Mayank Verma Vignesh Elamvazhuthi Venkata Snehith Cherukuri Zhibin Zhou The Identity and Location Privacy in Sensor Ad Hoc Networks

Mayank VermaVignesh Elamvazhuthi

Venkata Snehith CherukuriZhibin Zhou

The Identity and Location Privacy in Sensor Ad Hoc Networks

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Agenda

ANONYMITY & PSUEDONUMITYID BASED CRYPTOGRAPHYLOCATION PRIVACYPrivacy Preserving Routing Protocols

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ANONYMITY

What is Anonymity? Absence of Identity

Why it is important? To provide security to user

Anonymization: concealing the relationship between a particular user and the data about him

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TYPES OF ANONYMITY

Environmental Content Based Procedural

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ENVIRONMENT ANONYMITY

1

Determined by External FactorsNumber and Diversity of usersPrior knowledge about them

It cannot be altered through design of system.

It is monitored over time while system is in operation.

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CONTENT-BASED ANONYMITY

2

Exist when no identification by means of the exchanged data is possible.

De-anonymization may occur on the basis of:The data content Their structure By sequence

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PROCEDURAL ANONYMITY

3

Determined by: The communication protocol The underlying communication layers

This type of anonymity can be provided by the system and should be planned for in the design phase of the system.

Sender anonymity is present when the sender of a message cannot be identified by the recipient of a message within the set of potential senders.

Receiver anonymity means that the identity of the receiver is not known to the sender of a message.

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LEVEL OF ANONYMITY

AnonymityAnonymity

BB

EE

CC

DD

AA

Super-Identification: The user identifies herself to a certification authority, which in return assigns unique credentials to her (e.g., X.509 certificates).

Identification: The user identifies himself to the system.

Latent Identification: The user identifies himself to a trustee and adopts a unique pseudonym that becomes registered with his identity

Anonymity. The user uses the system without any identification or identifier that distinguishes her from other users.

Pseudonymous Identification: The user initially chooses a unique but otherwise uncontrolled pseudonym, which he will also employ in subsequent sessions

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DD

BB

CC

AAPseudonymity is a word derived from pseudonym, meaning 'false name’.

Describes a state of disguised identity resulting from the use of a pseudonym

The pseudonym identifies a holder, that is, one or more human beings who possess but do not disclose their “true name”.

So it’s a type of anonymity.

Pseudonymity

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Characteristics of Pseudonymity

Linkable for the User-Adaptive System: The user-adaptive system can link every interaction with a specific user, even across sessions (users maintain a persistent identity)

Characteristics

Unobservable for Third Parties: The usage of a user-adaptive application by a user should not be recognizable by third parties.

Unlikable for Third Parties: Third parties (including other components of the user-adaptive system) cannot link two interaction steps of the same user.

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Types of Pseudonymity

Role Pseudonyms: To interact with the same site in different roles (e.g., as an employee at work, or a private citizen at home)

Relationship Pseudonyms (or Application Pseudonyms): To interact with different sites under different pseudonyms; and

Role-Relationship Pseudonyms: combines both of the above. Using multiple pseudonyms enhances environmental and content-based anonymity. Separate role pseudonyms may improve personalization if users exhibit different

personal characteristics in different roles, Separate relationship pseudonyms may hurt the quality of personalization since

synergy effects between assumptions made by different user-adaptive applications cannot occur any more.

Transaction pseudonyms that are different for each transaction would even bar any user modeling since likeability is no longer preserved.

If there is a chance that a user’s identity could be usurped by another user or software component, super-identification should instead be employed. The responsibility for the assignment of identifying data to the user is thereby delegated to a mutually trusted outside component.

Depending on the application type (e.g., tutorial systems) and its domain (e.g., electronic commerce), different levels of user anonymity can be required. A specific characteristic of user-adaptive systems is moreover that not only the user but also the user modeling server may need to remain anonymous.

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ANONYMITY BASED PROTOCOLS

Onion Routing

Web Mixes

DC-Net

Crowds

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WEB-MIX

We refer to a Mix-Net as protocol that uses Onion Routing's layered encryption and also employs mixing techniques to thwart timing analysis.

Such mixing techniques include sending messages in reordered batches, sending dummy messages, and introducing random delays.

