Quisimbing vs Garcia GR 175527 (2008)Corporate Powers. Sec 22

DOCTRINE:Disbursement, as used in Sec. 346, should be understood to pertain to payments for statutory and contractual obligations which the sanggunian has already authorized thru ordinances enacting the annual budget and are therefore already subsisting obligations of the local government unit. Contracts, as used in Sec. 22(c) on the other hand, are those which bind the local government unit to new obligations, with their corresponding terms and conditions, for which the local chief executive needs prior authority from the sanggunian

The question of whether a sanggunian authorization separate from the appropriation ordinance is required should be resolved depending on the particular circumstances of the case. Resort to the appropriation ordinance is necessary in order to determine if there is a provision therein which specifically covers the expense to be incurred or the contract to be entered into. Should the appropriation ordinance, for instance, already contain in sufficient detail the project and cost of a capital outlay such that all that the local chief executive needs to do after undergoing the requisite public bidding is to execute the contract, no further authorization is required, the appropriation ordinance already being sufficient. On the other hand, should the appropriation ordinance describe the projects in generic terms such as "infrastructure projects," "inter-municipal waterworks, drainage and sewerage, flood control, and irrigation systems projects," "reclamation projects" or "roads and bridges," there is an obvious need for a covering contract for every specific project that in turn requires approval by the sanggunian. Specific sanggunian approval may also be required for the purchase of goods and services which are neither specified in the appropriation ordinance nor encompassed within the regular personal services and maintenance operating expenses.

FACTS:

The Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a financial audit on the Province of Cebu for the period ending December 2004. Its audit team rendered a report, which states: "Several contracts in the total amount ofP102,092,841.47 were not supported with a Sangguniang Panlalawigan resolution authorizing the Provincial Governor to enter into a contract, as required under Section 22 of R.A. No. 7160." The audit team then recommended that the Governor secure such sanggunian resolution. Gov Garcia sought reconsideration of the findings and recommendation of the COA. However, without waiting for the resolution of the reconsideration sought, she instituted an action for Declaratory Relief.

Alleging that the infrastructure contracts subject of the audit report complied with the bidding procedures provided under R.A. No. 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act) and were entered into pursuant to the general and/or supplemental appropriation ordinances passed by the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Gov. Garcia alleged that a separate authority to enter into such contracts was no longer necessary.

RTC ruled pursuant to Sections 22(c) in relation to Sections 306 and 346 of the LGC and Section 37 of the Government Procurement Reform Act, the Governor of Cebu need not secure prior authorization by way of a resolution from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Cebu before she enters into a contract involving monetary obligations on the part of the Province of Cebu when there is a prior appropriation ordinance enacted. It is only when the contract (entered into by the local chief executive) involves obligations which are not backed by prior ordinances that the prior authority of the sanggunian concerned is required. The trial court also declared that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan does not have juridical personality nor is it vested by R.A. No. 7160 with authority to sue and be sued.

On appeal, COA officials maintained that Sections 306 and 346 of the LGC cannot be considered exceptions to Sec. 22(c). Sec. 346 allegedly refers to disbursements which must be made in accordance with an appropriation ordinance without need of approval from the sanggunian concerned.

ISSUE: Is the Provincial Governor required to obtain prior authorization of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan of Cebu before she can enter into the questioned contracts?

HELD: YES. The case should be remanded to the trial court. If the contracts were disbursements then no prior authorization is necessary. However, if they are new contracts, prior authorization of the Sanggunian is indispensable

RATIO: As per Sec 22 (c) of the LGC, prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned is required before the local chief executive may enter into contracts on behalf of the local government unit. Sec. 306 of R.A. No. 7160 merely contains a definition of terms. Read in conjunction with Sec. 346, Sec. 306 authorizes the local chief executive to make disbursements of funds in accordance with the ordinance authorizing the annual or supplemental appropriations. The "ordinance" referred to in Sec. 346 pertains to that which enacts the local government unit’s budget, for which reason no further authorization from the local council is required, the ordinance functioning, as it does, as the legislative authorization of the budget.

To construe Sections 306 and 346 of R.A. No. 7160 as exceptions to Sec. 22(c) would render the requirement of prior sanggunian authorization superfluous, useless and irrelevant. There would be no instance when such prior authorization would be required, as in contracts involving the disbursement of appropriated funds. Yet, this is obviously not the effect Congress had in mind when it required, as a condition to the local chief executive’s representation of the local government unit in business transactions, the prior authorization of the sanggunian concerned. The

requirement was deliberately added as a measure of check and balance, to temper the authority of the local chief executive, and in recognition of the fact that the corporate powers of the local government unit are wielded as much by its chief executive as by its council. However, the sanggunian authorization may be in the form of an appropriation ordinance passed for the year which specifically covers the project, cost or contract to be entered into by the local government unit. Sec. 323 of R.A. No. 7160 provides that in case of a reenacted budget, "only the annual appropriations for salaries and wages of existing positions, statutory and contractual obligations, and essential operating expenses authorized in the annual and supplemental budgets for the preceding year shall be deemed reenacted and disbursement of funds shall be in accordance therewith." It should be observed that, as indicated by the word "only" preceding the above enumeration in Sec. 323, the items for which disbursements may be made under a reenacted budget are exclusive. Clearly, contractual obligations which were not included in the previous year’s annual and supplemental budgets cannot be disbursed by the local government unit. It follows, too, that new contracts entered into by the local chief executive require the prior approval of the sanggunian.

The words "disbursement" and "contract" separately referred to in Sec. 346 and 22(c) of R.A. No. 7160 should be understood in their common signification. Disbursement is defined as "To pay out, commonly from a fund. To make payment in settlement of a debt or account payable." “Contract,” on the other hand, is defined by our Civil Code as "a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service." And so, to give life to the obvious intendment of the law and to avoid a construction which would render Sec. 22(c) of R.A. No. 7160 meaningless, disbursement, as used in Sec. 346, should be understood to pertain to payments for statutory and contractual obligations which the sanggunian has already authorized thru ordinances enacting the annual budget and are therefore already subsisting obligations of the local government unit. Contracts, as used in Sec. 22(c) on the other hand, are those which bind the local government unit to new obligations, with their corresponding terms and conditions, for which the local chief executive needs prior authority from the sanggunian.

Sec. 465, Art. 1, Chapter 3 of R.A. No. 7160 states that the provincial governor shall "[r]epresent the province in all its business transactions and sign in its behalf all bonds, contracts, and obligations, and such other documents upon authority of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or pursuant to law or ordinances." Sec. 468, Art. 3 of the same chapter also establishes the sanggunian’s power, as the province’s legislative body, to authorize the provincial governor to negotiate and contract loans, lease public buildings held in a proprietary capacity to private parties, among other things. The foregoing inexorably confirms the indispensability of the sanggunian’s authorization in the execution of contracts which bind the local government unit to new obligations. Note should be taken of the fact that R.A. No. 7160 does not expressly state the form that the authorization by the sanggunian has to take. Such authorization may be done by resolution enacted in the same manner prescribed

by ordinances, except that the resolution need not go through a third reading for final consideration unless the majority of all the members of the sanggunian decides otherwise.

R.A. No. 9184 establishes the law and procedure for public procurement. Sec. 37 thereof explicitly makes the approval of the appropriate authority which, in the case of local government units, is the sanggunian, the point of reference for the notice to proceed to be issued to the winning bidder. This provision, rather than being in conflict with or providing an exception to Sec. 22(c) of R.A. No. 7160, blends seamlessly with the latter and even acknowledges that in the exercise of the local government unit’s corporate powers, the chief executive acts merely as an instrumentality of the local council. Read together, the cited provisions mandate the local chief executive to secure the sanggunian’s approval before entering into procurement contracts and to transmit the notice to proceed to the winning bidder not later than seven (7) calendar days therefrom.

OSMEÑA vs.COA Corporate Powers. Sec 22G.R. No. 110045 November 29, 1994

Personal liability for expenditures of government fund when made in violation of law. Notably, the public official’s personal liability arises only if the expenditure of government funds was made in violation of law

FACTS:  The controversy had its origin when City of Cebu hosted the 1994 Palarong

Pambansa, for which in preparation of the said games, the City engaged the services of several construction companies While the construction is being undertaken, Osmena as the City Mayor issued 20 change/Extra Work Orders, amounting to 35m * about 83% of the original contract price (w/c were not covered by any Supplemental Agreemnt or authorization from the Sanggunian).

When the WTCI and DCDC (construction companies) demanded for the payment of said extra work, only one of the Sanggunian member sponsosored a resolution authorizing the supplemental agreements for extra construction while the rest of the members refused to pass the resolution.

Hence, the construction companies filed a case against the City of Cebu. RTC’s ruling: in favor of WTCI and DCDC (Subsequently, to satisfy judgment debts, the Sanggunian finally passed the required appropriation ordinances)

The City Auditor then held Osmena, members of the Sanggunian and City Administrator liable in their personal capacities, so said officials sought reconsideration from COA Regional Office which modified the decision and absolved the members of the Sanggunian from any liability (Why? As it was him who ordered the change / extra work without the supplemental agreement rrreqqquired by law, or the prior authorization by the Sanggunian)

ISSUE: WON Osmena should be held solely liable

HELD:  NO. The Sanggunian members tacitly approved the Orders rendering the Supplemental Agreemnt unnecessary. As in the case of Melchor, we find it "unjust to order the petitioner to shoulder the expenditure when the government had already received and accepted benefits from the utilization of the [sports complex]," especially considering that the City incurred no substantial loss in paying for the additional work and the damages awarded. Apparently, the City placed in a time deposit the entire funds allotted for the construction and renovation of the sports complex. The interest that the deposits earned amounted to P12,835,683.15, more than enough to cover the damages awarded to WTCI (P2,514,255.40) and the DCDC (P102,015.00). There was "no showing that [the] petitioner was ill-motivated, or that [the petitioner] had personally profited or sought to profit from the transactions, or that the disbursements have been made for personal or selfish ends." All in all, the circumstances showed that Osmeña issued the change and extra work orders for the City’s successful hosting of the Palaro, and not for any other "nefarious endeavour."

Section 103 of PD 1445 declares that "[e]xpenditures of government funds or uses of government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found to be directly responsible therefor." Notably, the public official’s personal liability arises only if the expenditure of government funds was made in violation of law. In this case, the damages were paid to WTCI and DCDC pursuant to final judgments rendered against the City for its unreasonable delay in paying its obligations. The COA, however, declared that the judgments, in the first place, would not be rendered against the City had it not been for the change and extra work orders that Osmeña made which (a) it considered as unnecessary, (b) were without the Sanggunian’s approval, and (c) were not covered by a supplemental agreement.

The court ruled that a) extra work oders were necessary and justified. The 10-page letter of City Administrator Juan Saul F. Montecillo to the Sanggunian explained in detail the reasons for each change and extra work order; most of which were made to address security and safety concerns that may arise not only during the holding of the Palaro, but also in other events and activities that may later be held in the sports complex. B) . Reviewing the facts of the case, we find that the prevailing circumstances at the time the change and extra work orders were executed and completed indicate that the City of Cebu tacitly approved these orders, rendering a supplemental agreement or authorization from the Sanggunian unnecessary.

 A separate Supplemental Agreement may be entered into for all Change Orders and Extra Work Orders if the aggregate amount exceeds 25% of the escalated original contract price. All change orders/extra work orders beyond 100% of the escalated original contract cost shall be subject to public bidding except where the works involved are inseparable from the original scope of the project in which case negotiation with the incumbent contractor may be allowed, subject to approval by the appropriate authorities.

The Pre-Qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBACapproved the change and extra work orders. It bears pointing out that two members of the PBAC were members of the Sanggunian as well A COA representative was also present during the deliberations of the PBAC. None of these officials voiced any objection to the lack of a prior authorization from the Sanggunian or a supplemental agreement. The RTC Decision in fact mentioned that the Project Post Completion Report and Acceptance was approved by an authorized representative of the City of Cebu on September 21, 1994. "[a]s the projects had been completed, accepted and used by the [City of Cebu]," the RTC ruled that there is "no necessity of [executing] a supplemental agreement." Indeed, as we declared in Mario R. Melchor v. COA, a supplemental agreement to cover change or extra work orders is not always mandatory, since the law adopts the permissive word "may." Despite its initial refusal, the Sanggunian was eventually compelled to enact the appropriation ordinance in order to satisfy the RTC judgments. Belated as it may be, the enactment of the appropriation ordinance, nonetheless, constitutes as sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law. It serves as a confirmatory act signifying the Sanggunian’s ratification of all the change and extra work orders issued by Osmeña.

CITY OF MANILA vs TEOTICO Torts and Damages – Liability of municipal corporations in certain cases 22 S 267FACTS:

In January 1958, at about 8pm, Genaro Teotico was about to board a jeepney in P. Burgos, Manila when he fell into an uncovered manhole. This caused injuries upon him.

Thereafter he sued for damages under Article 2189 of the Civil Code the City of Manila, the mayor, the city engineer, the city health officer, the city treasurer, and the chief of police. CFI Manila ruled against Teotico.

The CA, on appeal, ruled that the City of Manila should pay damages to Teotico.

The City of Manila assailed the decision of the CA on the ground that the charter of Manila states that it shall not be liable for damages caused by the negligence of the city officers in enforcing the charter; that the charter is a special law and shall prevail over the Civil Code which is a general law; and that the accident happened in national highway.

ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Manila is liable in the case at bar.

HELD: Yes. It is true that in case of conflict, a special law prevails over a general law; that the charter of Manila is a special law and that the Civil Code is a general law. However, looking at the particular provisions of each law concerned, the provision of the Manila Charter exempting it from liability caused by the negligence of its officers is a general law in the sense that it exempts the city from negligence of its officers in general. There is no particular exemption but merely a general exemption. On the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code provides a particular prescription to the effect that it makes provinces, cities, and municipalities liable for the damages caused to a certain person by reason of the “…defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision.” The allegation that the incident happened in a national highway was only raised for the first time in the City’s motion for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals, hence it cannot be given due weight. At any rate, even though it is a national highway, the law contemplates that regardless if whether or not the road is national, provincial, city, or municipal, so long as it is under the City’s control and supervision, it shall be responsible for damages by reason of the defective conditions thereof. In the case at bar, the City admitted they have control and supervision over the road where Teotico fell when the City alleged that it has been doing constant and regular inspection of the city’s roads, P. Burgos included

PILAR vs SANGGUNIANG BAYAN NG DASOL PANGASINAN -do-128 S 170RESPONDENT MAYOR PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE THEREFOR ON ACCOUNT OF ARBITRARY EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY. — That respondent Hon. Mayor Lodovico Espinosa alone should be held liable and responsible for the miserable plight of the petitioner is clear. Respondent Mayor vetoed without just cause on October 26, 1982 the Resolution of the Sanguniang Bayan appropriating the salary of the petitioner. While "to veto or not to veto involves the exercise of discretion" as contended by respondents, respondent Mayor, however, exceeded his authority in an arbitrary manner when he vetoed the resolution since there exists sufficient municipal funds from which the salary of the petitioner could be paid. Respondent Mayor’s refusal, neglect or omission in complying with the directives of the Provincial Budget Officer and the Director of the Bureau of Local Government that the salary of the petitioner be provided for and paid the prescribed salary rate, is reckless and oppressive, hence, by way of example or correction for the public good, respondent Mayor is liable personally to the petitioner for exemplary or corrective damages.CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; MORAL DAMAGES; RESPONDENT MAYOR IN CASE AT BAR PERSONALLY LIABLE THEREFORE; BASIS. — As respondent mayor acted in bad faith in not performing his legal duty to appropriate the requisite amount for the payment of petitioner's salaries, he becomes personally liable for damages. The governing law is found in article 27 of the Civil Code which makes a public servant or employee liable for damages for his refusal or neglect, without just cause, to perform his official duty (Javellana vs. Tayo, 116 Phil. 1342, where a municipal mayor was adjudged liable to pay P100 as moral damages and P100 as attorney's fees for failure to sign the payrolls for the per diems of certain councilors). Article 2219(10) of the Civil Code allows moral damages in an action under article 27.

This is an original action for mandamus to compel the Sanguniang Bayan and the municipal treasurer to pay the salary due petitioner Hon. Expedito B. Pilar, in his capacity as the Vice Mayor of Dasol, Pangasinan, as provided for by Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 and to recover actual, moral and exemplary damages plus attorney’s fees.chanrobles

Petitioner was elected vice mayor of Dasol, Pangasinan in 1980 local elections. On March 4, 1980, the Sanguniang Bayan adopted Resolution No. 1 which increased the salaries of the mayor and municipal treasurer to P18,636.00 and P16,044.00 per annum respectively. The said resolution did not provide for an increase in salary of the vice mayor despite the fact that such position is entitled to an annual salary of P16,044.00.

Petitioner questioned the failure of the Sanguniang Bayan to appropriate an amount for the payment of his salary. He wrote letters to the proper authorities complaining about the matter. The proper provincial and national officials endorsed compliance with Circular 9-A of the Joint Commission on Local Government and Personnel Administration in giving

the revised rate of salary for petitioner. In fact, the mayor was sent a letter by the Executive Secretary of the Commission advising him that the Municipality should pay the Vice-Mayor the salary due him equivalent to that of the Municipal Treasurer per Circular No. 15.

On December 12, 1980, the Sanguniang Bayan enacted a resolution appropriating the amount of P500.00 per month as the salary of the petitioner. This amount was increased to P774.00 per month in December, 1981. Then,  on October 26, 1982, amount of P15,144.00 was appropriated as payment of the unpaid salaries of the petitioner from January 1, 1981 to December 31, 1982. The resolution was vetoed by the respondent mayor resulting into the filing by the petitioner of this petition. 

RESPONDENTS CONTENTIONS:

(1) The filing of the petition is premature because the petitioner did not exhaust all administrative remedies contending that petitioner should have lodged his complaint first with the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development; (2) that the petition involves a question of fact and, therefore, this Court does not have jurisdiction over the case because the right of the petitioner to receive a salary depends on the availability of municipal funds and "the availability or non-availability of municipal funds is a factual issue which is not cognizable by the Supreme Court; and (3) that the petition is now moot and academic

PETITIONER CONTENTIONS:(1) The only factual issue involved in this case is the ascertainment of damages inflicted to the petitioner due to the failure of the respondents to pay him his lawful salary. The existence of municipal funds from which the salary of the petitioner could be appropriated is not a factual issue anymore due to the certification of the municipal treasurer as to the existence of such funds, and (3) The issue has not become moot and academic because there is no guarantee that even though a resolution appropriating the salary of the Vice Mayor has been enacted, actual payment shall be made to the petitioner.

ISSUE: WON Respondent Espinosa is solely liableHELD: YES. The mayor acted in groos evidend bad faith. Although mot and academic for the pettioner’s claom has already been provided, the court still ruled the case. Petitioner is enititled damages and attorney’s fees because the facts show that petitioner was forced to litigate in order to claim his lawful salary which was unduly denied him for three (3) years and that the Mayor acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy petitioner’s plainly valid, just and demandable claim. (Article 2208, (2) and (5), New Civil Code). That respondent Hon. Mayor Lodovico Espinosa alone should be held liable and responsible for the miserable plight of the petitioner is clear. Respondent Mayor vetoed without just cause on October 26, 1982 the Resolution of the Sanguniang Bayan appropriating the salary of the petitioner.

Respondent Mayor exceeded his authority in an arbitrary manner when he vetoed the resolution since there exists sufficient municipal funds from which the salary of the petitioner could be paid. 8Respondent Mayor’s refusal, neglect or omission in complying with the directives of the Provincial Budget Officer and the Director of the Bureau of Local Government that the salary of the petitioner be provided for and paid the prescribed salary rate, is reckless and oppressive, hence, by way of example or correction for the public good, respondent Mayor is liable personally to the petitioner for exemplary or corrective damages.

LIABILITY FOR DAMAGESMUN OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION vs HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, JUANA RIMANDO-BANIÑA, LAUREANO BANIÑA, JR., SOR MARIETA BANIÑA, MONTANO BANIÑA ORJA BANIÑA AND LYDIA R. BANIÑA

FACTS: At about 7 o'clock in the morning of December 16, 1965, a collision

occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig.

Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and four (4) others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.

Priv respondent Banina instituted a complaint against the owner and driver of the jeepney

The owner and driver of the jeepney, however, filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner

CONTENTION OF MUNICIPALITY: Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of action and the negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the collision

RTC ruled against the municipality ordering them to pay P1,500 funeral expenses and P24,744.24 as the lost expected earnings of the late Laureano Baniña Sr., P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P2,500.00 as attorney's fees

ISSUE: whether or not the respondent court committed GAD when it deferred and failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.

HELD: YES, there was GAD for he holding the municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed by its regular employee

RATIO: The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in

Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution, to wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent."

GEN RULE: the State may not be sued except when it gives consent to be sued. Consent takes the form of express or implied consent.

WHEN is there EXPRESS CONSENT TO BE SUED:o Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special

law. The standing consent of the State to be sued in case of money claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. A special law may be passed to enable a person to sue the government for an alleged quasi-delic

There is IMPLIED CONSENT when:o when the government enters into business contracts, thereby

descending to the level of the other contracting party, and also when the State files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim.

RE Municipal Corporations: Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of

the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued.

RE SUABILITY vs LIABILITY "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the

applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; On the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be

sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be

sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable."

ISSUE NOW is TEST OF LIABILITY:Whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is

performing governmental or proprietary functions

PURPOSE OF DISTINCTION: for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third persons.

"Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are twofold.

the right springing from sovereignty, acts are political and governmental

officers are public functionaries performing a public service

a private, proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as public agencies.

Officers in corporate/ individual capacity

1) In one they exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental.

Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by them, are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state.

2) In the other capacity the municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as public agencies.

Their officers and agents in the performance of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power."

GEN RULE ON SUABILITY: not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity.

EXCEPTIONS: municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued

IN CASE at bar, driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." Which are admittedly governmental activities

HENCE, municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger — tragic and deplorable though it may be imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.

LIABILITY FOR DAMAGESCASE: CITY OF CALOOCAN and NORMA M. ABRACIA, petitioners, vs. HON. MAURO T. ALLARDE, Presiding Judge of Branch 123, RTC of Caloocan City, ALBERTO A. CASTILLO, Deputy Sheriff of Branch 123, RTC of Caloocan City, and DELFINA HERNANDEZ SANTIAGO and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (PNB), respondents.

FACTS: Sometime in 1972, Marcial Samson, City Mayor of Caloocan City,

abolished the position of Assistant City Administrator and 17 other positions from the plantilla of the LocGov of Caloocan.

Assistant City Administrator Delfina Santiago assailed the constitutionality of the abolition

Upon winning in the CFI, Santiago was paid partial back wages, the others were paid in full

Upon another court order to pay the balance, Then Caloocan Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr., however, refused to sign the check intended as payment for respondent Santiago's claims. This, despite the fact that he was one of the signatories of the ordinance authorizing such payment.

Sheriff then served a copy of Notice of Garnishment on PNB PNB complied with Judge’s roder and issued the check of P439,378

ISSUE: WON the garnishment of its funds in PNB was invalid inasmuch as these were publicfunds and thus exempt from execution

HELD: NO. VALID.

RATIO:RE Garnishment: Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means of which the

plaintiff seeks to subject to his claim property of the defendant in the hands of a third person or money owed by such third person or garnishee to the defendant.

GEN RULE: government funds deposited in the PNB remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law.

EXCEPTION: when there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law.

Otherwise stated, the rule on the immunity of public funds from seizure or garnishment does not apply where the funds sought to be levied under execution are already allocated by law specifically for the satisfaction of the money judgment against the government. In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes.

In case at bar, garnishment was allowed because an ordinance has already been enacted for the payment of the City's obligations

Re the acts of Mayor of Caloocan City:Finally, we cannot simply pass over in silence the deplorable act of the

former Mayor of Caloocan City in refusing to sign the check in payment of the City's obligation to private respondent. It was an open defiance of judicial processes, smacking of political arrogance, and a direct violation of the very ordinance he himself approved. Our Resolution in G.R. No. 98366, City Government of Caloocan vs. Court of Appeals, et al., dated May 16, 1991, dismissing the petition of the City of Caloocan assailing the issuance of a writ of execution by the trial court, already resolved with finality all impediments to the execution of judgment in this case. Yet, the City Government of Caloocan, in a blatant display of malice and bad faith, refused to comply with the decision. Now, it has the temerity to come to this Court once more and continue inflicting injustice on a hapless citizen, as if all the harm and prejudice it has already heaped upon respondent Santiago are still not enough.

This Court will not condone the repudiation of just obligations contracted by municipal corporations. On the contrary, we will extend our aid and every judicial facility to any citizen in the enforcement of just and valid claims against abusive local government units.

GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSECASE: TANO vs SOCRATESSYNOPSISFACTS: On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa City

enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City effective for five years.

PURPOSE: “To effectively free our City Sea Waters from Cyanide and other Obnoxious substance[s], and shall cover all persons and/or entities operating within and outside the City of Puerto Princesa who is are (sic) directly or indirectly in the business or shipment of live fish and lobster outside the City.”

To implement the ordinance, the City Mayor of Puerto Princesa City issued Office Order No. 23 dated January 23, 1993,

1) ordering inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from air and sea.

2) Likewise, oin1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Provincial Government of Palawan, enacted Resolution and Ordinance, prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a period of five years.

RATIO for the Coral prohibition:

the destruction and devastation of the corals of province were principally due to illegal fishing activities

Petitioners (violators of the ordinances) challenged the aforementioned ordinances and office order on the ground that

it deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade.

The Supreme Court ruled that the challenged ordinances do not suffer any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws, including the Local Government Code. There is no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman.

The Local Government Code vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor. The Sangguniangs are directed to enact ordinances that protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing. One of the devolved powers under the Code is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution and the powers granted therein to local government units under the General Welfare Clause and those which involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.

The ordinances find full support under R.A. 7611, otherwise known as the Strategic Environment Plan (SEP) for Palawan Act, approved on 19 June 1992 which adopts a comprehensive framework for the sustainable development of Palawan compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural resources and endangered environment of the province.

HELD:RE Marginal Fishermen: A marginal fisherman is an individual engaged in fishing whose margin of

return is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering the fish, while a subsistence fisherman is one whose catch yields but the irreducible

minimum for his livelihood.

nothing in the record supports a finding that any petitioner falls within these definitions.

RE State’s power to promote general welfare:

the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature under the Declaration of Principles the State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights

right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it a correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment

Art XIII, 1987 Consti:SEC. 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.

SEC. 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources.

The Consti aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation's marine wealth.

RE Power of LGUs over its municipal waters Section 5(c) of the LGC "shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to

the local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people of the community."

In Sec 149, LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of deleterious methods of fishing;

Moreover, Sanggunian:are directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, which shall include, inter alia, ordinances that "[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing . . . and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological imbalance."

RE LGC interpretation: liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall

be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit.

Devolution refers to the act by which the National Government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.

RE Power of LGUs: Sec 17, (b), 2, (i)

Power of enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters.

MUNICIPAL WATERS

DEF: The term "municipal waters," in turn, includes not only streams, lakes, and tidal waters within the municipality, not being the subject of private ownership and not comprised within the national parks, public forest, timber lands, forest reserves, or fishery reserves, but also marine waters included between two lines drawn perpendicularly to the general coastline from points where the boundary lines of the municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and a third line parallel with the general coastline and fifteen kilometers from it. 31 Under P.D. No. 704, the marine waters included in municipal waters is limited to three nautical miles from the general coastline using the above perpendicular lines and a third parallel line.

Ratio for Municipal Fishery Laws: “CLOSED SEASON” if necessary for conservation or ecological purposes, for

the exploration, exploitation, utilization and conservation of coral resources

Re General Welfare Clause: LGUs are vested the power, inter alia, to enact ordinances to enhance the right

of the people to a balanced ecology. Hence, the duty of the Sanggunian to:

"[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing . . . and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance."

GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSECASE: CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents.

FACTS: Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING

THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF" provides:

"Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are

paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the application."

After several years of not enforcing the ordinance, City passed a resolution to “stop selling of memorial parks where owners failed to donate the required 6% space for paupers’ burial

Petitioner city’s contention: That Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of

local police power, "to make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein."

Respondent contends: General welfare clause is not available as source of power BECAUSE if an

owner is deprived of his property outright under the State's police power, the property is generally not taken for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in order to promote the general welfare. The respondent cites the case of a nuisance per se or the destruction of a house to prevent the spread of a conflagration.

General Welfare Clause is "the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property."

ISSUE: WON the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power in lieu of the General Welfare Clause of LGUsHELD: NORATIO: The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation

of a memorial park cemetery The confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from

operating a memorial park cemetery.RE POLICE POWER: that police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or

restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare.

GENERALLY, It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the

EXCEPTION where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.

"It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It

deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation."

RE GENERAL WELFARE: There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6)

percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people.

The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

This is a case of expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries.

When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practice in the past. It continues to the present.

RE Expropriation: Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned

ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots.

The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to homeowners.

RE Non-applicability of General Welfare Clause: As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on

implied powers of the municipal corporation, not on any express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. The clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking. Moreover, the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated, received necessary licenses and permits, and commenced operating. The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery cannot even be considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted the permits to commence operations.

GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSEHON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, petitioners, vs. HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.

FACT:“A RESOLUTION TO CONFIRM AND/OR RATIFY THE ONGOING BURIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM INITIATED BY THE OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, OF EXTENDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OF FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) TO A BEREAVED FAMILY, FUNDS TO BE TAKEN OUT OF UNAPPROPRIATED AVAILABLE FUNDS EXISTING IN THE MUNICIPAL TREASURY."

Qualified beneficiaries are those whose gross family income is less than P2,000 per month.

COA disapproved the resolution and disallowed the disbursement of funds for its implementation

ISSUE: whether or not Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.

HELD: YES a valid exercise of police powerRATIO:

There must always be on obvious and real connection between the actual provisions of a police regulations and its avowed purpose, and the regulation adopted must be reasonably adapted to accomplish the end sought to be attained.'

RE Police Power: Power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,

education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers

an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government

It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation

On it depends the security of social order, the life and health of the citizen, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of property, and it has been said to be the very foundation on which our social system rests.

PURPOSE:

Securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.

RE Police Power on Municipal Cooperation: Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a

valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State.

HOW delegated:i. express delegation, or

ii. inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation;

GEN RULE of Municipal Cooperation’s Police Power: may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their

creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people

RATIO: Founded on public necessity, to enable Mun.Corp to perform their

governmental functions Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally

benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services (Section 9, Art. II, Constitution), the promotion of the general welfare (Section 5, ibid) social justice (Section 10, ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights.

It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation

Title: Rimando vs Emission Testing Center, Inc.July 23, 2012 GR 198860

Ponente: Reyes, J.:Facts:

The CA held that the petitioner may not be held liable for damages since his action or inaction, for that matter, was done in the performance of official duties that are legally protected by the presumption of good faith.

The CA likewise stressed that the civil action filed against the petitioner had already become moot and academic upon the expiration of his term as the mayor of Naguilian, La Union.

The present controversy stemmed from a petition for mandamus and damages filed before Branch 67 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union, by Naguilian Emission Testing Center, Inc., represented by its President, Rosemarie Llarenas (respondent) against Abraham P. Rimando (petitioner), who, at the time material to the case, was the sitting mayor of the Municipality of Naguilian, La Union. The petition prayed for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the petitioner to issue a business permit in favor of the respondent.

In support of its plea, the respondent claimed that its business is being conducted on a parcel of land which formerly belonged to the national government but later on certified by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as an alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The respondent had operated its business of emission testing on the land from 2005 to 2007. On January 18, 2008, the respondent filed an application for the renewal of its business permit and paid the corresponding fees therefor.

The petitioner, however, refused to issue a business permit unless and until the respondent executes a contract of lease with the Municipality of Naguilian. The respondent was amenable to signing such contract subject to some proposed revisions, which, however, were not acceptable to the petitioner. The parties did not reach a common ground hence, the petition for mandamus.

Issue:WON the petition for writ of mandamus is sufficient to compel respondent

mayor to issue a business permit in favor of petitioner.WON the tax declaration on the subject lot is sufficient to prove ownership

of the city.Held:

No petition for writ of mandamus will not prosper.No it is not sufficient. (It must be proven by clear and convincing evidence).

Ratio:More importantly, a mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a

business permit since the exercise of the same is a delegated police power hence, discretionary in nature.As Section 444(b)(3)(iv) so states, the power of the municipal mayor to issue licenses is pursuant to Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which declares:

SEC. 16. General Welfare. – Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

Section 16, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police power to local governments. Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. Evidently, the Local Government Code of 1991 is unequivocal that the municipal mayor has the power to issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. x x x

Indeed, as correctly ruled by the RTC, the petition for mandamus filed by the respondent is incompetent to compel the exercise of a mayor’s discretionary duty to issue business permits.

Title: Tatel vs Municipality of ViracMarch 11, 1992 GR 40243

Ponente: Nocon, J.:Facts:

This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction with the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes filed by appellant, Celestino Tatel, a businessman engaged in the import and export of abaca and other products against the Municipal Council of Virac, Catanduanes and its municipal officials enjoining them from enforcing Resolution No 29 1 of the Council, declaring the warehouse of petitioner in barrio Sta. Elena of the said municipality a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and directing the petitioner to remove and transfer said warehouse to a more suitable place within two (2) months from receipt of the said resolution.

It appears from the records that on the basis of complaints received from the residents of barrio Sta. Elena on March 18, 1966 against the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside the warehouse of petitioner which affected the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due to the smoke, obnoxious odor and dust emitted by the machine, a committee was appointed by the municipal council of Virac to investigate the matter. The committee noted the crowded nature of the neighborhood with narrow roads and the surrounding residential houses, so much so that

an accidental fire within the warehouse of the petitioner occasioned by the continuance of the activity inside the warehouse and the storing of inflammable materials created a danger to the lives and properties of the people within the neighborhood.

Resultantly, Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on April 22, 1966 declaring the warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. 

Respondent municipal officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire.

On the other hand, petitioner contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and void for not having been passed in accordance with law.

Issue:

WON petitioner’s warehouse is a nuisance under Article 694(Civil Code). A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which:

(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or

(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or

(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or

(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or

(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.

WON Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional.

Held:

Yes petitioner’s warehouse is a nuisance under Art.794 of the Civil Code.

No the said ordinance is not unconstitutional.

Ratio:

Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. 3 Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code, which reads:

The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.

For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with certain well established and basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that a municipal ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable. Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria.

The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have not been substantiated. Its purpose is well within the objectives of sound government. No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in the warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the people residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is concerned, there can be no better policy than what has been conceived by the municipal government.

Title: Technology Developers, Inc. vs CA

January 21, 1991 GR 94759

Ponente: Gancayco, j.:

Facts:

Petitioner, a domestic private corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of charcoal briquette, received a letter dated February 16, 1989 from private respondent acting mayor Pablo N. Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the operation of the petitioner's plant located at Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, until further order. The letter likewise requested Plant Manager Mr. Armando Manese to bring with him to the office of the mayor on February 20, 1989 the following: a) Building permit; b) Mayor's permit; c) Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit; and of other document.

At the requested conference on February 20, 1989, petitioner, through its representative, undertook to comply with respondent's request for the production of the required documents. In compliance with said undertaking, petitioner commenced to secure "Region III-Department of Environmental and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit," although among the permits previously secured prior to the operation of petitioner's plant was a "Temporary Permit to Operate Air Pollution Installation" issued by the then National Pollution Control Commission (now Environmental Management Bureau) and is now at a stage where the Environmental Management Bureau is trying to determine the correct kind of anti-pollution devise to be installed as part of petitioner's request for the renewal of its permit.

Petitioner's attention having been called to its lack of mayor's permit, it sent its representatives to the office of the mayor to secure the same but were not entertained.

On April 6, 1989, without previous and reasonable notice upon petitioner, respondent acting mayor ordered the Municipality's station commander to padlock the premises of petitioner's plant, thus effectively causing the stoppage of its operation.

Issue:

WON the orders of respondent mayor to padlock the premises of the factory thus resulting in the cessation of it’s operation and the issuance of the writh of preliminary injunction by the respondent judge is proper.

Held: YES.

Ratio: No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining whether there is a pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially addressed to the then National Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry of Human Settlements, now the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virture of his police power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the emissions in the operation of the business.

This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through channels. 4 The alleged NBI finding that some of the signatures in the four-page petition were written by one person, 5 appears to be true in some instances, (particularly as among members of the same family), but on the whole the many signatures appear to be written by different persons. The certification of the barrio captain of said barrio that he has not received any complaint on the matter 6 must be because the complaint was sent directly to the Governor through the Acting Mayor.

The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made by Marivic Guina who in her report of December 8, 1988 observed that the fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device has been installed. 

Title: Asilo, jr. vs The People of the PhilippinesMarch 9, 2011 GR 159017-18

Ponente: Perez, J.:*Medio mahaba talaga facts nito Facts:

Respondent Angeles and mayor died in this case, and the issue of their liabilities is irrelevant to the topic. But only the mayor’s civil liability remained as it survived after his death and his criminal liability is extinguished. When Angeles died there was yet to be any final judgment thus his civil and criminal liability was extinguished.

On 15 March 1978, Private Respondent Visitacion’s late mother Marciana Vda. De Coronado (Vda. De Coronado) and the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna (represented by the then Municipal Mayor Crisostomo P. Manalang) entered into a lease contract whereby the Municipality allowed the use and enjoyment of property comprising of a lot and a store located at the corner of Coronado and E. Fernandez Sts. at Poblacion, Nagcarlan, Laguna, in favor of the respondent’s mother for a period of twenty (20) years beginning on 15 March 1978 until 15 March 1998, extendible for another 20 years.

The lease contract provided that the late Vda. De Coronado could build a firewall on her rented property which must be at least as high as the store;

and in case of modification of the public market, she or her heir/s would be given preferential rights.

Visitacion took over the store when her mother died sometime in 1984. From then on up to January 1993, Visitacion secured the yearly Mayor’s permits.1

Sometime in 1986, a fire razed the public market of Nagcarlan. Upon Visitacion’s request for inspection on 15 May 1986, District Engineer Marcelino B. Gorospe (Engineer Gorospe) of the then Ministry of Public Works and Highways, Regional Office No. IV-A, found that the store of Visitacion remained intact and stood strong. This finding of Engineer Gorospe was contested by the Municipality of Nagcarlan.

The store of Visitacion continued to operate after the fire until 15 October 1993.

On 1 September 1993, Visitacion received a letter12 from Mayor Comendador directing her to demolish her store within five (5) days from notice. Attached to the letter were copies of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 15613 dated 30 August 1993 and a Memorandum issued by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Marianito Sasondoncillo of Laguna.

The relevant provisos of the Resolution No. 156 states that:

NOW THEREFORE, be it RESOLVED, as it hereby resolved to authorize Hon. Demetrio T. Comendador to enforce and order the Coronado’s to demolish the building constructed on the space previously rented to them in order to give way for the construction of a new municipal market building.

RESOLVED FURTHER, to authorize Demetrio T. Comendador, Honorable Mayor of Nagcarlan to file an Unlawful Detainer Case with damages for the expenses incurred due to the delay in the completion of the project if the Coronado’s continuously resists the order.

On 3 September 1993, Visitacion wrote a reply letter to Mayor Comendador saying that: (1) the lease contract was still existing and legally binding; (2) she was willing to vacate the store as long as same place and area would be given to her in the new public market; and (3) in case her proposals are not acceptable to Mayor Comendador, for the latter to just file an unlawful detainer case against her pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 156. 

On 15 September 1993, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Florencio Buyser sent a letter to Visitacion ordering her to vacate the portion of the public market she was occupying within 15 days from her receipt of the letter; else, a court action will be filed against her.

On 11 October 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna issued Resolution No. 183 authorizing Mayor Comendador to demolish the store being occupied by Visitacion using legal means. The significant portion of the Resolution reads:

Kung kaya ang Sangguniang Bayan ay buong pagkakaisang IPINASIYA: Ang pagbibigay kapangyarihan kay Kgg. Demetrio T. Comendador na ipagiba ang anumang istrakturang nagiging sagabal sa mabilis at maayos na pagbabangon ng pamilihang bayan.15

On 14 October 1993, Municipal Administrator Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. (Asilo) also sent a letter16 to Visitacion informing her of the impending demolition of her store the next day. Within the same day, Visitacion wrote a reply letter17 to Asilo, alleging that there is no legal right to demolish the store in the absence of a court order and that the Resolutions did not sanction the demolition of her store but only the filing of an appropriate unlawful detainer case against her. She further replied that if the demolition will take place, appropriate administrative, criminal and civil actions will be filed against Mayor Comendador, Asilo and all persons who will take part in the demolition.

On 15 October 1993, Mayor Comendador relying on the strength of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution Nos. 183 and 156 authorized the demolition of the store with Asilo and Angeles supervising the work.

Engineer Winston Cabrega (Engineer Cabrega), a licensed civil engineer, estimated the cost of the demolished property as amounting to P437,900.00.

Issue:

WON the acts of petitioners in demolishing the market stall was clothed with legal authority.

WON the respondents market stall constituted as a nuisance notwithstanding the events after the fire.

Held: No, petitioners acted in grave abuse of discretion in demolishing the said market stall.

No, even the municipality attested to the condition of the market stall/building that it was unharmed and not affected by the fire that burnt down the public market.

Ratio:

 Clearly, the demolition of plaintiff’s store was carried out without a court order, and notwithstanding a restraining order which the plaintiff was able to obtain. The demolition was done in the exercise of official duties which apparently was attended by evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence as there is nothing in the two (2) resolutions which gave the herein accused the authority to demolish plaintiff’s store.

"Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.36 [It] contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.37

It is quite evident in the case at bar that the accused public officials committed bad faith in performing the demolition.

First, there can be no merit in the contention that respondents’ structure is a public nuisance. The abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible if it is nuisance per se.38 Nuisance per se is that which is nuisance at all times and under any circumstance, regardless of location and surroundings.39 In this case, the market stall cannot be considered as a nuisance per se because as found out by the Court, the buildings had not been affected by the 1986 fire. This finding was certified to by Supervising Civil Engineer Wilfredo A. Sambrano of the Laguna District Engineer Office.40 To quote:

An inspection has been made on the building (a commercial establishment) cited above and found out the following:

1. It is a two-storey building, sketch of which is attached.2. It is located within the market site.3. The building has not been affected by the recent fire.4. The concrete wall[s] does not even show signs of being exposed to fire.41

Second, the Sangguniang Bayan resolutions are not enough to justify demolition. Unlike its predecessor law,42 the present Local Government Code43 does not expressly provide for the abatement of nuisance.44 And even assuming that the power to abate nuisance is provided for by the present code, the accused public officials were under the facts of this case, still devoid of any power to demolish the store. A closer look at the contested resolutions reveals that Mayor Comendador was only

authorized to file an unlawful detainer case in case of resistance to obey the order or to demolish the building using legal means. Clearly, the act of demolition without legal order in this case was not among those provided by the resolutions, as indeed, it is a legally impossible provision.

Title: LTO vs City of Butuan January 20, 2000 GR 131512

Ponente: Vitug, J.:

Facts:

Relying on the fiscal autonomy granted to LGU's by the Constittuion and the provisons of the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City of Butuan enacted an ordinance "Regulating the Operation of Tricycles-for-Hire, providing mechanism for the issuance of Franchise, Registration and Permit, and Imposing Penalties for Violations thereof and for other Purposes." The ordinance provided for, among other things, the payment of franchise fees for the grant of the franchise of tricycles-for-hire, fees for the registration of the vehicle, and fees for the issuance of a permit for the driving thereof.

Petitioner LTO explains that one of the functions of the national government that, indeed, has been transferred to local government units is the franchising authority over tricycles-for-hire of the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board ("LTFRB") but not, it asseverates, the

authority of LTO to register all motor vehicles and to issue to qualified persons of licenses to drive such vehicles.

The RTC and CA ruled that the power to give registration and license for driving tricycles has been devolved to LGU's.

Issue: WON the registration of tricycles was given to LGU’s, hence the ordinances is a valid exercise of police power.

Held : No, the city ordinance is invalid.

Ratio:Based on the-"Guidelines to Implement the Devolution of LTFRBs Franchising Authority over Tricycles-For-Hire to Local Government units pursuant to the Local Government Code"- the newly delegated powers to LGU's pertain to the franchising and regulatory powers exercised by the LTFRB and not to the functions of the LTO relative to the registration of motor vehicles and issuance of licenses for the driving thereof. Corollarily, the exercised of a police power must be through a valid delegation. In this case the police power of registering tricycles was not delegated to the LGU’s, but remained in the LTO.

Clearly unaffected by the Local Government Code are the powers of LTO under R.A. No.4136 requiring the registration of all kinds of motor vehicles "used or operated on or upon any public highway" in the country.

The Commissioner of Land Transportation and his deputies are empowered at anytime to examine and inspect such motor vehicles to determine whether said vehicles are registered, or are unsightly, unsafe, improperly marked or equipped, or otherwise unfit to be operated on because of possible excessive damage to highways, bridges and other infrastructures. The LTO is additionally charged with being the central repository and custodian of all records of all motor vehicles. Adds the Court, the reliance made by respondents on the broad taxing power of local government units, specifically under Section 133 of the Local Government Code, is tangential.

Police power and taxation, along with eminent domain, are inherent powers of sovereignty which the State might share with local government units by delegation given under a constitutional or a statutory fiat. All these inherent powers are for a public purpose and legislative in nature but the similarities just about end there. The basic aim of police power is public good and welfare. Taxation, in its case, focuses on the power of government to raise revenue in order to support its existence and carry out its legitimate objectives. Although correlative to each other in many

respects, the grant of one does not necessarily carry with it the grant of the other. The two powers are, by tradition and jurisprudence, separate and distinct powers, varying in their respective concepts, character, scopes and limitations. To construe the tax provisions of Section 133 (1) of the LGC indistinctively would result in the repeal to that extent of LTO's regulatory power which evidently has not been intended. If it were otherwise, the law could have just said so in Section 447 and 458 of Book III of the Local Government Code in the same manner that the specific devolution of LTFRB's power on franchising of tricycles has been provided. Repeal by implication is not favored.

The power over tricycles granted under Section 458(a)(3)(VI) of the Local Government Code to LGUs is the power to regulate their operation and to grant franchises for the operation thereof. The exclusionary clause contained in the tax provisions of Section 133 (1) of the Local Government Code must not be held to have had the effect of withdrawing the express power of LTO to cause the registration of all motor vehicles and the issuance of licenses for the driving thereof. These functions of the LTO are essentially regulatory in nature, exercised pursuant to the police power of the State, whose basic objectives are to achieve road safety by insuring the road worthiness of these motor vehicles and the competence of drivers prescribed by R. A. 4136. Not insignificant is the rule that a statute must not be construed in isolation but must be taken in harmony with the extant body of laws.

LGUs indubitably now have the power to regulate the operation of tricycles-for-hire and to grant franchises for the operation thereof, and not to issue registration.

G.R. No. 78673 March 18, 1991

BRUNO S. CABRERA vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PROVINCE OF CATANDUANES

CRUZ, J.:p

Damnum absque injuria : Damage results from a person’s exercising his legal rights - The Constitution does not undertake to guarantee to a property owner the public maintenance of the most convenient route to his door. The law will not permit him to be cut off from the public thoroughfares, but he must content himself with such route for outlet as the regularly constituted public authority may deem most compatible with the public welfare. When he acquires city property, he does so in tacit recognition of these principles. If, subsequent to his acquisition, the city authorities abandon a portion of the street to which his property is not immediately adjacent, he may suffer loss because of the inconvenience imposed, but the public treasury cannot be required to recompense him. Such case is damnum absque injuria.

FACTS: Petitioner Cabrera assailed the Resolution No. 158 by the Provincial Board of Catanduanes on the ground that it is not an order for the closure of the road but an authority to barter or exchange it with private respondents as follows:

RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, to close the old road leading to the new Capitol Building of this province to traffic effective October 31, 1969, and to give to the owners of the properties traversed by the new road equal area as per survey by the Highway District Engineer's office from the old road adjacent to the respective remaining portion of their properties.

RESOLVED FURTHER, that the Honorable Provincial Governor be, as he is hereby authorized to sign for and in behalf of the province of Catanduanes, the pertinent Deed of Exchange and or other documents pertaining thereto;

Pursuant to Reso No.158, Deeds of Exchange were executed under w/c the Province of Catanduanes conveyed portions of the closed road to the people who were affected by the new concrete road leading to the Capitol Building.

Petitioner, furthermore alleged that the cloeure of the road injured him and his family for they can no longer use it in going to national road but must pass through a small passageway. (Hence, he asked for damages)

ISSUE: WON the closure of the road constitutes nuisance to petitioner.

HELD: NO. It is evident that there is an order of closure which was even written in black and white. Resolution 158 clearly says that it is “hereby resolved to close the old road”. Following the doctrine (indicated above) the petitioner is not entitled to damages because the injury he has incurred is the price he and others like him must pay for the welfare of the entire community. (Not a case for exprorpiateion where there’s a need for compensation). The construction of the new road was undertaken under the general welfare clause. As the trial judge acutely observed, whatever inconvenience the petitioner has suffered "pales in significance compared to the greater convenience the new road, which is wide and concrete, straight to the veterans fountain and down to the pier, has been giving to the public, plus the fact that the new road adds beauty and color not only to the town of Virac but also to the whole province of Catanduanes." For the enjoyment of those benefits, every individual in the province, including the petitioner, must be prepared to give his share.

[G.R. NO. 195770 - July 17, 2012]AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, et al vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it. The national government is, thus not precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and implementation of national development programs especially where it is implemented locally in tcoordination with the LGU’s concerned.

The DSWD on its aim on poverty reduction, embarked on a national program that provides cash grant to extreme poor households to allow the members of the families to meet certain human devt’ goals, hereto referred as CCTP.

Said program is with active participation of other government agencies and the local government units, to ensure effective implementation of CCTP.

Wherein the assessed annual amount of 15,000 is to be appropriate for the assistance package.

A MOA was executed by the DSWD with each participating LGYU for the obligation of both parties during the 5-year implementation of CCP. Congress for its part provided funds under GAA (General Appropriations Act) On, 2011,..21,194,117,000 was the biggest allotment for which Petitioner Pimentel challenged the disbursement of said public funds.

Petitioner’s contentions: The implementation of CCP encroached th eautonmy of LGU’s. That it should be the responsibility of the LGUs to deliver services of social welfare, agriculture and health care service pursuant to Sec 17 of LGC.

ISSUE: WON THE P21 BILLION CCTP BUDGET ALLOCATION UNDER THE DSWD IN THE GAA FY 2011 VIOLATES ART. II, SEC. 25 & ART. X, SEC. 3 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IN RELATION TO SEC. 17 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 BY PROVIDING FOR THE RECENTRALIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE DELIVERY OF BASIC SERVICES ALREADY DEVOLVED TO THE LGUS.

HELD: NO. While Sec. 17 of LGC charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services, thus:

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by the National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs and services.

The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress. Indeed, a complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it. The national government is, thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and implementation of national development programs especially where it is implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned.