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Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d) Presented by Erion Lin

Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

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Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d). Presented by Erion Lin. Outline. Problem Description Model Solution Approach. Problem Description. Problem Description. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Presented by Erion Lin

Page 2: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Outline

Problem DescriptionModelSolution Approach

Page 3: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Problem Description

Page 4: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Problem Description

Assume the budget allocation policy is given, we want to know the minimal attack cost for an attacker to compromise a network.

The system is survivable if there is at least one available path for each critical OD-pair.

Page 5: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Problem Assumptions

The survivability metric is measured as the connectivity of the given critical OD-pairs.

The attacker and the defender have complete information about the targeted network topology.

The defender’s budget allocation strategy is a given parameter.

Page 6: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Problem Assumptions (Cont’d)

The objective of the attacker is to minimize the total attack cost of destroying all paths between one of the critical OD-pairs.

We consider node attacks only. (No link attacks are considered). If a node is attacked, its outgoing links are not functional.

We consider malicious attacks only. (No random failures are considered.)

Page 7: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Model

Page 8: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Model Description

Given Network topology A set of critical OD-pairs Total defense budget for the defender

Page 9: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Model Description (Cont’d)

Objective: To minimize the total cost of an attack

Subject to: There is no available path for one of the critical

OD-pairs to communicate.

To determine: Which nodes will be attacked

Page 10: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Given Parameters

Page 11: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Decision Variables

Page 12: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Formulation

Objective Function

subject to ii i

yi V

Min y a

l ic y M , ii V l OUT (IP 1.1)

Link cost representation

wl l pl ll L l L

t c c

,wp P w W (IP 1.2)

w

p pl wlp P

x t

,w W l L (IP 1.3)

wl lw W l L

M t c

(IP 1.4)

Page 13: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Formulation (Cont.)

subject to (cont.)

0 1px or ,wp P w W (IP 1.6)

0 1iy or i V (IP 1.7)

0 1wlt or ,w W l L (IP 1.8)

1w

pp P

x

w W (IP 1.5)

Page 14: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Reformulation

We reformulate the problem with one assumption and one argument.

Assumption

Argument the optimality condition for the defender holds if

and only if the total budget B is fully used.

,i ia b i V

The threshold attack cost to compromise a node equals to the allocated budget on it.

Page 15: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Reformulation (Cont.)

Objective Function

subject to ii i

yi V

Min y b

l ic y M , ii V l OUT (IP 2.1)

Link cost representation

wl l pl ll L l L

t c c

,wp P w W (IP 2.2)

,w W l L (IP 2.3)

wl lw W l L

M t c

(IP 2.4)

w

p pl wlp P

x t

Page 16: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Reformulation (Cont.)

subject to (cont.)

1w

pp P

x

w W (IP 2.5)

0 1px or ,wp P w W (IP 2.6)

0 1iy or i V (IP 2.7)

0 1wlt or ,w W l L (IP 2.8)

or lc M .l L (IP 2.9)

Page 17: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Solution Approach

Page 18: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Max-Flow Min-Cut Theorem

The maximum value of the flow from a source node to a sink node t in a capacitated network equals the minimum capacity among all s-t cuts.

Therefore, we gain a byproduct of the minimum cut from the maximum flow algorithm.

Page 19: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Genetic Augmenting Path Algorithm

Page 20: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Example

Page 21: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Example (cont.)

Page 22: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Questions

How to identify an augmenting path or show that the network contains no such path?

Whether the algorithm terminates in finite number of iterations?

Labeling algorithm is a specific implementation.

Page 23: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Exists if the residual capacity of the arc is not zero

The Labeling Algorithm

Page 24: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)
Page 25: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

S-T Cut

A cut is a partition of the node N into two subsets S and =N – S.

We refer to a cut as an s-t cut if .S

s S and t S

Page 26: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Example of an S-T Cut

Page 27: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Theorem

The maximum value of the flow from a source node s to a sink node t in a capacitated network equals the minimum capacity among all s-t cuts.

Proof. When the labeling algorithm terminates, it also

discovered a minimum cut.

Page 28: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Theorem (Cont’d)

A flow x* is a maximum flow if and only of the residual network G(x*) contains no augmenting path.

Proof. If the residual network G(x*) contains an augme

nting path, clearly the flow x* is not a maximum flow.

Page 29: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Node Splitting

300300

Page 30: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Solution Approach

Combine max-flow min-cut theorem and node splitting method.

Page 31: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Example

300

200

50

400

70

Page 32: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Example (Cont’d)

300

50

200

70

400

Infinite Capacity

-200

-200

-200

-50

-50 -50

-50

Max Flow and Min Cut: 250

Page 33: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Time Complexity Analysis

Labeling Algorithm :O((|N|+|L|)xn) n: number of augmentations

Consider w OD-pairs O(|W|x(|N|+|L|)xn)

Page 34: Maximization of Network Survivability against Intelligent and Malicious Attacks (Cont’d)

Thanks for Your Listening