Institut für Föderalismus, Universität Freiburg

Institut du Fédéralisme, Université de Fribourg

Institute of Federalism, University of Fribourg

Fact Sheet

Conflict Dynamics Indicators and

Decentralisation Processes

May 2007

Prof. Dr. Lidija R. Basta Fleiner and lic. phil. Sean Müller, International Research and Consulting Centre (IRCC) Project mandated and funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)

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Table of Contents

► PURPOSE .................................................................... 2

► INTENDED AUDIENCE....................................................... 2

► STRUCTURE ................................................................. 2

KEY MESSAGES.............................................................. 3

INTRODUCTION............................................................. 5

KEY CONCEPT: GOOD GOVERNANCE .............................. 7

KEY QUESTIONS OF GETTING INVOLVED....................... 9

ANALYZING THE PROBLEM..................................................... 9

FIRST ENTRY POINT: DECENTRALISATION AND CONFLICTS ............. 10

SECOND ENTRY POINT: CONFLICTS AND DECENTRALISATION .......... 11

CASE STUDIES............................................................. 14

INDICATORS OF STATE COLLAPSE .......................................... 14

INDICATORS OF THE RULE OF LAW ......................................... 15

INDICATORS OF “SOCIAL SECESSION” .................................... 17

INDICATORS OF FRAGMENTED SOCIETIES ................................. 18

INDICATORS OF TRADE-OFF ................................................ 19

CONCLUSION ................................................................. 20

REFERENCES................................................................ 22

Table of Figures

Figure 1: Three Dimensions of Good Governance...........................7 Figure 2: The Cyclic Approach ............................................. 10

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► Purpose

Wanting to reform the state through decentralisation is conflictual per se. New power structures produce winners and losers that both tend to engage in the process, albeit with different underlying motivations, of course. Next to this, in an existing (latent or open) conflict, the structure of the state can be used as an instrument in mobilizing political support – to the detriment of groups that already are, or will be, excluded from the very same state.

This fact sheet outlines the relation between conflict dynamics and decentralisation processes. On the basis of two case studies from the Western Balkans (Macedonia and Kosovo), it identifies major indica-tors for the type and level of conflict as a part of decentralisation. To understand how conflicts interrelate with decentralisation strategies is a prerequisite for any actor aiming at changing things to the better and in line with democratic governance.

► Intended Audience

The primary target of this fact sheet are policy makers, be they involved directly in the country where change shall take place, or rather at the outside, supporting the decentralisation reforms through technical and/or financial development aid.

Trying to avoid a much too academic style does not, however, pre-clude researchers (constitutionalists, political scientists, economists, conflict dynamics researchers) from accessing and including this paper in their work.

► Structure

• Introduction

• Key Concept: Good Governance

• Key Questions of Getting Involved

o Analyzing the Problem o Entry Points

• Cases Studies Kosovo and Macedonia – Indicators of:

o State Collapse o The Rule of Law o “Social Secession” o Fragmented Societies o Trade-Off

• Conclusion

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Key Messages

• Decentralisation as a reform of the state structure entails per se conflict potentials, since new power sharing agreements need to be negotiated. These new structures inevitably produ-ce winners and losers, thus creating new, fostering old, or easing existing conflicts.

• At the same time do conflicts over responsibilities and access

to resources – be they individual, community-related, regio-nal, or national – heavily influence the shaping of a state’s structure. From this point of view, decentralisation is but one of various policy options to reform the state.

• Although the reasons for decentralisation may be culturally or

economically motivated, or related to security or environ-mental concerns, the decision to decentralise is political, the form legal, and the implementation a “technical” change of the state’s structure.

• A conflict assessment which includes the decentralisation

dynamic must take into account the actors that promo-te/hinder the reform process, and ask for their interests, relationships, capacities, and incentives.

• Five sets of indicators have been identified to capture the

conflict dynamics in decentralisation processes. These are indicators of 1. state collapse; 2. the rule of law; 3. “social secession” (as artificially created and repeatedly evoked group barriers); 4. fragmented societies; and of 5. the day-to-day political trade off.

• Sudden and full independence of a formerly decentralised unit

can compromise the conditions for solid state capacity. State collapse is likely to happen in the presence of the following three indicators: economic instability; pivotal reliance on foreign aid; and a disputed bottom level of Good Governance (legitimacy and state foundation). Here, decentralisation can not but lead to the collapse of the encompassing political entity.

• As regards irreversible steps towards the rule of law, an

illegitimate and/or illegal constitution may be an indicator of fundamental conflicts that must be resolved before setting-up a more concrete institutional design. A particular emphasis has been on the question of a jurisdictional unit – the territorial basis of authority and people.

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Conflict Dynamics Indicators in Decentralisation Processes

Ethno-Political Conflicts and Decentralisation – Case Studies from Kosovo and Macedonia

Talking about conflict dynamics, decentralisation, and indicators

linking the two in the context of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)

inevitably leads us to consider the specificity of this region. Also, a

proper theoretical foundation (key concept) has to be set for the

linkage of conflict indicators and decentralisation processes, in order

to identify entry points and then shift the focus to the case studies:

Kosovo and Macedonia.

To start with, the conflict dynamics indicators and decentralisation

processes are context related. This text builds, first, on a concept

elaborated by Lidija Basta Fleiner and Matthias Schnyder in February

2004, where the issues of conflict dynamics indicators and

decentralisation processes are mapped out. A particular emphasis

was set on ethnic conflicts within weak and contested states. In this

sense both Kosovo and Macedonia are paradigmatic cases.

Slobodan Samardzic’s study on “Decentralisation of Government

Structures and Conflict Resolution – The Case of Kosovo and

Metohija” is written by an inside actor in the strongest possible

meaning of the word.1 Together with other consulted analyses on

this conflict, signed by Albanian or foreign authors, it serves as an

empirical indication and basis to analyse the conflict dynamics

related to the decentralisation reforms. Matthias Schnyder’s fact

sheet serves as the analogue on Macedonia: Conflict management in

1 During his guest professorship at IFF and work on this analysis (Oct–Dec 2005), S. Samardzic was nominated as one of the two co-ordinators of the Serbian team for the Vienna negotiations on the future status of Kosovo. As of today (May 2007), he is Minister for Kosovo-Metohija (http://www.srbija.sr.gov.yu/vlada/ministri.php).

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Box 1: Markets in Macedonia In 2006 a law came into force that reduced the duration of the registration procedure for esta-blishing a new business – from 48 to 5 days. At the same time, corruption and judicial shortco-mings continue to discourage investments, and updating of the cadastre as well as better management skills of the admi-nistration and accountability measures are needed in order to overcome a unemployment rate as high as 36%. (Factbook 2007; EBRD 2006: 21-22)

Box 2: Political Symbols in Kosovo

To underline his claim that Kosovo’s independence has existed since 1991 but awaits "discovery" by the inter-national community, President Rugo-va has styled his proposal for a Kosovo-flag as a representation of Dardania, the “land of pears”. Pre-medieval, pre-Serb artefacts from the Illyrian era have featured prominent-ly in a museum in Pristina, and one figurine was even taken to cover the UNDP Kosovo Human Development Report of 2004. (Crisis Group 2005a: 7)

this country is analyzed from a historical perspective and in

connection to the ongoing decentralisation process.

Introduction There are a number of issues that can-

not be ignored when talking about the

state, in general, and conflicts around

and decentralisation of the state, in

particular. First of all, there is a general

simultaneity problem: the “building” of a

state is in Central and Eastern Europe

(CEE) accompanied – sometimes

facilitated, but mostly hindered – by the

parallel establishment of rule of law, the creation of a viable and

competitive market, and the formation of civil society (cf. box 1).

Second, fragmented societies,

living within political entities such

as Macedonia or Serbia or Koso-

vo, are permanently confronted

with a legitimacy crisis: “whose

state are we talking about?” is a

fundamental question in order to

identify the actors legitimized to

reform the state (cf. box 2).

Third, an ethnification of politics –

and not a “politicization of ethnic

conflicts” (cf. box 3) – can radicalize

the negative side effects of decen-

tralisation. Everywhere, devolution

of power risks group capture if this

process is not part of a wider stra-

tegy to hold these newly created,

Box 3: Politics and Ethnicity The debate is the same as every-where: what was first? Is it politics, as non-violent bargaining between power-holders and/or -aspirers, which was then the victim of ethni-fication? Or were there, first, ethnic conflicts, which intensified only be-cause they acquired a certain impor-tance for politicians? Both dynamics should be assessed, taking into consideration that a difference exists – and is instituted already at the conceptual level, depending on whether one speaks about the “ethnification of politics” or the “politicization of ethnic conflicts”.

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Box 4: The “Quota-Dilemma” Drawn from the context of deve-lopment aid in the larger sense, a study done on Malawi found that “good local staff should be recruited because they are good, and not because they are local.” (ODI 2006: 65) The dilemma here is the same as with staffing newly esta-blished governmental bodies with “good” representatives from the different communities.

local or regional governmental bodies accountable to their

constituency (downward-accountability). Where these constituencies

are fragmented or divided by ethnic conflict, every new institution is

scrutinized under the aspect of ethnicity – in addition to possible

group capture we have the danger of ethnic group capture.

Forth, and as a consequence of the ethnification of politics, there will

be a tension between two approaches. The first will look more at the

administrative capacities of newly appointed public officials, referring

to technical skills and promoting a non-personal, meritocratic

principle. The other approach focuses on how the principle of political

representation is adequately respected, and will therefore advocate

more individual space to decide on who is actually going to represent

the community at hand (cf. box 4).

The last issue to raise is about the

constitutional aspects. What state

we will have depends on what

state we have now, and this in turn

influences the procedure by which

actors start the redefinition of

structures and processes making

up the state. An inclusive consti-

tution-giving process favours the idea of a “demos” over the concept

of “ethno-nation”, thus strengthening the common identity – or

creating one, if inexistent yet. On the other hand, as soon as

disputes over territory arise, the “ethno-nation” will come to the

forefront again, as it is in the tradition of the 19th century that a

symbiosis with the state (as the “trinity” of people, authority, and

territory) is argued to exist. Neglecting the “demos” will, in this case,

lead to requests for autonomy, and ultimately for secession and an

independent (nation)state.

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Key Concept: Good Governance Apart form this region-specific considerations – certainly valid for

other regions as well - a number of theoretical premises need to be

set. The concept of good governance is used in this paper as

including three dimensions: First, referring to the basis of a given

state, we analyse its legitimacy claims, i.e. what is the constitutive

foundation of the state structures? Second, on the next higher level,

we look at the institutional design: what is the formal or informal

framework of rules and norms legitimacy is translated into? Third,

governance in the narrower sense is about how the rules are actually

implemented and the norms practically applied. Figure 1 visualizes

this approach:

Figure 1: Three Dimensions of Good Governance

Understanding Good Governance in this broader sense of state

foundation, construction, and functioning allows capturing the

different effects that decentralisation processes have on the state as

such – decentralisation affects all the three dimensions:

At the bottom level, decentralisation, as a creative undertaking,

leads to the establishment of local government units that have to be

legitimized through a democratic process, most often elections of at

least the local legislative bodies.

This newly installed set of institutions inevitably affects the already

existing network of state ministries and agencies; the same

functions (e.g. watering, heating, environmental protection etc.) are

Governance

Institutional Design

State Legitimacy

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Box 5: Conflict Indicators and Good Governance in Macedonia 1. Governance: Citizens are unsatisfied with the service delivery – the availabili-ty of higher education only in Macedonian led to the creation of the Tetovo University in 1995, where classes are taught in Albanian only. 2. Institutional Design: A feeling of being underrepresented anyhow led the ethnic Albanians to boycott the referendum on independence in 1991. 3. State Legitimacy: At the basis of all this lies the feeling of Albanians to be merely second-class citizens. Until 2001, the Macedonian Constitution reads, in its preamble: “Macedonia is established as a national state of the Macedonian people, in which full equality as citizens and permanent co-existence with the Macedonian people is provided for Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romanics and other nationalities living in the Republic of Macedonia.” (SIDA 2003: 7)

now fulfilled by other/new institutional actors, changing the system

of task allocation and financing within the overall state structure.

Furthermore, the new institutions are different from line ministries

that are accountable solely upwards, and it is exactly because of

their downward-accountability that they are thought to govern

“better”, i.e. to deliver state services more efficiently and to apply

state rules more justly.

In the same manner, this three-staged conceptualisation of Good

Governance can help to understand conflict indicators; they as well

can be ascribed to one or more of these levels (cf. box 5).

The following sections try to integrate preventive thinking (about

conflicts) into development strategies (favouring decentralisation). A

framework is established that should serve as a “diagnostic tool”: To

this end, indicators of conflict dynamics in decentralisation processes

are assessed in the context of Macedonia and Kosovo. The challenge

here is threefold, as this framework should:

a. Focus on what is relevant and avoid information overload,

b. Include a regional perspective, and

c. Be based on local expertise.

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Key Questions of Getting Involved

Analyzing the Problem

In a first step, conflict dynamics indicators and decentralisation must

be linked at the conceptual level, in order to identify possible entry

points for development policies in a second step. Then, in a third

step, the practical relevance of this undertaking is analyzed for the

cases of Macedonia and Kosovo.

What is needed is a framework that brings together the analyses of

conflict and of decentralisation, and which develops indicators that

can serve as prediction (ex ante) and explication (ex post) for both.

Therefore, such a framework should, on the one hand, include the

dimensions of conflict in the process of decentralisation, and, on the

other hand, include the decentralisation process in the dimensions of

the conflicts.

The question of what was first – is decentralisation an answer to a

specific conflict, or is the conflict a consequence of decentralisation?

– is, for the moment, left unanswered in favour of a cyclic approach

(cf. Figure 2):

Decentralisation as a reform of the state structure entails per se

conflict potentials, since new power sharing agreements need to be

negotiated. These new structures inevitably produce winners and

losers, thus creating new, fostering old, or easing existing conflicts.

At the same time do conflicts over responsibilities and access to

resources – be they individual, community-related, regional, or

national – heavily influence the shaping of a state’s structure. From

this point of view, decentralisation is but one of various policy

options to reform the state.

What state is wanted (politically), what state is needed (technically),

and who decides through what process – these are questions that lie

at the heart of this approach.

According to this model, two entry points can be identified for both

policy-makers and development agencies: First, the influence of

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conflict dynamics on decentralisation processes, and second, the

impact of decentralisation on conflict dynamics.

Note: D = Decentralisation, C = Conflict

First Entry Point: Decentralisation and Conflicts

Decentralisation is the process through which geographically

demarcated administrative units are established, each with:

1. Authority: a significant portfolio of responsibilities,

2. Power: sufficient resources of its own to carry out the

allocated tasks, and

3. Local Government: democratically elected and thus

accountable officials. (BMZ 2002: 7-8)

Although the reasons for decentralisation may be culturally or

economically motivated, or may take place out of security or

environment related concerns, the decision to decentralise is

political, the form legal, and the implementation a “technical” change

of the state’s structure.

Decentralisation’s interlocking with conflicts can happen through all

three above-mentioned elements of the new administrative units. To

come back to the conceptualisation of Good Governance (cf. Figure

1), one can draw the line from state foundation and legitimacy to

D

C

C

D

D

C

State Structure

Figure 2: The Cyclic Approach

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Box 7: Legitimacy and Crisis in Macedonia

The crisis leading up to the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) in 2001 was marked by distrust among the different communities as well as disloyalty towards the state. Thus, the main negotiation goal was to “create a unitary state by preserving and cherish-ing the differences.” (Sulejmani 2006: 3)

authority and responsibility; from state organisation and institutions

to power and resources; and from governance and state functioning

to accountable and effective local government.

From the state’s point of view, decentralisation is a technical

process. Nonetheless, the state is reformed to an extent that

changes its very structure, introducing a new echelon of

legitimacy/authority, a diversified set of institutions/power-holders,

and a better way of governing.

And exactly because it is all about the state, decentralisation, when

inserted into the World Bank’s Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF

2005), links to the category of “governance and political

institutions”:

The task- and resource-allocation should contribute to more “equity

of governance” (1st variable in the CAF-category) and “stability of

political institutions” (2nd variable). Establishing accountable local

governments strengthens the “links bet-

ween government and citizens” (4th va-

riable). The respective indicators are the

same as in the CAF, e.g. level of trust in

local and central government; nature of

elections; corruption perceptions indices

etc. (cf. box 6).

Second Entry Point: Conflicts and Decentralisation

A conflict assessment which includes the decentralisation dynamic

must take into account the actors that promote/hinder the reform

process, and ask for their interests,

relationships, capacities, and incenti-

ves. The independent variables (that

are, in the CAF, supposed to influen-

ce conflicts) are based on antece-

dent conditions such as nature and

degree of decentralisation. For

example, the stability of political

Box 6: The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)

The CPI of Transparency In-ternational ranks countries according to perceptions of the degree of corruption, as seen by business people and country analysts. 10 means “highly clean” and 0 “highly corrupt”. (TI 2006)

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institutions depends on their legitimacy, i.e. their acceptance by the

actors – elites and people – involved. Decentralisation can contribute

to fortifying this acceptance (cf. box 7).

Most often, decentralisation as a reform process is advanced as the

very instrument to manage conflicts, implying that there would be

no conflict of itself, but rather various struggles for authority,

resources, and/or office that create or acerbate conflicts.

The specificity of ethno-political conflicts is that they are, by

definition, non-negotiable. They are thus insolvable at the level of

identity. But on the level of state organisation, they can be managed

– and the issue of “we vs. them” becomes redundant in the sense

that as soon as state services are provided efficiently, it does not

matter anymore if one is member of the majority or the minority. A

demos is a community defined politically (trough the state), and it is

not anymore the state that is defined ethnically (through the ethno-

nation).

A civic conception of nationhood (based on the individual) can not

replace the “ethnic” identity of an individual, but it can, within the

structure of an organised community, co-exist with the latter. Why

should the political belonging to a given set of bureaucratic

institutions (the state) exclude the existence of ethnic diversity?

With regard to conflicts that have an ethno-political basis, two

extreme scenarios are possible:

1. Conflict management, i.e. decentralisation as an instrument in

easing ethno-political conflicts:

Conflicts Decentralisation Ethnic lines adminis-

tratively redundant

2. Conflict intensification, i.e. decentralisation as fostering ethno-

political conflicts:

Conflicts Decentralisation Ethnic divide between groups

administratively fortified

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Box 8: The Question of Size In Bosnia and Herzegovina, territorial organisation based on ethnicity created functionally illogical boundaries. (Sehic 2006: 7) On the other hand, inter-communal collaboration is considered a possible transitory solution towards territorial re-organisation. (Dedja/Brahimi 2006: 19) This will shift the focus towards the two essential criteria of decentralisation – that “local government units must be at once viable and identifiable with citizens.” (Basta Fleiner/Byrne 2007: 6) In the end, what matters is effective delivery of services. The state is but a means to that.

The key to success seems to be accountability of local elites more to

the people (below) than to the central state (above); and real

subsidiarity not only as the general rule that services are provided

by the next higher level only if the lower level proves unable to do

so, but also as the capacity of the lower level to decide on its own

when it has come to this point.

In this view, the degree of decentralisation depends more on a) the

political will enshrined in the elite negotiations, b) the will of the

people, and c) the financial and technical, but also symbolic support

by international donors; and less on d) the “technical” requirements

(optimal size of administrative units) for improving the delivery of

state services (cf. box 8).

Decentralisation, here, becomes part of the conflict, instead of

contributing to a successful management of it. However, this does

not mean that the conflict can not be managed at all – indeed,

conflictual decentralisation can become a test for the possibility to

change the basic structure of the conflict.

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Case Studies The comparison between Kosovo and Macedonia builds on the

outlined conceptual framework. The following five questions have

been identified to capture the relevancy of indicators of conflict

dynamics in decentralisation processes:

• What indicators point to an increasing likeliness that

decentralisation will lead to state collapse?

• What indicators suggest that an irreversible step towards the

rule of law cannot be taken yet?

• Can “social secession” be seen as an indicator that a

democratic solution of minority problems is impossible?

• What is the impact of fragmented civil societies on conflict

dynamics?

• What is the influence of day-to-day trade-offs on the feasibili-

ty of democracy, and on the carrying-out of decentralisation?

Indicators of State Collapse

First, in order for a state to collapse, it must fulfil at least the basic

requirements of statehood. A critical minimum of state capacity must

exist, as much on the central as on the regional and/or local level.

From an economic point of view, Samardzic (Kosovo case-study)

puts forward two conditions for state capacity: a healthy business

environment and rule of law. He argues that these two conditions

will not be fulfilled by the independence of Kosovo. A

“decentralisation” in this radical form of unilateral secession would

increase the likeliness of state collapse.

Another indicator would be a critical dependence on foreign

involvement: both Kosovo and Macedonia underwent and undergo

international influence (Ohrid agreement & UNMIK), that is

essentially negative if exercised to the detriment of local ownership;

too much reliance on donor funding can impede a proper resource

management.

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Box 9: Status vs. Organisation In Kosovo, the decentralisation debate was transformed into a status-debate. “Status”, once se-condary to “standards”, is now advanced by the international community as having priority. The Serbian position on “gover-nance”-issues tries to shift dis-cussions back to the institutional, if not even the top level of im-plementations (cf. Figure 1).

Moreover, in Kosovo, the debate is

situated at the very state legitimacy

level, i.e. it is more about “sove-

reignty” as the goal and “secession”

as the means, instead of being about

self- and shared-rule, the principles

of decentralisation (cf. box 9). Like-

wise, the conflict in Macedonia has

begun with the exclusive character of the state. Schnyder draws the

passage from a mono-national state with various “members of

minorities” to a bi-national state with the same, individually

conceived minorities (cf. box 5, p. 8).

The strong territorial connotations of the ethnicities increase the

likeliness of state collapse if decentralisation is pushed ahead without

adequate safeguarding measures, e.g. minority rights protection. As

of now, decentralisation is not regarded as a technical process, but

as a political symbol of “autonomy” (Macedonia) and “self-

determination” (Kosovo). These conceptions of decentralisation can

lead to state collapse.

Indicators of the Rule of Law

In both cases, the basic foundation of the state, i.e. the constitution,

is questioned. The “Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo” of 1990

may have been legitimate, but it had no legal basis. On the other

side, the new Serbian Constitution of 2006 may be both legitimate

and legal for the Serb minority in Kosovo, but is definitely

illegitimate for the Albanian majority in Kosovo. Namely, in the

Preamble, the Constitution mentions Kosovo as an “integral part of

the territory of Serbia”.

In a nutshell: Kosovo and Serbia are political entities, and both have

a constitution. But the two constitutions are mutually exclusive –

what the first sees as “independent” from the other is labelled as

“integral part” of and by the very other. Furthermore, both entities

disregard their minorities (Albanians in Serbia, Serbs in Kosovo)

when it comes to the rights they claim for themselves – self-

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Box 10: Manipulative Democracy In Kosovo, the territorial unit is disputed – is it Kosovo as a “province of Serbia”, or the territory within the province inhabited by an Albanian majority? Clearly, this question has to be solved before advocating a “de-mocratic” solution, i.e. a decision by simple majority. Otherwise, democra-cy becomes just another tool for manipulation. (Samardzic)

determination (of an ethnic community) and territorial integrity (of a

political entity).

The Macedonian logic of decentralisation as set out in the Ohrid

Framework Agreement (OFA) may be legally negotiated and imple-

mented, yet it can be and is by many ethnic Macedonians viewed as

illegitimate because imposed from outside.

In Kosovo, no agreement on the general values (human and minority

rights, democracy) has been reached between the Albanian and the

Serbian side. So far, a total confrontation and symbolic political

instrumentalisation of either independence (of Kosovo) or territorial

integrity (of Serbia) is taking place.

Among other things, the negotiations got stuck at the bottom level

of Good Governance, displaying an irreversible conflict over state

foundation and legitimacy. This blocks the other issues of Good

Governance, amongst them the rule of law. The question of rule of

law – basically an obstacle to arbitrary exercise of state authority –

will not be tackled as long as the debate does not move on to the

next higher levels of Good Governance. In other words, it is very

unlikely for discussions to take place about the proper institutional

design, i.e. the rules and procedures guiding their funding and

functioning.

In this situation, talking about

the rule of law does not make

sense because it refers to state

authority, which in turn is based

on population and territory. What

is to be limited has to be clarified

before talking about how to limit

it (cf. box 10).

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Indicators of “Social Secession”

This directly leads to the next question: is “social secession” an

indicator that a democratic solution of minority problems is

impossible? Social secession refers here to artificially created and

repeatedly evoked barriers between different groups within a given

society.

A consequence of the decentralisation in Macedonia was a redrawing

of municipal boundaries according to ethnic criteria, e.g. in Skopje,

Kicevo, or Struga. Likewise, in Kosovo, ethnic Serbs demand a power

balance within the territory of Kosovo as asymmetrical as ethnic

Albanians experience it within the territory of Serbia.

Here, goals and means are inversed. Normally, what is essential is

state delivery of certain services (internal and external security,

welfare, infrastructure, education etc.). But when the delivery is

questioned because it comes from an “illegitimate” state, then the

problem is not the goals (the delivery of services), but the means:

the state.

Next to social secession, an institutionalisation of the ethnic differen-

ce takes place. For example, Kosovo-Serbs boycott the Kosovo

Parliament. In the municipalities with Serbian majority, institutional

structures have been preserved or created that work as line minis-

tries for Belgrade, mainly in the fields of education, healthcare, and

welfare.

Different in character, but comparable in outcome, in Macedonia,

informal economic support from outside the country is strongly

biased towards Albanians in Macedonia due to the important financial

contributions of the Albanian Diaspora.

In addition to that, we not only have, in Serbia and Macedonia, two

territorially well defined minorities. But these two minorities belong

to the same ethnic group – or “nation”, if reference is made to

Albania as the kin state. This further complicates the issue of “social

secession”, as every step of the Albanian minorities “away” from the

state they are part of (Serbia, Macedonia) is perceived, on the side

of the majority (Serbs, Macedonians), as a step closer “towards” the

kin state Albania (“Greater Albania”).

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Indicators of Fragmented Societies

As to the impact of fragmented civil societies on conflict dynamics, it

is overwhelming and far-reaching. One can say that every technical

question, e.g. the optimal size of municipalities to deliver running

water to all households, becomes “ethnified”.

In Macedonia, political parties are constituted along these lines, and

when they form a coalition crossing these boundaries, it does not

happen without daily re-affirming the very same boundary. This is an

indicator for further conflict, as additional minorities might still be

excluded; the passage from the mono- to the bi-national conception

of statehood has been mentioned already.

Furthermore, civil society was excluded from the elite negotiations in

the Mavrovo Mountains, when the implementing talks on the OFA

began. For Kosovo, Samardzic does not mention civil society at all –

a sign of its unimportance in the process.

Decentralisation reinforces existing, or creates new administrative

lines: these can territorially “legitimize” ethnic divisions. Serbs in

Kosovo are a minority, but given a certain degree of communal

autonomy, this might be bearable.

Categorical conflicts such as ethno-political divisions are not only

insolvable at the level of political symbolism; they in turn influence

other types of conflict as well. This goes for example for the question

of orthodox monasteries in Kosovo, which from religious institutions

turn into the base of culture – the question of religion is ethnified.

And since ethnicity is at this point the core issue of politics, religion

is also politicized.

Thus, ethnic conflicts are even more difficult to solve if a given

society is fragmented along ethnic as well as religious and cultural

divisions. And if political (under)representation matches the

distribution of economic wealth, it is very likely that decentralisation

must go very far to ease tensions.

Also, it is important to analyze when decentralisation has started and

to what extent it has taken place. The tendency that the more it was

forced upon an entity from outside, the less it is accepted in the

19

entity itself is confirmed by both the Kosovo and the Macedonian

case.

Indicators of Trade-Off

What is then the impact of day-to-day trade-offs on the feasibility of

democracy? And what influence do they have on the carrying-out of

decentralisation?

