Cases in Ltd

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC.,

ETC., respondents.

D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:

The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the IntermediateAppellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which orderedregistration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagattribe.

The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth ActNo. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of thetrial court in said proceedings in this wise:

1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a

corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines andregistered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23, 1959;

2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquirereal properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on theprovision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');

3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired byAcme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel,both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities;

4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale

took place on October 29, 1962;

5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood &Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as theancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to generationuntil the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;

6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous,adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who


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were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence thepossession is already considered from time immemorial.

7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions ofRepublic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribeson land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable

public land or within the public domain;

8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-FiveMillion (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements were seen by theCourt during its ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on September 18,1982;

9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicantwas duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela,have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., andthis negotiation came to reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & VeneerCo., Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels for the

townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which donation wasaccepted by the Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during theirspecial session on November 22, 1979.

The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of the1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the registrationproceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution hadgone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIVprohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain,except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution whichwas in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversibleerror to decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth

Act No. 141, as amended, reads:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the publicdomain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have notbeen perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province wherethe land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of titletherefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of thepublic domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years

immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except whenprevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performedall the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of titleunder the provisions of this chapter.

(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through theirpredecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious possessionand occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or


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be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that theland is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).

The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginningwith Carinoin 1909 2thru Susiin 1925 3 down to Hericoin 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed andreaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for

the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of therequisite period ipso jureand without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public landand becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what is the better and, indeed, thecorrect, view-becomes evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein,

The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carinoinvolving the Decree/Regulations of June 25,1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the PhilippineIslands. It was ruled that:

It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove'possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means mayprove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have

recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculatedto convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were indanger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better, inview of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in anylitigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all but none sufficient toshow that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by thedecree, if not by earlier law. ...

That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical language,in Susi:

.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jureestablishedin paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessaryrequirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actualand physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land ofthe public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with aright to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. Sothat when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had alreadyacquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for itis not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may besanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions ofsection 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land inquestion by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and hadbecome private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the

Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the Directorof Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the salethus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6

Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeofLacaste vs. Director ofLands,7Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9Miguel vs. Court ofAppeals10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted itin jurisprudence.


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We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to the salesapplication of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right tothe land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.

That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution.Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public

agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner'prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.

xxx xxx xxx

The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not impairvested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of amunicipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimateexercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).

xxx xxx xxx

In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution theright of the corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and establishedand was no longer open to doubt or controversy.

Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent hadthe effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's right toobtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without dueprocess (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919). 15

The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name mustbe regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more thanprocedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be

confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it isunquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservienceto the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by validconveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.

The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority rulingin Meralcomust be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule,as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by apossessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusivelyfor the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is convertedto private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule andon the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at

the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, therebeing at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. Theobjection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of titleunder section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds itsanswer in the dissent in Meralco:

6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that thePublic Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply forconfirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court


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actions. Assuming that there was a technical error not having filed the application forregistration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it isconceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralcoand neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effectin the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end resultof their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by

operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should notbe necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applicationsin their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after allthese years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)

The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications forconfirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the originalpersons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the titlethat they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act andwho thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations dulyqualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of titleto the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.

There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter fromthemselves applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in theirnames, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty charades,whereas the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, bya liberal application of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissentin Meralco.

While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a realsense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines thesoundness of which has passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in many past cases.Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief JusticeFernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralcorested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner

therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect title topublic land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its

Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may,in that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutionalquestion.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the IntermediateAppellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance.

SO ORDERED.

Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.


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had paid the price of the property. The possession and occupation of the land in question, first, byApolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open, continuous,adverse and public, without any interruption, except during the revolution, or disturbance, exceptwhen Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913, commenced an action in the Court of First Instance ofPampanga to recover the possession of said land (Exhibit C), wherein after considering the evidenceintroduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of Valentin Susi and against Angela

Razon, dismissing the complaint (Exhibit E). Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of theland in question through the court, Angela Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the purchasethereof on August 15, 1914 (Exhibit C). Having learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed andopposition thereto on December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of the land for twenty-five years(Exhibit P). After making the proper administrative investigation, the Director of Lands overruled theopposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon. By virtue of said grant the register ofdeeds of Pampanga, on August 31, 1921, issued the proper certificate of title to Angela Razon.

Armed with said document, Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in question, andas he refused to do so, she brought and action for forcible entry and detainer in the justice of thepeace court of Guagua, Pampanga, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the case being oneof title to real property (Exhibit F and M). Valentin Susi then brought this action.

