1

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A11-1319

Court of Appeals

Joane M. Christianson,

Anderson, Paul H., J.

Dissenting, Stras, J.

Respondent,

vs. Filed: May 31, 2013

Office of Appellate Courts

Travis Henke,

Respondent,

Claire Holewa,

Appellant.

________________________

Virginia A. Marso, Marso Law Office, Waite Park, Minnesota, for respondent Joane M.

Christianson.

Travis Henke, Foreston, Minnesota, pro se.

Robert A. Manson, Robert A. Manson, P.A., White Bear Lake, Minnesota, for appellant.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S

The execution of a valid Recognition of Parentage by a mother and father and the

filing of that form with the appropriate state agency constitutes a “proceeding” for

“parentage” for purposes of Minn. Stat. § 257C.08, subd. 2 (2012).

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The district court had subject matter jurisdiction to award grandparent visitation

under Minn. Stat. § 257C.08 (2012), because the mother and father of the child with

whom visitation is sought executed and filed a valid Recognition of Parentage with the

appropriate state agency pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 257.75 (2012).

Affirmed.

O P I N I O N

ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice.

The Benton County District Court awarded grandparent visitation to Joane

Christianson, the paternal grandmother of T.H., which decision was affirmed by the

Minnesota Court of Appeals. T.H.’s mother, Claire Holewa, appeals the court of appeals

decision to affirm the award of visitation to Christianson. Minnesota Statutes § 257C.08

(2012), the grandparent visitation statute, allows a court to award visitation as part of

several different kinds of proceedings, including a “proceeding” for parentage. The

district court concluded that the Recognition of Parentage executed by T.H.’s parents

pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 257.75 (2012) was a proceeding for parentage under the

grandparent visitation statute. Holewa asserts that there has been no proceeding under

the statute and therefore the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to award

visitation to T.H.’s grandmother. Because we conclude that a Recognition of Parentage

executed and filed with the appropriate state agency under Minn. Stat. § 257.75 is a

“proceeding” for purposes of Minn. Stat. § 257C.08, subd. 2, we conclude that a

“proceeding” occurred and that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to award

visitation to Christianson. Therefore, we affirm.

3

On August 2, 2007, Claire Holewa gave birth to a son, T.H. That same day,

Holewa and Travis Henke executed, and subsequently filed with the appropriate state

agency, a Recognition of Parentage (ROP), which stated that Henke was T.H.’s father.

See Minn. Stat. § 257.75 (creating ROP form and procedure). For most of the first two

years of T.H.’s life, Joane Christianson, T.H.’s paternal grandmother, and Craig

Christianson, T.H.’s paternal step-grandfather, played a major role in supporting T.H. and

his parents. This support included helping Holewa and Henke purchase a trailer home

that was located near the Christiansons’ own home and frequently caring for T.H.

After Holewa and Henke separated, Benton County brought a child support action

against Henke. Following the separation, the Christiansons continued to provide

childcare for T.H. They did so at Henke’s request. The Christiansons usually cared for

T.H. on afternoons and evenings on Mondays and Wednesdays, and overnights on

Friday.

On November 13, 2010, an incident occurred that adversely affected the

relationship between T.H.’s parents and the Christiansons. On that day, Henke sent a text

message to the Christiansons indicating that Holewa was threatening to commit suicide.

Holewa had attempted suicide before T.H. was born, a fact that was known to the

Christiansons. Holewa’s suicide attempt had left her hospitalized for two days. On

November 13, following Holewa’s new threat of suicide, Henke brought T.H. to the

Christiansons’ home. At some point thereafter, Holewa arrived at the Christiansons’

home so that she could retrieve T.H., but the Christiansons refused to release T.H. to her.

The police were called and after they arrived, the Christiansons fully complied with the

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police’s instruction that the Christiansons return T.H. to Holewa. This incident caused

Holewa and Henke to state that the Christiansons “would never see [T.H.] again.”

Following the November 13, 2010 incident, the Christiansons filed a petition for

grandparent visitation with T.H. The Christiansons requested visitation of four hours

twice per week plus one overnight stay every weekend, time around each major holiday,

and a minimum of three nonconsecutive weeks during the summer. Holewa answered the

Christiansons’ petition and indicated that she disagreed with the amount of visitation the

Christiansons sought with T.H. The Christiansons subsequently reduced their request for

visitation to “reasonable grandparent visitation.” Holewa then amended her answer to the

Christiansons’ petition and moved the district court to dismiss Craig Christianson as a

party to the proceedings and to award Joane Christianson some visitation with T.H.,

provided Craig Christianson was not present. By the time the district court held a hearing

on the parties’ motions, Craig Christianson had withdrawn as a party to the visitation

proceedings and the remaining parties—Holewa, Henke, and Joane Christianson—agreed

that Joane Christianson should have at least some visitation. But the parties disagreed

over how much visitation was warranted and whether Craig Christianson should be

allowed to be present during the visitation.

On March 8, 2011, the district court issued an order ruling on the parties’ motions.

The court conducted an amount-of-contact, a best-interests-of-the-child, and an

interference-with-parent/child-relationship analysis. The court then found that Joane

Christianson “has had significant contact with” T.H. throughout his life and that she

“cared for [T.H.] frequently.” The court found, and the parties agreed, that it was in

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T.H.’s best interests for T.H. to have some contact with Joane Christianson. Further, the

court could not find any reason beyond the November 13, 2010 incident to mandate that

Craig Christianson have no contact with T.H. The court concluded that the November 13

incident alone was “unreasonable” grounds for excluding Craig Christianson from being

present during the visitation between T.H. and Joane Christianson. But the court found

that the amount of time Joane Christianson had requested for visitation would interfere

with the parent/child relationship and therefore granted visitation limited to 4:00-8:00

p.m. on Wednesday evenings and an overnight stay on every third Friday of each month.

Holewa responded by moving to vacate the district court’s order, further amend

her amended answer, and amending the district court’s order. Holewa alleged that she

had received faulty legal advice from her attorney and that the district court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction to award Joane Christianson visitation under the grandparent

visitation statute, Minn. Stat. § 257C.08. Section 257C.08, subdivision 2, only allows a

court to award grandparent visitation following the “commencement” of a variety of

proceedings, including a proceeding for parentage. Holewa claimed that the ROP she

and Henke had executed is not such a proceeding, and thus, the court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction to award visitation to Joane Christianson.

The district court disagreed with Holewa’s claims, concluding that an ROP is

unambiguously a “proceeding” under section 257C.08, subdivision 2, and that legislative

intent also dictates that an ROP is a proceeding. But the court did amend its visitation

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order, superseding the original schedule by specifying several holidays that T.H. would

spend with his mother.1 The court then denied Holewa’s other motions.

Holewa appealed the district court’s orders on the subject matter jurisdiction issue

to the court of appeals. Christianson v. Henke, 812 N.W.2d 190, 191 (Minn. App. 2012).

The court of appeals affirmed the district court, holding that “under the plain language of

the applicable statutes, a ROP is a ‘proceeding’ for ‘parentage’ for purposes of asserting a

claim for grandparent visitation.” Id. at 194. Holewa subsequently appealed to our court

and we granted review.

The parties do not dispute any relevant facts in this case. The only disputed issue

before us is a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Varda v.

Nw. Airlines Corp., 692 N.W.2d 440, 444 (Minn. 2005). When there are no disputed

facts, the application of the law to the undisputed facts is a question of law and “fully

reviewable” by appellate courts. Metro. Sports Facilities Comm’n v. Cnty. of Hennepin,

561 N.W.2d 513, 515 (Minn. 1997).

Holewa asserts that an ROP cannot count as a proceeding under section 257C.08,

subdivision 2, and makes several arguments to support her assertion. First, while the

district court found that section 257.75, subdivision 3, states that an ROP “has the force

and effect of a judgment,” Holewa argues that the court skipped over parts of the statute

that do not support the court’s holding. To support her claim, Holewa cites the fact that,

1 The holidays included Christmas Eve, Christmas Day, New Year’s Day, July 4,

Halloween, Holewa’s birthday, and T.H.’s birthday.

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under certain conditions, an ROP can be challenged.2 Holewa also cites a definition of

“proceeding” from Black’s Law Dictionary, which in part defines a “proceeding” as a

component of actual litigation. Holewa next argues that the ROP statute specifically lists

the actions that can be brought using an ROP, and she asserts that this list should be

interpreted as exclusive under the “expression unius est exclusio alterius” canon of

statutory construction.3

Holewa also notes the fact that the title of the grandparent visitation subdivision in

question is “Family court proceedings.” Minn. Stat. § 257C.07, subd.2. She argues that,

while the titles of statutes are not typically relevant, the titles can be relevant for

interpreting legislative intent when the titles were present during the legislative process

2 These conditions include if there are competing ROP forms signed by two

different putative fathers, Minn. Stat. §§ 257.75, subd. 3, 257.55, subd. 1(g) (2012), or if

a signed revocation of an ROP is submitted within 60 days of the original ROP, Minn.

Stat. § 257.75, subd. 2. None of these conditions are present here and the ROP is not

disputed.

3 United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, author,

editor, and editor-in-chief of Black’s Law Dictionary, described this canon as follows:

Expressio unius . . . is a Latin name for the communicative device

known as negative implication. In English, it is known as the negative-

implication canon. . . .

