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LUCHTVAARTINFORMATIES
S C - l ® 1656S • '54 - 28 .r, /*"*
MINISTERIE VAN OORLOGX.UCHTMAOHTSTAF
SECTIE L 2„
HT VA ART
INHOUDblz
I RED SHADOWS OVER THE RISING SUN 1
II V.T,0. AND !IJET~LIFTI! 7
III --- AND NOW THE ÏHERMAL BARRIER '. 14
IV HOW GOOD ARE NONZ3TOP FïGHTER TACTICS? 17
V FERRCR WSAPON THAI FAILEE 19
VI WHERE COMMUNISTS ARE BUSY NOW 24
VII I BELIEVE IN FITTING SAUCERS 28
VIII A MISSILE TEST 30
IX NEW A4D DBSIGNEB TO OUTPERFORM MIG-15 31
X AIRCRA?T AHMAffiENT 34
DIVERSE BERICHTEN
1 Jet pilots helped by Televisionmap 132 Fire-fighting diaoovery for alrfield crashes "3 VtS,s Vernieuwing van de Luchtmacht 184 U.S. Supersonio bomber 33
5 Blueprint for World Revolution • 37
6 2 Mph in 175 Years 38
7 New U o S a IdghtT/eight 398 N,A,T.O, Infradtruoture "9 Bows and arruwa in modern war? "10 ïer leeriiig ende vermaenk 40
Voor de volledige betrouwbaar- Augustus 1954«heid van de in deae artikelenverstrekte gegevens wordt nietingestaan.,
A I R FORCE • ' . M a y 1954.'
Whv ïïe Are l'ej
By Earl H„
Gsography favors a Communist air attaaon. Japan, juicy iudustrial target forRed raiders from Aslsïi basss.
Jimmy Doolittls and, the tw.riQ.reds of World War II pilots whofollowed him over Japan to drop sverything from.leafleta toatom bombs will faal a twinge of irony when they hear this;
The United States is presently providing Japan, with an ex-cellent air defense.,
Some very recent alumni from the Jeipan Air Defense Force arethe source of this claim,, and there is no reason to discount it.
Certainly, the air defenae of Japan is better than that ofalmost any other coxmti-y in the world with the possible excep-tion of Soviet Russia, whiuh has an infinitely longer border topatrol.
But how good is any air defense? How safe from air assaultis the second best, possibly the best, defended country in theworld? Is it much iess vulnerable than other countries?
The American commander of the Japan Air Defense Force, Maj.Ge n« Roy H. Lynn, put i t this way 'in an ar t iele in Ariny-Navy-Air Force Journal; "A realistic appraisal of JADF's fïghterstrength and ovar-all air defense capability indioates that 'JADF can cope with the thr-G8,t of potential Communist agression".
General Lynn undoubtedly was looking on the bright aide. Buthè added qualifiers: "that is not to say JADF has ALL the per-sonnel, ALL the air power< needed to perfect Japan's defensea.A commander rarely feelw hè ever has enough to completely sat-isfy the magnitude of his assignment. But in pure-ly physicalterms of what is currantly available and that which JADF iscapable of absorbing in a vont of all-out war, prospects of suo-cesfully repelling airborne aggressors are more heartening than'at any time in the past,,"
Looking closely, it develops that the general did not say hècould defeat anything the Communiste throw at him, He merelysaid hè could '-cope" with it„ ïïhat does this mea,a?
From talks with defense officials while in Japan recently,and from general pcstwar experience with the caliber of UnitedStates intelligence about the Soviet Union's military capabili-ties, this coi'respondent ia rsady to conclude that General Lynnprobably had no intention of claiming that hè could stop anyRed air attaok on Japan.
The question of Japan's air defense involves four principalquestionas
What does Japan he.ve that wo want to defend?What is the nature and strength of the threat. to Japan?What defense doos the United States Air ï'orcs provide?%en and how can the Japanese take over their own air de-
fense.There is no blinkiug the fact that'Japan is important to the
West. She has strategie position and prodxictiva power.Japan, of course, is the workshop of Asia, Her industries
are far and away tho most highly developed in. the Par Sast. RedChina and India have at least a decade to go before they can
hope to approach the Japanesa Ie VB! of pz-oductive capacity. MaoTse-tung would, first of allf prefor to capture this prize in-tact. Failing this, hè would' try to deprive the free world ofusing it against hiia in an all-out war.
General Lynn classifies the ialaud empire's target areas in-to three geograpMcal regions„
First there is Hokkaidc, Frorn the Japanese standpoint, thisnorthern-nost island is FiCiy.oed by the Hussian-held semi-circleformed by Sakhalin and the Kurlle Islands.Erom the Soviet Union'apoint of view, however, Hokkaido with j.ts U.S. Army and AirPorce installations is a dagger polnted at the eastern faat-nesses of the Soviet empire.
Hokkaido, of course» is not a largo industrial area. lts im-portance is primarily strategie, It is a potential base forcounterattack and for warning of air attack» It also would bea logical site for Eed invasi'on, possibly by paratroops, ifthings ever get to that stage.
The central plains area of Honsliu, on the other hand, wouldbe the prime objeotive of any eneiny bent on destroying Japan'scapacity to wage or stipport war» The Tokyo-Yokohama and Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto areas today ooatain:
55 percent of the nation's .stüel produotion.27.7 percent of the j.rcn.75 percent of the heayy industry.90 percent of Japan' s autornotiye works.52 percent of her precision manufacturing.72 percent of the country's total exports.
General Lynn put the case for defending the Honshu industri-al oomplexes very convincingly reoently when hè said, "Ho areaof comparable size in the entire Par East can match the indus-trial potential of Japan's contral sector."
PRIME TARGET AREAS in the Japaneseisiands are Hokkaido,closest to Soviet territory; the industrial complexeson Honshu, inoluding the 'Ïokyo-Yokohama manufacturingcenters; and Zyushu, guarding the southern approaches.
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The southern Japanose i Eland of Zyushu is the third geograph-ical region of Japan- being defonded by J" AD?. 11 has severalvital ports and the largo industrial city of ïTagasaki. Besidea,It forms the south^rn approaoh for attacking airoraf t headedfor the central plalns,,
As with the Ei.üir arsa of Western Enrope, the United Statesis probably as nruoh intercsted in keeping the Japanese prod'ic-tive potential out o .f the hand a of the enemy as in using itsoutput in pro se enting anywar that might come. Japanese outputis still small wh*n cüjnparod to that of the Ü„3e But one needonly recall tha sbowing" Japan made againat the West in World WarII to einphasise how muoli tronblG she could aalce if her factoriesfeil into hostils hands end thtir ou kput wer? put into war-disciplined distribution,
So much for the need tor dafonding Japan,A few minutea' study of tho aceompanyins; map shows how geog-
raphy favors a Communist air attaok on Japan. The country isliterally hemmod in. Cn the west there is almbat nothing butCommunist country and on the east, tho Pacific,
The big questiorj.,, of course, is ;vhat the Russians, North Ko-reans, and Chinuso have hamly for the attacls. 'Roughly, the Redarsenal breaks down into two parts ™ aircraft and oxplosivea.
V/hen you pin down ov.r ini;olligencc poople, you find thatit's hard to learn muofc. about v/hat the Russiana have in tbs ParEast. The Iron Curtain is just as effective in the Oriënt as itis in Burope. The prinoipal sources of Information are air re-connaissanoe. whoae limitations are obvious, and Japanese re-patriates, who aren't alwaya reliable.
Recent'Far Sast Air loroos intelligenoe reports which havebeen cleared for publicatioa indioate that there are now 700 newIL-28 jet bombers i-.nd about 2.500 MIG fighters based in the ParBast, Here is a partial breakdown of their disparsal over somethirty fields, most of the:u within range of South Korea and Ja-pan.
In Red Ciiina. Some 3.25 to 150 IL-20 jet bombers are disposedstral"egïcaïïy np and dov;n the China coast. Soms are based op-posite Formosa* But most aro in tht; Shanghai, Tientsin,. and Pei-ping areas.
In_Manchuri_a5 ï'here are fif by IL~28s. If tho war in Koreawerë "resumecT, "t-heae Mndoubi.odly would oome into play to knookout South Korean airficads and other military instailations.There is no indication that thsy could not reaoh Japan, too, ifoccasion warranted, The ir• prinoipal purposu, however, ssems tobe as reserves for ths :5t bOHb3.rs in Horth Korea.
In North_Eorea. ïhe Roia have stationed about 100 of theirIL~2lT'böï)bers"*anS' 200 1:0 300 of their 3.lIG.-15s hers. Of course,these, too, are availablc for offer.*, s.i v e operations either inSouth Korea or Japan,
In jglberia, Intelligeace report s reloased 'by PEAÏ1 group Sa-khaHE andÜEe Kurilog "with. Siberia. Thoy estimate that. the Rua-aians have between 350 and 400 of their IL-23s and some 1,200to 1,500 MI Ga in th&ss ar-oas,. Ifeny of these are "basod on Sakha-lin and in the Zirffilus, ,-lust a fu'ff miles from Japan's northerni sland.
What this geographical proxinity has oome to moaa in the jetage is already well-Jaaown. Secrstary of Stat3 John. Poster Dulleghas warned repeatedly of Japan's extre.iasly -.-ulnorable position.Even' piston-engined planes aould. bo over Holdcaldo only a fewminutes af ter tatee--off from Sakhalin and the Kurile Islandsbases. Vladivostok is about an hour avray for jets.
What kind of payload the ,1'Jt bombers froai Communist baseswould carry is, of coursSj, just ebout as important as the awift-ness of the carrier, Wo have to assxime • that a,ny invasion of Ja-pan's air with esplcsives would be made with the fuil raaliza-tion that World WarJII was t.;aer;:/ath underway, Japan might wellbe one of the first target e to be hit. in coordinated strikes at
U.,$,..„production centers. American ov&rseas air bases, -;and.. WestGermany. ' , ' '', • .
Under such circumstances the Communists oould be expeoted tousë atomic bombs on Japan in the hope of dealing a knodkou;fc, .''"blow, ïf the Rods have A-bom/bs to drop, the Japanëse :.defe,nse:would have to be nearly perfect to avoid extensive damagë..Forit would take only a füw bombers to get through into the Tokyo-Yokohama and Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto areaa and do heavy damage. Indus-try is concentrated in the port areas.
There is also a psychological aspect. Japan, it will be re-membored, is the only country of the world that, knows the ter-ror of the atora bomb first™hand„
How the Japaneso populace might react to the news that A-bombs were dropping on their cities again is not hard to imagine.Large numbers of thein in all ths major cities rushed to thehills and mountains in. August 1945 to hide from the American"barbarians".
One bomb droppsd almost anywhere probably would disrupt Jap-anese production nationwide,
How can Japan and the Uuited States prevent this catastrophe?As already indicated, tho oommand responsible för defending
the island empire is the Japan Air Itefense Porce, headed byGeneral Lynn.
Under him are threo air öivisions, the 39th, the 41st, and43d, in northern, central, and soutliern Japan. The northern baseis at Misawa on Hokkaido Island, Tha central base is locatednear Tokyo, and the southern base is at Itazuki air base, onZyushy Island. Headq,uarters are in iïagoya, about 150 miles southof Tokyo.
. Actually, Japan is such a small place that interceptors wouldhave to get out over the aea to meet the aggressors if their de-fen.se were to be effective. Jet pilots who have flown long hoursthere point out that the Japanese islands are "only about thir-ty minutes" wide at their widest. Once over the islands, invad-ers would be hard to stop.
The JADF system is comprised of four elementa; a radar warn-ing net, a high-speed Communications system, fighter-bomber andinterceptor units, and anti-aircraft artillery.
The radar warning net is conetantly being improved. Locationsof the scanners are being changed to take advantage of the moststrategie locations. More modern equipment is coming in con-stantly. Airborne radar probablj- is being used in vigilance mis-sions, too.
But even if the system wcrks -u.p to the high standards itsdesigners hope for, there are two grim limitations, one of themcommon to all known radar warning systems, one uniq.ue in Japans
Radar is "blind" to low-flylng aircraft, skimming over thetop of the watery approaches to Japan.
Even if radar detects the attackers, there will be only afew minutes1 warning,
Radar operators are being trained not to dawdle over bogeys.Identification thus is likely to be less positive before alarmaare sounded. But under present conditions the efficiënt traffiocontrol centers manned by FÏÏAP personnel usually can preventscrambles for routine friendly approa.ches.
At present American airmen run the Communications net, usingthe latest American olectronio equipmtirit for transmitting radarwarnings of defense squadrons. Somc of the equipment JADi1 useois Japanese, of cowse, The Nipponese commimications system ±soneoof the beat in the world, and far better than other Orient-al nets. Equipment is now being modernized and with Japanesetechnicians and operators already "breaking in" on Americangear, prospects are that this phaao of the air defense systemmay be the first to be turned.over to the Japanese completely.
