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[OSG] has no personality to raise any issue at all under the circumstancespointed out hereinabove.[9] Otherwise, it is content in alleging that [Martinez]presented sufficient and persuasive proof to substantiate the fact that his title toLot Nos. 464-A and 464-B is worth the confirmation he seeks to be done in thisregistration case;[10] and that the RTC had since issued a new Order dated 1September 2003, confirming Martinezs title over Lot No. 370.

In its Comment dated 24 May 2004,[11] the OSG raises several substantialpoints, including the fact that it had duly opposed Martinezs application for

registration before the RTC; that jurisprudence and the Rules of Courtacknowledge that a party in default is not precluded from appealing theunfavorable judgment; that the RTC had no jurisdiction over Lot No. 370 sinceits technical description was not published in the Official Gazette; and that asfound by the Court of Appeals the evidence presented by Martinez is insufficientfor registering the lots in his name.[12] Despite an order from the Court requiringhim to file a Reply to the Comment, counsel for Martinez declined to do so,explaining, among others, that he felt he would only be taxing the collectivepatience of this [Court] if he merely repeats x x x what petitioner had succinctlystated x x x on pages four (4) to seven (7) of his said petition. Counsel forpetitioner was accordingly fined by the Court.[13]The Courts patience is taxed less by redundant pleadings than by insubstantialarguments. The inability of Martinez to offer an effective rebuttal to thearguments of the OSG further debilitates what is an already weak petition.

The central question, as posed by Martinez, is whether the OSG could have stillappealed the RTC decision after it had been declared in default. The OSGargues that a party in default is not precluded from filing an appeal, citingMetropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Court of Appeals,[14] and asserts that [t]heRules of Court expressly provides that a party who has been declared in defaultmay appeal from the judgment rendered against him.[15]

There is error in that latter, unequivocal averment, though one which does notdeter from the ultimate correctness of the general postulate that a partydeclared in default is allowed to pose an appeal. Elaboration is in order.

We note at the onset that the OSG does not impute before this Court that the

RTC acted improperly in declaring public respondent in default, even though anopposition had been filed to Martinezs petition. Under Section 26 of PresidentialDecree No. 1529, as amended, the order of default may be issued [i]f noperson appears and answers within the time allowed. The RTC appears tohave issued the order of general default simply on the premise that no oppositorappeared before it on the hearing of 29 March 2000. But it cannot be deniedthat the OSG had already duly filed its Opposition to Martinezs petition longbefore the said hearing. As we held in Director of Lands v. Santiago:[16]

[The] opposition or answer, which is based on substantial grounds, having beenformally filed, it was improper for the respondent Judge taking cognizance ofsuch registration case to declare the oppositor in default simply because hefailed to appear on the day set for the initial healing. The pertinent provision oflaw which states: "If no person appears and answers within the time allowed,

the court may at once upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contraryappearing, order a general default to be recorded . . . ," cannot be interpreted to

mean that the court can just disregard the answer before it, which has longbeen filed, for such an interpretation would be nothing less than illogical,unwarranted, and unjust. Had the law intended that failure of the oppositor toappear on the date of the initial hearing would be a ground for default despitehis having filed an answer, it would have been so stated in unmistakable terms,considering the serious consequences of an order of default. Especially in thiscase where the greater public interest is involved as the land sought to beregistered is alleged to be public land, the respondent Judge should havereceived the applicant's evidence and set another date for the reception of the

oppositor's evidence. The oppositor in the Court below and petitioner hereinshould have been accorded ample opportunity to establish the government'sclaim.[17]

Strangely, the OSG did not challenge the propriety of the default order, whetherin its appeal before the Court of Appeals or in its petition before this Court. Itwould thus be improper for the Court to make a pronouncement on the validityof the default order since the same has not been put into issue. Nonetheless,we can, with comfort, proceed from same apparent premise of the OSG that thedefault order was proper or regular.

The juridical utility of a declaration of default cannot be disputed. By forgoing theneed for adversarial proceedings, it affords the opportunity for the speedyresolution of cases even as it penalizes parties who fail to give regard or

obedience to the judicial processes.

The extent to which a party in default loses standing in court has been thesubject of considerable jurisprudential debate. Way back in 1920, in Velez v.Ramas,[18] we declared that the defaulting defendant loses his standing incourt, he not being entitled to the service of notices in the case, nor to appear inthe suit in any way. He cannot adduce evidence; nor can he be heard at thefinal hearing.[19] These restrictions were controversially expanded in Lim Tocov. Go Fay,[20] decided in 1948, where a divided Court pronounced that adefendant in default had no right to appeal the judgment rendered by the trialcourt, except where a motion to set aside the order of default had been filed.This, despite the point raised by Justice Perfecto in dissent that there was noprovision in the then Rules of Court or any law depriving a defaulted defendant

of the right to be heard on appeal.[21]The enactment of the 1964 Rules of Court incontestably countermanded theLim Toco ruling. Section 2, Rule 41 therein expressly stated that [a] party whohas been declared in default may likewise appeal from the judgment renderedagainst him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition for reliefto set aside the order of default has been presented by him in accordance withRule 38.[22] By clearly specifying that the right to appeal was available even ifno petition for relief to set aside the order of default had been filed, the thenfresh Rules clearly rendered the Lim Toco ruling as moot.

Another provision in the 1964 Rules concerning the effect of an order of defaultacknowledged that a party declared in default shall not be entitled to notice ofsubsequent proceedings, nor to take part in the trial.[23] Though it might be argued that appellate proceedings fall part of the trial since there is no finaltermination of the case as of then, the clear intent of the 1964 Rules was to

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nonetheless allow the defaulted defendant to file an appeal from the trial courtdecision. Indeed, jurisprudence applying the 1964 Rules was unhesitant toaffirm a defaulted defendants right to appeal, as guaranteed under Section 2 ofRule 41, even as Lim Toco was not explicitly abandoned.

In the 1965 case of Antonio, et al. v. Jacinto,[24] the Court acknowledged thatthe prior necessity of a ruling setting aside the order of default however, waschanged by the Revised Rules of Court. Under Rule 41, section 2, paragraph 3,a party who has been declared in default may likewise appeal from the

judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even ifno petition for relief to set aside the order of default has been presented by himin accordance with Rule 38.[25] It was further qualified in Matute v. Court ofAppeals[26] that the new availability of a defaulted defendants right to appealdid not preclude a defendant who has been illegally declared in default frompursuing a more speedy and efficacious remedy, like a petition for certiorari tohave the judgment by default se t aside as a nullity.[27]

In Tanhu v. Ramolete,[28] the Court cited with approval the commentaries ofChief Justice Moran, expressing the reformulated doctrine that following LimToco, a defaulted defendant cannot adduce evidence; nor can he be heardat the final hearing, although

[under Section 2, Rule 41,] he may appeal the judgment rendered against himon the merits.[29]

Thus, for around thirty-odd years, there was no cause to doubt that a defaulteddefendant had the right to appeal the adverse decision of the trial court evenwithout seeking to set aside the order of default. Then, in 1997, the Rules ofCivil Procedure were amended, providing for a new Section 2, Rule 41. Thenew provision reads:

SECTION 1. Subject of appeal.An appeal may be taken from a judgment orfinal order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter thereinwhen declared by these Rules to be appealable.

No appeal may be taken from:(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;

(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relieffrom judgment;

(c) An interlocutory order;

(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;

(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent,confession or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or anyother ground vitiating consent;

(f) An order of execution;

(g) A judgment or final order for or against or one or more of several partiesor in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints,while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom;and

(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable,the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.

Evidently, the prior warrant that a defaulted defendant had the right to appealwas removed from Section 2, Rule 41. On the other hand, Section 3 of Rule 9 ofthe 1997 Rules incorporated the particular effects on the parties of an order ofdefault:

Sec. 3. Default; declaration of.If the defending party fails to answer within thetime allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party withnotice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defendingparty in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting

the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in itsdiscretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidencemay be delegated to the clerk of court.

(a) Effect of order of default.A party in default shall be entitled to notice ofsubsequent proceedings but shall not take part in the trial.

(b) Relief from order of default.A party declared in default may any timeafter notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set asidethe order of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due tofraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a meritoriousdefense. In such case, the order of default may be set aside on such terms andconditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.

(c) Effect of partial default.When a pleading asserting a claim states acommon cause of action against several defending parties, some of whomanswer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all uponthe answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented.