Virtually all the authorities who discuss the negative-implication

canon emphasize that it must be applied with great caution, since its

application depends so much on context. Indeed, one commentator

suggests that it is not a proper canon at all but merely a description of the

result gleaned from context. That goes too far. . . .

The doctrine properly applies only when the . . . unum, the thing

specified[] can reasonably be thought to be an expression of all that shares

in the grant or prohibition involved. Common sense often suggests when

this is or is not so.

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 107

(2012) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).

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that created the statute. See Minn. Express, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 333 N.W.2d 871,

873 (Minn. 1983). To support this argument, Holewa reviews several earlier versions of

the grandparent visitation statute in order to show that the term “family court

proceedings” has been present during multiple iterations of the statute. Holewa notes that

the grandparent visitation statute initially allowed a district court to award visitation only

during proceedings for the dissolution of marriage between the child’s parents, and was

only subsequently expanded to include proceedings for parentage. Holewa argues that

one common element between dissolution of marriage and parentage proceedings in

family court is that, for both of those proceedings, the court is required to address issues

of custody and visitation in its final order.

Christianson counters with the assertion that treating an ROP as a “proceeding”

under the grandparent visitation statute vindicates the clear intent of the Legislature.

Christianson argues that the title of the statute should not be considered as part of our

analysis because the statute’s purpose is dispositive—in this case, the purpose being

providing visitation rights for grandparents. Christianson also argues that Holewa’s

review of the various versions of the grandparent visitation statute is “enlightening,” but

that this review shows that the Legislature did not intend “proceedings” under the statute

to be limited only to court proceedings. Christianson asserts the fact the Legislature

could have qualified the term “proceeding” with “court proceedings,” but chose not to.

Christianson next argues against Holewa’s suggestion that the ROP statute’s list of

actions wherein an ROP can be used should be read as an exclusive list. Christianson

notes that the ROP statute includes a catchall provision, which states that the ROP should

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be “determinative for all other purposes related to the existence of the parent and child

relationship.” Minn. Stat. § 257.75, subd. 3(2). Christianson also argues that an ROP is a

proceeding because there is a detailed process for executing and filing an ROP within the

ROP statute and thus an ROP can have a “commencement” as mentioned in the

grandparent visitation statute. See id., subd. 5 (describing ROP form).

We have stated that the “goal of all statutory interpretation is to ‘ascertain and

effectuate the intention of the legislature.’ ” Caldas v. Affordable Granite & Stone, Inc.,

820 N.W.2d 826, 836 (Minn. 2012) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2012)). The first step

in statutory interpretation is to “ ‘determine whether the statute’s language, on its face, is

ambiguous.’ ” Larson v. State, 790 N.W.2d 700, 703 (Minn. 2010) (quoting Am. Tower,

L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn. 2001)). In determining whether a

statute is ambiguous, we will “ ‘construe the statute’s words and phrases according to

their plain and ordinary meaning.’ ” In re the Fin. Responsibility for the Out-of-Home

Placement Costs for S.M., 812 N.W.2d 826, 829 (Minn. 2012), quoted in Martin v.

Dicklich, 823 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Minn. 2012). A statute is only ambiguous if its language

is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. Id. Multiple parts of a statute may

be read together so as to ascertain whether the statute is ambiguous. Dicklich, 823

N.W.2d at 344. When we conclude that a statute is unambiguous, our “role is to enforce

the language of the statute and not explore the spirit or purpose of the law.” Caldas, 820

N.W.2d at 836. Alternatively, if we conclude that the language in a statute is ambiguous,

then “we may consider the factors set forth” by the Legislature for interpreting a statute.

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State v. Peck, 773 N.W.2d 768, 772 (Minn. 2009); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.16(1)-(8)

(setting out factors for statutory interpretation).

Using the foregoing rules for interpreting a statute, the first step of our analysis is

to ascertain whether the meaning of “proceeding” in Minn. Stat. § 257C.08, subd. 2, is

ambiguous as to an ROP executed by a child’s mother and father and filed with the “state

registrar of vital statistics” under Minn. Stat. § 257.75. If the meaning of “proceeding”

within Minn. Stat. § 257C.08 is plain, then our inquiry ends. But, if the meaning is

ambiguous, and thus not determinative, we must consider the statute’s language in the

context of the legislative intent of the statute and the factors set forth under Minn. Stat.

§ 645.16. 4

The grandparent visitation statute reads in pertinent part:

In all proceedings for dissolution, custody, legal separation, annulment, or

parentage, after the commencement of the proceeding, or at any time after

completion of the proceedings, and continuing during the minority of the

child, the court may, upon the request of the parent or grandparent of a

party, grant reasonable visitation rights to the unmarried minor child . . . .