Japanese who speak English s.re böing allowed to take over
some of the ground-to-air oo.miaanicat2.uns, as well. With the Jap-anese coming "back in bc ooiamoroial air business, the aèed for bi-lingual cominuaieatiotis j/orgonnel vd.ll increaa.e, R.nd_ the Japan-ese tecbnieians aro already hard at work mastering English,
As for airoraft, Jüüï' ha s s.n all-;jet forcs of Lockheed ï-94Starfires. North American. ,P-86 Sabrej^ts, and Hepublic F-84Thund&róets, all kopt et the peak of röaö.iness. Kowever, thereis some sküptioiszi that those pianos could operate at the highalti tudes they might be called on to chaso IL~-28s.
JADF squadrons fly roguls.r PP.trol s over the Japanese Islands,sometimes mlxing pranst:ice flo/rfights vrith the l r rigilance mia-sions. Heavy weather OVÜ.L' Japan.'s n?.ouatainous inlands - ffiuoh ofit coiaiug off the Siberian waBtslands te the nortliwest - pro-vidos excellent training con.dif.ions ±'or all-weather squadrons.In contrast; -50 the situatioii reported fron Korea, pilots getJus t about all tho timo in tlvs air they think they need, accord-ing te a equadron oomnander recently returned.
Desk men at the heavily populated FEAP hoarlquarters in theMG i j I Building .of Tokyo and in JADF hcadquorters in ïïagoya arestill limited to their 100 hours, of cour se, 'But most of thomtalce tb'„3 Gcntonce phlD.osophically,,
One of tliem pointed out, however, that it doesn't talce solong for the chair corps to got baol: int o the swing of things.He estimates that seventy-five percent of the aces in the Ko-reaa v/ar were couvertod desk men» If a new war coma a these menwould ba right back hurjtiag bogoys again. If they are providedplanes and eouipmont that oan oope with what the Communistshave, they undolibtediy vrill moi-e than hold their ovra in the airbattles as they have in tlio past.
American pilots in. tactical outfits now stationed in Japantrain in instrument flying, gunuöry, air-to~air interception,and weather flying. Reosntl:/-, some of the squadrons have beentraining .in air-to-air rsfuéiing» A flight of P-84G's flew non-stop frem Japan to Bangkok net lon^ ago usiag the air-refuel-ing technique, öirice .?-84G'a ars k;;owa to be capablo of carry-ing "baby" "A-bombs, this incroasoa the strength of the U.S.retaliatory foroe ia tho ï'ar iïas::„
Depondenco on' seaberne fuel ;:ipp3ars to ta a waak point inthe JADE set"up. Japan ha.s little home-produceö petroleum. Ifthe Oommunists could spare rmough submarineg to blockade Japaa,thejr p.robably could koe p ths ,1üts on tho ground for laok offuel. How longaiöny p^b foroea could operabe in Japanese watersif the new Ameri.can. sub-CAasiag foroöa were aicked on them is,of cour se, a subject tho Bof e aso Dopartïaont is not discussing.
Tokyo naval sources s&y tho Sussians have posted about one-third of theii- subiuarino forcvj,,, sorao 125 vossalsy in the ParEast. There wers raports in mid-ÜTebruary that one of the Rus-sian. sub s had been smik off Hainan ïs'land, presumably by aaAmerican submarxne, The Soviot sub a .rs s ai d to have been beat-ing a rogular pa oh through tho Strai fs of ï'oi^moaa, ï'roia time totime Japanese fisheiTiOE al KI have reported soeing unidentifiedsubs surface in the Soa of Japan,
American anti--airurat't is the laat line of defense againstenemy attack, But in spito of lts racdern radar gur.-laying equip-ment and longer--range guu3r tho chanoög of AA stopping bombingruns oncü the raidez's £,ot throv.,gh tho jet squadrons' defsnsesaro not rated vary high,,
8ven if Japan, should havo the best air dofease in the world,then, the dogree of saf o fcy siio öajoys is iict iaipressive. Morealarming from the Japaawso standpoiat, things wlll probably getworse before they get better,
Thore is aiready talk about ths U.S„ pulliag its securityforces out of Japan,, Thore is stroug politica.!, support for thisinside Japan among Proi^essivss (coaserval'ivoa net now in power)and Socialistsr 21ie CoTanupistü are l'armiag the spark, hoping it
will build into a flams.This combination of left and right is making it hard for the
Idberal (conservative) govsrnment of Prime Minister ShigeruYoshida to meet any kind of a self-help schedule.
The root problsm is that tho Japanese - once looked on assuch a war-like breed - are not in any hurry at all to re-armthemselven now. American occupation authorities did tpo good ajob of selling them General MaoArthur's l!Switzerland of the Pa-cific" theory.
Prime Ministsr Yoshida is going ever so slowly in nudgingpublic opinion along the rsarmamont path. Even so hè is on ex-tremely shaky grcund, Right now hè is on the point of riskinghis premiersnip to push through a very modest defense programin the Diet, the Japanaae Oongreas. Tha U.S. has made its newmilitary aid program for Japan contingent upon Nippen's doingsomething to build her own defenses.
To support even a smail force the Japanese will have tobrace themselves for an austerity drive. Their government lead-ers are gingerly men.tion.ing the prospect and ducking for cove'rwhile the opposition howls about Japanese foreign' policy beingwritten in the American embassy in Tokyo.
Thus the gloomy pictuye for Japan's air defense: While thereis talk that United States might .pull out, the Japanese arelagging hopelesaly behind in taking up the slack.
Meanwhile, the Communist threat isn't getting any smaller.Red air units in the Far Eaa't are not only getting more numer-ous, they1re getting more modern. And the Gommunists are defi-nitely interested in what goes on in Japan. Red reconnaissanceplanes have appeared over Japan too often for oomfort.
Aa a result Japan issued the stern Ja.ny.ary 1953 warning, ob-viously aimed at the Soviet Union, that "violations of our ter-ritorial air over Hokkaido by foreign military planes" had be-come "increasingly frequent" and would be prevented in thefuture by Japan "with the oooperaticm of the American securityforces stationed in Japan". Gen. Mark Clark» then U.S. command-er in Tokyo, backed up the announcement.
In the face of this obvious threat, the Japansae are hopinglamely that America will not leave her naked of air defensewhile they go slowly about building their own. They are betting,in effect, that Uncle Sam will continue to piek up the checkafter 1958-59, recently mentioned as the possible departuredate for all American forces in Japan.
Even if American.forces stay, however, it is likely thatCommunist airpowor oould inflict somo heavy blows on Japan ifthe Reds were willing to expend the effort. The nightmare .Nip-pon faces is the squadron of low-flying IL~28s- or quite pos-sibly supersonic guided miesilos - equippad with atom bombs.And in the e vent of all-out; war-, Japan might well find herselfas vulnerablo to submarine blockade as she was in World War II,when the U.S. was on the blockading rather than the supplyingside. - END.
Earl Voss got acquainted with the Par Eastduring World War II and in a 5-|--year stint inGeneral MacArthur'a public relations set-up. Since1951 hè's been with the Washington "Evening Star",revisited Japan recently.
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ancAIR RESERVE GAZEïïïï July, 1954.
V . T . O . ' AND •'JET-LIFT"
The future of vertical or .nsar-vertical take-off has been revived by the announoement of thetwo U.S. Navy V.T.O. types, the Oonvair XPY-1 andthe Lockheed XP7-1. JAMES HA.Y STKVMS raises herethe question of whether there is really any pointin these and stollar "contraptions".
There is, of course, nothing new about vortioal take-off; itis achieved whên effecttve upward thrust exceeda weight at thestart. In fact the firat take-off was vertical - when ths upwardthrust of the hot air in the Montgolfière balloon exaeeded itsweight. Ignoring the early, almost uncontrclled, helicopters, itwas in 1933 that Don Juan de la Cierva aohieved practical V.T.O.with a heavier-than-air machine. This was the "jump-start" auto-giro in which suffioient energy was stored in the retor by re-viving it up at low inoidence (pitch), to achievs an initialleap when the ongine clutch was diserigaged and inoidence in-creased.• With the arrival of the oontrollable helicopters, the Pooke-Aohgelis and Sikorsky, vertical take-off became an establiahedfact, gut, what had been gained at the low-speed end of thescale had been lost at the other.
The engina power of the' helicopter is harnessed to a rotatingwing aystem that providss the necesaary vertical lift at the ex-pense of horizontal propulsivo efficiency. Whether one regardg ahelicopter rotor as a large variable-pitch airsorew or as awhirling wing, it achieves lift by creating artificial air speedthrough spinning aorofoilfs about ita head as it were. In otherwords, although the airci-aft rises vertically, lift is achievedtranslationally at the eest of some structura.1 and mechanicalcomplexity - a complcxity that prevents the helicopter, as weknow it today, frora competing with the aeroplans in its mainselling point - speed.
The autithesis of this methcd of vertical take-off is therocket - the power unit of ths world'a fastest vehicles, theguided missiles. The rocket can be_iamensely powerful and is al-v/ays very, very extravagant on fuel. It can, however, provide aninitial thrust greatly in excess of the weight of the aireraft,and it does so without any aerodynamio or mechanical devices. Ifyou like, it achieves V.T.O. by brute force alone.
I'ig. 1. The Fock-e-Wulfconvertiplane projectwith ram-jeb rotor-ti'ppropulsion - the firsttime such a system wasmooted.
The rooket vertical take-off is extravagant, but i t is ac-ceptable beoause the miBsile ia to be aooellerated to high su-personic speeds and the best results are obtained by accelerat-ing as rapidly as possible from the beginning, Usually boosterrookets are used at the start in order to achieve a .good excessof thrust over weight, which means rapid aöceleration, so re-duoing the "dead" pericd when. the aircraft has left its launoh-ing support and before its speed is suffioient for the controlsurfaces to "BITE".
Anyone who haa seen the German V-2 films will reoall howslowly the huge rooket rose off its base, appearing to hover onits jet of flame and smoke before it rose quioker and quickerinto the sky. Some of the films also showed how the rooketstoppled in this early stage - fortunately for us in SouthernEngland a very frequent occurrence,
The "Convertiplane".Returning to the aaro-machanical lift device, the "converti-
plane" makss an effort to combine the virtues of the helicopterwith thoee of the aeroplane. This is a compromise that may wellend by having to subsidise the vicos of both very heavily frompayload.
One of the first, and most ambitious, V.T.O. schemes was aFocke-Wulf fighter helicopter project of 194-4. This was a stream-lined fuselage with the pilot in the nose, and the rotor was tohave been mounted in the middle of the fuselage (in the plane ofa normal propeller) and driven by large ram-jets at the bladetips. This queer aircraft had tail surfaces, but no wings. Itwas to have sat on its tail and then the ram-jets would have ao-oelerated the rotor, in low incidence, with little torque, andthe take-off would have been much like that of a normal helioop-ter. Once at altitude the aircraft would have been nosed overuntil the fuselage was horizontal and at the same time the rotorwould have increased incidence and slowod down till it was simptyidling and the ram jets were thrusting almost due aft. The slow-ly revolving rotor would have given all the lift needed at the600 m.p.h. operating speed of this project. Control about allaxes was to have been from the tail surfaces.
This scheme was intended to overcome the brake upon speed in-herent in the helicopter formula, that is to say, the huge aero-dynamic problems, the shock waves, drag, turbulence and conse-quent stresses set up by bhe high resultant airspeed when therotational and forward speeds of a helicopter are combined inthe rotor.
Mg. 2. Diagram of the liftingVought V-173. With high inoi-dence the airscrews contributea direct vertical lift compo-nent, while the slipstream en-veloping the low«aspect ratiowing induces lift Srom the wing.A little forward speed is allthat is needed to make the to-tal lift exceed the weight.
Pantastic as this scheme appeared ten years ago, it is not sovery different from some of today's projects. Por example, thehalf-joking transport helicopter with the passengers in gymbalseats propounded by Lvr. Raoul Hafner of Bristols reoently.
The Pairey Rotodynes the forty-passenger inter-city rotor-
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eraft ordered by the Miniatry of Supply, is an applieation ofthe convertiplarie princlpie, of which the nowly re-constitutedGyrodyne is a worlsrïng uodel. At take-off, power from two turbo-props is diverted to supply ccmpreased air to the rotor tip-jeta for combustion. This energy provides aerodynamio lift bywhirling the rotor, exactly as in. a hülloopter. After altitudehas been gainad the wbole engine power goes into driving air-screws for forward propulaion, the tip-~je^e being stopped, andlift is obtained from the auto-rotating rotor and stub winga.This lightening of the loads on the rotor allcws a forwardspeed of 200 m,p,h, to be Kafely reacheci - it is hoped.
