Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 179987               September 3, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

BERSAMIN, J.:

For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not established by sufficient evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).

Antecedents

The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and

adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.1

To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which reads:

This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2

After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanan’s application for land registration, disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED.3

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the

property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.

On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazco’s possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanan’s period of possession.

Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CA’s decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.

The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable and disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject of the application for registration as alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.

The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6 to support their argument that the property had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was essential was that the property had been "converted"

into private property through prescription at the time of the application without regard to whether the property sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain.

As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration

In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable by the State.

The Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration

The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference to the application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.

Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land

subject of the application had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Ruling

We deny the motions for reconsideration.

In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different classifications of land in relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the Philippines.

Classifications of land according to ownership

Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public dominion or of private ownership.11Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State.13 Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain belong to the State.15 This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony.16

All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17

Classifications of public landsaccording to alienability

Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted.21 The identification of lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive Department.22

Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.

Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural.24 A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts.26 If, however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used

for public service or for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.

Disposition of alienable public lands

Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:

Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:

(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;

(3) By lease; and

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

(a) By judicial legalization; or

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

x x x x

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)

Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:

1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and occupation of the property subject of the application;

2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;

3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;

4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and

5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.

Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for registration must have been already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or reclassification of a public land as agricultural.

The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent be respected.

We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.

Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant’s imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.

Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period.29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.30 It is for this reason that the property subject of the application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession.

To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.

The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the applicant’s possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.31

If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation thereof for the number of years prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33 in order to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land to qualified applicants, particularly residential lands, subject to area limitations.34

On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby converting such land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable provision concerning disposition and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription can now run against the State.

To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of the public domain, namely:

(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;

(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:

(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the applicant’s possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the conditions essential to a government grant arises,36 and the applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has become private property.37

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for the

development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMINAssociate Justice

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES GR No. 179987 April 29, 2009

FACTS:

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife,Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, includingLot9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.” On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.

ISSUES:

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?

HELD:

The Pertition is denied.

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to

establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents.

D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:

The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.

The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise:

1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23, 1959;

2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on the provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');

3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on

October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities;

4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took place on October 29, 1962;

5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;

6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered from time immemorial.

7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain;

8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements were seen by the Court during its ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on September 18, 1982;

9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,

Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special session on November 22, 1979.

The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.

The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial court which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of the national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.

Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.

The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does not apply.

In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than 60%

of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:

..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.

Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has on imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.

Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).

The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning with Carino in 1909 2thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction

whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what is the better — and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein,

The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:

It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...

That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical language, in Susi:

.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII

of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6

Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.

Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11

.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. ....

xxx xxx xxx

As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title

being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. 12

Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."

If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.

Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the

1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.

We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to the sales application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.

That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.

xxx xxx xxx

The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).

xxx xxx xxx

In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase

the land in question had become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.

Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919).<äre||anº•1àw> 15

The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.

The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:

6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)

The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.

There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter from themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.

While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance.

SO ORDERED.

Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

 

 

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here. 

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld, "expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the correct

view." My dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private property." I hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity's sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents and discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.

Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. "

The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued an order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domainand had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and beyond his authority to sell to any other person]. " 6

The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the dismissal of his application for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by the

Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."

The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the aforecited established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision was promulgated). We reaffirm the established doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by operation of law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public domain and becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified corporations such as respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")

Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such conversion into private property, qualified corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title to lands of the public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no public lands are involved.

It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which contained no prohibition against corporations holding public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P 45million investments redounding presumably to the welfare and progress of the community,

particularly the municipality of Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the townsite created a vested right which could not be impaired by the prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso jure converted into private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to be established in confirmation of title proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and validly transferred to respondent corporation.

In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been converted into private property and grant the possessors the opportunity to establish and record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application which would have originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31, 1957, then to December 31, 1968, further extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7

The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and not of substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line from the majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect that

the applicant was Meralco, a juridical person rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao,where the legal question raised, instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the application under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in the procedural result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority ruling on the question of substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots which are sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they were acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable. " 10

To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural citizens who may prove their undisputed and open possession of public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such as corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for the required statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious. But when the natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to follow the letter of the law that they file the applications for confirmation of their title, although they have lawfully transferred their title to the land. But such procedural failure cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law, as stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the lands are already private lands because ofacquisitive prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution would be to consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with the evidence, confirm their title to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully transferred by

them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to the corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the corporation reassign its rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on paper with the technicality of having natural persons file the application for confirmation of title to the private land.

 MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

(a) ...

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed are the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) ...

Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:

SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares ....

It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a corporation from directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.

The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:

(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land involved in the case.

(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.

(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to directly apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to ACME.

The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]).

To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors,

still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco

and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor.

It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now." (Paragraphing supplied)

The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A construction adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).