4 Those factors are:

(1) the occasion and necessity for the law;

(2) the circumstances under which it was enacted;

(3) the mischief to be remedied;

(4) the object to be attained;

(5) the former law, if any, including other laws upon the same or similar subjects;

(6) the consequences of a particular interpretation;

(7) the contemporaneous legislative history; and

(8) legislative and administrative interpretations of the statute.

Minn. Stat. § 645.16(1)-(8).

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Minn. Stat. § 257C.08, subd. 2. Thus, the statute identifies five types of “proceedings”

that provide a district court with sufficient subject matter jurisdiction to award visitation

to a child’s grandparents: dissolution, custody, legal separation, annulment, or parentage.

The core question presented here is whether an ROP is considered to be such a

proceeding. Subdivision 3 of the ROP statute states “the [ROP] has the force and effect

of a judgment or order determining the existence of the parent and child relationship

under section 257.66,” Minn. Stat. § 257.75, subd. 3, and subdivision 3(2) provides that

an ROP is “determinative for all . . . purposes related to the existence of the parent and

child relationship,” id. subd. 3(2). The ROP form described in the statute is prepared by

the Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services. Id., subd. 5. To take effect, an ROP

must be filled out, notarized, and then filed with the “state registrar of vital statistics.” Id.

subds. 1, 5.

Both Black’s Law Dictionary and Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary offer

definitions of “proceeding” that support including an ROP as a proceeding. Black’s

provides three definitions of a proceeding: (1) “Any procedural means for seeking

redress from a tribunal or agency”; (2) “An act or step that is part of a larger action”; and

(3) “The business conducted by a court or other official body.” Black’s Law Dictionary

1324 (9th ed. 2009). “Proceeding” has also been defined as a “legal action (a divorce),”

or “an official record of things said or done.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary

927 (10th ed. 2001).

We have not adopted a specific definition for “proceeding.” See State v.

Hohenwald, 815 N.W.2d 823, 830 (Minn. 2012) (articulating one definition of

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“proceeding”); Latourell v. Dempsey, 518 N.W.2d 564, 565-66 (Minn. 1994) (weighing

different factors to determine whether custody and visitation determinations under the

Parentage Act constitute a proceeding). But we have considered the force and weight of

an ROP on several occasions. See Beardsley v. Garcia, 753 N.W.2d 735, 740 (Minn.

2008) (awarding parenting time during an OFP proceeding based on an ROP); In re Child

of B.J.-M. and H.W., 744 N.W.2d 669, 673-74 (Minn. 2008) (holding that a parent who

had executed an ROP could not have his parental rights terminated in the absence of a

petition naming the parent as a party to the proceedings). In Beardsley v. Garcia, we

held that an ROP provided a sufficient basis for the district court to have subject matter

jurisdiction to award parenting time to a father who was subject to an OFP proceeding

brought by the child’s mother. 753 N.W.2d at 737-38. It is significant that in Beardsley

we attributed great weight to an ROP when considering whether the district court had

subject matter jurisdiction for granting visitation. We have held that “when we have

interpreted a statute, that interpretation guides us in reviewing subsequent disputes over

the meaning of the statute.” Caldas, 820 N.W.2d at 836.

Given both the plain meaning of the relevant statutes and our prior case law

wherein we stated that ROPs carried great weight, we conclude that an ROP is a

“proceeding” for purposes of Minn. Stat. § 257C.08, subd. 2. There are several

considerations that lend considerable support for this conclusion. An examination of the

plain language definitions of “proceeding” shows that an official document such as an

ROP is included within the plain meaning of the word. Here, it is important to note that

the Legislature has used forceful language about the significance of an ROP, including

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the statement that an ROP should be “determinative for all other purposes related to the

existence of the parent and child relationship,” Minn. Stat. § 257.75, subd. 3(2), and that

the ROP is to have the same “force and effect” as a judgment, id., subd. 3.

We have frequently stated that a statute should be interpreted so as to give effect

to all of its provisions. See, e.g., Am. Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277

(Minn. 2000). We have further stated that “no word, phrase, or sentence should be

deemed superfluous, void, or insignificant.” Amaral v. Saint Cloud Hosp., 598 N.W.2d

379, 384 (Minn. 1999). Combined, these considerations convince us that an ROP is

unambiguously a proceeding for purposes of the grandparent visitation statute, Minn.

Stat. § 257C.08. Concluding that the statute is unambiguous is determinative for the

present question. Nevertheless, because our conclusion receives further support from the

Legislature’s intent in enacting the grandparent visitation statute, we turn briefly to

legislative intent.