Independent Macedonia was established through a referendum held

in September 1991. As known, the brake-up of the Socialist Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) took place along the borders of the six

republics. As for Macedonia, the same Albanian minority now faced a

different majority, and in this respect the problems were merely

postponed. Clearly, the short-term goal was to consolidate the

acquired full sovereignty of the people living on this territory, i.e. the

building of a Macedonian state – and not the long-term goal of

peaceful coexistence.

Nearly a decade later, the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of

June 1999 reaffirmed the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of the

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”, to which today’s Serbia is the legal

successor. At the same time, the Security Council decided the

establishment of “substantial autonomy and self-government in

Kosovo”. (Ibid: art. 11.a) The resolution’s main goal was based on a

G-8 decision: “Immediate and verifiable end of violence and

repression in Kosovo.” (Ibid: Annex 1)

In both Macedonia and Kosovo, however, democracy and the rule of

law were not seen as stations along the path towards general

welfare and security, which are the primary goals of a state. In

Macedonia, the sudden loss of central-state monopoly on the use of

force enabled extended mafia structures. In Kosovo, violent clashes

between paramilitary groups and Serbian armed forces, coupled with

atrocities against civil Albanian population, led to a NATO military

intervention.

The challengers to state capacity turned towards ethnicity to be able

to claim legitimacy. The consequence of this process is that who is a

terrorist for one side, may well be a hero for the other. Extremists

20

on both sides label legal conflicts between criminals and police as

fundamental struggles between Albanians and Serbs/Macedonians,

and/or between “secessionists” and “centralists”. The question of

”over what did conflicts arise and between whom?” was simplified to

the internally re-assuring and externally excluding “we vs. them”.

Networks of people profiting from the status quo are not only against

an easing of the ethnic tension, but also against any promising

reform of the state as such. Therefore, what can be the prospects of

for example decentralisation as state reform, and who shall be able

to promote it? In Macedonia, inter-ethnic coalitions are certainly

good for peace, but if they are too elitist, it can be bad for

implementing decentralisation: “This environment of uncertainty and

political jockeying turned redistricting into a hot button political

issue.” (Crisis Group 2005b: 2)

Conclusion

Sudden and full independence of a formerly decentralised unit can

compromise the conditions for solid state capacity. In other words,

state collapse is likely to happen in the presence of the following

three indicators:

o Economic instability;

o Pivotal reliance on foreign aid; and

o The context of the decentralisation-debate: when situated at

the bottom level of Good Governance (legitimacy and state

foundation), decentralisation can not but lead to the collapse

of the encompassing political entity.

With regard to irreversible steps towards the rule of law, two fin-

dings bear mentioning:

o An illegitimate and/or illegal constitution may be an indicator

of fundamental conflicts that must be resolved before setting-

up a more concrete institutional design.

o A particular emphasis has been put on the question of a

jurisdictional unit – the territorial basis of authority and

people.

21

“Social secession” basically relates to three problems in this context

of conflicts and decentralisation:

o In an inversed means-goals-logic, the state is questioned not

because of failed service delivery, but because of its very

character.

o Especially problematic is the institutionalisation of societal

divisions.

o Furthermore, the presence of kin states may hinder

reasonable debates about power-sharing.

In fragmented societies, four indicators were identified:

o Questions of municipal size are transformed into “ammunition”

for the overall ethno-cultural struggle.

o Political parties based on ethnicity further indicate the

possibility that decentralisation acerbates conflicts.

o Overlapping ethno-cultural, socio-religious, and political-

economical divisions spoil the prospects for technical

reasoning.

o The absence of a clear political will among elite and people to

manage conflicts through decentralisation is another indicator

of aggravating conflicts.

Lastly, trade-offs and bargaining deals belong to politics, but

indicators of conflict dynamics nonetheless persist:

o Focusing too much on the short-term goals (e.g. independen-

ce or ending violence) can damage the long-term goals (e.g.

prosperity or durable security).

o When trade-offs and bargaining deals are carried out in an

elitist way, they pose a danger to democracy. Successful

decentralisation requires establishing downwards accountable

governmental bodies, at best by holding regular elections.

o People are to be empowered to actually hold officials

accountable: through information campaigns and

strengthening civil society. Conflicts will then shift to the local

arena and either disappear (if nationally motivated), or

become non-violent because entering the political arena.

22

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