(d) Extent of relief to be awarded.A judgment rendered against a party indefault shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed fornor award unliquidated damages.

x x x

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It cannot be escaped that the old provision expressly guaranteeing the right of adefendant declared in default to appeal the adverse decision was not replicatedin the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Should this be taken as a sign that underthe 1997 Rules a defaulted defendant no longer has the right to appeal the trialcourt decision, or that the Lim Toco doctrine has been reinstated?

If post-1997 jurisprudence and the published commentaries to the 1997 Ruleswere taken as an indication, the answer should be in the negative. The right of a

defaulted defendant to appeal remains extant.By 1997, the doctrinal rule concerning the remedies of a party declared indefault had evolved into a fairly comprehensive restatement as offered in Lina v.Court of Appeals:[30]

a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof andbefore judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default onthe ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake orexcusable neglect, and that he has meritorious defenses; (Sec 3, Rule 18)

b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendantdiscovered the default, but before the same has become final and executory, hemay file a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37;

c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has becomefinal and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38;and

d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contraryto the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of defaulthas been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41)[31]

The fourth remedy, that of appeal, is anchored on Section 2, Rule 41 of the1964 Rules. Yet even after that provisions deletion under the 1997 Rules, theCourt did not hesitate to expressly rely again on the Lina doctrine, including the

pronouncement that a defaulted defendant may appeal from the judgmentrendered against him. This can be seen in the cases of Indiana AerospaceUniversity v. Commission on Higher Education,[32] Tan v. Dumarpa,[33] andCrisologo v. Globe Telecom, Inc.[34]

Annotated textbooks on the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure similarlyacknowledge that even under the new rules, a defaulted defendant retains theright to appeal as previously confirmed under the old Section 2, Rule 41. In histextbook on Civil Procedure, Justice Francisco answers the q uestion What arethe remedies available to a defending party in default? with a reiteration of theLina doctrine, including the remedy that a defaulted defendant may also appealfrom the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to thelaw, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented byhim.[35] Justice Regalado also restates the Lina rule in his textbook on Civil

Procedure, opining that the remedies enumerated therein, even if under theformer Rules of Procedure, would hold true under the present amended

Rules.[36] Former Court of Appeals Justice Herrerra likewise reiterates theLina doctrine, though with the caveat that an appeal from an order denying apetition for relief from judgment was no longer appealable under Section 1, Rule41 of the 1997 Rules.[37] Herrera further adds:

Section 2, paragraph [2] of the former Rule 41, which allows an appeal from adenial of a petition for relief, was deleted from the present Rule, and confinedappeals to cases from a final judgment or final order that completely disposes ofthe case, or of a particular matter therein, when declared by these rules to be

appealable. A judgment by default may be considered as one that completelydisposes of the case.[38]

We are hard-pressed to find a published view that the enactment of the 1997Rules of Civil Procedure accordingly withdrew the right, previously grantedunder the 1964 Rules, of a defaulted defendant to appeal the judgment bydefault against him. Neither is there any provision under the 1997 Rules whichexpressly denies the defaulted defendant such a right. If it is perplexing why the1997 Rules deleted the previous authorization under the old Section 2, Rule 41(on subject of appeal), it is perhaps worth noting that its counterpart provision inthe 1997 Rules, now Section 1, Rule 41, is different in orientation even as it alsocovers subject of appeal. Unlike in the old provision, the bulk of the newprovision is devoted to enumerating the various rulings from which no appealmay be taken, and nowhere therein is a judgment by default included. A

declaration therein that a defaulted defendant may still appeal the judgment bydefault would have seemed out of place.

Yet even if it were to assume the doubtful proposition that this contested right ofappeal finds no anchor in the 1997 Rules, the doctrine still exists, applying theprinciple of stare decisis. Jurisprudence applying the 1997 Rules has continuedto acknowledge the Lina doctrine which embodies this right to appeal as amongthe remedies of a defendant, and no argument in this petition persuades theCourt to rule otherwise.

In Rural Bank of Sta. Catalina v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[39] the Court,through Justice Callejo, Sr., again provided a comprehensive restatement of theremedies of the defending party declared in default, which we adopt for

purposes of this decision:It bears stressing that a defending party declared in default loses his standing incourt and his right to adduce evidence and to present his defense. He, however,has the right to appeal from the judgment by default and assail said judgmenton the ground, inter alia, that the amount of the judgment is excessive or isdifferent in kind from that prayed for, or that the plaintiff failed to prove thematerial allegations of his complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law. Suchparty declared in default is proscribed from seeking a modification or reversal ofthe assailed decision on the basis of the evidence submitted by him in the Courtof Appeals, for if it were otherwise, he would thereby be allowed to regain hisright to adduce evidence, a right which he lost in the trial court when he wasdeclared in default, and which he failed to have vacated. In this case, thepetitioner sought the modification of the decision of the trial court based on the

evidence submitted by it only in the Court of Appeals.[40]

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If it cannot be made any clearer, we hold that a defendant party declared indefault retains the right to appeal from the judgment by default on the groundthat the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of the complaint, or thatthe decision is contrary to law, even without need of the prior filing of a motionto set aside the order of default. We reaffi rm that the Lim Toco doctrine, denyingsuch right to appeal unless the order of default has been set aside, was nolonger controlling in this jurisdiction upon the effectivity of the 1964 Rules ofCourt, and up to this day.

Turning to the other issues, we affirm the conclusion of the Court of Appealsthat Martinez failed to adduce the evidence needed to secure the registration ofthe subject lots in his name.

It should be noted that the OSG, in appealing the case to the Court of Appeals,did not introduce any new evidence, but simply pointed to the insufficiency ofthe evidence presented by Martinez before the trial court. The Court of Appealswas careful to point out that the case against Martinez was established not bythe OSGs evidence, but by petitioners own insufficient evidence. We adoptwith approval the following findings arrived at by the Court of Appeals, thus:

The burden of proof in land registration cases is incumbent on the applicant whomust show that he is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the landapplied for. Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and convincing

evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his ancestors by anyof the means provided for the proper acquisition of public lands, the rule issettled that the property must be held to be a part of the public domain. Theapplicant must, therefore, present competent and persuasive proof tosubstantiate his claim. He may not rely on general statements, or mereconclusions of law other than factual evidence of possession and title.

Considered in the light of the opposition filed by the Office of the SolicitorGeneral, we find the evidence adduced by appellee, on the whole, insufficient tosupport the registration of the subject parcels in his name. To prove theprovenance of the land, for one, all that appellee proffered by way of oralevidence is the following cursory testimony during his direct examination, viz:

x x x xQ You mentioned that you are the owner of these three (3) parcels of land.How did you begin the ownership of the same?A I bought it from my uncles Julian Martinez and Juan Martinez.

x x x x

Q x x x x Who took possession of these parcels of land from then on?A I took possession, sir

Q As owner?A Yes, as owner.

Q Up to the present who is in possession as owner of these parcels ofland?

A I took possession.

Q Before Julian Martinez and Juan Martinez sold these parcels of landbefore you took possession who were the owners and in possession of these?A Hilarion Martinez, the father of my predecessors-in-interest and also mygrandfather.

x x x x

Court:

Q Of your own knowledge[,] where [sic] did your grandfather HilarionMartinez acquire these lands?A According to my grandfather he bought that land from a certain JuanCasano in the year 1870s[,] I think.

x x x x

Q By the way[,] when did your grandfather Hilarion Martinez die?A Either in 1920 or 1921.

Q Since you said your immediate predecessors-in-interest Julian Martinezand Juan Martinez inherited the same from your grandfather. Can you say it thesame that your predecessors-in-interest were the owners and possessors of thesame since 1921 up to the time they sold the land to you in 1952?A Yes, sir.

x x x x

In the dreary tradition of most land registration cases, appellee has apparentlytaken the absence of representation for appellant at the hearing of his petitionas license to be perfunctory in the presentation of his evidence. Actualpossession of land, however, consists in the manifestation of acts of dominionover it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own

property. It is not enough for an applicant to declare himself or hispredecessors-in-interest the possessors and owners of the land for whichregistration is sought. He must present specific acts of ownership tosubstantiate the claim and cannot just offer general statements which are mereconclusions of law requiring evidentiary support and substantiation.