In a MIX network, no two nodes know about the identity of a sender or reiever.

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WEB-MIX (Contd.)

Mix – a single computing node that performs operations on input messages and outputs them.

But you cannot map an output message to an input message.

Operations performed – cryptographic, padding and reordering.

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MIXES

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MIX NETWORK

A single Mix node never used – several ‘mixes’ are used as a mix network.

Why Not single? Less anonymity : small mapping Bottleneck Minimizing links to be tapped to 2

Use several mix nodes – increases strength of anonymity

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Mix network (Contd.)

Messages may pass through any number of these nodes.

Application decides how to use the nodes.

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Hiding Routing Information

Only the sender and receiver know each others identity.

Intermediate nodes know only the identity of previous and next hops in the route.

Path to be followed is decided by proxy node closest to sender

Alternatively several proxy nodes decide the route – “Loose Routing”.

Proxy nodes are “sensitive” to attack

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CROWD

Reiter and Rubin developed Crowds. It uses a group of nodes that serve as proxies for a

given initiator from the group. An initialization message is routed from the initiator to a

series of proxies, forming a path for all future messages from the initiator.

Upon receiving this message, each proxy decides, based on a probability of forwarding (pf), whether to extend the path through another proxy chosen at random with uniform probability or to become the last node on the path and communicate with the responder directly.

This path is maintained for a limited period of time, after which all paths must be reformed. The time limit allows nodes that join the protocol to add their paths at the same time as all other nodes; otherwise new paths may be easily attributed to recently joined nodes. Paths must also be reformed when proxies on the path leave the session.

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DISADVANTAGES

An attacker can guess the initiator of an anonymous connection. The guess can be made based on information about the predecessor on the path of proxies. The presence of the attack caused the designers of Crowds to modify their protocol, which helped to ward off, but failed to eliminate, any threat.

A number of attackers may simply join the crowd and wait for paths to be reformed to attack crowd. This wait is a periodic occurrence, usually hourly. Each attacker can log its predecessor after each path reformation. The attacker can appear directly after I and may then easily recover the responder R's address, which is in plain view, and other session identifying information. Multiple attackers can perform this attack in parallel.

Another method is for attackers to always submit requests from the session directly to the responder, thereby ending the path. Or the attacker may covertly tag messages before forwarding along the route.

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ONION ROUTING

Onion Routing is similar to Crowds in that an initial message forms a path of proxies through which the initiator sends its future messages.

The protocol gets its name from its method of encrypting the initial packet and the address of the proxies at each hop on the path with the public key of the previous step.

This scheme results in layers of encryption that are peeled off at each step in order to determine the next address to send to on the path. This requires the initiator to predetermine the entire path.

Onion Routing has generally been implemented with the onion routers being placed in the network outside of the control of the individual users

Onion Routing can be configured in two ways: Local COR configurations where individuals run their own onion router, and Remote-COR configurations where individual’s first connect to a remote untrusted COR.

The use of layered encryption in Onion Routing results in a substantial advantage: Only the last node in the path can recognize a particular data stream. An attacker must compromise the first and last node on the path, and even then must use

timing analysis to know that both compromised nodes are on the path. This might be possible if packet decryption and encryption dominated the message latency. But since there is not message latency, this attack is not possible.

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ONION ROUTING (CONTD.)

The message packet is repeatedly encrypted by sender.

Public encryption scheme is used for this.

As the onion is passed through the network each node decrypts and passes on to the next node.

Finally the receiver gets the original message.

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ONION ROUTING (CONTD.)

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DISADVANTAGES

While it can be argued that this reduces the possibility of corruption of any particular onion router, it requires that the users trust the operators of the onion router to maintain their anonymity.

Accordingly, users may instead choose to run their own onion routers locally and band together cooperatively to forward traffic for each other. This local configuration distributes the trust to many operators, but provides more opportunities for corruption of routing nodes.

Secure only against simple traffic analysis.

Attacker can still engage in Denial of Service attacks.

If Proxy nodes are compromised all details are exposed – single point of failure.

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DC-NET

Given by Chaum's solution for anonymous communication, called DC-Net.