Here a step haa beon made tüward iiaprovins the speed range.Those curious anianatioiis froiu Bxirbank and San Diego, the
XFV-1 and XFY-1, are in somewhat the sarae claso. In the Roto-dyne vertical take-off is "feo be achieved while retaining some-thing of thé charaoteristics of a t.ransport aeroplane. In theLockheed XF7-1 and the üonvaj.r XFÏ--1, built to meet U.S. Navyrequirements, an attem.pt is made to convert relatively conven-tional aeroplanes so that they will take off and alight likehelicopters.,
One is in no position to conprehend the inner aecrets ofthe U.S. naval authorities - and if one were disclcsure wouldbe impossible - so it is d-iffioy.lt to see why these exp'ensivecontraptions were built. There has been oufficient ,knowledgefor ten years to make something very like themj the basicmechanioal req.uiremen.ts are a light and powerful engine,coupled to a laa-ge contra-rotating airscrev/. With a powerloading of about 4 lb./h.-p, the engine oan lift the aeroplanethrough the intermediary of the airscrew in very fine pitoh -the countei1 rotation eliminating torq.ue reaction.
Once airborne and at a safe altitude these aeroplanes willtip over into horizontal flight (as models have done in aN.A.C.A. free-fllght tunnel), the ene tricky period being atthe stalling iricidence whon the' conditions of f light change towing-supported. Here the low-aspecit ratio helps, particularlythe delta Convair, bocaurse thia forra of wing is more adaptableto lifting at high incideiice,
Pig. 3. The Polish 1Z--2Bvertical .take-off jet ariarocket experimental delta,A sketch based on pjnuggleddata and believod to beaubstantially correct.
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Alighting is a case of letting down ba.okwa.rd on. reducedpower, the pilot having to ;jv,<lge his approaoh and touch-down bylooking over hls shouldör, 'Fa i e is bounci t o be tricky in the . •extreme s not only becaude of difflcult piloting jüdgement, bui»also because of the effect of wind on the l&rge surfaces, sinö©there will not be the lateral control of a; helicopter. In oaaëof engine f allure, there i 13 a parachute in the spinner whichtit is hoped, wlll let the aeroplane down gently ehough to savethe pilot, To alight on a heaving deck with these aeroplaneseoorns unduly hazardous.
Fig. 4. A typ i cal Griffith suetioaaerofoil in which the boundarylayer is gucked in at the pointwhere drag-producing turbulenoewould start. In effect the inef™fective rear part of the wing,shown dotted, lias been discarded.
But it is not at r.-Iow speed that one has most doubt. Thesefighters simply have not the shape to achieve modern operatio-nal speads. In other words, they appear to have no practicalpurpose, even if thsy work.
They are, uncToubtedly, oaly part of a large, and typicallylavish, American V.1.0, programme. Obviously jet propulsionalor.a oan achieve modern speeds, so these propeller-driventypes must be a dead-end experiment, since control and stab-ility-without slipstream caiinot but be guite different.
Polish V.T.O.Very similar to the Ameriearï aeroplanes is a machine that is
understood to be under development in Poland, the CZ-2B. Thiais a delta with three vary large fing, .in the tips of which areboth rcckets and landing supports. The idea here is to use themain o'et engine s for all flighl and the rockets as boosters fortake-off only. To overoome the problem of guidance withoutslipstream the three fin-tip rocket throttles are under controlfrom the stick.
An aeroplane like thia ought to be able to achieve operat-ional performance, but the use of rocket and jet thrust direct-ly for lift is very extravagant in fuel - the airsorew and thev/ing are far more efficiënt converters of thrust into lift - sowe are back to the 7-2 again.
Vertical alighting a more difficu.lt problem, is achievedwith the GZ-23 as with the American aeroplanes. It Iets downbackward as thrugt j.s rechiced and a drogue parachute is releas-ed from the nose to give stability.
Ia there a future in Y..ü!._0.?Broad hints have been dropped by Sir Prederick Handley Page
and others that the world will shortly witness an aeronauticalrefolution, Thia change will be brought about by the integra-tion of thrust and lift - or briefly, "jet-lift".
This term means the uae of a propulsive air stream to gen-erate lift by direct action on the wings.
One example of this v-/as the vouglit V-173, the fljdng pancakeof Charles H„ Zimmerman, This was a "square" flying wing withtwo large-diameter, oppositely-rotating propellers near eachwingtip. Square .wings, tilted to an angle of 45 cleg. s resemblea kite in .action, and develop lift in the same way. An ordinaryv/ing of conventional-aspeot ratio would of course be hopelesslystalled at such an angle. Like the current V.T.O.'s, the V-173had airsorewa with very fine pitoh and when these aocalerated
10 -
large masses of air over the winfi the aaroplaae rnoved forwardonly a few yards befora it gouarated eiicugh lift tq fly steeplyupward at a.n air spe o cl of about 25 ic.p.h,
Alightin.g was relatively siraple pocau.se thsrs was no reversalcondition as1 with the othsr t?pe.ö daliH~fbèir7~whTcli cóme downTail fïrst.
A jet-engineü vörsioja was projected which, it was announeed,would have flown at 301*0 forward spaed - af ter which there wassilenes. One doeg not know wheiher the whole scheme was dropped- or whethör a fljring sauc^r baq taken, off!
Mg, 5. The N.A.C.A,'s' 3slflifting ductad fan Biodel,.Counter rotating propellorsworking in the duot are ef-ficiënt and product a jetthat will lift the wholedevice., Gontrol is by -vatiesin the jet .stream. The sx-ternal ri"b"bing is pv.x-elystruotural for this elomeii-tary model.
In embryo tht: V-173 expressen the idea of ,1 et-lift.A possible jet fona would have nozsles along inost of the
trailing edge, which would be tiltad downwrard for verticalflight. With the wing already at high incidence induced airflow over the curved upper surface of the wing would act muchlike the slipstream in generating lift.
There is, however, another factor. It is a well-known pre-oept that in aërodynamica the boundary layer is the nigger inthe woodpile. Without the sluggish onvelope cf air around amovn.ng body the stall would be delayed and drag reduced to verysmall proportions. In other words, the work of the engines inlifting and propelling would. be greatljr reduced.
Many experiments have been made with auoking and blowing a-way the boundary layer. ïïnaer laboratory conditiona, in windtunnels that is. the30 have "bsen most promisingf but flighttrials have revèaled disappcir.tingly low percentages of thetheoretical gains. Hathe r large quantitios of air have to beremoved to be effectivo a.ad, in the paat, this has been a prob-lem. Today, however, there ia the air-thirsty turbo jet and itseven greedier cousing, the ducted fan and by-pass engines.
The N.A.G.A. has actuall:/- flownf and controlled, a simpleducted fan which too3c off vertioally7"Here indeed is an ob-viously practical devies suited to vertical and horizontalflight at both high speed and no speed» Lift should be derivedfaix'ly economioa.ll3r, too„ On th« o the r hand, it presents man-ifest disauvantagös in rogard to gtowage space for crev/ andfuel.
Fig» 6. it might work! Cascades,or multiple sïots, oan gen.ere.toconsiderable lifting fofoe andit might be possible to divert ajet gtream through sucli a öystem.ïhe cascades could be jiede 't oclose up as a normal aerofoilafter take-off, when lift wouldbe generated by the air .flow overthe whole due to forward uiotion,.
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concrete. Such a positlcn IR m-diiifestly ridiculous. If the moneyspent on the manufacture - and ohe not inconsïderable mainte-nance - of the runwaye of the vïorld sinoe the war had been spentupon research into rsducing stalling spesda, the runways wouldnot be needed!
Let.us hope that research is going-in this direction now andthat, wheri more monsy is required it will -coma from the "con-crete funds", since we hope "tl?at they are obeolescent.
V.T.O., pure vertical take-cff. may not be necessary; in factone would fee! quite happy vrith reliable taie-cff and landingin five hundred yards.,
An aeroplane that oan operatt- f.rom such an araa, particular-ly if it does not need concrete, eari be deployed almost anywherein the world. If it is military it wo.ll not be inmobolised bybombed runways, if it is cororaorcial it will be cheaper and- saferto operate„
Accepting jet-lift, or integrated thrust and lift, as the newconcept in aërodynamica ~ at present a concept deeply shroudedin the veil of secur:! ;;y -- it is poasxble to foresee that just asthe aeroplane cf today is adapted to particular duties, so thatof the future will -va.ry ;n UB ta.ke-off behaviour from verticalto a few hundred yards.
AIR POWER Summer 1954.
THE SOCIETY OF BRITISH AIRGRAFT GOKSTRUCTORS(NEWS ITEMS)
j^et^Pilots Helped by
The Royal Air Force is installing a "televisiou map" systemat its traffic-control centre a. Th;j system has been especiallydesigned to enable controllers to see at a glance the positionof jet aircraft in d; stress.
The Royal Kavy and Royal ITetherlands Air Force are also in-stalling this new equipmeni, and civil aviation authorities areinterested as we 11. The system has been developed by StandardTèlephones & Cablea Ltd.
The aystem works in the following way. Radio signals from theaircraft v\rhioh are pickod up on an airfield direction-f indingset and convertsd to hearings, are fed by landline to the con-trol centre. Here? bearings from two or more of these stationsin different parts of the country are shown on the televisionmap, and the controller knov/3 that the air eraf t' s position isat1 the interaection of the boarings. The controller can see ata glance where the aircraft is. and then direct it to ap-propriate airfield,
Fire-fighting; 1'iscovery for Airf iöld,_0rash.eg.
Airfield fire-fightjng crewg are to use a new British devioewhich will -revolutionise "resctie work on planes which are forcedto crash-land. A special ohemical is used which, when sprayed onto a fire, puts it out in a matter of secoiids, and drasticallyreduces the temperatures, eo gL-eatly improving the chances ofsaving people trapped in a red— hot wre ckags ..
The eq^uipment has already been ordered by the United StatesAir Force in 3urope , and af ter oxhaustive tests it is now to beused by the Royal Air Force.
The chemical used is chlorobromomethanes generally known asG. B., and developed by General ï'ire Appliances Co. Ltd., ofLondon. It is sprayed through hoses fitted with speoially de-signed applicators, whioh control the droplet aiae.
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unimpedfcd. The distanau l ; tvv^-a the- surf ace and the freely movingair, known as the boundary layer, may b e anything from a fraotionof an inch to several inches.
ïïow, as the air is slovved down. by skin friction, the energy ofthe air (kinetic energy) is coaverted to heat energy, so thefaster the airplane flies the more the heat,
One other factor entering into the problem is that temperatureriae doesn't vary linearly with speed. It incrcases as the squareof the speed. Ia other vfords, the temperature at 1,000 m.p,h. isnot 10 times that at 100 ia „p.h,, it is aotually 10 times 10 - 100time s as much. So the magnitude of this pro'blem beoomes obviousas we reaoh for higher and highor speeds„
The designer then, recently reoc.vered from his onslaught onthe sonic barrier, is Sold that the wing skins of his airplanewill be subjected to 250 degrees Fahrenheit at 1,000 m.p.h. Atfirst hè doesn't grasp the significan.ee of this. The meltingpoint of alumlaum is far above that figure, so why worry? Thenhè remembers how all metals gradually lose strength with increasein temperature, and a oorapletely new perimeter enters into hiastrength oalcuiationa.
At 250 degrees S'ahrenheit the normal strength of aluminum hasdropped by 20$, a severe penalty indeed, particularly as themajor portion of today'0 airplanea are made of aluminum.
Steel only loscs 3 of ita strength at that temperature, butweight and an inborn prejudice against it, preclude the use ofateel for airplane skinning.
What then is the answer?Aluminum, the metal used by designers for many years now, will
'not generally be used for the skinning of airplanes flying atmore than 1,000 m.p.h, Bcyond that point the strength of themetal drops quickly, until at 1,500 m.p.h., the strength is onlya quarter of its normal strength. A- word to the sceptics at thispoint - 1,500 m.p.h.s or approximately Mach Number Two at sealevel, is not so f ar away as one may think, for it is the design,speed for aircraft already on the drawing boards.
With aluminum ruled out, we ars left with steel and titanium,and at high temperature .there geems little to choose betweenthese two me tal s, The oharj.ce s are that the designers of tomor-row's fighter aircraft will regort to the so-called wonder metal- titanium. This metal ±s at present in short aupply, and fairlycostly,'but with the extensive research being carried out on it,the costs and produotion rates should improTö, Eren today thereis flying the vanguard of this new breed of intercoptors - theïïorth American YÏ-100, a top-seeret airoraft, reportedly uaingtitanium on a wide scale„
Apart from the struo'tural and metallurgical oonsiderations,there is the effect of this heat barrier on pilot and equipment.