We have held that if the language in a statute has more than one reasonable

interpretation then the statute is ambiguous. Dicklich, 823 N.W.2d at 342. As previously

stated, we will then look beyond the plain language of the statute to ascertain the intent of

the Legislature and we may consider the factors laid out in section 645.16(1)-(8) when

doing so. Rohmiller v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Minn. 2012); Peck, 773 N.W.2d at

772. While we conclude that the word “proceeding” as used in Minn. Stat. § 257C.08

unambiguously includes an ROP and thus we need not consider the Legislature’s purpose

behind the statute, even a cursory examination of the legislative history supports

including an ROP within the meaning of “proceeding.” Our earlier case law has

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considered the issue of the legislative history of the ROP statute and is helpful

background for the present case.

We have examined the grandparent visitation statute at least twice to determine the

statute’s purpose and the Legislature’s intent in enacting it. See Rohmiller, 811 N.W.2d

at 591-92; Olson v. Olson, 534 N.W.2d 547, 549 (Minn. 1995). We have recognized that,

“[h]istorically, grandparents had virtually no legal right to maintain a relationship with a

grandchild independent of the wishes of the child’s parents.” Olson, 534 N.W.2d at 549.

The Legislature “responded to the issue” by adopting a statute to provide grandparents

some visitation rights. Id. This grant was originally limited to only cases of divorce

between a child’s parents, but the Legislature has amended the statute several times—and

over time has expanded grandparents’ visitation rights. See id. We have previously held

that “the legislative purpose in enacting Minn. Stat. § 257C.08” was to provide

grandparents “a legal right to maintain a relationship” with their grandchildren

“independent of the wishes of the child’s parents.” Rohmiller, 811 N.W.2d at 591-92

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

While our conclusion in Rohmiller as to the legislative purpose of Minn. Stat.

§ 257C.08 does not speak directly to the meaning of “proceeding,” our conclusion weighs

significantly in favor of an inclusive reading of that word in the context of this case so

that the Legislature’s purpose is given effect. Three of the legislatively outlined factors

of statutory interpretation buttress an inclusive reading of “proceeding” as used in

section 257C.08. These factors include: “the occasion and necessity for the law,”

meaning providing legal rights to grandparents; “the mischief to be remedied,” meaning

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the lack of visitation rights for grandparents under the common law; and “the object to be

attained,” meaning providing grandparents with a legal remedy to seek visitation. See

Minn. Stat. § 645.16(1), (3), (4).

We conclude that the legislative intent of the grandparent visitation statute, Minn.

Stat. § 257C.08, supports the inclusion of an ROP within the meaning of “proceeding.”

We reach this conclusion based on the unambiguous meaning of the relevant statutes.

Our interpretation is further supported by the legislative purpose of section 257C.08 that

we have identified in this opinion and our prior case law, together with how that

legislative purpose is interpreted in conjunction with an ROP as defined in Minn. Stat.

§ 257.75—including the fact that under section 257.75, subdivision 3, an ROP has the

full “force and effect” of a judgment establishing parentage.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that an ROP is a “proceeding” for

purposes of Minn. Stat. § 257C.08, and we therefore hold that the district court had

subject matter jurisdiction to award visitation to Joane Christianson.

Affirmed.

D-1

D I S S E N T

STRAS, Justice (dissenting).

The question presented by this case is whether execution of a recognition of

parentage (ROP) constitutes a “proceeding[] for . . . parentage” under Minnesota’s

grandparent visitation statute, Minn. Stat. § 257C.08, subd. 2 (2012). If the answer to

that question is “yes,” as the court concludes, then the district court had the statutory

authority to award visitation rights to Joane Christianson, T.H.’s paternal grandmother.

On the other hand, if an ROP lacks the attributes of a “proceeding,” then the district court

lacked the authority to award visitation rights to Christianson. In my view, an ROP does

not qualify as a “proceeding” because, even under the definitions relied upon by the

court, an ROP lacks the attributes common to each of the “proceedings” listed in the

statute: the requirement of an underlying legal action and involvement of a court.

Because an ROP avoids the necessity for a legal action and court involvement to establish

parentage, I respectfully dissent.

I.

The legal issue in this case turns upon the interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 257C.08,

subd. 2, which lists the proceedings that can give rise to a request for grandparent

visitation:

In all proceedings for dissolution, custody, legal separation, annulment, or

parentage, after the commencement of the proceeding, or at any time after

completion of the proceedings, and continuing during the minority of the

child, the court may, upon the request of the parent or grandparent of a

party, grant reasonable visitation rights to the unmarried minor child, after

dissolution of marriage, legal separation, annulment, or determination of

parentage during minority . . . .

