Lessons From the Financial Crisis for Teaching Economics

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  • L f h Fi i l C i i fLessonsfromtheFinancialCrisisforTeachingEconomicsg

    John B TaylorJohnB.TaylorStanfordUniversity

    June2,2011

    NationalConferenceonTeachingEconomicsandResearchinEconomicEducation

  • OutlineOutline NarrativeoftheFinancialCrisis

    Informsonesviewsaboutlessonsforteaching AlternativeNarratives

    N t i i l i t di Notsurprisingly,economistsdisagree ImplicationsforTeaching

    Examples will be presented throughout talk based on Exampleswillbepresentedthroughouttalkbasedonexperience

    Graduate(1styearPh.D.courseatStanford) Undergraduate(Economics1atStanford) Textbook(PrinciplesBookwithWeerapana)

  • NarrativeE i li d i t d f b i i Economicpolicydeviatedfrombasiceconomicprincipleswhichhadworkedwell

    Result? A great recession a financial panic and a Result?Agreatrecession,afinancialpanic,andaveryweak,nearlynonexistent,recovery.

    The deviations began with policies such asThedeviationsbeganwithpoliciessuchas amonetarypolicywithinterestratestoolowfortoolong aregulatorypolicywhichfailedtoenforceexistingrulesg y p y g

    Thedeviationsfromsoundprinciplescontinuedwhengovernmentrespondedwithanadhocbailoutprocessandtemporarystimulusprograms

    Thegoodnews:economicgrowthandstabilitycanberestoredbyadoptingpoliciesconsistentwithbasiceconomicprinciples.

  • Anillustrationthatbasicprinciplesworkwell,whenfollowed

    15

    20Percent

    GreatModerationperiod

    10

    15 period

    0

    5

    -5

    0

    G t R i

    -15

    -10GreatRecession(EndofGreatModeration?)

    50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10

    Growth Rate of Real GDP

  • IllustrativemonetarypolicychartfromSanFranciscoFed,March1995,JuddandTrehan

    196579

    198792

    199394

  • IllustrativemonetarypolicychartfromStLouisFedFebruary2007,BillPooley

  • PolicyDeviationsLeadinguptothed h llCrisisandthePanicinFall2008

    Interestratestoolowfortoolongg DiscretionaryfiscalstimulusofFeb08($152B) Onagain offagain bailouts financed by centralOnagain,offagainbailoutsfinancedbycentralbanksbalancesheet on for BSC creditors bailout off for Lehman creditorson forBSCcreditors bailout,off forLehmancreditors bailout,on forAIGcreditorsbailout,off forTARProleout

    Government regulators and supervisors deviatedGovernmentregulatorsandsupervisorsdeviatedfromsoundregulatoryrules,especiallyatlargebanks

  • IllustrativemonetarypolicychartfromStLouisFedFebruary2007,BillPooley

  • IllustrativemonetarypolicychartfromStLouisFedFebruary2007,BillPooley

  • ChartfromKansasCityFed,2009,TomHoenig

    (20002009)

  • TheBoomBustinHousingStartsCompared with the CounterfactualComparedwiththeCounterfactual

  • IllustrativeChartfromtheOECD,March2008

  • IllustrativeChartfromtheOECD,March2008

  • Temporarystimulusmeetspermanentincomehypothesisp yp

  • ThePanicofFall08

  • Policy makers then doubleddownPolicymakersthendoubled down

    Discretionaryfiscalstimulusof2009($862billion)sc et o a y sca st u us o 009 ($86 b o ) Onetimepaymentsagain Moregovernmentspendingtoo

    Cashforclunkersprogram Quantitativeeasingin2009,nowcalledQE1

    Purchasesof$1.25trillionofmortgagebackedsecurities,$300billionoflongertermTreasurybonds

    QE2 i 2010 d 2011 QE2in2010and2011 purchasesof$600billionoflongertermTreasurybondsbonds.

  • Temporarystimulusmeetspermanentincomehypothesisagainp yp g

  • Cashforclunkers:incentivesreallymatter

  • 400Billions of dollars, annual rates

    300

    350

    200

    250 --- Temporary transfer payments and credits

    t

    150

    200

    G t t t t d

    to persons

    50

    100

    F d l t ti

    --- Grants to state and local governments

    009Q1 09Q2 09Q3 09Q4 10Q1 10Q2 10Q3 10Q4

    --- Federal government investment--- Federal government consumption

    Two-Year Effect of ARRA on Major Federal Budget Categories (Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis)

  • 2,300Billions of dollars, annual rates

    2 100

    2,200

    ,Total receipts of stateand local governments

    2,000

    2,100

    Recepits less

    1,800

    1,900p

    ARRA grants

    1 600

    1,700 Purchases by state and local governments

    1,500

    1,600

    1,4002005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

  • Stateandlocalgovernmentsalsoconsiderpermanentincome

  • Comparewithtextbookdiscussion:Sharp drop in I causes expenditure lineSharpdropinIcausesexpenditureline

    toshiftdown

    45-degree line

    SPENDING25_10

    New E line

    Original E lineOriginal point of spending balance

    I falls by this amount

    Income or real GDP falls by this amount (more than by amount I falls ).

    New point of spending balance

    Original income level

    New income level

    INCOME OR REAL GDP

    (more than by amount I falls ).

