. 24 M.R.S. was formedat the Medical Training Establishment, Harro-gate, on 3rd November, 1941. The completeunit, consisting of six officers and 55 airmen,embarked for the Middle East on 10th Novem-ber, and reached Suez on 11th January, 1942.After proceeding to Helwan, the unit was non-ope-rative for five months, owing to delays in thearrival of its stores and equipment. Many of itspersonnel were meanwhile detached to otherunits. On 13th June, 1942, 24 M.R.S. was finallyenabled to move off in convoy, and stayed thenight at Amriya. The following day Fuka wasreached, but the old site of Nos. 21 and 22 M.R.S.was found unsuitable for occupation, being com-pletey sanded in, and infested after a long periodof dissuse. A new site was therefore chosennearby, and on 20th June the unit was fullyfunctioning. The news of Rommel's offensive inLibya, however, became increasingly grave, andafter six days the unit was given orders to with-draw. On 26th June, No. 24 M.R.S. left Fuka forWadi Natrun, where it worked on a skeleton basisat a site one mile south-east of the Road House,until 17th July. At these two locations, over aperiod of 21 operational days, the unit admitteda total of 125 cases, and gained a useful expe-rience of desert conditions and rapid mobility.

On 17th July, the unit moved to Burg-el-Arab,the Advanced Air H.Q. of R.A.F., Western Desert,where it functioned for nearly four months.During this vital period, it accomplished a heavyamount of operational work with conspicuousefficiency. Over 638 cases were admitted as pa-tients, and 160 operations performed, while inaddition, over 1,700 cases attended as out-patients,nearly 60% from Army units.

24 M.R.S. Moves Forward

With the advance of the VIIIth Army into Cy-renaica, No. 24 M.R.S. was moved forward toMaaten Bagush on 9th November, and to Gerawlaon 10th November, where it was assigned to servethe rear force of R.A.F. units, when the leap-frogging plan was superseded, and thus fell backbehind its colleagues. It remained at Gerawla forten days, during which 58 patients were admitted.The remains of a German Field Hospital werefound near Mersa Matruh, and four large WardMarquees were salvaged. These possessed sev-eral advantages over ours, in the absence of

guyropes, the small number of tent-pegs required,(only 20 as against 60 in our standard patterns),the excellent lighting and ventilation by means ofmica windows on sliding frames, ease of erection,and the better wearing qualities of heavier ma-terial. These Marquees were subsequently putinto service, and found satisfactory, proving com-pletely rainproof in the heaviest shower. Ampleaccommodation was afforded within for 24 pa-tients.

On 23rd November, No. 24 M.R.S. moved for-ward again, and arrived at Gambut the followingday, where the unit remained operational for thenext two months. During December, over 260admissions were recorded, of whom fully 78%were R.A.F. personnel. The number of opera-tions was 66, and over 300 cases were treated asOut-Patients. Evacuation of R.A.F. personnelwho were expected to be fit for duty within sixto eight weeks, was arranged by air to No. 22M.R.S. the "holding" unit at the Colonial Hospital,Benghasi, while others were sent by air to base.Army cases were evacuated through the C.C.S.at Tobruk. Occasional delays in the working ofthe Air Evacuation Scheme were experiencedaway from the forward areas.

On 21st January, the unit moved forwardagain, reaching Benghasi on the 24th. Instructionswere received here to proceed to Rear A.H.Q.,W.D., at 30 miles west of Buerat. On arrival, theunit was notified that it was to serve as the fu-ture "holding" M.R.S., and occupy the ItalianMilitary Hospital at Tripoli. The full convoyreached Tripoli on 28th January, five days afterthe capture of the town, and encamped on theBir Setta race-course. They speedily settled downto the task of preparing and equipping the hospi-tal.

A Base Hospital at Tripoli

From the end of January, 1943, No. 24 M.R.S.ceased to function as a Mobile Field Unit, andbecame a static hospital. A great deal of preli-minary work had to be done before the hospitalcould be ready for the reception of casualties.The buildings were in a filthy condition, damagedby previous bombing attacks, and stripped of alldoors, windows, and fittings by indiscriminatelooting on the part of natives. Many deficiencieswere found in the site; the main buildings wereold converted military barracks, with drainage,latrine and washing facilities totally inadequatefor a hospital. The central hospital block, how-ever, was well built, and certain of the annexeswere of modern design. Within a few days, theexpansion of 24 M.R.S. from a 40-bed to a 200-bedunit was well advanced, and large quantities ofequipment already on their way. During the acti-ve period of February, 292 admissions were re-corded, over 55% of them being surgical cases.The following month witnessed a still furtherexpansion of the Hospital, 341 cases being admitt-ed, with an average daily Bed State of 155. TheX-Ray, Laboratory, and Dental departments werewell installed, and rendered useful service.

.19 f I f s

44 ( l 1 u

An important advance was marked duringApril by the arrival of six R.A.F. Nursing Sisters,whose services had been needed for same time.They were joined by two more Nursing Sistersin May, and further additions were made to boththe medical staff and personnel

The value, of 24 M.R.S. as a holding unit at aforward base was of increasing assistance tolarge numbers of R.A.F. units in the area, andcases could now be retained and successfullytreated over a considerable period. By 15th May,when its name was changed to No. 24 MobileField Hospital, the word "mobile" had become arelative term only. For the unit was now in-stalled in a 240-bedded hospital, with plans pro-jected for a further steady increase to 300, andultimately to 400 beds.

No. 25 Medical Receiving Station

Though easily the youngest of the four MedicalReceiving Stations in the Middle East, No. 25M.R.S. very soon attuned itself to operationalconditions, and by the end of the Tunisian cam-paign had already become a vigorous and enter-prising unit. Formed at No. 2 P. D. C., Wilmslow,on 15th August, 1942, over nine months later thanNo. 24 M.R.S., it embarked for the Middle Easton 28th August, and arrived at Port Tewfik on8th November. Helwan was reached the next day,and during the following four weeks the supplyof equipment and training of personnel proceededspace. Operations were by then in full swing in.the Western Desert, and the speed of Rommel'sretreat brooked of little delay. No time wasavailable to await the arrival of the unit's medi-cal stores from the U.K. On 6th December, theconvoy left Helwan, and arrived at Tmimi road-house on the 9th, where the unit functioned until16th December, when it moved off again, reach-ing Benghasi on the 17th, and Agedabia the fol-lowing day.

At Agedabia, No. 25 M.R.S. pitched its camp11 miles south of the town, on the coastal side ofthe main road. Numerous cases were admittedat once, with a large proportion of Infective He-patitis among them. Several had been sent froma Group of the U.S.A.A.F. stationed at Balindah,25 miles away across the desert. Then for six daysa sand storm with alternate gales and rain blewcontinuously, bringing with it loads of dust andsand from the desert tracks away to the south.The unit spent its first Christmas fairly pleasant-ly, however, despite these adverse conditions. OnBoxing Day a message was dropped from a Ly-sander, instructing the unit to proceed to MarbleArch by 28th December. The whole of the dayfollowing, therefore, the M.R.S. struggled to ex-tricate itself out of the mud, with its personnelexerting almost superhuman efforts. A diminu-tive "Jeep", lent by the 57th U.S. Pursuit Group,rendered heroic servce in towing a large Fordsonsix-wheeler ambulance out of the quagmire. Twoanxious hours elapsed before all the bogged veh-

icles were safely on the main road. Marble Archwas duly reached next day, and by 29th Decem-ber the unit was functioning again on a site twomiles east of Nofilia landing ground.

The ten days spent at Agedabia proved a very

useful period of activity. Over sixty cases wereadmitted, and eleven operations performed. Morethan half the patients were returned to their

units, and the remainder transferred by Air Am-bulance. At Nofilia, the unit soon settled downto work again. On the last day of the year, five

South African natives were brought in, injuredby a land mine. Contact was made with three

New Zealand Field Ambulances in the area, and

a joint celebration organised to greet the New

Year.

Gales with the New Year

1943 arrived, however, with the worst galesexperienced by the unit since it set out for theWestern Desert. The storm blew continuouslyfor three days with terrific force, and all aircommunication was cut off. In eleven days stayat Nofilia, the unit admitted 44 cases, and per-formed 14 operations. On 11th January, theM.R.S. moved to a landing ground at Gzina near

Sirte, where it remained for four weeks, and avariation in the menu of desert rations wasafforded by a number of gazelle and turkey-bustards shot in the vicinity. Eighty-three ad-missions were made during the time spent inthis area, and 24 operations performed, and on20th January a light section was moved forwardto Hamraiet east.

On 9th February another move forward wasdecreed. Bir Dufan was reached on 11th Februa-ry, and here No. 25 M.R.IS. remained until 5thMarch. Numerous cases, some very severely in-jured, were admitted during this period, the BedState often reaching 35. Evacuations were orga-nised by air to 24 M.R.S., now operating as ahospital at Tripoli. Their embarkation wasgreatly facilitated by the marking-out of a smalllanding ground on the unit site, and the D.H.86s of No. 1 Australian Air Ambulance UnitSquadron were thus enabled to complete theirlanding, loading of patients, and take off withinless than half-an-hour. During the three weeksspent at Bir Dufan, 98 patients were admitted,and 16 operations performed. The majority ofR.A.F. patients were discharged either directly,or via. No. 24 M.R.S., back to their units.

On 5th March, 1943, the unit moved again, andarrived next day at its new site, three miles northwest of El Assa village, west of the Ben Gardanetrack. No. 25 M.R.S. remained here until 4thApril, and spent an active four weeks. For awhile it acted as a holding unit, receiving casual-ties from No. 21 M.R.S. and two VIIIth ArmyC.C.Ss. Its admissions totalled 125, and includedcases of R.A.F., S.A.A.F., and U.S.A.A.F. person-nel. The equipment was ample,. and allowed ofeasy expansion to admit 150 cases if necessary.The M.R.S. left El Assa on 4th April and remain-ed for ten days at Medenine, on the site of 21

Entrance to No. 24 M.R.S. at

Military Hospital, Tripoli,

May, 1943

Main bauilding of No. 24

M.R.S. at Tripoli

A surgical ward of No. 24

M.R.S., at Tripoli

A ward of No. 22 M.R.S. at

Colonial Hospital, Benghasi.

December, 1942

'A4

M.R.S., where 81 patients ere admitted. Four medical officers, with a British Army guard. Thedays were then spent at Triaga near Sfax, and sanitation was hopelessly inadequate, the wardson 20th April the unit 'reached a site two miles badly overcrowded, and sepsis rife among gross-along the La Hancha - El Azheg road, below its ly-wounded patients in close proximity. Super-intersection with the main road from Sfax to El vision was exercised over the transfer of theseDjem. It remained here for six weeks as a German wounded to prisoner-of-war camps, andsemi-holding unit, to cover the light bomber wings to prevent destruction of captured enemy equip-in the Sfax - EF Djem area. ment, which included R.A.F. medical equipment

During this period over 200 admissions were captured by them at Tobruk. The advance partyrecorded, and 50 major operations performed. remained at Carthage until the end of May, byThe majority of the cases were medical, but a which time some 230 patients were still awaitinglarge number of severe casualties from road transfer.accidents were admitted, accounting for three Instructions were received for a further movedeaths. One very severe case of Haemorrhagic southwards to the Ben Gardane area at the endSmallpox occurred, with fatal results. of May, and by early June, the move had been

completed. And here, at La Hancha, we leaveIn a German Hospital No. 25 Medical Receiving Station with its name

The camp at La Hancha was pleasantly sit- changed tb No. 25 Mobile Field Hospital.uated amid olive groves, and sea-bathing waswithin easy reach. A light section of No. 25M.R.S. moved to Carthage, near Tunis, on 13th Thus ends this record of the four R.A.F.May, to take charge of a German Field Hospital, Medical Receiving Stations in the Middle Easthoused in a converted Convent School. The during their evolution and development intobuilding was finely situated on a hill overlooking Mobile Field Hospitals. The full story of theirthe beautiful Bay of Tunis and the ruins of achievements and the magnificent work theyancient Carthage. The hospital contained over accomplished will be told when the history of the450 German wounded under the. care of their own R.A.F. Medical Service is written..