Each participant share secret coin flips with other participants in pairs. The parity of the flips a participant has seen is then announced to all other participants. Since each flip is announced twice, the total parity should be even.

To send a message, a participant incorrectly states the parity seen. This causes the total parity to be odd, which indicates transmission of a bit. No one except the initiator knows who sent the message, unless all of the nodes who flipped coins with the sender reveal their coin flips among themselves.

In DC-Net, a graph is constructed by viewing each shared secret as an edge between nodes. To defeat DC-Net and expose the messages of a node N, attackers can surround N by corrupting all nodes that share an edge with N and share their secret coin flips with each other. By doing this, they know all the coin flips that N shared and therefore know what N's bit parity should be and can detect any messages.

To determine the initiator in a particular session, the attackers can surround each node in turn until the initiator is found. A good instantiation of DC-Net does not allow less than all pairs of participants exchanging coin flips.

The enhancement is given in Ring Based DCNET. In the ring version of DC-Net each participant shares two secret coin flips, one with each of her neighbors.

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RING BASED DCNET The anonymity of a ring-based DC-Net degrades to zero and the initiator's

identity can be proven by only two attackers after an average-case of Θ (n lg n) rounds.

A round only requires each attacker to leave the Chaum ring and rejoin it – Since it is assumed that joining nodes are placed randomly in the ring. If nodes are placed deterministically based on a piece of information about the nodes, such as a node's IP address, an attacker can simply forge that information before joining. This allows the attacker to effectively choose the best positions in the ring to perform the attack, which then works much faster. It is also assumed that all nodes hear all outgoing messages. This is a requirement of DC-Net, because the sender must hear the message to know whether it was sent correctly or if a collision occurred. Even with a system to prevent collisions and denial of service attacks, such as found in, the sender must be able to see its message to know whether a trap was set off.

During a round, two nonadjacent attackers A and B may share their coin flips with each other. This effectively creates a new edge in the DC-Net graph seen only by the attackers. This new edge creates two sub-rings: one new ring consists of the edges from A to B and the new edge; while the other ring consists of the edges from B to A and the new edge. The announced parities in the sub-ring without the initiator will sum to zero, and the nodes in that ring may be eliminated as possible initiators. The attackers will be able to identify the initiator immediately if it is the only node present in one of the sub-rings, which is not possible.

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DISADVANTAGE Any node may launch a denial-of-service attack

by choosing to send a message every round of coin flips. Such a node is as anonymous as any initiator, and therefore cannot be simply detected and denied access. Strategies have been developed to detect such an attacker, but at a high cost in overhead.

The work shows that attack against DC-Net are extremely low-cost when participants are arranged in a logical ring. Additionally, authors argue that although attacks against DC-Net where participants are fully connected require unreasonable resources on the part of the attacker.

DC-Net has overhead that does not scale well with the number of participants.

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Public Key Cryptography

Symmetric key cryptography People use the same key to encrypt and decrypt. DES AES IEDA Pro: Fast Con: Key Management is a critical problem

Public key cryptography People use different key to encrypt and decrypt RSA, ECC Pro: easy to manage the key, digital signature Con: Computational Intensive, Based on Unsolved

Math problems

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Public Key Cryptography -Encryption

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Public Key Cryptography-Authentication

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Public Key Cryptography

RSA in 1977 by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Len Adleman

at MIT Based on the Big Integer Factoring Problem 1024 bit key size

ECC by Neal Koblitz and Victor S. Miller in 1985. Based on the Discrete Logarithm Problem 128 bit key size can achieve the security level of

1024-RSA

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ID based Cryptography

Based on the Public Key Cryptography (ECC) Use the Identity of the user as the Public

key to encrypt message ID can be the name: Bob, Alice ID can be the email address: [email protected] ID can be a arbitrary bit string: Pseudonym

Do not need to share any thing before the encryption Bob use Alice to encrypt the message to get the ciphertext C. Alice get C, then she can ask a third party to derive the

respective private key to decrypt the message. All Bob need to know is the name: Alice

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ID Privacy with ID based Cryptography

The Identity privacy of Alice can be protected by: Alice keep anonymous to Bob by informing the

pseudonyms to Bob. Bob can not identify Alice from the pseudonyms, but

• He can be ensured that the pseudonym belong to a trusted anonymous user.