D-2

Neither party disputes that the ROP signed by Claire Holewa and Travis Henke

established their parentage of T.H., the minor child over whom Christianson seeks

visitation rights. Rather, the question at issue in this case is whether the ROP signed

following T.H.’s birth constitutes a “proceeding” under the plain language of Minn. Stat.

§ 257C.08, subd. 2.

The grandparent visitation statute does not define the term “proceedings.” In the

absence of a statutory definition, we give statutory terms their plain and ordinary

meaning. See State v. Leathers, 799 N.W.2d 606, 609 (Minn. 2011). As the court notes,

we have defined the term “proceedings” before, as recently as last year in State v.

Hohenwald, 815 N.W.2d 823 (Minn. 2012). In determining the plain and ordinary

meaning of the term “proceedings” for purposes of Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01—the

provision governing the legal standards for ordering a mental competency hearing for a

defendant in a criminal case—we held that the term refers to “the multiple, progressive

hearings within a ‘particular action at law or case in litigation.’ ” Hohenwald,

815 N.W.2d at 830 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English

Language Unabridged 1807 (2002)). In discussing the varying interpretations of the

term advanced by the parties in that case, we rejected Hohenwald’s definition because it

failed to account for the fact that “proceedings” refers to the business or “work done by

courts.” Id. at 830 n.2. We reached a similar conclusion in Latourell v. Dempsey—the

other case cited by the court—in which we determined that custody and visitation actions

brought in court qualified as “proceedings” under the Parentage Act. 518 N.W.2d 564,

D-3

565-66 (Minn. 1994). Never have we suggested that a “proceeding” is anything other

than an action at law or a case in litigation.1

In concluding otherwise, the court relies on other definitions of the term

“proceedings”—some of which we rejected in Hohenwald—but even those definitions

ascribe a narrow meaning to the term. The court lists three definitions from Black’s Law

Dictionary: (1) “Any procedural means for seeking redress from a tribunal or agency”;

(2) “[a]n act or step that is part of a larger action”; and (3) “the business conducted by a

court or other official body; a hearing.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1324 (9th ed. 2009).

None of those three definitions, however, supports the court’s interpretation of Minn.

Stat. § 257C.08, subd. 2. For instance, the court seems to imply that an ROP is a means

of seeking redress from an agency. While the Minnesota Department of Health files an

ROP after the parents submit it, the agency does not grant the parties anything, much less

redress or a remedy. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1392 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “redress”

as “[r]elief; remedy”). An ROP also is not a step in a larger action. Instead, it is the only

step for parents in establishing parentage outside of court. Nor does the execution of an

ROP involve business conducted by a court or other official body. In sum, the definitions

1 Indeed, the court’s broad interpretation of the term “proceedings” means that

parents who execute an ROP arguably are entitled to appointed counsel if they are

“financially unable to obtain counsel.” Minn. Stat. § 257.69, subd. 1 (2012). As we held

in Latourell, the question of whether indigent parties receive counsel in determining

parentage under the Parentage Act turns on whether the underlying dispute constitutes a

“proceeding.” 518 N.W.2d at 565-66. While such a broad right to counsel would appear

contrary to the Legislature’s intent in limiting the right to counsel to the statutory actions

listed in Minn. Stat. §§ 257.51-.74 (2012), the court premises its determination that an

ROP is a “proceeding” on its conclusive effect under Minn. Stat. § 257.66—a provision

that unquestionably is covered by the appointment-of-counsel statute.

D-4

of the term “proceeding” discussed by the court contradict, rather than support, the

court’s interpretation that an ROP constitutes a “proceeding” under Minn. Stat.

§ 257C.08, subd. 2.2

II.

Application of the textual, “commonsense canon of noscitur a sociis—which

counsels that a word is given more precise content by the neighboring words with which

it is associated,” supports my interpretation that an ROP is not a “proceeding” under

Minn. Stat. § 257C.08, subd. 2. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294 (2008); see

also State v. Suess, 236 Minn. 174, 182, 52 N.W.2d 409, 415 (1952) (“[T]he meaning of

doubtful words in a legislative act may be determined by reference to their association

with other associated words and phrases.”). The purpose of the noscitur a sociis canon—

a Latin phrase meaning it is known by its associates—is to “avoid ascribing to one word a

meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying words.” Gustafson v.

Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995).

2 The court also relies on two additional definitions without explaining how those

definitions support its interpretation of the statute. The first definition—“a legal action (a

divorce)”—flatly contradicts the court’s broad interpretation of the statute because an

ROP does not involve a “legal action.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 927

(10th ed. 2001). The second definition—“an official record of things said or done”—

arguably supports the court’s interpretation until the definition is viewed in the context of

the remainder of Minn. Stat. § 257C.08, subd. 2. Id. The court fails to explain how the

second definition applies to the other “proceedings” listed in the statute—those involving

dissolution, custody, legal separation, and annulment—all of which are legal actions that

fall within the first definition. See infra at D-6 to D-8. Moreover, only the first definition

from Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary is synonymous with how we have

defined the term “proceedings” in the past. See Hohenwald, 815 N.W.2d at 829-30;

Latourell, 518 N.W.2d at 565-66.

