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Liberalism First published Thu Nov 28, 1996; substantive revision Thu Sep 16, 2010

As soon as one examines it, ‘liberalism’ fractures into a variety of types andcompeting visions. In this entry we focus on debates within the liberal

tradition. We begin by (! examining different interpretations of liberalism"score commitment # liberty. We then consider ($! the longstanding debate

between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ liberalism. In section (%! we turn to the morerecent controversy about whether liberalism is a ‘comprehensive’ or a

‘political’ doctrine. We close in (&! by considering disagreements as to ‘thereach’ of liberalism # does it apply to all human'ind, and must all political

communities be liberal

• . )he *ebate About +iberty

o . )he resumption in -avor of +iberty

o .$ egative +iberty

o .% ositive +iberty

o .& /epublican +iberty

• $. )he *ebate 0etween the ‘1ld’ and the ‘ew’

o $. 2lassical +iberalism

o $.$ )he ‘ew +iberalism’

o $.% +iberal )heories of 3ocial 4ustice

• %. )he *ebate About the 2omprehensiveness of +iberalism

o %. olitical +iberalism

o %.$ +iberal 5thics

o %.% +iberal )heories of 6alue

o %.& )he 7etaphysics of +iberalism

• &. )he *ebate About )he /each of +iberalism

o &. Is +iberalism 4ustified in All olitical 2ommunities

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#DebAboLib

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#PreFavLib

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#NegLib

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#PosLib

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#RepLib

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#DebBetOldNew

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#ClaLib

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#NewLib

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#LibTheSocJus

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#DebAboComLib

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#PolLib

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#LibEth

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#LibTheVal

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#MetLib

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#DebAboReaLib

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#LibJusAllPolCom

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#PreFavLib

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#NegLib

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#PosLib

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#RepLib

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#DebBetOldNew

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#ClaLib

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#NewLib

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#LibTheSocJus

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#DebAboComLib

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#PolLib

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#LibEth

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#LibTheVal

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#MetLib

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#DebAboReaLib

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#LibJusAllPolCom

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#DebAboLib



o &.$ Is +iberalism a 2osmopolitan or a 3tate8centered )heory

o &.% +iberal Interaction with on8+iberal 9roups: International

o &.& +iberal Interaction with on8+iberal 9roups: *omestic

• ;. 2onclusion

• 0ibliography

• 1ther Internet /esources

• /elated 5ntries

1. The Debate About Liberty

1.1 The Presumption in Favor of Liberty

‘0y definition’, 7aurice 2ranston rightly points out, ‘a liberal is a man who believes in liberty’ (<=>: &;<!. In two different ways, liberals accord liberty

primacy as a political value. (i! +iberals have typically maintained thathumans are naturally in ‘a State of perfect Freedom to order their Actions?as

they thin' fit?without as'ing leave, or depending on the Will of any other7an’ (+oc'e, <=@ =B<C: $B>!. 7ill too argued that ‘the burden of proof is

supposed to be with those who are against libertyD who contend for anyrestriction or prohibition?. )he a priori assumption is in favour of

freedom?’ (<=%, vol. $: $=$!. /ecent liberal thin'ers such as as 4oel-einberg (<B&: <!, 3tanley 0enn (<BB: B>! and 4ohn /awls ($@@: &&, $!

agree. )his might be called the Fundamental iberal !rinciple (9aus, <<=:=$8==!: freedom is normatively basic, and so the onus of Eustification is on

those who would limit freedom, especially through coercive means. It followsfrom this that political authority and law must be Eustified, as they limit the

liberty of citiFens. 2onseGuently, a central Guestion of liberal political theoryis whether political authority can be Eustified, and if so, how. It is for this

reason that social contract theory, as developed by )homas Hobbes (<&B=;C!, 4ohn +oc'e (<=@ =B<C!, 4ean84acGues /ousseau (<>% >=$C! and

Immanuel ant (<=; ><>C!, is usually viewed as liberal even though theactual political prescriptions of, say, Hobbes and /ousseau, have distinctly

illiberal features. Insofar as they ta'e as their starting point a state of nature inwhich humans are free and eGual, and so argue that any limitation of this

freedom and eGuality stands in need of Eustification (i.e., by the social

contract!, the contractual tradition expresses the -undamental +iberalrinciple.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#LibCosStaCenThe

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#LibIntNonLibGroInt

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#LibIntNonLibGroDom

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#Con

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#Bib

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#Oth

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#Rel

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#LibCosStaCenThe

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#LibIntNonLibGroInt

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#LibIntNonLibGroDom

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#Con

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#Bib

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#Oth

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#Rel



(ii! )he -undamental +iberal rinciple holds that restrictions on liberty must

be Eustified, and because he accepts this, we can understand Hobbes asespousing a liberal political theory. 0ut Hobbes is at best a Gualified liberal,

for he also argues that drastic limitations on liberty can be Eustified.aradigmatic liberals such as +oc'e not only advocate the -undamental

+iberal rinciple, but also maintain that Eustified limitations on liberty arefairly modest. 1nly a limited government can be EustifiedD indeed, the basic

tas' of government is to protect the eGual liberty of citiFens. )hus 4ohn/awls"s first principle of Eustice: ‘5ach person is to have an eGual right to the

most extensive system of eGual basic liberty compatible with a similar systemfor all’ (/awls, <<<b: $$@!.