The record shows that appellee did not fare any better with the documentaryevidence he adduced before the trial court. The October 20, 1952 Deed of Saleby which appellee claims to have purchased the subject parcels from his uncle,Julian Martinez, was not translated from the vernacular in which it was executedand, by said token, was inadmissible in evidence. Having submitted a whiteprint copy of the survey plan for Lot Nos. 464-A and 464-B, appellee alsosubmitted the tracing cloth plan for Lot No. 370 which does not, however,appear to be approved by the Director of Lands. In much the same manner that

the submission of the original tracing cloth plan is a mandatory statutory

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requirement which cannot be waived, the rule is settled that a survey plan notapproved by the Director of Lands is not admissible in evidence.[41]

These findings of the Court of Appeals, arrived at after a sufficiently extensiveevaluation of the evidence, stand in contrast to that contained in the RTCdecision, encapsulated in a one-paragraph prcis of the factual allegations ofMartinez concerning how he acquired possession of the subject properties. TheCourt of Appeals, of course, is an appropriate trier of facts, and a comparisonbetween the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and that of the RTC clearlydemonstrates that it was the appellate court which reached a more thoroughand considered evaluation of the evidence.

As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the burden of proof expected of thepetitioner in a land registration case has not been matched in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-53768 May 6, 1991

PATRICIA CASILDO CACHERO and the HEIRS OF TOMAS CACHERO(Alejandria Cachero-Estilong, Lolita Cachero-Teodoro, Severa Cachero-Simplinam, Bernardo Cachero, and Luzviminda Cachero-Balinag), applicants-appellees,

vs.

BERNARDINO MARZAN, HILARIO MARZAN, CIPRIANO PULIDO, MAGNOMARZAN and GUILLERMO HIPOL, oppositors. ADELINA PULIDO GENOVA,and the HEIRS OF PAULINA NUDO AND FELIX GENOVA (Cornelio Genova,Herminia Genova, Carmelita Genova, Josefina Genova and Margarita Genova),petitioners-appellants.

Luis L. Lardizabal for applicants-appellees.

NARVASA, J.:p

The Spouses Tomas Cachero and Patricia Casildo brought suit in the Court ofFirst Instance of La Union against Bernardino Marzan, Julian Marzan andCipriano Pulido for recovery of possession and ownership of two (2) adjoiningparcels of land having an aggregate area of some fifteen (15) hectares, locatedin Barrio Basca, Aringay, La Union. In that action, docketed as Civil Case No.384, judgment was rendered declaring the plaintiff spouses "owners of the ninehectares piece of land described in the complaint." 1 The judgment became finaland executory.

About seven (7) years later 2 the Cachero Spouses, instituted proceedings forthe registration under the Torrens Act of the parcels of land subject of Civil CaseNo. 384, supraidentified as Lot No. 6860 of the Cadastral Survey of AringayLa Union, with an area of 109,480 square meters and another parcel of landidentified as Lot No. 6859 of the same Cadastral Survey, measuring 50,412square meters, both lots being situated in Sitio Iriw, Basca (now Barrio SanAntonio), Aringay, La Union. In said case, docketed as Land Registration CaseNo. N-824, separate oppositions were filed by Atty. Agaton Yaranon, Jr. inbehalf of five individuals, namely:

1) Bernardino Marzan, claiming 10,000 square meters on the northeastern

portion of lot No. 6860;

2) Cipriano Pulido, claiming 50,412 square meters of Lot No. 6859;

3) Hilario Marzan, claiming 39,480 square meters on the western portion of LotNo. 6860;

4) Magno Marzan, claiming 30,000 square meters on the southeastern portionof Lot No. 6860; and

5) Guillermo Hipol, claiming the eastern central portion of the same Lot No.6860.

Note that two of the five oppositors, the first two above named, were parties inthe aforementioned Civil Case No. 384 which, as already mentioned, wasdecided some seven years earlier.

The Registration Court thereafter issued an Order to the effect that "exceptingBernardino Marzan, Cipriano Pulido, Magno Marzan, Hilario Marzan and theBureau of Lands, a special entry of default is declared against the whole world."3

Tomas Cachero died before judgment and was substituted by his children. Theregistration proceedings culminated in a verdict favorable to the applicantspouses. The Court found that the applicant spouses and their predecessors-in-

interest had been in continuous and notorious possession of Lots Numbered6859 and 6860 for more than sixty (60) years in concept of owners, to theexclusion of others, except for a one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6860 which theCacheros had sold to Bernardino Marzan; that Tomas Cachero had inheritedsaid lots from his late father, Simeon Cachero; and that the applicant spouseshad been religiously paying the realty taxes on the parcels of land as ownersthereof. The Court's judgment 4 made the following disposition, to wit:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby grants the application andorders that the two adjoining lots, namely, Lots No. 6859 and 6860, which aredescribed in plan (LRC) SWO-7861, Exh. "A" and plan (LRC) SWO-4204, Exh."D" respectively, and the technical descriptions, Exhs. "B" and "E," respectively,be registered in the name of Patricia Casildo, widow, Alejandria Cachero,

married to Estilong, Lolita Cachero, married to Fidel Teodoro; Severa Cachero,married to Hilario Simplina; Bernardo Cachero, married to Aniceta Rumbaoa;and Luzviminda Cachero, married to Abraham Balinag, all Filipinos, of legalage, and residents of Alicia, Isabela, excepting the one hectare portion of LotNo. 6860 which now belongs to Nicolas Abejona. Once this decision hasbecome final, let the corresponding decree be issued.

The oppositors' counsel, Atty. Yaranon, filed a motion for reconsideration of thejudgment on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, the lands in question having earlier been subject of cadastralproceedings in which, as shown by the records, neither the Cacheros nor theirpredecessors-in-interest had ever entered a claim for either lot. The Cacherosopposed the motion. They argued that by the time the motion forreconsideration was filed, the judgment sought to be reconsidered had already

become final, more than thirty (30) days having elapsed from the time that theoppositors' counsel was served with notice thereof. 5 The motion was denied. 6

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About seven (7) months after the filing of the oppositors' aforesaid motion forreconsideration, 7 persons not parties to the registration proceedings filed a "petition for review of judgment and/or decree." They were Paulina Nodo and thespouses Felix Genova and Adelina Pulido Genova, residents of Alicia, Isabela.They were represented by the same a ttorney who represented the oppositors inthe registration case, Atty. Agaton Yaranon, Jr. They alleged that they not theCacheros, or any of the original oppositors (the Marzans, Pulido, Hipol)represented by their own lawyer, Atty. Yaranon,were the owners of the landdesignated as Lot No. 6859, having purchased the same sometime in 1929 andhaving been in continuous possession thereof since then; that the Cacherosfraudulently omitted to give them notice of their application for registration; and(echoing the same theory on which the oppositors' motion for reconsiderationwas based) that in the earlier cadastral survey, Lots Numbered 6859 and 6860had been declared public land for lack of any original claimant and at thecadastral hearing only the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry, and they(Nodo and the Genova Spouses) had filed "cadastral answers," but not TomasCachero or his predecessors-in-interest. The petition prayed for the re-opening,review and setting aside of the judgment and for the accord to them of anopportunity to prove their asserted contentions.

This petition for review was denied. In its order of denial 8 the RegistrationCourt cited the report of the chief surveyor of the Land Registration Commission

stating that no decree of registration had been issued as regards lots 6859 and6860 and no decision had been furnished the Commission. The Court also ruledthat the movants had failed to show fraud on the Cacheros' part, that "lack ofactual notice or knowledge of pendency of the proceeding does not in itselfestablish fraud," and that there had been "due publication in accordance withlaw, . . . (the) proceedings being an action in rem," apart from the fact that "saidmovants are represented by Atty. Yaranon, who also is the lawyer for theoppositor(s) who presented a written opposition to the application."

Paulina Nodo and Felix Genova subsequently died. Felix Genova wassubstituted by his heirs, Adelina P. Vda. de Genova, and Cornelio, Juanito,Magdalena, Herminia, Carmelita, Josefina and Margarita, all surnamed Genova,Paulina Nodo was substituted by her heir, Adelina P. Vda. de Genova.

These heirs, the Genovas, then submitted through Atty. Yaranon, Jr., and"amended petition for declaration of nullity of the judgment and/or review of thedecree," reiterating and expatiating on the averments of the "petition for reviewof judgment and/or decree" earlier filed by the same Atty. Yaranon, Jr.

