Knorr Cetina Sobre Merton

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Review: Merton's Sociology of Science: The First and the Last Sociology of Science?Author(s): Karin Knorr CetinaSource: Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Jul., 1991), pp. 522-526Published by: American Sociological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2071782 .

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522 SYMPOSIUM

contemporary works on magical beliefs(Boudon forthcoming; 990). In otherwords,the validity f the MRT behind the nterpreta-tion of a social phenomenon s what makesthis nterpretationtrong r weak.

This latter xample shows also thatmiddle-range theorizing s crucial not only as farastheprogressof sociology itself s concerned;it can also-as in the natural sciences-contribute federating findings and theoriesfromvariousdisciplines,as from conomics,political theory, ognitive psychology,or thesociological theory f ideologies. It producesinterdisciplinarityaturally, o to say.

Coda

A brilliant,but strangeand defeatistbook(Lepenies 1985) recentlytriedto show thatsociology should be considered a thirdculture,between literaturend science, with-out raisingthe obvious questionas to why, fa new continentbetween art and scienceexistedreally,we would have had to wait solong to become informed f such big news.What is true is that many sociologicalproducts an-effectively andunfortunately-be considered both bad science and badliterature.But why should the sociologicalproducts f the bad literature-badhilosophy-bad history-bad cience kind be assumed todefine the essence of sociology? As Mertonsuggests, after Weber and Durkheim, whoagreed on this point, sociology can also begood science; it can, as well as any otherscientific discipline, help explain puzzling

phenomenaand create new solid knowledge

about the aspects of the social world it istraditionallyconcerned with. Middle-rangetheory s effectively he indispensablemeansto reach thisgoal, whilebroad-range heory sthemain source of the third ulture.

Other Literature Cited

Boudon, Raymond. 1977. Education, Equality andSocial Opportunity.New York: Wiley.

. 1982. The UnintendedConsequences of SocialAction. London: Macmillan.

. 1988. "L'acteur social est-il irrational(et siconformiste) u'on le dit?" Pp. 219-44 in Individu etjustice sociale. Paris: Seuil.

. 1989a. "Subjective Rationality nd theExplana-

tion of Social Behavior." Rationality and Society1:173-96.. 1989b. The Analysis of Ideology. Cambridge:

Polity Press.. 1990a. "Les Causes de linegalite des chances."

Commentaire 51: 533-42.. 1990b. L'Art de se persuader. Paris: Fayard;

Cambridge: PolityPress (forthcomingn English).. forthcoming. European Sociology: The Identity

Lost." In European Sociology at the Turn of theTwentiethCentury, dited by BirgittaNedelmann andPiotrSztompka. Mainz: Unwin Hyman.

Hirschman, Albert 0. 1980. "The Changing Tolerance

for Income Inequality in the Course of EconomicDevelopment." Pp. 39-58 in Essays in Trespassing:Economics to Politics and Beyond. Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress.

Katz, Elihu and Paul Lazarsfeld. 1955. PersonalInfluence. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Lepenies, Wolf. 1985. Die drei Kulturen.Munich: CarlHanser.

Merton, Robert K. 1957. Social Theory and SocialStructure.Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Pawson, Ray. 1989. Measure for Measures. London:Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Simon, HerbertA. 1982. Models ofBounded Rationality.

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Merton'sSociology f Science: The Firstand the LastSociology fScience?

KARIN KNORR CETINAUniversity f Bielefeld

Merton the founderof thesociologyof science

Even his enemies admit thatMerton s thefounder f thesociology of science. When hepublished his classic Science, Technology,and Society in Seventeenth-Centurynglandin 1938, the sociology of science was not arecognized field. Fifty years later, an abun-

dance of programsof instructionnd centersof research in social studies of science and

technology an be found n the United Statesand Europe, and the status of sociology ofscience as an academic subdiscipline isbeyond question. To be sure, therewere otherbooks produced on science, technology, ndsociety at the time of Merton's publication,most notably Bernal's famous The Social



SYMPOSIUM 523

Function of Science (1939). Yet none of theworksexamining he social aspectsof sciencehad the range of professionalinterests, hedepth of knowledge, and, later,the strategicposition n sociologyto help a whole subfield

offtheground.Moreover,Merton's achieve-ment in this respect was not just aninstitutional chievement. The many pro-grams in the area that we have today camelater, nd most were only ndirectly elped byMerton. Rather, in finding and motivatingstudents, in producing over time a wholeseries of seminal papers on social aspects ofscience, and in buildinghis "middle-range"theories in sociology in general, Mertoncreateda framework f conceptsand tools forthe sociology of science. Most importantly,he proposed a programfor research:to tracethe way the institutional environmentofscience, including its norms and culturalvalues, impinges on science-not on thenature of science or the substance of itstheories ut on itsprogress nd development.Merton'sstudents leshedout thisprogram yemphasizing, in addition, the institutionalstructurewithin science-for example, its

social structure e.g., Cole and Cole 1973;Zuckerman and Merton 1971).'This research programset the new field

apartfromthe conceptionof science studiesas a pastime for natural scientists-turned-commentatorsf their ield a conception tilldominant in some countries). Merton issometimes criticized for not producing asystematic heoryof society or a systemofsociology,and for nsteadusinghis extraordi-narytalents to focus theoreticalpropositions

on empirical research (see Bierstedt 1981).Yet inhis stubborn nsistence hat heorymusthave utilityfor research and must adapt itsrange and conceptions to this role, Mertonwas ahead of his time rather than behindamong American sociologists. Certainly, nsociology of science his research orientationhas seta trend hat ontinues odaywithin ndwithout the Mertonian program; and insociology in general, grand,unifyingystemsof thought re now treatedwithwidespreadsuspicion. If the Mertonian program has

l It is only fair to say that Merton's students thoseassociated with Merton) did not "just" extend hisprogram. See, for example, the most recent book byStephenCole (1991).

failed, it has not failedin recommending ndinitiating rofessional ociological research.

But has it failed? Many of my colleaguestoday would say yes. There exists today a"new sociology of science," also known as

the "sociology of scientificpractice" or the"sociology of scientificknowledge," whichhas become a centralpartof the argerfield ofscience, technology, nd society.2

This new brandof social studies of sciencehas created ts research agenda in oppositionto the Mertonian program. The followingconcerns tselfwith the criticism he Merton-ian approach has attracted n relation to thisnew development. Stripped to its essentials,this criticism can be divided into twocategories: first,t consists of an attackon the"normative" and "functionalist" orientationof Merton's sociology of science; second, itquestions any research agenda that saves theeffort f examining n detail the substance ofscience and of scientificwork.

The critique ofMerton

Interestinglynough,Merton'soriginalworkon Puritanism nd the rise of modern ciencehasnot ttractedhe ttentiontdeserves mongsociologists. Sociologistsmorereadily atchedon to his lateressays, particularly is work onthe "ethos" of science (e.g., Stehr1978, Col-lins 1982). Merton's first ully ledgeddiscus-sion ofthis thos s a paperfrom 942 in whichhe described"four sets of institutionalmpera-tives": universalism, ommunism,disinterest-edness, and organized skepticism.These are

the"guidingprinciples" f scientificwork,the"canons" expressed throughdemands madeuponscientists: cientific indingsmustbe pub-lished (the norm of communism),knowledgeclaims mustbe subjected o impersonal riteriaof evaluation universalism), ersonal nterestsmustbe excluded from roper cientific roce-dures disinterestedness),nd criticism s per-mitted nd encouraged organized skepticism).The critics rguedthat hese norms re neitherstableproperties or xclusive anctionable de-als of scientific ctivities.Where thenorms reendorsed,"counternorms" lso appear whichto some degreecancel theoriginal mperative.

2 For an overview over thisprogram, ee Knorr Cetinaand Mulkay (1983) and Zuckerman 1988). For a reviewfrom he Mertonianperspectivesee Gieryn 1982).



524 SYMPOSIUM

Consequently,both normsand counternormsmaybe perceived s part f a larger and chang-ing) rhetoric f science whose relationship oscientific ractice remains an open question.But the criticismruns deeper: it is directed

against ny approachthat reatsnorms,orval-ues, as primaryxplanatory rinciples f socialbehavior.The whole movement f sociologicaltheory, fterParsons, is a move against suchassumptions.Within he sociologyof science,thegoal of "explaining"scientific ehavior t-self became a point of contention.Where thegoal was maintained, he normativemodelwasreplaced by the interest, onflict, nd interac-tion models of scientific onduct.

In addition to the objections against any"normative"theory, he critiqueof function-alisms spilled over into debates about "Mer-tonianism" n science studies,although t wasdirected more against Parsons than againstMerton. More interesting erhaps, and morespecific to science studies, was the secondmajor objectionagainst theMertonian ociol-ogy of science, an objectiondirected gainsttheoriginalresearchprogram.Since virtuallythe same objectionhas been raised indepen-

dently by historiansof science against the"Merton thesis," let me look at the latterfirst. he "Merton thesis" is the upshotof his1938 volume. In essence it says thatPuritan-ism in seventeenth-centurynglandpromoteda favorableattitude oward science in virtueof the "inner-worldly" activism which itfavored as a means to the Puritan's goal ofachievinga stateofgrace. In modemscience,inner-worldlyctivitytranslates nto empiri-cism and rationalism-the presumedworldly

means for revealing God's works. Theensuing debates concerned the question ofwhether the Puritan or Catholic contextprovidedthe social reinforcementhathelpedseventeenth-centurycience off the ground.Predictably, hey also concernedthequestionof whetherreligion, commerce, or industryshould be taken as the dominantsustainingfactor n regardto science (Heilbron, FE, p.11). Yet the deeper issue, fromthe point ofview of recent sociology of science, is amethodologicalone. Could a thesis such asthe Puritanism-sciencethesis even be ad-dressed without adequate analysis of thenature of the new science? From thisperspective, predominantly ut forwardbyHall (1963; see Rattansi,CMM, pp. 351-79),Merton was cavalier about characterizing

science. He essentially took science to beidentical with ts public face, as the embodi-ment of objective knowledge. Yet an ade-quate analysis,so Hall argued, would demandbetter care in establishing the institutional

reality of science (and of course of Puritan-ism). If this care was taken, otherfeatures fscience would emerge such as mathematiza-tion and mechanization) whose congenialitywithPuritanismwould have to be proven byMerton.

The details of this debate are of no concernto us here.What is significants the extent owhich theproblemshistorianshad with Mer-ton's approach nd the problems n accountofwhich the new social studiesof science movedaway fromMertonianismre dentical. hepointis that ocial influences pon science, and in-deed the social makeupof science, cannot beadequatelyunderstood f the "cognitive" be-liefs, the methodicalprocedures, he ontologi-cal assumptions, nd moregenerally he tech-nical structuref this nstitutionre notknown,and not ddressed nthe nalysis.Merton'sdef-inition f science remained n outsider's defi-nition. ince then, he sociologyofscience has

emulated hehistoryndphilosophy f sciencebybecoming fieldthat ncludes he substanceofscience. It no longer huns heresponsibilityof considering he technical content f scien-tificwork. In fact, t oftenconsiders t in asmuchdetail s do the cientistshemselves. heresult s that he ociologyofscience has turnedinto a sociologyofscientific nowledge. thasbecome internalists well as externalist,on-cernedwiththe contentwithin s well as thecontextof scientificwork. To be sure,Mer-

ton's thesiswas also a thesiswithin he sociol-ogyofknowledge. n thisrespect, s inothers,Merton nticipatedhedevelopmentfthefield.Yet he did notconsiderenoughtheneed forsociology of scientificknowledgeto developnot from xternal nfluencessuch as Puritan-ism) uponscience,but from definitionfthephenomenal tructuresnd the technical ctiv-ities of itsobjects.

The alternativedefinition f socialstudies of science

The Mertonian onception f sociologyis apure,coherent, utexclusionary onception. tis based on thedeploymentfimportantocio-logical concepts (social structure, unction,



SYMPOSIUM 525

norm,value, social actor, social role, anomie,and the ike) as defined ytheclassic studies fthe field. These concepts re tools for lassify-ing social relations nd mechanisms f integra-tion or disintegration. hey go hand in hand

with setof predominantlyquantitative"meth-ods that uitably upport heseconcepts.Yet inchoosing this paradigm, sociology had pro-posed a division f aborwith ther isciplines-forexample,withhistory, inguistics, thnog-raphy, or philosophy.The cognitive content,discourse,cosmology, ndontology f modeminstitutions ere eft o thesefields. Stimulatedby Kuhn, the new studies of knowledge pro-posed a more nclusionary efinition. heyre-jected the special epistemicstatus of scienceand came to believe that ognition,discourse,cosmologies, and ontologiesare also sociallyconstituted.he inclusionary efinitionmirrorsdevelopments n sociology in general,wheresuch subfields s ethnomethodology,iscourseanalysis, and micromethods, ormerlyefttohistoriansndanthropologists,ave takenhold.Yet within ocial studiesof science, the movetoward an internalist ociology of scientificknowledge raised furtherssues, which domi-

nate thediscussion nthe field oday.These arethe ssues ofreflexivitynd of the redefinitionof sociology tself.

Firstreflexivity. he conceptiondevelopedby new studies of knowledge sees scientific(and technological) realityand "facts" firstand foremost s theoutcome of a process ofconstruction. "Truth" is seen as a conse-quence ratherthan a cause of this process.But if natural scientists' results are notunproblematic epresentations f naturalreal-

ity,what about social scientists'representa-tions? t is easy to see that he constructionistthesis applies equally to the "findings" ofsociologists of science themselves. Thisawareness has led to a self-reflexive iscus-sion of the "methodological horror" ofreflexivity e.g., Woolgar 1988), and to itsfurtherxploration through he studyof themethods hroughwhichsocial scientists earnabout science (e.g., Mulkayet al. 1983). To acertaindegree, the explorationof reflexivityhas promoted a problem shift in sciencestudies: it has mingledthe original problemson the researchagenda of the field e.g., theproblem of understandingthe practice ofnatural science) with methodological andepistemological questions, and has therebycontributed o a further lienation between

sociology of science as itonce existed and itscurrent evelopments.But thepoint want todraw attention o is the weakening of socialanalysis that follows from the discussion ofreflexivity. raditional,Mertonian sociology

applied thebelief n theedge of objectivity fscience to itself. tremained ecure enough nits knowledge of the positivistfoundation fscience to carry the Mertonian researchprogram through until today. The newsociology of scientificknowledge, on theotherhand-since it cannotshirk heduty ofconfrontingreflexivity-more easily lendsitself to discussions that ead away from, orcontinually redefine, a coherent researchagenda. If the turn way from heMertonianprogram has contributed o opening up thedefinition f science andnature or ociology,reflexivity as contributedo opening up thedefinition f sociology itself.

Ofcourse, na sensethisdefinition as beenat issue ever since sociologymoved into sci-ence. Unlike thehistoryfscience,whichusedto be an intellectual istorywhen t was inter-nalist, hesociologyof sciencehas notbecome"cognitive" r "intellectual" hroughhismove.

But neitherhas it remainedthe strictlyocialrelational, trictlyocial institutionalociologythat t had been in the 1940s, '50s, and '60s.Merton'sdefinition f sociology, too, was anoutsider'sdefinition, definitionppliedtobutnot earnedfrom deeper understandingf theworking f science. Complex systems hat reorganized roundargebodiesofesoteric nowl-edge whichtheyconstrueusing their wn in-ternalmechanismshave their wn ways of en-actingsociety. They enact society and other

matters)within he echnical odyoftheirwork,not ust within heirorganizational tructures,financial epartments,r othermoreobviously"social" components.Theymay,for xample,achieve social goals through heir wn "tech-nical" means, or use social means to furtherscientific oals. Such systemsnclude a wholenew level of reality, whole new category fresources nd mechanismsthe category f the"technical" or "scientific"), which theycanbring o bear on or intertwine ithmore tradi-tional ocialcategories nd resources.Theymayincorporate ew definitions f the social, andrevise distinctions hat ociologistsderivefromother, less texturedenvironments. n otherwords,theyconstruct cultural rderof theirown that s embeddedwithin hetechnicalitiesof theirwork.



526 SYMPOSIUM

One consequenceof earning rom omplex,knowledge-based nstitutionsowthey ecreatethe social is that ociologists have to begin torebuild heir onceptualframework or nalyz-ing science. For one thing, he distinction e-

tween he social and the natural rder,betweensocial and naturalforces, betweenthe inten-tionalhumanactors ociologyassumes and in-tentionless onhuman things"has itselfbeencalled intoquestion (e.g., Latour 1991). Foranother,comparisons between different ci-ences suggest hat here xists a variety f "so-ciologies" embodied in the culturalorders ofthesesciences,and that bstractmetaconcepts,or alternations etween frameworks,will beneeded todeal with his ituation.3 t thispointthe redefinitionfsociological resources nre-lationto the sciences s in fullcourse. It seemslikely,however, hat tudents f science nthisarea will not revert o Merton'sprogram.Withregard osome questions,his nstitutional,ure,untainted ociology of science will retain tsvalue. But forother uestionswhich the studyof science has opened up in recentyears,theoriginal ociologyof science offers ewtools.If the fielddevelops along thepresent ines it

will continueto blur thefamiliardivision oflabor between disciplinesand the distinctionsthathave been foundational orsociology-asit blurred he distinctionetween ognitive ndsocial analysis by finding ociety within thetechnical artof science. Ifthishappens, Mer-ton's programwill nonethelesshave been thefirst rueprofessional ociologyof science. Butperhaps twill also remain he ast true ociol-ogy of science.

3 For an elaboration of this point, see Knorr Cetina(1991).

OtherLiteratureCitedBernal, J.D. 1939. The Social Function of Science. New

York: Macmillan.Bierstedt, Robert. 1981. AmericanSociological Theory:

A Critical History. New York: Academic Press.Cole, Stephen. 1991. The Sociology of Science. Cam-

bridge, MA: HarvardUniversityPress.Cole, Jonathan R. and Stephen Cole. 1973. Social

Stratificationand Science. Chicago: University ofChicago Press.

Collins, H. M. 1982. "Knowledge, Norms and Rules inthe Sociology of Science." Social Studies of Science12:299-309.

Gieryn, Thomas 1982. "Relativist/Constructivist ro-grammes n theSociology of Science: Redundance andRetreat." Social Studies of Science 12:279-97.

Hall, A. Rupert. 1963. "Merton Revisited, or Scienceand Society in the SeventeenthCentury." HistoryofScience 2:1-16.

Knorr Cetina, Karin and Michael Mulkay, eds. 1983.Science Observed: Perspectiveson the Social Study ofScience. London: Sage.

Knorr Cetina, Karin D. 1991. Epistemic Cultures(forthcoming).

Latour,Bruno. 1991. "The Impactof Science Studies onPolitical Philosophy." Science, Technology and Hu-man Values 16:3-19.

Merton, Robert K. 1938. "Science, Technology andSociety in Seventeenth-CenturyEngland." Osiris4:360-632.

. 1942. "A Note on Science and Democracy."Journal of Legal and Political Sociology 1:115-26.

Mulkay, Michael, J. Potter, and Steven Yearley. 1983."Why an Analysis of ScientificDiscourse is Needed."Pp. 171-203 in Science Observed: Perspectives on theSocial Study ofScience, edited by Karin Knorr Cetinaand Michael Mulkay. London: Sage.

Stehr, Nico. 1978. "The Ethos of Science Revisited."Pp. 172-96 in The Sociology of Science: Problems,Approaches and Research, edited by J. Gaston. SanFrancisco: Jossey-Bass.

Woolgar, Steve, ed. 1988. Knowledge and Reflexivity:New Frontiers n theSociology of Knowledge. London:Sage.

Zuckerman,Harriet. 1988. "The Sociology of Science."

Pp. 511-74 in Handbook of Sociology, edited by NeilJ. Smelser. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Zuckerman, Harriet and Robert K. Merton. 1971."Patternsof Evaluation in Science: Institutionalization,Structure and Functions of the Referee System."Minerva 9:66-100.

Science,Religion, nd BoundaryMaintenance

NATHAN SIVIN

University fPennsylvaniaBernard Cohen, occupying Merton's old

desk in Widener Library 189, "literallypounced upon the first vailable copy of . . .Merton'smonograph, nd so musthave beenone of the first eadersof STS in print." Asthis fledgling historian of science read

Science, Technology, and Society in Seven-teenth-Century ngland (1938), the mono-graph that aunched the American sociologyofscience, "therecame the flashof revelationthat my chosen subject of the history ofscience could be a grandadventure n which

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Knorr Cetina Sobre Merton