The Vulnerability of the US Electric Power Grid to EMP and Severe Space Weather Events

John G. KappenmanStorm Analysis

Consultants218-727-2666

http://www.linkedin.com/in/johnkappenman

“EMP as well a widespread Cyber Attack and a Large Scale Geomagnetic storm are the largest threat to the Nation” Dr. William R. Graham, Chair EMP Commission (Hearing before the US House Armed Services Committee, July 10, 2008)

•The US Electric Power Grid is a Critical Infrastructure & Vulnerable to both EMP & Space Weather (Geomagnetic Storms)

•Electricity is largest energy segment of US ~40% of all energy consumed

•EMP Commission, FEMA Exec Order 13407 Investigation and National Academy of Sciences Reports Indicate

•EMP & Space Weather Risks have potential to create Large Scale Blackouts, •Permanent Damage to Key Power Grid Assets and Lengthy Restoration

•Loss of Electric Supply will Impact all other Interdependent Infrastructures

•Potable Water distribution, waste treatment impacted within several hours, •Loss of perishable foods and medications in about 12-24 hours, •Immediate or eventual loss of heating/AC, sewage, phones, transportation, fuel resupply, etc.

Review of Power Grid Vulnerability to Space Weather

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Great Geomagnetic Storms Disturbance Intensity Perspectives

•Impacts on North American Power Grid on March 13-14, 1989 occurred at disturbance intensities of ~300-500 nT/min

•Disturbance intensities of >2000 nT/min have been observed at latitudes of concern for US power grid infrastructure on at least 3 occasions since 1972

•Disturbance intensity of ~5000 nT/min was estimated for storm on May 14-15, 1921 (estimated to be largest storm of 20th Century and comparable to Carrington Event of 1859)

•Power Grids should expect Storms 4 to 10 Times More Intense than the March 1989 Storm

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Historic Storm ImpactsA Brief Overview of the Last Geomagnetic Superstorm and

North American Power Grid ImpactsMarch 13-14, 1989

This will provide some perspective on Potential Impacts from even larger Geomagnetic Storms and EMP Threats to this Critical Infrastructure

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5 minutes of storm conditions that precipitated the Quebec blackout

A Quick Overview of the March 13-14, 1989 Geomagnetic Storm and

North American Power Grid Impacts

30 minutes of storm conditions later that day and impacts observed across the US

A Quick Overview of the March 13-14, 1989 Geomagnetic Storm and

North American Power Grid Impacts

Salem Nuclear Plant GSU Transformer Failure, March ‘89

EMP & Geomagnetic Storms Can Cause Permanent Transformer Damage

These Key Assets may take a Year or More to Replace

–Few Spares are available–Manufacturing performed offshore

Damage due to one storm

Storms have Continent-Wide Footprints

Field Disturbances

from Electrojet Current Couple

to Power Systems

Geomagnetic Storms and Large Power Grids

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Great Geomagnetic Storms March 1989 Superstorm & May 1921 Storm Comparisons

Boundaries of Eastward Electrojet March 13, 1989

Position of Westward Electrojet

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Great Geomagnetic Storms March 1989 Superstorm & May 1921 Storm Comparisons

Estimated Boundaries of Eastward Electrojet

for much larger May 14-15, 1921 Storm

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11EMP Effects Area – Fast Pulse

EMP Threats to US Electric GridSource: EMP Commission including an Executive Report

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EMP Fast Pulse Exposure covers a total of 1765 substations exposed or ~83% of 2106 major HV and EHV substations. In addition some 35,000 to 40,000 Distribution Class Substations may also be of concern for Fast Pulse Exposure

EMP Threats to US Electric GridMajor HV and EHV Substations

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EMP Fast Pulse exposed power plants (Red) total 10,730 with a generation capacity that is ~74.4% of the U.S. total generation capability.

EMP Threats to US Electric GridLarge Electric Generation Plants

EMP and Great Geomagnetic Storms

US Electric Grid Vulnerability Trends and Preparedness

•New Awareness has developed on the Extremes of both EMP and Severe Geomagnetic Storms

•Potential for blackouts of unprecedented scale for the US Electric Grid•Potential for permanent damage to Key Grid Assets with lengthy restoration times

(For Example – Multiple Years to replace EHV Transformers )

•Current Design Practices of Electric Grids have unknowingly and greatly escalated the Risks and Potential Impacts

•Un-Recognized Systemic Risk – No Design Code Yet to minimize this Threat•Present Operational Procedures for Geomagnetic Storms are based upon limited experience, do not reduce GIC levels and will be inadequate for Severe Storms and also EMP threats

•Economic and societal costs could be also of unprecedented levels;•August 14, 2003 Northeast Blackout Cost Estimate - $4 - $10 Billion•Hurricane Katrina Cost Estimate - $81 - $125 Billion•Severe Geomagnetic Storm Scenario ~$1 - $2 Trillion in 1st Year Depending on Damage, Full Recovery could take 4 – 10 Years

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2 0 0 2 / 0 9 / 2 7 0 0 : 0 4 : 0 0 . 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 / 0 9 / 2 7 0 0 : 0 4 : 0 0 . 0 0 0

Severe Geomagnetic Storm Disturbance Scenario

Areas of Probable Power System

Collapse

Impacted Regions involve population of >130 Million

Power System Disturbance and Outage Scenario of Unprecedented Scale

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365 Transformers At-Risk, ~300,000 MVA Rating ~Severe Storm Scenario has larger geographic footprint than all other Natural Hazards

33%

24%

55%

34%

17%27%

18%19%

47%

9%

21%

35%

30%7%

7%

40%

1%

82%

97%

11%

7%

37%

39%

8%

17%

23%

24%

38%

12%

75%

55%

72%

6%

15%

32%

6%

26%

19%

36%

47%

30%

Estimated that over 300 large EHV Transformers would have sufficient GIC exposure to be At-Risk of permanent damage & loss – replacement

could extend into 4-10 years at current world production rates

Severe Geomagnetic Storm Scenario At-Risk 345kV, 500kV & 765kV Transformers

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Power Grid Vulnerability - Response Initiatives

•The EMP Commission notes positive movement within the Department of Defense toward addressing EMP survivability concerns. Unfortunately, a similar level of effort for the Critical Infrastructures is not evident within the DOE, NERC, and the DHS.

•Improved Situational Awareness for Power Grid Operators is needed and is readily available

•Emphasis on disturbance environments/GIC levels instead of ambiguous K/G Indices•Recognize and Improve Situational Awareness for Geomagnetic Storms and EMP Attack and Understand How Effects Differ from Other Disruptions

•Major Emphasis should be focused on Preventing EMP and Geomagnetic Storm-Related Catastrophic Failure - Remedial Design measures for the Grid (transformer neutral resistors) are readily feasible and cost effective

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Power Grid Vulnerability – Recommendations

•Protect high value assets through hardening: hardening, special grounding, other schemes to assure functional operation for assets such as transformers, breakers, generators, critical elements of the natural gas supply systems to key power plants

•Protect the use of emergency power supplies and fuel delivery:–Increase battery and on-site generating capability for key substation and control facilities to extend critical period allowing recovery–Require emergency generator start, operation, and interconnection mechanisms to be EMP hard or manual. Requires ability to isolate these facilities from main electric power system.–Determine and specify those strategically important electrical loads critical to preserve in such an emergency

•Designate substantially more black start generation units coupled with specific transmission :

•Improve, extend, and exercise recovery capabilities: Assure sufficient numbers of adequately trained recovery personnel. Develop center for purpose of simulating EMP and other major system threatening attacks.