D-5

Application of the noscitur a sociis canon reveals two aspects of Minn. Stat.

§ 257C.08, subd. 2, that cast doubt on the court’s interpretation of the statute. First, the

statute indicates that the “proceeding” described in the statute must be capable of

“commencement” and “completion” because those two events trigger a grandparent’s

right to request visitation. By specifying two triggering events that bookend the

“proceeding” itself, the text implies that the “proceeding” described in the statute must be

of sufficient duration that a grandparent has an opportunity to file a request for visitation

during the “proceeding.” Otherwise, a “proceeding” that is too short would not permit a

grandparent to file a request for visitation “after the commencement of the proceeding,”

which effectively would eliminate one of the triggering events. Minn. Stat. § 257C.08,

subd. 2. Put differently, the triggering events that give rise to a grandparent’s request for

visitation—“commencement” and “completion”—provide context for the meaning of the

general terms “proceeding” and “proceedings” in Minn. Stat. § 257C.08, subd. 2.

It is odd to describe an ROP as capable of “commencement” and “completion”

because an ROP is a two-page form drafted by the Commissioner of Human Services.

Infra at Appendix. Because the time to complete an ROP is so short—just a few

minutes—it is highly unlikely that a grandparent will have time to file a request for

visitation with a court “after the commencement of the proceeding.” Minn. Stat.

§ 257C.08, subd. 2. The form requires only that the mother and father list basic

biographical information about themselves and the child, including their names,

birthdates, and birthplaces. Infra at Appendix. An ROP is similar in scope and length to

a credit card application or a form to acquire a driver’s license in Minnesota. An ROP

D-6

makes clear that parents can complete the form shortly after childbirth at the hospital, so

long as a notary public witnesses the signatures of the two parents and affixes his or her

stamp and signature to the form. An ROP is intended to—and indeed fulfills the purpose

of—providing an inexpensive and informal way to establish the legal parentage of a child

without the costs and hassles associated with legal proceedings. Therefore, one of the

characteristics of a “proceeding”—that it be of sufficient duration that a grandparent has

time to file a request for visitation with a court—is absent with an ROP.

Second, the specific types of proceedings listed in Minn. Stat. § 257C.08, subd. 2,

clarify the scope of the general terms “proceeding” and “proceedings” in the statute.

Under the canon of noscitur a sociis, the fact “[t]hat several items in a list share an

attribute counsels in favor of interpreting the other items as possessing that attribute as

well.” Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 371 (1994). The statute lists the specific

types of “proceedings” that give rise to the statutory right of grandparents to request

visitation with a minor child: those involving “dissolution, custody, legal separation,

annulment, or parentage.” Minn. Stat. § 257C.08, subd. 2.

Actions for dissolution, annulment, and legal separation require the filing of an

underlying legal action and the involvement of a court. See Minn. Stat. § 518.06, subd. 1

(2012) (dissolution and legal separation); Minn. Stat. § 518.03 (2012) (annulment). Each

is commenced by service of a petition, includes an opportunity for the respondent to

answer, and generally involves a hearing and findings made by a court. Minn. Stat.

§§ 518.09-.13 (2012). Although a court may grant a dissolution, legal separation, or

annulment without a hearing in limited circumstances, the court must still approve the

D-7

proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment in order for the

dissolution, legal separation, or annulment to be legally enforceable. Minn. Stat.

§§ 518.03, 518.13, subd. 5.

A custody determination also requires the filing of a legal action and the

involvement of a court. A parent commences a custody proceeding by filing “a petition

for dissolution or legal separation” or “a petition or motion seeking custody or parenting

time.” Minn. Stat. § 518.156, subd. 1 (2012). The person commencing the proceeding

must give notice to “the child’s parent, guardian, and custodian, who may appear and be

heard and may file a responsive pleading.” Id., subd. 2 (2012). Custody proceedings

involve a hearing, after which the court “determine[s] questions of law and fact,” Minn.

Stat. § 518.168(c) (2012), and issues a custody order, Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 3

(2012).

In contrast to “proceedings” for dissolution, custody, legal separation, and

annulment, an ROP does not involve the filing of a legal action or the involvement of a

court. An ROP does not require a court’s approval, findings of fact, conclusions of law,

or an order or decree. In fact, the purpose of an ROP is to avoid legal action before a

court. See Minn. Stat. § 257.75, subd. 3 (2012) (“Once [an ROP] has been properly

executed and filed . . ., if there are no competing presumptions of paternity, a judicial or

administrative court may not allow further action to determine parentage regarding the

signator of the recognition.”).