The amended petition for declaration of nullity, etc. suffered the same fate asthe original petition. It was denied by the Registration Court, 9 which pointed outthat the petitioners were "total strangers" who had "no personality to contest thelegality of the decision which has become final," that they failed to file any"timely opposition to the registration proceedings," or to show that they had"been denied or deprived of their day in Court." The Genovas thereuponappealed to the Court of Appeals, upon the following assignment of errors:

I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE DECISION DATEDNOVEMBER 15, 1972 NULL AND VOID, FOR WANT OR LACK OFJURISDICTION OVER LOT NOS. 6859 AND 6860 OF THE ARINGAY (LAUNION) CADASTRAL SURVEY, B.I. CASE NO. 106, CAD. CASE NO. 6,G.L.R.O. CAD. REC. NO. 249, (1) LOT 6859 HAVING BEEN SURVEYED ASPUBLIC LAND, AND/OR (2) INASMUCH AS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OFTHE CADASTRAL ACT (ACT NO. 2259), THE PETITION FOR THESTATEMENT AND ADJUDICATION OF THE TITLE TO THE SAID LOTS ANDOTHER LOTS INVOLVED IN SAID CADASTRAL SURVEY HAD LONG BEENAUTHORIZED DIRECTED, PRESENTED, AND IN FACT TRIAL HADCOMMENCED, ORDER OF DEFAULT ISSUED AND/OR ADJUDICATIONBEEN MADE, BEFORE THE CADASTRAL COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OFLA UNION, LONG BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF THE LAST PACIFIC WAR IN1941, AND/OR THE FAILURE OF THE APPLICANTS TO FILE THEIRPETITION UNDER PERTINENT REGISTRATION FOR RE-OPENING OFCADASTRAL PROCEEDING;

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE DECISION DATEDNOVEMBER 15, 1972 NULL AND VOID FOR FATAL INFIRMITY THEREOF;

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO THEPETITION FOR REVIEW OF THE DECREE.

After the parties' briefs were filed and duly considered, the Appellate Courtpromulgated a Resolution forwarding the case to this Court; it opined that it hadno appellate jurisdiction over the appeal since only "purely legal questions" wereinvolved therein. 10 In its Resolution, the Appellate Court declared that theappellants (the Genovas) "are not the oppositors in the proceedings below butare third persons who came into the case, through a petition for review ofjudgment, later amended as a petition for nullity of judgment, after the decisionof the lower Court had become final and executory;" that the purely legal issuesinvolved are:

1) whether or not "persons declared in default by an entry of special defaultbecause they did not file any answer after publication of the notice of hearing(may) still file a petition for review of judgment and/or decree on grounds thatthe decision is null and void for want of jurisdiction;" and

2) whether or not "a Court of First Instance (may) acquire jurisdiction overvoluntary land registration proceedings covering lots that are already subject toa pending cadastral proceeding instituted by the Director of Lands;" statedotherwise"once a Cadastral Court has acquired jurisdiction over all lots in agiven cadastree.g., the Aringay, La Union Cadastreand all holdersclaimants, possessors, and occupants of said lots have been required to showtheir interests or rights to the end that tit les of all lands in the cadastral area maybe settled and adjudicated" whether or not "that cadastral jurisdiction" excludes

or bars "voluntary land registration proceedings in court or even administrativeconcessions such as homesteads, free patents and sale patents," or, stated in

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still another manner, whether or not persons who "wish to assert rights ofownership or to acquire titles to any lots covered by the cadastral survey are . . .limited to pursuing their causes of action before the cadastral court" and "othermodes of acquiring title (will) have to wait until after the cadastral proceeding isclosed;" and if "this requirement (is) jurisdictional."

The Genova's contention that the earlier cadastral proceedings should bedeemed a bar to the institution by the Cacheros of registration proceedings, ifnot indeed to the acquisition of jurisdiction over these later proceedings by theCourt of First Instance, is without merit.

The fact that, as claimed by the Genovas, the Cacheros, by failing to intervenein the aforementioned cadastral case commenced before the outbreak of thePacific War, had been comprehended in the order of general default thereinentered and forever barred from substantiating any claims to the areas thereininvolved, is inconsequential. For it is clear from the record, in fact it is admittedon all sides, that at least as far as the parcels of land involved in the appeal atbar are concernedLots No. 6859 and No. 6860the cadastral proceedingshad been abandoned, had not been continued or resumed after the war, andhad never eventuated in any adjudication of any sort. 11 Of no little significancein this connection is that although the Director of Lands had presented anopposition to the Cacheros' application for registration of their title over Lots No.6859 and No. 6860, (a) his opposition contains no reference whatever to the

earlier cadastral proceedings or any challenge, on account thereof, to thejurisdiction of the Court of First Instance over the subject matter of theCacheros' application, and (b) no appeal had been taken by him from thejudgment declaring the Cacheros owners of the land in question and decreeingthe issuance of title to them.

Hence, said compulsory cadastral proceedings under Act 2259 (the CadastralAct) cannot be invoked and set up as a bar to the registration proceedingsunder Act 496 (the Torrens Act) initiated more than twenty years later by theCacheros. Indeed, when the latter registration case was begun, the cadastralproceedings had long been discontinued and abandoned and, to all intents andpurposes, had ceased to exist. In any event, it is undisputed that the cadastralproceedings had resulted in no judgment or final order affecting the lands now

in question. There having been no final adjudication in the cadastralproceedings at all, there is no occasion whatever to refer to the familiar doctrineof res judicatawhich this Court applied, for instance, in Republic vs. Vera(1983), in pronouncing a Court of First Instance to be without jurisdiction overlands subject of voluntary registration proceedings under Act No. 496 (theTorrens Act), it appearing that many, many years earlier, the same property hadbeen declared public land by a decision handed down by the Cadastral Court incompulsory registration proceedings under Act 2259 (the Cadastral Act) andwhich decision had become "final and conclusive." 12 The conclusion herereached renders unnecessary adjudgment of the other questions posed by theCourt of Appeals in its Resolution of April 14, 1980 referring the case at bar tothis Court for the reason that only "purely legal questions" were involved.

Of no little significance, too, is that the Cacheros and their children had

succeeded in establishing and vindicating their ownership over Lots No. 6859and No. 6860 in no less than two (2) appropriate judicial proceedings in both of

which the judgments rendered had become final and executory. In Civil CaseNo. 384, mentioned in this opinion's opening paragraph, the Spouses TomasCachero and Patricia Casildo were declared by final judgment of the Court ofFirst Instance of La Union to be the owners of the parcels of land in question inan action instituted by them against Bernardino Marzan, Julian Marzan andCipriano Pulido. And in Land Registration Case No. N-824where oppositionswere submitted by five persons two of whom were parties-defendant in CivilCase No. 384, and whence the present appeal proceedings emanatedMrs. Cacheros and her children (her late husband's heirs) were similarlydeclared owners of the same property. Surely, these judicial pronouncementsshould not be set aside except for the gravest and most compelling causes. Nosuch cause has been presented by the Genovas.

All the Genovas have done, to repeat, is to claim that the compulsory cadastralproceedings instituted before the Pacific War, involving among others Lots No.6859 and 6860, constituted an insuperable obstacle to the acquisition by theCourt of First Instance of jurisdiction over the voluntary registration proceedingsinvolving the same lots, initiated some twenty (20) years later by theCacherosa claim singularly lacking in merit, as already pointed out.

Moreover, the Genovas were and are bound by the order of default issued inLand Reg. Case No. N-824, a proceeding undoubtedly in rem in character. Thatdefault order was entered "against the whole world," with the exception only of

the parties who had appeared and filed pleadings in the registration case,namely: Bernardino Marzan, Cipriano Pulido, Magno Marzan, Hilario Marzanand the Bureau of Lands. The Genovas were charged with knowledge of theCacheros' application since notice of the application had been published inaccordance with law. They could and should have taken part in the case toassert and prove their rights over the property subject thereof The fact that theydid not, cannot operate to exclude them from the binding effects of the in remjudgment rendered in the proceedings. Their claim that they were precludedfrom doing so by fraud perpetrated by the Cacheros has not been substantiated,and was not found by the Court of Appeals to be a proper issue in their appeal,since it declared that the only issues were "purely legal" ones. Besides, thatunsubstantiated claim of fraud does not at all explain why they should not bebound by the published notices of the Cacheros' application, accomplished in

accordance, with law and by direction of the Registration Court.WHEREFORE, the appeal of the petitioners-appellants ADELINA PULIDOGENOVA, and the HEIRS OF PAULINA NUDO AND FELIX GENOVA (CorneliaGenova, Herminia Genova, Carmelita Genova, Josefina Genova and MargaritaGenova) is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the judgment of the Court inLand Registration Case No. N-824 entitled "In Re Application for LandRegistration under Act 496: Tomas Cachero & Patricia Casildo (Spouses),"rendered on November 15, 1972 is AFFIRMED in toto, without pronouncementas to costs.