• He can be ensured that the pseudonym belong to a trusted group.

Alice generate the Private key from the pseudonyms. The trusted third party can certify and invoke the

pseudonym.

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ID Privacy with ID based Cryptography

Id based cryptography can help achieve the Identity Privacy through pseudonyms.

Pseudonym is an arbitrary string The owner of the pseudonym can identity it. The other party in the communication can not identity

the owner through the pseudonyms. The communication can be protected by the

pseudonym with the both party keep anonymous.

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Pairing Based Cryptography

Pairing is the math foundation for ID based Cryptography.

The central idea is the construction of a mapping between two useful cryptographic groups allows for new cryptographic schemes based on the reduction or

transform of one problem in one group to a different, sometimes easier problem in the other group.

the Weil and Tate pairings. first used in cryptography as cryptanalytic tools to reduce the

complexity of the discrete logarithm problem on some “weak” elliptic curves. However, using them for constructive purposes is a novel idea.

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Bilinear Maps

The Core work of Weil and Tate pairings is to construct a Bilinear Map

211: GGGe

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Bilinear Maps

Bilinearity:

Non-Degeneracy: If everything maps to the identity, that’s obviously not interesting

Computability: is efficiently computable

*,1 ,, qZbaGQP

abQPebQaPe ),(),(

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Divisor

Definition: A divisor is the formal sum of points on the curve.

We define the Function

)(PaAEP P

EP

aPPfAf )()(

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Weil and Tate Pairing

The weil pairing:

f is a function that have intersection points on the Curve

The tate pairing:

)(

)(),(

PQ

QP

Af

AfQPe

)(),( QPn AfQPt

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Computing Pairing in Sensors

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Computing Pairing in Sensors

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Security Services Focusing on Mobile Networks

1

Data integrity, origin authentication and anti-replay protection of MIP registration and location update message

2

Access control of the MN when it uses resource on a visiting network

3

Location privacy and anonymity of the MN

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What is Location Privacy ???????? Location privacy is the ability to prevent other parties

from learning one's current or past location. In order to get such ability, the mobile node must conceal any relation between its location and the personal identifiable information

The disclosure of the MN’s location and identity allows unauthorized entities to track down its moving history, which can be a serious violation of privacy

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Important Design Considerations

Proposed protocol must support revocable privacy rather than perfect privacy.

Proposed protocols desired not to increase the network traffic.

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IMPORTANT POINTERS WHILE ENSURING LOCATION PRIVACY

The home network should have no knowledge about which foreign network the mobile node is currently connected to.

Similarly, the foreign or roaming network should have no knowledge about the mobile node's home network

An eavesdropper or man-in-the-middle should not be able to tell who the communicating parties are.

In addition, all the usual communication security constraints must apply; ie message integrity, authentication and confidentiality.

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THE ADMINISTRATION requires all legitimate users to provide identity (ID) information in order to grant them permission to use its wireless service

Location Privacy

MOBILE USERS would prefer not to expose any information which enables anyone, including the administration, to get some clue regarding their whereabouts

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AUTHORIZED ANONYMOUS ID BASED SCHEME

Key Weapon Is A Cryptographic Technique Called Blind Signature

It is a Distributed Architecture , overcoming the drawbacks of Centralized ArchitectureThe location privacy of mobile users is not completely

under their own control since the system administration maintains a central server where the location information of mobile users is stored.

The central server is a single-failure-point; that is, the location privacy of mobile users would be compromised if an attacker successfully hacked into it.

The centralized architecture is not scalable.

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AUTHORIZED ANONYMOUS ID BASED SCHEME

Two important Phases Registration Protocol Controlled Connection Protocol

MAC (Message Authentication Code) used for access control

Contd...

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Registration Protocol

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Controlled Connection Protocol

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Future Work It is not desirable from the

administration perspective, that an authorized-anonymous- ID enables a mobile device to have an eternal right to access the infrastructure. Hence, an administration may want to have a function that can revoke or invalidate an issued authorized-anonymous-ID.

Frequent communication between a home computer and a mobile device could be another factor exposing the association between the mobile device and its stationary home.

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LOCATION PRIVACY WHILE SEAMLESSLY ROAMING

Extension to the Freedom system (Developed by the Canadian company Zero Knowledge Systems Inc )

Allowing Users between different networks using the concept of CoA (Care of Address)

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MOBILE CLIENT LOCATION PRIVACY

MOBILE SERVER

LOCATION PRIVACY

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Case 0 (Full Route Create): The mobile node sends a new ROUTE CREATE message after changing its point of attachment rebuilding the whole virtual circuit but keeping the same AIPexit and ACIexit, ie to preserve TCP connections and UDP port bindings.

Case 1 (Partial Route Creating Preserving Aipentry):The node sends a ROUTE CREATEv:3 message3 to the AIPentry that updates the partial route. The information in the route create packet is used to renew the [IPFCj (t); PortFCj (t);ACI1(t)] parameters while preserving the mapping with [IPAIP2 ; PortAIP2 ;ACI2]. If we represent the stages before and after a handover with to and t1, then the ACI mappings in an entry AIP (AIPentry)

Case 2 (Partial Route Creating Non-preserving Aipentry):The mobile node sends a ROUTE CREATEv:3 message upwards in the hierarchy of AIPs until the message reaches the switching AIP. All the routes under the switching AIP are updated preserving the higher part of the hierarchy

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Case 3 (Mobile Server Location Privacy)

This protocol provides extensions of the Freedom System permit a mobile client to seamlessly roam among IP sub networks and media types while remaining untraceable


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AUTHENTICATION AND PAYMENT PROTOCOL PRESERVING LOCATION PRIVACY IN MOBILE IP

Based on Chaum’s mix-network

Two Types of Tracing Mix-encrypted message → plaintext message Plaintext message → mix-encrypted message

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DRAWBACKS This protocol requires

stronger computational power and trust at the mix-server which was selected as the last mix-server.

The mix-server has to perform one more decryption and encryption than other mix-servers. We have to assume that the private key of this mix-server is kept more securely than that of other mix-servers.

In this protocol, inputs are decrypted at a given interval, so the goal of real time communication can’t be achieved.

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LOCATION PRIVACY WITH IP MOBILITY

IP Address can be used to map to physical address using ,multiple methods.

This Protocol Addresses Two Problems How to conceal a fixed identifier from on-lookers

when a user roams to a visited network How to protect from informing an unacquainted

correspondent that the user has roamed.

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Privacy – Tag Computation

After the complete of the Return routability protocol before the Binding update message is sent the MN calculates the Privacy –tag as follows

HoAStringTagivacy Pr1

))(1_,128( ,DATAKSHAHMACfirstString bm 2

)( CNIHNICoAHoAData 3

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Design based on “broadcast with trapdoor information”

In the case of compromising location privacy the enemy will avoid such aggressive schemes, and will be as “invisible” as possible, until it traces, locates, and then physically destroys the assets

ANODR: ANONYMOUS ON DEMAND ROUTING WITH UNTRACEABLE ROUTES FOR MOBILE ADHOC NETWORKS

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The contribution of this scheme is to present an untraceable and intrusion tolerant routing protocol for mobile ad hoc networks. UNTRACEABILITY: ANODR dissociates ad hoc routing

from the design of network member’s identity/pseudonym. The enemy can neither link network members’ identities with their locations, nor follow a packet flow to its source and destination.

INTRUSION TOLERANCE: ANODR ensures there is no single point of compromise in ad hoc routing. Node intrusion does not compromise location privacy of other legitimate members, and an on-demand ANODR route is traceable only if all forwarding nodes en route are intruded.

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Design Rationales Broadcasting with trapdoor assignment

Intrusion tolerant location privacy and untraceability design

Dissociating untraceable ad hoc routing from identity pseudonymity and content privacy

Avoiding expensive cryptographic operations

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Design components Anonymous route discovery

Anonymous data forwarding

Anonymous route maintenance

This network security concept can be applied to multicast communication as well

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Future Work

Location privacy modules will likely involve integrating it with a much larger system of modules as well as better I/O between the main module and the server/database.

In one list of contacts, different contacts may have different privileges such as how accurately he/she can locate the user. Conventions will need to be established for adding support for these details to the location privacy module.