Putative parents can also establish their parentage through a legal action brought in

district court. Minn. Stat. §§ 257.57, 257.59 (2012); see also Minn. Stat. § 257.71 (2012)

D-8

(providing that an action to determine the mother-and-child relationship follows, to the

extent practicable, the same provisions that govern an action to determine the father-and-

child relationship). Such an action “is a civil action governed by the Rules of Civil

Procedure,” Minn. Stat. § 257.65 (2012), and includes the presentation of testimony,

blood and genetic tests, and other evidence, Minn. Stat. §§ 257.62, 257.63 (2012). An

action for parentage concludes with a judgment or order of the court determining the

existence or nonexistence of parentage. Minn. Stat. § 257.66 (2012).

Under the canon of noscitur a sociis, only a court action to establish parentage

qualifies as a “proceeding[] for . . . parentage” under Minn. Stat. § 257C.08, subd. 2.

Only that type of action, not an ROP, shares the attributes common to all of the other

“proceedings” listed in the statute: an underlying legal action and court involvement.

III.

In construing the statute to reach the opposite conclusion, the court relies on three

considerations that are independent of the statutory text. First, although the court

concludes that the statute is unambiguous, it nonetheless discusses the legislative history

and purpose of the statute. Specifically, the court points to the “occasion and necessity

for the law,” “the mischief to be remedied,” and the “object to be attained.”3 Because

3 I would not resort to the canons of construction to interpret Minn. Stat. § 257C.08,

subd. 2 because the statutory language is unambiguous. Nevertheless, I will make an

observation regarding the bizarre implications of the court’s interpretation of the statute.

Aside from possibly creating a right to counsel for indigent parties executing an ROP, see

supra at D-3 note 1, the court’s interpretation of the statute discriminates against

unmarried couples. Only unmarried couples need to establish parentage. See Minn. Stat.

§ 257.55 (providing a presumption of paternity for a man who is married to the child’s

(Footnote continued on next page.)

D-9

neither the court nor I conclude that the statute is ambiguous, resort to the canons of

construction listed in Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2012) is both unnecessary and contrary to our

case law. See State v. Bluhm, 676 N.W.2d 649, 651 (Minn. 2004) (“[W]hen the

legislature’s intent is clear from plain and unambiguous statutory language, this court

does not engage in any further construction and instead looks to the plain meaning of the

statutory language.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Second, the court posits that, because an ROP has the same “force and effect” as a

judgment, it must constitute a “proceeding.” The court’s analysis is exactly backwards.

Instead of determining whether an ROP is a “proceeding” in the first instance, the court’s

analysis bootstraps by concluding that, because a court action or judgment is a

“proceeding,” then anything with the same force and effect logically must be a

“proceeding” too. The court’s analysis also begs the question. The effect of an action

does not necessarily say anything about its character. For example, a guilty plea has the

same force and effect as a jury trial, but no one would argue that a guilty plea and a jury

trial are the same thing. In fact, a primary purpose of a guilty plea, like an ROP, is to

avoid a trial. The court therefore relies on a logical fallacy in concluding that an ROP

must be a “proceeding” because it has the same “force and effect” as a judgment.

(Footnote continued from previous page.)

birth mother). Rather than placing unmarried couples on an equal footing with married

couples, the court today concludes that unmarried couples must necessarily open

themselves up to potential challenges by grandparents for visitation rights no matter

whether they choose an ROP or another method to establish parentage. The court fails to

identify any basis, textual or otherwise, that demonstrates legislative intent to establish a

statutory scheme that discriminates against unmarried couples.

D-10

Third, the court compounds its error by relying on case law that purportedly

demonstrates the “great weight” we have attributed to the effect of an ROP. For example,

the question presented in Beardsley v. Garcia was whether the district court had the

statutory authority to grant parenting time to the father—whose parentage had been

acknowledged through an ROP—during a subsequent order for protection proceeding.

753 N.W.2d 735, 737-38 (Minn. 2008). Thus, the issue in Beardsley had everything to

do with the effect of an ROP and nothing to do with the character of an ROP, let alone its

relationship to the grandparent visitation statute. Similarly, the other two cases relied

upon by the court both involved the legal effect of a previously executed ROP in a

separate proceeding. See In re D.T.R., 796 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2011); In re Child of

B.J.-M. & H.W., 744 N.W.2d 669 (Minn. 2008). Neither case addressed the question

presented here. In sum, the court is simply wrong in its interpretation of the grandparent

visitation statute.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the decision of the court of appeals.

A P P E N D I X