1.2 Negative Liberty

+iberals disagree, however, about the concept of liberty, and as a result theliberal ideal of protecting individual liberty can lead to very differentconceptions of the tas' of government. As is well8'nown, Isaiah 0erlin

advocated a negative conception of liberty:

I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of meninterferes with my activity. olitical liberty in this sense is simply the area

within which a man can act unobstructed by others. If I am prevented byothers from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfreeD and if

this area is contracted by other men beyond a certain minimum, I can be

described as being coerced, or, it may be, enslaved. 2oercion is not, however,a term that covers every form of inability. If I say that I am unable to Eumpmore than ten feet in the air, or cannot read because I am blind?it would beeccentric to say that I am to that degree enslaved or coerced. 2oercion implies

the deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in which Icould otherwise act. Jou lac' political liberty or freedom only if you are

prevented from attaining a goal by other human beings (0erlin, <=<: $$!.

-or 0erlin and those who follow him, then, the heart of liberty is the absenceof coercion by othersD conseGuently, the liberal state"s commitment to

protecting liberty is, essentially, the Eob of ensuring that citiFens do not coerceeach other without compelling Eustification. 3o understood, negative liberty isan opportunit"#concept . 0eing free is merely a matter of what we can do, what

options are open to us, regardless of whether or not we exercise such options()aylor, <><!.

1.3 Positive Liberty

7any liberals have been attracted to more ‘positive’ conceptions of liberty.Although /ousseau (<>% >=$C! seemed to advocate a positive conception

of liberty, according to which one was free when one acted according to one"s



true will (the general will!, the positive conception was best developed by the

0ritish neo8Hegelians of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,such as )homas Hill 9reen and 0ernard 0osanGuet ($@@ <$%C!. 9reen

ac'nowledged that ‘?it must be of course admitted that every usage of theterm i.e., ‘freedom’C to express anything but a social and political relation of

one man to other involves a metaphor?It always implies?some exemptionfrom compulsion by another?’(<B= B<;C: $$<!. evertheless, 9reen went

on to claim that a person can be unfree if he is subEect to an impulse orcraving that cannot be controlled. 3uch a person, 9reen argued, is ‘?in the

condition of a bondsman who is carrying out the will of another, not his own’(<B= B<;C: $$B!. 4ust as a slave is not doing what he reall" wants to do, one

who is, say, an alcoholic, is being led by a craving to loo' for satisfactionwhere it cannot, ultimately, be found.

-or 9reen, a person is free only if she is self8directed or autonomous. /unningthroughout liberal political theory is an ideal of a free person as one whose

actions are in some sense her o$n.In this sense, positive liberty is an e%ercise#concept . 1ne is free merely to the degree that one has effectively determined

oneself and the shape of one"s life ()aylor, <><!. 3uch a person is not subEectto compulsions, critically reflects on her ideals and so does not unreflectively

follow custom, and does not ignore her long8term interests for short8term pleasures. )his ideal of freedom as autonomy has its roots not only in

/ousseau"s and ant"s political theory, but also in 4ohn 3tuart 7ill"s &n ibert"' And today it is a dominant strain in liberalism, as witnessed by the

wor' of 3.I. 0enn (<BB!, 9erald *wor'in (<BB!, and 4oseph /aF (<B=!D seealso the essays in 2hristman and Anderson ($@@;!.

)his 9reenian, autonomy8based, conception of positive freedom is often runtogether with a very different notion of ‘positive’ freedom: freedom as

effective power to act or to pursue one"s ends. In the words of the 0ritishsocialist /. H. )awney, freedom thus understood is ‘the ability act’ (<%:

$$D see also 9aus, $@@@D ch. ;.! 1n this view of positive freedom, a personwho is not prohibited from being a member of a 2ountry 2lub but who is too

poor to afford membership is not free to be a member: she does not have aneffective power to act. Although the 9reenian autonomy8based conception of

positive freedom certainly had implications for the distribution of resources(education, for example, should be easily available so that all can develop

their capacities!, positive freedom (ua effective power to act closely tiesfreedom to material resources. It was this conception of positive liberty that

Haye' had in mind when he insisted that although ‘freedom and wealth are both good things?they still remain different’ (<=@: >8B!.

1.4 epubli!an Liberty



An older notion of liberty that has recently undergone resurgence is the

republican, or neo8/oman, conception of liberty which has its roots in thewritings of 2icero and iccolo 7achiavelli (<;@ ;%C!. According to

hilip ettit, ‘)he contrary of the liber , or free, person in /oman, republicanusage was the servus, or slave, and up to at least the beginning of the last

century, the dominant connotation of freedom, emphasiFed in the longrepublican tradition, was not having to live in servitude to another: not being

subEect to the arbitrary power of another’ (ettit, <<=: ;>=!. 1n this view, theopposite of freedom is domination. An agent is said to be unfree if she is

‘subEect to the potentially capricious will or the potentially idiosyncratic Eudgement of another’ (ettit, <<>: ;!. )he ideal liberty8protecting

government, then, ensures that no agent, including itself, has arbitrary powerover any citiFen. )he 'ey method by which this is accomplished is through an

eGual disbursement of power. 5ach person has power that offsets the power of

another to arbitrarily interfere with her activities (ettit, <<>: =>!.

)he republican conception of liberty is certainly distinct from both 9reenian positive and negative conceptions. Knli'e 9reenian positive liberty,

republican liberty is not primarily concerned with rational autonomy, realiFingone"s true nature, or becoming one"s higher self. When all dominating power

has been dispersed, republican theorists are generally silent about these goals(+armore $@@!. Knli'e negative liberty, republican liberty is primarily

focused upon ‘defenseless susceptibility to interference, rather than actualinterference’ (ettit, <<=: ;>>!. )hus, in contrast to the ordinary negative

conception, on the republican conception the mere possibilit" of arbitraryinterference appears to constitute a limitation of liberty. /epublican liberty

thus seems to involve a modal claim about the possibility of interference, andthis is often cashed out in terms of complex counterfactual claims. It is not

clear whether these claims can be adeGuately explicated (9aus, $@@%D cf.+armore, $@@&!.

