7 2 * Korea Blazes

H E new Secretary of Defense was no stranger to the early background of the Korean problem. As Chief of Staff in the

closing days of World War 11, he had participated in crucial deci- sions regarding that country. During this period, the 38th Parallel was drawn between North and South Korea, and a forerunner of the U.S. Military Advisory Group for South Korea was set up. During the year that Marshall spent in China, the United States increased its commitment to that area.

After receiving the Japanese surrender of South Korea, the United States had intended to end its occupation and pave the way for the establishment of a unified government. Washington hoped that its example would encourage the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from North Korea.

Japan had annexed Korea in i g io and had proceeded ruthlessly to impose autocratic rule throughout the peninsula, so that Korea presented the Allies with the difficult problem of restoring a long- dispossessed government. Conmiittees for Korean independence had developed outside the country during World War I In ig ig , Dr. Syngman Rhee, prominent in the independence movement, announced at Shanghai the formation of a provisional government for Korea, and began a propaganda campaign in the Far East and the United States. Six years later, the Soviet Union encouraged the establishment of a Communist independence movement for Korea. The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union included Korean independence in their declaration at the Tehran Confer- ence in 1943; “a free and independent Korea” was henceforth listed among Allied war aims.

Although Korea was not specifically included at Yalta among the countries to be freed from Japan’s control, the United States ob-

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tained informal Soviet agreement at Yalta, and again in May 1945, to a four-power trusteeship for Korea.'

At Potsdam, General Marshall reminded, President Truman that the Joint Chiefs of Staff needed guidance on the handling of Ko- rean claims. He also discussed with the Russian Chief of Staff, General Alexei Antonov, the proposed Soviet course of action in Korea at the end of the war. Antonov, in turn, asked whether the United States would be operating against the shores of Korea in coordination with a Russian land offensive, and was told that plans for Korea waited on the ending of Japanese control. Marshall feared that attempts to land in Korea before the invasion ofJapan would be subject to kamikaze attacks, but he thought that Korea could be controlled from the airfields in Kyushu, once they were taken over from the Japanese.2

The Soviet Union's declaration of war on Japan on August 9 hastened the dispatch of a U.S. directive to MacArthur for taking the Japanese surrender. Aware that the Russians were poised to move into Korea, Secretary of State Byrnes proposed that the U.S. commanders accept the surrender of Japanese forces as far north as possible. Assistant Secretary of War John J McCloy, responsible for military occupation and civil affairs, asked Colonel Charles H.

. Bonesteel and Coloiiel Dean Rusk (who had spent much of the war with Stilwell), of the War Department staff, to draw a proposed northern line for the area of Korea that the United States would occupy. The 38th Parallel was selected because it included Seoul, the capital, and seemed to be as far north as the U.S. forces could be expected to reach. Rusk was surprised when the line was ac- cepted by the Russians.3

Russian troops were already moving into Manchuria and Korea when Truman approved the directive drawn up by the Joint Chiefs and sent it on to London and then Moscow. On getting Allied concurrence, he forwarded it to the Commander in Chief, Far East. MacArthur named Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, commander of the XXIV Corps, to take the surrender. He instructed hiin to occupy Seoul, make friendly contact with the Soviet forces, and avoid incidents.4

Hodge ran into difficulties when Syngman Rhee and Kim KOO, leader of the provisional government, returned to Korea in the fall. Not only did Rhee sharply disagree with Communist groups that had become active in South Korea, but he also became critical and resentful of Hodge. The American General had been told to make a gradual shift from U.S. occupation control to self-government.

Korea Blazes 443 Rhee's demands that he speed up the process led Hodge to ask Washington for authority to overrule Rhee.

Marshall, beset with occupation problems in Germany and in Japan, directed MacArthur to seek a single administration for the whole of Korea but realized that i t might be a year before a four- power trusteeship could take over affairs in the country. The Far Eastern commander recalled that efforts to cooperate with the So- viet government had so far met with little success.5

State Department officials had begun to doubt the wisdom of trusteeship for Korea, and the idea was anathema to Koreans, for it promised another period of foreign occupation. In November, the U.S. political adviser in that country suggested to Secretary Byrnes that the concept be dropped. Byrnes said that, if the Soviet Union would accept unification and independence for Korea, trus- teeship might not be needed.6

As Marshall was leaving on his mission to China, an announce- ment of four-power discussion of a trusteeship led to riots in South Korea, which had to be put down by American troops Even while occupied by problems on mainland China, Marshall knew of con- tinuing difficulties between the United States and the Soviet Union over the Korean situation. From the beginning, the Russians had blocked off North Korea from the rest of the country. American proposals in January and February 1946 to integrate North and South Korea were met by Soviet insistence on keeping the two zones but coordinating the control. Soviet newspapers attacked the United States for trying to impose a trusteeship.7

By February, a Coniniunist regime had been established in the North led by a Korean who had served in the Soviet Army under the name Kim I1 Sung. With a compliant government in control, the Soviets withdrew all but 10,ooo troops from Korea by mid-year 1946. By fall, the United States had reduced its troops in the South, but was disturbed by reports that the Soviets were training a large North Korean force that would be capable of defeating South Korea.

MacArthur was still seeking a Korean settlement during the late winter of 1946. As Secretary of State Marshall prepared for the Moscow Conference in early March 1947, his advisers suggested that he raise the question of Korean independence. While he was away, representatives of State, War, and Navy discussed the future role of the United States in Korea. Secretary of War Patterson, aware of the rapid reduction of U.S. military forces, favored with- drawal Secretary of Navy Forrestal agreed, saying that Korea's I

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importance to American policy had been exaggerated. It remained for Acheson, sitting in for the Secretary of State, to remind them that Marshall wanted to go slow on withdrawal because of the damage to U.S. prestige in the Far East. In later talks, Patterson and Acheson held to their earlier stands while Forrestal accepted Mar- shall’s warning of a Communist takeover of the whole country if all American forces were suddenly pulled out.8

Already bitterly at odds with the United States over events in Germany, Molotov accused the American presence in Korea of causing the breakdown of talks there. However, he said that the Russians were ready to resume talks at Seoul in late May. Marshall insisted that all interested groups be admitted to discussions before the Joint Commission on Korea and their right to freedom of ex- pression be guaranteed. The United States agreed to a provisional democratic government, local government by free elections, and economic development of the country. Molotov finally agreed to these American amendments to Soviet proposals.9

During a May 7 meeting of State, Army, and Navy representa- tives, Marshall disagreed with Patterson’s reiteration that U.S. forces should be withdrawn from Korea because of its lack of strate- gic importance. His experiences in China, with the Russians in Manchuria, and more recently with the Soviets in Germany in- creased his awareness of the North Korean threat to the South. Dubious about the effectiveness of the training and reorganization of the South Korean constabulary, he suggested that there be a one-year program of rehabilitation and that the State Department take over nonmilitary features of the occupation. A provisional government for South Korea could be set up after a suitable elec- tion law was provided.10

In late July, overestimating his power, Syngman Rhee assailed Koreans who cooperated with the Joint Commission, attacked any suggestion of a trusteeship, urged that negotiations with the Sovi- ets stop, and asked that the Korean problem be submitted to the United Nations. The State Department suggested that the United Nations plan elections for Korea with U.N. observers present. If the Soviet Union opposed this action, State proposed that the whole matter be referred to the United Nations.ll

I n early August, State, War, and Navy representatives proposed to reduce the military comniitnient to Korea “as soon as possible without abandoning Korea to Soviet domination.” They wanted to fix a deadline for the Joint Commission report, failing which the U.S. would submit its own report to the powers that had signed the

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Korea Blazes 445 agreement for the establishment of a unified, democratic Korea. If these powers failed to act on the report, the United States would then submit the matter to the United Nations. Secretary of State Marshall approved this proposal.l2

Marshall complained to Molotov on August 1 1 about the Joint Commission’s lack of action. Denying any delays, the Soviet For- eign Minister accused American authorities with the persecution of Koreans who supported Moscow. O n August 26, concluding that the Joint Commission would never be permitted to act, Acting Secretary of State Lovett asked that the proposals be submitted to the four powers that had signed the Korean agreement. Molotov replied that there was no hope of Russian acceptance of four-power action.13

The pattern of action was all too familiar to Marshall. In mid- September, the State Department asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to state the extent of military interest in Korea. State’s Policy Planning Staff had already assumed that Korea was not militarily essential to the United States and that “our policy should be to cut our losses and get out of there as gracefully but promptly as possible,” much the idea that Patterson had set forth earlier. To some degree it was the view of General Hodge. Forrestal replied for the Joint Chiefs near the end of the month. From the standpoint of military security, “the United States has little strategic interest in maintaining the present troops and bases in Korea.’’ In case of war, Korea would be a liability. Any American offensive northward would bypass Korea, air action would neutralize it at less cost than ground action, the 45,000 troops in Korea could be used more effectively else- where, and troops left there might be forced to withdraw later with a loss of prestige.14

