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Local Conflict Dynamics and Development Projects in Indonesia: Part of the Problem or Part of a Solution?. Patrick Barron, University of Oxford Rachael Diprose , University of Oxford Michael Woolcock , World Bank Mixed Methods Course, Washington 9-10 February 2011. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Local Conflict Dynamics and Development Projects in Indonesia:
Part of the Problem or Part of a Solution?
Patrick Barron, University of OxfordRachael Diprose, University of Oxford
Michael Woolcock, World Bank
Mixed Methods Course, Washington9-10 February 2011
For more information: www.conflictanddevelopment.orgPatrick Barron, Rachael Diprose and Michael Woolcock (2011) Contesting Development:
Participatory Projects and Local Conflict Dynamics in Indonesia (Yale University Press)
Overview• Background
– Context, motivations– KDP & Community Conflict Negotiation Study
• Definitions, Hypotheses, Methodology• Key Findings
– Projects as ‘problem’ (i.e., as sources of conflict)– Projects as (part of a) ‘solution’?
• Policy, Project Implications• Q&A
2
Conflict and Change in Indonesia
• Indonesia in transition since 1998– Political, Economic, Social– Accompanied by violence (large and small episodes)– Institutional vacuum for managing conflicts
• Need to understand…– The nature and causes of violence– Possibilities for management or reduction of violence
• Limitations of previous research and responses– Conflict literature in general: econometrics vs. ethnography– In Indonesia (and elsewhere), focus on high conflict areas– Policy responses largely top-down, technocratic
3
KDP and Local Conflict
• KDP: US$ 1 billion community development program– Across 28,000 villages—40% of the total—from 1998-2006– September 2006: Announced as full, nation-wide program (PNPM)
• Mechanism: grants to sub-districts for villages to compete over– Small-scale infrastructure and economic activities– Built on local institutional structures; connects village to kecamatan– Mediated through forums and facilitators, to effect social change
• Aims: poverty relief most immediately, but also democratization, empowerment of marginalized groups– ‘Democracy project disguised as development project’
• Conflict links:– Sustained presence in high conflict areas (e.g., Aceh)– Preliminary evidence that it plays a role in conflict management
• Interest from GoI to expand/modify program in conflict areas (e.g., into Aceh and Maluku via SPADA)– Especially so in the aftermath of tsunami, Aceh peace agreements
4
Definitions
Definitions of key concepts– ‘Local’
• Sub-district (kecamatan) level and below
– ‘Conflict’ • Disputes that become violent or non-violent
– ‘Capacity’• Collective ability to manage/resolve disputes
– Direct KDP effects• Via forums and/or facilitators
– Indirect KDP effects• Via behavioral and/or normative shifts
5
Hypotheses• Projects as ‘Problem’
– All projects generate disputes (cf. Anderson 1999, Uvin 2000), especially those that overtly entail an element of competition
– KDP generates fewer conflicts than other projects– Fewer of the conflicts KDP does generate become violent
6
Hypotheses• Projects as ‘Problem’
– All projects generate disputes (cf. Anderson 1999, Uvin 2000), especially those that overtly entail an element of competition
– KDP generates fewer conflicts than other projects– Fewer of the conflicts KDP does generate become violent
• Projects as (part of a) ‘Solution’– Direct effects: KDP forums and facilitators create spaces and
procedures for both project and non-project dispute resolution
– Indirect effects: KDP participation (a) improves inter-group relations, (b) enhances negotiation skills, (c) ‘empowers’ the marginalized, and (d) establishes new norms/precedents
– Context effects: Positive impacts contingent on (a) program functionality and (b) ‘capacity’ of institutional environment
7
Summary of KDP Impact Hypotheses
Type of Impact
Context Capacity
Low High
Program Functionality Program Functionality
Low High Low High
Dire
ct
Forums (places)
Facilitators (people)
Indi
rect
Group Relations
Behavioral
Normative
8
Higher impact
9
Locations of study in Indonesia
NTTEast Java
• Selection of two “lower level” conflict provinces• Selected for diversity across all demographic indicators
Sampling Strategy
10
East Java
High CapacityPonorogo
Low CapacityPamekasan
High CapacitySikka
LLow CapacityManggarai
NTT
KDPBadegan
non-KDPSampung
Extra KDP: Jenangan
Extra KDP: Slahung
Sample
2 Provinces: diverse provinces
4 Districts: high/low capacity
16 Sub-districts: matched KDP/non-KDP
and extra for variation
40 Villages
Summary of Methods
11
Breadth
Depth
Case Studies
KI Survey
NewspaperAnalysis
PODES,GDS
Data Collection: Mixed Methods
• Qualitative approaches (‘depth’)– Team (of 16 researchers) spent seven months in the field– Structured interviews: 800 individual, 100 FGDs– Informal interviews and participant observation
• Initial analysis through case studies– Conflict pathways (68 cases)– Village conflict management capacity (40 cases)– Informed subsequent qualitative phases of research
• Complementary quantitative approaches (‘breadth’)– Newspaper study of reported conflicts/violence– Key informant survey (N=268)– PODES and GDS (nationally representative)
12
Assessing ‘impact’ of CDD projects
• Enormously difficult—methodologically, logistically, politically and empirically—to formally identify ‘impact’– Multiple interacting components; non-uniform; highly discretionary and
tailored to context idiosyncrasies; non-obvious (perhaps several, context-dependent) ‘functional form(s)’
• Prototypical “complex” CDD project:– Open project menu: unconstrained content of intervention– Highly participatory: communities control resources and decision-making– Decentralized: local providers and communities given high degree of
discretion in implementation– Emphasis on building capabilities and the capacity for collective action– Context-specific; project is (in principle) designed to respond to and
reflect local cultural realities• Thus equally problematic to draw general ‘policy implications’,
especially for other countries, contexts13
Using Mixed Methods to Make Causal Claims
Alternative Approaches to Understanding ‘Causality’• Econometrics: robustness tests on large N datasets;
controlling for various contending factors• History: processes, conjunctures shaping single/rare events• Anthropology: deep knowledge of contexts• ‘Legal standards’
‘Preponderance of the evidence’; ‘Beyond a reasonable doubt’
This study tries to integrate various types and ‘quality’ of evidence (qualitative and quantitative) to test particular hypotheses about the efficacy of KDP
14
Examples of local conflict (NTT)No. Type of Conflict Description
Locations (number violent incidents: 2001-2003)
Impacts (2001-2003)
I Natural resource conflict
(a) Privately owned Conflict over the ownership, access, or use of private natural resources
Manggarai (6), Sikka (2), Flotim (1), Ngada (1)
Killed: 4 Injured: 7 Property: 4
(b) Publicly/ communally owned
Conflict over the ownership, access, or use of public/communal natural resources
Manggarai (18), Ngada (9), Flotim (8), Ende (7), Sikka (5)
Killed: 54 Injured: 78 Property: 123
II Administrative Disputes
(a) Development programs/services
Management and/or procedures of government/non-government projects, funds or service
Manggarai (7), Ende (4), Flotim (4), Sikka (3), Ngada (2)
Killed: 2 Injured: 20 Property: 5
(b) Administrative Jurisdiction
Disputes over administrative jurisdiction (e.g. election disputes, administrative boundary disputes)
Ende (3), Flotim (3), Manggarai (1), Ngada (1), Sikka (1)
Killed: 0 Injured: 23 Property: 5
III Gender/Sexual Violence
(a) Domestic Violence Violence against woman within the household
Sikka (6), Ende (3), Flotim (1), Manggarai (1), Ngada (1)
Killed: 11 Injured: 8 Property: 0
(b) Sexual Indiscretion Conflict over (alleged) sexual indiscretion: rape/adultory
Ende (4), Flotim (4), Ngada (4), Manggarai (3), Sikka (3)
Killed: 7 Injured: 13 Property: 5
IV Vigilantism and Retribution
(a) Against individuals Retribution against individuals Flotim (18), Ende (16), Sikka (14), Manggarai (10), Ngada (8)
Killed: 27 Injured: 82 Property: 10
(b) Against groups Retribution against groups, often over ‘identity’ clash
Manggarai (8), Flotim (7) Sikka (6), Ende (5), Ngada (3)
Killed: 8 Injured: 66 Property: 19
15
16
Key Findings from Part II
Projects as ‘Problem’1. Development projects cause conflict, especially when they
entail an element of competition, even when they ‘succeed’– Sources: (a) In-built; (b) Program malfunction; (c) Interaction
2. KDP…– Almost never generates instances of violent conflict (in our sample,
only one minor case in three years)– Any given episode of KDP conflict less likely to escalate– Generates much fewer instances of conflict than other projects (36
cases of violent conflict associated with other government projects)
3. Why?– Presence of feedback mechanisms – Presence of facilitators and forums– Widespread participation
17
Key Findings from Part II
Projects as (Part of a) ‘Solution’?4. Evidence suggests indirect (group relations, behavioral,
normative) rather than direct (forums, facilitators) positive impacts on conflict management capacity
5. Positive impacts of KDP strongest and most likely where– KDP itself is well implemented (not a given)– Direct effects strongest where ‘capacity’ is low– Indirect effects strongest where ‘capacity’ is high
6. Increased impacts over time– Endogenous: ‘learning by doing’, capacity building– Exogenous: broad-based institutional reform
1. Projects cause/exacerbate conflict, but fewer in KDP, and fewer KDP
conflicts become violentType of Program # Conflicts # Violent Conflicts % Violent # Killed # Injured
# Properties Damaged
KDP 42 1 2% 0 2 0
East Java 10 0 0% 0 0 0
NTT 32 1 3% 0 2 0
Other Government 715 36 5% 4 38 11
East Java 621 20 3% 2 23 6
NTT 94 16 17% 2 15 5
Other Program 19 1 5% 0 1 0
East Java 17 0 0% 0 0 0
NTT 2 1 0 1 0
Total 776 38 5% 4 41 11
18
2. KDP (mostly) succeeds at resolvingthe conflicts it generates
Specific Source of Problem/Conflict
Type of Tension (in most cases)
Dealt With in KDP Forums (% respondents agreeing)
Successfully Resolved in Forums
(% respondents agreeing)
Problems over understanding the project In-built 88% 96%
Decisions on projects to go to the kecamatan forum
In-built or malfunction 87% 98%
Decisions made on funding at the kecamatan forum In-built 72% 90%
Problems over decisions on procurement/implementation
In-built or malfunction 69% 92%
Problems over KDP staff/facilitators Malfunction 39% 83%
Problem over corruption Malfunction 33% 74%
19
3. Why? How?
• Responding to ‘problems of commission’ (e.g., corruption) and ‘problems of omission’ (negligence, inadequate socialization)– Feedback mechanisms– Facilitators– Participation– Socialization and monitoring
20
4a. Direct effects of KDP
• KDP per se does not reduce overall conflict• KDP forums, facilitators infrequently used to address
non-KDP problems, though… – are usually successful when they do– but ad hoc (i.e., not institutionalized)
• Especially so where… – other (legitimate) mechanisms exist– KDP facilitators are weak, risk-averse
21
4b. Indirect effects of KDP• Positive indirect effects:
– Improved inter-group (religion, class) relations– Increased participation in village meetings by marginalized
groups (women, the poor, ethnic minorities), esp. in NTT– “… the women in Sana Daya experienced many problems. They
usually stayed quiet at meetings, [but] now they’ve begun to propose things. Perhaps this can be interpreted as indicating that after KDP women have become bolder. For example, there was a women’s Koranic recital group reading Yasin [a book of the Koran]. Just one person regularly turned up. But after KDP arrived many of them began to come and offer something…”
Female beneficiary, Sana Daya village, Pasean, Pamekasan– Increased monitoring and enforcement of accountability
mechanisms on a broader village scale• Reduced potential for conflict in other decision-making realms• Stimulates demand for transparent decision-making
– KDP a catalyst to social/political transformation in environments already conducive to change
22
5. Summary of Context - Functionality Interactions, and Type of Impact
Type of Impact
Context Capacity
Low High
Program Functionality Program Functionality
Low High Low High
Dire
ct Forums (places)
- -
+ +
- *
0
Facilitators (people)
0
0
0
0
Ind
irec
t
Group Relations
0
+ +
+
+ + +
Behavioral (participation)
0
+ + +
0
+
Behavioral (decision-making)
0
+
+
+ + +
Normative
0
+
0
+ + +
23* While we noted higher rates of KDP-triggered conflict in high capacity areas, such conflict is much less likely to escalate and/or turn violent. Hence negative impacts are greater in low capacity areas, where program functionality is poor.
6. Effects over time
24
• Harder to discern, but in terms of participation by previously marginalized groups, impacts appear positive over time, at least within villages:
Over four years of KDP:
* East Java: From 41% (initially) to 75% (after four years) say ‘more groups come to meetings’
* NTT: 25% to 31% say ‘many more groups come’
• Still some concern that neighboring villages that have yet to receive KDP feel ‘left out’; some evidence of rising tensions between KDP and non-KDP villages over time.
• Positive pragmatic impacts: Aceh response, full national coverage…
• …but success more ‘muted’ in replications in East Timor and Afghanistan
Conflicts triggered by competition
level oftensions
years of KDP
Inter-villagetensions
Intra-villagetensions
Figure 2.3: Tension over Competition
level oftensions
years of KDP
Inter-villagetensions
Intra-villagetensions
Figure 2.3: Tension over Competition
25
7. Broader Policy Implications1. Re-think ‘policy implications’ orthodoxy
Incentives and project design details clearly matter, but reducing conflict rarely a technocratic ‘fix’
CDD projects as part of, not substitute for, a coherent strategy for reducing local conflict, improving quality of governance
2. Ensure all development projects have accessible, effective dispute resolution mechanisms in place
Grievances likely, even (especially) in overtly successful projects Importance of well-funded socialization and monitoring Understand (potential, actual) flashpoints in project cycle
26
7. Broader Policy Implications1. Re-think ‘policy implications’ orthodoxy
Incentives and project design details clearly matter, but reducing conflict rarely a technocratic ‘fix’
CDD projects as part of, not substitute for, a coherent strategy for reducing local conflict, improving quality of governance
2. Ensure all development projects have accessible, effective dispute resolution mechanisms in place
Grievances likely, even (especially) in overtly successful projects Importance of well-funded socialization and monitoring Understand (potential, actual) flashpoints in project cycle
3. Provide spaces, resources, and incentives for negotiating difference Conflicts often a product of confusing, contradictory rules Include program staff, local leaders, state officials in dispute
resolution Innovative and legitimate enforcement mechanisms essential Front-line intermediaries need full logistical support
4. Building capacity, accountability, and accessibility of government (at all levels) is the key long-term goal
‘Supply’ (institutions) and ‘demand’ (citizen expectations) sides 27