Lecture 21 Elections November 20, 2012. I. Why Bother Voting?

Lecture 21Lecture 21

ElectionsElectionsNovember 20, 2012November 20, 2012

I.I. Why Bother Voting?Why Bother Voting?

WHY DO PEOPLE BOTHER TO VOTE?WHY DO PEOPLE BOTHER TO VOTE?

The problem:

1. In a large election, one vote never makes a difference.

2. There are some costs attached to voting: getting information about candidates and parties, voter registration procedures, getting to the polls, waiting in line.

3. Since there is zero chance that there is any benefit from your individual act of voting (since one vote never decides an election), and since there are real costs to voting, why bother voting?

4. But if most people think this way, few people vote and democracy is weakened. Another prisoner’s dilemma!

I. Voting & ApathyI. Voting & Apathy

AnswerAnswer

It only makes sense to vote if you do not make the It only makes sense to vote if you do not make the decision on the basis of simple cost-benefit decision on the basis of simple cost-benefit calculation. calculation.

People vote mainly because they see it as a civic People vote mainly because they see it as a civic obligation and they believe it is wrong to be a free rider obligation and they believe it is wrong to be a free rider on other people’s efforts.on other people’s efforts.


Average voter turnout in national elections Average voter turnout in national elections for lower legislative house, 1965-1995 for lower legislative house, 1965-1995

Note: In U.S. this is only for elections in years with a presidential electionNote: In U.S. this is only for elections in years with a presidential election

Voter Turnout in off-year Congressional Elections, 1962-2006Voter Turnout in off-year Congressional Elections, 1962-2006


How our social conditions and political How our social conditions and political institutions institutions

generate political apathy and free-ridinggenerate political apathy and free-riding

1.1. Consumerism, individualism and privatism undermine value of Consumerism, individualism and privatism undermine value of collective institutions, including democracy.collective institutions, including democracy.

2.2. Constant attack on the “affirmative state” undermines people’s Constant attack on the “affirmative state” undermines people’s identification with government and belief in politicsidentification with government and belief in politics

3.3. High levels of inequality erode the sense of community and the High levels of inequality erode the sense of community and the sense of civic obligation.sense of civic obligation.

4.4. The role of money in politics makes many people feel cynical The role of money in politics makes many people feel cynical about participation: corruption breeds cynicism and cynicism about participation: corruption breeds cynicism and cynicism breeds apathybreeds apathy


US Voting

• Very low• Certainly not representative (absence of PR, IRV,

fusion, etc., but more)• Comparatively low• Anomalous in development (“appearance and

disappearance of American voter”)• Class skewed• Prone to manipulation (not particularly

representative, even for an SMD-PV/WTA system)

Anybody vote?

International voter turnoutAverage voter turnout 1960-95 in national elections for lower legisteve house in countries with at least five elections during period

U.S. Presidential election turnout, 1824-2008

Voter turnout in off-year elections

Class skew in voting

Occupation % Votingin Sweden

% Voting in US

US difference

Owners/managers/professional s 89.6 76.9 - 12.7

Nonpropertied “white collar” 90.4 70.4 - 20.0

Skilled workers 93.3 58.0 - 35.3

Unskilled workers 87.0 46.7 - 40.3

Source: Burnham, Current Crisis in American Politics, “Appearance and Disappearance of American Voter”

Unrepresentative

Senate unrepresentativeness: Halving their state populations in 2009, each CA US Senator represented about 19 million people, each WY one about 270 thousand, a ratio of 70/1. Otherwise expressed, a CA vote is worth 1.4% of a WY one

Electoral college unrepresentativeness

U.S. Presidential election turnout, 1824-2008

II.II. REPRESENTATION RULESREPRESENTATION RULES

1.1.Key ideaKey idea

Different electoral rules of the game generate Different electoral rules of the game generate very different dynamics of political very different dynamics of political competition with very different long term competition with very different long term effects on democratic life.effects on democratic life.

Of particular importance = the rules of Of particular importance = the rules of electoral competition and representation shape electoral competition and representation shape the number and strength of political parties.the number and strength of political parties.

II. REPRESENTATION RULESII. REPRESENTATION RULES

2. Basic Structure of US system2. Basic Structure of US systemSingle member districts with plurality voting, also called Single member districts with plurality voting, also called “first past the post single member districts”: Whoever “first past the post single member districts”: Whoever gets the most votes wins.gets the most votes wins.

• Example: Three candidates, one gets 34% of the Example: Three candidates, one gets 34% of the vote, the other two each gets 32% of the vote. The vote, the other two each gets 32% of the vote. The first candidate is elected.first candidate is elected.

• Consequence: Consequence: two party duopoly two party duopoly because of fear of because of fear of wasting vote on third parties. wasting vote on third parties.

• This encourages “lesser of two evils voting”This encourages “lesser of two evils voting”


Duverger’s “law”

In a single member district, “winner take all” voting system, you’re almost certain to get only two parties

Why? Because voter support for a third party, especially when first starting out, will be suppressed by fear of wasted votes– voting for a candidate with no serious chance of winning – or spoiling – throwing the election to a candidate furthest from your preferences by not voting for one closer to them

Me

Me You ?

You? You?

Me You

Where should you put your store?

Why? Because then you get all the customers to the right of me, rather than a portion

Hotelling Principle

Hotelling’s principle applied to politics

If parties do indeed maximize votes, and you have only two parties in an electoral system with a continuous/linear distribution of voter preferences, those parties are likely to take positions very close to one another

It gets more interesting if you introduce discontinuity/non-linearity and more parties

Me Me’

Me Me’ You

Me You Me’

Where should you put your party?

Me Me’ You

What it take to compete as a third party

• Qualifying for the ballot• Staying in competition, which requires overcoming

the wasted vote/ spoiler problem in an SMD/WTA system– wasted vote problem … what’s the point of voting for

somebody who has no chance of winning– spoiler problem … will doing so allow the perfect to

become the enemy of the good

3. 3. Voting rules in the past in the USVoting rules in the past in the US““Fusion voting” in 19Fusion voting” in 19thth Century US: Century US:

Basic idea: two parties could nominate the same Basic idea: two parties could nominate the same candidate, so that candidate could appear o9n the candidate, so that candidate could appear o9n the ballot more than once, under different “party lines.” ballot more than once, under different “party lines.” This increased the strength of third parties and their This increased the strength of third parties and their role in elections.role in elections.

• Most important case in the 19Most important case in the 19thth century = The century = The Populist PartyPopulist Party

• Still exists in a few places, like New York. New Still exists in a few places, like New York. New York has the strongest third parties in the nation.York has the strongest third parties in the nation.


Fusion voting

Fusion/plural nomination election rules: Permit more than one party to nominate the same candidate for an office, with votes cast on any nominating party’s ballot lint counting in that candidates total against rivals

Hypothetical 2000 Election Under Fusion Voting Rules

Party Candidate Vote % Total vote by candidate

Democratic Gore 35 Gore 52

Republican Bush 48 Bush 48

Green Gore 17

Story of fusion litigation

Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997)

4. 4. Alternative voting rules that might Alternative voting rules that might increase the democraticness of electionsincrease the democraticness of elections

• Proportional RepresentationProportional Representation [PR]: multi-member districts [PR]: multi-member districts with each party running multiple candidates on a “party with each party running multiple candidates on a “party list”. Candidates are elected proportionately to the vote for list”. Candidates are elected proportionately to the vote for the party.the party.

• Instant Run-off votingInstant Run-off voting [IRV]: You rank-order the candidates [IRV]: You rank-order the candidates on the ballot when you vote.on the ballot when you vote.


Candidates 1st place votes 2nd choices Vote count after first round

Vote count after second round

A B C

A 1700 - 1500 200 1700 = 28% X

B 2100 1500 - 600 2100 = 35% 3600 = 60%

C 2200 300 2000 - 2200 = 37% 2400 = 40%

Instant Run-off Elections: how it works


III.III. ELECTORAL DISTRICTSELECTORAL DISTRICTS

District Number Votes for Democratic candidate

Votes for Republican candidate

Winner in election

1 2 million 100,000 Democrat

2 1 million 1.1 million Republican

3 1 million 1.1 million Republican

Total 4 million 2.3 million 1 Democrat, 2 Republicans

Hypothetical Example of How District Boundaries can affect Electoral Outcomes

III. ELECTORAL DISTRICTSIII. ELECTORAL DISTRICTS

Redrawing the balanced electoral districts in this example creates a guaranteed 3-to-1 advantage in representation for the blue voters. Here, 14 red voters are packed into the lower left district and the remaining 18 are cracked across the 3 blue districts.

Packing & CrackingPacking & Cracking

From Wikipedia



Gerrymandering in Wisconsin: Gerrymandering in Wisconsin: The 2012 electionsThe 2012 elections

Dem votes Rep Votes Dem Seats Rep Seats

U.S. House 1,443,190 1,399,871 3 5

State Senate 475,695 462,773 5 6

State assembly 1,026,736 1,122,109 38 60

IV.IV. MONEY AND POLITICSMONEY AND POLITICS

IV. MONEY AND POLITICSIV. MONEY AND POLITICS

Two core problemsTwo core problems

1.1. Lobbying: Lobbying:

Legislators have limited staffs to study problems, work out policies, acquire information. Well-funded lobbyists provide vast amounts of slick information to politicians and government officials

2. Campaign Finance 2. Campaign Finance

It costs an enormous amount to run for national public office, and It costs an enormous amount to run for national public office, and almost always the candidate with the most money wins. Does almost always the candidate with the most money wins. Does this undermine equality of citizens in a democracy?this undermine equality of citizens in a democracy?

Concentrated influence of money

.05 percent give the max to any congressional candidate

.01 percent give more than $10,000 in a election cycle

.0000061 percent (196 people) account for 4/5ths of new super PAC money (circa July 2012)

Lessig 2012

.26 percent account for 68 percent of all contributions


Campaign Finance: the legal contextCampaign Finance: the legal contextTwo Supreme Court cases: Two Supreme Court cases: Buckley v ValeoBuckley v Valeo (1976 ) and (1976 ) and Citizens Citizens

United v Federal Elections Commission United v Federal Elections Commission (2010)(2010)

Basic ruling declared that most restrictions on campaign Basic ruling declared that most restrictions on campaign spending amount to restrictions on free speech. spending amount to restrictions on free speech.

The Government cannot restrict:The Government cannot restrict:• Candidates spending from their own pocketsCandidates spending from their own pockets

• Overall level of spendingOverall level of spending

• ““Independent expenditures” on issue adsIndependent expenditures” on issue ads

• Corporations spending on independent ads for candidatesCorporations spending on independent ads for candidates

• Only real limits = on direct contributions to candidates (but Only real limits = on direct contributions to candidates (but there are ways to get around this).there are ways to get around this).


ConsequencesConsequences: :

• Candidates without strong financial networks or personal Candidates without strong financial networks or personal fortunes cannot run for office: the Senate is filled with fortunes cannot run for office: the Senate is filled with millionaires.millionaires.

• Candidates get the vast portion of their money from wealthy Candidates get the vast portion of their money from wealthy individuals and corporations: in 2008 only 1% of adult individuals and corporations: in 2008 only 1% of adult population contributed $200 or more to political campaigns.population contributed $200 or more to political campaigns.

• There is a strong correlation of the votes of politicians and their There is a strong correlation of the votes of politicians and their sources of funding. Example: The 213 members of congress who sources of funding. Example: The 213 members of congress who voted to spend almost half a billion more on B-2 stealth bombers voted to spend almost half a billion more on B-2 stealth bombers received on average $2100 from the contractor; the 210 who received on average $2100 from the contractor; the 210 who voted against only got $100.voted against only got $100. [Note: this does not prove quid-pro-quo]


Campaign Finance: solutions?Campaign Finance: solutions?(i) (i) The Patchwork Option – The Patchwork Option – keep adding targeted restrictions keep adding targeted restrictions

and provisions. The McCain-Feingold campaign finance and provisions. The McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform was an example.reform was an example.

(ii) (ii) Direct Public Funding: Direct Public Funding: The “Clean Elections Act” The “Clean Elections Act”

• Candidates who participate agree to accept only public Candidates who participate agree to accept only public fundingfunding

• To qualify, need a specified number of $5 contributionsTo qualify, need a specified number of $5 contributions

• Special provisions for “start-up funds”Special provisions for “start-up funds”

• No matching funds: all candidates get the sameNo matching funds: all candidates get the same

• Clean Election candidates get more money if outspent Clean Election candidates get more money if outspent by privately funded candidatesby privately funded candidates


(iii) (iii) The Democracy Card The Democracy Card (Bruce Ackerman proposal)(Bruce Ackerman proposal)

• Every registered voter gets (for example) a $50 political credit card Every registered voter gets (for example) a $50 political credit card when they register to vote.when they register to vote.

• This card can be used to make contributions to any political This card can be used to make contributions to any political candidate or political organization. candidate or political organization.

• With 130 million registered voters, this comes to a maximum of $6.5 With 130 million registered voters, this comes to a maximum of $6.5 billion dollars per year for all elections billion dollars per year for all elections

• If a candidate gets any private contributions they cannot use any If a candidate gets any private contributions they cannot use any democracy money. democracy money.

• There is no limit to how much money a candidate can get through There is no limit to how much money a candidate can get through democracy card donations.democracy card donations.

• Allocating democracy card money is therefore itself an egalitarian Allocating democracy card money is therefore itself an egalitarian political act – candidates first campaign for democracy dollars and political act – candidates first campaign for democracy dollars and then for votes, then for votes, but both are based on equality of citizens.but both are based on equality of citizens.

Documents

Lecture 21 Elections November 20, 2012. I. Why Bother Voting?