Meanwhile, the United States was readying action in the United Nations. Explaining the American position to the General Assem- bly, Marshall said that China and Britain had agreed with the United States in its efforts to get a provisional government for Korea, but the Soviet Union had opposed these proposals. Further attempts at bilateral negotiation would only delay the e,stablish- ment of an independent state. Molotov’s reply on October io, proposing simultaneous U.S. and Soviet withdrawal of military forces by the end of 1948, was met by an American request that the U.N. set elections not later than March 31, 1948. The assembly accepted the U.S. substitute resolution, and established a U.N. Commission for Korea.l5

Near the end of the year, American officials began to plan for

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future withdrawal. The Department of the Army directed MacAr- thur and Hodge to make preparatory arrangements, and Eisen- hower, then Chief of Staff, asked Marshall to retain Hodge until the end of the occupation. General Saltzman, Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, added that a sudden relief of Hodge would be regarded as a victory by Syngman Rhee and his followers. Marshall agreed, unless serious delays made changes in dead- lines.16

The Soviet Union denied the new U.N. commission access to North Korea. The interim committee of the General Assembly then directed the commission to hold an election in South Korea. As- suming that a government would emerge by summer, the State Department advised that the United States stay flexible on the date for withdrawal: time was needed to prepare South Korean defenses and to train a South Korean security force.”

Marshall wondered if the poorly trained and scantily armed 25,000 constabulary of South Korea could be shaped to resist North Korea’s forces by the time the United States withdrew from Korea. Remembering the organization of the Philippine Scouts from the days of his first military experiences, he asked whether South Korean soldiers could be put into American units until they were properly trained.’*

The National Security Council on April 2, 1948, delineated the existing American options in Korea ( 1 ) abandoning the South Koreans (not considered feasible), (2) supporting the South Ko- reans by training troops and providing other assistance; (3) with: drawing troops there by the end of the year; and (4) continuing cooperation with the United Nations. The council emphasized that the United States should avoid getting so involved “that any action taken by any faction in Korea . . . could be considered a casus belli by the U S.” The council also held that further negotiation with the Soviet Union on t,he unification and independence of Korea should not be written off 19

The U.N.-sponsored elections took place in South Korea on May io. Two days later, at his press conference, Marshall declared “the fact that some go per cent of the registered voters cast their ballots, despite the lawless efforts o,f a communis t-dominated iiiinority to prevent or sabotage the election, is a clear revelation that the Ko- rean people are determined to form their own government by democratic means ”20

In mid-Augus t , the first Korean-controlled government since 1 9 1 0 was established at Seoul, with Syngniaii Rhee as head. He was delighted to have General MacArthur declaim:

Korea Blazes 447 In this hour as the forces of righteousness advance, the triumph

is dulled by one of the greatest tragedies of contemporary history. An artificial barrier has divided your land This barrier must and shall be torn down. Nothing shall prevent the ultimate unity of your people as free men of a free nation.2l

His words struck a gallant and very popular note, but they did not exactly indicate the cautious approach that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department recommended. When speaking later of MacArthur’s October visit to Korea, Rhee declared that the Gen- eral had privately assured him that he would protect Korea “as I would protect the United States or California against aggres- sion.”22 This was a remarkable statement, because MacArthur no longer had principal responsibility for Korean independence.

North Korea held no elections. A body called the “Supreme People’s Assembly” of North Korea ratified a constitution and pro- claimed a People’s Democratic Republic with Kim I1 Sung as Prime Minister in early September 1948. The Soviet Union recognized this new government, followed by Poland, Mongolia, Czecho- slovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. Moscow announced that it would begin to withdraw its troops in mid-October and complete the process by the end of the year.

At the end of December 1948, Moscow announced that all its troops had been withdrawn. The United States increased its evacu- ation of troops and, near the end ofJune 1949, brought out its last regular units, leaving behind a small Military Advisory Group.23

But there was no real peace. A summary of that period later stated:

The withdrawal of the respective occupation troops left the two hostile Korean regimes facing one another, each claiming to be the only leg-itimate government, each augmenting its armed forces, and each eager to settle the question by force of arms 24

The Advisory Group had grown out of an early-1948 statement by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee that a strong South Ko- rean constabulary might be able to deter North Korean aggression. General MacArthur had advised against building a South Korean army and favored increasing the constabulary to 50,000 men. Near the end of 1948, at Syngman Rhee’s request, the Far Eastern com- mander made available members of his own headquarters, some 472 officers and men, to become the U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea under Brigadier General William J. Rob-

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erts. MacArthur was to be responsible for logistical support to the waterline and for the evacuation of American citizens in case of emergency.25

MacArthur took a cautious stand. He favored a South Korean force large enough to maintain internal security but organized in such a way as to make clear that it offered no danger to North Korea. Arms were provided for a 50,000-man “constabulary force.” In September 1948, apparently using MacArthur’s argu- ment, Marshall recommended the program to the Department of the Army.

Marshall left the State Department inJanuary 1949 and did not deal with Korean matters again until September 1950. During this intervening period, the Koreans benefited from arms and equip- ment left behind by the U.S. troops In August 1949, at President Rhee’s request for additional support, Truman recommended such aid to Congress. Yet, although a military assistance agreement was signed in January 1950, little was made available before the open- ing of hostilities in June.

The Soviets had been reported to be busy equipping North Ko- rean ground troops and making air support available. In March 1950, the U.S. Advisory Group commander estimated that the South Korean ground force was stronger than that of the North but that North Korean air forces could tip the scales. Testifying before a congressional committee in early June 1950, U.S. Ambassador John J , Muccio warned that Soviet aid would give the North Ko- reails victory in an armed confrontation.

Tension between the two Koreas increased as summer ap- proached. In May, the United Nations held elections for a new National Assembly. The North Korean government attacked the election and demanded the establishment of an all-Korean legisla- tive body to draw up a new constitution and organize a national government. Its continued assault on the leaders of the South Korean government as traitors and its demands that the U.N. com- mission leave made peace seem increasingly unlikely Observers charged the North Koreans with offensive action along the 38th Parallel and soon afterward warned of guerrilla activities south of the line On June 25, 1950, Washington time, North Korean forces invaded South Korea.26

Korea had been substantially written off as unessential to Ameri- can interests before the attack, and no one in the United States had definitely foreseen an incident at that time. Inasmuch as North Korea’s capabilities were regarded as limited, American intelli-

Korea Blazes 449 gence agencies suggested that trouble was likely to coine to Indo- china before it did in Korea

Marshall, naturally, had little intimate day-by-day knowledge of the situation. Red Cross business was taking up much of his time. Delegates to a national Red Cross meeting were gathering in De- troit at the time of the attack. On June 25, the General attended the Red Cross board of governors’ meeting there, and spoke at the morning session the next day.

President Truman was at his home in Independence when the attack came. Acheson called him at once and got his consent to request a meeting of the United Nations Security Council for the following day. Truman flew east to talk with his advisers at Blair House, and the Security Couiicil met in New York without repre- sentation froin the Soviet Union. The Soviets were boycotting the Council because it refbsed to recognize the Chinese Communist regime as entitled to the permanent seat allotted to China in the Council.

The Council voted nine ayes to one abstaining for an American resolution requesting an end to the hostilities in Korea and the restoration of the sfutrts quo It also asked for U.N. aid to carry the resolution into effect. Even before Truman arrived in Washington, the Joint Chiefs gave MacArthur operational control over U.S. inili- tary forces in Korea and directed hiin to be prepared to send U.S. forces to Korea if the United Nations asked for such aid.

On June 27, the Security Council called for an end to the fighting and asked United Nations inembers to give the aid necessary “to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and secu- rity in the area.’’ Truman had already authorized U s. air and naval forces to support South Korean forces south of the 38th Parallel. It was clear that the United States, if necessary, was prepared to act alone, but the President preferred to act in concert with the U N. Although at times the collaboi-ation was to be irksoine, i t helped to avoid direct confrontation with the Soviet Union and rallied a con- siderable part of world opinion against the Soviet abetting of North Korean aggression

Turning down a proposed directive by MacArthur that could imply action against the Russians, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pei-init- ted hiin to hit military targets in North Korea but warned against striking areas near Manchuria or Soviet territory He was reminded that there was no commitinent to fight the Soviet Union. Even if Red forces crossed into Korea, U.S. troops were to take no action to aggravate the situation.

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After a quick visit to Korea, MacArthur informed Washington that current lines could be held and lost ground retaken if U.S. ground forces could be committed. He wanted to send in a regi- mental combat team at once and build up two divisions in Japan to be available against a counterattack. Truman at once authorized him to use all ground forces then available in the Far East.

More than a show of force was needed to help the South Koreans. Despite the landing of American troops, the South Koreans were pushed back, revealing the weakness in training and organization that Marshall and others had feared. Within two weeks of his opti- mistic report, MacArthur called for four or four and a half U.S. divisions, with some supporting airborne and armored troops. T w o days later, he had to increase his estimates.

Forces in Qkinawa and Hawaii were instructed to aid MacArthur, and reserve units in the United States were alerted. The slender American resources were soon strained to the limit. The United States had to build a reserve, because any further call on regular forces left nothing to send to Europe in case of trouble. MacArthur would later accuse the United States of not trying to win, but military limitations of the country meant that armed assistance to Korea had to be measured against U.S. commitments to NATO, a factor that he and his adherents in the United States did not like to accept.

Asked to restrain the North Koreans, the Soviet Union flatly declared that South Korea had been the aggressor At this point, an Anglo-French resolution was passed by the U.N. Security Coun- cil with seven affirmative votes against four abstentions (the Soviet Union still refused to be present) to give the United States coin- mand of forces supplied by United Nations members for the sup- port of South Korea. President Truman was appointed executive for the Council, and troops supplied by United Nations countries were to be led by an American commander. With the recommenda- tion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General MacArthur got that assign- ment; Syrigman Rhee then transferred South Korean forces to MacArthur's command. His new U.N. command was established in Tokyo one month after the invasion of South Korea. He made periodic reports to the Joint Chiefs, who forwarded them through the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State, who, after in- forming President Truman, passed the reports to the U.N. Security c0unc11.

Although command of forces in the field was exercised as if the troops were all American, two elements of possible conflict ap- peared. First of all, the State Department and the recently estab-

Korea Blazes 451 lished Defense Department were brought into the command chan- nel in a way that had not existed in World War 11. Lack of agree- ment between the secretaries of the two departments could cause a breakdown in operations. Accustomed to dealing directly with the Joint Chief of Staff in World War 11, MacArthur found that he was responsible to the secretaries of State and Defense as well as to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and he was required to heed the views of the United Nations.

The contributing nations acted only under American pressure, since their main anxiety concerned possible Soviet offenses in Europe. They were reluctant to weaken their resistance to Soviet expansion in Europe. European efforts to curb the aggressive poll- cies of the United Nations commander came through the Secretary of State, who was viewed with increased suspicion by MacArthur and his supporters in Congress. The complicated system of com- mand and responsibility was certain to create frustration and vio- lent resentment, and when it involved a temperament such as MacArthur’s, it created angry trumpet calls about planned opposi- tion and conspiracy.

Limiting the capabilities of the United Nations command were the United States’ global commitments and the steady deteriora- tion of the armed forces since World War 11. In 1950 and 1951, Washington constantly had to face the question whether a more aggressive policy in the Far East might destroy the defensive alli- ance so carefully developed in Western Europe. For MacArthur, the answer was as simple as it had been in the Pacific during World War 11- the chief enemy was in the Far East, and as commander there he must have everything he needed to win and the authority to wage his fight as he saw f i t . 27

The Allied forces were extremely weak compared with those of World War 11, but the British placed naval units at the disposal of the U.N. commander before the end of June. Australia, New Zea- land, and Canada soon offered naval and air units as well. The Chinese Nationalists eagerly offered to join the fray fi-om Formosa, but fear that such an ally might bring in another enemy-the Chi- nese Communists-led to a refusal with thanks for the offer.

These token efforts were otherwise gratefully received, but as the situation darkened in Korea, more help was expected. British Am- bassador Franks quickly briefed Prime Minister Clement Attlee on the danger in the situation. By 1950, the degree of economic recov- ery in Britain had made her once more the greatest world power after the United States and the Soviet Union. Britain and the United States were again dealing as a partnership, but the reality of that

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partnership was soon to be tested. Franks noticed a prickly growth of questions about and criticisms of Britain’s role in the Korean crisis: Americans had a tendency to assume, in those cases where the British had been slow to support the United States, that ulti- mate cooperation came only from American pressure. Therefore, Franks insisted to Attlee that, if the British planned to add token ground forces to the naval units already provided, they must add them quickly.28

Intent on keeping the Anglo-American partnership intact, For- eign Secretary Bevin hastened to follow Franks’s advice. Other oflers from other countries followed. By September, when Marshall became Secretary of Defense, eleven countries were giving aid to the U.N. effort in Korea.29

The United States, as Franks had made clear, had acted quickly against a Communist threat But it had decided to do so within the framework of the United Nations, and a large section of the country regarded its action as a defense of the United Nations, which would have broken,up if this aggression had not been challenged. The Americans, the Ambassador added, were proud to assume the lion’s share of the defense, but they wanted the support of other members, as a clear indication of the U.N. character of the opera- tions and as a test of the faith of other U.N. members. Washington was caught up in the emotional drive of a country at war. Although this feeling had not ye t spread to the rest of the United States, it would as soon as the President called for an increase in the armed forces and set priorities and controls on industry. This American mood was something that must be taken into consideration by the British government in evaluating its contribution.30

Franks’s prediction of a call by Ti-uinan for more troops and supplies became a reality. In early July, the ground-force ceiling was raised by 50,000 to 680,000. By the end ofJuly, i t had increased to 834,000. A month later, it was raised to i million. To get this number, the Army had to cease being a volunteer force and use the authority it had been given under the Selective Service Extension Act of 1948, which it had hitherto scarcely used. On July 25, a call was made for a draft of 50,000 to be inducted in September, and on September 1 2 , Truman reluctantly called up four National Guard divisions and two Natioiial Guard regimental combat teams.3

These early, fr-antic attempts to raise troops displayed the na- tion’s unpreparedness and fLieled attacks against Secretary of De- fense Louis Johnson. The early belief that the few U.S. forces in the Far East would be sufficient to reinforce South Korean troops

Korea Blazes 453 evaporated when some of the South Korean divisions disinte- grated. General Walton H. Walker, World War I1 corps cominan- der in Europe, now commander of the Eighth Army, which was made up of U.S. and Korean soldiers, pulled back and formed what he called the Pusan perimeter, near the South Korean port of that name. It was an area that could be reinforced and supplied and would afford an escape roLite should that prove necessary as the North Koreans advanced southward. He declared that the Eighth Army would not surrender.

With Walker dug in, MacAi-thur began to see some hope. As the North Koreans moved southward, their supply lines were open to air and sea attack. Having made good use of amphibious attack in the Southwest Pacific, MacArthur began to inuse on a landing at Inchon, on the Korean western coast, southwest of Seoul. He tried out his idea on General Collins and General Vandenberg when they visited him in mid-July Collins raised some questions of feasibility, but the two men left without giving a definite reply. To every high-ranking visitor from Washington that summer-among them Averell Hari-iman, General Matthew Ridgway, General Laui-is Nor- stad-MacArthur urged the need for some action before the Chi- nese Communists and the Russians could further strengthen the North Koreans. He did not always mention Inchon: those who heard of his idea for a landing there did not seem to think it a suitable place.

The U.N. commander told the Joint Chiefs that he would launch an attack in inid-September, and in late August he set plans specifi- cally for a landing- at Inchon at that time. Although he met skepti- cism on all sides, he held out stubbornly for Inchon in the face of doubts from senior officers of the Marines (who would have to make the landing), the Navy, and the Air Force. Even when General Collins and Admiral Sherman flew out to discuss alternative plans, and General Lemuel Shepherd of the Fleet Marine Force expressed grave doubts, MacArthur held out for Inchon and Inchon 0nly.32

Near the end of August, the Joint Chiefs approved a landing but asked for a substitute plan for a landing at Kunsan, far south of Inchon. As if to make it clear that they were still in charge, they reminded MacArthur that they would want full details and plans for any future operations. On August 30, MacAi-thur issued directives for the Inchon attack. One week before the September 15 landings, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to his plan, sending nearly all the Marine reserves from the Atlantic and trying to bring the 7th U.S. Infantry Division up to strength.

The landings were a tremendous success. Following heavy air

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and naval bombardment, the Marines went ashore and by evening had more than one-third of the port From his ship headquarters, MacArthur ’praised the forces under his command and announced that the North Koreans were retreating toward Seoul with heavy losses.

It was a great vindication for MacArthur’s plan and his willing- ness to take risks, and many who had opposed his idea forgot that they had done so in admiration of his success. Later, he would decide that nearly everyone had been against him and that he had triumphed despite their opposition. Actually, Washington had ex- pressed proper concern and urged the consideration of alterna- tives, but had finally endorsed his plan and then done everything possible to strengthen his hand

MacArthur’s victory contained serious portents for his future. Just as Hitler had won some of his early gambles over the doubts of his military advisers and came to hold their advice in contempt, so MacArthur now tended to dismiss Washington-voiced reserva- tions about any of his plans. Never given to underrating the sound- ness of his own judgment, MacArthur allowed his self-confidence to soar after his Inchon victory. He became certain of his destiny, and his conviction hardened that he had to depend, in the last analysis, on his own genius.