It has also been said that:

In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless,

inoperative, or nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will give effect to the act, while the other will defeat it, the former construction is preferred. One part of a statute may not be construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect. Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule against the enlargement of extension of a statute by construction, the meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the precise words used in the law, and words or phrases may be altered or supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity. Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything which is necessary to make such provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)

The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The proper course for the Court to take is to promote in the fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction which would alter or defeat that policy.

In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.

 

Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appelate Court (IAC)146 SCRA 509 December 29, 1986

Facts:

1. Defendant through his lawyer filed an answer therein admitting the averment in the complaint that the land was acquired by the plaintiff through inheritance from his parents, the former owners thereof.

2.Subsequently, the defendant changed his counsel, and with leave of court, amended the answer. In the amended answer, the admission no longer appears. The alleged ownership of the land by the plaintiff was denied coupled with an allegation that the defendant is the owner of the land as he bought it from the plaintiff’s parents while they were still alive.

3. After trial, the lower court upheld the defendant’s ownership of the land. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the defendant is bound by the admission contained in his original answer.

Issue: Whether or not the contention of plaintiff is correct

RULING: NO. The original pleading had been amended such that it already disappeared from the record, lost its status as a pleading and cease to be a judicial admission. While the said pleading may be utilized against the pleader as extrajudicial admission, they must, in order to have such effect, be formally offered in evidence.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 185092               June 4, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.CORAZON C. SESE and FE C. SESE, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSGJ, assailing the November 21, 2007 Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81439, which dismissed its appeal and affirmed the October 3, 2003 Decision2 of the Municipal Trial Court of Pulilan, Bulacan (MTC), in LRC Case No. 026.

Factual and Procedural Antecedents:

Records show that on September 17, 2002, Corazon C. Sese and Fe C. Sese (respondents) filed with the MTC an application for original registration of land over a parcel of land with an area of 10, 792 square meters, situated in Barangay Sto. Cristo, Municipality of Pulilan, Province of Bulacan, and more particularly described as Lot 11247, Cad. 345, Pulilan Cadastre, under Plan No. AP-03-004226.

Respondents alleged that on July 22, 1972, they acquired, through a donation inter vivos from their mother, Resurreccion L. Castro (Resurreccion), the subject agricultural land; that they, through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in possession of the subject property; and that the property was not within a reservation.

In support of their application, respondents submitted the following documents, namely: (1) Tax Declaration No. 99-19015-01557 "in the name of Corazon Sese and Fe Sese, minor, representing their mother Resurreccion Castro, as her Natural Guardian"; (2) Certificate of Technical Description which was approved on December 10, 1998 by the Land Management Service, Region III, of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR); (3) Certification in lieu of lost Surveyor’s Certificate issued by the same authority; (4) Official Receipt of payment of real property tax over the subject property; (5) Certification from the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Pulilan, stating that the registered owners of a property under Tax Declaration No. 99-19-015-01557 were Corazon Sese and others; and (6) Survey plan of Lot 11247, CAD 345,Pulilan Cadastre, approved by the Regional Technical Director of the

Land Management Service, Region III, of the DENR, stating that the land subject of the survey was alienable and disposable land, and as certified to by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1, 1927, was outside of any civil or military reservation. On the lower portion of the plan, there was a note stating that a deed of absolute sale over the subject property was executed by a certain Luis Santos and Fermina Santos (the Santoses) in favor of Resurreccion on October 4, 1950.

On the lower portion of the survey plan, a note stated, among others, that: "This survey is inside the alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 20 LC Map No. 637 certified by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1, 1927. It is outside any civil or military reservation." The said plan was approved by the DENR, Land Management Services, Regional Office III, San Fernando, Pampanga, on December 3, 1998.

Finding the application sufficient in form and substance, the MTC issued the Order, dated October 10, 2002, setting the case for hearing with the corresponding publication. After compliance with all the requirements of the law regarding publication, mailing and posting, hearing on the merits of the application followed.

During the trial on June 4, 2003, respondent Corazon C. Sese (Corazon) testified on their claim over the subject lot. Thereafter, respondents submitted their formal offer of evidence, after which the evidence offered were admitted by the MTC in the Order, dated July 10, 2003, without objection from the public prosecutor.

The OSG did not present any evidence to oppose the application.

On October 3, 2003, the MTC rendered its Decision,3 ordering the registration of the subject property in the name of respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the instant application to be sufficient in form and substance and the applicants having established their right of ownership over the subject parcel of land and are therefore entitled to registration thereof, the Court thereby grants the petition.

Accordingly, the Court hereby orders the registration of the parcel of land subject matter of this petition which is more particularly described in Plan Ap-03-004226 Pulilan Cadastre and in their corresponding technical descriptions in the name of Resureccion Castro.

Upon this decision becoming final, let an Order for the decree be issued.

SO ORDERED.

The MTC reasoned out that there was evidence to show that the subject lots had been in open, continuous, adverse, and public possession, either by the applicants themselves or their predecessor-in-interest. Such possession since time immemorial conferred an effective title on the applicants, whereby the land ceased to be public and became private property. It had been the accepted norm that open, adverse and continuous possession for at least 30 years was sufficient. The MTC noted that evidence showed that the parcel of land involved was not covered by land patent or a public land application as certified to by the Community Environment and Natural Resources of Tabang, Guiguinto, Bulacan. Moreover, it added that the technical descriptions of Lot 11247 were prepared and secured from the Land Management Sector, DENR, Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga, and were verified and found to be correct by Eriberto Almazan, In-Charge of the Regional Survey Division.

On December 19, 2003, the OSG interposed an appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-GR. CV No. 81439. In its brief,4 the OSG presented the following assignment of errors: a) only alienable lands of the public domain occupied and possessed in concept of owner for a period of at least thirty (30) years is entitled to confirmation of title; and b) respondents failed to prove specific acts of possession.

The OSG argued that there was no proof that the subject property was already segregated from inalienable lands of the public domain. Verily, it was only from the date of declaration of such lands as alienable and disposable that the period for counting the statutory requirement of possession would start.

Also, there was absolutely no proof of respondents’ supposed possession of the subject property. Save for the testimony of Corazon

that "at present, the worker of (her) mother is occupying the subject property," there was no evidence that respondents were actually occupying the subject tract of land or that they had introduced improvement thereon.

On November 21, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision5 affirming the judgment of the MTC ordering the registration of the subject property in the name of respondents. The decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed decision dated October 3, 2003 of the MTC of Pulilan, Bulacan, in LRC Case No. 026 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

The CA reasoned out, among others, that the approved survey plan of the subject property with an annotation, stating that the subject property was alienable and disposable land, was a public document, having been issued by the DENR, a competent authority. Its contents were prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the subject property was indeed alienable and disposable.

With respect to the second issue, the CA was of the view that the doctrine of constructive possession was applicable. Respondents acquired the subject property through a donation inter vivos executed on July 22, 1972 from their mother. The latter acquired the said property from the Santoses on October 4, 1950 by virtue of a deed of absolute sale. Further, respondent Corazon testified that a small hut was built on the said land, which was occupied by the worker of her mother. Moreover, neither the public prosecutor nor any private individual appeared to oppose the application for registration of the subject property.

The CA also stated that respondents’ claim of possession over the subject property was buttressed by the Tax Declaration No. 99-19015-01557 "in the name of Corazon Sese and Fe Sese, minor, representing their mother Resurreccion Castro, as her Natural Guardian"; the official receipt of payment of real property tax over the subject property; and the

certificate from the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Pulilan, stating that the registered owner of a property under Tax Declaration No. 99-19015-01557 were respondents.

The CA added that although tax declaration or realty tax payments of property were not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they were good indicia of possession in the concept of owner.

Hence, the OSG filed this petition.

ISSUES

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN RULING THAT THE APPROVED SURVEY PLAN IDENTIFIED BY ONE OF THE RESPONDENTS IS PROOF THAT THE SUBJECT LAND IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION.

The OSG argues that unless a piece of land is shown to have been classified as alienable and disposable, it remains part of the inalienable land of the public domain. In the present case, the CA relied on the approved survey indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. It is well-settled, however, that such notation does not suffice to prove that the land sought to be registered is alienable and disposable. What respondents should have done was to show that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration fell within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, they should have adduced a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.

To bolster its argument, the OSG cites the case of Republic of the Philippine v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,6 where the Court stated that the trial court should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable. Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

With respect to the second assignment of error, the OSG argues that respondents failed to present specific acts of ownership to prove open, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and adverse possession in the concept of an owner. Facts constituting possession must be duly established by competent evidence. As to the tax declaration adduced by respondents, it cannot be said that it clearly manifested their adverse claim on the property. If respondents genuinely and consistently believed their claim of ownership, they should have regularly complied with their real estate obligations from the start of their supposed occupation.

Position of Respondents

On the other hand, respondents assert that the CA correctly found that the subject land was alienable and disposable. The approved survey plan of the subject property with an annotation, stating that the subject property is alienable and disposable land, is a public document, having been issued by the DENR, a competent authority. Its contents are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein and are sufficient to establish that the subject property is indeed alienable and disposable.

Respondents cite the case of Republic v. Serrano,7 where the Court stated that a DENR Regional Technical Director’s certification, which was annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence, constituted substantial compliance with the legal requirement. The DENR certification enjoyed the presumption of regularity absent any evidence to the contrary.

Anent the second assignment of error, respondents contend that the CA correctly applied the doctrine of constructive possession because they acquired the subject land from their mother, Resurreccion, through a donation inter vivos, dated July 22, 1972.Their mother, in turn, acquired the subject land from the Santoses on October 4, 1950 by virtue of an absolute sale. They claim that a small hut was built in the said land and was occupied by a worker of her mother. They countered that although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property which is not in his actual or constructive custody.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

The vital issue to be resolved by the Court is whether respondents are entitled to the registration of land title under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.)No. 1529, or pursuant to Section 14(2) of the same statute. Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,8 as amended by Section 4 of P.D. No. 1073,9 provides:

SECTION 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

x x x x

Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the

issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

x x x x

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

Based on the above-quoted provisions, applicants for registration of land title must establish and prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.10 Compliance with the foregoing requirements is indispensable for an application for registration of land title, under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, to validly prosper. The absence of any one requisite renders the application for registration substantially defective.

Anent the first requisite, respondents presented evidence to establish the disposable and alienable character of the subject land through a survey plan, where on its lower portion, a note stated, among others, as follows: "This survey is inside the alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 20 LC Map No. 637 certified by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1, 1927. It is outside any civil or military reservation." The said plan was approved by the DENR, Land Management Services, Regional Office III, San Fernando, Pampanga on December 3, 1998. The annotation in the survey plan, however, fell short of the requirement of the law in proving its disposable and alienable character.

In Republic v. Espinosa,11 citing Republic v. Sarmiento12 and Menguito v. Republic,13 the Court reiterated the rule that that a notation made by a surveyor-geodetic engineer that the property surveyed was alienable and disposable was not the positive government act that would remove the property from the inalienable domain and neither was it the evidence accepted as sufficient to controvert the presumption that the property was inalienable. Thus:

To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print Copy of the conversion and subdivision plan approved by the DENR Center which bears the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that "this survey is inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry."

Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance on such annotation to prove that the lot is alienable is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that it remains part of the inalienable public domain.

"To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: ‘This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968,’ appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).

This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State..."

For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible

evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.

In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic engineer’s notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor’s assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable." (Citations omitted and emphases supplied)

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. The applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; or a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.14

Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.15 declared that a CENRO certification was insufficient to prove the alienable and disposable character of the land sought to be registered. The applicant must also show sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary approved the land classification and released the land in question as alienable and disposable.

Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.16

Here, the only evidence presented by respondents to prove the disposable and alienable character of the subject land was an annotation by a geodetic engineer in a survey plan. Although this was certified by

the DENR, it clearly falls short of the requirements for original registration.

With regard to the third requisite, it must be shown that the possession and occupation of a parcel of land by the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, started on June 12, 1945 or earlier.17 A mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or more, by itself, is not sufficient.18

In this regard, respondents likewise failed. As the records and pleadings of this case will reveal, the earliest that respondents and their predecessor-in-interest can trace back possession and occupation of the subject land was only in the year 1950,when their mother, Resurreccion, acquired the subject land from the Santoses on October 4, 1950 by virtue of an absolute sale. Evidently, their possession of the subject property commenced roughly five (5) years beyond June 12, 1945, the reckoning date expressly provided under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Thus, their application for registration of land title was legally infirm.

The respondents cannot invoke Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 which provides:

SEC. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

x x x x

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.1avvphi1 The case of Malabanan v. Republic19 gives a definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original registration proceedings under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. In the said case, the Court laid down the following rules:

We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:

x x x x

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership. (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and, thus, incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.20

Thus, under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, for acquisitive prescription to commence and operate against the State, the classification of land as alienable and disposable alone is not sufficient. The applicant must be able to show that the State, in addition to the said classification, expressly declared through either a law enacted by Congress or a proclamation issued by the President that the subject land is no longer retained for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Consequently, without an express declaration by the State, the land remains to be a property of public dominion and, hence, not susceptible to acquisition by virtue of prescription.21 The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. It is still insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.22

For the above reasons, the respondents cannot avail of either Section 14 (1) or 14 (2) of P.O. No. 1529. Under Section 14 (1), respondents failed to prove (a) that the property is alienable and disposable; and (b) that their possession of the property dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier. Failing to prove the alienable and disposable nature of the subject land, respondents all the more cannot apply for registration by way of prescription pursuant to Section 14 (2) which requires possession for 30 years to acquire or take. Not only did respondents need to prove the classification of the subject land as alienable and disposable, but also to show that it has been converted into patrimonial. As to whether respondents were able to prove that their possession and occupation were of the character prescribed by law, the resolution of this issue has been rendered unnecessary by the foregoing considerations.

In fine, the Court holds that the ruling of the CA lacks sufficient factual or legal justification.1âwphi1 Hence, the Court is constrained to reverse the assailed CA decision and resolution and deny the application for registration of land title of respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The November 21, 2007 Decision and the October 8, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 81439, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Application for Registration of Title of Respondents Corazon C. Sese and Fe C. Sese in Land Registration Case No. 026 is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZAAssociate Justice

G.R. No. 185092 : June 4, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. CORAZON C. SESE and FE C. SESE, Respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:

Respondents filed with the MTC an application for original registration of land over a parcel of land with an area of 10, 792 square meters, situated in Barangay Sto. Cristo, Municipality of Pulilan, Province of Bulacan, and more particularly described as Lot 11247, Cad. 345, PulilanCadastre, under Plan No. AP-03-004226.

Respondents alleged that on July 22, 1972, they acquired, through a donation inter vivos from their mother, Resurreccion L. Castro (Resurreccion), the subject agricultural land; that they, through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in possession of the subject property; and that the property was not within a reservation.

In support of their application, respondents submitted among others a survey plan approved by the Regional Technical Director of the Land Management Service, Region III of the DENR stating that the land subject of the survey was alienable and disposable land, and as certified to by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1, 1927, was outside of any civil or military reservation. On the lower portion of the plan, there was a note stating that a deed of absolute sale over the subject property was executed by a certain Luis Santos and Fermina Santos (the Santoses) in favor of Resurreccion on October 4, 1950.

On the lower portion of the survey plan, a note stated, that: "This survey is inside the alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 20 LC Map No. 637 certified by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1, 1927. It is outside any civil or military reservation." Finding the application sufficient in form and substance, the MTC issued the Order, dated October 10, 2002, setting the case for hearing with the corresponding publication. After compliance with all the requirements of the law regarding publication, mailing and posting, hearing on the merits of the application followed.

During the trial, respondent Corazon C. Sese (Corazon) testified on their claim over the subject lot. Thereafter, respondents submitted their formal offer of evidence, after which the evidence offered were admitted by the MTC in the Order, without objection from the public prosecutor.

The OSG did not present any evidence to oppose the application.

The MTC ordered the registration of the subject property in the name of

respondents.

Later, the OSG interposed an appeal with the CA. In its brief, the OSG presented the following assignment of errors: a) only alienable lands of the public domain occupied and possessed in concept of owner for a period of at least thirty (30) years is entitled to confirmation of title; and b) respondents failed to prove specific acts of possession.

The OSG argued that there was no proof that the subject property was already segregated from inalienable lands of the public domain. Verily, it was only from the date of declaration of such lands as alienable and disposable that the period for counting the statutory requirement of possession would start.

Also, there was absolutely no proof of respondents supposed possession of the subject property. Save for the testimony of Corazon that "at present, the worker of (her) mother is occupying the subject property," there was no evidence that respondents were actually occupying the subject tract of land or that they had introduced improvement thereon.

The CA however, affirming the judgment of the MTC ordering the registration of the subject property in the name of respondents. The CA was of the view that the doctrine of constructive possession was applicable. Respondents acquired the subject property through a donation inter vivos executed on July 22, 1972 from their mother. The latter acquired the said property from the Santoses on October 4, 1950 by virtue of a deed of absolute sale. Further, respondent Corazon testified that a small hut was built on the said land, which was occupied by the worker of her mother. Moreover, neither the public prosecutor nor any private individual appeared to oppose the application for registration of the subject property.

The CA also stated that respondents claim of possession over the subject property was buttressed by the Tax Declaration No. 99-19015-01557 "in the name of Corazon Sese and Fe Sese, minor, representing their mother Resurreccion Castro, as her Natural Guardian"; the official receipt of payment of real property tax over the subject property; and the certificate from the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Pulilan, stating that the registered owner of a property under Tax Declaration No. 99-19015-01557 were respondents.

The CA added that although tax declaration or realty tax payments of property were not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they were good indicia of possession in the concept of owner. Hence, the OSG filed this petition.

ISSUES: Whether the Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in ruling that the approved survey plan identified by one of the respondents is proof that the subject land is alienable and disposable.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in granting the application for registration.

HELD: The decision of the Court of Appeals is overruled.

CIVIL LAW: proof for claim of ownership

In Republic v. Espinosa, G.R. No. 171514, July 18, 2012 citing Republic v. Sarmiento 547 Phil. 157, 166167 (2007) and Menguito v. Republic, 401 Phil. 274, 287-288 (2000), the Court reiterated the rule that that a notation made by a surveyor-geodetic engineer that the property surveyed was alienable and disposable was not the positive government act that would remove the property from the inalienable domain and neither was it the evidence accepted as sufficient to controvert the presumption that the property was inalienable. Thus:

To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print Copy of the conversion and subdivision plan approved by the DENR Center which bears the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that "this survey is inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry."

Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance on such annotation to prove that the lot is alienable is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that it remains part of the inalienable public domain.

"To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968, appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).

This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State..."

For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.

In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic engineers notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyors assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable."

Thus, under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, for acquisitive prescription to commence and operate against the State, the classification of land as alienable and disposable alone is not sufficient. The applicant must be able to show that the State, in addition to the said classification, expressly declared through either a law enacted by Congress or a proclamation issued by the President that the subject land is no longer retained for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Consequently,

without an express declaration by the State, the land remains to be a property of public dominion and, hence, not susceptible to acquisition by virtue of prescription. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. It is still insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

For the above reasons, the respondents cannot avail of either Section 14 (1) or 14 (2) of P.O. No. 1529. Under Section 14 (1), respondents failed to prove (a) that the property is alienable and disposable; and (b) that their possession of the property dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier. Failing to prove the alienable and disposable nature of the subject land, respondents all the more cannot apply for registration by way of prescription pursuant to Section 14 (2) which requires possession for 30 years to acquire or take. Not only did respondents need to prove the classification of the subject land as alienable and disposable, but also to show that it has been converted into patrimonial. As to whether respondents were able to prove that their possession and occupation were of the character prescribed by law, the resolution of this issue has been rendered unnecessary by the foregoing considerations.

The petition is GRANTED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 164408               March 24, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.ZURBARAN REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

BERSAMIN, J.:

An application for original registration of land of the public domain under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 must show not only that the land has previously been declared alienable and disposable, but also that the land has been declared patrimonial property of the State at the onset of the 30-year or 10-year period of possession and occupation required under the law on acquisitive prescription. Once again, the Court applies this rule-as clarified in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic1 – in reviewing the decision promulgated on June 10, 2004,2 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) granted the petitioner's application for registration of land.

Antecedents

On May 28, 1993, respondent Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in San Pedro, Laguna an application for original registration covering a 1,520 square meter parcel of land situated in Barrio Banlic, Municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna, denominated as Lot 8017-A of Subdivision Plan CSD-04-006985-D, Cad. 455-D, Cabuyao Cadastre,3 alleging that it had purchased the land on March 9, 1992 from Jane de Castro Abalos, married to Jose Abalos, for P300,000.00; that the land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of its predecessor-in-interest under Tax Declaration No. 22711; that there was no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind affecting the land, nor was there any other person or entity having any interest thereon, legal or equitable, adverse to that of the applicant; and that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner.

Attached to the application were several documents, namely: (1) tracing cloth plan as approved by the Land Management Division of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR); (2) blue print copies of the tracing cloth plan; (3) copies of the technical description; (4) copies of Tax Declaration No. 2711; and (5) copies of the Deed of Sale dated March 9, 1992.

The Republic, represented by the Director of Lands, opposed the application, arguing that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest had not been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land since June 12, 1945; that the muniments of title and tax declaration presented did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land; and that the land was a portion of the public domain, and, therefore, was not subject to private appropriation.4

The RTC directed the Land Management Bureau, Manila; the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Los Baños, Laguna; and the Land Management Sector and Forest Management Bureau, Manila, to submit a status report on the land, particularly, on whether the land was covered by a land patent, whether it was subject of a previously approved isolated survey, and whether it was within a forest zone.5

In his memorandum to the DENR, Region IV (Lands Forestry Sector), and the Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna, a copy of which was furnished the trial court, CENRO Officer Arnulfo Hernandez stated that the land had been "verified to be within the Alienable and Disposable land under Land Classification Project No. 23-A of Cabuyao, Laguna, certified and declared as such pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, under Forestry Administrative Order No. A-1627 dated September 28, 1981 per BFD Map LC-3004." Attached to the memorandum was the inspection report declaring that "the area is surrounded with concrete fence, three (3) buildings for employees’ residence;" that the land was acquired through sale before the filing of the application; that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest had been in "continuous, open and peaceful occupation" of the land, and that "no forestry interest is adversely affected."6

CENRO Land Management Inspector/Investigator Rodolfo S. Gonzales reported that: (1) the land was covered by a survey plan approved by the Regional Land Director/Land Registration Authority on May 25, 1988 pursuant to PD No. 239 dated July 9, 1975; (2) it consisted of 22,773 square meters and was located in Barangay Banlic, Cabuyao, Laguna; (3) the area was entirely within the alienable and disposable area; (4) it had never been forfeited in favor of the government for non-payment of taxes, and had not been confiscated in connection with any civil or criminal cases; (5) it was not within a previously patented property as certified to by the Register of Deeds, Calamba, Laguna; and (6) there was no public land application filed for it by the applicant or any other persons as per verification from the records unit of his office. The report further stated that a verification at the Office of the Municipal Assessor showed that: (1) the land was declared for the first time in 1960 under Tax Declaration No. 6712 in the name of Enrique Hemedez with an area of 23,073 square meters; (2) it was now covered by Tax Declaration No. 2253 issued in the name of the respondent; (3) the real property taxes had been paid since 1968; and (4) it had not been earmarked for public or quasi-public purposes per information from the District Engineer.

After inspection, it was also found that (1) the land was residential; (2) the respondent was in the actual occupation and possession of the land; and (3) the land did not encroach upon an established watershed, riverbank/bed protection, creek, right-of-way or park site or any area devoted to general use or devoted to public service.7

A certification was issued by the Records Management Division of the Land Management Bureau stating that it had no record of any kind of public land applications/land patents covering the parcel of land subject of the application.8

The respondent presented Gloria P. Noel, its Vice President and Treasurer, who testified that the respondent had purchased the land from Jane de Castro Abalos on March 9, 1992 for P300,000.00; that the land had been declared for taxation purposes in the name of Abalos under Tax Declaration No. 22711; that after the sale, a new Tax Declaration had been issued in the name of the respondent, who had meanwhile taken possession of the land by building a fence around it and introducing improvements thereon; that the respondent had paid the real property taxes thereon since its acquisition; that the respondent’s

possession had been continuous, open and public; and that the land was free from any lien or encumbrance; and that there was no adverse claimant to the land.9

Engr. Edilberto Tamis attested that he was familiar with the land because it was a portion of Lot No. 8017 of Subdivision Plan Cad-455-D of the Cabuyao Cadastre, owned by Corazon Tapalla who had acquired it from the Hemedez family; that Tapalla had sold a portion of Lot No. 8017 to Abalos and the remaining portion to him; and that he had witnessed the sale of the land to the respondent.10

The respondent’s final witness was Armando Espela who declared that he was a retired land overseer residing in Barangay Banlic from birth; that he was familiar with the land which was part of a bigger parcel of land owned by the Hemedez family; that his father, Toribio Espela, with his assistance, and one Francisco Capacio worked on the land since 1960; that the entire landholding had originally been sugarland, but was later on subdivided, sold, and resold until it ceased to be agricultural land; that, in 1982, the land was sold to Corazon Tapalla who hired him as the overseer; that as the overseer, he fenced and cleared the area; that he was allowed to use the grassy portion for grazing purposes; that in 1987, Tapalla sold part of the land to Abalos and the remaining portion to Engr. Tamis; that he continued to oversee the land for the new owners; that Abalos then sold her portion to the respondent in 1992; that since then, the respondent took possession of the land, and he then ceased to be the overseer; that the possession by the Hemedez family and its successors-in-interest was open, continuous, public and under claim of ownership; and that he did not know any person who claimed ownership of the land other than those he and his father served as overseers.11

Decision of the RTC

On May 12, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision, holding that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership even prior to 1960 and, accordingly, granted the application for registration, viz:

WHEREFORE, taking into consideration the evidence submitted by the applicant, this Court hereby orders the confirmation and registration of title of the land described as Lot 8017-A of subdivision plan Csd-04-006985-D, being a portion of Lot 8017 of subdivision plan Cad-455-D, Cabuyao Cadastre situated at Barangay Banlic, Cabuyao, Laguna with an area of 1,520 square meters to be entered under the name of the applicant Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with office address at 33 M. Viola St., San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City by the Land Registration Authority. After the decision shall become final, let an order for the issuance of a decree of title be issued in favor of said applicant.

SO ORDERED.12

Judgment of the CA

The Republic appealed, arguing that the issue of whether the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest had possessed the land within the required length of time could not be determined because there was no evidence as to when the land had been declared alienable and disposable.

On June 10, 2004, the CA promulgated its judgment affirming the RTC, and concluded that the reports made by the concerned government agencies and the testimonies of those familiar with the land in question had buttressed the court a quo’s conclusion that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership even prior to 1960.13

Issue

Hence, the Republic appeals the adverse judgment of the CA upon the following ground:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANT OF THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION DESPITE THE

ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE THAT RESPONDENT AND ITS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAVE COMPLIED WITH THE PERIOD OF POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION REQUIRED BY LAW.14

The Republic contends that the respondent did not establish the time when the land covered by the application for registration became alienable and disposable;15 that such detail was crucial because the possession of the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest, for the purpose of determining whether it acquired the property by prescription, should be reckoned from the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable; and that prior to the declaration of the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, it was not susceptible to private ownership, and any possession or occupation at such time could not be counted as part of the period of possession required under the law on prescription.16

The respondent counters that whether it established when the property was declared alienable and disposable and whether it complied with the 30-year required period of possession should not be entertained anymore by the Court because: (a) these issues had not been raised in the trial court and were being raised for the first time on appeal; and (b) factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, were binding and conclusive on this Court. At any rate, the respondent insists that it had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession of the property for the prescribed period of 30 years as evidenced by the fact that the property had been declared for taxation purposes in 1960 in the name of its predecessors-in-interest, and that such possession had the effect of converting the land into private property and vesting ownership upon the respondent.17

In reply, the Republic asserts that it duly opposed the respondent’s application for registration; that it was only able to ascertain the errors committed by the trial court after the latter rendered its decision; and that the burden of proof in land registration cases rested on the applicant who must prove its ownership of the property being registered. The Republic maintains that the Court had the authority to review and reverse the factual findings of the lower courts when the conclusion reached was not supported by the evidence on record, as in this case.18

Ruling

The petition for review is meritorious.

Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 enumerates those who may file an application for registration of land based on possession and occupation of a land of the public domain, thus:

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws.

x x x x

An application for registration under Section14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 must establish the following requisites, namely: (a) the land is alienable and disposable property of the public domain; (b) the applicant and its predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership; and (c) the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed and occupied the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The Court has clarified in Malabanan19 that under Section14(1), it is not necessary that the land must have been declared alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945, or earlier, because the law simply requires the property sought to be registered to be alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. The Court has explained that a contrary interpretation would absurdly limit the application of the provision "to the point of virtual inutility."

The foregoing interpretation highlights the distinction between a registration proceeding filed under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 and one filed under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. According to Malabanan:

Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code.20

In other words, registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 is based on possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain since June 12, 1945 or earlier, without regard to whether the land was susceptible to private ownership at that time. The applicant needs only to show that the land had already been declared alienable and disposable at any time prior to the filing of the application for registration.

On the other hand, an application under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 is based on acquisitive prescription and must comply with the law on prescription as provided by the Civil Code. In that regard, only the patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription pursuant to the Civil Code.21 For acquisitive prescription to set in, therefore, the land being possessed and occupied must already be classified or declared as patrimonial property of the State. Otherwise, no length of possession would vest any right in the possessor if the property has remained land of the public dominion. Malabanan stresses that even if the land is later converted to patrimonial property of the State, possession of it prior to such conversion will not be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription.22 Thus, registration under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 requires that the land had already been converted to patrimonial property of the State at the onset of the period of possession required by the law on prescription.

An application for registration based on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 must, therefore, establish the following requisites, to wit: (a) the land is an alienable and disposable, and patrimonial property of the public domain; (b) the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have been in

possession of the land for at least 10 years, in good faith and with just title, or for at least 30 years, regardless of good faith or just title; and (c) the land had already been converted to or declared as patrimonial property of the State at the beginning of the said 10-year or 30-year period of possession.

To properly appreciate the respondent’s case, we must ascertain under what provision its application for registration was filed. If the application was filed under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, the determination of the particular date when the property was declared alienable and disposable would be unnecessary, inasmuch as proof showing that the land had already been classified as such at the time the application was filed would be enough. If the application was filed under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, the determination of the issue would not be crucial for, as earlier clarified, it was not the declaration of the land as alienable and disposable that would make it susceptible to private ownership by acquisitive prescription. Malabanan expounds thereon, thus …Would such lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property of the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription.

Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth."

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the

development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.23

The respondent’s application does not enlighten as to whether it was filed under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The application alleged that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation of the property in the concept of an owner, but did not state when possession and occupation commenced and the duration of such possession. At any rate, the evidence presented by the respondent and its averments in the other pleadings reveal that the application for registration was filed based on Section 14(2), not Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. The respondent did not make any allegation in its application that it had been in possession of the property since June 12, 1945, or earlier, nor did it present any evidence to establish such fact.1âwphi1

With the application of the respondent having been filed under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, the crucial query is whether the land subject of the application had already been converted to patrimonial property of the State. In short, has the land been declared by law as no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth?

The respondent may perhaps object to a determination of this issue by the Court for the same reason that it objects to the determination of whether it established when the land was declared alienable and disposable, that is, the issue was not raised in and resolved and by the trial court. But the objection would be futile because the issue was actually raised in the trial court, as borne out by the Republic's allegation in its opposition to the application to the effect "that the land is a portion of the public domain not subject to prescription." In any case, the interest of justice dictates the consideration and resolution of an issue that is relevant to another that was specifically raised. The rule that only

theories raised in the initial proceedings may be taken up by a party on appeal refers only to independent, not concomitant, matters to support or oppose the cause of action.24

Here, there is no evidence showing that the land in question was within an area expressly declared by law either to be the patrimonial property of the State, or to be no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth. The Court is left with no alternative but to deny the respondent's application for registration.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on June 10, 2004; and DISMISSES the respondent's application for original registration of Lot 8017-A of Subdivision Plan CSD-04-006985-D, Cad. 455-D, of the Cabuyao Cadastre.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMINAssociate Justice

REPUBLIC vs. ZURBARAN REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G.R. No. 164408, March 24, 2014

Facts:

Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation filed with RTC an application for original registration of land. Director of Lands opposed it arguing that applicant and its predecessor in interest had not been in

open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of land since June 12, 1945.

RTC and CA ruled in favor of Zurbaran.

On appeal to SC, the Republic appealed arguing that Zurbaran failed to establish the time when the land became alienable and disposable, which is crucial in determining whether Zuburan acquired the land by prescription.

ISSUE: What are the substantive elements in filing an application for original registration of land?

RULING:

The requirements depend on what basis the application was filed..

The following are the bases for application:

1. On the basis of possession, wherein you need to show the following:

a. The land is alienable and disposable property of the public domain (Example of non-alienable lands are forests, lakeshores, etc)

b. the applicant and its predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership; and

c. the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed and occupied the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier

Note: Land need not be declared alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or earlier. It is sufficient that property is alienable and disposable at the time of application (Malaban vs. Republic)

2. On the basis of prescription, wherein you need to prove the following:

a. Land is alienable and disposable, and patrimonial property

b. continuous possession of land for at least 10 years in good faith and with just title OR 30 years regardless of good faith or bad faith.

c. Land is converted or declared as patrimonial property of the State at the beginning of 10-year or 30-year period of possession.

Only patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription (Article 1113 of Civil Code). Property of public dominion, if not longer intended for public use or service, shall form part of patrimonial property of State.  (Article 422 of Civil Code)

Here, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public use, service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.

In the case at bar, the application did not state when their possession and occupation commenced (no allegation that they have been in possession since June 12, 1945) and the duration. So the application is based on prescription. Here, there is no evidence showing that the land in question was within an area expressly declared by law either to be the patrimonial property of the State, or to be no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth.