Evidence Day 02PERALTA V. OMELIO, A.M. NOS. RTJ-22-2259, RTJ-22-2264, & RTJ-22-2273, OCTOBER 22, 2013.Ma. Regina Peralta v. Judge Omelio (RTC Davao City) / Romualdo Mendoza v. Judge Omelio / Atty. Cruzabra v. Judge Omelio (2013) Per Curiam.FACTS:These are three consolidated administrative complaints brought against Judge Omelio of RTC Davao City.ONLY the third case, Cruzabra v. Omelio is relevant:(1) Cruzabra is the Acting Registrar of Deeds of Davao City.(2) A special proceeding for reconstitution of title was fled by Helen Denila with the RTC wherein Judge Omelio was the presiding Judge.(3) The special proceeding was fled despite the fact that the SC had already ruled against the reconstitution in a prior case Heirs of Don Constancio Guzman Inc. v. Hon. Judge Emmanuel Carpio.(4) Despite this ruling, Judge Omelio granted the petition of Helen Denila.(5) OSG and Cruzabra attempted various legal procedures to reverse the decision. Cruzabra also refused to reconstitute the titles as ordered and was eventually charged for indirect contempt by Judge Omelio.(6) An administrative investigation was conducted with the following fndings:a. The frst two cases to be dismissed for lack of merit.b. Cruzabra v. Omelio Investigating judge found that Omelio was guilty of gross ignorance of the law; recommendation that he be dismissed fromservice and forfeiture of his benefts.ISSUE: WON Judge Omelio was guiltly of gross ignorance of the law. (YES)SC: Guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Should have taken judicial notice of prior decision.(1) Rule 129, Section 1 prior SC decisions fall under ofcial acts of judicial departments of the Phillippines(2) Decisions of courts form part of the legal system and failure of any court to apply them shall constitute an abdication of its duty to resolve a dispute in accordance with law, and shall be a ground for administrative action against an inferior court magistrate (citing Petran Development Inc v. CA).(3) The Supreme Court had already ruled against reconstitution of titles in Heirs of Don Constancio Guzman Inc. v. Hon. Judge Emmanuel Carpio.(4) Judge Omelio was guilty of gross ignorance of the law for failing to take judicial notice of this prior decision of a superior court (as well as reversing a prior inhibition and taking cognizance of the motion for indirect contempt).(5) Where the law is straightforward and the facts so evident, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 152375, DECEMBER 13, 2011.REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN [2011]FACTS Republic of the Philippines, through the PCGG, fled a complaint (CC No. 0009) against Jose L. Africa, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages before the Sandiganbayan.The petitioner alleged that the respondents illegally manipulated the purchase of themajor shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), which shareholdings respondents Jose Africa and Manuel Nieto, Jr. held for themselves and, through their holdings benefcially for Sps. Marcos. [Filthy dummies!] CC No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental cases, among them, CC No. 0130.I. CC NO. 0130 PCGG-conducted ETPI SHs meeting, a PCGG-controlled BOD was elected. The ETPI SHs convened a special SHs meeting wherein another set of BOD was elected. Africa fled a petition seeking to nullify the Orders of the PCGG. Sandiganbayan favored Africas motion and ordered an annual SHs meeting where only the registered owners [or their proxies] may vote their corresponding shares. In an April 12, 1993 resolution, the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation of CC No. 0130, among others, with CC No. 0009, with the latter as the main case andthe former merely an incident. PCGG fled with this Court a Very Urgent Petition for Authority to Hold Special SHs Meeting for [the] Sole Purpose of Increasing [ETPIs] Authorized Capital Stock (Urgent Petition). SC referred this Petition to the Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence and immediateresolution. The Sandiganbayan included the Urgent Petition in CC 0130. In the proceedings to resolve the Urgent Petition, the testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former director and treasurer-in-trust of ETPI) was taken at the petitioners instance and after serving notice of the deposition-taking on the respondents by way of deposition upon oral examination (Bane deposition) before Consul General Ernesto Castro of the Philippine Embassy in London, England. PCGG deposed Bane without leave of court (invoking that it is a matter of right after the defendants have fled their answer, the notice stated that the purpose of the deposition is for [Bane] to identify and testify on the facts so as to prove the ownership issuein favor of [the petitioner] and/or establish the prima facie factual foundation for sequestration of [ETPIs] Class A stock. The notice also states that the petitioner shall use the Bane deposition in evidence in the main case of CC No. 0009. On the scheduled deposition date, only Africa was present and he cross-examined Bane. Sandiganbayan resolved the Urgent Petition by granting authority to the PCGGPahina 1 ng 33Evidence Day 02o (i) to cause the holding of a special SHs meeting of ETPI for the sole purpose of increasing ETPIs authorized capital stock ando (ii) to vote therein the sequestered Class A shares of stock. Africa petitioned. Court referred the petitions at bar to the Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence todetermine whether there is a prima facie evidence showing that the sequestered shares in question are ill-gotten and there is an imminent danger of dissipationto entitle the PCGG to vote them in a SHs meeting.II. CC NO. 0009 Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution (1998 resolution) denying the petitioners 1st motion insofar as [the petitioner] prays therein to adopt the testimonies on oral deposition of Bane as part of its evidence in CC No. 0009 for the reason that said deponents according to the [petitioner] are not available for cross-examination in this Court by the [respondents]. The petitioner did not in any way question the 1998 resolution, and instead made its Formal Ofer of Evidence on Dec 14, 1999. Signifcantly, the Bane deposition was not included as part of its ofered exhibits. Rectifying the omission, the petitioner fled an Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice (2nd motion) dated February 21, 2000, with the alternative prayer that the case be re-opened for the introduction of additional evidence. Sandiganbayan promulgated (2000 resolution) denying the petitioners 2nd motion: On the matter of the [Bane deposition], [its] admission is done through the ordinary formal ofer of exhibits wherein the defendant is given ample opportunity to raise objection on grounds provided by law. Defnitely, it is not under Art (sic) 129 on judicial notice. Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners 3rdmotion:o 1998 Resolution which already denied the introduction in evidence of Banes deposition and which has become fnal in view of plaintifs failure to fle any MR or appeal within the 15-day reglementary period.o Plaintif has slept on its rights for almost two years that it sought to rectify its ineptitude by fling a motion to reopen its case as to enable it to introduce and ofer Banes deposition as additional evidence, or in the alternative for thecourt to take judicial notice of the allegations of the deposition.o it has been resolved as early as 1998 that the deposition is inadmissible.THE PETITION Petitioner asserts that CC No. 0130 (where the Bane deposition was originally taken, introduced and admitted in evidence) is but a child of the parent case, CC No. 0009; under this relationship, evidence ofered and admitted in any of the children cases should be considered as evidence in the parent case. Sandiganbayan should not have denied its admission on fimsy grounds, considering that:1. It was also already stated in the notice (of the taking of the Bane deposition) that it would be used as evidence in CC No. 0009. Notices having been duly served on all the parties concerned, they must accordingly be deemed to have waived their right to cross-examine the witness when they failed to show up.2. The Bane deposition was a very vital cog in the case of the petitioner relativeto its allegation that the respondents interest in ETPI and related frms properly belongs to the government.3. The non-inclusion of the Bane deposition in the petitioners formal ofer of evidence was obviously excusable considering the period that had lapsed from the time the case was fled and the voluminous records that the present case has generated. THE RESPONDENTS COMMENTS AND THE PETITIONERS REPLY Respondents:o 3rd motion - mere rehash of similar motions earlier fled by the petitioner,likewise simply assails the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution.o 3rd motion actually partakes of a proscribed third MR of the 1998 resolution.o respondents assert that they have not waived their right to cross-examine the deponent;o the allegations in the Bane deposition cannot be a proper subject of judicial notice under Rule 129.o Bane deposition is inadmissible in evidence because the petitioner failed to comply with the requisites for admission under Sec 47, Rule 130. Petitioner:o it fled the 3rd motion precisely because of the Sandiganbayans 2000 resolution, which held that the admission of the Bane deposition should be done through the ordinary formal ofer of evidence.o it has not yet rested its case although it has fled a formal ofer of evidence.o mere reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the deponent is sufcient for the admission of the Bane deposition considering that the deponent is not an ordinary witness who can be easily summoned by our courts in light of his foreign residence, his citizenship, and his advanced age. Rule 24 (now Rule 23), and not Sec 47, Rule 130, should apply to the present case, as explicitly stated in the notice of the deposition-taking.ISSUES/RULINGWON THE CONSOLIDATION OF CC NO. 0009 AND CC NO. 0130 DISPENSED WITH THE USUAL REQUISITES OF ADMISSIBILITY. NO.Pahina 2 ng 33Evidence Day 02 Petitioner argues that the Bane deposition can be admitted in evidence without observing the provisions of Sec 47, Rule 130. The petitioner claims that in light of the prior consolidation of CC No. 0009 and CC No. 0130, among others, the former case or proceeding that Sec 47, Rule 130 speaks of no longer exists. Consolidation is used generically and even synonymously with joint hearing or trial of several causes. There is nothing that would even suggest that the Sandiganbayan in fact intended a merger of causes of action, parties and evidence. At most , there was a consolidation of trial but not actual consolidation. Considering the fact that in the present case the party respondents to CC No. 0009 are not parties to CC 0130, the conclusion that the Sandiganbayan in fact intended an actual consolidation. To impose upon the respondents the efects of an actual consolidation results in an outright deprivation of the petitioners right to due process especially where the evidence sought to be admitted is not simply a testimonytaken in one of the several cases, but a deposition upon oral examination taken in another jurisdiction and whose admission is governed by specifc provisions on our rules on evidence.WON THE BANE DEPOSITION IS ADMISSIBLE BY VIRTUE OF RULE 130, SEC 47. NO. Depositions are not meant as substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. Generally, the deponent must be presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing. Any deposition ofered to prove the facts set forth therein, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed by the adverse party and excluded under the hearsay rule i.e., that the adverse party had or has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time that his testimony is ofered. That opportunity for cross-examination was aforded during the taking of thedeposition alone is no argument, as the opportunity for cross-examination must normally be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during the trial or hearing of a case. However, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes laid down in Sec 4, Rule 23, the deposition may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand. Sec 47, Rule 130 lays down the following requisites for the admission of a testimony or deposition given at a former case or proceeding.1. The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or otherwise unable to testify;2. The testimony was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative;3. Involving the same parties;4. Relating to the same matter;5. The adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him. The reasons for the admissibility of testimony or deposition taken at a former trial or proceeding are the necessity for the testimony and its trustworthiness. However, before the former testimony or deposition can be introduced in evidence, the proponent must frst lay the proper predicate therefor, i.e., the party must establish the basis for the admission of the Bane deposition in the realm of admissible evidence. The deposition may not be allowed in this case because petitioner failed to impute, much less establish, the identity of interest or privity between the then opponent, Africa, and the present opponents, the respondents.WON THE RESPONDENTS NOTICE OF TAKING OF BANE DEPOSITION IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF WAIVER. NO. The petitioner asserts that the respondents have waived their right to cross-examine the deponent for their failure to appear at the deposition-taking despite individual notices previously sent to them. Petitioners reliance on the prior notice on the respondents, as adequate opportunity for cross-examination, cannot override the non-party status of the respondents in CC No. 0130 the efect of consolidation being merely for trial. As non-parties, they cannot be bound by proceedings in that case. Specifcally, they cannot be bound by the taking of the Bane deposition without the consequent impairment of theirright of cross-examination. After failing to take Banes deposition in 1991 and in view of the peculiar circumstancesof this case, the least that the petitioner could have done was to move for the taking of the Bane deposition and proceed with the deposition immediately upon securing a favorable ruling thereon Fundamental fairness dictates this course of action. It must be stressed that not only were the respondents non-parties to CC No. 0130, they likewise have no interest inAfricas certiorari petition asserting his right as an ETPI stockholder. Considering that the testimony of Bane is allegedly a vital cog in the petitioners case against the respondents, the Court is left to wonder why the petitioner had to take the deposition in an incident case (instead of the main case) at a time when it became the technical right of the petitioner to do so.[SYLLABUS TOPIC] WON THE SANDIGANBAYAN SHOULD HAVE TAKEN JUDICIAL NOTICE OF BANES DEPOSITION. NO. The petitioner also claims that since the Bane deposition had already been previously introduced and admitted in CC No. 0130, then the Sandiganbayan should have taken judicial notice of the Bane deposition as part of its evidence. Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without proof because these facts are already known to them. It is the assumption by a court of a fact without need of further traditional evidentiary support. The principle is based on convenience and expediency in securing and introducing evidence on matters which are not ordinarily capable of dispute and are not bona fde disputed. The foundation for judicial notice may be traced to the civil and canon law maxim, manifesta (or notoria) non indigent probatione.The taking of judicial notice means that the court will dispense with the traditional form of presentation of Pahina 3 ng 33Evidence Day 02evidence. In so doing, the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it would not be disputed. The concept of judicial notice is embodied in Rule 129. Rule 129 either requires the court to take judicial notice of the ofcial acts of the x x x judicial departments of the Philippines, or gives the court the discretion to take judicial notice of matters oughtto be known to judges because of their judicial functions. Generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge. This rule though admits of exceptions. As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case fled in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of, and absent an objection from, the adverse party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufciently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives at the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending. Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another case or cases, where sufcient basis exists in the records of the case before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case. The issue before us does not involve the applicability of the rule on mandatory taking ofjudicial notice; neither is the applicability of the rule on discretionary taking of judicial notice seriously pursued. Petitioner approaches the concept of judicial notice from a genealogical perspective of treating whatever evidence ofered in any of the children cases CC 0130 as evidence in the parent case CC 0009 - or of the whole family of cases. To the petitioner, the supposed relationship of these cases warrants the taking of judicial notice. We strongly disagree.o The supporting cases the petitioner cited are inapplicable either becausethese cases involve only a single proceeding or an exception to the rule, which proscribes the courts from taking judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases.o The petitioners proposition is obviously obnoxious to a system of orderly procedure. The petitioner itself admits that the present case has generated a lot of cases, which, in all likelihood, involve issues of varyingcomplexity. If we follow the logic of the petitioners argument, we would be espousing judicial confusion by indiscriminately allowing the admission of evidence in one case, which was presumably found competent and relevant in another case, simply based on the supposed lineage of the cases. It is the duty of the petitioner, as a party-litigant, to properly lay before the court the evidence it relies upon in support of the relief it seeks, instead of imposing that same duty on the court. The Judge in trying a case sees only with judicial eyes as he ought to know nothing about the facts of the case, except those which have been adduced judicially in evidence.Thus, when the case is up for trial, the judicial head is empty as to facts involved and itis incumbent upon the litigants to the action to establish by evidence the facts upon which they rely.NEW SUN VALLEY HOMEOWNER'S ASS'N., INC. V. SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY, BRGY. SUNVALLEY, PARAAQUE CITY, G.R. NO. 156686, JULY 27, 2011.NEW SUN VALLEY HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC. vs SANGGUNIANG BRGY., BRGY. SUN VALLEYFactsRespondent Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley issued a Resolution to petitioner New Sun Valley Homeowners Association (NSVHAI) directing it to open Rosemallow and Aster Streets to private vehicles and pedestrian trafc at all hours daily except from 11 p.m to 5 a.m.NSVHAI, represented by its President Marita Cortez, fled a petition for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Permanent Injunction with a prayer for issuance of TRO with the RTC, arguing that the resolution would disrupt the residents' safety, health and well-being, that it would destroy the roads and drainage system on said streets (as these were not designed to withstand heavy trafc), and that there are other ways to ease trafc fow anyway, such as strict enforcement of trafc rules and regulations, and the presence of trafc enforcers on all trafc choke points. In its Amended Petition, NSVHAI also claimed that respondent had no jurisdiction over the opening of Rosemallow and Aster Streets as such can only be ordered through an ordinance.BSV Sangguniang Barangay fled its Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of failure to state a cause of action, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and lack of court jurisdiction over the subject matter, alleging that the subject streets are of the public domain and are thus owned by the local government. It was granted, prompting petitioner to appeal the casebefore the Supreme Court.Issuew/n the CA erred in dismissing the case by making fndings of fact not supported by evidence of recordHeldNO, the CA did not err in dismissing the case of the petitionersRatioBurden of ProofPahina 4 ng 33Evidence Day 02Being the party asking for injunctive relief, the burden of proof was on the petitioner to show ownership over the subject roads. It is a basic rule in civil cases that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence, relying on the strength of their own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.In this case, NSVHAI did not submit an iota of proof to support its acts of ownership over Rosemallow and Aster streets (closing the roads, collecting fees from delivery vans passing through, etc). On the other hand, the local government units power to close and open roads within its jurisdiction is clear under Section 211 of the Local Government Code. However, since Rosemallow and Aster Streets have already been donated by the Sun Valley Subdivision to the City Government of Paranaque, they have since then taken the nature of public roads which are withdrawn from the commerce of man, and hence placed beyond the private rights or claims of herein Appellant. Section 21 of the LGC thus does not apply in this case.Judicial NoticeMoreover, NSVHAI wants the court to take judicial knowledge that criminal activities like robbery and kidnapping are becoming daily fares in Philippine society. However, Rule 129 provides that:Rule 129WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVEDSECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the ofcial acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.(1a)The activities claimed by petitioner to be part of judicial knowledge are not found in the rule quoted above and do not support its petition for injunctive relief in any way.As petitioner has failed to establish that it has any right entitled to the protection of the law,and it also failed to exhaust administrative remedies by applying for injunctive relief insteadof going to the Mayor as provided by the Local Government Code, the petition must be denied.1 Section 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. (a) A local government unit may pursuant to an ordinance permanently or temporarily close or open any local road alley par! or s"uare falling #ithin its $urisdiction% Provided ho#ever &hat in case of permanent closure such ordinance must 'e approved 'y at least t#o(thirds (2)*) of all the mem'ers of the sanggunian and #hen necessary an ade"uate su'stitute for the pu'lic facility that is su'$ect to closure is provided.Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remediesThe thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respectivecompetence. In this case, It is the Mayor who can best review the Sangguniang Barangays actions to see if it acted within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions. Indeed, this is a local problem to be resolved within the local government.Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly found that the trial court committed no reversible errorin dismissing the case for petitioners failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as the requirement under the Local Government Code that the closure and opening of roads be made pursuant to an ordinance, instead of a resolution, is not applicable in this case because the subject roads belong to the City Government of Paranaque.ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. V. MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC., G.R. NO. 171406, APRIL 4, 2011.ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. v. MALAYAN INSURANCE, CO., INC., (2011)DEL CASTILLO, J.:FACTS:1. On November 14, 1995, Shandong Weifang Soda Ash Plant shipped on board the vessel MV Jinlian I 60,000 plastic bags of soda ash dense (each bag weighing 50 kilograms) from China to Manila. The shipment, with an invoice value of US$456,000.00, was insured with respondent Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. under Marine Risk Note No. RN-0001-21430, and covered by a Bill of Lading issued by Tianjin Navigation Company with Philippine Banking Corporation as the consignee and Chemphil Albright and Wilson Corporation as the notify party.2. On November 21, 1995, upon arrival of the vessel at Pier 9, South Harbor, Manila, the stevedores of petitioner Asian Terminals, Inc., a duly registered domestic corporation engaged in providing arrastre and stevedoring services, unloaded the 60,000 bags of soda ash dense from the vessel and brought them to the open storage area of petitioner for temporary storage and safekeeping, pending clearance from the Bureau of Customs and delivery to the consignee. When the unloading of the bags was completed on November 28, 1995, 2,702 bags were foundto be in bad order condition.3. On November 29, 1995, the stevedores of petitioner began loading the bags in the trucks of MEC Customs Brokerage for transport and delivery to the consignee. On December 28, 1995, after all the bags were unloaded in the warehouses of the consignee, a total of 2,881 bags were in bad order condition due to spillage, caking,and hardening of the contents.4. On April 19, 1996, respondent, as insurer, paid the value of the lost/ damaged cargoes to the consignee in the amount of P643,600.25.5. On November 20, 1996, respondent, as subrogee of the consignee, fled before RTC of Manila for damages against petitioner, the shipper Inchcape Shipping Services, and the cargo broker MEC Customs Brokerage.Pahina 5 ng 33Evidence Day 026. RTC rendered a Decision fnding petitioner liable for the damage/loss sustained bythe shipment but absolving the other defendants. The RTC found that the proximate cause of the damage/loss was the negligence of petitioners stevedores who handled the unloading of the cargoes from the vessel. The RTC emphasized that despite the admonitions of Marine Cargo Surveyors Edgar Liceralde and Redentor Antonio not to use steel hooks in retrieving and picking-up the bags, petitioners stevedores continued to use such tools, which pierced the bags and caused the spillage.The RTC, thus, ruled that petitioner, as employer, is liable for the acts and omissions of its stevedores under Articles 2176 and 2180 paragraph (4) of the Civil Code. The CA denied the appeal.ISSUE (TOPICAL): WON the court can take judicial notice of the Management Contract between petitioner and the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) in determining petitioners liability.HOLDING: Judicial notice does not apply.1. Petitioner claims that the amount of damages should not be more than P5,000.00, pursuant to its Management Contract for cargo handling services with the PPA. Petitioner contends that the CA should have taken judicial notice of the said contract since it is an ofcial act of an executive department subject to judicial cognizance.2. Respondent contends that this is outside the operation of judicial notice. And even if it is not, petitioners liability cannot be limited by it since it is a contract of adhesion.3. The Management Contract entered into by petitioner and the PPA is clearly not among the matters which the courts can take judicial notice of. It cannot be considered an ofcial act of the executive department. The PPA, which was createdby virtue of Presidential Decree No. 857, as amended, is a government-owned and controlled corporation in charge of administering the ports in the country. Obviously, the PPA was only performing a proprietary function when it entered into a Management Contract with petitioner. As such, judicial notice cannot be applied.AS TO THE LIABILITY: The petition was DENIED. Asian Terminals is liable.From the nature of the damage caused to the shipment, i.e., torn bags, spillage of contents and hardened or caked portions of the contents, it is not difcult to see that the damage caused was due to the negligence of ATIs stevedores who used steel hooks to retrieve the bags from the higher portions of the piles thereby piercing the bags and spilling their contents, and who piled the bags in the open storage area of ATI with insufcient coverthereby exposing them to the elements and causing the contents to cake or harden.B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC. V. CA, G.R. NO. 159230, OCTOBER 18, 2010.B.E. San Diego Inc. v. Court of AppealsDoctrine: Geographical divisions are subject to mandatory judicial notice. A new barrio being previously part of another barrio is a geographical division which is a matter subject of mandatory judicial notice.FACTS:B.E. San Diego fled an accion publiciana (recovery of possession, who has a better right to possession) against Jovita Matias over a parcel of land located in Malabon. In her Answer, Matias said that the property she is occupying is diferent from the property that B.E. San Diego seeks to recover.She claimed that the property she is now occupying is located in Barrio Catmon while the property B.E. San Diego is seeking to recover is located in Barrio Tinajeros as shown in the transfer certifcate of title (TCT) it presented.RTC took judicial notice of the fact that Barrio Catmon was previously part of Barrio Tinajeros, and declared B.E. San Diego as the rightful owner of the subject property. CA however reversed the RTC and said that the discrepancy in the location is signifcant, and RTC should have required an expert witness from concerned government agency to resolve the said discrepancy.ISSUE:Whether or not the testimony of an expert witness is necessary to explain the discrepancy inthe location of the subject propertyHELD:No. Expert witness testimony is not necessary.RATIO:The RTC has authority to declare that the discrepancy arose from the fact that Barrio Catmon was previously part of Barrio Tinajeros. This is a matter subject of mandatory judicial notice. Geographical division is among matters that courts should take judicial notice of as provided for in Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.Given that Barrio Tinajeros is adjacent to Barrio Catmon, it is likely that, indeed, the two barrios previously formed one geographical unit.Sufcient evidence also exists to support this conclusion. The TCT of B.E. San Diego identifes the property as Lot No. 3, Block No. 13 in Barrio Tinajeros. B.E. San Diegos tax declaration identifes it too as Lot No. 3, Block No. 13 but located in Barrio Catmon. It is clear though that both title and the tax declaration share the same boundaries to identify the property. The trial court judge can very well ascertain the facts to resolve the discrepancy and dispense with the need for the testimony of an expert witness.BARUT V. PEOPLE, G. R. NO. 167454, SEPTEMBER 24, 2014.EMERITU C. BARUT v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (2014, J. Bersamin)FACTSPahina 6 ng 33Evidence Day 021. Barut (a guard of Philippine National Construction Corporation) was tried for and found guilty of homicide by the RTC of Muntinlupa City2. Background: SPO4 Vicente Ucag was on board a passenger jeepney (driven by his brother) on the SLEX, coming from Laguna and going back to Metro Manila. His wife and 16-yr old son Vincent were riding an owner-type jeep driven by Rico Villas on the same route. When the jeep driven by Villas exited at the Sucat interchange ahead of Ucags jeepney, PNCC guards Ancheta and Barut stopped Villas. They informed him that his vehicle had no headlights, asked for his license, and issued him a trafc violation report (TVR) ticket. The jeepney carrying Ucag then stopped where Villas jeep had parked. Ucag and co-passenger Fabiano alighted and approached Ancheta and Barut to inquire what the matter was. Ucag then requested the return of Villas license upon being apprised, but Ancheta refused. Argument ensued. Later, Ucag turned around to avoid further argument, which irked Ancheta. Ancheta then suddenly pulled out his .38 caliber revolver and fred it several times. Ucag was hit on both thighs. Ucag fred back and hit Ancheta. Vicente Ucag (son), upon seeing the exchange of gunshots, rushed towards Ucag (his father). Before he could reach his father, Barut fred at Vincent in the chest. Vicente was rushed to the Paranaque Medical Center. He died during the emergency surgery.3. Baruts contentions: the extrajudicial statement that Villas gave at about 1:00pm of September 25 1995 (a day after the fatal shooting of Vincent), in which he declared not having seen Barut fre a gun, is inconsistent with Villas court testimony on June 10 1996; this manifested that he was not clear and convincing because he never pointed out who [had] really shot Vincent Ucag.o Question during direct examination: What was the reason if you know why he (Vicente Ucag) was weak?o Villas answer: Maybe he was hit Such inconsistency gave rise to the doubt as to who really shot and killed the victim4. CA: Villas and Fabiano clearly and consistently testifed that Barut was the person who shot Vincent, and Baruts bare denial of fring at Vincent did not prevail over their positive and categorical identifcation of him as the perpetrator the RTC could not take the declaration of Villas into consideration because Villas extrajudicial sworn statement containing the declaration had not been ofered and admitted as evidence by either side. Only evidence that was formally ofered and made part of the records could be considered. In any event, the supposed contradiction between the extrajudicial sworn statement and the court testimony should be resolved in favor of the latter.5. Barut seeks review of his conviction by petition for review on certiorariRULING: CA ruling afrmed.1. Findings of fact by the RTC are accorded great respect especially when afrmed by the CA RTC judge has personal and direct observation of the witnesses manner and decorum during intensive grilling by the counsel for the accused2. CAs negative treatment of the declaration contained in Villas extra-judicial sworn statement was in accord with rules and jurisprudence Sec. 34, Rule 132 (Rules of Court): the RTC, as the trial court, could consider only the evidence that had been formally ofered; the ofering party must specify the purpose for which the evidence was being oferedo Purpose: to ensure the right of the adverse party to due process of law (to timely object to the evidence as well as to properly counter the impact of evidence not formally ofered)o Candido v. CA: xxx a formal ofer is necessary since judges are required to base their fndings of fact and judgment only upon the evidence ofered by the parties at the trial xxx The rule that only evidence formally ofered before the trial court can be considered is relaxed upon the concurrence of two requisites:(a) The evidence was duly identifed by testimony duly recorded(b) The evidence was incorporated in the records of the case Furthermore, the rule has no application where:(a) The court takes judicial notice of adjudicative facts pursuant to Section 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, or(b) where the court relies on judicial admissions or draws inferences from such judicial admissions within the context of Section 4,14 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court; or(c) where the trial court, in judging the demeanor of witnesses, determines their credibility even without the ofer of the demeanor as evidence.DELA LLANA V. BIONG, G.R. NO. 182356, DECEMBER 4, 2013.Dela Llana v BiongAction: Petition for review under Rule 45 of ROC(Note: Relevant to Section is the question on Judicial Notice)FACTS: Petitioner Dra. dela Llana was on front passenger seat while Juan dela Llana was driving along North Ave. Dump truck carrying sand and gravel rammed into their rear. They were bumped by driver Joel Primero, employed by Rebecca Biong.Pahina 7 ng 33Evidence Day 02 Dra. dela Llana started feeling pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder deteriorating her health after a month. It was soon found out she had an injury caused by compression of nerve running to her left arm and hand.o Underwent surgery but it incapacitated her from practice of her profession. Petitioner demanded compensation from Respondent Biong. But respondent refused payment. Petitioner fled for damages in RTC. Petitioner presented her Medical Certifcate for sufering whiplash injury as evidence. Respondent presented Testimonial evidence of herself, Joel and licensed driver-mechanic Alberto Marcelo. RTC ruled in favor of Petitioner holding the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana's whiplash injury to be Joel's reckless driving. CA reversed RTC ruling saying Petitioner failed to establish reasonable connection bet. vehicular accident and whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence citing Nutrimix Feeds Corp v CA.o CA declared courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries. Arguments:o Petitioner Stressed that Nutrimix ruling involved the application of Article 1561 and 1566 of the Civil Code on hidden defects and no evidence was shown to connect the poisonous animal feeds sold to respondents. Preponderance of evidence is shown in 1) pictures of damaged car 2)medical certifcate 3) petitioners testimony since she is a medical surgeon. Judicial Notice should be rendered to the causation of whiplash injury from accident since such is a matter of common knowledge.o Respondent Argues that Petitioner does not ofer substantial merit to Courts consideration ISSUE: Whether or not Joel's reckless driving is the proximate cause of Petitioner Dra. dela Llana's whiplash injury? HELD: No. Petitioner failed to establish preponderance of evidence. RATIO:o Petitioner should establish preponderance of evidence on the quasi-delict case(Art 2176 of Civil Code)o It is required that Petitioner show chain of causation between the reckless driving and the whiplash injury in order for presumption to arise. He who alleges has burden of proving allegation by preponderance of evidence. Burden falls on the Petitioner.o Petitioner failed to adduce the evidentiary facts by which the ultimate fact can be adduced. 1) Picture of the damaged car only demonstrated the impact of the collision. But it did not establish result of whiplash. 2) Medical certifcate cannot be considered because it was not admitted in evidence. CA should have not considered it as documentary evidence since RTC did not admit it. Said medical certifcate is has no Probative Value for being hearsay since it is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on knowledge of another person not in the witness stand. 3) Petitioner's opinion that Joel's negligence caused her whiplash injury has no probative value. She serves as an ordinary witness and not an expert witness. Opinion of ordinary witness may be received: (a) identity of persons he has adequate knowledge (b) handwriting he has familiarity (c) sanity of person sufciently acquainted Expert witness may be received on special knowledge, skill, experience or training. Yet, courts do not immediately accord probative value to an expert testimony. Testimony of Petitioner on whiplash efect cannot be givenprobative value since she serves as not as an expert witness.o IN REGARD to the Judicial Notice on whiplash injuries caused by vehicularaccidents. Courts cannot take judicial notice on such because 1) not public knowledge 2) not capable of unquestionable demonstration 3) not known to judges on their judicial functions (Sec 3 of Rule 129 ROC) Court has no expertise in the feld of medicine contrary to Petitioners claim. She failed to render testimonial/ documentary evidence in the Trial Court.MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 190793, JULY 19, 2012.MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (from UST Law Review)Public knowledge of facts pertaining to employment of violence and unlawful means to achieve ones goals is within the determination of the COMELEC, and such fact is sufcient to deny a party registration and accreditation.Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) fed its Petition for Registration with the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in the 2010 National and Local Elections. It was represented by its Chairperson, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV (Trillanes), and its Secretary General, Francisco Ashley L. Acedillo (Acedillo).Pahina 8 ng 33Evidence Day 02Taking cognizance of the Oakwood incident, the COMELEC denied the Petition, claiming that MAGDALOs purpose was to employ violence and unlawful means to achieve their goals.ISSUE:Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Petition for Registration fled by MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to achieve its goals through violent or unlawful meansHELD:MAGDALO contends that it was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to have denied the Petition for Registration not on the basis of facts or evidence on record, but on mere speculation and conjectures. This argument cannot be given any merit. Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may be taken of matters that are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration. Further, Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code, specifcally empowers administrative agencies to admit and give probative value to evidence commonly acceptable by reasonably prudent men, and to take notice of judicially cognizable facts.That the Oakwood incident was widely known and extensively covered by the media made it a proper subject of judicial notice. Thus, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it treated these facts as public knowledge, and took cognizance thereof without requiring the introduction and recent jurisprudence. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in fnding that MAGDALO uses violence or unlawful means to achieve its goals. Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means shall be Denied registration. This disqualifcation is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that no political party which seeks to achieve its goal through Violence shall be entitled to accreditation.In the present case, the Oakwood incident was one that was attended with Violence. As publicly announced by the leaders of MAGDALO during the siege, their objectives were to express their dissatisfaction with the administration of Former President Arroyo and to divulge the alleged corruption in the military and The supposed sale of arms to enemies of the state. Ultimately, they wanted the President, her cabinet members, and the top ofcials of the AFP and the PNP To resign. To achieve these goals, MAGDALO opted to seize a hotel occupied by civilians, March in the premises in full battle gear with ammunitions, and plantExplosives in the building. These brash methods by which MAGDALO opted to ventilate the grievances of its members and withdraw its support from the government constituted clear acts of violence. The COMELEC did not, therefore, commit grave abuse of discretion when ittreated the Oakwood standof as a Manifestation of the predilection of MAGDALO for resorting to violence or Threats thereof in order to achieve its objectives.The fnding that MAGDALO seeks to achieve its goals through violence or unlawful means did not operate as a prejudgment of Criminal Case No. 03-2784. The power vested by ArticleIX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881 in the COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in the elections is purely administrative in Character. In exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to assess whether the party or organization seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing acts considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in Nature.In fnding that MAGDALO resorts to violence or unlawful acts to fulfl its organizational objectives, the COMELEC did not render an assessment as to whether the members of MAGDALO committed crimes, as COMELEC was not required to make that determination in the frst place. Its evaluation was limited only to examining whether MAGDALO possessed all the necessary qualifcations and none of disqualifcations for registration as a political party. Accreditation as a political party is not a right but only a privilege given to groups who have Qualifed and met the requirements provided by law.Note worthily, however, in view of the subsequent amnesty granted in favour of the membersof MAGDALO, the events that transpired during the Oakwood incident can no longer be interpreted as acts of violence in the context of the disqualifcations from party registration.SPS. LATIP V. CHUA, G.R. NO. 177809, OCTOBER 16, 2009.FACTS:( Respondent Rosalie Chua is the owner of Roferxane Building, a commercial building in Baclaran.( In 2001, she fled a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against the Sps. Latip. She attached to the complaint a contract of lease over two cubicles of the building.( A year after the commencement of the lease and with the Sps. Latip already occupying the leased cubicles, Rosalie, through counsel, sent the spouses a letter demanding payment of back rentals and should they fail( In their Answer, the Sps. Latip refuted Rosalies claims. They averred that the lease of the two cubicles had already been paid in full as evidenced by receipts showing payment to Rosalie of the total amount of 2.5M.( Sps. Latip asseverated that sometime in October 1999, Rosalie ofered for sale lease rights over 2 cubicles in the building. According to them, the immediate payment of 2.5M would be used to fnish the construction of the building giving them frst priority in the occupation of the fnished cubicles.( In December 1999, as soon as the 2 cubicles were fnished, Sps. Latip occupied them without waiting for completion of the other 5 stalls.MTC: in favor of Rosalie and asked them to vacate the premisesRTC: ruled in favor of Sps. Latip, did not give credence to the contract of lease( lacked the signature of Ferdinand Chua, etc.Pahina 9 ng 33+O& ,-1 o#ned 'y .egayo 'eing leased to /arencio(.ingle 0loilo/ a l a u d R i v e r m a y a+O& 1*2,O#ned 'y .inglasan(Pototan 0loilo)Evidence Day 02( signature of Sps. Latip( the specifc dates on the term of the contract( exact date of execution of the document( provision for payment of deposit or advance rental which is supposedly uncommon in big commercial lease contracts( As to Rosalies claim that her receipt of 2.5M was simply goodwill payment by the prospective leases, and not payment for the purchase of lease rights, the RTC shot this down and pointed out that, apart from her bare allegations, Rosalie did not adduce evidence in this regard.CA: reversed the decision of the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MTC ( found that the alleged defects of the contract of lease did not render the contract inefective( On the issue of WON the 2.5M was goodwill payment, the CA took judicial notice of this common practice in the area of Baclaran (also bolstered by the statement ofthe other occupants)ISSUES/HELD: WON taking judicial notice of goodwill payments is proper NORATIO:( Sec. 1 and 2 of Rule 129 declare when the taking of judicial notice is mandatory or discretionary.( State Prosecutors v. Muro is also instructive:o The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and everyreasonable doubt on the subject should be prompty resolved in the negative.o Requisites:1. Matter must be one of common and general knowledge2. It must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain3. It must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the courto Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court.- reiterates the requisite of notoriety( Things of common knowledge of which courts could take judicial notice may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration.( Here, RTC specifcally ruled that apart from the bare allegation, Rosalie produced no evidence to prove her claim that the amount of 2.5M simply constituted the payment of goodwill money.( Here, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching documentaryevidence. Apparently, only that division of the CA had knowledge of the practice to pay goodwill money in the Baclaran area.( DISPOSITIVE: Liable to pay unpaid rentals minus 2.5M payment.DEGAYO V. MAGBANUA-DINGLASAN, G.R. NO. 173148, APRIL 6, 2015.Degayo v. DinglasanPetitioner: ELSA DEGAYORespondent: CECILIA MAGBANUA-DINGLASAN, et. alTopic: Judicial NoticeKeywords: Accretion, General Rule on Judicial Notice, Exception, Close ConnectionBrion, J. (2015)Facts:1. This petition for review involves two cases:a. Case 1: Magbanua-Dinglasan v. Jarencio (Branch 27)b. Case 2: Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan (Branch 22)2. The river bounding the two lots and separating Dingle from Pototan, Iloilo, as illustrated, steadily moved its course sometime in 1970 towards the banks of Pototan, leaving its old riverbed dry. As a result the lot owned by Dinglasan progressively decreased while the lot of Degayo increased in land area. Because Degayo and her tenant, Jarencio, believed that the increase was an accretion to Lot 861, Jarencio cultivated said land. DInglasan, however, believed that the land was an abandoned riverbed and therefore, belonged to them.Pahina 10 ng 33Evidence Day 023. To assert their right over the disputed land, Dinglasan, et al., fled Case 1 against Jarencio, the tenant, a complaint seeking to declare her the owner of the land and for damages.4. Degayo sought to intervene in Case 1, being the owner of the land, but her motion was denied. Degayo never questioned this order. Hindi nya siguro alam ang petition for certiorari (Rule 65) na favorite ni Ta Vicks. However, she was able to participate in the case as witness for the defense.5. Instead, she fled a separate petition, (Cae 2) also for declaration of ownership with damages. The matters she raised herein are the same as those she raised as witness in Case 1.6. RTC Iloilo Branch 27 ruled in favor of Dinglasan (no accretion happened). Jarenciofailed to perfect the appeal, hence, the case became fnal and executory.7. On the other hand, in Case 2, Branch 22 ruled in favor of Degayo (there was an accretion).8. Dinglasan appealed to the CA; the CA reversed. Ruling of CA:a. The disputed land was an abandoned riverbed, hence belonged to Dinglasan.b. The decision in Case 1 was conclusive to the title of the thing, being an aspect of the rule on conclusiveness on judgment.RELEVANT ISSUE:1. WON CA erred in taking judicial notice of the RTC decision in Case 1 which was not presented during the hearing of the present case.HELD:1. NO.General rule: Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge.Exceptions: (Enunciated in Tiburcio v. PHHC)1. When a case has close connection with the matter in the controversy (asin this case)2. When a previous case determines WON the case pending is a moot oneThe Court did not elaborate on this but obviously, this case belongs to the frst exception. The matter in controversy in this case is the nature of the disputed land (WON its an accretion) and such controversy is closely linked, in fact similar, with the 1st case.Also, Degayos objection was deemed a mere technicality because Degayo herself repeatedly referred to the Case 1 in her pleadings in Case 2, as well as in her appellees brief before the CA and her petition for review in the SC. The existenceof Case 1 was also jointly stipulated by the parties in Case 2.OTHER ISSUES (In case she asks)1. WON the disputed property is an abandoned riverbed and not an accretion. YESArt. 461 CC - River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost.2. WON Case 1 constitutes Res Judicata to Case 2. YESTwo concepts of Res Judicata:a. Bar by former judgment - a judgment constitutes a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action.b. Conclusiveness of judgment - precludes the relitigation of a particular fact of issue in another action between the same parties on a diferent claim or cause of action. For this concept to apply, the identities of parties and issues must be the same.Issue both cases involve the question on the nature of the disputed landParties need not be identical; only community of interest is required. Degayo is privy to the interest of Jarencio in the frst case since she is the owner of Lot 861.ANDO V. DFA, G.R. NO. 195432, AUGUST 27, 2014.Edelina Ando v. DFAAug. 27, 2014 | Sereno | 1stFACTS:Edelina Ando married Japanese National Yuichiro Kobayashi. In Japan, Yuichiro Kobayashiwas validly granted a divorce. Believing in good faith that the divorce capacitated her to remarry, Edelina married Masatomi Ando. Edelina applied for the renewal of her Philippinepassport to indicate her surname as Ando but was told at the DFA that the same cannot be issued to her until she can prove by competent court decision that her marriage with her said husband Masatomi is valid until otherwise declared.Edelina fled with the RTC a petition for declaratory relief, impleading the DFA as respondent and praying the court to declare her marriage with Masatomi as valid and to direct the DFA to issue a passport under the name Edelina Ando y Tungol. RTC issued an order dismissing the petition for want of cause and action as well as jurisdiction. The RTC said there is no showing that Edelina complied with the requirements set forth in Art. 13 of the Family Code, that is obtaining a judicial recognition of the foreign decree of absolute divorce. After Edelina fled an ex parte motion for reconsideration of the order was endorsed to a family court, which dismissed the petition anew on the ground that petitioner had no cause of action. An ex parte motion for reconsideration was also denied.Edelina fled this petition for review under Rule 45.ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in ruling that she had no cause of action.Pahina 11 ng 33Evidence Day 02PETITIONER: Under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it is solely the wife or the husband who can flea petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a void marriage. Thus, the state cannot collaterally attack the validity of a marriage in a petition for declaratory relief. Further, Edelina alleged that a marriage shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in ajudicial proceeding. She also argued that assuming a court judgment recognizing a judicial decree of divorce is required under Article 13 of the Family Code, noncompliance therewith is a mere irregularity in the issuance of a marriage license.RESPONDENT: Prior judicial recognition by a Philippine court of a divorce decree obtained by the alien spouse is required before a Filipino spouse can remarry and be entitled to the legal efects of remarriage.SC: Petition is without merit.1. Edelina incorrectly fled a petition for declaratory relief with respect to her prayer to compel the DFA to issue her passport. She should have frst appealed before the Secretary ofForeign Afairs, according to the Philippine Passport Act.2. Edelina should have fled a petition for the judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from her frst husband with respect to her prayer for the recognition of her second marriage as valid.In Garcia v. Recio, the SC ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufcient; both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment. The law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven and like any other fact.There appears to be insufcient proof or evidence presented on record of both the national law of her frst husband, Kobayashi, and of the validity of the divorce decree under that national law. Any declaration as to the validity of the divorce can only be made upon her complete submission of evidence proving the divorce decree and the national law of her alienspouse, in an action instituted in the proper forum.NOVERAS V. NOVERAS, G.R. NO. 188289, AUGUST 20, 2014.David A. Noveras v. Leticia T. Noveras20 August 2014J. Perez | 2nd DivisionFacts:1. Petition for review assailing the Decision of the CA, which afrmed in part the RTC decision.2. Case: Petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property fled by LeticiaDavid and Leticia were married on 12/3/1988 in QC, Philippines. They have 2 children, namely: Jerome and Jena. They migrated to the USA where they eventually acquired American citizenship. They continues to own properties in theUS and Philippines.Due to business reverses, David returned to the Philippines in 2001. According to Leticia, sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his family and lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province.Leticia fled a petition for divorce with the Superior Court of California, whichwas granted. The California court also granted to Leticia the custody of her two children, as well as all the couples properties in the USA and awarded the Philippine properties to David.On 8 August 2005, Leticia fled a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. Grounds: David has abandoned Leticia and their 2 minor children or failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family; and At the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for atleast one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.3. RTC Recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that cover their legal and personal status are those of the USA. With respect to their marriage, the parties marriage had already been dissolved by virtue of the decree of dissolution of their marriage issued by the Superior Court of California. Thus, the petition fled by Leticia is converted as one for liquidation of the absolute community of property (ACP) regime with the determination of the legitimes, support and custody of the children, instead of an action for judicial separation of conjugal property. Re property relations, TC frst classifed their property regime as ACP because they did not execute any marriage settlement before the solemnization of their marriage pursuant to Article 75 of the Family Code. Then, TC ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any proof oftheir national law. TC held that as the instant petition does not fall under the provisions of the law for the grant of judicial separation of properties, the ACP cannot be forfeited in favor of Leticia and her children. Moreover, the trial court observed that Leticia failed to prove abandonment and infdelity with preponderant evidence.Pahina 12 ng 33Evidence Day 02 Decalred the ACP dissolved and awarded the Philippine properties to David only with of the awarded properties given to Jerome and Jena as their presumptive legitimes.4. CA: modifed the trial courts Decision by directing the equal division of the Philippine properties between the spouses.5. David fled petition for review.Issue 1: W/N the Court should recognize the Caifornia Judgment which awarded the Philippine properties to David. (Said judgment was made part of the pleadings presented and ofered in evidence)Held: TC erred in recognizing the divorce decree.The foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to show the efect of the judgmenton the alien himself or herself. Specifcally, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132.24 and132. 25, in relation to Rule 39. 48(b). The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifcally for the purpose orin another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.Under 132.24, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by: (1) an ofcial publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the ofcer having the legal custody thereof. Such ofcial publication or copy must be accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certifcate that the attesting ofcer has the legal custody thereof. The certifcate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular ofcials stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his ofce. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specifc part thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the ofcial seal of the attesting ofcer.132.25 states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specifc part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the ofcial seal of the attesting ofcer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.Only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certifcates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.The Court relaxed the requirement on certifcation in Bayot v. CA where it held therein that "[petitioner therein] was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufcient." In this case however, it appears that there is no seal from the ofce where the divorce decree was obtained.The application of the doctrine of processual presumption is entirely a diferent matter because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines.Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.Issue 2: W/N the Philippine properties should be awarded to David.Held: NOTC should have proceeded with the case as an action for judicial separation of conjugal property based on Art. 135 of the Family Code instead of converting it as a liquidation of theACP. It should have evaluated the grounds asserted by Leticia.The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this case to necessitate judicial separation of properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family Code.Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was nottackled in the trial courts decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the absolute community of properties.The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. It is undisputedthat the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David decided to go back to thePhilippines. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once confned, testifed that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form. Third, their divorce was granted by the California court in June 2005. Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.Disposition: CA decision afrmedLBP V. YATCO AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES, G.R. NO. 172551, JANUARY 15, 2014.Rule 129: What Need Not Be Proved>Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessaryLBP v YatcoJanuary 15, 2014Brion,2 J.FACTS: Respondent Yatco Agricultural enterprises (Yatco) was the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land in Laguna. In 1999, the government placed the property under the coverage of its Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).Pahina 13 ng 33Evidence Day 02 Pursuant to EO 405, LBP valued the property at PHP1+ M, which Yatco did not fnd acceptable. Yatco elevated the matter to DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). PARAD computed the propertys value at PHP16+ M; it used the propertys current market value (as shown in the tax declaration that Yatco submitted) and applied the formula MV x 2. PARAD noted that the LBP did not present any verifed or authentic document to back up its computation; hence, it brushed aside LBPs evaluation. LBP fled with the RTC of San Pablo City Branch 30, acting as Special Agrarian Court (RTC-SAC), a petition for judicial determination of just compensation. RTC-SAC fxed just compensation at PHP200/sqm. It used the valuation set by RTC Calamba Branches 35 and 36 in 2 civil cases. RTC-SAC did not give weight tothe LBPs evidence in justifying its valuation, pointing out that the LBP failed to prove that it complied with the prescribed procedure and likewise failed to consider the valuation factors provided in Sec 17 of the CARL. RTC-SAC denied LBPs MR. LBP appealed to the CA, CA dismissed appeal. Hence, this petition.ISSUE/HOLDING: W/N RTC-SACs determination of just compensation for the property was proper. NO. Petition granted, case was remanded to RTC-SAC.RATIO: [topic] The rules allow the courts to take judicial notice of certain facts. The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience for it fulflls the purpose that the evidence is intended to achieve, and in this sense, it isequivalent to proof. Generally, courts are not authorized to "take judicial notice ofthe contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge." They may take judicial notice of a decision or the facts prevailing in another case sitting in the same court if: (1) the parties present them in evidence, absent any opposition from the other party; or (2) the court, in its discretion, resolves to do so. In either case, the courts must observe the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.SC noted that Yatco ofered in evidence copies of the decisions in the civil cases, which ofer the LBP opposed. These were duly noted by the court. Even assuming, however, that the order of the RTC-SAC (that noted Yatcos ofer in evidence and the LBPs opposition to it) constitutes sufcient compliance with the requirement of Section 3, Rule 129 of the ROC, the Court still found the RTC-SACs valuation based on Branch 36s previous ruling to be legally erroneous because:1. The RTC-SAC fully disregarded Section 17 of R.A. No. 66572 and DAR AO 5-983 and thus acted outside the contemplation of the law. The RTC-SAC did not point to any specifc evidence or cite the values and amounts it used in arriving at the PHP200/sqm valuation. It did not even consider the propertys 2 Section 11. .etermination of /ust Compensation. 3 0n determining $ust compensation the cost of ac"uisition of the land the current value of li!e properties its nature actual use and income the s#orn valuation 'y the o#ner the ta4 declarations and the assessment made 'y government assessors shall 'e considered. &he social and economic 'ene5ts contri'uted 'y the farmers and the farm#or!ers and 'y the 6overnment to the property as #ell as the non(payment of ta4es or loans secured from any government 5nancing institution on the said land shall 'e considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.3A. &here shall 'e one 'asic formula for the valuation of lands covered 'y 7OS orCA%+7 8 (C90 4 :.-) ; (CS 4 :.*) ; (ed 9et 0ncomeCS 8 Compara'le Sales