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McLennan,J., Elliott, G. & Omodei, M. (2012). Householder decision-making under imminent wildfire threat: Stay and defend or leave? International Journal of Wildland Fire, 21, 915-925. doi: 10.1071/WF11061
Householder Decision Making Under Imminent Wildfire Threat: Stay and Defend or
Leave?
Jim McLennanA, Glenn Elliott and Mary Omodei
School of Psychological Science, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia
ACorresponding author. Email [email protected]
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Abstract. The study examined aspects of decision making which distinguish between those who
stay and defend their property and those who leave for an assumed safer location when a
community comes under imminent threat from a severe wildfire. The data were obtained from
field interviews with 49 survivors of the Murrindindi wildfire (Victoria, Australia, 7 February
2009) which killed 38 people and destroyed the small township of Marysville. Uncertainty about
the level of threat was a major feature of the decision making context in the period immediately
preceding the impact of the fire. The majority of those who stayed and defended did so because
they were committed to this plan of action. For most of those who left, the action of leaving was
triggered by realisation of the severe threat posed by the intensity or location of the fire.
Additional keywords: natural hazards, wildfire, bushfire, community wildfire safety, decision
making, wildfire survival
We compared two groups of survivors interviewed after the 2009 Victorian wildfires: those who
stayed and defended, and those who left. The major determinant of staying and defending was
prior commitment to this plan; the major determinant of leaving was a trigger event which
confirmed that the fire posed a severe threat.
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Householder Decision Making Under Imminent Wildfire Threat: Stay and Defend or
Leave?
The Victorian Bushfires of 7 February 2009
In this paper we use the term ‘bushfire’ when discussing the Australian context, and the
synonymous term ‘wildfire’ when discussing trans-national issues of community safety. On 7
February 2009 the State of Victoria experienced Australia’s worst day of bushfires in recorded
history. Extreme fire danger weather was predicted six days in advance. Warnings of expected
extreme fire risk were broadcast widely via electronic media, and reported extensively in daily
newspapers, during the preceding week. From mid-morning, numerous fires occurred across the
State. As predicted, weather conditions were extreme—high temperatures (>44 degrees Celsius),
low relative humidities (<10%), and strong winds (>100kph). Rainfall for the previous 12
months was well below the annual average, and this followed 10 years of drought conditions.
There were 173 fatalities; more than 2,000 homes were destroyed; and several communities were
devastated; resulting in severe economic, social, and environmental costs, amounting to at least
US$4 billion (2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission 2010).
On 16 February 2009 the Victorian Government established the 2009 Victorian Bushfires
Royal Commission, which delivered its Final Report on 31 July, 2010. Evidence presented
suggested that, in addition to serious shortcomings in agencies’ warnings to threatened
communities, the number of fatalities may have been less if residents had made (and acted upon)
decisions more appropriate to their situation under the extreme weather conditions, especially a
decision to leave—self-evacuate—before bushfire attack was imminent.
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A Policy Context For Understanding Community Members’ Actions on 7 February 2009
Investigations following multi-fatality bushfire disasters in 1967 and 1983 lead Australian fire
authorities to conclude that householders (a) were most likely to be killed by radiant heat or
vehicle accident while attempting to flee at the last moment; and (b) could successfully defend
suitably-prepared houses against bushfires (Handmer and Tibbits 2005). These conclusions
contributed to a general policy position that: “By extinguishing small initial ignitions, people of
adequate mental, emotional, and physical fitness, equipped with appropriate skills, and basic
resources, can save a building that would otherwise be lost in a fire” (Australasian Fire
Authorities Council 2005, p. 6). This position came to be summarized as the ‘prepare, stay and
defend, or leave early’ policy (Tibbits et al. 2008). Such a policy differs from that adopted in
most North American fire jurisdictions, where evacuation of residents from threatened
communities is generally the preferred strategy (Paveglio et al. 2010).
By the beginning of the 2008-2009 south-eastern Australian bushfire season, agencies
had in place detailed community bushfire safety programs. Residents in high risk areas were
advised to formulate a bushfire plan to implement on days of extreme fire danger to either defend
a suitably prepared property, or to leave well before a fire threatened. Educational material about
preparing grounds and dwellings, and defending against bushfire attack, was available for
residents whose plan was to stay and defend. However, investigations in the aftermath of the
fires found that few of those impacted by the fire had planned and prepared adequately to survive
a severe bushfire—either by property defence or timely self-evacuation—indicating that
agencies’ community bushfire safety promotion endeavours had been largely ineffective (2009
Bushfires Royal Commission 2010; Whittaker et al 2009). What remained largely unexamined
was how affected residents came to their final decisions to stay and defend or evacuate.
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The Present Study
The present study aims to contribute to knowledge of community wildfire safety by addressing
the apparent knowledge gap about how people come to a decision under threat of wildfire attack
to either stay and defend their property, or evacuate to a presumed safer location. We discuss the
limited literature related to this issue, and describe a data set comprising interviews with
residents of a Victorian community which was severely affected by one of the 2009 bushfires.
We report an analysis comparing accounts by those who stayed and attempted to defend their
properties with those who left to seek safety elsewhere, and discuss implications for community
wildfire safety.
Community Wildfire Safety Research
Numerous studies of aspects of community wildfire safety have been reported by North
American and Australasian researchers, mostly about determinants of householder property
preparation to mitigate effects of wildfire on dwellings. Several recent studies have noted the
importance of factors such as residents’ perceptions of wildfire risk, knowledge of wildfire
mitigation options and availability of resources, mitigation activity efficacy beliefs and
expectations, as well as environmental, social and community contextual characteristics, as
determinants of property preparation against wildfires (e. g., Collins 2008; Hall and Slothower
2009; Kyle et al. 2010; Martin et al. 2009; McCaffrey et al. 2011; McGee et al. 2009; Paton et
al. 2008). However, most of the research focussed on reducing vulnerability of dwellings to
wildfire attack following evacuation (such as vegetation clearing), with relatively little attention
given to preparation for active property defence by householders.
Few studies have investigated residents’ readiness to evacuate. In surveys of three US
communities affected by wildfires McCaffrey and Winter (2011) found that many residents who
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had been warned to evacuate chose to wait and see what developed before making a final
decision about whether this was necessary. Cohn et al. (2006) interviewed residents of three US
communities about their evacuation experiences and identified several factors which made
evacuation problematic for some residents, such as uncertainty about the nature of the fire threat
and perceived lack of facilities for evacuees.
A search of data bases located only two research studies which investigated the
experiences of survivors of wildfires and factors driving their decisions and actions under threat
from an approaching fire. Proudley (2008) interviewed 38 couples affected by the 2005 Wangary
Fire in South Australia’s Lower Eyre Peninsula, focussing on their uncertainty about staying in
their home or driving to a presumed safer location. The fire burned more than 77,000 ha of land,
destroyed 93 homes and caused 9 deaths. Proudley found that it was difficult for households to
decide whether to remain in their house for protection or to risk attempting to drive to safety,
chiefly because of differences between husbands and wives about what to do and concerns by
mothers about their children’s safety: “Interviews (and participant observations) conducted with
fire affected families identified that the roles that people have within a family unit play a major
part in what family members do, how they behave and respond during a crisis” (p. 42). Proudley
concluded that agencies’ understanding of the ‘prepare, stay and defend or leave early’ policy
failed to take into account the complexities of household dynamics in a crisis, and that there was
a need for more research into decision making in households under threat.
Tibbits and Whittaker (2007) analysed data from nine focus groups (73 participants) in
five communities affected by the January-March 2003 north-eastern Victorian bushfires, which
burned 1.2 million ha and destroyed 41 homes. There were no civilian fatalities. The focus
groups were conducted to find out residents’ levels of understanding and support for the
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‘prepare, stay and defend or leave early’ policy and if they had implemented the policy during
the fires. Tibbits and Whittaker reported a high level of awareness of, and strong support for, the
policy. The majority opposed forced evacuations. The concept of preparing, staying and
defending was well understood. However, there was confusion about ’leaving early’: for some it
meant the day before a predicted fire, for others it was following a warning from authorities, and
for others it was after a trigger such as smoke, flames, or embers. Tibbits and Whittaker found
that influential factors in participants’ decisions to stay and defend or leave early included: the
number of people available to stay and defend; responsibility for vulnerable household members;
level of investment in the property; and responsibility for livestock and pets. They concluded that
“Participants’ confidence in the survivability of their house and in their physical and mental
capacity to stay and actively defend it was the greatest influence on decisions to stay and defend
or leave early” (p. 287). They also noted that “...many of those who plan to stay and defend their
properties are not fully committed to doing so. Many of those who plan to stay and defend are
consciously or unconsciously retaining late evacuation as a last minute option...” (p. 289).
Neither Proudley (2008) nor Tibbits and Whittaker (2007) focussed specifically on
residents’ survival-related decision-drivers under imminent bushfire threat from an actual
bushfire, instead exploring ‘prepare, stay and defend or leave early’ understandings more
generally. We suggest that one avenue for authorities to improve the effectiveness of their
community wildfire safety endeavours and reduce fatalities is to better understand the factors
that drive decisions and subsequent behaviours of householders exposed to a wildfire threat.
Anecdotal accounts by survivors of wildfires indicate how such decisions can be complicated by
inadequate information and warnings about the fire in question, communications failures, and
uncertainty about evacuation routes (e. g., Franklin 2009; Kissane 2010). Some studies in the
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stress and human performance literature suggest that survival-related decision making may be
further compromised by anxiety associated with imminent wildfire threat (McLennan et al.
2011). The present study investigated decision making by residents threatened by an approaching
bushfire, by analysing transcripts of interviews with survivors from a community which was
impacted severely by one of the fires which occurred in Victoria on 7 February 2009. As
described below, the fire struck homes in a rural community north east of Melbourne, the capital
city of Victorian, destroying homes and causing deaths. Our focus was on identifying
determinants of residents’ decisions, under imminent bushfire threat, to either stay and defend
their homes or to leave—self-evacuate—to a presumed safer location.