  • OffsetbyCountercyclicalfiscalpolicyIncreaseinGraisesGDPdependingonsizeofthep g

    multiplierandamountofcrowdingout

    45-degree line

    SPENDING25_10

    G rises

    INCOME OR REAL GDP

  • Butlookwhathappened

    6Percent, annual rate

    Growth rate of real GDP

    2

    4

    0Contribution of

    -4

    -2 government purchases

    -6

    -807Q1 07Q3 08Q1 08Q3 09Q1 09Q3 10Q1 10Q3

  • QuantitativeEasingFinancedbyMonetaryBase

    2,800Billions of dollars

    2,400Monetarybase(currencyplusreserves)

    2,000

    1,600

    1,200

    800Jan 08 Jul 08 Jan 09 Jul 09 Jan 10 Jul 10 Jan 11

  • AWonderfulTeachingMoment:The Money Multiplier and the Monetary BaseTheMoneyMultiplierandtheMonetaryBase

  • Percent

    800

    1,000CBO Outlook in 2010

    600

    800

    Federal Debt as a

    CBO Outlook in 2009

    400

    600 Federal Debt as aPercent of GDP

    200

    400

    0

    200

    CBO Outlook in 2011??0

    1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 2050

  • TeachingAboutRegulatoryCapture:E l i f il t f l t lExplainsfailuretoenforceregulatoryrules

    C ti b t Cozyconnectionsbetweengovernmentandthefi i l i d tfinancialindustry.

    Bookshowsgovernmenthelpingwellconnectedindividuals,whointurnhelpedthegovernmentofficials.

    Result:Recklesspolicy

  • ImplicationofNarrativeforBasicEconomics

    Needsareformulation? PaulSamuelson(January2009)PaulSamuelson(January2009)

    todayweseehowutterlymistakenwastheMiltonFriedmannotionthatamarketsystemcanregulateitselfThisprevailing ideology of the last few decades has now beenprevailingideologyofthelastfewdecadeshasnowbeenreversedIwishFriedmanwerestillalivesohecouldwitnesshowhisextremismledtothedefeatofhisownideas.

    PaulKrugman blamesmoderneconomics(especiallymacro)forthecrisis.

    B t ti h i li b i i k Butnarrativehereimpliesbasiceconomicsworks Thecrisiswascausedbyadeviationfromprinciples

    f h h h d Butofcoursethereismuchresearchtodo

  • Another NarrativeAnotherNarrative

    US policy was not an issue leading up to theUSpolicywasnotanissueleadinguptothecrisisandisnotanissuenow

    Global capital flows were and are the problem Globalcapitalflowswereandaretheproblem Causedemergingmarketcrisesin1990sC d 2007 09 i i S i Gl Caused200709crisis:SavingGlut

    Causeoffuturecrises:focusonglobalrebalancing Muchdifferentpolicyimplication

  • ButchartfromtheIMFin2005ShowsNoGlobalSavingGlut

  • So Why Do Economists Disagree?SoWhyDoEconomistsDisagree?

    Students and everyone else really want toStudentsandeveryoneelsereallywanttoknowtheanswer

    One reason is that the details of their models Onereasonisthatthedetailsoftheirmodelsaredifferent,eventhoughthereisagreementabout the basic principlesaboutthebasicprinciples

    ThenextthreechartsfromtheNewYorkTi d h ill hi llTimes andtwoothersillustratethiswell.

  • 66

    NewKeynesianSmets ECB

    RobertBarroHarvard

    3

    4

    5With stimulus

    3

    4

    5

    With stimulus

    0

    1

    2If nostimulus

    0

    1

    2If nostimulus

    -12009 2010

    -12009 2010

    The accumulation of hard data and real-lifeThe accumulation of hard data and real life experience has allowed more dispassionate analysts to reach a consensus that the stimulus package, messy p g yas it is, is workingNew York Times November 12, 2009

  • ImplicationsforTeachingM ill t ti f b i i Manynewillustrationsofbasiceconomics

    InterestingdebatesbetweeneconomistsR l di ti Rulesversusdiscretion

    Butraisemorequestionsaboutdiscretionarypolicy More integration of micro and macro Moreintegrationofmicroandmacro

    interestratestoolowfortoolong(macro) housing markets including bubbles (micro)housingmarketsincludingbubbles(micro) stimuluspackage(macro) regulatorycaptureandmoralhazard(micro) newinstrumentsofmonetarypolicy(macro) riskpremia ininterestrates(micro) debateoversizeofmultipliers(macro) cashforclunkers,firsttimehomebuyer(micro)

  • ManyNewYouTubeVideosQuantitativeEasingExplained.5milliondownloads.Doesn't

    getitallrightandbrutalinplaces,butgoodfordiscussionTheWrongFinancialAdviser CreatedbyNobelprizewinner

    BillSharpeFedChairmanontheDailyShowwithJonStewart.Fromtwo

    differentepisodesof60Minutes,focusonwhetherquantitativeeasingisprintingmoney.

    UnmaskingInterestRates,HonkyTonk StyleMerleHazardsings"InflationorDeflationInsideJobTrailerChristine Lagarde in clip from Inside JobChristineLagarde inclipfromInsideJobHayekKeynesrapvideos"FeartheBoomandBustandFight

    oftheCentury

  • Lines from Fight of the CenturyLinesfrom FightoftheCentury

    Keynes: Even you must admit that the lessonKeynes: Evenyoumustadmitthatthelessonwevelearnedisthatmoreoversightsneededor else well get burnedorelsewe llgetburned

    Hayek:Oversight?Thegovernmentslongbeenin bed with those Wall Street execs and theinbedwiththoseWallStreetexecsandthefirmsthattheyveled.