Rescue By NightDURING THE AFTERNOON of 5th June, 1943, a re- there was no sign of the H.S.L., which had been

port was received by the Air/Sea Rescue Flight delayed owing to high seas, it was decided tothat a Beaufighter flying from Malta to the Delta return to Base. Having plotted the dinghy's po-area was believed to be down in the sea; the sition, course was set for Base and after flyingposition given was 300° Benina 15 miles, and was for about ten minutes, a light was seen on thelater amended to "more likely to be in the neigh- water. Upon closer investigation, this provedbourhood of 200 miles". A Wellington was des- to be the H.S.L. and she was signalled "Are youpatched to search along this track. The weather O.K. ? " The reply being "Yes," she was signal-was none too good, with rainstorms, low cloud led "Follow us and watch for lights," and courseand a very rough sea, making searching for a was reset back to the dinghy. Before the aircraftsmall dinghy very difficult. Added to this was arrived at the position, double red cartridges werethe fact that the aircraft was flying more or less seen being fired by the dinghy, and as the aircraftinto a setting sun. Despite these difficulties a passed overhead, the survivors flashed a torchgood look-out was kept and after about a 100 which enabled the aircraft to drop a flame floatmiles flying, the rear gunner reported a Verey close by. The aircraft then dropped two otherlight on the port quarter, this being some 45 flame floats to form a triangle with the dinghyminutes before estimated time of sighting. The in the centre and at the same time commencedaircraft altered course and flew in the direction of to fire Verey cartridges so that the launch couldthe smoke of the cartridge, which remained vis- see the aircraft's position.ible in the air, and located a dinghy containing The Wellington circled for over an hour, replac-three men. A rescue kit was dropped andthree men. A rescue kit was dropped and ing the flame floats as they went out, firing Vereyinformation signalled to Base. cartridges, and switching on the aircraft landing

H.S.L. 159 from Benghazi was immediatelyH.S.L.159 from Benhazi was immediately lamps to indicate the position to the launch,ordered out to the position, and a second Welling- which arrived at approximately 23.00 hours.ton laid on to relieve, the first, which was stillcircling the dinghy, at 19.00 hours. This relief This is the first combined air and sea rescuewas duly carried out and the relieving Welling- on record achieved by night in the Mediterranean,ton continued to circle the dinghy until 21.00 hours, and is an. c nt example of team work carriedby which time it had become it h blk, ad s| it une i veryjifficult conditions.

4 I,

DEi UESilED

PART I. 1942-1943.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF Flying Control in theMiddle East, from its inception until our retreatto El Alamein, was described in the last numberof the R.A.F. Middle East Review. This secondpart of the article deals with subsequent expan-sion and the introduction of Area control.

Central Flying ControlDuring the summer of 1942 the ground position

in the Western Desert remained static, but nightafter night strong forces of heavy and mediumbombers crossed the Delta from their bases in theCanal Zone or Palestine to attack the harboursat Benghazi, Tobruk, Mersa Matruh, Sollum andBardia, Crete, or the enemy's forward landinggrounds at Fuka and Daba. It was inevitablethat many of the aircraft returned lame and some

service was urgently needed to assist them tomake safe landings at base or at more con-veniently situated landing grounds. The answer tothis problem was the establishment of the CentralFlying Control in the Fighter Operations Roomat Air Headquarters, Egypt. The Flying ControlOfficers watched the plots of returning bomberscreeping across the operations table - guardwatches were maintained on as many as eightoperational frequencies - and as intercepted bear-ings related to their respective plots, "owners"were given the latest information of their air-craft. A night seldom passed without at leastone or two returning bombers needing definiteassistance, and on the instructions of the CentralFlying Control airfields were illuminated, pyro-technics fieed; and .searchlight homing broughtinto action.

123 DE MSIREDDEBLM lED

From the sublime:-(Control Tower at Civil Air Port in the Middle East)

Regional Flying Controls (ii) The co-ordination of Air/Sea Rescue and

The situation changed completely when the Desert Rescue action.

VIIth Army advanced across Cyrenaica in the (iii) The tracing of aircraft reported missingautumn and winter of }942. Static fighter defen- or overdue on the same lines as the Air

ces were set up to protect supply bases in the Ministry department, A.S. 4.

rear and the convoys passing along the coast. (iv) The establishment of an information

Air Headquarters, Egypt, became Air Defences, bureau where all information concerningEastern Mediterranean, and it was impossible to the safety of aircraft was kept available,maintain an adequate aircraft safety organisation and from whence all warnings of a

from the Central Flying Control in Cairo. That navigational nature were notified to in-

had done its job and done it well under the cir- terested flying units.

cumstances already described. It was now nec- The Regional Flying Control at Benina was par-essary to meet the changed conditions, and so ticularly successful in bomber liaison, beingwas born the idea of establishing a series of Re- situated close to and in an ideal position to assistgional Flying Controls along the coast, located the Ninth United States Bomber Command, andin the operations rooms at the Fighter Group letters of appreciation for services rendered wereHeadquarters at Haifa, A.H.Q., A.D.E.M. Benina received from them. The close liaison and inter-and, later, Tripoli. The responsibilities of the change of information maintained between theRegional Flying Controls fell under four head- Movements Liaison sections in the Filter Roomsings :- and the Regional Flying Control was the secret

(i) Direct control by W/T or other means of of the organisation's smooth working. The R.D.F.aircraft in distress is . assed immediately from the

-:To the ingenious

(Control Office on desert landing

ground, constructed of old petrol

tits)

Standard design for Control Towers on base airfields.

C! 6 ,tB

i f A f N

:k

- , r'

t

_ . ,

" :

s

r .

s y r

9g " '.y

:

The Airfield Controller, from the runway Control Van, gives a Hurricaneof the R.E.A.F. permission to take off

Filter Rooms to the Flying Controls, and HF/DFbearings intercepted by the latter's W/T watcheswere passed to the Movements Liaison Officer.thereby assisting identification of his plots.

The most important development during theperiod, however, was the organisation for tracingoverdue aircraft. Hitherto each flying unit hadbeen responsible for the initiation of request-news signals when aircraft failed to arrive, andno organisation existed to carry searches to theirconclusion or to maintain a record of the num-bers of aircraft adrift. Now it became the dutyof flying units to inform the appropriate RegionalFlying Control of aircraft overdue. In the firsttwo months over 500 aircraft were so reported,and subsequent analysis proved that out of thisnumber only about two per cent were in anyform of trouble. Of the rest, pilots had failedto book in, incorrect signals had been originated,aircraft had made non-scheduled stops; in fact,a general state of slovenly disregard on the partof all concerned for the movement of aircraftregulations was discovered. A vigorous drive toimprove conditions started, and up to the timeof writing has met with some success, but by nomeans enough; there is still an average of some150 aircraft unnecessarily reported overdue eachmonth.

More information than hitherto also becameavailable upon which the Air/Sea Rescue Squad-ron could work, and close liason was kept by theRegional Flying Controls with civil and militaryunits to assist in searches for, and the rescue of,crews forced down over land. In time, however,it' became obvious that a dual control problemwas arising in the field of air/sea rescue,Operationally, air/sea rescue was the respon-sibility of No.201 (Naval Co-operation) Group,but more and more of the work of co-ordinationof the necessary information was undertaken bythe Regional Flying Controls under A.H.Q.,A.D.E.M. To obtain the maximum value fromthe organisation and at the same time save man-

power it was decided to put the whole on aMiddle East basis, and fuse the Regional FlyingControls and the Air/Sea Rescue organisation.The Regional Flying Control was therefore mov-ed from A.H.Q., A.D.E.M., to H.Q., No. 201 (N.C.)Group, and a plan implemented to locate

the various Regional Flying Controls in the most

suitable geographical positions, all under the

direct control of H.Q., R.A.F., M.E. A control

was formed at No. 25 Fighter Sector in Cyprus;

the Control at Haifa moved to Ramleh; Sub-Con-

trols were formed on the airfields at Mersa

Matruh and El Adem; the Control at Benina re-

127 '"1

MoakEtt tu

mained, and the Control at Tripoli was moved toCastel Benito. Thus was built an aircraft safetyorganisation with executive powers in air/searescue, extending from Cyprus to the Tunisianborder. Immediately prior to the invasion ofSicily, the Regional Flying Control at Malta wasadded to the chain.

Increase in Ferry Controls

Alongside the development of the RegionalFlying Controls came the big increase in thenumber of Ferry Controls and Staging Postsalong the Ferry and Reinforcement routes, withsubsequent increased need for this specialisedform of Flying Control. As operations movedwestwards, Staging Posts were opened at ElAdem, Marble Arch, Castel Benito, and onwardsto Biskra, El Aouina, Maison Blanche, RabatSale, etc. Local Airfield Control personnel wereprovided to handle the ever increasing flow oftransport and reinforcements arriving from GreatBritain and the United States, and safetyfacilities were created from the Atlantic to thePersian Gulf, from Italy to the Sudan and SouthArabia.

The School of Flying Control

This vast expansion stretched the supply oftrained Flying Control personnel to the limit.Bomber Command was absorbing all the outputof the School of Flying Control in England, andthe need for personnel in the Mediterranean areabecame acute. To overcome the difficulty and

meet the demand, a School of Flying Controlwas inaugurated in Cairo, where officers andairmen could be trained as Flying Control Of-ficers and N.C.O. Airfield Controllers. A com-prehensive syllabus was drawn up includingLocal Control of operational and non-operationalaircraft; Regional Control; Navigation; Meteor-ology and Signals; with lectures by specialistson such varied subjects as the performance ofdifferent types of aircraft, accidents investiga-tion and methods of controlled approach.

The ISchool is now well established. Personnelselected for training spend up to three monthsin preliminary training on airfields before takingthe Course, which is followed by a further periodunder instruction before they are finally posted.

As this article goes to press, O.T.Us are open-ing in Egypt and the Levant and Flying ControlOfficers, some from Middle East resources andsome fresh from the United Kingdom, are takingup their duties of assisting the crews and train-ing them in Flying Control procedure. The aimof Flying Control is to render the maximumpossible assistance to pilots, not only when introuble, but at all times. On their side pilotscan assist Flying Control to carry out this im-portant work by rigidly adhering to the instruc-tions laid down, and by remembering that theseinstructions have been issued solely for the safe-ty and assistance of the crews who fly aircraft.Those on the ground are the servants of thosewho fly, but only by complete understanding andco-operation can they achieve success in theirtasks.

R.A.F. MIDDLE EAST REVIEW No. 2.

Supplies of the above number are now exhausted. Requests are beingreceived for them, however, and it would be appreciated if Units possessingcopies which they no longer require would return them to H.Q., M.A.A.F.

(S.C.O.R.U.)

• . , .-

I _

i ryaE

THE NUMBER 216 is a famous one in R.A.F.history in the Middle East. The connection goesback to June, 1919, when No. 216 Squadron ar-rived in Egypt. At the outbreak of the presentwar, the squadron was still here and was theonly heavy night-bomber unit in the MiddleEast. Its Valencias were even then, however,employed largely on transport work. Now it ispurely a transport squadron and comes underNo. 216 Group.

This Group, which bears the same number asthe old squadron, was formed on 21st May, 1942,to control the aircraft reinforcement routes in theMiddle East. On 9th September it was re-formedwith enlarged scope as No. 216 Air Transport andFerry Group, controlling the transport squadronsin the command as well as the ferry routes.

Thus what had happened in effect was thatwhere there had formerly been one bomber squa-dron that did transport work in its spare timethere was now a Group controlling five trans-port squadrons flying over a million miles amonth and an organization comprising eight fer-ry routes, over which delivery pilots were flyingmore than a million and a half miles every month.

Importance of the Group's WorkWhat makes the Group's work so vital is the

vastness of the territory that it has to cover. In

Africa itself the Group's aircraft have to operatefrom the West Coast to Egypt, and from Egyptto Algeria; beyond Africa they operate acrossArabia to India. Especially during the long periodwhen the Mediterranean was virtually shut to ourshipping, the responsibilities resting on the flyingorganization, and the strain thrown on it, wereenormous. The strain was made greater all alongby the chronic shortage of load-carrying aircraft.

From the beginning of the war the value of airtransport had been recognized by the enemy bothin the European and African campaigns. We hadlagged behind. Where the enemy had employedhundreds^ of load-carriers, we had only tensavailable. The fact that in April, 1942, ourfighters shot them down like grouse on the12th does not alter the fact that the enemy hadsome 300 transport aircraft available for thefinal stages of the North African campaign. Wehad to start almost from scratch, the only purely .transport aircraft available being those belongingto the commercial air lines.

On the ferry side of the organization such pro-blems did not, of course, exist.. The work -before and since No. 216 Group came into being- had just gone on steadily, week in, week out

they 1

rio d .r heire the Group'swork has been valuable is in the co-ordinationof effort, cutting out waste and overlapping.

In the following paragraphs some idea is givenof the two sides of the Group's work and of theproblems that had to be met before the fusioninto one organization became possible.

Before the Group Took Over

As already mentioned, on the outbreak of warany odd jobs in the way of transport had of ne-cessity to be undertaken by No. 216 Squadron'sValencias. They carried stores and personnel toand from the Western Desert and between Egyptand Iraq. One journey was made in October, 1939,to take General Wavell and his staff for thesigning of the Anglo-French-Turkish agreement.

In October, squadron crews went to England tocollect the Bombays that were soon to become oneof the most familiar features of the Middle East- the old faithfuls, a few of which were still inservice in 1943. The first Bombay transport flightwas made on 6th November, 1939, when one flewto Matruh to bring back some Staff Officers toCairo. This month also saw the inauguration ofa weekly mail service between Egypt .and Iraq,run by No. 216 Squadron. By the end of theyear, however, air transport in the command canscarcely be said to have begun.

Until Italy entered the arena in June, 1940,No: 216 Squadron pursued the even tenor of itsway, doing useful even if not exhilarating work.In the light of later developments, the most sig-nificant trips were those made by Bombays inhelping units to move. On 11th May, for in-stance, the Squadron Operations Record Bookstates: "One Bombay to Amman and Port Saidmoving No. '14 Squadron attachment"; on 18thMay: "Four Bombays to Amman to assist 2ndEchelon to move to Port Said". These werepointers to the days in 1942 and 1943 when wholefighter wings were to be flown in behind theenemy's lines and maintained exclusively by airtransport, and when the ground personnel andequipment of the whole Tactical Fighter Forcewere to be flown over to Italy.

A Temporary Return to Bombing

With Italy in the war and menacing the fron-tier from Cyrenaica, No. 216 Squadron revertedpartly to its original function of bombing. Thiswas due to the fact that, apart from a few Blen-heims, there were no other aircraft on hand to dothe job.

Nevertheless, in addition to bombing the Ita-lians, the squadron's Bombays and Valenciasfound time for such occupations as bringingstretcher cases back to the rear, taking guard re-liefs to desert frontier posts, conveying stores andrations, an S ing in the move of squadronsto Aden a a

In Octosome bomexample, a Bon

land forces in attacking military concentrationsat Sidi Barrani. But from the autumn of 1940 on-wards the essential work was transport -ofstores, spares, wounded and what are classed as"very important personages", including Mr. Eden,who was flown from Cairo to Lydda. In Octobera Bombay went as far afield as Nigeria and back.

Evacuation from Greece and Crete

The trouble in Greece gave the squadron moreexciting work in the transport line. On 1st No-vember a Bombay took No. 30 Squadron groundcrew to Heraklion, in Crete, and thence on toEleusis, near Athens. This was the first Bri-tish aircraft to land 6n Greek soil after the Ita-lian declaration of war, and was the first of aseries of over a hundred flights, transportingwar material to Greece and Crete - all complet-ed without casualties or engine failures. Theseflights were supplemented by others made bytwo Sunderland squadrons, which normally car-ried out sea patrols.

In April and May, 1941, came the evacuationfrom Greece and Crete, in which a memorablepart was played by No. 216 Squadron, No. 267Squadron, which had been formed late in theprevious summer for communication work, theSunderlands, and by the flying boats of the Bri-tish Overseas Airways Corporation, which werecalled in to help. The Bombays concentratedmainly on air crews; the other aircraft broughtaway passengers of all kinds, both service andcivilian.

The Sunderlands began by evacuating 48 pas-sengers from Yugo-Slavia on 16th April; theyfollowed this by evacuating some 700 personnelfrom Greece - including a record number of 83in one aircraft - and 90 from Crete. TheB.O.A.C's share consisted of thirteen returntrips between Alexandria and Suda Bay, thefirst on 22nd April and the last on 5th May. Atotal of 469 passengers were taken off, includ-ing the Greek Royal Family. The Lodestars ofNo. 267 Squadron evacuated nearly a hundredpassengers between 24th and 28th April, includ-ing 44 from Heraklion in the face of continuousair activity over the airfield. No. 216 Squa-dron's Bombays, in addition to picking up air-crews and other personnel, took reinforcementsof men and materials to Cyprus in May, as aprecautionary measure.

Transport for Iraq and SyriaIn March, four Bombays of No. 216 Squadron

had been detached to Khartoum to cope withthe transport of equipment, stores, ferry pilotsand crews necessary for the West African rein-forcement route. On 30th April, 1941, this de-tachment was re-formed as No. 117 Bomber-Transport Squadron and began operating on 1stMay. A notable fight was made on 4th Junewhen one of the squadron's Bombays flew toGura to convey the Duke of Aosta and his Staffto captivity after his surrender in Abyssinia.

Meanwhile, in early May, trouble had brokentin Iraq. No. 216 Squadron's first task was

to send five Valencias and three Bombays to

Lydda on 4th May, thence to transport troopsand ammunition to Iraq. Between the 6th and

the 21st Valencias and Bombays carried out si-

milar operations in support of the Army andalso evacuated personnel from Habbaniya.

On 24th May a special operation took place,in which a Bombay flew thirteen sappers from

Egypt to Habbaniya, whence they were taken byValencias into Syria, with which we were no-nminally at peace, but across which the enemywas operating into Iraq. Once in Syria the sap-pers blew up an important bridge on the Mosul-Aleppo railway and got away without casualtiesin spite of being machine-gunned from an ar-moured vehicle.

In June, just before the Syrian campaign open-ed, Bombays of No. 216 Squadron dropped pro-paganda leaflets over towns in Syria by night.During the campaign itself the squadron carriedup all kinds of war materials and brought backwounded.

The Period Before "Crusader"

Transport work went on as usual between theend of the Syrian campaign in July and the be-ginning of "Crusader" in November, 1941, andthe opportunity was taken to make a numberof changes and developments, the chief of whichwere as follows:- A daily fiewspaper and mailservice to the desert was inaugurated by No. 267Squadron in September. In October the B.O.A.C.formed, at the request of the R.A.F,, a commu-nicating service between Heliopolis and the Wes-tern Desert to assist both Nos. 216 and 267Squadrons. Also in October No. 117 Squadronwas re-equipped with D.C.IIs, and at the endof the month the Squadron left Khartoum forBilbeis, in preparation for operations in connec-tion with "Crusader".

In November - and this paved the way forthe creation of No. 216 Group - the AircraftMovements Branch was formed at H.Q., R.A.F.,M.E., with the object of co-ordinating the workboth of the transport squadrons and the air rein-forcements organizations under one control.These had previously been respectively underAir Staff and the C.M.S.O. branch.

Immediately .before "Crusader" a special taskfell to No. 216 !Squadron. On the night of16/17th November five Bombays were briefed todrop 60 parachute troops to sabotage enemy air-,fields in the Tmimi and Gazala areas. Mainlydue to bad weather, the attempt was not a suc-cess and one of the Bombays was lost.

It is unnecessary to give a detailed picture ofthe activities of the transport squadrons during"Crusader". All that need be said is that theydid a fine job of work. Throughout the cam-paign a regular desert transport service wasmaintained; help was given to No. 1 Air Ambu-lance Unit in evacuating casualties; and manyurgent calls for petrol and other essential sup-plies were answered. The first appeal came on

'20th November, when twelve tons of 37 mm.

SI Ai wammunition, asked for at 12.30 hours 'was deli-' 'vered in Bombays at an advanced landing groundfour hours later. Nos. 216 and 117 Squadronswere largely concerned with special tasks whileNo. 267 Squadron- and the B.O.A.C. dealt withthe more routine runs.

The B.O.A.C. worked in close co-operation withthe R.A.F. and followed up the advancing VIIIthArmy. Rarely was their terminal landingground more than a score or so of miles awayfrom the battle area. When the western termi-nus was at Tmimi, for instance, it was only 30miles south-east of Derna, which was still inenemy hands. Towards the end of the advance,the B.O.A.C., together with No. 267 Squadron,was engaged in rushing petrol to our forwardforces south of Benghazi who were runningshort.

In December No. 117 Squadron, in additionto carrying 97,500 Ibs. of freight and 380 pas-sengers, borrowed a Lodestar from the B.O.A.C.and flew the Air Mission, bound for Russia, asfar as Teheran.

Activity after "Crusader"

During the withdrawal to Gazala in Januaryand February, 1942, and the subsequent lull, thetransport squadrons carried on steadily. Apartfrom the routine runs, flights were made muchfurther afield. In February No. 117 Squadronflew General Alexander to Delhi, on his way totake over the Burma Command, and made twoother trips to India, taking 3,200 lbs. of equip-ment to a squadron recently transfered there.In March five D.H.86s were allotted to No. 117Squadron and its D.C.IIs were transfered toIndia. Some of "A" Flight pilots ferried the air-craft there and other pilots delivered a numberof other D.C.IIs. In May the Squadron receivedsome Lodestars and began a period of intensivetraining. Also in May a Lodestar of No. 267Squadron took the Duke of Gloucester on hisMiddle East tour of Cyrenaica, Egypt, Palestine,Syria and Iraq.

At the end of February it had been decidedthat the B.O.A.C's Western Desert work wasfinished for the time being and its aircraft re-verted to their normal civilian routes. Early inMay, however, the B.O.A.C's Lodestars sharedwith No. 267 Squadron's Lodestars in the Cairo-Malta service, which had begun in March. Be-tween them they operated six services a weekuntil the end of June when the Axis advanceoverran the Gambut and other landing groundsthat were being used. Before the service wassuspended the B.O.A.C. had made 33 trips, car-rying over 200 passengers and much mail andfreight. For several months, when Malta wascut off by intense enemy air attack, air trans-port was almost its only link with the outsideworld. On an average, two weekly services weremaintained and the aircraft sometimes tookgrae rsks in taking off heavily over-loaded.

Fo.

216 Ferry Group, although the transport squa-drons were not directly affected until this Groupbecame the Air Transport and Ferry Group inthe following September.

The Withdrawal to El Alamein

Throughout the crisis of June-September, 1942,the transport squadrons made an all-out effortin the desert. Urgently needed stores and equip-ment were moved from place to place and manywounded brought back to safety. On the nightof 9/10th June one of No. 216 Squadron's Bom-bays was given the special task of dropping sup-plies for the besieged garrison at Bir Hakeim,after two Hurricane-bombers had done so theprevious night.

No, 117 Squadron found time for two deliveryflights to India, and in July and August flewover a thousand passengers and many thousandpounds of mail and freight to and from Maltain D.C.IIIs. Other D.C.IIIs of No. 267 Squadronalso made journeys between Egypt and Malta,one of their passengers being Lord Gort, theGovernor of the island. Work was made easierby the issue in August of some 40 Lockheed air-craft to the transport squadrons and by the for-mation in July of No. 173 Squadron, with a mix-ed bag of aircraft, mainly for communicationwork in the Delta area.

So far the transport aircraft had come off re-markably light in casualties. On 24th July, how-ever, the Bombays of No. 216 Squadron had theirfirst loss when two were shot up on a temporarylanding ground about six miles behind the frontline. Early in August, again, another Bombaywas caught in the air by enemy fighters anddestroyed. The casualties included General Gott,who was to have taken over the command of theVIIIth Army.

Three Special Operations

Between July and September No. 216. Squa-dron was involved in three special operations.The first, on 9/10th July, was a strike by-Alba-cores against a convoy running from Crete toTobruk. To be within effective range of theconvoy the Albacores had to refuel at an unoc-cupied landing ground 150 miles behind the ene-my lines. This plan entailed a ground party toprotect the bombers against air attack while re-fuelling and to defend the landing ground for alimited period against possible enemy raidingparties. No. 216 Squadron's job was to carryboth the ground party and its equipment and thefuel and other necessities for the Albacores. SixBombays took part and the whole operation wentoff almost without a hitch and without a casual-ty. The fact that the Albacores could not claima definite sinking does not detract from the com-petence and daring of the operation.

The second operation, in early August, was onein which the R.A.F. assisted one of the LongRange Desert Group's thrusts deep behind theenemy's lines. No. 216 Squadron's task was toreplenish four L.R.D.G. parties on their way back

Vrhi 7:t: s~

to our own lines. To do this one of the squa-dron pilots reconnoitred the area south of MersaMatruh, some 150 miles behind the battle area,to find a suitable landing ground. Our formerL.G. 64 was chosen and on the night of 4/5thAugust three Bombays were briefed to deliver800 gallons of petrol and rations for 160 men.They were also to bring back certain L.R.D.G.personnel. In spite of difficulties in locating theprepared flare path, two of the Bombays safelydelivered the goods, and returned with 42 pas-sengers, including the crew of a crashed Wel-lington and some escapees from Tobruk.

The third operation, in September, was a moreanitious combined-services affair, aimed main-ly at disrupting enemy supplies by sabotage atTobruk and Benghazi; a diversionary raid was tobe made at Barce and a temporary base was tobe established at Jalo Oasis by a force operatingfrom Kufra. No. 216 Squadron was called uponto transport the necessary supplies to Kufra andto stand by there with six Bombays. Five ofthe squadron's Hudsons were also detailed todrop dummy parachutists over Siwa Oasis withthe object of causing alarm among the Italiangarrison there and possibly making the Germansrush reinforcements from the Matruh-Tobrukarea. This task was duly carried out by theHudsons, although the exact result could not begauged.

The only one of the Bombays at Kufra to beemployed was briefed to fly to a landing groundnear Jarabub to evacuate Wounded L.R.D.G. per-sonnel. In spite of a flight of 400 miles overfeatureless desert, the landing ground was locat-ed and the wounded flown back safely to Kufra.There was trouble a few days later, however,when the enemy made a surprise air attack onKufra. Although there were no casualties topersonnel, three Bombays were written off on theground. On the credit side was a "probable"HE.111, which a member of one of the air crewsfired at with a Bren gun.

This operation did not achieve the hoped-forresults. Nevertheless, with the others, it showsthe varied activities expected of the transportsquadrons-activities that added spice to normaland more mundane duties.

No. 216 Group in its Final Form

On 9th September, 1942, No. 216 Group took onits final form as an Air Transport and FerryGroup. It immediately began its preparations forthe October offensive, including the planning bythe Group Signals of special wireless channels forthe advanced transport centres. When theVIIIth Army advanced, the transport squadronswere ready and better organized than they hadever been before. The widest possible use wasmade of them during our advance, and once againthe B.O.A.C. was called upon to play an activepart by carrying men and materials to and fromthe desert. Throughout the campaign fuel, am-munition, water and supplies of all kinds - in-cluding such comparative luxuries as current

newspapers - were flown wherever they wereneeded, casualties were brought back and, in ad-dition, a number of special assignments were un-dertaken.

The first assignment of the transport squa-drons was on the first night of the offensiveand was similar to that carried out over SiwaOasis in the previous month. On the night of23/24th October, in co-ordination with a Navalsimulated landing, four Hudsons of No. 216Squadron dropped 32 dummy, self-destroyingparachutists in the Fuka area. The object, asin September, was to cause confusion among thelocal enemy troops, thereby diverting attentionfrom the main operations taking place at ElAlamein.

Fighter Wings Moved by Air

The next operations exploited the full tacticalpossibilities of air transport in wartime and harkback to the occasions in May, 1940, when Born-bays helped units to move from place to placein the command. Now the ground crews andequipment of complete 'fighter wings were car-ried forward en masse to confound the enemyby operating fighters where he would never ex-pect them to be, and providing air cover for ourmost forward troops.

On the first occasion on 11th November No.239 (Kittyhawk) Wing had been moved forwardby surface transport to the south -of the retreat-ing enemy columns. It was supplied by air withammunition, water and equipment until the S.& T. Column could catch up. The next day alanding ground some 120 miles south-west ofMaddalena was reconnoitred and supplies offuel, water and rations were laid down by trans-port aircraft, ready for a move of No. 243 (Hur-ricane) Wing. On the 13th nine Hudsons flewground personnel of No. 243 Wing to the land-ing ground where they made everything readyfor their Hurricanes to operate against the re-treating enemy in the Jedabya-Agheila district.The squadrons were maintained by air until the16th when they were withdrawn by transportaircraft.

Other more ambitious "wing lifts" followed,involving the whole available transport force.On 18th December No. 239 Wing was movedfrom Belandah to Marble Arch and was operat-ing its aircraft on the same day by 13.30 hours.No. 216 Group had to make four "sorties" at fullstrength, to carry a total weight of approxima-tely 160 tons of personnel, equipment and sup-plies, including 35,000 gallons of petrol and oil.

This feat was followed up on 17th Januarywith a lift of No. 239 Wing from Hamraiet to alanding ground about twelve miles from Sedada,specially prepared by an R.E. aerodrome party.Of the 25 D.C.IIIs, 22 Hudsons and eight Bom-bays employed, the only loss was one Bombay,which was written off when a tyre burst.

Two more lifts carried the wing forward toCastel Benito by 24th January, only one dayafter the enemy had evacuated Tripoli. For

some of these operations No. 216 Group had thehelp of the American transport squadrons, whichapproximately doubled the load-carrying capacity.From now on American help began to make allthe difference to air transport work in theMediterranean area.

Other Special Operations

In addition to these "wing lifts" there wereother interesting and well executed special tasks.Daily between 19th and 26th November trans-port aircraft supplied ammunition, water, rationsand diesel oil to an armoured force operatingnear Msus; between 28th November and 1st De-cember all available aircraft, except No. 267Squadron, were engaged in carrying 250 lb.bombs to the forward landing grounds, theheaviest load in one day being 52 tons.

The reason for No. 267 Squadron's absence onthis occasion was that it was busy with an ope-ration that consisted in flying some 250 men,with tools and equipment, from Egypt to Maltain thirteen Hudsons and three D.C.IIIs. Thisoperation was repeated between 2nd and 5thDecember and again between 7th and 8thDecember.

On 11th December came an operation in whichtwo Hudsons led a force of eleven Hurricanes toMalta and thence via an overland route acrossTunisia to Algiers. The Hudsons returned withHurricane pilots and other passagers. In a repeatperformance, one Hudson and one Hurricane werelost.

The Ferry Side of the Work

Before rounding off the story of No. 216 Groupin the first nine months of 1943, it must be re-membered that during the time that the transportsquadrons were engaged in the desert campaigns,the ferry side of the Group's work had continueduninterruptedly. By 1943 it bore little resem-blance to the ill-equipped organization that had in1940, with a few primitive and inadequately-staffed ilanding grounds, practically no signalsfacilities and no flying control or other flyingaids, blazed the West African reinforcementroute that had been pioneered four years earlierby Imperial Airways. On the pilot alone in theearlier part of the war rested almost all the res-ponsibility of getting his aircraft to Egypt.

Yet the first convoy of one Blenheim and sixHudsons that. came through in October, 1940,was the beginning of a stream that was to swellin two years to a thousand aircraft a month,flying over routes totalling over 11,000 miles.Where formerly each journey was something ofan adventure into the unknown, by 1943 fewerthan .65 per cent of the aircraft ferried failed toreach their ultimate destination.

In the early days the landing grounds and theferry crews were looked after by the AfricanReinforcement Route Control. On 15th Decem-ber, 1941, however, ,the:'A.R.R.C. crews wereabsorbed .in the Aircraft :Deliv t« ugh-'*' * * .?* "**'^^k -jtflh .M'l8S5B' jf- W * -

lengthening and the flow of aircraft increasing.Up to 1942, however, each section of the rein-forcement routes ran its own show, under thegeneral direction of H.Q., Middle East. Therewas little or no co-ordination of effort. In May,therefore, No. 216 Group was created to operateall the ferry routes and to control the A.D.U.,which by then had some 300 pilots on its strength,

Everything was tightened up to ensure that theaircraft flowed as easily and speedily as possiblefrom the erection centres to the immediate bat-tle areas, to the storage units or to the IndiaCommand. Directly under the Group came theFerry Controls, in turn responsible for the stag-ing posts on the air routes-the Takoradi Rou-te, the Northern Trans-African Route, the Sou-thern Trans-African Route, the Nile Valley Rou-te, the Port Sudan Route, the North ArabianRoute, the South Arabian Route and the Wes-tern Desert Route.

The A.D.U. was later split into two sectionsto deal more conveniently with local commitmentsand by 1943 was employing some 450 pilots andaircrew - British and men from the Coloniesand Dominions, Poles, Yugoslavs and French.

Developments in 1943

By the beginning of 1943, the two complemen-tary sides of No. 216 Group were in full swing.At any given moment there were some 200-250aircraft, including transports, flying on the Grouproutes. More and better aircraft - particularlyDouglas Dakotas - were to hand for the trans-port squadrons and new staging posts had beensuccessively set up at intervals roughly 100 milesbehind the front line, to cut down to a minimumthe time necessary to get the freshly-deliveredaircraft into action.

In January No. 249 Wing was formed to absorbthe advanced elements of the transport squadronsthat had previously been under the control of acuriously disembodied unit that had never beenestablished; on 27th January a staging post wasopened at Castel Benito, the main Tripoli airfield,only four days after the fall of the town. InFebruary a weekly air service to Karachi wasinaugurated. In March - the month in whichthe new Transport Command was formed inEngland - the Group pulled'off another success-ful operation, in which on the 27th 1,500 reinfor-cements for the VIIIth Army, with 15,000 lbs. ofurgent equipment, were flown up to Castel Benito.In April the new route, United Kingdom - Mo-rocco- Middle East, was opened, and the firsttwo Air Despatch and Reception Units wereformed to facilitate the handling of freight andmail and the movement of passengers byair. In May the last of the old Bombays werewithdrawn from service - to the delight ofthe maintenance crews - and the transportsquadrons were now almost entirely equippedwith Dakotas. In June a daily service was run-ning from Egypt to Casablanca and the B.O.A.C.began its service from the United Kingdomthrough to Russia. Four additional A.D.R.Us

P f .. , 'J,.

were also formed, bringing the total number upto six.

Preparing to Invade Sicily

The month of June saw the Group's transportand ferry organizations working to full capacity.The transport squadrons flew nearly 7;000 hours(about 1,700 more hours than in May); carriedover 9,000 passengers (about 2,500 more than inMay); and delivered over 700 tons of freight andmail (about 100 more tons than in May). Theincrease in flying hours was largely due to theease of maintaining the new Dakotas, and all theroutine trips ran a hundred per cent to schedule.Attention was also paid to the casualty-clearingside of the transport work and some 50 aircraftwere adapted to augment, when necessary, No. 1Air Ambulance Unit.

Everything was now set for the next phase ofthe Mediterranean campaign - the invasion ofSicily. In preparation for this, Advanced H.Q.,No. 216 Group, was formed at Tunis on 1st July.The aircraft at its disposal comprised ten D.C.IIIsand twenty Hudsons of No. 117 Squadron, based atCastel Benito (Tripoli), ten D.C.IIIs of No. 267Squadron, based at El Aouina _(Tunis), and fourextra Dakotas attached from No. 216 Squadron.To supplement this force, it was arranged thatimmediately the United States Troop CarrierCommand H.Q. at Kairouan had fulfilled its air-borne-landing commitments, its aircraft wouldcome under the operational control of AdvancedH.Q., No. 216 Group, for transport purposes.The aircraft that were thus made available-ap-proximately 320 C.47s and C.53s-were predomi-nantly U.S.A.F. and to facilitate co-operation anumber of U.S.T.C.C. officers were located withAdvanced H.Q. Also under the control of Ad-vanced H.Q. were No. 1 Air Ambulance Unitand a flight of six Sunderlands detached fromNo. 230 Squadron (Mombasa) and based at Bi-zerta, for communication work between Malta andNorth-west Africa.

Immediately before the invasion, No. 216Group carried out one of its large-scale "lifts"when its aircraft carried the ground personneland equipment of two fighter squadrons engagedin convoy protection from the Delta to Cyrenai-ca. Another type of operation, which No. 216Group had carried out several times in the past,took place on the night of 11th July. Four Da-kotas of No. 267 Squadron were briefed to dropdummy paracutists and incendiary flares overMarsala, on the west coast of Sicily. One of theaircraft crashed a few minutes after take-off,but the others completed their mission, whichresulted in the enemy temporarily divertingsome of his forces that had been proceedingsouth.

Work During the Invasion

On 13th July fifteen Dakotas-ten of No. 216Group and five U.S.A.F.-carried the servicingechelon of the 31st Fighter Giroup squadrons,comprising 75 personnel and 1,700 lbs. of equip-

ment, from Gozo to Licata. These were the firsttransport aircraft to land in Sicily and were thebeginning of a stream of aircraft that flew per-sonnel, equipment, stores and M.T. from North-west Africa, Malta and Pantelleria into the in-vaded island.

On the 19th, at the request of the 15th Army.Group, No. 216 Group began a regular serviceto Sicily that was gradually extended, linking upTunis-Cassibile-Palermo-Malta. Throughout theSicilian campaign this service was maintained,and in addition the Group was called upon tofulfil such tasks as the transportation of FighterControl staffs from Malta and Tunisia; completeheadquarters consisting of over a hundred per-sonnel and 40,000 lbs. of baggage and equipment;Jeeps, motor-cycles and trailers, and such ran-dom demands as fifteen tons of boots and stock-ings for the 7th Army. The number of casual-ties carried out of the island rose from 2,462 inJuly to 4,422 in August.

Valuable work was done in Sicily by the threemobile A.D.R.Us-Nos. 24, 25 and .26- that weresent there. They operated under extremely dif-ficult circumstances, improvising continually,and were largely responsible for the smoothrunning of transport matters in the island.

The Group's achievements in Sicily are bestshown by the figures themselves. Between 13thJuly and 18th August 2,689 passengers wereflown into Sicily and 1,054 flown out; 785 tonsof freight were carried either in or out; and,with No., 1 Air Ambulance Unit, 6,538 casualtieswere flown to safety either in North-west Africaor Malta or from forward landing grounds to theevacuation bases in the rear of the fighting. Inspite of the added commitments of the campaign,the only curtailment of the normal routine ser-vices was that the Ras el Mar-Casablanca leg ofthe daily Cairo-Casablanca run was reduced toalternate days.

In the Group's work as a whole, records con-tinued to be made in July and August in both thetransport and ferry sides. In July the transportsquadrons carried 12,558 passengers and 1,289tons of freight; in August - with the help ofNo. 28 S.A.A.F. Squadron, which had been formedtowards the end of July and added to the Group'sstrength - 14,463 passengers and 3,395 tons offreight. The ferry pilots also improved on theJune figures and delivered 1,412 aircraft in Julyand 1,241 in August to North-west Africa, theMiddle East, India, Iraq and South and WestAfrica.

The Assault on Italy

There is no doubt, however, that the climax ofNo. 216 Group's work in the Mediterranean areawas reached during the assault on Italy in Sep-

tember. In the initial stages of the campaign,the ground personnel and equipment of the wholeof the Tactical Fighter Force and of a considera-ble part of the Bomber Force were lifted intoItaly by aircraft under the Group's operationalcontrol.

The importance of these mammoth "lifts" isobvious when it is realized that, owing to thedistances involved, no single-engined shore-basedfighters would have been available to support theAllied armies during the critical early periodexcept by this method.

In addition to its work in Italy in September,the Group also lent a hand in the Aegean opera-tions. In August a detachment of eight No. 216Squadron Dakotas had been sent to Ramat Davidin Palestine in connection with paratroop training.When the occupation of Cos took place on 13thSeptember, six Dakotas dropped 120 paratroopsat selected points on the island. Altogether, upto the end of September, Dakotas flew 680 Armypersonnel to Cos with vehicles, equipment andstores weighing 171,598 lbs., as well as R.A.F.Regiment and other air force personnel and theirequipment.

September figures showed an improvement evenon those of' the two previous months and thetransport squadrons set up a new record. A total

of 17,374 passengers and 3,907 tons of freightwere carried on the Group routes, the aircraft indoing this covering a total of 1,390,562 miles.

Three Years of Progress

As this article briefly indicates, great strideshave been made in the development of transportand ferry work in the Mediterranean area sincethe beginning of the war. The ferry side wasobviously essential all the time, as we strove tobuild up an air force capable of attaining airsuperiority - and at last succeeded. The valueof the transport side was not so quickly recog-nized except by people with vision, but the recordof the transport squadrons alone is sufficientproof of their value.

Even when they were inadequately equipped,they had an important share in all the Mediter-ranean campaigns - in the Desert, in Greece and

Crete, in Iraq and Syria, in the retreat to Alamein

and in the victorious advance to Tripolitania and

Tunisia. By that time, with the invaluable help

of U.S.A.F. aircraft, they had showed the possi-

bilities of mass air "lifts", a development that

was to be exploited still further in the Sicilian and

Italian invasions.

Much air has flowed past the transport air-

craft's wings since those days when, even before

Italy was in the war, No. 216 Squadron assisted

R.A.F. units to move from place to place.

47

Ipp-iyi ;

o

A Difficult Rescue

AT APPROXIMATELY 03.00 hours on 10th. July,1943, the ten members of the crew of a Liberatorof the 93rd U.S.A.F. Bombardment Group, havingcompletely lost themselves after an invasion-eveattack on Sicily, decided to bale out, as the air-craft had reached the limit of endurance and aforced landing was impossible in the darkness.Unfortunately, they were over one of the mostinaccessible spots in the Libyan desert, some 200miles south of Nofilia, in the Gulf of Sirte. Thearea consists mainly of hard, black volcanic lava,strewn with boulders, the only recognizable fea-tures being various rock formations. This barrenand inhospitable region became known to the lostairmen and their rescuers as "The Coal".

The story of this rescue - which took the airforce and army units concerned over ten days,during which aircraft flew 120 flying hours, theland party covered 1,350 miles and the total areasearched was 15,500 square miles - is a goodexample of army and air force team work and ofjoint triumph over difficulties.

The Search Begins

Having made up their minds to bale out, theAmericans sent out a W/T message to that ef-fect. Bearings were taken on the distressed air-craft by the H.F. D/F stations at Benina, ElAdem, Misurata, Berka, Marble Arch, Heliopolis,Cairo West and Malta. From these it was decidedby No. 212 Group Flying Control and the Air/Sea Rescue Flight that the best position to starta search was 27.48 N., 18.27 E.

At 08.25 hours the search began with an Air/Sea Rescue Flight Wellington airborne, for thisposition. After eight hours flying the pilot re-turned to base, having completed a square searchof 900 square miles without result. Two Libera-tors of the IXth Bomber Command also made anunavailing seach around this position.

On the evening of the 10th a conference washeld between the Air/Sea Rescue Flight andthe IXth Bomber Command and an extensivesearch was planned, using three Liberators, aWellington and a Blenheim. The area to be cover-

.ed was to the west of the one already searchedand extended 150 miles north and south and 65miles east and west.

On the 11th the Welllington and the Blenheimwere unsuccessful, but two of the Liberators re-ported five survivors in position 27.10 N., 18.00 E.,and two survivors in position 26.50 N., 17.50 E.Supplies were dropped for both parties.

A Land Party Organized

Meanwhile, a land rescue attempt had also been

sisted of a light car patrol of No. 9 Motor Batt-alion of the Sudan Defence Force. The Britishofficer in charge received his orders at 11.00hours on the 10th, stocked five eight-cwt. vansand a fifteen-cwt. wireless truck, and with aparty of sixteen men left Benghazi at 13.30hours to report to the Civil Affairs Officer atJedabya, who was to provide maps and route re-ports of the area.