3ome republican theorists, such as Luentin 3'inner (<<B: %!, 7auriFio6iroli ($@@$: =! and ettit (<<>: B8!, view republicanism as an alternative

to liberalism. Insofar as republican liberty is seen as a basis for criticiFingmar'et liberty and mar'et society, this is plausible (9aus, $@@%b!. However,

when liberalism is understood more expansively, and not so closely tied toeither negative liberty or mar'et society, republicanism becomes

indistinguishable from liberalism (9hosh, $@@BD /ogers, $@@BD +armore,$@@D *agger, <<>!.

2. The Debate "et#een the $%l&' an& the $Ne#'

2.1 (lassi!al Liberalism



+iberal political theory, then, fractures over the conception of liberty. 0ut a

more important division concerns the place of private property and the mar'etorder. -or classical liberals # sometimes called the ‘old’ liberalism # liberty

and private property are intimately related. -rom the eighteenth century rightup to today, classical liberals have insisted that an economic system based on

private property is uniGuely consistent with individual liberty, allowing eachto live her life #including employing her labor and her capital # as she sees

fit. Indeed, classical liberals and libertarians have often asserted that in someway liberty and property are really the same thingD it has been argued, for

example, that all rights, including liberty rights, are forms of propertyD othershave maintained that property is itself a form of freedom (9aus, <<&D 3teiner,

<<&!. A mar'et order based on private property is thus seen asanembodiment of freedom (/obbins, <=: @&!. Knless people are free to

ma'e contracts and to sell their labour, or unless they are free to save their

incomes and then invest them as they see fit, or unless they are free to runenterprises when they have obtained the capital, they are not really free.

2lassical liberals employ a second argument connecting liberty and private

property. /ather than insisting that the freedom to obtain and employ private property is simply one aspect of people"s liberty, this second argument insists

that private property is the only effective means for the protection of liberty.Here the idea is that the dispersion of power that results from a free mar'et

economy based on private property protects the liberty of subEects againstencroachments by the state. As -.A. Haye' argues, ‘)here can be no freedom

of press if the instruments of printing are under government control, nofreedom of assembly if the needed rooms are so controlled, no freedom of

movement if the means of transport are a government monopoly’ (<>B: &<!.

Although classical liberals agree on the fundamental importance of private

property to a free society, the classical liberal tradition itself refracts into aspectrum of views, from near8anarchist to those that attribute a significant role

to the state in economic and social policy (on this spectrum, see 7ac' and9aus, $@@&!. )owards the most extreme ‘libertarian’ end of the classical

liberal spectrum are views of Eustified states as legitimate monopolies thatmay with Eustice charge for their necessary rights8protection services: taxation

is legitimate so long as it is necessary to protect liberty and property rights. Aswe go further ‘leftward’ we encounter classical liberal views that allow

taxation for (other! public goods and social infrastructure and, moving yetfurther ‘left’, some classical liberal views allow for a modest social minimum.

(e.g., Haye', <>=: B>!. 7ost nineteenth century classical liberal economistsendorsed a variety of state policies, encompassing not only the criminal law

and enforcement of contracts, but the licensing of professionals, health, safetyand fire regulations, ban'ing regulations, commercial infrastructure (roads,

harbors and canals! and often encouraged unioniFation (9aus, <B%b!.Although today classical liberalism is often associated with extreme forms of



libertarianism, the classical liberal tradition was centrally concerned with

bettering the lot of the wor'ing class. )he aim, as 0entham put it, was to ma'ethe poor richer, not the rich poorer (0entham, <;$ ><;C: vol. , $$=n!.

2onseGuently, classical liberals reEect the redistribution of wealth as alegitimate aim of government.

2.2 The $Ne# Liberalism'

What has come to be 'nown as ‘new’, ‘revisionist’, ‘welfare state’, or perhaps best, ‘social Eustice’, liberalism challenges this intimate connection between

personal liberty and a private property based mar'et order (-reeden, <>BD9aus, <B%bD aul, 7iller and aul, $@@>!. )hree factors help explain the rise

of this revisionist theory. -irst, the new liberalism arose in the late nineteenthand early twentieth centuries, a period in which the ability of a free mar'et to

sustain what +ord 0everidge (<&&: <=! called a ‘prosperous eGuilibrium’ was being Guestioned. 0elieving that a private property based mar'et tended to beunstable, or could, as eynes argued (<>% <%=C!, get stuc' in an

eGuilibrium with high unemployment, new liberals came to doubt that it wasan adeGuate foundation for a stable, free society. Here the second factor comes

into play: Eust as the new liberals were losing faith in the mar'et, their faith ingovernment as a means of supervising economic life was increasing. )his was

partly due to the experiences of the -irst World War, in which governmentattempts at economic planning seemed to succeed (*ewey, <$<: ;;8=@!D

more importantly, this reevaluation of the state was spurred by the

democratiFation of western states, and the conviction that, for the first time,elected officials could truly be, in 4.A. Hobson"s phrase ‘representatives of thecommunity’ (<$$: &<!. As *.9. /itchie proclaimed:

be it observed that arguments used against ‘government’ action, where thegovernment is entirely or mainly in the hands of a ruling class or caste,

exercising wisely or unwisely a paternal or grandmotherly authority # sucharguments lose their force Eust in proportion as the government becomes more

and more genuinely the government of the people by the people themselves(B<=: =&!.

)he third factor underlying the development of the new liberalism was probably the most fundamental: a growing conviction that, so far from being

‘the guardian of every other right’ (5ly, <<$: $=!, property rights generatedan unEust ineGuality of power that led to a less8than8eGual liberty (typically,

‘positive liberty’! for the wor'ing class. )his theme is central to what isusually called ‘liberalism’ in American politics, combining a strong

endorsement of civil and personal liberties with, at best, an indifference, andoften enough an antipathy, to private ownership. )he seeds of this newer

liberalism can be found in 7ill"s &n ibert"' Although 7ill insisted that the‘so8called doctrine of -ree )rade’ rested on ‘eGually solid’ grounds as did the



‘principle of individual liberty’ (<=%, vol. B: $<%!, he nevertheless insisted

that the Eustifications of personal and economic liberty were distinct. And inhis !rinciples of !olitical )conom" 7ill consistently emphasiFed that it is an

open Guestion whether personal liberty can flourish without private property(<=%, vol. $D $@%8$@!, a view that /awls was to reassert over a century later

($@@: art I6!.

2.3 Liberal Theories of )o!ial *usti!e

1ne of the many conseGuences of /awls"s great wor', * Theor" of

+ustice (<<< first published in <>C! is that the ‘new liberalism’ has becomefocused on developing a theory of social Eustice. -or over thirty8five years

liberal political philosophers have analyFed, and disputed, his famous‘difference principle’ according to which a Eust basic structure of society

arranges social and economic ineGualities such that they are to the greatestadvantage of the least well off representative group (<<<b: $==!. -or /awls,the default is an eGual distribution of (basically! income and wealthD only

ineGualities that best enhance the long8term prospects of the least advantagedare Eust. As /awls sees it, the difference principle constitutes a public

recognition of the principle of reciprocity: the basic structure is to be arrangedsuch that no social group advances at the cost of another ($@@: $$8$&!.

7any followers of /awls have focused less on the ideal of reciprocity than thecommitment to eGuality (*wor'in, $@@@!. Indeed, what was previously called

‘welfare state’ liberalism is now often described as ‘egalitarian’ liberalism.

And in one way that is especially appropriate: in his later wor' /awls insiststhat welfare8state capitalism does not constitute a Eust basic structure ($@@:%>8%B!. If some version of capitalism is to be Eust it must be a ‘property

owning democracy’ with a wide diffusion of ownershipD a mar'et socialistregime, in /awls"s view, is more Eust than welfare8state capitalism ($@@: %;8

%B!. ot too surprisingly, classical liberals such as Haye' (<>=! insist that thecontemporary liberal fixation on ‘the mirage of social Eustice’ leads them to

ignore the way that freedom depends on a decentraliFed mar'et based on private property, the overall results of which are unpredictable. In a similar

vein, /obert oFic' (<>&: =@ff! famously argued that any attempt to ensurethat mar'et transactions conform to any specific pattern of holdings will

involve constant interferences with individual freedom.

3. The Debate About the (omprehensiveness of Liberalism

3.1 Politi!al Liberalism

As his wor' evolved, /awls (<<=: ;ff! insisted that his liberalism was not a

‘comprehensive’ doctrine, that is, one which includes an overall theory ofvalue, an ethical theory, an epistemology, or a controversial metaphysics of

the person and society. 1ur modern societies, characteriFed by a ‘reasonable



pluralism’, are already filled with such doctrines. )he aim of ‘political

liberalism’ is not to add yet another sectarian doctrine, but to provide a political framewor' that is neutral between such controversial comprehensive

doctrines (+armore, <<=: $ff!. If it is to serve as the basis for publicreasoning in our diverse western societies, liberalism must be restricted to a

core set of political principles that are, or can be, the subEect of consensusamong all reasonable citiFens. /awls"s notion of a purely political conception

of liberalism seems more austere than the traditional liberal political theoriesdiscussed above, being largely restricted to constitutional principles upholding

basic civil liberties and the democratic process.

As 9aus ($@@&! has argued, the distinction between ‘political’ and

‘comprehensive’ liberalism misses a great deal. +iberal theories form a broadcontinuum, from those that constitute full8blown philosophical systems, to

those that rely on a full theory of value and the good, to those that rely on atheory of the right (but not the good!, all the way to those that see' to be

purely political doctrines. evertheless, it is important to appreciate that,though liberalism is primarily a political theory, it has been associated with

broader theories of ethics, value and society. Indeed, many believe thatliberalism cannot rid itself of all controversial metaphysical (Hampton, <B<!

or epistemological (/aF, <<@! commitments.

3.2 Liberal +thi!s

-ollowing Wilhelm von Humboldt (<<% B;&C!, in &n ibert" 7ill arguesthat one basis for endorsing freedom (7ill believes that there are many!, is thegoodness of developing individuality and cultivating capacities:

Individuality is the same thing with development, and?it is only thecultivation of individuality which produces, or can produce, well8developed

human beings?what more can be said of any condition of human affairs, thanthat it brings human beings themselves nearer to the best thing they can be or

what worse can be said of any obstruction to good, than that it prevents this(7ill, <=%, vol. B: $=>!

)his is not Eust a theory about politics: it is a substantive, perfectionist, moraltheory about the good. And, on this view, the right thing to do is to promote

development or perfection, and only a regime securing extensive liberty foreach person can accomplish this (Wall, <<B!. )his moral ideal of human

perfection and development dominated liberal thin'ing in the latter part of thenineteenth, and for most of the twentieth, century: not only 7ill, but ).H.

9reen, +.). Hobhouse, 0ernard 0osanGuet, 4ohn *ewey and even /awlsshow allegiance to variants of this perfectionist ethic and the claim that it

provides a foundation for endorsing a regime of liberal rights (9aus, <B%a!.And it is fundamental to the proponents of liberal autonomy discussed above,



as well as ‘liberal virtue’ theorists such as William 9alston (<B@!. )hat the

good life is necessarily a freely chosen one in which a person develops hisuniGue capacities as part of a plan of life is probably the dominant liberal ethic

of the past century.

)he main challenge to 7illian perfectionism as the distinctly liberal ethic

comes from moral contractualism, which can be divided into what might veryroughly be labeled ‘antian’ and ‘Hobbesian’ versions. According to antian

contractualism, ‘society, being composed of a plurality of persons, each withhis own aims, interests, and conceptions of the good, is best arranged when it

is governed by principles that do not themselves presuppose any particularconception of the good?’(3andel, <B$: !. 1n this view, respect for the

person of others demands that we refrain from imposing our view of the goodlife on them. 1nly principles that can be Eustified to all respect the personhood

of each. We thus witness the tendency of recent liberal theory (/eiman, <<@D3canlon, <<B! to transform the social contract from an account of the state to

an overall Eustification of morality, or at least a social morality. 0asic to such‘antian contractualism’ is the idea that suitably idealiFed individuals are

motivated not by the pursuit of gain, but by a commitment or desireto publicly Eustify the claims they ma'e on others (/eiman, <<@D 3canlon,

<B$!. A moral code that could be the obEect of agreement among suchindividuals is thus a publicly Eustified morality.

In contrast, the Hobbesian version of contractualism supposes only that

individuals are self8interested, and correctly perceive that each person"s abilityto effectively pursue her interests is enhanced by a framewor' of norms thatstructure social life and divide the fruits of social cooperation (9auither, <B=D

Hampton, <B=D av'a, <B=!. 7orality, then, is a common framewor' thatadvances the self8interest of each. )he claim of Hobbesian contractualism to

be a distinctly liberal conception of morality stems from the importance ofindividual freedom and property in such a common framewor': only systems

of norms that allow each person great freedom to pursue her interests as shesees fit could, it is argued, be the obEect of consensus among self8interested

agents (2ourtland, $@@BD 9aus $@@%a: chap. %D /idge, <<BD 9authier, <<;!.)he continuing problem for Hobbesian contractualism is the apparent

rationality of free8riding: if everyone (or enough! complies with the terms ofthe contract, and so social order is achieved, it would seem rational to defect,

and act immorally when one can gain by doing so. )his is essentially theargument of Hobbes"s ‘-oole’, and from Hobbes (<&B =;C: <&ff! to

9authier (<B=: =@ff!, Hobbesians have tried to reply to it.

3.3 Liberal Theories of ,alue

)urning from rightness to goodness, we can identify three main candidates for a liberal theory of value. We have already encountered the first: perfectionism.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justification-public/

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justification-public/



Insofar as perfectionism is a theory of right action, it can be understood as an

account of morality. 1bviously, however, it is an account of rightness that presupposes a theory of value or the good: the ultimate human value is

developed personality or an autonomous life. 2ompeting with this obEectivisttheory of value are two other liberal accounts: pluralism and subEectivism.

In his famous defence of negative liberty, 0erlin insisted that values or endsare plural, and no interpersonally Eustifiable ran'ing among these many ends

is to be had. 7ore than that, 0erlin maintained that the pursuit of one endnecessarily implies that other ends will not be achieved. In this sense ends

collide or, in the more prosaic terms of economics, the pursuit of one endnecessarily entails opportunity costs in relation to others which cannot be

impersonally shown to be less worthy. 3o there is no interpersonally Eustifiable way to ran' the ends, and there is no way to achieve them all. )he

upshot is that each person must devote herself to some ends at the cost ofignoring others. -or the pluralist, then, autonomy, perfection or development

are not necessarily ran'ed higher than hedonistic pleasures, environmental preservation or economic eGuality. All compete for our allegiance, but because

they are incommensurable, no choice can be interpersonally Eustified ascorrect.

)he pluralist is not a subEectivist: that values are many, competing andincommensurable does not imply that they are somehow dependent on

subEective experiences. 0ut the claim that what a person values rests on

experiences that vary from person to person has long been a part of the liberaltradition. )o Hobbes, what one values depends on what one desires (<&B=;C: &B!. +oc'e advances a ‘taste theory of value’:

)he 7ind has a different relish, as well as the alateD and you will asfruitlessly endeavour to delight all 7an with /iches or 9lory, (which yet

some 7en place their Happiness in,! as you would satisfy all men"s Hungerwith 2heese or +obstersD which, though very agreeable and delicious fare to

some, are to others extremely nauseous and offensive: And many eoplewould with reason preferr sicC the griping of an hungry 0elly, to those

*ishes, which are a -east to others. Hence it was, I thin', that thehilosophers of old did in vain enGuire, whether the Summum

bonum consisted in /iches, or bodily *elights, or 6irtue, or 2ontemplation:And they might have as reasonably disputed, whether the best /elish were to

be found in Apples, lumbs or utsD and have divided themselves into 3ectsupon it. -or?pleasant )astes depend not on the things themselves, but their

agreeableness to this or that particulare alate, wherein there is great variety?(<>; >@=C: $=<!.

)he perfectionist, the pluralist and the subEectivist concur on the crucial point:the nature of value is such that reasonable people pursue different ways of



living. )o the perfectionist, this is because each person has uniGue capacities,

the development of which confers value on her lifeD to the pluralist, it is because values are many and conflicting, and no one life can include them all,

or ma'e the interpersonally correct choice among themD and to thesubEectivist, it is because our ideas about what is valuable stem from our

desires or tastes, and these differ from one individual to another. All threeviews, then, defend the basic liberal idea that people rationally follow very

different ways of living. 0ut in themselves, such notions of the good do notconstitute a full8fledged liberal ethic, for an additional argument is reGuired

lin'ing liberal value with norms of eGual liberty. )o be sure, 0erlin seems to believe this is a very Guic' argument: the inherent plurality of ends points to

the political preeminence of liberty. 9uaranteeing each a measure of negativeliberty is, 0erlin argues, the most humane ideal, as it recognises that ‘human

goals are many’, and no one can ma'e a choice that is right for all people

(<=<: >!. 0ut the move from diversity to eGual liberty and individual rightsseems a complicated oneD it is here that both subEectivists and pluralists oftenrely on versions of moral contractualism. )hose who insist that liberalism is

ultimately a nihilistic theory can be interpreted as arguing that this transitioncannot be made successfully: liberals, on their view, are stuc' with a

subEectivistic or pluralistic theory of value, and no account of the rightemerges from it.

3.4 The -etaphysi!s of Liberalism

)hroughout the last century, liberalism has been beset by controversies between, on the one hand, those broadly identified as ‘individualists’ and, onthe other, ‘collectivists’, ‘communitarians’ or ‘organicists’ (for s'epticism

about this, though, see 0ird, <<<!. )hese vague and sweeping designationshave been applied to a wide array of disputesD we focus here on controversies

concerning (i! the nature of societyD (ii! the nature of the self.

+iberalism is, of course, usually associated with individualist analyses of

society. ‘Human beings in society’, 7ill claimed, ‘have no properties butthose which are derived from, and which may be resolved into, the laws of the

nature of individual men’ (<=%, 6ol. B: B><D see also 0entham: <>@ B$%C:chap. I, sec. &!. Herbert 3pencer agreed: ‘the properties of the mass are

dependent upon the attributes of its component parts’ (<<; B;C: !. In thelast years of the nineteenth century this individualist view was increasingly

subEect to attac', especially by those who were influenced by idealist philosophy. *. 9. /itche, criticiFing 3pencer"s individualist liberalism,

explicitly reEected the idea that society is simply a ‘heap’ of individuals,insisting that it is more a'in to an organism, with a complex internal life

(B<=: %!. +iberals such as +. ). Hobhouse and *ewey refused to adopt

radically collectivist views such as those advocated by 0ernard 0osanGuet($@@!, but they too reEected the radical individualism of 0entham, 7ill and



3pencer. )hroughout most of the first half of the twentieth century such

‘organic’ analyses of society held sway in liberal theory, even in economics(see A.- 7ummery and 4. A. Hobson, <;=: @=D 4.7. eynes, <>$: $>;!.

*uring and after the 3econd World War the idea that liberalism was based oninherently individualist analysis of humans8in8society arose again. arl

opper"s The &pen Societ" and its )nemies (<&;! presented a sustainedcritiGue of Hegelian and 7arxist theory and its collectivist and historicist, and

to opper, inherently illiberal, understanding of society. )he reemergence ofeconomic analysis in liberal theory brought to the fore a thoroughgoing

methodological individualism. Writing in the early <=@s, 4ames 0uchananand 9ordon )ulloc' adamantly defended the ‘individualistic postulate’ against

all forms of ‘organicism’: ‘)his organicistC approach or theory of thecollectivity?.is essentially opposed to the Western philosophical tradition in

which the human individual is the primary philosophical entity’ (<=;: 8$!.Human beings, insisted 0uchanan and )ulloc', are the only real choosers and

decision8ma'ers, and their preferences determine both public and privateactions. )he renascent individualism of late8twentieth century liberalism was

closely bound up with the induction of Hobbes as a member of the liberal pantheon. Hobbes"s relentlessly individualistic account of society, and the

manner in which his analysis of the state of nature lent itself to game8theoretical modeling, yielded a highly individualist, formal analysis of the

liberal state and liberal morality.

1f course, as is widely 'nown, the last twenty8five years have witnessed arenewed interest in collectivist analyses of liberal society #though the term‘collectivist’ is abEured in favor of ‘communitarian’. Writing in <B;, Amy

9utmann observed that ‘we are witnessing a revival of communitariancriticisms of liberal political theory. +i'e the critics of the <=@s, those of the

<B@s fault liberalism for being mista'enly and irreparably individualistic’(<B;: %@B!. 3tarting with 7ichael 3andel"s (<B$! famous criticism of /awls,

a number of critics charged that liberalism was necessarily premised on anabstract conception of individual selves as pure choosers, whose

commitments, values and concerns are possessions of the self, but neverconstitute the self. Although the now famous, not to say infamous, ‘liberal8

communitarian’ debate ultimately involved wide8ranging moral, political andsociological disputes about the nature of communities, and the rights and

responsibilities of their members, the heart of the debate was about the natureof liberal selves. -or 3andel the flaw at the heart of /awls"s liberalism was its

implausibly abstract theory of the self, the pure autonomous chooser. /awls,he charges, ultimately assumes that it ma'es sense to identify us with a pure

capacity for choice, and that such pure choosers might reEect any or all of their attachments and values and yet retain their identity.



-rom the mid8<B@s onwards various liberals sought to show how liberalism

may consistently advocate a theory of the self which finds room for culturalmembership and other non8chosen attachments and commitments which at

least partially constitute the self (ymlic'a, <B<!. 7uch of liberal theory has became focused on the issue as to how we can be social creatures, members of

cultures and raised in various traditions, while also being autonomouschoosers who employ our liberty to construct lives of our own.

4. The Debate About The ea!h of Liberalism

4.1 s Liberalism *ustifie& in All Politi!al (ommunities/

In &n ibert" 7ill argued that ‘+iberty, as a principle, has no application toany state of things anterior to the time when man'ind have become capable of

being improved by free and eGual discussion’ (<=%, vol. B: $$&!. )hus‘*espotism is a legitimate form of government in dealing with barbarians,

provided the end be their improvement?. ’(<=%, vol. B: $$&!. )his passage # infused with the spirit of nineteenth century imperialism # is often

ignored by defenders of 7ill as an embarrassment. evertheless, it raises aGuestion that still divides liberals: are liberal political principles Eustified for

all political communities In The a$ of !eoples /awls argues that they arenot. According to /awls there can be a ‘decent hierarchical society’ which is

not based on the liberal conception of all persons as free and eGual, but insteadviews persons as ‘responsible and cooperating members of their respective

groups’ but not inherently eGual (<<<a: ==!. 9iven this, the full liberalconception of Eustice cannot be constructed out of shared ideas of this

‘people’, though basic human rights, implicit in the very idea of a socialcooperative structure, apply to all peoples. *avid 7iller ($@@$! develops a

different defense of this anti8universalistic position, while those such as)homas ogge ($@@$: ch. &! and 7artha ussbaum ($@@$! reEect /awls"s

position, instead advocating versions of moral universalism: they claim that

liberal moral principles apply to all states.

4.2 s Liberalism a (osmopolitan or a )tate0!entere& Theory/

)he debate about whether liberal principles apply to all political communities

should not be confused with the debate as to whether liberalism is a state8centered theory, or whether, at least ideally, it is a cosmopolitan political

theory for the community of all human'ind. Immanuel ant # a moraluniversalist if ever there was one # argued that all states should respect the

dignity of their citiFens as free and eGual persons, yet denied that humanityforms one political community. )hus he reEected the ideal of a universal

cosmopolitan liberal political community in favor of a world of states, all withinternally Eust constitutions, and united in a confederation to assure peace

(<>@ ><;C!.



1n a classical liberal theory, the difference between a world of liberal

communities and a world liberal community is not of fundamentalimportance. 3ince the aim of government in a community is to assure the

basic liberty and property rights of its citiFens, borders are not of great moralsignificance in classical liberalism (+omas'y, $@@>D but cf. ogge, $@@$: ch.

$!. In contrast under the ‘new’ liberalism, which stresses redistributive programs to achieve social Eustice, it matters a great deal who is included

within the political or moral community. If liberal principles reGuiresignificant redistribution, then it is crucially important whether these

principles apply only within particular communities, or whether their reach isglobal. )hus a fundamental debate between /awls and many of his followers

is whether the difference principle should only be applied within a liberal statesuch as the Knited 3tates (where the least well off are the least well off

Americans!, or whether it should be applied globally (where the least well off

are the least well off in the world! (/awls, <<<a: %ffD 0eitF, <>%: &%ffDogge, <B<: art )hree!.

4.3 Liberal ntera!tion #ith Non0Liberal roups nternational

+iberal political theory also fractures concerning the appropriate response togroups (cultural, religious, etc.! which endorse illiberal policies and values.

)hese groups may deny education to some of their members, advocate femalegenital mutilation, restrict religious freedom, maintain an ineGuitable caste

system, and so on. When, if ever, is it reasonable for a liberal group to

interfere with the internal governance of an illiberal group

3uppose first that the illiberal group is another political community or state.2an liberals intervene in the affairs of non8liberal states 7ill provides a

complicated answer in his B;< essay ‘A -ew Words on on8Intervention’./eiterating his claim from &n ibert" that civiliFed and non8civiliFed

countries are to be treated differently, he insists that ‘barbarians have no rightsas a nation, except a right to such treatment as may, at the earliest possible

period, fit them for becoming one. )he only moral laws for the relation between a civiliFed and a barbarous government, are the universal rules of

morality between man and man’ (<=%, vol. $: <!. Although this stri'es ustoday as simply a case for an obEectionable paternalistic imperialism (and it

certainly was such a case!, 7ill"s argument for the conclusion is morecomplex, including a claim that, since international morality depends on

reciprocity, ‘barbarous’ governments that cannot be counted on to engage inreciprocal behavior have no rights (ua governments. In any event, when 7ill

turns to interventions among ‘civiliFed’ peoples he develops an altogethermore sophisticated account as to when one state can intervene in the affairs of

another to protect liberal principles. Here 7ill is generally against

intervention. ‘)he reason is, that there can seldom be anything approaching toassurance that intervention, even if successful, would be for the good of the



people themselves. )he only test possessing any real value, of a people"s

having become fit for popular institutions, is that they, or a sufficient proportion of them to prevail in the contest, are willing to brave labour and

danger for their liberation’ (<=%, vol. $: $$!.

In addition to Guestions of efficacy, to the extent that peoples or groups have

rights to collective self8determination, intervention by a liberal group toinduce a non8liberal community to adopt liberal principles will be morally

obEectionable. As with individuals, liberals may thin' that peoples or groupshave freedom to ma'e mista'es in managing their collective affairs. If

people"s self8conceptions are based on their participation in such groups, eventhose whose liberties are denied may obEect to, and perhaps in some way

harmed by, the imposition of liberal principles (7argalit and /aF, <<@D)amir, <<%!. )hus rather than proposing a doctrine of intervention many

liberals propose various principles of toleration which specify to what extentliberals must tolerate non8liberal peoples and cultures. As is usual, /awls"s

discussion is subtle and enlightening. In his account of the foreign affairs ofliberal peoples, /awls argues that liberal peoples must distinguish ‘decent’

non8liberal societies from ‘outlaw’ and other statesD the former have a claimon liberal peoples to tolerance while the latter do not (<<<a: ;<8=!. *ecent

peoples, argues /awls, ‘simply do not tolerate’ outlaw states which ignorehuman rights: such states may be subEect to ‘forceful sanctions and even to

intervention’ (<<<a: B!. In contrast, /awls insists that ‘liberal peoples musttry to encourage non8liberalC decent peoples and not frustrate their vitality by

coercively insisting that all societies be liberal’ (<<<a: =$!. 2handranu'athas ($@@%! # whose liberalism derives from the classical tradition # is

inclined to almost complete toleration of non8liberal peoples, with the provisothat there must be exit rights.

4.4 Liberal ntera!tion #ith Non0Liberal roups Domesti!

)he status of non8liberal groups within liberal societies has increasingly

become a subEect of debate, especially with respect to some citiFens of faith.We should distinguish two Guestions: (i! to what extent should non8liberal

cultural and religious communities be exempt from the reGuirements of theliberal state and, (ii! to what extent can they be allowed to participate in

decision8ma'ing in the liberal state

)urning to (i!, liberalism has a long history of see'ing to accommodate

religious groups that have deep obEections to certain public policies, such asthe Lua'ers, 7ennonites or 3i'hs. )he most difficult issues in this regard

arise in relation to children and education (see 9alston, $@@%! 7ill, forexample, writes:



2onsider ? the case of education. Is it not almost a self8evident axiom, that

the 3tate should reGuire and compel the education, up to a certain standard, ofevery human being who is born its citiFen Jet who is there that is not afraid

to recogniFe and assert this truth Hardly any one indeed will deny that it isone of the most sacred duties of the parents (or, as law and usage now stand,

the father!, after summoning a human being into the world, to give to that being an education fitting him to perform his part well in life towards others

and towards himself ? . that to bring a child into existence without a fair prospect of being able, not only to provide food for its body, but instruction

and training for its mind, is a moral crime, both against the unfortunateoffspring and against society ? . (<=%, vol. B!

1ver the last thirty years, there has been a particular case that is at the core ofthis debate # isconsin vs' -oder : &@= K.3. $@; (<>$!C. In this case, the

Knited 3tates 3upreme 2ourt upheld the right of Amish parents to avoidcompulsory schooling laws and remove their children from school at the age

of & # thus, according to the Amish, avoiding secular influences that mightundermine the traditional Amish way of life. 0ecause cultural and religious

communities raise and educate children, they cannot be seen as purelyvoluntary opt8outs from the liberal state: they exercise coercive power over

children, and so basic liberal principles about protecting the innocent fromunEustified coercion come into play. 3ome have maintained that liberal

principles reGuire that the state should intervene (against groups li'e theAmish! in order to C provide the children with an effective right of exit that

would otherwise be denied via a lac' of education (1'in, $@@$!, $C to protectthe children"s right to an autonomous and ‘open future’ (-einberg, <B@!

andMor %C to insure that children will have the cognitive tools to prepare themfor their future role as citiFens (9alston, <<;: p. ;$<D 7acedo, <<;: pp. $B;8

=!. 1ther liberal theorists, on the other hand, have argued that the state shouldnot intervene because it might undermine the inculcation of certain values that

are necessary for the continued existence of certain comprehensive doctrines(9alston, <<;: p. ;%%D 3tolFenberg, <<%: pp. ;B$8%!. 7oreover, some such

as Harry 0righouse (<<B! have argued that the inculcation of liberal values

through compulsory education might undermine the legitimacy of liberalstates because children would not (due to possible indoctrination! be free toconsent to such institutions.

Luestion (ii! # the extent to which non8liberal beliefs and values may beemployed in liberal political discussion# has become the subEect of sustained

debate in the years following /awls"s !olitical iberalism. According to/awls"s liberalism # and what we might call ‘public reason liberalism’ more

generally # because our societies are characteriFed by ‘reasonable pluralism’,coercion cannot be Eustified on the basis of comprehensive moral or religious

systems of belief. 0ut many friends of religion (e.g., 5berle, $@@$D erry,<<%! argue that this is obEectionably ‘exclusionary’: conscientious believers



are barred from voting on their deepest convictions. Again liberals diverge in

their responses. 3ome such as 3tephen 7acedo ta'e a pretty hard8nosedattitude: ‘if some people?feel NsilencedO or NmarginaliFedO by the fact that

some of us believe that it is wrong to shape basic liberties on the basis ofreligious or metaphysical claims, I can only say Ngrow upPO’ ($@@@: %;!.

/awls, in contrast, see's to be more accommodating, allowing that arguments based on religious comprehensive doctrines may enter into liberal politics on

issues of basic Eustice ‘provided that, in due course, we give properly publicreasons to support the principles and policies that our comprehensive doctrine

is said to support’ (<<<a: &&!. )hus /awls allows the legitimacy ofreligious8based arguments against slavery and in favor of the Knited 3tates

civil rights movement, because ultimately such arguments were supported by public reasons. 1thers (e.g., 9reenawalt, <<;! hold that even this is too

restrictive: it is difficult for liberals to Eustify a moral prohibition on a

religious citiFen from voicing her view in liberal political debate.

. (on!lusion

9iven that liberalism fractures on so many issues # the nature of liberty, the place of property and democracy in a Eust society, the comprehensiveness and

the reach of the liberal ideal # one might wonder whether there is any pointin tal'ing of ‘liberalism’ at all. It is not, though, an unimportant or trivial thing

that all these theories ta'e liberty to be the grounding political value. /adicaldemocrats assert the overriding value of eGuality, communitarians maintain

that the demands of belongingness trump freedom, and conservativescomplain that the liberal devotion to freedom undermines traditional values

and virtues and so social order itself. Intramural disputes aside, liberals Eoin inreEecting these conceptions of political right.

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