During the long-drawn~out oomparisons between the "Sabre" andthe Miü-15, it was often pointed out that the "Sabre" carried animpressive arra.y of air-oonditioning equipment, Gadgetry, whiohthe newspapers claimsd was there to give the pilot all the com-forts of home! ïhere may be a certain anrount of truth in it, butone thing is certain, without somo efficiënt form of air-oon-ditioning the cockpit tomperaturss would bö bsyond the limit ofhuman endurance. It is absolutely essential that the pilot besupplied with the correct aiaounts of oxygen, pressure, humidityand temperature. The equipment required to porform all theseduties is oonsequently 'largo, heavy, -exponsive. and costly.
Also affected by the torrific heat are radar and electronicunits, and the guidance systems of any missilas carried. All of
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AMERICAN AVIATIOH May 10, 1954.
More work must be dcne on inttfgrating ths pilotand his equipmeut t o niaintairi aom'ba.t sfficisncy.
Ey 'W.LTER A. KILRAIN.
It is feasible even for fighfcers to fly 10-15 hours if thesituation requireg it, However they cannot de this and stillmaintain their combat efficiency with thRir present equipment.
•Sbe estimate and its cjxialification come i'rom Harry W. Dorris,Jr. , who-has been in a position to know. He was in the poaitionfor some 14 hours, flying a Lockheed J-BQ fighter over Korea,during which time hè refueled in the air six time s and fleweight missions. Since röturning to work as an operations de-velopment erigineer at the Glenn L, Martin Co. , hè has outlinedboth the advantages inherent in mid-air refueling as carried outduring his experiment and the drawbacks that presently out com-bat efficiency.
"During (the) 14 hours, l became intimately familiar with mypersonal equipment," Dorris observed. "As a matter of fact, myparachute seat strap made a firm impression on my posterior dur-ing this flight. I could see the acute need for redesign ofcockpits and personal equipment, I could also see the greatoperational mobility afforded by using inflight refueling tae-tics."
The mobility that Dorris refers to can be exploited in sev-eral ways. With a larger supply of fuel, obtained by means ofinflight refueling, the Jet fighter can penetrate deeper intoenemy territory, remain longer in the target area, or fly atlower altitudes while going to or from the taa"get. These ad-vantages, together witli the fact that atomio bombs can be car-ried by fighter aircraft, constitute reasonable grounds forattempting to iron the'bugs • out of such marathon operationa. "Itis," as Dorris points out, "only 8000 miles from Washington a-cros-s the Arctic and eastern Europa to India, oi' less than 14hours in a fighter."
The actual refueling is simple enough. The fighter arrivés atits rendezvous with the tanker, moves slowly up until its probeenters and locks inside the drogue of the larger aircraft, waitswhile fuel is pumped aboard at the rate of 600 gallons per min-ute, then reduces speed and breaks contact. In three to fiveminutes the operation is finished, It is done almost as easilyat night as in the da,ytime.
Por the pilot however, such a flight has real difficulties,which revolve around the probleia of flying? alert for possibleenemy actions for long periode, while hurxg with various items ofpersonal eq_uipment.
LIPE VEST UNBEARABLE.
"I became more and more uncomfortable as the hours passed,"says Dorris. "My Mae West life vast bec3:ns nnbearable after fivehours, so I took it oi'f and placed it ori the floor of the cock-pit... it would have "been impoysible foz- mo to have flown 14 hourswith it on*... My survival eq.uipment was bulky and uncomf ortable.
Prior to the flight I had found out in relatively short fligits(four to -five hours) thab I could not tolerate the surviva,! vestwith its coatents. I renioved the content s and replaced them intoa makeshift cushion. which I placed on the top of my dinghy tosit on.
- l? -
"Another irritating itsm was the back of the P-l heimet rub-bing my neek. Plying alone, I was most oonoernad about whatmight be coming up on my tail, so I checked that area frequent-ly. I did not want a MIG to'sneak up undoteoted and shoot medown. To look directly behind you requirea a good twist of theneck. This .results in your oxygen mask puiling back, your P-lheimet turning slightly on your head, and as it turns, theback edg3 rubs your neck,
"Another uncomfortable pis.o of equipment on a long flightis the main Btrap of your parachute that fits under your legs,which you sit on a's you corae down in the parachute. 11 ia aatrap .about four inches wide and very heavy. This made a firmimpression on my posterior during the 14-hour flight."
The answer, says Dorris, is tailor-made personal equipmentinstëacl. of mass-produced items whioh. may only come close tofitting everybody. "We pay a million dollars for a modern jetfighter so it will go higher and faster, but at the aame timewe pay a few hundred dollars for equipment which we hang on thepilot as best we c'an....Wo must integrate the aircrewman, hispersonal equipment, his ejection seat, and his cockpit layout(the Instruments, handles, levers, knobs to push, pull, andtwist) into one entity."
Just how closely Dorris1 opinion coincides with currentUSAF thinking was emphasized during ths recent meeting of theAero Mëdical ABsociation, wïien Colonel Don Flickinger, assistantdeputy commander for technical oparations of the Air Researchand Development Command, descrabed the problem as "one withwhioh we are currently grappling on practioally a 'do or die'basis.
"Equipment which is reasonably tolerable for a two-hourfighter mission may become so uncomfortable in four to sixhours as to eause an unavoidable, unpreventable decrement inperformance at a critical point in the mission. This same e-quipment may b3 altered suffluiantly to allow some degree offunctional comfort for a bomber mission of oix to eight houra,but with the added oapability of several in~fllght refuelings,we end up with tho savae crew sitting in the'same work spacewith the same equipment, but required to remain mission-com-petent for 18 hours rather than the original six."
Until the resources of the pilot can. be coordinated with theresources of the fuel tanks, the taotical advantages of mid-airrefueling may remain more or lese e„cademic„ In "lickinger'swords: "Any performance capability researched and engineered .into the hardware of a woapou which is over and above the ca-pability of the crew memoer to use and exploit it is wasted."
N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE July 22, 1954-.VER_MIj3rp_£ _STATM s yernieuwing van de Luchtmacht.
De Am. Luchtmacht is bezig met de ontwikkeling en productievan oen nieuwe serie straaljagers en straalbommenwerpers,schrijft ïalbört ir, de "N.Y. Her. Tribune".
Schr. noemt hierva.ii de "super-Sabre" - I1 100, de "McDonnell"- B1 101, de "Convair"-!' 102, de "Republic"-F 103, de "Lockheed"- F 104 en de "Republic!! jachtbommenv/erper P-105.
Elk van bovengenoemde typen is bestemd voor een speciale taak;P 100 ~ Dit toestel sol ir. de komende jaren Amerika's belang-
rijkste "Air superiority fighter" zijn;I 101 - Is bestemd voor escorte bij raids op-lange-afstandjP 102 enP 103 - dag-en-nacht-jagers ten dienste van de luchtverdediging;P 104 - voor locale luchtverdediging;P 105 - voor tactische atomische bombardementen te velde.
- 18 -
THE CROWSNEST March, 1954.
A TERROR WEAPON THAT FAIEED
Japanese Balloons' Principal FunctionWas Raising of Home Morale.
Since censorship was lifted from the subject in 1946, therehaa been a lot said and written about the unique invasion ofNorth America by bomb-laden Japanese balloons near the close ofthe Second World War. They appeared in the United States, Canada,Mexico, Alaska and the Pacific Oceari. Not much of this publioitywas focused on the Conadian scène and still less on the faol;that personnel of the Royal Ganadian Navy had a hand in eombat-ting the menaoe.
The story behind their appearance is thiss According to in-formation ebtained from Japanase army officers after the sur-render, paper balloons were under development in Japan beforethe war for meteorological use. When the first bombing attaok onJapan occurred in 1942, the effect on morale there was such thatall-out efforts were made to devise retaliatory measures.
A revenge attaok on North America was conoeived, uaing air-planes, submarines and free balloons, It was first decided todevelop a balloon oapable of travelling a distance of about1,800 miles to be released by submarines or warships off theWest Coast of the United States, By the summer of 1943 such aballoon had been developed but the Japanese navy had been de-pleted so much that units neceesary to oarry out this type ofattack were no longer available. To traverse the entire ocean,still larger types had to be f^tr"cated. Much experimental workwas neoesaary, but the first 200 were released in December 1943.
On the basis of a few reports of fires and exploaions oocur-ring in "unexpected araas" recorded by monitors of U.S. broad-casts, the initial onslaught was begun, using paper balloonshaving an inflated diameter of about 33 feet, and carrying abomb load averaging 50 pounds. The oost of each was a shade over$2,000 onoe full produotion got under way. The paper envelopeswere spherical, grey white or greeniah-blue in colour and had achandelier slung under them whioh carried sandbags, high explo-sive and incendiary bombs. Inflated with hydrogen gas, they werereleased from the Island of Honshu„
The baga rose to the vicinity of 33»000 feet and the prevail-ing west-to-east winds whipped them towards North America atspeeds of 100 to 150 miles an hour. A barometrio device keptthem at the desired altitude by releasing gas or dropping sand-bags as required. A-little over a week later they were -overtheir targets, By this time their loads of sandbags were ex-hausted and they began dropping the bombs along their overlandroute with eaoh dip they made.
In all« about 9,000 were launched. It is estimated that onlyten per cent ever reached North America. Just 281 seperate re-coveries of balloon materials were made, the findings rangingfrom small pieoes of paper to a few almost intaot balloons.Thirty-two bombs, or fragments of them, were found and therewere 407 reports of the sighting of one or more balloons in theair. Why so few have been found was because they were fittedwith self-destroying davioes which aoted after bombs had beendropped. Somatimes this device did not work, since it waa power-ed by a wet-cell battery which froze in the high altitudes, RCAFpilots on search and rescue missions over western wastes are de-ceived still by remnants of the snagged balloons in out-of-the-way timber stands. From the air they resemble collapsed para-chutes or aircraft wreckage.
- 19 -
ïhü f irst real evidence of their incidence in Canada was atMinton» £ask„ On January 12, 1945? a, partially deflated balloondrifted across a field almost at ground levsl and tanglod in abarbed wire f snee. A 15 kg "bomt), two cylinders and a celluloidbox containing a transparent, frosen liquid feil from the chande-lier, while the balloon, freod of'this weight, drifted away andwas nsver saen s.'.ain.,
National Defence Hsadquart-c-rs was informed of its whereaboutsand the matter was put into the hands of the Ganadian Inter-Serv-ica Boato Disposal Centre ir.i Ottawa, under command of the lateOrdnance Ldeut.-Cdr. Edward Litchfield Borradaile, of Ganges Har-bour, B.G.
That' night hè organized a team hurriedly f roai instructors atthe 'centre, They aasembled scme disposal equipment and the nextday embarkod in an RCAP transport for Saskatchewan. The team wascomposed of Lieut.-Gdr. Borradaile, Gapt. JVL. Mclntosh of theArmy, CPO G-.M.H. Deed and Ldg. Soa. J.C. Smith. When weather con-ditions penaitted them to finish their journey, they started ren-dering the bombs -safe and found them to be an anti-personnel. bomliand incendiaries of Japanese make,s The celluloid container wassampled for bacterial culture with negativo results. The spoilswe-re brought back to the centre in Ot-cawa. When the United Statesgovernment was informed, it replied that the American forces hadbeen aware of the situation for several months.
Further reports from various areas-from the Northwest Terri-tories to the 49th parallel began to oome into Ottawa. Consider-able attention was given to this invasion, beoauae no one was atall sure what else besides.bombs the balloons might oarry. To aidin counter-measures, several assumptions were made as to theenemy's propable use of this novel revenge weapon,
It v/ar. considered that thsy could be used to provide the Japawith (l) v/ee'/bher and atmospherio data for further air aggression;(2) to transport incendiary and high exploaives to cause forestfires and human casualties; (3) a.a carriers of poigon gases, bac-teria or both against humans, animals and crops; (4) to transportenemy agente to thi« country or the StateG; (5) as anti-aircraft .devlces, and (6) a good propaganda weapo:-i for'home consumptionand to uuderaine enemy morale. •..
Special Japanese balloon co-ordinating oommittees-were set upin each of thé four western provinces, sin.ce- the greatest conoen-tration of the new me na c e was th'ere. even though one had drifted •as f ar inlaad as the Gr-aat Lalces.
Inoluded in these commlttees were representatives from theprovinoial departments of heaü-tli, the federal Department of Agri-culturéj the provincial forestry branches. ROMP and, where appli-cable, provincial polioe, and the general and medical- staffs ofthe jirmect Forces a
The Ganadian Inter-Service Bomb Digpoaal Centre became thefocal point for the counter network operating from the GreatLakes to the Paoific, with field investigatora and bomb disposalcrews composed of foregt rangers, provincial police and SCMP,and personnel from' the thrse armed ssrvices actively involved.The services ware ailooated-responsibilities in their own domainsand thoy quiokly trained bomb disposal personnel for this pur-pose , as' well„
At the Ottawa centre WGI-G officera and men of the forces whotrained man to deal. with every known German and Japans se bomb.''hen this network was firmly egtablishod, the latest discoverieswere distfiatvtlBd and sb.ipped to Ottawa,, Once this material hadarrived in the Gartiar School headquaxters of the OISBDC, allweapons aaide from bombs were distributed to the departments oon-oerned with chaiaica.1 or bactericlogical warfare.
The centre was able to assemble ballcons frcm these parts sothat Li9ut."Cd::-. Borradaile, as commanding officer of the unit,was able to provide both the navy and army of the United States
20
that spring wlth. examplos for research, and display at the ir BDand ordnance schools.
Msanwhile the preas and radio of Canada and the United Statesmaintained a very complete voluntary security blackout at therequost of the official censors and thus denied the Japanesevital informatica as to the numbere of balloons arriving and thelanding points.
All the balloons found oarrlad only bombs or incendiarieg orboth. A fuller analyses showed that it would be impossible forthem to transport agents and they were not at all effective as,nor inteuded to be, anti-airoraft devicea*
Oontrary to popular articles in the presa, official testimonyfrom high ranking Japanese army authoritie.a stated that it hadnever been inteded to send biologioal or chemical weapons in theballoons. They said that one of tlie main purposes of the balloonwas to bolster home morale and for propaganda abroad.
During the war, however, little referenoe was made to theballoon warfare in Japanese broadcasts and there was apparentlyno organized exploitation of their propaganda value for foreignoonsumption. Nor did the enerny expect that the balloons would beeffective, and this gu.es s provsd to be accurate. The originalgoal was to make 20,000 of"them but only 9,000 were manufacturedand released. If hostilities had continued longer, the labour .involved in their production would have been diverted into someothor aspeot of the Nipponese war effort.
Oanadian and American authorities concluded that the balloonswere of no military consequence, since they could not be aimedat population oentres and, since they had to be launched during ..the winter nonths when winds were aio s t favourable, negligibledamage was caused by the incendiarj.es, The only casualties re-sulting were six persons, moatly children» killed in Oregonwhen they handled a T.'omb dropped about a month previo.us. The on-ly fires started were one or two grass fires. A word 'of mouth 'campaign was launched to forestall further inexperienoed hand-ling of the bombs and the pregs and radio made only ;a brief men-tion of the arrival of the first balloons, Their main dangerwas the j)syohologicai effect on'the population, which was prompt-ly curtailed by censorship and other adequate .counter measures.
This story has a sequel. Lieut.-Cdr. Borradaile emerged frorahostilitisa unscathed.by his war against Japaneoe bcmbs. Af tera brief period in oivilian. life, hè transferred to the RCÏÏ on ashort service appoint"!..ent in Juae 1951 ahd was appointed. to theOrdnance School at'MCS'ijfeden.
A year latei-"hè "Hecame "'ïïïé' traglo victim of • a Japanese minewhich prematurelyexploded while hè was trying to render itharmless,, On June 11, 1952, on Bonilla Island, 90 miles from.Princë Rupert, hè 'died violently in the service of his countrywhilë attempting to destroy the- beached inine, and an assistantwas wounded. His remains' were escorted to burial in the navalaection of the Veterans1 Cemetery in Victoria by 400 offioersand men of -the Pacific command.- H.C.W.
Tn spite of the fact that air power alone can neverbe decisive in total war» the air battle must be won.In spite of all the now developments in the field ofatomic energy and the various military applications,the airplane nontinues to be the best mothod of pro-jecting the power of the atom to the battle field, andto the heart of any l ar ge Xandmass nation,
. General Omar N. Bradley.
— 21 —
AMERICAN AVIATION 21 June 1954.
"STRATE&Y FOR THE WEST"(Former British O.A.S. interviewed)
Questioni What do you consider to be the major oonsiderationsregarding the nature of the next war and how do these diotatethe defense requirements of the West?
Sir John Slessor, Marshal of the Royal Air Force: My view isthat the "next war" - if by that you mean World Total War -would be so muoh a matter of mutual suicide that the priraarydefense requirement of the West is to prevent it happening,That we can do - and can only do - by being so strong in thatdeoisive arm of atomio and thermonuclear air power that no ag-gressor will dare risk it.
£. s Do you feel the next war will start with a major aasault,such as an assault on Europe, or will it occur on many frontsfurther to disperse our forces?
A,: This question assumes that there will be a "next war" -which I don't believe. But if I'm wrong, I don't see how anyoneoan give a worthwhile answer to that question. The most I cansay is that I oan't see another total war happening without amajor assault on Europe. But I have no doubt that at the sametime there would be attacks elsewhere - in Asia for instance,and by air against the United States - to make us disperse ourforces.
But the point on whioh we should be crystal clear - and onwhich we should allow no doubt to arise in the minds of our po-tential enemies - is that any major assault on the free worldanywhere will instantly bring down upon their heads Mr Dulleg'"massive retaliatory power".
Q.; Do you feel that each of the military services, inoludingthe army and navy, should have its own air foroe for unrestrict-ed operatlons, or should all airpower be concentrated in asingle force?
A.: There is no better way of wasting public money than havingfhree or four separate air foroes. I think that as long as thereare carriers - which won't be very long as these things go - theaircraft that actually go to sea in ships are more convenientlypart of the navy. But they should be a very small proportion ofthe whole.
Por the rest: What was wrong with our system in the last war?Our taotical air foroes worked admirably with the Army withoutbeing oommanded by soldiers. Field Marshal Montgomery is one ofthe strongest advocates of that system. And as for maritime war-fare - well, I may be prejudiced, I think our Coastel Commandsystem worked admirably, and our relations with the Royal Navycould not have been closer. Anyway, no one can say we did notdeliver the goods in the way of killing U-boats. Admiral Doenitzcertainly thought so, and the customer is always right!
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Q,:ïïould you comment on the role of the super aireraft-carrierin the e vent of an, atomic war?
k. i I'd like to quote Dr. Vannevar flus.1?, at you on that. In hiab"ook "Modern Arma and Pre o Men" hè wrote five years agos "Theprimary mission of our Navy in war is to interrupt enemy aeacommerce and make i t possa/blo for our commsrce to move rapidlyto supply our allies and our fighting forces overseaa. ...Cer-tainly until we have the meane fully in hand for dischargingthe primary mission it would be foolhardy to seek out new tasksfor great ships» suoh as participation in strategie bombing,merely for the sake of having graat ships, Their cost is largeand their impregnability questionable. On. the other hand, ifthere is an essential aspect of strategie bombing that oan beeffected only from carriers and if they oan be defended withreasonable effort and assurance, by all means build them beforeit is too late".
Well- I don't think there is an essential aspect of strat-egie bombing that can be effected only from carriers. And Idon't think they can be defended with reasonable effort and as-suranoe. I'd like to see the U.S. Navy sticking to its primarymission and not being "diverted by the sirens of more specta-cular fiel ds" to quote Dr. Bush again.
Q.i Would you comment on the major weapons of our next war andthe relative importance of each, i.e., intercontinental bofflbers,the various types of missiles, atomic artillery, etc.?
A. : You use that expression "next war1" again. I think the "nextwar" (and the next after that) will be small wars rather on theKorean model, That, as Mr„ Dean Aeheson recently said, is theonly sort of war we - the world - can afford. As for the rela-tive importance of weapons - well to my mind the first prioritymust go to the long-range bomber, wnether it's the manned bomb-er of today or the long-range controlled missile that one daywill take .its place. And the reason is that it is only the long-range bomber that will prsvent the next war being World War IIIand the end of civiliaation as we know it today.
In these smaller wars the job of the bomber will be the bigstick in the background - to keep them small and prevent therelatively minor incident blowing up into atomic Armageddon.
But I think it follows from what I've said before that wemust have a sufficiency of the other weapons, like atomic ar-tillery. I see no reason why atonic artillery or the taoticalatomic bomb should not be used in these small wars - that'smerely a matter of using one gun or one fighter-bomber to dowhat a thousand were required to do in the old wars, The cruxhere of course (as it usually is in this sort of matter) isthat of priorities, of allocating the right proportion of thatpart of the gross national product that we are prepared to setaside for armamen-Js, to the various arms. The thing to reraemberthere is that if we try to be 100 stroug in every ann we shallbe strong enough in no arm. We can't afford many luxuries -certainly not the luxury of sentiment. We must cut back mth-lessly on those par t s of the ru;,', ie™*! military eatablishmönt -particularly the "frills" and the administrative "tail" - thatare not absolutely vital. to our survival or to cur capacity todefeat an eriemy if it comes to hot war. .
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT June 25, 1954.
TOERJJL CpjMUlTISTS ARE ...BtJSY NOWReds Nibble at Mountain Areas North of India
Communists are preparing a "sücond front" in Asia- this time in the forbidding peaks of the Himalayas.
A gent s are busy in Tibet, Nepal, elsewhere. Bases,supply routes are being dug into the world1s highest.movmtains.
It is a direct, growing threat to neutral India.A tako-over in the Himalayas would put the Communistson ÏTehru's doorctep.
NEW DELHI.
The Communists ara advanclng across Asia with another creep-ing invasion - in tha high Himalayas, one of the strangest,most inaccesaible ragions on earth. Erom the roof of the world,the Chinese are moving down on neutra]. India through the moun-tain barrier that alwaye has defended that country against at-tack from Russia and China.
New Communist military bases and roads are being developedin Tibet, the myaterious highland which the Chinese Reds seizedthree years ago. Other supporting bases and strategie r'oads arebeing built in Sinkiarig Province of China, at the edge of Rus-sia.
These moves are bringing Communist military power close tothe Indian buffer state g of Nepal, Kashmir, and the little pro-tectorates rulad by manarajahs toward the eastern end of India's1,500-mile Himalayan froutier. All the00 border countries .arein danger of waking up soms raorning "t° find themselves suddenlymade a part of Communist China.
The mountains that dominate the region are the highest inthe world - pepis such as Annapurna, K-2 and Mount Everest,which was scaled for the first time last year by a British ex-pedition, But the mountains no longer form the impregnable bar-rier to invasion from the north that the British and Indiansonoe thought they were.
.Developments along his mountain frontiar are forcing India'sPrime Minister Jawaharlal Nehni to ohange his ideas about Com-munist China. Although no formal pretests are being made fromNew Delhi, India is moving to strengthen the China-Tibet fron-tier. Ocoasional claahes between Indian and Chinese troops are•j eginning to look like the forerunner of moi'e serious trouble.
The_pattern of ths Communist s' cre-aping invasaon of Indiacan"~bT~pï"ec5ëT.""together from intelligence reports and from in-formation brouglit out of the mountaiïi land s by travelers.
These reports show that Communist agenta, coming from bothTibet and Sinkiang, are carrying arms and instructions toNepal and other rieighboring areas. Communist fronts are in-filtrating shaky governmenta and stlrring up trouble. Officialmaps of the Chinese Communist Government .are being distributed,claiming for China territory that extends far south of the Ti-bot-Indian border. Indian Communistg are stepping up their ownactivities on the Indian side of the boundary.
It was the take-over cf Tibet three years ago by China thatsst ths stage for brsaching India''s Himalayan defensa barrierwithout firing a shot. That "brought the Chinese Communist Armyto the borders of India, Nepal and Eashmir, in an area where
frontiers have never been clearly defined.Sinoe then the Chinese have been working quietly, and with
extreme caution, to consolidate their hold on Tibet. Ultimatelytheir aim is to do what Chinese rulers have attempted withoutsuocess for two oenturies - annex Tibet completely to China pro-per. But for the time being they are moving slowly.
The obvious reason is that the Buddhist religion haa a power-ful grip on the people of this country on "the roof of the world".Hundreda of monasteries dot the mountainous landscape. The priest-hood is one of the most popular professiona, and the most in-fluential. The supreme spiritual and temporal ruler still is theyoung Dalai Lama, who is worshiped as the fourteenth reincarna-tion of Buddha.
The Chinese are handling the Dalai Lama with the utmost deli-cacy. No attempt ia being made yet to "communize" the countrynor to take over direct govermiental powers. But, indirectly, theCommunists are tightening their hold by infiltrating the rulingcouncil with hand-picked priests who take their orders from Pei-ping.
The Communists know that, if they move too quickly to stripthe Dalai Lama of his power, they might stir up a beehive oftrouble. The priests in somè of the monasteries are tough fight-ers with substantial supplies of arms. The Communists aren'tstrong enough yet to cope with a guerrilla campaign led by Ti-betan priests.
Roads. Por the moment they a're concentrating on a road-build-ing program linking Tibet more closely with China as a means ofsupplying their troops. At least three roada are being built.One is under construction from Kashgar, in Sinkiang Province nearthe Russian frontier, to Lhasa. When it is completed, it willprovide the Russians with a direct overland route into Tibet. An-other road is under construction from Tsinghai Provinee to Lhasa,and a third will link Lhasa with Chengtu in central China.
Military bases in Tibet are being developed by the Communistsat pointe along the two caravan trails from India. Until theroads and Communications between Tibet and China are improved,these military outposts will not oonstitute a serious threat.But, as they become stronger, the Communists" can be expected tomove more forcefully to take over direct control of Tibet's Gov-ernment .
The Communist bases also can be used, eventually, to push theTibetan frontier deeper into the Indian subcontinent. Alreadythere are reports that the bases are headquarters for agents try-ing to promote revolution in nearby Nepal.
Gradually, the Communists are sealing off the Indian-Tibetanborder. The Chinese have established check points near the fron-tier and Indian traders and pilgrims are thoroughly searched,once they cross over. They are not permitted to oarry arms intoTibet. There are many signs that the Communists are moving toisolate Tibet from India and the rest of the world as rapidlyaa they can do so in safety.
Nepal next? With Tibet on the way to being engulfed by theCommunists, signs are increasing that the attention of Red agentsis being shifted to Nepal. Communists are intensifying their sub-versive activities and exploiting the political chaos that hasprevailed in that country for months. Gradual take-over of theNepalese Government now is considered a real danger.
There are persistent reports that Chinese Communists in Tibetare operating a training center for guerrillas near the borderof, Nepal. Mule trains from Tibet are suspected of carrying armsinto the troubled country. Communists are active among the bor-der tribes, and Communist agents, disguised as Buddhist monks,are operating in Nepal's óapital city of Katmandy. They are be-ing used to stir up feeling against India.
The Government in Katmandn is weak, and political discord isacute. Poverty is almost universal in this little country that
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produces the famous Gurkha soldiers, who fought on the side ofthe British in two world wars and now serve as mercenaries inboth the British and Indian armies* It is a situation that i'smade to order for the Communists, and a move by them to grab oon-trol through a contrived insurrection would come as no great sur-prise in New Delhi.
To counter the Communist threat, India is attempting tostrengthen Nepal's military forces. The Indians are supplyingarms and modern equipment to the 40,000 men in uniform. And ahuge reservoir of battle-testad veterans is available among thethousands of Gurkhas who fought in World War II. The Indians havejust completed the first road connecting India with Katmandu, andeconomie programs have been started to help the country. Theproblem is to move fast enough to get strong props under Nepalbefore the Communists stir up enough internal trouble to topplethe Government.
On another front, however, the Communists are building up Sin-kiang Provinoe in West China as part of the oreeping encroachmenton India. The development of oommunications and industry in Sin-kiang Province is clearly designed to backstop the Chinese in Ti-bet and strengthen China's position on the border with India andPakistan,
Chinese troops, assisted by Russian advisers, are reporte.d tobe building a major military base at Kashgar, near the Pakistan-Kashmir frontiers. The Chinese closed off this area last October,ordered India and Pakistan to close their consulates and barredIndian traders from doing business in the area. A strategie rail-road is being built across Sinkiang to oonneot Soviet Turkestanwith Lanchow .in Central China.
In Kashmir - flanked by Sinkiang and Tibet - Communist sub-version fits into the campaign of pressure on India. The situa-tion there is more serious than the Indian Government admitspublicly.
Intelligence reports list three of Kashmir's Cabinet membersas being either Communist agents or fellow travelers. The DeputyP-remier is identified with a Communist-front organization. So isthe Home Minister. Several other Government officials have rec-ords of Communist activity.
So far the Communists in Kashmir have been operating quietlybut there are persistent reports that they are placing agents ina netwórk that runs through several Government bureaus. Cautionprobably is forced upon the Communists by the presence of theIndian Army, which probably would move fast to block a Red take-over. The strategy, instead, is to nibble deep into the Govern-ment system.
• A squeeze play' by the Communists against Indian territory andseveral little border kingdoms that-are under .the protection ofthe Indian Government is another maneuver that is causing concernin New Delhi.
The entire border area between India and Tibet is poorly out-lined, and, for generations, parts of it have been the subjectof disputes. Intelligence agents have disoovered Chinese mapsshowing the frontier of Tibet and China proper extending down tothe lower reaches of the Brahmaputra River. If these maps aregenuine, that probably means that the Chinese Communists areclaiming the two little states of Sikkim and Bhutan, which adjoinNepal on the Tibetan border, as well as a chunk of Indian terri-tory in Assam.
The main route from India to Tibet passes through Sikkim. Bhu-tan could be of considerable interest to the Chinese Communistsas a possible source of food for their troops stationed in Tibet.
The cituation is such that the Nehru Government is taking somedeliberate steps to strengthen India's position in that region.Bhutan and Sikkim are so-called "protected states". The Maharajahof Sikkim has concluded an agreement giving India control overhis state's foreign policy, Communications and defense. This
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makes it posaible for India to defend Sikkim's autonomy politi-cally, and also gives it the right to station Indian troops -inthe strategie little stats.
Nehru is reported to have negotiated with the Maharajah ofBhutan to strengthen the ties between India and Bhutan and topernoit India to station troops there.
Special pains are being taken, too, to establish Indian. eon-trol over the wild region of Aseam. Nehru Is trying to cultivatethe tribal ohiefs aad to organisö an effective administrationover thia area,
The Comnmnist moves in the moxintains are forcing officials inNew Delhi to re-examine some of iiheir old notions about RedChina. The pressure in the Himalayas and elsewhere coincideswith the Communist campaign to seize Indo-China. And Indo-China,in Communist hand3, oould outflank the Himalayas from the eastand nudge both Eurma and India from anothor direotion.
As a result, Prime Minister ïTehru has been showing signs ofbecoming lass critical of U,S, and less friendly to CommunistChina and Russia. He isn't likely to rush into any defensivearrangement with the West. But some observers feel there is areal possibility hè will moderate his violent opposition to theidea of "oollective security" led by U.S. Before too long, hèmay need some help against the Coramunists himself.
27
SUNDAY DISPATCH July 11, 1954
Au Article By 0:ie Of
Britain's Great War Leaders.
Air Chiof Marshal LORD DOWDIKG,
Air Officer Commanding-in-Chisf,Fighter Comraand In The
. Battle of Sritain.
I have never seen. a "Flying Saucer", and yet I believe thatthey exist, I have never seen. Australia, and yet I believe thatAustralia also exists. My belief in t>oth cases is based uponoumulative evidenoe in suoh quantity that, for me at any rate,it brings complete conviction.
More than 10,000 sightings have been reported, the majorityof which oannpt. be accounted for by any "scientifio"~ëx':piana--tion, e.g., thaiTldiey are halluoinations, the effects of lightrefraction, meteors, wheels falling from aeroplanes, and thelike.
BEST EVTDEÏÏCE
The best available evidenoe, perhaps, is contained in MajorDonald Keyhoe's recent book, "Flying Saucers From Outer Space."
I say this becauso most of the inoidents which hè rec-ords have been cheoked by the Intelligence Branch of theUnited States Air Porce. They endorse the accuracy of theevidence, but they put forward no explanation. The oritioswho deny the existence of these objects must produce jgomealternaiive theory whioh will accouïrS for the obseryëcTfacts.
In a brief article I cannot deal at length with the sug-gestion that they are new types of aircraft under developmentby Eussia or the U.S. They have been traoked on radar screensin America - on one occasion by thrée screens simultaneously -and the observed speeds have been as graat as 9,000 miles anhour.
No earthly materials that we know of could be forcedthrough the air at such a speed without getting too hot to al-low human ocoupants to exist. The accelerations whioh theydevelop in starting, changing course, and stopping would alsomake human life as we know it, impossible.
I say then that I am convinced that these objects doexist and that they are not manufactured by any nationon earth. I can therefore see no alternative to accept-ing the theory that they come from some extra-terres-trial source.
And why should this be oonsidered to be such a ridiculousidea? In ten years' time we shall probably have shot a rocketto the moon. In a hundred years we may have m'ade the returntrip with a manned projectile. In 500 years we may have reach-ed the nearer planets. Are we ao az'rogant as tp maintain thatthe inhabitants of no planet are as muoh as 500 years ahead
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of us in scientifio developrasnt?
PEIHOÏPAL QUBoïIC'NS
Please do not teil me that eoientists affiria that lifö is notpossible on other planets. They aasuma that !?lifs!' must neees-sarily exiei> in earth-typo bodies» irut it is onlj" r&asonable tosuppose "that boules would. b e conditioneel to th.e physioal condi-tions exlating on saoh plauet.
Now that is as far as my "conviotions" takt? me: beyond thismy ideas are frankly speculative. The principal q_uestions whicharise are; Where do these objeots come from? And what are themotives o.f the oocupants in visiting the Eerth's atmosphere?
I think that we must resist the tendency to assume that theyall come from tha same planet, or that they are all actuated bysimilar motives. It might be that visitors from one planet wishedto help xis in. our evolutioa frcm the basis of a higher level towhioh thay had attainecL.
Another planet might send an expedition to ascertain whathave been these terrible explosions which they have observed,and to prevent us from disoommoding other people besides our-selves by the new toys v/ith which we are ao light-heartedlyplaying.
Other visitors mi glit hava oome bent solely on scientifiodisoovary and might regard us with the dispassionate aloof-ness with which we might regard insects found beneath anupturned stone„
A WAltlTINGIf I say that I believe that the majority of our visitors are
actuated by friendly and helpful jnotivos, I oannot produce thesame volume of evidence in. support of my opinion as. I have donefor the physical reality of the Saucers; but the fragmentary anduncorroborated evidenca which I have is reinforced .by the reason-ability, if not the probability, of the idea that, if the in-habitants of other planets ara so far ahead of us in making useof the (to ua) unknown foroes of nature, they may we 11 be eq.ua!-ly far ahead of us in spiritual evolution, and may have bettermethode of spreading theii- wisdom than by killing those who dis-agree with them.
But this hypothesis is not univeraally accepted, particular-ly in the U.S., where fighters sent up to intercept the visitorshave sometimes had unpleasant fexperisnces. In the case of CaptainMairtell, who was sent to investigate a "huge round glowing ob-ject," his machine diaj.ntegratecl in mld-air and hls body wasfound among the wrepkago.
.This brings me to the most important thing which I haveto say. It is to give a waxv.lng against attempts to ogen fireeither with guns or aeroplanes on theso objeots. LooEecï"at fromthe purely selfish aspect, euch gratuitous folly might well turnneutral curiosity into aotive hostility, and it may be assumedthat those who visit us from outer spaoe can well look afterthemselves and will have the ruoans of making ue sorry that wecompelled thsm to defend themaelves.
But it is not on this note that l wish to finish. It seemspossible that for the first time -in recorded history intelli-gible communioation on the physical level aay become poss;vblebstween the earth and other planets of the solar system.
Such a prospect j s epoch-making in. thc'lltaral sense of theword, and we should be guilty of crj.minal folly if we were tode anythiug to hinder a contact whieh may well bring untoldblessings to a distraught h\ima,nity„
AVIATIOÏT WEEK June 28, 1954
A..MISSILE_.TEST
USAF to launch Matadornear the Iron. Curtain,
Trial v;ill simu.ls.te attaekagainst Russian forcos.
By William J. Ooughlin.
Coooa, JPla_._- U.S. soon will fire guided missiles in Europef orTEë i ir s t time, simulating atomic attack against Russiangrounö forces.
These will "be the USAF B.-61 Matador surface-to-aurfacebombardment missile manufactured by the Glenn L. Martin Co.Initial unit to do the firing will be the Ist Pilotless SomberSquadron of the Taotical Air Command, transferred to Bitburg,Germany, from the U.S. Mar. 9, 1954.
Bitburg is about 300 mi. from the Iron Curtain boundary.More Sguadrori£ - A seoond guided misaile unit, the 69th Pilot-
less BömBer Squadrons is scheduled to move to Europe later thisyear. It now is stationed here at Patric AFB for training.
A pilotless bomber squadron consists of 53 officers and 543airmen. Number of B~61s assigned to each squadron is classified.
These are the first operational units of their kind in theAir Foroe.
Firings of the B-61, which can oarry an atomic warhead, willsimulate the tacticaï use to which the Matador would be put inevent of a Russian attack against NATO forces in Europe.
Range to 600 Mi. - The Martin missxle is designed for closeair support ofthe "type now provided by piloted f ighter-bombers.It thus fits into the U.S. military pattern of employing NATOground troops to force superior Eussian manpower to mass atpoints where it can be hit with tactioal atomio weapons.
Harige of the B-61 A i,-; al:.out that of a fighter-bomber, in theneighborhood of 500-600 mi. Tacticaï units probably will beequipped with the refined B-61B.
Although firings of the Matador in the U.S. have been onlyon oarefully instrumenteü guided missile ranges, Maj. Gen. Wil-liam L. Richardson, oommanding offioer of the Air Force MissileTest Center at Patrick AFB, reports that elaborate instrumenta-tion of the type used at this missile center is not reijuiredfor safe praotice firings in Europe. They can be fired overwater or over clear land areas, hè aays.
Controlled Flights -• Practioe missions within a limited areain Europe gEoüTïï" pré sent no irisurmouatable problems for thetactioal squadrons. Prior to testing on the Long Cape CanaveralRange near here, first flights of the Matador took place atHolloman Air Force Base, N.M., where they were restricted bythe size of the range, The misoiles were 'flown in figure eightsand cirüles to stay within range llmits.
rresumably, safety prccautions sirailsjr to those taken hereto protecu U.S. cities aloug the Florida cosst from runawaymissiles will be snforoed in Europe. The ge incltide;
An armed chase plane which. aan shoot down missile if oontrolis lost.
Ground-controlled radio circuits which can destroy the mis-siie in the air if it atraya off course.
Self-contairied "suïcide." circuit which will cause the migsileto destroy itgelf if' radio contact is lost for-more1 than a fewseconds.
Matador, similar in appearancs to a conventional aireraft, hasa wingspari of 28.6 ft, and a length of 39.5 ft. Powered by amodified Allison. J33 turbo jet üngine , i t iü laujiehed from a zero-length launcher with the aid of a Rato (roeket-asaisted takeoff)unit.'" Pi_rst_ Showing - 'Bus to the expendabla nature of the missile,its möctlTïe3~J33 i nclu.de a features dasigned TO reduoe costs.
"Less critica! materials are utilised, inspection tolerancesare not quitc so close, inspection is not required af ter the •initial run on ths test stand, and the number of accessories isreduced considerably", Aliison explains»
First public demonstration of a E-61 firiixg was before membersof the Aviatiou %'riters Assn. June 10 at Cape Oanaveral, the aux-iliary Air ï'orcs base 18 mi. from Patric AFB,
The pilotless bomber squadrons will be completely mobile in.tactical use, Gen. Hichardson reports. Operating from trucks, asquadron could set up Tor firing within 90 minutes, hè says.
Range Ebctensi on - Range of the Matador is greater than thepresent range of'"its initial ground control station. This presentsno problem at Cape Canaveral where oontrol may be passed alongto down range island stations, but roquires a slightly differenttechnique for taotical use.
Range could be extended by placing the firing base in a reararea near a port or other logistic supply source and placing theoontrol unit near the front, perhaps 100 mi. away.
Although the missile is on autopilot for some seconds afterlaunching before the ground controller takes over, the B-61 atpresent does not have an'autopilot system which could be set todive it into the target after it passes beyomï the range of theground controller.
Other Techniques - It would "be possible, hov/ever, for an ac-oompanying "mother" plane to talcs over oontrol of the missileonoe it was airborne and. direct it onto targets many miles beyondcontrol range o
Newsmen also saw a. demonstration here of how thia might work.Director planes were used to fly both QF-80 and a QB-17 duringremote-control fli'ghts, taking over the radio control after theplane's had been airborne under the direction of a ground station.Similar technlques could be used to dirsct a misslle to its tar-get, a further refinement of the tactic used during the Koreanwar in whioh Aï~6 spotter aireraft dlrected fightar-bomberstrikes onto close support targets.
Although the B-61 oan dive onto a target at supersonic speed,it is subsonic in leveri flight.
AVI ATI OK V/EEE June U, 1954.
KOT A4D LBSIGNED TO OUT-PORM MIG:-15
El Se&uudo -• The Navy last week unvciled the smal. Ie at andhteaT ü, 57 'je t- oombat plane .ye t revealad - the Douglas A4D
Skyhawk.The single-place triangular-wing inidget atomic bomber is so
sraall it will fit within the folded wingspan of a traditionalNavy carrier-based plane.
ïet, it has been desigiiRd to fly non-stop acroas the conti-nent and will have a speed greatar than Eusaian MiG-15 fighters.
The skyhawk in ita simplicity of design; light weight and lowoost is the end product of the philosophy of its ohief designer,Ed Heinemann., and Douglas Aireraft Co„~
Although security regulatioas would not permit disclosure ofdetailed apeoifications or performance, Heinemann told newsmenthe bantam bomber is a -little leas than half the weight of manyourrent operatioaal jet fighters whioh weigh in at about 30,000lb., has a wingspan "botween 26 and 28 ft., and is approximately35 ft. long, Powerplant is a single Wright J65-W-2 turbojet ratedat more than 7,200 Ib thrust.
"Under our program of design simplification," hè said, "theA4D gained 23$ more in speod and a third more in range than wasat firB b thought possible."
Subsonlp Speed - lts speed is designed to be subsonic inl e vel f light, the" El Segundo Division chief engineer said, butit will be tested at supersonio speeds iu dive.
An announcsment c;leared by Navy disclosed;It will fly faster over greater distances with a more power-
ful striking load than any alrplsne of its type. Congtruotionia of aluminum alloy.
It has a combat radius greater than present propeller-drivenal-tack airplanes.
It has been deeigned to operate from all sizes of Navy oar-riers and from short landing fielda.
More Skyhawks can be stored in an airoraft carrier thanfolded-wing places.
It is capable of carrying atom bombs or rookets, machinegunsmissileg and other weapons to auit the wide variety of miasionsof attack-type airplanes.
The tiny bomber, nioknamed the Heinemann "Hot Rod", rolledout of the Douglas plant only 19 months after it was conoeived,Heinemann said. It is due to make its maiden flight later thisweek.
The chief engineer said hè had long feit there was a needfor a smaller, low-cost airplane to carry the modern A-bomb andenough eleotronic gear to operate under all~\veather conditions.
"The A4-D is belioved to 'bo a major step in designing an air-plane on a completely functional basis, making each req.uirementstand on its own feet rather than by doing things because theyhave been. done that way in the past," hè said.
ISlHiP111? !:- ^?- !6. . ~ ° realiae such an airplane, Heine-mann "sai"d", weight" savings had to be achieved through emphasisupon simplification^ Given a free hand by the Navy, hè hasfought against excess weight on evers;- suboontracted artiolein the plane.
Papkaging oommunioations equipnient inoluding IPi1 equipmentinto oae coiapac.t~a.Tnminura""oase saves"approximately 105 lh. onthis item alone.
Bombs igh , whioh weighs 18 Ib. in other aireraft, has beencut" t o o'nTyo Ib. •
New ejection seat weighs approximately 30 Ib. as comparedwith .abouf~7C"Tb". ,"w3ight of tha lightest one now being used.It is made up of oni.y 80 part s, whereais current models oontain24-0, Heinemann said,
Mr_c£na2.tionin sjr_stem is said to be one~third the weightof the type former-Ly" ü"sëd~."
Heinemann paid tribute to ITavy's BuAsr for assistance in re-designing equipment components to make the Skyhawk's simplifi-oation program possible. "Revolxrbiooary techniq.uesi! in engin-eering,* tooiing; and produotion. have permitted A4E line produc-tion to start immediatsly. An undisclosed number for servicetest is now on order, the company discloses, and can be pro-duced in the time normally required to build one experimentalairplane.
Tailored Cockpit - Test pilot Bob Ralxn eaid when hè saw thefirst mook-up of the small plane hè immediately hopped into thecockpit "to aee if I would fit". Actually, tiiere was plenty ofroom. They've tailored the cockpit without gacrificing comfortand convenienoe of the pilot, hè said.
Navy said the lightweight design philosophy incorporated inthe A4D should open a new era of h i gh -p erf c rmance jet attackairplanes not thought possible a few years ago.
Aviation Week, 1-7-544
U.S, SUPERSONIC BQMBBR: The IKS.A.7". has reached a top~level decisionto give high priority to the acceleration of its supersonic bom-
ber development programme aftsr nearly a ytar of Air Staff debateover it. The new bomber is the Convair XB-58, also known as theHustler, It is a deltawing design, aimed at operating in the super-sonic speed range of about 1.000 m.p.h., and undoubtedly will bearmed with atomic or hydrögen bombs. The Hustler is schedeled tobe powered by an extremely high-povvered turbo j et still under devel-opment , such aa the General Electric J79 which is aimed at produc-ing about 15,000 Ib. thrust. The Hustler project is being handledby Convair's Ft. Worth Divisicn where the B-58 is schedeled tosucceed the B-36 on the production line of the giant govemment-owned plant,, The Hustler development programme also was geared todevelopment of a new type of gas-turbine-powered tanker of unusualrange and fuel capacity. This phase of the programme has been as-signed by U.S.A.P. to Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc., for developmentof the C-132 tanker transport, to be powered by four Pratt & Whit-ney 157 turboprops. Pentagon experts concede that the Hustler devel-opment programme, both technically and financially, is one of themost formidable that U.S.A.F. has ever tackled» Technical hurdlesthat must be surmounted by the programme includej
Radical airframe design features thrt will enable the Hustlerto operate at sufiersonic speeds»
Development of new techniques for faster aerial fuel transfer.Development of the 10Q.OOO-lb.~payload~tanker-transport,Development of two completely new powerplants~the G.B. J79 turbojetand the P. & W.A. T57 turboprop.
OKDNANCE July-August 1954
AIRCRAFT ARMAMBN'J
New gunsj rockets, and bonibs are being developed to helpsolve the pressing problems of firepower and aocuracy un&er 'the supersonic oonditions of todayjs high-altitude aërialwarfare.
fip.l, Robert T Fincke, Ü0S,A.P.
Colonel Fincke is chieff AirMunitions Division, in the Di-reotorate of Development, AirResearch and DevelopmentComraand, Ealtimore, Md.This article is taken from anaddress given "by Colonel
• Fincke at the Thirty-sixthAnnual Meeting of the AmerioanOrdnance Association, PortWorth, Tex. , May 6, 1954-
The extensiv;j publicity recently given tha atomic and thermo-nuclar weapons has apparently left the impression with manythat the Air Force has practically eliminated lts program inother weapons. This is definitely not the case. Since theSecond World War the Air Force has conducted a vigorous researchand development program to obtair; improved guns, rockets, andbonibs, and, although we are placing a high priority on attaininga capability in atomic weapons, we are continuing to supportthe development and improvement of conventional weapons whichcomplement the "new look".
During the past fifteen years majorstrides have been madein aircraft performance.Our aircraft ?„re flying higher than45.000 feet and faster than Mach 1.0 in level flight.
These altitudes and speeds vvere not considered possible whensome of our present v;eapons were first oonceived Consequently,the devslopment of air weapons has been sorely pushed to keepabreast of these rapid advancGs in aircraft performance
The Pressure to phase weapons into spocific aircraft has meantstarting production, in some instaneesp prior to full develop-ment and testingu- If we are to have an adaquately tested weaponavailable for future aircraft, it is mandatory that our techni~0al program explore new ideas and develop prototypes in antici-pation of these future needs.
We cannot walt v.ntil an airframe is selected to begin workon a new weapon.. and expect the two to meet in production»
The first step in obtaining a proper research and develop-ment program is to determine what is needed and to expresathis need in the form of military i-equirements. To accomplishthis, the Air Force has established the' Directorate ofRequirements in Headquarters, U»S.A.F. This group consultswith the planners, the developers, the producersf and the usersbefore determining the Air Force requirementsa
The military characteristics for a given aërial weapon whichwould satisfy a rec^irement are a compromise of what is tech-nically feasible, what is logistically supportable, and whatis acceptable to the users»
It is obvious, but not alv/ays appreciated. that these charac-teristics change as tha operatlcnal framework changea and asthe feasibility of new components changea,
In order co tap all available ideas, persons at each echelonof the Air Force are encouraged to forward recommendations formilitary requirements to the Headquarters, These channels .are al-ways open.
The second step in our research and development program isto deelde how the requirements can best be met.- This decision isthe responsibility of the Air Research and Development Commandworking with the other services and with induatry's research anddevelopment people.
The Air Force is cast in the röle of customer in its relation-snip with industry, This repationship is a contrast with that ofthe Army and Navy which are more in the röls partners because oftheir internal capability to develop and produoe ordnance end items.
We do not intend to duplicate this ''in-house1' capability ofour sister services but will continue to use their facilities andorganizations to the greatest extent possible,,
It is also Air Force policy to encourage and support the broadparticipation of industry in the research and development of airarmament equipment. Only by joining the technical knowhow of boththe military and industrial agencies can we find easier, simplerways to meet our needs.
Those of you who have accepted con tracts for development ofair ordnance appreciate that we always consider the complete sys-tem. It is' the system whioh determines the outcome of aërial com-bat rather than the caliber or rate of fire of the gunsa
The measure of a gun, rocket, or bomb to satisfy a requirémentcannot be evaluated independently of its effect on the airframe,engines, or other equipment. ITor wan it be separated from theaërodynamic forces which make up its environment»
An illustravion of this is the caliber .50 machine gun whichserved us throughout World V/ar II and again in Korea. In 1946 af terextensive calculations, the developers concluded that the caliber.50 gun was superior to the 15-mm. and Co-ram, cannon then avail-able.
The conclusion of over-all effsotiveness is based on an anal-ysis-type equation which relates effectiviness to;(a) hit proba-bility,(h) rate of fire, (c) dastruction per hit; and (d) weightof the complete systrm. The increased destruction per hit of thecannon was nullified by its slower rate of firef
As aircraft speeds increase, the time on target continues tobe reduced. In aërial combat the target may be in range for onlya fraction of a second at a tiir.j and a hit may have to be madeduring only one pass,
As a consequence, the increase in rate of fire and the increasein lethality of ths projectile by enlarging its caliber becomemore critical. These changes require more and heavier rounds,inturn increasing the weight of the system which penalizes the per-formance of the airplane.
We can satisfactorily compensate for this increase in weightas illustrated by the M39 gun which was recently standardized»This is a 20-mm. automatic gun employing the revolving-chamberprinciple and firing an explosive shell at a rate greater thanthe caliber „50 gun which has been built up to 1,200 rounds aminute»
A few of the M39 guns wero tested in Korea and are reportedto have accounted for six MIG's destroved, thrse probable destroyedand twelve damaged„ This gun wa« developsJL £or the Air Force bythe Army Ordnance.Corps in coöp&ration wich industry.
Now that satisfactory larger caliber guns are beeoming'Bvailable, specis.1 emphasis is being placed on reliabilityof their performances, problems associated with aircraft shockand vibriation, and the effect of aerodynamic forces on thetrajectory of bullets fired at high yaw angl.es during subsonioand suporsonic speeds.,
'The 'fundament al problem of reduoed time 011 target has cal-led for a duckhunter's approach' to increase the probabilityof a hit9 We have therefore adopted the shotgun principle ofa simultaneous burst of many pellets on the targete
The modern version is a burst of small unguided rockets.These are selfpropellad warheads and can ba made in almostany sise from ons to several inches in diameter and with anexplosive head weighing from several ounces to several pounds.
Rockets have a built-in relia-bility. The failure of oneround to fire does not oause a stoppage of the weapon.Since each round is oarried in a separate tubes only the onefaulty round is lost from the total available,,
Because the propelling forcss act only on the motor walls,there is little rscoil and aocompanying stress on the firingaircraft» Thus, both the rockets and the launcher installationcan be light in weight and relatively aimple in design.
This appears to be an ideal weapon with many of our criticismsof the gun mechanism eliminatedo But it» too, -is not withoutits problems and Bhortcomings. The burning time of the pro-pellants is directly related to the ambient temperature, andthis variation changes the ballistic path with a resultingreduction in accuracy.
All three of the services are devoting considerable effortto developing rooket fuels which are less affected by temperature.A rocket which is fast at low altitudes will be faste.r at higheraltitudes, but in the thinner atmosphsre the fin-stabilizedrockat loses stability? Under these conditions a spin-stabilizedrocket may offer a aolutlon.
The Mighty Moixse, & new rocket dsvelopod by the Navy, isnow being stockpiled for both.the Navy an.d the Air Force. Itis 2.75 inches in diameter and about 4 feet long. It is stabilizedby foldlng fins which do not increase its over-a?l diameterwhen clust&reda Our gbility to fire large number of theserockets at the same time has made this a superior weapon, and itis "being installed in Air Porce interosptor airoraft»
Twenthy-four «an be oarriefi in a retractable launrher inthe belly of the North American ?-86D Sabres in the LockheedF-94C Starfire, twenthy-four can be nested around the radarnose» .Additional roun'Js cab be carried ir. separate wing pods»
.Smaller rockets with warheads equivalent to that of the2o75f as well as larger rockets, are under development and willgive our interceptors even greater lethality against enemybombers,
So far it is in the r8le of high-explesive bombs that atomicweapons have had their g-raatast influenco on air Ordnance,But there is still a need for conventional bombs, and have acontiuing prograüi in this areat-
This pro.gram is airaed primsrj.ly aj- dsveloping bomb shapescompatible with new aircraft designs and capabilities and op-timizing the effeotiveness of the bomb against specializedtarget r: auch vehicular traffic or troop concentrations<,
Inei-easad speeds may produoe seriouB turbuïence within openbomb baysf and bombs released at these speeds have been observedto float in the bomb bay .before falling away» Thie not onlydestroys bom'bing accuracy but extremely hasardous, Jettisoningof estei-nal stores at high speeds likewi .a prasents nsw andgr e at er p rob l eins 0
During the past several years the Air Force has developeda new seriea of bombs dusigned for release at high speeds»
They are longer and Meekar than the old bombs and havestronger and longsr tails to withstand the greater dynamic forces.
More improvement is required, however. and we are lookingat shapes entirely different from the conventional ones in orderto stabilize bombs as they anter the turbulence of the slip streams
In conclusion, may I again stress t nat it is the effective-ness of the system which pays off, not the individual superiorityof any one component.
Because aircraft are continuing to fly highei? and faster,we must continue a vigorous research and development programin air ordnance„ We ars relying on the Industry-Ordnance Teamto find the best solution to our military requirements»
—o-o-O-o-o-
BLUEPRINT ECR ftORLD REVOLÏÏTIOM
by Pachydermus.
Some T,imes ag0 -the Soviet Press reacjrted angrily to the U.S.statements on Soviet aid to ïforth Korea and the Vlet Minh. OnJune 3rd Pravda again accused the U.S. authorities of having pro-duced documents "falsified from beginning to end". .
This time Pravda's Geneva correspondends Yuri Zhukov andIvan Plyshevsky, voiced their indignation over Senator Jöiowlands'srevelations to the U,S. Congress" - meaning a memorandum Mao Tse-tung is said to have sent Stalin in February 1953 by Chou En-lai.It can be summarised as follows.
MAO's PLANPrance should be allowed to retire from Indo-China by a
"face saving" formal armistice„ After this, Indo-Cina could begradually liberated by propaganda and coaunon front politics,culminating in a coup d'état i;wo years later,
"Liberated Indo-China" would serve as a base from whichthe Communist domination of Burma, Siam and Indonesia could beachieved by 1960.
If China and the U„S.S„R,, demonstrated their strength, Ja-pan wóuld capitulate.
India should be conquered by peaceful means, such as allian-ces, common fronts and Asiatic coalitions, which, by 1969» wouldinclude the Pnilippines and the Arab States» Britain would haveto withdraw from "encircled ïlalaya'1'.
In the next stage, revolution would have to be stirred upin Africa, to expel the "colonialist imperialists".
Once Asia and Africa were freed from Western domination,Europe would face economie catastrophy, followed by politicalcapitulation. Canada and South America would also find themselvesin a defenceless situation. In twenthy years (1973) the worldrevolution would have become a fact.
In liberated Sast and South-Jüast Asia, a huge army of 25million men would be kept in readiness to force the capitaliststates to bankrupt themselves by excessive defence expenditure.One by one, the ruling capitallst-iiaperialist cliq.ues would haveto capitulate.
Open war should be avoidod because, for the time being, thecapitalist world was better prepared than the Soviet bloc, andCommunist victory was no certainïy.,
— 37 —
Most important;: the U,,S„A„ had to "bo isolated, whileG-reat Britain had to be placeï.ed.,
MILITARY PLAÏÏ3 S TI IL SECRET
ïhus far the highlights of the memorandum, which alsocontains a military outline-so far not released. Together,they fonn part of a larger and highly instructive document,picited up "somewhera" by U0S0 Intelligente. Some people believethat Chiang Kai-chek's Intelligence secured the memorandum,others- that Soviet Captain Yuri Rastovorov brought it overwhen, after Beria's death, hè defected to the west»
Despite Pravda's efforts to prove that these documentswere fakes, their coatents ring t rus,, The Soviet and the intervnational Communist Press have, for years, campaigned in favourof all the points enumerated in it. Since 1944. every Communistmove in the Par East fits in with it.
As a rule, Communist régimes base their actions on longrange plans, even if tactical necessities foroe temporarychangea. Bocause of this, sometimes it is easier to forecasttheir "general line" than their short term tactics.The valuö of the text presented by Senator Khowland to Congresslies in the fact that it ties into a logical '«hole the develop-ments we have c.bserved at various points of the vast frontbetween the capitalist and the Communist worlds, Whetker ornot this mc-iuorandum was drafted by Mao-Tse-tung as a new planfor world revolution, does not affect its valldity. Genuineor apocryphal, it spells out the background to Communist policy.
It is important that the western public should lookfurther than the tactical field of immediate events, and realisethat it is far more important to build up a longrange programmefor counteraction than to préparé for "peaceful competition "between the two worlds,
The final issues will not be decided today, bu$ in severalyears' time. Shortsighbed polioy never makes history.
AMERICAN AVIATION -o-o--0~o~o- 21-6-'542 MPH IN 175 TEARS.
ADMIRAL CHARLBS F. HOB1TB (U_SN, Het,), manager of Convair"a guidedmissile plant at Pomona, Calif., delivered a bang-up speechrecently on logistics, Here are some of this telling points:
In the Revolutionary War the logistiotl task of gettinggunpowder on its way by horse-drawn transportation after beingrequisitioned by hcrseback averaged the pnenomenal speed of oneand ona-third miles per hour.
In World V/ar II, based on official records, the average speedfrom time of requisition to delivery of the needed item wasabout three and one-half miles per hour.
"So-in the past 175 years-with all the advantages of moderncommunication and transportation, with radio that circles theglobe in the jerk of a saddle cinch and planes that fly 100miles in the time required to hitch a team, with all this, wehave increased the speed of getting suppliss to the front byonly two miles per .hour,
"Plainly, in the field of logistics, we have faileè miser-ablo to keep pace with our techi-iOlogicajL progress".
In World V/ar II, hè points out, we depended upon a vaststockpillirig syst&ai, something that futuro wars will not permit.The probloms are known, but so little ia being dcne. Logisticsis probably the greatest single blind spot in Pentagon thinkingand planning today, yet it is ono of the most crucial of allitems.
Thanks to Admiral Horne (a former administrator of CAA, inciden-tally), for pointing up the issues again.
-o-o-O-o-o-
AVIATION WLilZ, 12-7-54.
ÏÏEW U.S. LIGHÏWJüIGHT: The Lockheed Aircraft Corporation announcedrecently that its prototype XP-104 is going through flight testsat Edwards A.P.B, in its bid for the U.S.A.Pc's first lightweightfighter contract. Although the company was restricted by the De-fenee Department to a brief four-paragraph test announoement thatskirted performance figures informed observers believe the newU.S.A.P. day fighter has a speed well over Mach 1,a ceiling inthe neighbourhood of 60.000 ft., plus better range and more arma-ment than U.S. combat planes used in Korea. Powered by a Curtiss-Wright J65 with afterburner, the XF-104 has a very thin straightwing with a span of approximately 27 ft., four in.less than theA4D, Douglas Aircraft Co.'s Navy entry in the lightweight field.The new fighter wing area is less than that of Lockheed's P-80.The XF-104 is the sixth military aircraft to use Cu^tiss-Wright'sJ65 turbo jet rated at more than 7,220 Ib. thrust without afterbur-ner. Fighting weight is estimated at 15.000 Ib., about half thatof North American Aviation's P-100, and slightly more than theA4D's 13,590. The XP-104 has a low-aspect ratio for highspeedflight, giving it a steep, nose-high descent during final landingapproaches, Flight tests have shown that its stalling characteris-tics, while unusual. are not considered vicious«
N.A.T.O. INFRASTRUCTURE: A ;]3t fuel network in Western Europe,involving 4.600 mi. of pipeline and storage facilities for 400m„gallons, is schedule for completion by July, 1957. The network,designed to provide for flexibility in the deployment of N. A. T.O.jet aircraft, extends from above the Arctic Circle to easternTurkey. July, 1955f is set for completion of 30 per cent. of thepipeline and 50 per cent, of the storage space, By July, 1956, 80per cent. of the pipeline and 75 per cent. of the storage spaceis schedule for completion, leaving 20 per cent. of the pipelineand 25 per cent. of the storage for completion the following year.
AIR POWÜR, SUMMER '54.
BOWS AND ARROWS IN MOD2RN \vAR?
The following appeared in the Presa recently under the heading"Darts as Weapons"!
"The U.S.A.P» yesterday made public details of a weapon (TheLazy Dog), a half-ounce steel dart, just over an inch and a halflong. A shower of the darts dropped by a plane or exploded in abomb had the same effect as a gigantic snot-gun charge, and couldknock out non-armoured vehicles, a spokesman said."
This reminds us of one day in 1915 when from the ancient "Vickers-Gunbus" aircraft an experiment with similar darts, called "Plech-ettest;. was carried out. A sackful of them was dropped on a target(which must remain unnamed to avoid repercussions)', the resultwas that "the old so-and-so" continued to graze without evenlooking up, and afterwards was found to Le unscathed, The experi-ments were discontinued.
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