The party arrived at 17.30 hours to find thatthe Civil Affairs Officer was at Benghazi. Onbeing shown maps of the area around Marada,some 90 miles south of Agheila, the S.D.F. Bim-bashi realized at once that he could not do thejourney with his present vehicles since theycould not carry sufficient water as well asthe necessary petrol. He arranged, therefore, fora three-ton lorry and 1,200 gallons of petrol tojoin the party at Agheila at dawn on the 11th.

On telephoning the D.A.Q.M.G., No. 93 Sub-Area, he was ordered to proceed immediately andleave one van to collect maps and route reportswhen the Civil Affairs Officer returned. TheBimbashi, however, did not feel inclined to ven-ture into the desert south of Agheila withoutmaking sure of maps, so remained at Jedabyauntil the Civil Affairs Officer returned at 19.30hours. He did not have the necessary maps, andafter telephoning the D.A.Q.M.G. it was arrangedthat next day maps should be dropped by air forthe party at Marada. It was suggested that,owing to the difficult nature of the country, a suncompass should be provided, but the D.A.Q.M.G.said that he did not consider one was necessarysince they did not have sun compasses ten yearsago.

The patrol left Jedabya at 21.15 hours forAgheila and at 01.00 hours on the 11th reachedMaaten Bescer, the Agheila water point, whereit remained for the rest of the night. Soon afterdawn it was joined by the three-ton lorry, and onarrival at Marada at 14.00 hours it was foundthat the R.A.F. had already dropped the maps.There was also a message saying that five sur-vivors had been located in position 27.10 N.,18.00 E. The Bimbashi decided to proceed atdawn on the 12th south-west to Abu Naim andfrom there try to reach the survivors. The patrolwas fortunate in finding a number of 2-gallonwater and petrol cans at Marada as its own con-tainers were leaking badly.

Difficulties to be Faced

From all reports it became evident that a mostcomplex operation faced both the air and landunits concerned. In the first place, much flying

organize 93u r ( M nt time was taken up in reaching the position and,

\\ ; ] DERNA

MISURATAA

tVCRLEAVES OJ.'RNA

LIBERATOR RETUEN BEJN 5H UY

WAv I4ALE OUT IA IN ESPONSTHnE COAL!03AONRI TO SIGNAL EL L E

0 TN JULY. SF SENT BY SDF.LIGH PATR

S.TER "2IE LFEAVES IZCA PATRO

\ FOR /ECB% 0 .30MR5

BUERAT EL HSUN

SIRTE GULF OF SIRTE

NOFLIA LI _ddu

/~ J EE*E AP1 r'.

IOHJULY. &U R PAOL ARRIVESj i JDABYA I7.OHR TO REPORT TO

° ~ CIVL AFFAIRS OFFICER; LEAVES

LEMARBLE ARCH AGHELAO22LR JUATR LLB S PATROL PATROL REACHES

SECEIS AUNAIS AT MAN-EDHI400H JULY. S.F PATROLTO MAKE FOD-MPCH T W 1 PESNSACH AOP 90 WATER-

POINT 01I.OOrRS. JINDBY,+ '-M t,'aS-1 ; AJUL. L EI M 0 MAKH. R I . FOR3-POTN LORRY IN PETROL. LA STRIP

RELOCATED3 + BY'S LIEAO DROPPE BY WELLINCTON,

12TH JULY PETROL EL O 714 JUL TWO 9 L .ELNGO uE" W

RELCAE PORSE ES LNNO-S ORA DN °SL" PATRO TO" MACSTE FORE-ANS 2H_N-. DRPAU-TTFSPPIS NTIEOFR 2 SILES VOTR S SETHo MORIN AFE AIaCE FAL CIPt'"" , "EA

WOF URVIOL TO PATURN L LEVE FOR~ " SA

DRO SUPLE TOTO BEIRA A T DELAY SURVORS11TH ULY, ELLINTON]MROUGOU 13 TtL P "" ""

BLfNnE1M AND THREE '-or .\LIBERATOS BEGIN SEAC ARD ,k,.,.,""" "

OVER AREA 150 x 65 11TH~~~I~ JULY. S..F. PATROL RAHS 2 .! "" ri, " 1 r'5S."

MILES JMARADA U DOHRS4 L RECEIVES VYL1 l ei .7 " ' "! ,L" I;, .

MESSAGE THAT SUIRvIVORS MA "La; !"f3 BEEN LOCATED. Z. '

IOTH MAKEST JULY A.S.R. WLLINIWGTON

U SERAYORS ALSO SEARH AREA. ''

1015T JULY. WELLINGTON WITH "" v,

COMPOSITE CREW ESTABLISESEXACT POSITIONS OF SURVIVORS I;

14T JULY. BLENHEIM MAKES) RECOlNAISSANCE . FOR

P00.T5 FOUR MEN IN " +O 3 LANDING STRIP

DROPS M.7: SPARES. ANDMAPS FOR S.M.F PATROL -

' t "1'-I '/ 'I '' aE '17TH JULY. BOTH MILITARY PATROLS

ARRIVE AT RENDEZVOUS & PREPARELANDING STRIP FROM INSTRUC'TIONS

14THJULY. TWO MEN LI iaFV''tDROPPED BY WELLINGTON.RELOCATED BY LIBRATOR.~ ~ LI:

18T JULY. WELLINGTON ANDD

MAGISTER LAND; CONFERENC" IjiHJULY. WELLGTON LU1TH JULY TWO I 19T JURY. WELLINGTON HELD WITH PATROL OFFICERS.RELOATES FOUR SURVIVOS LIBERATORS LOCAE GUIDES LL." PATOL TO MAISTER FORCE-LANDS IS2OMR

SDROPS FURTHER SUPPLIES PARTIES OF FOUR L SURVIVORS., NEXT MORNING AFTER AIRSCREW FALLS OFF,T-WD SURVIVORS L SD.PATROL LEAVES FORDROP SUPPLIES TO BASE*S WITH SURVIVORS.

THEM.

secondly, "The Coal" in which the survivors werelocated consisted, as already mentioned, of rough,black volcanic rock, providing extremely difficultgoing for the land party and an equally difficultlanding ground for aircraft.

For these reasons a Bisley carried out twosorties on the 12th to re-locate the survivors andalso to reconnoitre the area. Although unsuccess-ful in finding the survivors, the pilot brought backmuch useful information, which later helped tospeed up the rescue. The S.D.F. patrol on the12th, having reached a point 22 miles west ofMarada, had to turn back owing to a brokenpiston on the petrol lorry, without which it wasimpossible to proceed. They were delayed atMarada throughout the 13th, awaiting the arrivalof two more three-ton lorries for which they hadsignalled, and certain M.T. spares which the

R.A.F. was to drop.The American airmen had not been re-located:

since the 11th, and another extensive search was

organized by the Air/Sea Rescue Flight and theIXth Bomber Command for the 13th. Two Wel-lingtons and three Liberators carried out sepa-rate searches, one of the Wellingtons spottingfour survivors in position 27.04 N., 17.56 E.. anddropping further supplies. These men were thesame as had been previously reported as five, asupport for their parachutes fixed to provideshelter having been mistaken for an injured sur-vivor. There was still no trace of the othermembers of the crew. o

The two men seen on the 11th were, however,re-located by Liberators on the 14th in position27.20 N., 18.00 F., and ,the group of four again.

seen by an Air/Sea Rescue Blenheim, who gavethe position as much further north-27.24 N., 17.50E. Supplies were dropped for both parties. TheBlenheim also dropped the springs and otherspares for the S.D.F. patrol and marked maps

- giving all known information -about' the missing

1airmen. The patrol then set out towards the

137 -

Part of the Army land 'partyready to enter the "Coal"

This glimpse of the convoy

travelling over the "Coal"

gives a good idea of the deso-

late nature of the terrain.

Making tracks for the trucksto get through the "Coal".

The S.D.F. patrol cooling off.

I

ti.i.,

11r : t

estimated position, but the going was rough androcky, with frequent patches of soft sand. Allthe vans boiled continuously and there were fur-ther breakdowns. These troubles persisted on the15th and one of the three-ton lorries ran its bigend. In the evening the Bimbashi signalled hisbattalion H.Q., suggesting that another patrol besent out as he could not get the airmen back inthe remaining vehicles without considerable delay.As a result, a patrol of the Indian Long RangeSquadron, based at Derna, was despatched.

Preparing a Landing Strip

Up to the 15th July the exact positions of thesurvivors had not been clearly established. Allpersonnel who had seen the Americans agreed,however, that they could re-locate, since they allsaid that there were various rock formations in"The Coal" that they could recognise. On the15th, therefore, a crew for a Wellington wasformed containing somebody who had been oneach of the previously successful flights.

Between them they found all the survivors, thetwo parties turning out to be only eight milesapart. More supplies were dropped and a re-connaissance was made to find a landing stripfor use as near "The Coal" as possible.

Information about the preparation of thisemergency landing ground was passed next dayto the S.D.F. patrol, which was still strugglingforward, along a mountainous and rocky track,broken by large sand dunes, and as it was stillmined from the time of the Wavell campaigngreat care had to be taken. The hard-workedvehicles, which were too light for the groundthey were traversing, continued to give troubleand the battery leads finally broke up in theW/T truck.

On the 17th the going improved and betterprogress was made, although during the heat ofthe day the vans boiled ceaselessly. At 16.30hours the patrol spotted an Air/Sea RescueFlight Wellington, and after its attention hadbeen attracted by verey lights the aircraft drop-ped smoke generators and marking strips aswell as full instructions for making the landingground. At 17.30 hours the patrol reached thespot chosen for the landing ground and an hourlater was joined by the I.L.R.S. party, which hadmade better time, having taken only two daysand six hours from Benghazi. By 20.00 hoursthe combined parties completed the landingground in position 27.30 N., 18.45 E. and hadinformed battalion H.Q. by signal.

The First Aircraft Lands

At 09.00 hours on the 18th an Air/Sea RescueWellington appeared and, guided by a smokegenerator, landed safely on the prepared strip. .2Two and a half hours later the C.O. of the Rescue 'Flight arrived in a Magister. A conference was;held at which it was decided that the I.L.R.S. :officer should go up in the Magister and recon-noitre the best route into the volcanic rock area.

This was done and both parties left the landingground at 14.30 hours.

At 15.00 hours the Magister flew over the pa-trols, but some twenty minutes later the airscrewfell off and the aircraft had to make a forced-landing. The crew was unhurt, but the positionwas so inaccessible that salvage of the aircraftwas impossible. The accident was seen by theRescue Flight's M.O., who was with the landparty, and rescue was soon effected, the crewbeing sent back to the landing ground, 25 milesaway, in one of the S.D.F. vans.

Next morning both patrols broke camp. Thegoing was appalling among the black volcaniclava and the I.L.R.S., being better equipped withvehicles, drew ahead of the SD.F., which had tostop continuously to remove boulders in order toget the vans through. At 13.45 hours the S.D.F.caught up with the I.L.R.S. patrol, which wasresting in a native village. The S.D.F. drivers,having been at the wheel for seven hours, hadto be rested, and the I.L.R.S. once more pushedon at 14.00 hours.

Shortly afterwards a Wellington flew over andwhen the S.D.F. Bimbashi wrote on the sandthat the I.L.R.S. was ahead, the aircraft follow-ed to assist in directing the search.

The Survivors Reached

The search was at last successful. The Wel-lington guided the I.L.R.S. patrol first to the twoAmericans and then, eight miles away, to theother four. Two of the airmen were injured, butthe others were well although weak and rathershaken after their ordeal. The two surviving of-ficers reported that there were four other air-men somewhere in "The Coal". The First Pilotand the Flight Engineer, they said, had startedto walk north-but had no water with them andtheir parachutes had been found rolled up undera tree; the remaining two airmen had at firstbeen with one of the rescued parties but, beingslightly injured, had dropped out when theircomrades began to walk northwards. None ofthe missing men, however, had been seen by thesearching aircraft.

It was decided that it would be better to getthe survivors to safety before making any deci-sion regarding further air searches for the lostairmen.

On the morning of the 20th the S.D.F., whichon the previous evening had caught up with theI.L.R.S., left camp with the six survivors, theinjured men riding in a borrowed I.L.R.S. truck.The other two trucks of the I.L.R.S. stayed tocontinue the search. They contacted a nativevillage, but could get no news of the missingmen and consequently made their way back inthe, evening to the landing ground, which theS.D.F. with the survivors had reached earlier.That night a message was received telling the

. patrols to remain at the landing ground for fur-ther orders, although by then the S.D.F. hadwater left for only two and a half days.

i!~' II

: 1 , I i /''i !!.I " :: i: ii ki! '!

il; ii.

. , '

i,- , *I .. .... " ,..,* I ...

The A.S.R. Flight Magister,used during the search, beingrefuelled from a Wellington.

Another view of the Magisterbeing refuelled, with one ofthe Army cars in the back-

ground.

The American survivors beingshown their position in the

"Coal" on a map.

The rescued airmen

back at Berka.

safely

140

~rc

DECLA

First thing next morning two Air/Sea RescueFlight Wellingtons flew the six rescued airmenback to base at Berka. A conference was thencalled to decide whether any further action waslikely to be fruitful. No. 212 Group Flying Con-trol, No. 93 Sub-Area, the 93rd BombardmentGroup and the Air/Sea Rescue Flight were allrepresented, and it was finally agreed that fur-ther searching would be useless and that the mis-sing men were to be considered lost. The land-ing ground was, therefore, evacuated by allpersonnel.

The S.D.F. patrol left at 13.45 hours on the21st and limped into the Company camp at Ben-ghazi at 16.00 hours on the 27th, after sufferingalmost every known type of breakdown. TheI.L.R.S. patrol received orders when at Zella, 150miles south of Nofilia, on the 22nd to proceed byforced-march to Qassassin, in the Suez CanalZone. It reached Benghazi, at 18.00 hours on the24th, rested and carried out repairs for the next24 hours, and made Suez by 16.00 hours on the28th, embarking for India next day.

As already mentioned, the Air/Sea RescueFlight's aircraft had flown 120 flying hours,

searching a total area, excluding areas coveredtwo or three times, of 15,500 square miles.

Owing to heavy commitments at that time inconnection with the invasion of Sicily, the Flightwas short of aircraft at base, but the small main-tenance organisation left behind completed sixengine changes in eight days on the aircraft,employed in this rescue.

An American Tribute

The following message was received by No.212 Group Flying Control from Brigadier Gene-

ral U.G. Ent, the C.O. of the IXth Bomber Com-mand, U.S.A.F.:-"This Command wishes to ex-

press its appreciation for the untiring efforts ex-pended by Flying Control personnel in the recentrescue of six American airmen of the 93rd Bom-bardment Group, who were stranded in the de-

sert. The problem of rescue in this case wasunusually difficult and only by the intelligentplanning and prompt action of your organizationand other units involved was the rescue madepossible".

An extract from the Operations Record Book of No. 209 Squadron wasgiven in "From the 540s" in 'Number 3 of the Review. On the followingpage is an interesting diagram showing the distances from base of the Squa-dron's Detachments.

141

GREAT CIRCLE DISTANCESSHOWN THUS:- ----

ACTUAL DISTANCES FLOWNSHOWN THUS: -

"-APPROXIMATE SCALE(5,vtsh4 Sth'tute Mies)

05S0300 200 300 400 500 600 700

fkOUTt ie

1 MOMBASA-DUBAN _ 1625-111 PAMANZL - 1946

2 MOMBASA-SL.LUCIA BAY.. 1510-W/A PAMANZIL 1800- BO

3 MOMBASA-LANGEBAAN,SALDHANA BAY - - 2125

/A PAMANZI, DURBAN,CAPETOWN------2925

4 MOMBASA-MAURITIUS.. 1425 0

5 MOMBASA-SEYCIELLES. 950'

6 MOMBASA-PAMANZL.. 626 t7 MOMBASA-DIEGO SUAREZ. 758

8 MOMASA DAR-ES-SALMAM. 165

9 MOMBASATULEAR 1180

THE ADJUTANTA DIAGRAM, SHOWING OVEROF EUROPE THE DISTANCESMENTS RUN BY Na2O9 SQUADRON SINCE IsiJANUARY1943. BASE H-AS BEEN TRANSPLANTED TO LONDON,THE DAR.K LINES REPRESENT DISTANCES BY THEROUTES NORMALLY FOLLOWED BY THE AIRCRAFT;THE DOTTED LINES REPRESENT DISTANCES AS

THE CROW FLEES.

n. I.. s 5 A

A N

LIST OF ADVANCED BASESOAR ES- SALAAMPAMANZIDIEGO SiUAREZPORT VICTORIA, SEYCHELLESTOMBEAU BAY, MALURTIUSTULEARST LUCIA BAYDURBANLANGE8AAN

. '

ACCOUNTS OF OPERATIONS in Sicily containedin the Operations Record Books of this quartercould have filled the R.A.F. MediterraneanReview alone, but following the previous policythe selection of extracts has been kept as diverseas possible, covering past as well as currentevents. Further sidelights on Sicilian adventureswill be included in future numbers.

No. 1. A Canadian Squadron in Sicily

(From No. 417 Squadron, R.C.A.F.)Malta. 15th July. Ordered at 1130 hours to

embark on barges in Valetta harbour at 1700hours. In view of previous instructions, andinspections under way, this was very difficult, butthe Squadron began loading on to the barge at1703 hours. Rear party of 20 airmen andEngineer Officer left to finish inspections. Land-ing barge very fine double decker, accommodatingall our 20 vehicles and 165 men quite easily. LeftValetta harbour and anchored off Valetta until

2300 hours. Convoy of ten barges and two cor-vettes sailed under full moon, calm sea.

Sicily. 16th July. Were off Sicilian coast at0400 hours; heavy air raid on Pachino, with im-pressive barrage. Lay off until raid was over,then drove .right up on to rocky beach at 0600hours. F/O E. and F/Lt. S. first ashore. Trans-port came through water and up on beach with-out a hitch. Proceeded immediately to Pachinoaerodrome three miles away, arriving at 0700hours. Wing decided to move ahead to afield the Engineers had hacked out of an almondgrove, so we moved on as advance squadron toCassibile. Secured a fine dispersal in a big al-mond grove, with camp lines in a vineyard justbehind. Had camp set up and flights ready toreceive aircraft at 1800 hours. Aircraft landedat Pachino on last patrol and pilots stayed therefor night. Heavy raid from 0005 to 0130 hourson ships at George Beach, Syracuse and Au-gusta. No Jprmns fl Qagii*i4,mlm

deal of shrapnel fromsleep two to a pup-tent,or four officers to a 180 1 tent in the desert.Pup-tents much more convenient to erect andcarry. Have no mess tents, all having been leftbehind in Africa, but stretched a truck tarpaulinover the long table from Sousse Court Houseand set up a pilots' mess.

Cassibile L.G. 17th July. Aircraft arrived at0730 hours. Bit of sniping in area still, two menbeing killed at Pachino. Impossible to dig slittrenches as only a foot of soil above the lavastone, so are building small blast walls aroundthe pup-tents. Very fine country, with anabundance of almonds, lemons, grapes, melons,tomatoes and good red wine. Oranges and wal-nuts not quite ripe. The district we are in is abroad plain with mountains to the south-west andnorth-west. Three hours raid between 2330 and0230, no casualties.

18th July. Very hot, but airmen have discover-ed a deep well in an old farmyard with ice coldwater, so have a constant bath parade. Sea muchtoo oily for swimming. Natives very friendly andwill trade anything for cigarettes. Rations verymuch better than in the desert-scarcely seebully beef. Have a new mascot, a young kid,which wandered into camp and attached herselflike a puppy to P/O P. All other mascots wereleft behind in Africa. F/O G. has started a smallpoultry farm with seven hens and two turkeys.Raid from 0100 to 0200, one Gerry shot downjust west of the aerodrome, one petrol ship inSyracuse in flames.

19th July. Visited by P.M.O. who complimentedthe Squadron on camp site, said it was bestordered and cleanest in the Wing. Squadron alsohad much the lowest sickness rate of any of thesquadrons, a tribute to the keenness of our M.O.and sanitary squad. Each day the pilots off dutytake a truck and travel round the country, visit-ing the Canadian Army and collecting greenproduce. Quite a number of the Canadian sailorsin the ships off George Beach are frequentvisitors of the Squadron. First raidless nightsince arrival.

20th July. Royal Engineers have now completedthe aerodrome and made a very fine job of it.In the Desert it was found quicker and safer toconstruct a new aerodrome rather than de-lousethe German ones, and so special companies ofthe Engineers were formed to specialize in thiswork; they are certainly very efficient. Heaviestraid to date started at 0300 hours. No casualtiesin our Squadron.

21st July. Air Evacuation centre set up in fieldand Squadron M.Os and orderlies worked onclearing casualties. As no cigarettes provided,the Squadron turned their daily ration over toour M.O. for distribution. Little progress beingmade against Catania, but Americans and Cana-dians advancing steadily. Another heavy twohour raid.

24th July. W/Cdr. D.S., D.S.O., D.F.C., nowWing Cdr. flying, led the Squadron on four

eps today and then complimented the pilotson being the best disciplined Squadron in the airof the five in the Wing; high praise indeed as244 Wing is the crack wing of the Desert AirForce. All pilots agree that the tremendouschange in Squadron airmanship and discipline isentirely due to S/Ldr. T. A very great changein the attitude of the Wing and Group to theSquadron; instead of being regarded as the ju-nior squadron, left behind and doing the uninte-resting shows, we are now the advance squadronand the C.O. sees that the pilots get the maxi-mum flying in the best shows.

No. 2. At Last!(From N9. 459 Squadron, R.A.A.F.)

June, 1943. Hudson "T" was airborne at 1220hours to co-operate with Naval vessels in a huntfor a U-boat which, had previously torpedoed atender in the Haifa area.

The Naval vessels were not met in the posi-tion given so the pilot climbed to 8,000 feetto take advantage of 4/10th cloud cover andcommenced an independent patrol. At 1347 hoursa submarine was sighted on the surface aboutfour miles away on a course of 3300 at eightknots. The aircraft immediately dived and de-livered an attack with four D.Cs up the track,one D.C. making a direct hit, two near missesand one 40 to 50 feet ahead. The submarineimmediately circled hard to port;- members of thecrew who had been caught sunbathing on thedeck dived overboard, and less than five minuteslater the U-boat sank stern first, the bow pro-jecting sharply out of the water. Later, 21 sur-vivors, all German, were picked up.

Unfortunately for the aircraft the D.C. whichmade a direct hit caused a tremendous explosionwhich threw the Hudson 400 feet into the air,and severely bent and damaged the mainplanes,fuselage and tailplane. In view of this, the air-craft remained on the scene only long enough totake photographs, and then returned to "XYZ",where an excellent landing was made althoughthe aircraft was so damaged that it was conse-quently placed in category two.

The U-boat was assessed as a definite "kill"thus giving the Squadron its first, but longsought-after, submarine. The comment of theS.A.S.O. at No. 201 (N.C.) Group, was "a clas-sical attack emphasising the value of surprisebrought about by good hunting methods in a wellcamouflaged aircraft and followed by immediateaction resulting in a certain kill". The Navysent a signal "Many thanks". The Pilot wasonly on his third operation with the Squadronwhen he made his kill and he deserves everycredit for this excellent attack, and his handlingof a subsequently damaged aircraft. He later re-ceived an immediate award of the D.F.M.

No. 3. The Right Spirit.(From No. 2 (M.E.) Fuel Transport Coy.)

Lete. Near Benghazi. 21st July. On comple-tion of deliveries on this date the unit had re-

.s <~ ~21 S 8I

O[CLASS irr icorded deliveries of aviation fuel exceeding onemillion gallons. The total mileage .for all unitM.T. vehicles was 147,285. All vehicles wereserviceable and there was a clear bill with re-gard to accidents.

31st July. During the month a great deal ofconsideration was given to the question of food.The stoves installed in the cookhouse lorry caus-ed considerable trouble, and the lack of freshmeat was a great handicap to the cooks. The"eternal bully" quotation was much in evidence,but the men accepted the position in a very cheer-ful manner. All Sawyer stoves were convertedto oilfed and field kitchens were built. Theseproved to be of great assistance and lessenedthe risk of fire. Morale was good, and was help-ed by the events in Sicily and Russia. The menare very proud of the work they are doing, andtheir meetings with the Americans in the courseof their duties has proved intensely valuable increating a better understanding between theU.S.A.F. and the R.A.F. here. The Officers haveencouraged U.S.A.F. Officers to visit this unitand whilst this cannot be developed to any greatdegree, it is felt that what has already beenachieved by individual invitaton has had an ef-fect which will spread.

Liaison between our unit and the U.S.A.F.units is given a high degree of importance.

During the month no effort was spared to im-prove accommodation and recreational facilitiesin the camp. An exceptionally good and fairlywell-stocked canteen now operates, and a pianohas been hired. A violin has also been purchas-ed through Welfare, and both instruments arebeing used to good advantage.

Sickness was at a very low percentage andhealth was good.

No. 4. Taxi, Sir ?(From No. 284 Squadron)

Cassibile. 4.8.43. Weather good. AerodromeO.K. At 1020 hours Sgt. L., W/O P., and F/Sgt.B. were sent off to meet escort and proceed threemiles east of Catania. Here they picked upF/O K. (R.C.A.F.) of No. 72 Squadron, alive butbadly wounded in the leg. Could not take offagain in area so taxied to better conditions nearAugusta, and took off.

At 1240 hours, ten minutes after landing, Sgt.L. took off again in another Walrus with Sgt. B.and F/Sgt. P., to position 400 yards east of Ca-tania. They picked up Sgt. W. (R.A.F.) in po-sition without opposition, and were on homewardjourney when re-vectored to position five milesfurther north, one mile off-shore, and here foundand picked up P/O B., alive. With the extraweight they were unable to take off, so aftertwo attemps proceeded to taxi. However, it wasfound that a hole had been made in the portfloat which proceeded to fill so three men weresent on to the starboard wing. As aircraft con-tinued to take water, Sgt. L. decided to beach,which was done successfully six miles south of

~ '%Fi 15'! ;gP i~ .1 ~ oi% 1i'I, f

F/Lt. H. flew to Malta to collect cigarettesand soap for the boys. State of aircraft, twoserviceable, two u/s.

No. 5. A Change of Luck.(From No. 152 (Hyderabad) Squadron)

18.7.43. Another sweep of the same area asyesterday by twelve aircraft proved uneventful.In the afternoon the ground party received wordto move again at one hour's notice and at 1700hours they left Syracuse to move forward, arriv-ing at Lentini at approximately 2100 hours wherethe night was spent under the transport.

The ground party spent the day in settling inand preparing a camp site. Meanwhile, the pilotsin Malta put up an excellent show. Four of ouraircraft on convoy patrol five miles north-westAugusta ran into a number of Reggiane 2001bombers attempting to attack the convoy. Wewent in full of joy, to send no fewer than six ofthem into the sea. F/O J. got three of them andF/O K. and Sgt. S. each got one and shared halfanother. This was the best break the Squadronhas had since coming overseas. Perhaps our luck,which has been pretty poor so far, may bechanged.

25.7.43. The best day in the history of theSquadron! At least thirteen enemy aircraftdestroyed, one probable, and one damaged; twelveof them in one scrap when, led by W/Cdr. G., weran into a crowd of JU.52s, escorted by ME.109s,attempting to land on the shore in the Gulf ofMilazzo., The other aircraft destroyed was aME.109 claimed by Sgt. S. on patrol in the samearea during the evening.

The Squadron was flying on the "deck" whenthe JU.52s were sighted and soon got amongthem. Several went up in a mass of flame, pro-bably petrol transports. W/Cdr. G. got two ofthe JU.52s, F/O K. two, Sgt. B. two, F/Lt. B.one and a half, F/O J. a half, Sgt. P. one andF/O B. and P/O M. shared one. After dealingwith the transports we got mixed up with theME.109s of which F/O J. destroyed two and F/OK. chased one into Italy before his ammunitionran out and he had to leave it smoking badlyvery low in a narrow gully. He claimed it as aprobable. Incidentally it got a shot into his wingbefore he first saw it. One of the JU.52s whichF/Lt. B. destroyed blew up right in front of himso that his cockpit was filled with smoke, andwhen he got back he found a length of parachutecord in his radiator.

The whole affair was a tremendous lift up to theSquadron, particularly in view of the six Italianaircraft destroyed on the 19th. The only blackspot was that F/O M. failed to return.

No. 6. For Services Rendered.(From No. 216 Squadron)

April, 1943. El Djem turned out to have agrass landing ground and this is the first timesince 1919, when the Squadron first came toEgypt, that our aircraft have operated from agrass aerodrome.

v- -

Towards the end of the month crews began tobe detailed back to base and Dakotas made theirappearance, firstly for training purposes and lateron replaced the Bombays.

In recognition of our services in evacuatingwounded under difficult conditions, we receiveda letter of appreciation from Colonel P. F., 2 N.Z.Division in which he said : "Would you pleaseconvey to Group Captain O'M., to No. 1 R.A.A.F.Air Ambulance Unit, and to the other air unitsinvolved the gratitude of the New Zealand Divi-sion for their help and co-operation during therecent fighting.

The total of 420 cases evacuated by air from aposition in close proximity to the enemy, and vir-tually behind his lines, would appear to be thelargest undertaking of its kind so far in thistheatre of war. By cutting out a journey of 160miles over rough desert tracks it must have savedmany lives and spared our wounded a great dealof suffering and so contributed to their early re-covery.

The work of the pilots in landing all types ofplanes on an improvised airfield under extremelybad weather conditions was most praiseworthy.

May I also express my gratitude to you for theimmediate response to all requests for assistancewith supplies of blood and other stores, whichcontributed greatly to the solving of our diffi-culties."

No. 7. Uncomfortable Moments.(From No. 249 Squadron)

Pachino. 4.8.43. A captured ME.109 piloted bya 72 Squadron pilot was airborne only for a shorttime before the gunners in and around the A/D,not having been warned previously and unableno doubt to distinguish British marking, openedfire. An exciting few minutes followed, groundpersonnel running for cover, the 109 taking eva-sive action, a Spitfire taking off, circling the

drome waggling wings, signalling ack-ack tocease fire. Finally the 109 came in making an ex-cellent one wheel landing; luckily the pilot escap-ed unscathed.

Pachino. 12.8.43. News was received from Ops.that F/Lt. G. had baled out near Lentini and wassafe with 244 Wing. He returned to the Squa-dron in a Whitley bomber on the 20th. Afterthe first attack, his section had broken and hehad become separated from it but not before hehad seen a Spitfire going down in flames atabout 12,000 feet and two other Spitfires in hissection still breaking. On his way to Sicily, aFW.190 had attacked him from below and astern,severely damaging his aircraft. Most of the con-trols were shot away, the tail unit damaged, theport and starboard mainplanes holed, parts of theelevator were missing, the port flap hanging inpieces, the radio was dead, and only the engineappeared untouched. The machine was almostbeyond control. At first he decided to try aforced-landing to save the engine. When he rea-lised the futility of this he undid his straps andprepared to bale out. The hood refused to jetti-son, and he found it impossible to re-fasten hisstraps. After climbing from 3,000 ft. to 5,000 ft.and making for Lentini he eventually forced offthe hood, after several attempts, whilst holdingthe stick between his knees. The hood struck thetail unit, rolling the aircraft on its back and hisfeet caught under the instrument panel. He hungsuspended for a time until managing to kickhimself free; he felt for the rip cord - moredelay; the parachute had slipped round his body.He; dropped about 1,500 feet before he could pullthe cord when the parachute opened immediately.He now found it necessary to control the 'chuteto avoid high tension cables and eventually landedin a cactus grove, luckily in an open space!During the descent he saw his own aircraft crashin a vineyard and burst into flames.

CORRECTIONS

1. Attention has been called to the fact that in the historical account

of R.A.F. operations in No. 3 of the R.A.F. Middle East Review, the activity

of the Western Desert Air Force was described in a manner implying that

it was still acting independently, whereas it was, w.e.f. 23rd February, 1943,

operationally controlled by the North-west African Tactical Air Force and

from then on operated, of course, as an integral part of that Force.

2. A printer's error occurred in the same issue. On page 50, line 16,

the bomb load, which was made up-primarily of 20 lb. fragmentation bombs,

shoul rpad : to, no't 39-t: m 3' Hy r" 7I I '

ACKNOWLEDGHENT

is due to the

Officers Commanding

THE R.A.F. REG IMENT

No. 216 GROUP

AIR STAFF INTELLIGENCE H.Q., R.A.F., MI.E.

P.0.. BRANCH H.Q., R.A.F., M.E.

AIRCRAFT 'SAFETY. ORGANISATIONH.Q., RAE., MLE.

NORTHWEST AFRICAN PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE

WING

R.A,F. MIDDLE EAST PHOTOGRAPHIC

INTERPRIETATION UNIT

MIDDLE EAST COMMNAND PUBLIC RELATIONSPHOTOGRAPHIC UNIT

294 SQUADRON

For their kind permission and co-operationin the production of material

for this number of

THlE RI.A.F. MYED1TERRIANEAN REVIEW

and also to those Officers. who supplied

articles or materials or photographs

rl C

PBODUJCED BY

AIR STAFF

(OPERATIONS RECORDS)

HEADQUARTERS, ROYAL AIR FORCE,

MIDDLE EAST

148