SO ORDERED.

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(3) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public dominion;

(4) Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands and their beds;

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

The Director of Lands would like Us to believe that since a portion of the landsought to be registered is covered with water four to five months a year, thesame is part of the lake bed of Laguna de Bay, or is at least, a foreshore land,which brings it within the enumeration in Art. 502 of the New Civil Code quotedabove and therefore it cannot be the subject of registration.

The extent of a lake bed is defined in Art. 74 of the Law of Waters of 1866, asfollows:

The natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or pools, is the ground covered bytheir waters when at their highest ordinary depth. (Emphasis supplied)

The phrase "highest ordinary depth" in the above definition has been interpretedin the case of Government of P.I. vs. Colegio de San Jose 7 to be the highestdepth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season, such depth being

the "regular, common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time duringthe year." The foregoing interpretation was the focal point in the Court ofAppeals decision sought to be reviewed. We see no reason to disturb the same.

Laguna de Bay is a lake. 8 While the waters of a lake are also subject to thesame gravitational forces that cause the formation of tides 9 in seas andoceans, this phenomenon is not a regular daily occurrence in the case of lakes.10 Thus, the alternation of high tides and low tides, which is an ordinaryoccurrence, could hardly account for the rise in the water level of the Laguna deBay as observed four to five months a year during the rainy season. Rather, it isthe rains which bring about the inundation of a portion of the land in question.Since the rise in the water level which causes the submersion of the land occursduring a shorter period (four to five months a year) than the level of the water at

which the is completely dry, the latter should be considered as the "highestordinary depth" of Laguna de Bay. Therefore, the land sought to be registered isnot part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay. Neither can it be considered asforeshore land. The Brief for the Petitioner Director of Lands cites an accuratedefinition of a foreshore land, to wit:

... that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by theflux and reflux of the tides... 11

The strip of land that lies between the high and low water mark and that isalternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. 12

As aptly found by the Court a quo, the submersion in water of a portion of theland in question is due to the rains "falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de

Bay from different sources. 13 Since the inundation of a portion of the land isnot due to "flux and reflux of tides" it cannot be considered a foreshore land

within the meaning of the authorities cited by petitioner Director of Lands. Theland sought to be registered not being part of the bed or basin of Laguna deBay, nor a foreshore land as claimed by the Director of Lands, it is not a publicland and therefore capable of registration as private property provided that theapplicant proves that he has a registerable title. This brings us to the secondissue, which is whether or not applicant private respondent has registerable titleto the land.

The purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the acquisitionof lands but only the registration of title which applicant already possesses overthe land. 14 Registration under the Torrens Law was never intended as ameans of acquiring ownership. Applicant in this case asserts ownership over theparcel of land he seeks to register and traces the roots of his title to a publicinstrument of sale (Exh. G) in favor of his father from whom he inherited saidland. In addition to this muniment of title, he presents tax declarations (Exhs. F,G, H, I) covering the land since 1918 and also tax receipts (Exhs. J, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, K, K-1, K-2, K-3) dating back to 1948. While it is true that by themselvestax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are notincontrovertible evidence of ownership, 15 they become strong evidence ofownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actualpossession of the property. 16 The then Court of Appeals found applicant byhimself and through his father before him, has been in open, continuous, public,peaceful, exclusive and adverse possession of the disputed land for more than

thirty (30) years, counted from April 19, 1909, when the land was acquired froma third person by purchase. 17 The record does not show any circumstance ofnote sufficient enough to overthrow said findings of facts which is binding uponus. Since applicant has possessed the subject parcel in the concept of ownerwith just title and in good faith, his possession need only last for ten years inorder for ordinary acquisitive prescription to set in. 18 Applicant has more thansatisfied this legal requirement. And even if the land sought to be registered ispublic land as claimed by the petitioners still, applicant would be entitled to ajudicial confirmation of his imperfect title, since he has also satisfied therequirements of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amendedby Republic Act No. 1942). Sec. 48 of said Act enumerates as among thepersons entitled to judicial confirmation of imperfect title, the following:

(a) ...(b) Those who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, havebeen in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession andoccupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under bona fide c ofownership, for at least tirty years immediately preceding the filing of theapplication for confirmation of title ...

The claim of private oppositors, petitioners in G.R. No. L43190, that they havereclaimed the land from the waters of Laguna de Bay and that they havepossessed the same for more than twenty (20) years does not improve theirposition. In the first place, private persons cannot, by themselves reclaim landfrom water bodies belonging to the public domain without proper permissionfrom government authorities. 19 And even if such reclamation had been

authorized, the reclaimed land does not automatically belong to the partyreclaiming the same as they may still be subject to the terms of the authority

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-42859 March 17, 1938

GABRIEL LASAM, applicant-appellee,vs.

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and JOSE CHAN HONG HIN, ET AL., opponents-appellants.

Acting Solicitor-General Melencio and B. Pobre for appellants.Alfredo Catolico for appellee.

LAUREL, J.:

On January 24, 1930, Gabriel Lasam filed with the Court of First Instance ofCagayan an application for the registration of 152 parcels of land containing atotal area of 24,723,436 square meters, situated in the municipality of Solana,Province of Cagayan, described in the plan Exhibit K attached to theapplication. These 152 parcels include the parcel No. 9 here involved.

According to the lower court, the portions of said parcel No. 9 which opposedduring the time of survey were delimited and marked on its plan Psu-67516attached to the record as lots A to Z, AA to HH, MM to ZZ, AAA to ZZZ, AAAAto ZZZZ, AAAAA, to FFFFF, NNNNN, 35 to 38, and 111 to 143, all inclusive.(Decision of the lower court, Bill of Exception of the Government, p. 35.)

The Director of Lands opposed the application on the ground that it is notsupported by any title fit for registration and that the land sought to be registeredis public land. The brothers Felipe, Jose and Salvador, all surnamed Narag,who are first cousin to the applicant Lasam, also filed opposition on the groundthat they are the owners of parcels No. 9. Opposition were also filed by TomasFurigay and 35 other persons as homesteaders; by the provincial fiscal,representing the Directors of Forestry, on the ground that portions thereof arepublic forest; by Francisco Caronan and some 71 others parties, claiming theparcels occupied by them as their exclusive properties; by Jose Chan Hong Hin,on the ground that the applicant includes his property of about 22 hectares and50 ares; and by Mauro Antonio, on the ground that the applicant includes theportion occupied by him and belonging to him. Pablo Soriano succeeded inhaving the order of general default set aside as to him and was allowed toregistered his opposition at a latter date. Amendede applications andoppositions by the parties were subsequently permitted to be filed.

After a protracted hearing, the lower court rejected and the oppositions filed,declaring the applicant, Gabriel Lasam, the owner of parcel No. 9 as indicated inthe plan Psu-67516 (Exhibit K), and decreed the registration of said parcel in hisfavor.

On September 10, 1934, counsel for various oppositors, after excepting to thedecision, filed a motion for new trial which was denied, and the case wasbrought before this court by bill of exceptions.

The Narag brothers and the Directors of Forestry appear to have abandonedtheir opposition. They made no attempt to substantiate their claims at the trial.

Counsel for the Director of Lands, et al. and for Jose Chan Hong Hin, et al.make various assignments of error in their respective briefs. It is not believenecessary however, to consider each and every assignment made as thequestions presented may, in our opinion, be reduced to the followingpropositions: (a) Whether or not the applicant, Gabriel Lasam, is entitled to theregistered of parcel No. 9 on the basis of the document presented as Exhibit L,hereinafter to be referred to, or in the alternative, whether or not he is entitled toregistered on the basis of public, continuous, and adverse possession under aclaim of ownership during the time prescribed by law (par. 9, application); andthe negative, (b) whether or not the numerous oppositors excluding thehomesteader are entitled to the parcels which they allege are included in thecontroverted parcel No. 9. The rights of the homesteader necessarily depend onthe resolution of these two propositions.

Exhibit L purports to be an application dated June 27, 1873 addressed byDomingo Narag 1. to the Alcalde Mayor, in which the former stated that he had

been in possession of the land above described and asked that informaciontestifical be admitted. The informacion testifical was had before the AlcaldeMayor and appears to have been approved by the Judge of the Court of FirstInstance without objection on the part of the fiscal. It is the theory of theapplicant that Domingo Narag 1. the original owner of parcel No. 5, describedin Exhibit L, owned P1,000 from the applicant's which amount Narag needed forhis candidacy gobernadorcillo of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, in 1880; that theoriginal of Exhibit L was turned over by the applicant to his lawyer, VicenteMarasigan, who lost it, and for this reason, only a certificate copy of thedocument marked Exhibit L presented; and that the fifth parcel mentioned in thedocument, Exhibit L, is the parcel No. 9 described in the plan, Exhibit K. TheGovernment contends that Exhibit L is not a valid titled and does not conferownership that even if it were valid, it does not cover so extensive an area asthat appearing on the plan, Exhibit K.

The land designated as the fifth parcel is described in Exhibit L as follows:

5. Un terreno o pasto de ganados vacunos llamado Marguirig o Cagguban quelinda al poniente con el estero Pagul, oriente con el pueblo de la Solana al nortecon el sitio llamado y Calabbacao y al sur con el sitio llamado Atayo el cualtiene un cabida de siete mil brazaz y herede de mis Padres hace viente y dosaos y en la actualidad es donde mis granados de procreacion.

Parcel No. 9, the registration of which is applied for in these proceedings, isdescribed thus (brief of claimant-appellee p. 61):

Por el norte con barrios de Iraga, Bauan y Bangag;

Por el este con el Centro y los barrios de Basi, Natapian y Lanna;

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Por el sur con la carretera provincial; y

Por el oeste barrios de Maguirig, Cagguban y estero Pangul.

We are of the opinion that the court below committed no error in receivingExhibit L as evidence for the claimant, but its admission by the court does notnecessarily entitled the applicant Gabriel Lasam, to the registration of the parcelclaimed by him in these proceedings. It is apparent that parcel No. 9, asindicated in the plan, Exhibit K, is not the same parcel No. 5 described indocument Exhibit L. Whereas Exhibit L gives as boundaries on the north thesitios of Maasin and Calabbacao, Exhibit K gives the barrios of Iraga, Bauan,and Bangag; on the east Exhibit L gives the pueblo of Solana, whereas ExhibitK gives "el Centro y los barrios de Basi, Natappian y Lanna"; on the westExhibit L gives estero Pangul, whereas Exhibit K gives the barrios of Maguirig,Cagguban and estero Pangul; on the south Exhibit L gives the sitio of Atayao,whereas Exhibit K gives the carretera provincial. While there may be partialindentity as to boundaries on the east and west, such indentity is lacking as tothe boundaries on the north and south. This discrepancy is accentuated by theadmmission of the applicant that the parcel whose registered is sought is muchsmaller than that described in paragraph 5 of Exhibit L. The explanation givenby the surveyors Jose Mallanao, presented as witness by the claimant, is afollows:

Because on the north side when we went around the lot and I asked for thebarrios of Maasin and Calabacao the applicant pointed to me a place very farfrom where he was at the time and where he actually occupied the land, and onthe south side he indicated to me the provincial road. I asked why he should nottake the actual land indicated by this title and he told me that he was notoccupying that portion . That is the reason why I took up the boundary on thesouth as provincial road. On the east side he indicated to me the center of themunicipality of Solana, barrios of Basi, Nangalisan and Lanna, and on the westis a public land party bounded by the barrios of Maguirig, and Cagguban andestero Pangul.

An applicant for registration of land, if he relies on a document evidencing histitle thereto, must prove not only the genuiness of his title but the indentity of theland therein referred to. The document in such a case is either a basis of hisclaim for registration or not at all. If as in this case, he only claims a portion ofwhat is included in his title, he must clearly prove that the property sought to beregistered is included in that title. The surveyor, Jose Mallannao, did not actuallycheck up the boundaries of parcel No. 5, as described in Exhibit L, and intestifying that parcel No. 9, in Exhibit K, is smaller than that described as parcelNo. 5 in Exhibit L, he relied on hearsay. For instance, when asked whethernorth of barrios Iraga, Bauan and Bangag of the land described in plan ExhibitK, he would locate the sitios of Maasin and Calabacao, he replied: "They saidthat Calabbacao is north of that barrio Iraga yet." (Emphasis ours.)

Aside from what has been said with reference to discrepanies in the boundaries,we cannot overlook the fact that the area in Exhibit L is vaguely given as 7,000

brazas. The surveyor for the applicant, Jose Mallannao, calculated the area ofthe property described in paragraph 5 of Exhibit L on the basis of 7,000 square

brazas or 49,000,00 square as 15,695,500 hectares more or less (s.n. pp. 820-822). The area claimed here according to the amended application of February26, 1930, and the plan Exhibit K is 24,723,437 square meters. According to theapplicant before his occupation of the land ceded by Domingo Narag 1., onlyabout 2 hectares were cultivated. (s.n. p. 56, Gabriel Lasam.) And, withreference to the payment of the land tax, the Solicitor-General in his brief (p. 12)makes the following observation:

The property appears to have been declared for taxation purposes asevidenced by revisions of tax declarations, Exhibit G-20 and G-21 (pp. 136, 137,record). There had been previous declarations with an area of about 294hectares (id.) but, according to Exhibit G-22 (p. 138, record), the area whichwas not previously declared contains 1,685 hectares.

With the exception of a statement in which it appears that tax was paid in 1902(p. 140, id.) there appears in the record no tax receipts evidencing the paymentof taxes continuously from 1902 up to this time.

It is not necessary to pass upon the contention of the Solicitor-General that theinformacion testifical (Exhibit L) is no legal effect because of failuresubsequently to solicit composition title pursuant to the Royal Decree of June25, 19880 (Fuster vs. Director of Lands, G.R. No. 40129, Dec. 29, 1934), or toconvert possession into a registration of ownership in accordance with article

393 of the Mortgage law (Fernandez Hermanos vs. Director of Lands, 57 Phil.,929), for even if we were to accord all the legal force to this document (ExhibitL), it would not serve as a basis for the registration of 24,723,437 squaremeters.

Having arrived at this conclusion as to Exhibit L, is the applicant entitled toregistration because of the required possession during the time prescribed bylaw? We have examined the evidence on this point both testimonial anddocumentary, and while there is evidence showing that the claimant might havepossessed a portion of the parcel claimed by him and the registration of which issought, we find the evidence lacking in certainly as to the particular portionoccupied and the extend thereof. Counsel for the applicant invokes the doctrinelaid down by us in Ramos vs. Director of Lands (39 Phil., 175, 180). (See alsoRoales vs. Director of Lands, 51 Phil., 302, 304.) But it should be observed thatthe applicant of the doctrine of constructive possession in that case is subject tocertain qualifications, and this court was careful to observe that among thesequalifications is "one particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversywith reference to the portion actually in possession of the claimant." While,therefore, "possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has tohave his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is inpossession", possession under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, asamended by paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained by merenominal claim. The mere planting of a sign or symbol of possession cannotjustify a Magellan like claim of dominion over an immense tract of territory.Possession as a means of acquiring ownership, while it may be constructive, isnot a mere fiction. In the present case, upon the description of 7,000 brazas asthe area of the land said have been originally possessed by Domingo Narag 1.

and conveyed to the applicant, only two hectares of which were according to theapplicant cultivated at the time of such transfer, the applicant would on the basis

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of the computation hereinabove referred to and given at the trial by surveyorJose Mallannao, be entitled under Exhibit L to more than 13,000 hectares,although only 2,432 odd hectares are now being sought for registration in theseproceedings. The fact, however, that he is claiming only a portion of the landclaimed by him to be included in his title, the further fact that according to hisown testimony he has given up more than 1,000 hectares to the Bureau ofForestry, the discrepancies in the boundaries, his tax declarations, and theexistence of numerous homesteaders and claimants are significant and tend toshow that his possession over the entire portion of the land sought to beregistered is not "such as to apprise the community and the world that the entireland was for his enjoyment." (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, supra.)

Our attention is next directed to the decision of this court in Pamittan vs. Lasamand Mallonga (60 Phil., 908) which according to counsel for the claimant Lasam,is determinative of the ownership of the property now sought to be registered.Said case refers to an action for partition between the heirs of Sofia Pamittan,wife of Gabriel Lasam, originally brought in the Court of First Instance andappealed to this court. The trial court in that case found that parcel No. 7 which is said to correspond to parcel No. 9 sought to be registered in theseproceedings "although during the existence of the conjugal partnership, wasproven to be the exclusive property of the husband Gabriel Lasam". This courtnot have passed upon the question whether parcel No. 7 was the same parcelNo. 9 in these proceedings; nor could it have passed upon the conflicting claims

with reference to parcel No. 9, now sought to be registered. Whatever was saidin that case could not bind the oppositors in the present case, who were notparties thereto.

The grounds for opposition of the various oppositors are divergent and arebased on (a) possession from time immemorial: (b) acquisition by inheritance,purchase and donations propters nuptias and inter vivos; (c) payment of landtaxes from 1906, 1915 and 1918 up to the filing of oppositions; and (d)acquisition "a titulo de composicion" with the State. These oppositors deniedtenants of the applicant Lasam. After persual of the evidence presented bythem, we are constrained to accept the conclusion of the lower court that noneof the portions or lots claimed by them or any one of them has been sufficientlyidentified, either by the oral or documentary evidence which they presented. Inview thereof, and because of the insufficiency of the evidence presented, weare of the opinion that the lower court committed no error in dismissing theiroppositions.

In view of the foregoing, the judgement of the lower court is reserved, withoutprejudice to the filing by the applicant. Gabriel Lasam, of a new application andplan covering the portion of the land actually occupied by him since July 25,1894. Upon the determination of that portion by the lower court, let judgementbe rendered accordingly. The remaining portion or portions of lot No. 9 asindicated on plan Psu-67516 (Exhibit K) are hereby declared public lands, to bedisposed of or otherwise death with in accordance with law. Withoutpronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

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4. That the "Calle para Collago" which according to the decision of the Court ofAppeals and is stoutly maintained until the present by the oppositors to be theextent or boundary of the property of the applicant on the South side is existingand still is the boundary on the South and on the Southeast side, as shown inthe Sketch Plan, Exh. "A";

That the property of Francisco Santua abound also the applicants propertysought to be registered on the South sides, at present as was the case duringthe original survey.[6]

The oppositors filed an opposition to the commissioners report, whereupon asecond ocular inspection was ordered by the trial court. After the secondinspection, the trial court, on August 28, 1967 again rendered judgmentreiterating its original decision ordering the registration of the aforesaid Lot 1 ofPSU 119561 with an area of 210,767[7] square meters in the name of privaterespondent. The judge made the following observations based on the ocularinspection:

The Commissioners and the Presiding Judge, upon their ocular inspection,found out a visible boundary on the South-east side of Lot 1 known as "Callepara Collago" which is represented in the relocation plan Exh. HH running fromthe intersection to Lagayan between points 22 and 21 down to point 18. This, inthe opinion of the Court, is the extension of the "Calle para Collago" referred to

by the applicant Rosario Valera as boundary exactly on the South but whichwas converted into ricefields by Francisco Santua. This ci rcumstance now couldexplain the presence of Francisco Santua as boundary owner on the Southwhich the parties stoutly maintained in the former proceedings that the "Callepara Collago" was on the South but which oppositors now repudiate claimingthat the "Calle para Collago" is on the East. Taking a good view over Lot 1, itcould safely be concluded that the existing "Calle para Collago" is more to theSouth than to the East.

With respect to the claim of the Damasens over Lot A mentioned in Exh. Dwhich the Court inadvertently failed to pass upon, the Court has found that it iswithin the property of the applicant.[8]

The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court reiterates its former decision ordering the registrationof Lot 1 of Plan Psu-119561, Exh. D, with an area of 210,767 square meters inthe name of applicant ROSARIO VALERA of Bangued, Abra, and a conjugalproperty with her husband Juan Valera of the same municipality. Theencumbrance with the Philippine National Bank in the amount of P1,000.00having already been settled (Exh. JJ-1) same shall no longer be annotated onthe title henceforth to be issued.

Upon this decision becoming final, let the corresponding decree issue. Acctmis

The applicant Rosario Valera is hereby directed to pay within seventy two hours

from notice hereof the sum of P182.00 as fees for the commissioner SantiagoAlejandre who made the relocation survey.[9]

The case was again appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR. 40796-R) by theoppositors, some of whom are now the petitioners in this case.[10] They arguethat the lower court erred in not excluding the areas they claimed as their ownwhich were wrongfully included in Lot 1 but was ordered registered in privaterespondents name. Disposing of the appeal, the CA ruled:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, with the modification that theregistration of Lot 1 of appellees (private respondent herein) should be confinedto the extent only as indicated in the sketch annexed to the Commissioners

report, Exhibit HH, and excluding therefrom the landholding of the oppositors,as indicated in the same sketch, the judgment of the trial court is herebyAFFIRMED. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.[11]

This decision became final and executory for which a corresponding entry ofjudgment was issued by the Court of Appeals.[12] Later, private respondentfiled with the trial court a motion for the issuance of writ of possession over twolots respectively tenanted by Trium Donato and Rudy Donato which werelikewise respectively claimed by Santiago Partolan (not an oppositor in the landregistration case) and Crispin Baltar (one of the oppositors).[13] In an Orderissued on September 14, 1981, the court a quo denied the motion.[14] When

her subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied in another Orderdated November 25, 1981,[15] private respondent appealed to the thenIntermediate Appellate Court (IAC) which reversed the said two orders andforthwith issued a decision with the following disposition:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES, CONSIDERED, the ORDERS appealed from arehereby REVERSED and judgment is hereby entered ordering: Mis act

1. The issuance of a WRIT OF POSSESSION in favor of applicant-appellantcovering the landholding claimed by oppositor Crispin Baltar and tenanted byRudy Donato;

2. Confirming the word "Landholding" in the dispositive portion of the decision inCA-G.R. No. 40796-R as singular and referring only to the landholding opposedby oppositors Segundina and Otilio Damasen as the only landholding excludedfrom lot 1; and

3. Ordering the issuance of the WRIT OF POSSESSION in favor of theapplicant-appellant covering the landholdings opposed by the other oppositorswho did not appeal the decision of the lower court dated August 28, 1967.

Without any special pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.[16]

Oppositors filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by theCourt of Appeals.[17] Hence this petition for review initiated by some of the

oppositors in the trial court. The petition was initially denied by the Court. On

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motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, the case was reinstated andrespondent was required to submit her comment to the petition.[18]

After a painstaking review of the vintage records of this case and afterdeciphering the ambiguous discussions in the petition,[19] the assailed ruling ofthe respondent court cannot be sustained. The burden of proof in landregistration cases is incumbent on the applicant[20] who must show that he isthe real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for.[21] On himalso rests the burden to overcome the presumption that the land sought to beregistered forms part of the public domain[22] considering that the inclusion in atitle of a part of the public domain nullifies the title.[23] Undoubtedly, a landregistration proceeding is one which is in rem in character, so that the defaultorder issued by the court binds the whole world and all persons whether knownor unknown,[24] except those who have appeared and filed their pleadings inthe registration case.[25] In the case at bar, those exempted from the order ofgeneral default are the petitioners and the other oppositors mentioned infootnote number 2. S djad

There is no dispute that the lands occupied and claimed by oppositors-petitioners Segundina and Otilio Damasen were already finally adjudgedexcluded from Lot 1 and cannot be registered in private respondents name. Inother words, the Damasens were declared to have a rightful and registrableright over their claims of specific portions of Lot 1. What private respondent

wants is that she be installed in possession of the area claimed by SantiagoPartolan and Crispin Baltar. Of these two, only Baltar entered his opposition toprivate respondents application for land registration. Being a proceeding in rem,Partolan is charged with knowledge of the application of private respondentsince the notice was published in accordance with law.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, private respondent is not entitled to awrit of possession of that portion of Lot I occupied by Partolan and Baltar. Noevidence was shown that private respondent had a rightful claim whetherpossessory or proprietary with respect to those areas. Even if Partolan wasexcluded by the order of general default and Baltar did not appeal from the trialcourts decision of April 23, 1956, the applicant must still prove and establishthat she has registrable rights over the land which must be grounded onincontrovertible evidence and based on positive and absolute proof. Thedeclaration by the applicant that the land applied for has been in the possessionof her predecessor-in-interest for a certain period, does not constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" and "conclusive" evidence required in landregistration.[26] Allegations of her predecessors ownership of the lot during theSpanish period is self-serving[27] and the declaration of ownership for purposesof assessment on the payment of tax is not sufficient evidence to proveownership.[28] It should be noted that tax declaration, by itself, is notconsidered conclusive evidence of ownership in land registration cases.[29]Private respondent should have substantiated her claim with clear andconvincing evidence specifically showing the nature of her claim. Herdescription of the circumstances of her own possession in relation to that of herpredecessor-in-interest are mere conclusions of law which require furtherfactual support and substantiation. If an applicant does not have any rightful

claim over real property, the Torrens system of registration can confirm orrecord nothing.[30]

Private respondent, being the applicant for registration of land and one whorelies on some documents enforcing her alleged title thereto, must prove notonly the genuineness of said title but also the identity of the land therein referredto,[31] inasmuch as this is required by law. The dispute in this case pertains tothe correctness of the survey of specific areas of lands. It must be borne in mindthat what defines a piece of land is not the size or area mentioned in itsdescription, but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land andindicating its limits.[32] Considering that the writ of possession was sought byprivate respondent against persons who were in "actual possession under claimof ownership," the latters possession raises a disputable presumption ofownership.[33] This unrebutted presumption militates against the claim ofprivate respondent, especially considering the evidentiary rule under Article 434of the Civil Code that a claimant of a parcel of land, such as private respondent,must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendantsclaim.[34]

Private respondents contention that the dispositive portion of the CA decisionon April 30, 1979 in CA GR 40796-R which mentioned only "landholding" andnot "landholdings", thus referring only to that area claimed by the Damasenspouses, is too trivial. A reading of the said decision and the foregoingdiscussions clearly indicates that the land to be registered in privaterespondents name is limited to a certain area stated in the sketch annexed to

the Commissioners report. It categorically excluded those portions pertaining tothe oppositors. Since private respondent failed to show that she has aproprietary right over the excluded areas, such as the portions occupied bythose against whom the writ of possession was sought for, then the trial courtwas correct in refusing to grant the writ as the same has no basis. Sppedsc

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals isREVERSED and SET ASIDE and the two orders of the trial court datedSeptember 14, 1981 and November 25, 1981 are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the PhilippinesSupreme Court

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Petitioner,

- versus -

ZENAIDA GUINTO-ALDANA, in her own behalf as Attorney-in-fact of MA.AURORA GUINTO-COMISO, MA. LUISA GUINTO-DIONISIO, ALFREDOGUINTO, JR., PACITA R. GUINTO, ERNESTO R. GUINTO, NATIVIDAD R.

GUINTO and ALBERTO R. GUINTO,Respondents.

G.R. No. 175578

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*

PERALTA,ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

August 11, 2010x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, theRepublic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, assailsthe March 30, 2006 Decision[1] and the November 20, 2006 Resolution,[2] bothof the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 80500. The assailed decision

reversed and set aside the July 10, 2003 judgment[3] of the Regional Trial Court

of Las Pias City, Branch 199 in LRC Case No. 02-0036, one for originalregistration of title, whereas the assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.

The facts follow.

On April 3, 2002, respondents Zenaida Guinto-Aldana[4] (Zenaida), Ma.Aurora Guinto-Comiso, Ma. Luisa Guinto-Dionisio, Alfredo Guinto, Jr., Pacita R.Guinto, Ernesto R. Guinto, Natividad R. Guinto and Alberto R. Guinto, filed withthe Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City, Branch 199 an Application forRegistration of Title[5] over two pieces of land in Talango, Pamplona Uno, Las

Pias City. These lands, identified as Lot No. 4 and Lot No. 5 in ConversionConsolidation Subdivision Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D,[6] measure 1,509square meters and 4,640 square meters, respectively.[7] Respondentsprofessed themselves to be co-owners of these lots, having acquired them bysuccession from their predecessors Sergio Guinto (Sergio) and Lucia Rivera-Guinto (Lucia)Zenaidas parentswho, in turn, had acquired the propertyunder a 1969 document denominated as Kasulatan sa Paghahati ng Lupa naLabas sa Hukuman na may Pagpaparaya at Bilihan. Under this document,Sergio and Lucia Guinto acquired for a consideration the respective shares onthe property of Pastor Guinto, Dionisio Guinto, Potenciana Guinto andMarcelina Bernardo who, together with Luisa, had derived the same fromRomulado Guinto.[8] Respondents also alleged that until the time of theapplication, they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open,

peaceful, adverse, exclusive and continuous possession of these lots in theconcept of owner and that they had consistently declared the property in theirname for purposes of real estate taxation.[9]

In support of their application, respondents submitted to the court the blueprintof Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D,[10] as well as copies of the technicaldescriptions of each lot,[11] a certification from the geodetic engineer[12] andthe pertinent tax declarations,[13] together with the receipts of paymenttherefor.[14] Expressly, they averred that the propertys original tracing clothplan had previously been submitted to the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 255(Las Pias RTC) in connection with the proceedings in LRC Case No. LP-128a previous registration case involving the subject property which, however, hadbeen dismissed without prejudice.[15]

The trial court found the application to be sufficient in form and substance;hence, it gave due course thereto and ordered compliance with the publicationand notification requirements of the law.[16]

Opposing the application, petitioner, through the Office of the City Prosecutor ofLas Pias City, advanced that the lots sought to be registered were inalienablelands of the public domain; that neither respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest had been in prior possession thereof; and that the muniment of title andthe tax declaration submitted to the court did not constitute competent andsufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition or of prior possession in the conceptof owner.[17]

At the hearing, Zenaida identified her herein co-respondents to be her siblings,

nephews and nieces. She likewise identified the adjoining lot owners named inthe application and the supporting documents attached to the application as

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We now proceed to the issue of possession. Petitioner theorizes that notonly were respondents unable to identify the lots applied for registration; it alsoclaims that they have no credible evidence tending to establish that for at least30 years they and their predecessors-in-interest have occupied and possessedthe property openly, continuously, exclusively and notoriously under a bona fideclaim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[41] We do not agree.

In an original registration of title under Section 14(1)[42] P.D. No. 1529,

the applicant for registration must be able to establish by evidence that he andhis predecessor-in-interest have exercised acts of dominion over the lot under abona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[43] He must provethat for at least 30 years, he and his predecessor have been in open,continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land.Republic v. Alconaba[44] well explains possession and occupation of thischaracter, thus:

The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words areseparated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to makeone synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupationbecause it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds theword occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive

possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive andnotorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicantto qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of aland consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature asa party would naturally exercise over his own property.[45]

Proceeding from this fundamental principle, we find that indeedrespondents have been in possession and occupation of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 undera bona fide claim of ownership for the duration required by law. This conclusionis primarily factual.

From the records, it is clear that respondents possession through theirpredecessor-in-interest dates back to as early as 1937. In that year, the subjectproperty had already been declared for taxation by Zenaidas father, Sergio,

jointly with a certain Toribia Miranda (Toribia).[46] Yet, it also can be safelyinferred that Sergio and Toribia had declared the land for taxation even earlierbecause the 1937 tax declaration shows that it offsets a previous taxnumber.[47] The property was again declared in 1979,[48] 1985[49] and1994[50] by Sergio, Toribia and by Romualdo.

Certainly, respondents could have produced more proof of this kind had itnot been for the fact that, as certified by the Office of the Rizal ProvincialAssessor, the relevant portions of the tax records on file with it had been burnedwhen the assessors office was razed by fire in 1997.[51] Of equal relevance isthe fact that with these tax assessments, there came next tax payments.Respondents receipts for tax expenditures on Lot Nos. 4 and 5 between 1977and 2001 are likewise fleshed out in the records and in these documents,

Sergio, Toribia and Romualdo are the named owners of the property with

Zenaida being identified as the one who delivered the payment in the 1994receipts.[52]

The foregoing evidentiary matters and muniments clearly show thatZenaidas testimony in this respect is no less believable. And the unbrokenchain of positive acts exercised by respondents predecessors, as demonstratedby these pieces of evidence, yields no other conclusion than that as early as1937, they had already demonstrated an unmistakable claim to the property.Not only do they show that they had excluded all others in their claim but also,that such claim is in all good faith.

Land registration proceedings are governed by the rule that while taxdeclarations and realty tax payment are not conclusive evidence of ownership,nevertheless, they are a good indication of possession in the concept of owner.These documents constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of titleover the property, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for aproperty that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. Thevoluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests notonly ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property. It alsoannounces his adverse claim against the state and all other parties who may bein conflict with his interest. More importantly, it signifies an unfeigned intentionto contribute to government revenuesan act that strengthens ones bona fideclaim of acquisition of ownership.[53]

Indeed, that respondents herein have been in possession of the land in theconcept of owneropen, continuous, peaceful and without interference andopposition from the government or from any private individualitself makestheir right thereto unquestionably settled and, hence, deserving of protectionunder the law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 30, 2006 Decisionand the November 20, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CVNo. 80500, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.