Method
Selection of the Sample of Survivors
Immediately following 7 February 2009, the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre organised a
multi-agency Task Force to investigate the fires and report to the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal
Commission. An important aspect of this was interviews with a large cross-section of survivors
about their experiences (see below). Overall, more than 500 interviews were conducted, covering
eight major fire complexes. Five of the eight fire complex interview data sets were too small (<
30 interviews) to allow useful comparisons between those who stayed and those who left. Of the
remaining three, two covered very large areas, in each of which the experiences of survivors
appeared to be rather disparate because of variations in land usage and types of dwelling, and
variations in the nature and intensity of the fire across the affected areas. We chose to examine
transcripts from the district affected by the Murrindindi Fire complex because of: (a) the scale of
the disaster (see below), (b) the relative homogeneity of landform and vegetation and types of
property; and (c) the reported social cohesiveness of the affected community— whose members
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often described themselves as residing in the ‘Marysville and triangle—Narbethong and
Buxton—community’ (Marysville Community Website 2010). These features together meant
that the nature of the physical fire threat confronting residents was broadly similar, thus
maximising the role of psychological, as distinct from environmental, survival-related ‘stay and
defend or leave early’ decision factors.
What Participants Faced: The Murrindindi Fire
A little before 1500 hours on Saturday 7 February 2009, a fire was reported near the hamlet of
Murrindindi (about 60 kilometres—37miles—to the north-east of Melbourne). The fire spread
rapidly in a south-easterly direction through dense eucalypt forests towards the hamlet of
Narbethong, and the town of Marysville (about 500 residents and about 400 homes and business
premises). At about 1715 hours, electrical power was lost, along with telephone and internet
communications. At about 1850 hours the town came under severe ember attack from forested
areas to the west and south. The town water supply failed. Most of the structures in the central
part of Marysville were destroyed, along with many vehicles (2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal
Commission 2010). Thirty eight people died and approximately 600 houses were destroyed. Six
of those who died were visitors to the area: all perished in or near vehicles. Of the 32 local
residents who perished: one died while attempting to flee in a vehicle; two died while attempting
to flee on foot; and 29 died in or near to houses or other buildings.
Those interviewed
Interviews were conducted by Task Force researchers with 49 residents, from different
households, who survived the Murrindindi Fire. These were 24 men and 25 women, whose mean
age was 59 years (range: 38 – 71 years). Of the 49 participants, 42 were at home on 7 February
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2009; while seven were absent, two by deliberate choice for reasons of safety, five by chance
(Figure 1).
Interview Procedure
Because of the level of destruction it was not possible to recruit a random sample of survivors to
interview. However, a range of dwelling construction types, household compositions, and
outcomes was represented. Interviews were conducted at properties where people were present
when Task Force teams were in the area, there were no reported refusals to be interviewed;
however, it is possible that interviewers may have decided not to approach some residents so as
not to add to their evident distress. Interviews were semi-structured, and followed an interview
guide which asked about: (a) preparations for a bushfire and their bushfire plan prior to 7
February 2009; (b) information and warnings received; (c) what they did when they became
aware of a fire threat and why. Interviewers were instructed to encourage participants to provide
a detailed account of their experiences. The interview guide is appended. There were four
interviewers: two were university research staff and two were fire agency community safety
staff. All had experience in interviewing in the context of bushfire safety. Most interviews lasted
between 20 and 40 minutes. Interviews were recorded, and transcribed and checked by a
professional legal transcription service.
Interview Transcript Coding
Because of the semi-structured nature of the interviews a 13-category interview content coding
frame was constructed, following the interview guide, to ensure that relevant information was
extracted from each interview so that interviews could be compared. As part of the process of
developing the coding frame, eight transcripts of the 42 participants who were present on the day
of the fire were selected at random for a preliminary examination by two researchers. They
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independently analysed in detail statements in the eight transcripts describing reported influences
on participants’ decision making about whether to stay and defend or to leave. The researchers
discussed their conclusions and agreed that five important potential influences on decision
making could be identified reliably. These influence categories were then incorporated into the
coding frame (category #13 (i)-(v) in Table 1). Table 1 shows the coding frame used to analyse
the 42 transcripts. Each transcript was coded independently by two coders; reliability indices for
all ratings and judgements are reported in the Results section. Disagreements were resolved by
joint re-examination of the transcripts in question, discussion, and consensus.
------------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 1 about here
------------------------------------------------------
The overall analysis involved four steps. First, coding each transcript independently by
two coders. Second, copying the coded transcript segments into corresponding coding categories
in an NVivo8 text management software file. Third, entering codings into an SPSS data file, and
analysis. Fourth, examining participants’ statements in NVivo8 file coding categories for content
and themes, by the two coders independently, following standard procedures for thematic content
analysis of verbal protocols (e. g., Braun and Clarke 2006): the coders discussed themes and
agreed on common issues described in relation to each coding category.
Results
Findings are presented below under three sub-headings: (i) preparations, warnings and
expectations; (ii) plans, actions and outcomes; and (iii) deciding to stay and defend or to leave.
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Preparations, Warnings and Participants’ Expectations
Participants’ accounts indicated wide variations in their planning and preparation for a bushfire.
Only a few reported considering loss of electrical power, telephone connection or mains water
supply. State and local radio reported the outbreak of a fire at Murrindindi (30 kilometres—19
miles—to the north-west of Marysville), but all participants claimed there was no prior warning
of threat to Narbethong or to Marysville. All reported some awareness of a fire somewhere:
smoke was visible, but many believed initially this was from other fires which had been reported
in locations well away from Marysville. A theme emerged of gradual increase in awareness of a
bushfire threat, with ongoing uncertainty, confusion and indecision:
I was saying ‘If it’s a fire you would smell the smoke, you’d be able to see embers and
stuff like that, and there wasn’t...But I mean we rung the police station, we rang pretty
much everywhere...there was this horrendous looking cloud that was coming over the
back..I rung the (hotel) and they told me the advice is we’ve just got to stay put; that’s the
advice we’ve been given. (#029)
Most participants reported considerable discussion via telephone and mobile phone involving
family members, friends and neighbours until communications failed. Advice from people
involved with emergency services was given high credence and was acted upon by some as a
trigger to leave. Several reported that knowing others were self-evacuating confirmed their
decision to leave. For many, the environmental cues of a rapidly approaching fire (smoke,
embers, flames) were the triggers to leave.
Several participants commented on widespread belief by local residents that since the
area had never been impacted by a serious bushfire in the past, it was unlikely ever to be
threatened:
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The big trouble is, even my wife was saying—she works in the op shops, and knows a lot
of the locals—and she said to them ‘Have you cleaned the leaves out of the gutters and
done anything for Saturday? They’re warning it’s going to be a very bad day’. And they all
said, “oh no, Marysville will never burn’. That was their attitude, you know, Marysville will
never burn. (#019)
Several participants described uncertainty about what they thought they should do if a
bushfire seriously threatened: they spoke of three different locations in or near Marysville which
they thought may be official places of assembly or safety—in fact, there was no official place for
residents to assemble or shelter in case of bushfire.
Participants’ Plans, Actions and Outcomes
Figure 1 shows the initial plans/intentions reported by the 49 participants (left side of Figure 1),
and the actions taken. Of the 28 whose plan was to stay and defend, 18 (64%) did so. Of the
other 10: three were not at home on the day (by chance, not a safety-related decision), while
seven changed their mind when they became aware of the intensity of the fire and the perceived
threat it posed. Of the 14 whose plan was to leave before a fire threatened their home, four (29%)
were absent on the day—two by a decision based on the predicted fire danger weather, the other
two by chance. Of the 10 present when the fire approached who had planned not to be there if
threatened, only one remained on the property when the fire struck (he attempted to defend, and
was unsuccessful), the other nine having left late, but prior to fire impact. Overall, of the 35
participants who (a) had a plan and (b) were on their property on 7 February 2009, 27 (77%)
implemented their plan; Chi-square analysis confirmed the link between these participants’ plans
(stay and defend, leave) and their actions (stayed and defended, left): χ2 (1, N = 35) = 8.71,
p = .003.
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--------------------------------
Insert Figure 1 about here
--------------------------------
Of the 42 interviewees who were on their properties, 21 (50%) left before the fire struck: of these
17 (81%) of these reported no danger, while four (19%) reported that they left late and had to
survive a dangerous escape. Twenty one participants attempted to defend their property: 14
(67%) were successful, while seven (33%) were unsuccessful. Of the seven participants who
failed to save their home: five (71%) fled in vehicles, three taking last resort shelter in their
vehicles on open ground, while two (29%) took last resort shelter, on foot, on or near their
property.
All those who stayed to defend described the experience as being very stressful, and at
times frightening: most described the fire as being more intense and challenging than they
expected. Most described unexpected problems: equipment failure; building vulnerability;
physical stress; injury or incapacitation of household members. The situations of those who had
to abandon their homes as they burned were especially hazardous, having to survive desperate
circumstances sheltering from radiant heat and embers using whatever protection was available.
...I said ‘the house is on fire, we’ve got to go’. So we opened the front door...and at the
same time the lounge room caught alight...I said ‘we’ve got to lie down on the ground’. We
lay on the ground...I said ‘we can’t stay here’. So we got over the fence and came to the
main road here. Then a (emergency services) man took us to the hospital (#020)
Some of those who drove away described last-minute uncertainty about which exit routes were
likely to be safe. Several described hazardous driving conditions involving poor visibility due to
smoke.
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Five participants (12%) described husband and wife taking different actions, with the
wife leaving and the husband staying and defending. No instances of spousal disagreements
about actions were evident in the transcripts.
Deciding to Stay and Defend versus Leave For Safety
The seven participants who were not present were omitted from subsequent analyses. As Table 2
indicates, more men (n = 15) than women (n = 6) stayed to defend, and more women (n = 12)
than men (n = 9) left before the fire: χ2 (1, N = 42) = 4.62, p = .03. To investigate possible
differences between those who stayed and defended, and those who left under imminent bushfire
threat on levels of bushfire preparation, knowledge, and awareness, we conducted a gender X
action factorial MANOVA. The independent variables were gender (men, women) and action
(stayed to defend, left before fire impact). The dependent variables were ratings of levels of:
(a) long-term preparation for fire; (b) readiness for fire on the day; (c) awareness of fire danger
on the day; (d) awareness of threat from the approaching fire; and (e) general knowledge of
bushfires. There was no significant overall interaction effect between gender and action:
F (5, 34) = 1.20, p = .332. There was no significant overall main effect for gender: F (5,
34) 1.08, p = .383. There was a significant overall main effect for action: F (5, 34) = 6.41,
p < .001). As Table 2 shows, participants who stayed to defend their property evidenced: higher
levels of long-term preparation; higher levels of readiness on the day; and greater awareness of
fire danger on the day; the magnitudes of the effect sizes (Cohen’s d) ranged from
‘moderate’(0.73) to ‘large’(1.80). There were no significant mean differences between those who
stayed to defend and those who left on: awareness of threat of the approaching fire, and general
knowledge of bushfires.
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------------------------------
Insert Table 2 about here
-------------------------------
Supplementary analysis showed there were no significant mean differences between
those who defended their property successfully and those who failed on: preparation, readiness,
awareness, or knowledge of bushfires. This suggests that success or failure in defence under the
conditions on the day was determined to some extent by external factors such as adjacent fuel
load and proximity, and building construction vulnerability, as well as random chance events.
Of the 21 participants who stayed and defended, six (29%) said that they had expected an
official warning about the fire threat, while ten (48%) said that they did not expect an official
warning. Of the 21 participants who left, eight (38%) said that they expected an official warning,
while none said that they did not expect this. The difference between the two groups was
significant, fewer of those who stayed and defended reported expecting an official warning about
imminent bushfire threat: χ2 (1, N = 24) = 6.19, p = .013.
Table 3 compares those who stayed to defend with those who chose to leave on five
potential decision influences. Chi-square analyses showed that those participants who chose to
stay and defend were significantly more likely to report that two factors influenced their
decision: (a) their prior commitment to a plan to stay and defend; and (b) time pressure—leaving
was no longer safe. Those who chose to leave were more likely to report that a trigger event
influenced their decision: (a) indications of imminent threat from the fire--advice to leave
(official, or unofficial from family or neighbours), sight of flames, smoke or embers; the sight of
others leaving; or (b) information about the location and direction of travel of the fire, mostly by
telephone from family members, friends, or neighbours.
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...and I went in to see ______ who’s the lieutenant of the CFA and she had the map up,
and for the first time someone said ‘fires are here, here and here, you’ve got less than
whatever, do your thing now...we left around then (#028)
...from the distance it was coming and the size of the cloud of smoke, and the way the
wind was blowing, this was going to be bad. So we decided to try to get out...(#005)
Then she phoned me...somebody (had) rushed in the door, some local people, and she
said you’ve got to get out now, the fire is at the farm adjacent to her (#024)
While more of those who left reported that feelings of responsibility for the wellbeing of others
influenced their decision compared with those who stayed to defend, the difference was not
significant.
-------------------------------
Insert Table 3 about here
-------------------------------
Supplementary analysis showed that there were no significant differences on decision
factors between those who defended their property successfully and those who failed in their
attempt to defend. Again, this is consistent with the likely role of external factors such as
adjacent fuel loads and building or equipment vulnerability and random chance as potential
determinants of success or failure in property defence under the severe weather conditions.
Discussion
In summary, participants reported that there was little by way of official warnings to people in
the area that they were going to come under bushfire attack, or information about the location or
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progress of the fire. The hour before impact of the fire was characterised by many as a time of
uncertainty, doubt, and indecision. Of those participants who had a bushfire plan and were
present on the day, most implemented their plan. This suggests that under conditions of
uncertainty and the absence of directives from authorities, the most important driver of survival-
related decision making and action will be prior commitment to a plan. Not all participants who
had a plan acted in accordance with their fire plan: almost all those who did not implement their
original plan had intended to stay and defend, but changed their mind in the face of a bushfire
which appeared more severe than they anticipated. This is consistent with the suggestion by
Tibbits and Whittaker (2007) that many residents who plan to stay and defend retain late
evacuation as an option. There was no evidence of household conflicts of the kind noted by
Proudley (2008), but this was not a topic that was probed for specifically during the interviews.
The major factors associated with staying and defending were: prior commitment to this
plan and belief that preparations for defence were adequate to meet the perceived threat from the
approaching fire, and for some a reinforcing belief that it was too late to evacuate safely. Two-
thirds of those participants who attempted to defend were successful, and one-third failed and
had to flee or take last resort shelter. This highlights a need for householders contemplating
staying and defending to formulate an alternative plan for survival in case defence fails. For
those who left before impact, the major decision driver was a specific trigger event indicating
either: (a) a high level of threat from the fire: advice to leave; visible smoke, embers, or flames;
knowledge of others leaving; or (b) information about location of the fire from trusted sources.
Together, the findings suggest that the process of deciding finally to either stay and defend or to
leave for a presumed safer location is not one of simply implementing a prior fire plan, but rather
the outcome of assessing the likely risk associated with implementing the plan under the
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perceived threat conditions at the time: committing to act on either plan, for most, involves some
form of ‘waiting and seeing’.
Before discussing possible implications of the findings, limitations of the research need
to be acknowledged. The sample size was smaller than desirable; participants constituted a
sample of convenience; and came from one rural community. Additional studies are needed to
confirm the findings.
Most survivors would have been exposed to subsequent media reporting on the fires,
which may have influenced aspects of their accounts. Hindsight bias, in which knowledge of
event outcomes influences judgements of the predictability of the outcomes (Bradfield and Wells
2005), may have had some effects on recollections of events. However, there seem no grounds to
suppose that this would operate differentially on those who stayed and defended or those who
left. Inspection of the content and the apparent immediacy of the style of narratives in the
transcripts suggests strongly that what was described were mostly episodic memories, many
associated with strong emotions, rather than semantic memories or autobiographical memories—
both of which are more vulnerable to re-working and reconstruction than episodic memories
(Tulving, 2002).
Hindsight bias remains potentially more problematic in relation to the claimed link
between prior plans and actions. It is possible that the link was not as strong as indicated because
some participants, knowing the outcomes of their actions on the day, described their plans or
intentions to interviewers as being more definitely to stay and defend, or to leave, than was
actually the case—it is possible that many more had actually planned to ‘wait and see’. This is a
challenge. The transcripts were re-checked, and as before, six participants had said that they had
no plan (most in the context of saying that they had never thought seriously being threatened by
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a bushfire); only one participant had said that his intention was to ‘wait and see’ before deciding
that he could safely defend or that it would be safer to leave. He described undertaking some
measures on the day to defend the house, but also packed some valuables in case he decided
ultimately to leave. In the wildfire research literature, there is limited discussion of intentions to
‘wait and see’, and the findings are somewhat difficult to interpret confidently. Tibbits and
Whittaker (2007) reported findings similar to ours in relation to the number who claimed that
they intended to ‘wait and see’: “...Five participants (7%) had made a clear decision to leave
early, while another two (3%) decided that they would ‘wait-and see’ what happened before they
made a decision either way” (p. 288). It may be, as proposed earlier, that all plans involve some
form of ‘waiting and seeing’ before a final decision is made that a given plan can be
implemented under the conditions prevailing when a fire threatens. In the present study, 7 (28%)
of 25 residents present on the day who planned to stay and defend changed their mind when they
realised the fire threat was greater than anticipated (Figure 1). A key issue may be the strength of
pre-commitment to implementing a given plan. Rhodes (2007) summarised findings from several
surveys of Australian communities affected by major fires over the period 2002-2007:
A significant minority in all studies (11-23%) intended to wait until told what to do, and
17-32% intended to wait but leave if they felt threatened. One study examining what
people actually did suggests that most people who intended to adopt recommended actions
actually carried out this intention...The results highlight the variability in what people
intend to do and also suggest that intention strength may be an important factor influencing
action during a fire. (p. 71)
McCaffrey and Winter (2011) reported that in their survey of 551 residents of three US
communities threatened by a wildfire 16 % planned to evacuate but waited until they were told
21
by authorities to leave; 30% waited to see what happened and stayed because the risk was not
great; and 17% waited to see what happened but left when the danger felt too great (p. 92). We
acknowledge hindsight cannot be dismissed as a possible complication, but there seems no
compelling reason why a possible hindsight bias concerning the importance of plans should
differentially affect those who stayed and defended compared with those who left.
Conclusions
Perhaps the preceding discussion indicates need for greater precision in terminology. A survivor
of the Murrindindi Fire wrote to one of the researchers: “An observation – ‘wait and see’ is not a
plan. It is a preparatory contingency that should be overlaid upon a plan” (D. Barton, personal
communication, 20 September 2011). In the present context, the term ‘wildfire plan’ could
perhaps be restricted to describing variants of intentions to either stay on the property throughout
a fire, or to leave before impact of a fire. ‘Wait and see’ could then be restricted to describing
conditions under which a plan would be implemented or changed. Clearly, the issue of ‘waiting
and seeing’ needs more attention by researchers.
Earlier, we described the AFAC community bushfire safety policy position at the time of
the fires—‘prepare, stay and defend or leave early’. Similar to Tibbits and Whitaker (2007), our
results suggested that participants had a clearer understanding of what was involved in preparing,
staying and defending compared with ‘leaving early’. Two-thirds of those who planned to stay
and defend had prepared accordingly and remained committed to that course of action. Those
who abandoned their plan to stay and defend did so after concluding that the fire was more
severe than they were prepared to deal with. For those whose plan was to leave safely,
committing to actually depart was difficult. In the face of uncertainty about the severity and
proximity of the fire, most of those who left waited until some external trigger-event signalled
22
that decisive action was now required, potentially compromising their plan to leave safely.
Following the 2009 Victorian fires, AFAC revised aspects of its official community
bushfire safety position to, apparently, give more weight to the ‘leave early’ option: “People
usually have two safe options when threatened by bushfire: leaving early or staying and
defending adequately prepared properties. Leaving early is always the safest option”
(Australasian Fire and Emergency Services Authorities Council 2010, p. 1).
It appears that in 2009 community bushfire safety educational material produced by
Australian agencies concentrated on how to prepare properties adequately to resist the impact of
bushfires. Our findings, together with those of Tibbits and Whittaker (2007), suggest a need to
alter the balance and invest more resources in assisting residents of at-risk communities to:
(a) make conservative appraisals of the likely benefits and costs associated with staying and
defending their property; and (b) understand what must be done in order to maximise their safety
if their bushfire plan is to survive by leaving safely, well before impact of a bushfire--that is, to
better educate householders about planning both preparations for leaving and when to leave, as
well as alerting them to the need for alternatives in case their intended evacuation plan is
compromised.
Concerning further research, it seems important for community wildfire research groups
to have teams ready to deploy into wildfire-affected communities as soon as practical after fires
so as to capture residents’ experiences. This will enable wildfire survival-related decision
processes to be better understood so that more effective community wildfire education programs
can be developed and delivered. The reasons why householders ‘wait and see’ before committing
to decisive action seem especially deserving of researchers’ attention.
23
Acknowledgements
The research was supported by a Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre Extension Grant.
However, the views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the Board of the funding agency. The research was approved by the La Trobe University Human
Ethics Committee. The authors thank Drew Dawson, University of South Australia; Damien
Killalea, Tasmania Fire Service; and Joshua Whittaker, RMIT University for their suggestions to
revise an earlier version of the manuscript. We are grateful to two anonymous reviewers for
helpful comments on a previous version of the paper.
24
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Appendix Bushfires Research Taskforce Human Behaviour and Community Safety
Interviewer Guidelines Note: these are a guide only. The participant is likely to answer many of the questions without being prompted. ______________________________________________________________________________ Before the interview ‐Introduce self ‐Introduce research ‐Provide ethics statement ‐ Stress independence from agencies and government ‐ Explain purpose ‐ Confidentiality ‐ Contact details ‐ Further research ‐ Obtain consent ‐ If consent is obtained, proceed with the interview Interview questions and prompts Starting question
- Tell me what happened to you during the fire
During the discussion prompt for: Preparation ‐How did you prepare? (timeframe) ‐ How well‐prepared did you feel? ‐Did you have a plan? If so, what was it? Information and warnings ‐When and how did you first become aware about the fire? ‐ When did you realise the fire would impact your property?
‐ Did you receive a warning? Where from? When? How long before the fire? (formal and informal)
Response
‐ What did you do (Stay, protect property, shelter in place, wait and see, leave early, leave late)? Why?
‐ What did other household members do? Why? ‐ Who was there? What were they doing?
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‐ Did you get any help? Did you help anyone? Did you see anyone else? ‐ What did you do after the fire front passed (e.g. stay, return) Leaving ‐ When did you leave? ‐ Do you think you left early enough? ‐ Was there a trigger for leaving? ‐ Where did you go? ‐ How did you get there? ‐ When did you return? Future ‐ Is there anything you would do differently? ‐ What could help the wider community respond to bushfires? Thank participant.
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Table 1: Transcript Statement Coding Scheme
1. Household composition on the day, and interviewee information.
2. Whereabouts on 7 February 2009.
3. Reported actions if present on the property on the day of the fires: stayed and
actively defended, or left before fire impact.
4. Reported outcome: house survived, damaged, destroyed, took last-resort shelter,
left safely, left in danger.
5. Stated plans prior to 7 February 2009: ‘stay and defend’, ‘leave’, ‘wait and see’,
‘no plan’—if no unambiguous statement: ‘unclear plan’.
6. Reported evidence of training, experience with bushfires.
7. Reported evidence of level of long-term preparation for bushfire:
Extensive (4) – vegetation clearing, independent water supply and independent
power source, plus two or more of: sprinklers, implements, water containers,
protective clothing; or detailed evacuation plan including three or more of:
safety of documents and valuables, arrangements for pets/livestock,
destination, evacuation routes, necessities for family needs for 24 hours or
more.
Some (3) – up to two or three of the above, in relation to staying and
defending, or to leaving.
Minimal (2) – limited vegetation clearing, discussion of leaving if threatened.
Nil (1).
8. Reported evidence of readiness for a bushfire on 7 February 2009:
High (4): - equipment ready and tested, water containers filled, protective
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clothing ready or bags packed and ready, pets/livestock readied, vehicle(s)
fuelled and ready.
Some (3): - some evidence of special preparation to defend or to leave: one or
two of the above.
Minimal (2): - clearing of leaf litter and similar or discussion of leaving if a
fire was reported.
Nil (1).
9. Reported evidence of awareness of fire danger weather on 7 February 2009:
High (4) - Frequent acts of vigilance during the day including monitoring the
local radio, checking agency web sites, scanning the environment for smoke or
embers, telephoning friends or family.
Some (3) - Infrequent checks of two or more of the above.
Minimal (2) - Radio on, or occasional glance at the environment.
Nil (1).
10. Reported evidence of level of awareness of approaching fire:
High (4) - Early awareness of a fire, active attempts to track location.
Some (3) – Awareness of fire somewhere in the area.
Minimal (2) – Only aware when threat obvious.
Nil (1) – Taken by surprise.
11. Reported evidence of knowledge of bushfires:
High (4) – Two or more of training, reading, practice, experience.
Some (3) – Attended CFA meeting(s) or reading.
Minimal (2) – General knowledge from the media.
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Nil (1).
12. Expected an official warning of bushfire threat to community: yes, no.
13. Report of potential influence on decision making? Yes/No for each of the
following:
(i) prior commitment to a fire plan to stay and defend, or to leave before a fire
threatened safety.
(ii) information about the severity of the threat posed by the fire.
(iii) time pressure and being surprised by the fire’s approach.
(iv) communications about the location and direction of the fire.
(v) responsibility for others’ safety or wellbeing.
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Table 2. Means, standard deviations, F-tests, and effect sizes comparing the two groups of survivors
on measures of bushfire preparation and awareness
Actions on the Day: Stayed and Defended Left
(n = 21)
(n = 21)
Gender:
15 men & 6 women 9 men & 12 women
Preparation & Awarenessa
M SD M SD F(1,43) p ESb
Long term preparation (.79)
3.5 0.74 2.0 0.87 31.43 <.001 1.80
Readiness on the day (.77)
3.5 0.68 2.6 0.81 14.61 <.001 1.23
Awareness of danger (.74)
3.5 0.87 2.8 0.91 4.81 .035 0.73
Awareness of threat (.73)
3.1 0.92 2.6 0.63 1.70 .200 0.42
Knowledge of fire (.72)
2.7 1.34 2.4 0.93 0.68 .416 0.26
a rated on four-point scales: 1 = nil, 2 = minimal, 3 = some, 4 = high; the figures in brackets are the inter-rater
reliabilities expressed as Spearman’s rho.
b Effect Size as Cohen’s d
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Table 3. Percentage of each group of survivors reporting a specific decision influence, Chi-square tests, and transcript examples Decision influencea Percentage reporting decision
influence _________________________
χ2 (1, N = 42)
pb Cramer’s V
Examples
Stayed defended n = 21
Left n = 21
Indications of fire threat (.75)
29% 90% 16.7 < .001 .63 Stayed: ...the local radio station said a fire had happened...I came outside to have a look and (saw) the smoke going up directly behind that hill...So we started to prepare..(#007) Left: I rang my brother, and I said listen to this (approaching fire), and the noise was horrendous. And he said ‘get out of there!’ And I said, ‘yep, yep, I’m going!’. (#010)
Prior commitment to plan (.81)
86% 38% 10.10 .001 .49 Stayed: The (previous) fires didn’t really affect Marysville...but we made up our minds to stay, and that’s what we did. (#009) Left: I always knew this place would not be safe if there was a bushfire. It’s not prepared. My plan was to get the hell out, don’t stay and defend your house, because it is going to go up (in flames) (#005)
Time pressure (.70) 48% 5% 9.98 .002 .49 Stayed: ...a friend...rang and said ’Don’t you know there’s a fire bearing down upon you?’ There was no smoke or nothing. We had no option but to stay because it was too late (#020) Left: The bush was just (exploding). So quick it came towards me that I didn’t have much time really. So I managed to grab some things...I went to the (Marysville) oval...the oval was a very safe place that night (#34)
Information about the fire location (.75)
24% 62% 6.62 .010 .39 Stayed: I checked on the CFA website and identified that there was a Murrindindi Mill fire. I looked up Murrindindi Mill on the map and looked at the direction from that... the smoke was definitely coming from Murrindindi Mill’ (#043)
35
Left: Then she (sister in the nearby community of Narbethong) phoned, I was on the internet checking the CFA site. Then she phoned me...some local people...she said ‘You’ve got to get out now, the fire is at the farm adjacent’... We started packing (#024)
Responsibility for others (.80)
33% 62% 3.44 .064 ns . 29 Stayed: ...and my young fellow who is in a wheelchair, we had him to worry about as well...you don’t go anywhere when the wind is blowing, you stay where you are (#021) Left: My mother did pack a few things in case we did have to evacuate. She is an insulin-dependent diabetic (#006)
a Figures in brackets are inter-rater reliability indices as Cohen’s Kappas b Critical p value = .05/5 = .01 ns = not significant
36
Fig. 1: Flow chart showing participants’ intentions (left column) and subsequent actions
Took Last Resort Shelter n=3
Attempted to Return, Failed n=1
Took Last Resort Shelter n=3
To Stay and
Defend n=28
To Leave Early n=14
No Plan n=6
To Wait and See n=1
Defended, Successn=13
Defended, Failed (stayed) n=2
Defended, Failed (abandoned)
n=3
Stayed and Defended n=18
Left Late (no danger)
n=4
Left Late (danger)n=3
Not Present (chance) n=3
Not Present (decision)
n=2
Not Present (chance) n=2
Defended, Failed (abandoned)
n=1
Left Late (no danger)
n=9
Left Late (no danger)
n=3
Defended, Failed (abandoned)
n=1
Defended, Successn=1
Left Late (danger)n=1
Left Late (no danger)
n=1