With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions raised by the appellant in hisassignments of error.lawphi1.net

It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land inquestion openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and through his predecessors,since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. While the judgment of the Court of FirstInstance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the forcible entry case does not affect the Directorof Lands, yet it is controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been inpossession thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said land,Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and through his predecessors forthirty-four years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land afish pond when he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began topossess and occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory. These

being the facts, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case ofCario vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 4491), is applicable here. In favor ofValentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jureestablished in paragraph (b) ofsection 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant bythe Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personallyand through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously,exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under theprovisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor,Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of theGovernment, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grantmay be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions ofsection 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by agrant of the State, it had already ceased to be the public domain and had become private property,

at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently,in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over whichhe had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and AngelaRazon did not thereby acquire any right.

The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession thereof.lawphi1.net


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If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, byoperation of law, private property of the plaintiff, there lacking only the judicial sanction of his title,Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover possession thereof and hold it.

For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment appealed from, the same ishereby affirmed in all its parts, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Avancea, C.J., Malcolm, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.Johnson, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 41 Phil., 935.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1925/dec1925/gr_l-24066_1925.htmlhttp://history.back%281%29/http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1925/dec1925/gr_l-24066_1925.htmlhttp://history.back%281%29/


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Cruz vs DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000Isagani Cruz v. Dept. of Energy and Natural Resources,G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000

FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous PeoplesRights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over

lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of theregalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basicallyenumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include naturalresources. Cruz et al content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domainsand ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. Theydeliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition wasdismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include natural resources somehow against the regalian doctrine.


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Republic of the Philippines

Supreme CourtManila

EN BANC

THE SECRETARY OF THE G.R. No. 167707

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT

AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THEREGIONAL EXECUTIVE Present:

DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI,REGIONAL TECHNICAL PUNO, C.J.,

DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, QUISUMBING,

LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, YNARES-SANTIAGO,

REGION VI PROVINCIAL CARPIO,

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, CORONA,*

AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, CARPIO MORALES,

DIRECTOR OF LAND AZCUNA,

REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, TINGA,

DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM CHICO-NAZARIO,

SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF VELASCO, JR.,

PHILIPPINE TOURISM NACHURA,**

AUTHORITY, REYES,

Petitioners, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, andBRION,JJ.

- versus -

MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD

TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and

ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and Promulgated:

in behalf of all those similarly situated,Respondents. October 8, 2008

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
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DR. ORLANDO SACAY and G.R. No. 173775

WILFREDO GELITO, joined by

THE LANDOWNERS OF

BORACAY SIMILARLY

SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST,

ANNEX A OF THIS PETITION,

Petitioners,

- versus -

THE SECRETARY OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT

AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THEREGIONAL TECHNICAL

DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS

MANAGEMENT BUREAU,

REGION VI, PROVINCIAL

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL

RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,

AKLAN,Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

REYES, R.T.,J.:

AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants

of Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands.

There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a

petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1]

of the Court of Appeals (CA)

affirming that[2]

of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted

the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose

Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is
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G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of

Proclamation No. 1064[3]

issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying

Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.

The Antecedents

G.R. No. 167707

Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white

sand beaches and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist

destination. The island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants[4]

who live in the bone-

shaped islands threebarangays.[5]

On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural

Resources (DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay

Island,[6]

which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named

persons.[7]

On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued


declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and

peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the

administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos laterapproved the issuance ofPTA Circular 3-82

[9]dated September 3, 1982, to

implement Proclamation No. 1801.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded

them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or

survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants
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Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap

filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801

and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over theiroccupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-

in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and

occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time

immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on

them.[10]

Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its

implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Sincethe Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private

ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise

known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their

names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed

the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that BoracayIsland was

an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands

classified as public forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant toSection 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry

Code,[11]

as amended.

The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801

and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of

title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not

been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot

ripen into ownership.

During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the

following facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels

of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees

and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less
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The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.[23]

The

Republic then appealed to the CA.

On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision,

disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby

rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING thedecision of the lower court.[24]

The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a

declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a

forest reserve.

Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly

denied.[25]

Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.

G.R. No. 173775

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064[26]

classifying Boracay

Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection

purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of

agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided

for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails,

reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest

land protection purposes.

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,[27]

Wilfredo

Gelito,[28]

and other landowners[29]

in Boracay filed with this Court an originalpetition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No.

1064.[30]

They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights

over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their

respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested
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billions of pesos in developing their lands and building internationally renowned

first class resorts on their lots.[31]

Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamationreclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral

nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of

1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act.[32]

Thus, their

possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial

confirmation of imperfect title.

Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not

have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is anunclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being

public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the

subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive

department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public

domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive

government act in order to release the lots for disposition.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two

petitions as they principally involve the same issues on the land classificationof Boracay Island.

[33]

Issues

G.R. No. 167707

The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801

and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all thosesimilarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.[34]

G.R. No. 173775
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Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:

I.

AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN

CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY,

SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIORTO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF

ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLICAGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL

CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS

DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?

II.

HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT

OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS

OF BORACAYLAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT

APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?

III.IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS

ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN]

INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAINTITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?

IV.

IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006,VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP

OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BYTHE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR ISPROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF

RA 6657.

V.CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE

SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF

THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN

BORACAY?[35]

(Underscoring supplied)

In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-

claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775)have a

right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions

pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA

No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to secure title under other

pertinent laws.
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Our Ruling

Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive

to reclassify lands of the public domain

Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for

judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902[36]

in

relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA

No. 141;[37]

(b) Proclamation No. 1801[38]

issued by then President Marcos; and (c)


issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall

proceed to determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect

title under these laws and executive acts.

But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to

reclassify lands of the public domain.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural,

forest or timber.[40]

Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following

divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral,

timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as may be provided by

law,[41]

giving the government great leeway for classification.[42]

Then the 1987Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition:

national parks.[43]

Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.[44]

Prior to

Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly

and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an

unclassified land of the public domain.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to

the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and

charged with the conservation of such patrimony.[45] The doctrine has been

consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.[46]

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are

presumed to belong to the State.[47]

Thus, all lands that have not been acquired

from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of
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the inalienable public domain.[48]

Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if

lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The

government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the

persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as

well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding theplacing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be

ordinary acts of ownership.[49]

Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the

Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and

possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.[50]

The Regalian

doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through theLaws of the Indies and

the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation that all lands that were not acquiredfrom the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public

domain.[51]

TheLaws of the Indies was followed by theLey Hipotecaria or

theMortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the

systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims.[52]

The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law[53]

partly amended the Spanish

Mortgage Law and theLaws of the Indies. It established possessory information asthe method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions

which were set forth in said decree.[54]

Under Section 393 of the Maura Law,

an informacion posesoria or possessory information title,[55]

when duly inscribed in

the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse

of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and

adverse,[56]

from the date of its inscription.[57]

However, possessory information title

had to be perfected one year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or

untilApril 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State.

[58]

In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be

founded on royal concessions which took various forms, namely: (1)titulo real or

royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el

estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and

(5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.[59]
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The first law governing the disposition of public lands in

the Philippines under American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill

of1902.[60]

By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were

classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber orforest lands.

[61] The act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands

by means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system).[62]

It

also provided the definition by exclusion of agricultural public

lands.[63] Interpreting the meaning of agricultural lands under the Philippine

Bill of 1902, the Court declared inMapa v. Insular Government:[64]

x x x In other words, that the phrase agricultural land as used in Act

No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timberor mineral lands. x x x

[65](Emphasis Ours)

On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496,

otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The act established a system of

registration by which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and

imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system.[66]

Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act

No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead

system and made provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of

imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations

regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or

purchase lands of the public domain.[67]

Under the Act, open, continuous,

exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the

next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904was sufficient for judicial confirmation

of imperfect title.[68]

On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874,

otherwise known as the second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive

law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and

citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial
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confirmation of title, possession and occupation en concepto dueo since time

immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required.[69]

After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No.

2874 on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended,remains as theexisting general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the

public domain other than timber and mineral lands,[70]

and privately owned lands

which reverted to the State.[71]

Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874

of possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial

or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act

(RA) No. 1942,

[72]

which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period forjudicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD

No. 1073,[73]

which now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied

for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.[74]

The issuance of PD No. 892[75]

on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of

Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings.[76]

Under the decree, all

holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under

Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on February

16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands[77]shall be governedby Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.

On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529,

known as the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various

laws relative to registration of property.[78]

It governs registration of lands under

the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages.[79]

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. Inkeeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again

emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government,such as an

official proclamation,[80]

declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land

for agricultural or other purposes.[81]

In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits

alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been officially

delimited and classified.[82]
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The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of

the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or

claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is

alienable or disposable.[83] To overcome this presumption, incontrovertibleevidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is

alienable or disposable.[84]

There must still be a positive act declaring land of the

public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an

application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence

of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an

executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands

investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.[85]

The applicant may also secure a

certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed forthe required number of years is alienable and disposable.[86]

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative

action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are

bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by

private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is

alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the

Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were

already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification orreclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.

[87]

Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or

portions of it, agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay was already

an agricultural land pursuant to the old casesAnkron v. Government of the

Philippine Islands (1919)[88]

andDe Aldecoa v. The Insular Government

(1909).[89]

These cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of

1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that in the absenceof evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until

the contrary is shown.[90]

Private claimants reliance onAnkron andDe Aldecoa is misplaced. These

cases did not have the effect of converting the whole of BoracayIsland or portions

of it into agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902
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and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which land registration

courts would classify lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be

classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in each

case.

Ankron andDe Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the

Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral,

timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding

classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so,

depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.[91]

This was the Courts ruling

inHeirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De

Palanca v. Republic,[92]

in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:

x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not beformally released by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed open to

private ownership, citing the cases ofRamos v. Director of Lands andAnkron v.

Government of the Philippine Islands.

x x x x

Petitioners reliance uponRamos v. Director of Lands andAnkron v.

Governmentis misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of

1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission

on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision vesting in the ChiefExecutive or President of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public

domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to

make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with

implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.[93]

To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it

was then necessary to devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved

the dictum inAnkronthat the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of

evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the

contrary is shown.[94]

But We cannot unduly expand the presumption inAnkron andDe Aldecoa to

an argument that all lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified
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as disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the

presumption convert all lands of the public domain into agricultural lands.

If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902

and Act No. 926 would have automatically made all lands in thePhilippines, exceptthose already classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable

lands. That would take these lands out of State ownership and worse, would be

utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian

doctrine.

The presumption inAnkron andDe Aldecoa attaches only to land

registration cases brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more

specifically those cases dealing with judicial and administrative confirmation ofimperfect titles. The presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or

administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly

cannot apply to landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-

interest, who failed to avail themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them,

their land remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued

to be owned by the State.

In any case, the assumption inAnkron andDe Aldecoa was not

absolute. Land classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there wasproof that the land was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts

could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the presumption. InAnkron,

this Court stated:

In the case ofJocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-

General admitted in effect that whether the particular land in question belongs to

one class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land hastrees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is

forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent

and present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have

just said, many definitions have been given for agriculture, forestry, and

mineral lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe tosay that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it is more

valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for agriculturalpurposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists

some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as

forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or


27/40

mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of

the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classifiedas agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be

decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its presentor future value for one or the other purposes . We believe, however,

considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of thelands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to

presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are

agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a

particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore,

be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a

question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case. The factthat the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to

decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance

belong to one or the other of said classes of land. The Government, in the first

instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for

itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless privateinterests have intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter case,

whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Untilprivate interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said

Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the public domain shallbe set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of

Lands, 39 Phil. 175;Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra)[95]

(Emphasis ours)

Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of

lands from the facts of each case, except those that have already became private

lands.[96]

Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA

No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the President,

the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or

disposable, mineral or forest.96-a

Since then, courts no longer had the authority,

whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public

domain.[97]

Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued

their title in 1933,[98]

did not present a justiciable case for determination by the land

registration court of the propertys land classification. Simply put, there was noopportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are

now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act

No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been

filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no
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longer authorized to determine the propertys land classification. Hence, private

claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.

We note that the RTC decision[99]

in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko

v. Register of Deeds of Manila,[100]which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141,vesting the Executive with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain

was already in effect. Krivenko cited the old casesMapa v. Insular

Government,[101]

De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,[102]

andAnkron v.

Government of the Philippine Islands.[103]

Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally

different issue. The pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots were

included in the general classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether analien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko

was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution[104]

from acquiring agricultural land,

which included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the

public domain are automatically deemed agricultural.

Notably, the definition of agricultural public lands mentioned

in Krivenko relied on the old cases decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874,

includingAnkron andDe Aldecoa.[105] As We have already stated, those casescannot apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did not have the

authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.

Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create

a presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their

continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten

(10) years under Act No. 926[106]

ipso factoconverted the island into private

ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their name.

A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court

of Appeals.[107]

Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato

S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a

ruled:
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29/40

Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in

pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The lawgoverned the disposition of lands of the public domain. It

prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and

leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands,

and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons toperfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for

the issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public

lands, for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein,for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or

confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands.In

short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to

public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government;

and that the governments title to public land sprung from theTreaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and

the United States. The term public land referred to all lands of

the public domain whose title still remained in the government andare thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and

excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar

lands.

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of

1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of

lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and

disposable.[108](Emphasis Ours)

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an

unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such

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