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Types of Routing Protocols Proactive

Adaptive system of routing Route immediately available on request Eg. Optimized Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR)

Reactive Discover route on Demand High Bandwidth Required Eg DSR, Ad Hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV)

Hybrid Mixture of Proactive and reactive or derivative of them Difficult to specify application domain Eg. Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP)

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Secure Routing Protocol (SRP)

Sole requirement of the proposed scheme is the existence of a security association between the node initiating the query and the sought destination

Makes efficient use of the Security association between to communicating nodes S and T

Fabricated, compromised, or replayed route replies would either be rejected or never reach back the querying node

The scheme is robust in the presence of a number of non-colluding nodes, and provides accurate routing information in a timely manner.

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Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) (Contd)

SRP as an Extension of a Reactive Routing Protocol

SRP Header

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Sequence of Operations: 1.Route Request 2.Query Handling/Propagation 3.Route Reply 4.Route Reply Validation 5.Intermediate node replies 6.Route Maintenance

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Advantages:

Guarantees the discovery of correct connectivity information over an unknown network, in the presence of malicious nodes.

Capable of operating without the existence of an on-line certification authority or the complete knowledge of keys of all network nodes.

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Drawback with this scheme:

The problem with this protocol is that it assumes operation only under the presence of non-colluding adversarial nodes. This might not be true in most cases where a number of colluding malicious nodes might be present and hence severely hampering the network operations.

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Anonymous Secure Routing (ASR)

Anonymous Secure Routing (ASR) protocol not only protects the privacy of nodes and routes, but also ensures the security of discovered routes.

Design Goals:

Ensure Privacy 1) Identity Privacy 2) Location Privacy 3) Route Anonymity

Ensure Security

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The whole protocol consists of the following parts:

1) Route Request: During the route request process, each node en route is denoted as Xi (i = 1, 2, . . ., n)

2) Route Response: During the route response process, each

node en route denoted as Xi (i = 1, 2, . . ., n) receives a route response with the following format:

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3) Anonymous Data Transmission:

a) Anonymous data transmission is provided making use of the shared secrets between any two consecutive nodes.

b) A small size information denoted as TAG is constructed

c) Any forwarding node broadcasts the data packet to its neighbors, and then neighbors verify the validity of TAG. If the packet passes the verification, the forwarding node re-calculates and replaces TAG.

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Comparison with other ProtocolsSDDR ANODR ASR

Identity of the Source and Destination

Yes No Yes

Identity Privacy of Nodes En Route

No Yes Yes

Weak Location Privacy Yes Yes Yes

Strong Location Privacy (External

Nodes)No Yes Yes

Strong Location Privacy (Internal

Nodes)No No Yes

Route Anonymity No Yes Yes

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Comparison with other Protocols

SDDR ANODR ASR

Passive Attacks Yes Yes Yes

DoS Attacks No No Yes

Attacks on Route Maintenance

No Yes Yes

Wormhole Attacks Yes Yes Yes

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Anonymous Dynamic Source Routing

Provides a strong security and anonymity protection and better scalability for mobile ad hoc networks.

Addresses the following issues in SDSR, SDAR, ANODR Security Anonymity Scalability

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Consists of three protocols: 1) Security Parameter Establishment Protocol: The security parameter

establishment protocol is used to establish the security parameters for secure and anonymous communications according to the secure type in the packet. It also can build a route for non-secure communications directly. The protocol has two phases: RREQ phase and RREP phase.

a) RREQ phase

b) RREP phase

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2) Anonymous Route Discovery Protocol: The anonymous

route discovery protocol establishes an anonymous route between a pair of source and destination nodes that is resistant against traffic analysis attacks launched by any adversaries including the intermediate forwarding nodes.

a) RREQ phase

b) RREP phase

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3) Anonymous Data Transfer Protocol: In the this

protocol, the source and destination use their session keys shared with the intermediate nodes to encrypt all communications with the cryptographic onion method.

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Comparison with other Protocols

Note:

1.n is the number of different RREQ or RREP packets on the ad hoc network

2)L is the number of hops of a RREQ or RREP packet from the source node to the destination node

Question

Documents

Mayank Verma Vignesh Elamvazhuthi Venkata Snehith Cherukuri Zhibin Zhou The Identity and Location Privacy in Sensor Ad Hoc Networks