SURVIVABILITY OF COMPLEX NETWORKS

KEEPING THE LIGHTS ON: STRATEGIES FOR COMPATIBILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY IN

ELECTRIC POWER NETWORKS

SURVIVABILITY OF COMPLEX NETWORKS

October 27, 2011

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Ira KohlbergKohlberg Associates, Inc.11308South Shore Road

Reston, VA 20190

File copy provided by http://www.wll.com

http://www.wll.com/

Threat: Historical Evidence• EMP damages and disrupts electronics—does not directly harm people

Puncture, temporary disconnection of transmission line

Safety devices burning Spark gaps

breakdown

Overhead Transmission Line and Telecommunications Disconnection and Damage

Overheadtransmission line

Malfunction of radio- location

Overheadsignal line

Diesels found damaged, “later”

Loss of communications;many examples

Groundzero

600 km

600 km400 km

600 km

1000 km Long line problems due to EMP “long tail”

Power supply breakdown

Amplification location unit

Power supply breakdown

Signal cable line

Figure presented by General Loborev, Director, Central Institute of Physics and

Technology, June 1994

Observed EMP Anomalies During USSR Atmospheric Testing (circa 1960)


http://www.wll.com/

Threat: Nature and Magnitude of EMP Threats

HOB = 500km

EMP May Produce Simultaneous, Widespread Failure Of High Reliability infrastructure

• Wide area coverage – A million square miles

• Intensity depends on:– Weapon design– Height of burst – Location of burst

• Broad frequency range• Threat to all electronics in exposure

HOB = 100 km

SurfaceZero


http://www.wll.com/

E1 footprint for a 30kT detonation at 100km altitude east of Chicago (unclassified version)

• The US power grid iscomprised of three interconnected systems, the eastern interconnect, the western, and Texas

• A relatively modest yield burst over the eastern US can affect 70% of the total national power generation

A single relatively small weapon can have a radius of impact of nearly 1,000 miles, affecting nearly 70% of the population and industrial production of the USA and Canada, the financial centers and

seat of governments.

Vulnerability of Power Grid Components to E1File copy provided by http://www.wll.com

http://www.wll.com/

But Everything Depends on Everything Else:Vulnerability of US National Infrastructure

• One or a few high-altitude nuclear detonations can produce EMP, simultaneously, over wide geographical areas

• Unprecedented cascading failure of our electronics-dependent infrastructures could result

– Power, energy transport, telecom, and financial systems are particularly vulnerable and interdependent

– EMP disruption of these sectors could cause large scale infrastructure failures for all aspects of the Nation’s life

• Both civilian and military capabilities depend on these infrastructures

• Without adequate protection recovery could be prolonged—months to years

C om pressor S tation

Fuel S upply

Oil / G as

S ubstation

P ow er P lant

P ow er S upply Electric Pow er

E nd Office

S w itch ing Off ice

Com m unications

Transport

TrafficL ight Transportation

W ater

E m ergencyC all C enter

H ospitalAm bulance

Em ergencyServices

FederalR eserve

ATM MilitaryInstallations

G overnm entServices

C heckP rocessing

C enter

R eservo irS ubstation

Banking & FinanceFire

S tation

P ension /S ervice P aym ents Treasury D ept.

Leg islative Off ices

B ank


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SCOPE OF PRESENTATION

MODELING THE INTERACTION BETWEEN POWER AND TELECOMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURES FOR A HEMP ATTACK

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Electromagnetic terrorism and potential infrastructure failures has become an extremely serious matter that may be viewed as embracing three major issues:

•Terrorist targets of interest•Effect on civilian and military populations•National response

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http://www.wll.com/

Effect on Civilian and Military Populations

•Civilian•Susceptibility of Infrastructures •Survivability of Infrastructures •Response of Infrastructures

•Military •Survivability of hardware•Communication survivability

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http://www.wll.com/

•Approach To Understanding How Coupled Infrastructures Work

•State Variable Theory

• linear approximation

• small perturbations

• infrastructure containing N components

• stability and susceptibility

• recovery time

• Recovery for a realistic segment of the public telephone

• Recovery model for coupled telecom and power infrastructures.

Dynamics of Recovery of Coupled Infrastructures

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http://www.wll.com/

PHASE SPACE REPRESENTATION OF POWER AND TELECOMMUNICATION RESPONSE TO HEMP

NO

RM

AL

IZE

D P

OW

ER

NORMALIZED TELECOMMUNICATIONS1.0

1.0

0.0

POWER AND TELECOMMUNICATIONSPLANE

STATE OF POWER

AND TELCOM AFTER

HEMP

DENOTES POSSIBLE TRAJECTORIES AFTER HEMP

INITIAL STATEOF SYSTEM

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http://www.wll.com/

The following set of vu-graphs show the theoretically derived conditions for the return to equilibrium.

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http://www.wll.com/

0 0

0 0

, ,

, .

TT P

PT P

dTT T P

dtdP

P T Pdt

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http://www.wll.com/

13


http://www.wll.com/

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http://www.wll.com/

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The following set of vu-graphs show the breakdown of a large network (power and or telecommunications) caused by a HEMP attack.

For illustrative purposes we show this as an evolutionary process although it could happen relatively rapidly.

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To other nodes

Link

Node

AA

BC

E

D

(a) No attack17


To other nodes

Link

Node

AA

B

E

D

(b) Attack node C

Cluster

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To other nodes

Link

Node

AA

B

E

D

(c) Attack node C and link between nodes D and E

Cluster

Cluster

Cluster

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The following set of vu-graphs show the recovery/ breakdown of Probability-of-Call Blocking and electric power from of a theoretical model of combined power and telecommunication networks.

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POWER AND TELECOMMUNICATION INTERDEPENDENCY

POWERCONTROL

POWER TRANSMISSION

POWER DISTRIBUTION

SCADA

PTNPTNPDN

PDN

PDNPDN

ELECTRICALPOWER

GENERATION

Telecommunications Line

Power Line

FUEL SOURCE

PDN

PDN

PDN

Telecommunications Line

a b

c

d

e

f

a

b

c g

e

fd

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10-2 10-1 1 10 100 1000

protective system

response time after the onset of an event in seconds

FACTS

exciters and PSS

underfrequency load shredding

governor control

AGC

ULTC voltage control

operator –initiated/ manual control

market price update

1 cycle

Data Source: Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology Solutions (CERTS)

Grid of the Future White Paper on Real Time Security Monitoring and Control of Powers Systems

Electric Power Response Time After the Onset of an Event

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CONCLUSION

•Modeling the response of large networks that are heavily dependent on electromagnetic effects is still in the formative stage.

•Theoretical models can provide much insight into key factors that influence resilience to terrorist attacks

•Ultimately, detailed models supported by experimental data that predict component and subsystem behavior will be required.

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SURVIVABILITY OF COMPLEX NETWORKS