JIABS Journal of the International

Association of Buddhist Studies

Volume 29 Number 2 2006 (2008)

JIABS Journal of the International

Association of Buddhist Studies

Volume 29 Number 2 2006 (2008)

Oskar VON HINÜBER

Hoary past and hazy memory. On the history of early Bud-dhist texts (Presidential address at the XVth Conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, June 23–28, 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

•

Junjie CHU

On Dignāgaʼs theory of the object of cognition as presented in PS(V) 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

David HIGGINS On the development of the non-mentation (amanasikāra) doctrine in Indo–Tibetan Buddhism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

Richard D. MCBRIDE, II The mysteries of body, speech, and mind: The three eso-terica (sanmi) in medieval Sinitic Buddhism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305

Hidenori SAKUMA

On doctrinal similarities between Sthiramati and Xuanzang . . . . 357

Jonathan STOLTZ

Concepts, intension, and identity in Tibetan philosophy of language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383

•

Report on the XVth Congress of the International Associa-tion of Buddhist Studies by Tom J.F. Tillemans, General Secretary IABS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401 IABS Treasurer financial report by Jérôme Ducor . . . . . . . . . . . . 407

•

Notes on the contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411

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EDITORlAL BOARD

KELLNER Birgit KRASSER Helmut

Joint Editors

BUSWELL Robert

CHEN Jinhua

COLLINS Steven Cox Collet

G6MEZ Luis O.

HARRISON Paul

VON HINOBER Oskar

JACKSON Roger

JAINI Padmanabh S.

KATsURA ShOryil KuoLi-ying

LOPEZ, Jf. Donald S. MAcDONALD Alexander

SCHERRER-SCHAUB Cristina

SEYFORT RUEGG David

SHARF Robert STEINKELLNER Ernst

nLLEMANS Tom

. HOARY PAST AND HAZY MEMORY

ON TIlE HISTORY OF EARLY BUDDHIST TEXTS'

OSKAR v. HlNOBER

On the occasion of the 215th meeting of the American Oriental Soci­ety in Philadelphia in 2005, the Hittitist Gary Beckman from the University of Michigan read his presidential address, "The limits of credulity," in which he sketched modem approaches to the art of writing history, presented a most useful overview or rather an extract of the flood of theoretical literature on this topic and, above all, dis­cussed how far it is advisable and possible to trust sources and how to evaluate them.1 All this is exemplified by ancient Middle Eastern, first of all of course Hittite material. Although based on a culture with a strong written tradition, much can be learned from this article also for the thoroughly oral tradition of ancient India and early Bud­dhism in spite of some marked differences.

In contrast to Beckman's after-dinner speech, the following deliberations do not concentrate on historiography, neither on mod­em historiography of the early Buddhist period; nor, and much less so, on an early Buddhist historiography, which is deplorably absent despite a remark made by Georg Btihler (1837-1898) to his friend, the renowned Arabist at the University of Strasbourg, Theodor Noldeke (1836-1930), as early as 1877:

Mit Deiner Idee, dass die Inder keine historische Literatur haben, stehst Du auf einem veralteten Standpunkte.2

• This text was read as the Presidential Address on 23 June 2008 during the XVth

IABS conference held at Atlanta (Georgia) from 23 to 28 June 2008. The oral form of the presentation has been largely preserved. An enlarged and more detailed version dealing with the early history of Theravada texts is under preparation.

1 JAOS 125. 2005, 343-352.

2 "Your idea that Indians do not possess literature on history is an outdated point of

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 29· Number 2·2006 (2008) pp. 193-210

194 OSKAR v. HINOBER

This is certainly true, if we remember KalhaI.1a's RajalarmigbJ-l and the Nepalese Vaf!1savalfs, or almost a millennium earlier in the area of Buddhism, the Dfpavaf!1$a and the Mahavaf!1sa. Important as both vaf!1sas are as sources, as underlined by the research of Wilhelm Geiger (1856-1943) and Erich Frauwallner (1898-1974),3 their value for the history of texts of the very early period of Buddhism is quite limited.

However, even if historiography begins too late for the period on which the following considerations are focussed, and if this Buddhist historiography contains little information on texts, we cannot con­clude that this is due to a total lack of interest in history in general or in the history of texts in particular in ancient India. Early evidence proving the contrary is found in inscriptions. Already Asoka vaguely, and it is true in a very general way, refers to the kings of yore at the beginning of his seventh pillar edict, and compares the successful propagation of his dhamma to the failure of those ancient kings to educate their peoples. In the well-known res gestae of his own reign, Kharavela looks back not only upon his own time. Kharavela also records a King Nanda, ruling either three hundred or, more likely, one hundred and three years before him, as having taken away a Jina image, which he, Kharavela, brought back to his capi­tal.4 A similar memory is found in the Rudradaman inscription, where the K~atrapa Rudradaman commemorates in the year AD 150 that he repaired and embellished the Sudarsana tank after it was badly damaged by floods. This Sudarsana tank was originally built, as Rudradaman reminds the readers of his inscription, by Candra­gupta Maurya and was subsequently enlarged by Asoka.5 This is

view," quoted from Julius Jolly: Georg Buhler. Grundriss der Indo-Arischen Philologie und Altertumskunde. 1. Band, 1. Heft A. Strassburg 1899, p. 13.

3 The relevant articles are quoted in O. v. Hinuber: A Handbook of Ptili Literature. Berlin 1996 (HPL), § 182, 183.

4 Shashi Kant: The Htithfgumphti Inscription of Khtiravela and the Bhabru Edict of Asoka. Delhi 22000, p. 11, line 6 and p. 17, line 12 of the inscription. For tivasasata "103(7)" cf. terasavasasata "113",line 11.

5 Idal?l tat;/tikaJ?1 SudarsanaJ?1 ... mauryasya rtijfiai} Candraguptasya rti!jtriyeIJa Vaisye­na PU!jyaguptena kiirita1]l Asokasya Mauryasya [krlte Yavanartijena TU!jtisphentidhi!jtiiya

HOARY PAST AND HAZY MEMORY 195

indeed a rather long historical memory stretching over almost half a millennium. Interestingly, no traces of this memory are found in the text of the inscription of the Hindu ruler Skandagupta, where he records his repairs of the same tank three centuries later.6

With the notable exception of the Bhairat edict by Asoka, refer­ences to Buddhist texts are almost totally absent from early inscrip­tions.?

However, historical memory is not only preserved in inscriptions, but in Buddhist texts as well, and, of course, this historical memory can be used with all due caution to date the texts that preserve them. This can be done only if the historical memory refers to a datable event in the political history, and this way of dating texts leads to approximations at best. Hardly ever was a text composed at the very time of the event being remembered, and never with the purpose to simply give a straightforward record of a certain event in ancient India. What we read is always an interpretation and a purposeful message of the authors to their audience. The information handed down by tradition thus depends on the intention and the will of the authors to select and to convey certain facts. This intention or will to shape the tradition being handed down is expressed both in the con­tent and in the literary form of the texts, and both changed consid­erably during the transition from Vedic to early Buddhist literature.

The intention why the collection later called Tipitaka was brought together is very clearly stated in the report on the first council held at Rajagaha. For we are explicitly told why the texts were assembled and formalized:

pra/;tlilihhir alalTl/q'talTl, F. Kielhorn: Junagadh rock inscription of Rudradiiman; the year 72.EI8.1905-06,p.36-49,esp.p.43,8.

6 This inscription is published in Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum III: Inscriptions of the early Gupta kings revised by Devadatta Ramakrishna Bhandarkar. Delhi 1981, no. 28, 296-305, cf. also O. v. Hiniiber: Les documents epigraphiques indiens: Difficultes de leur interpretation - Examples concernant l'irrigation. Academie des Inscriptions et Belles­Lettres. Comptes Rendus des Seances de l'Annee 2004. Avril-Juin. Paris 2004 [2006], p. 989-1011, esp. p. 989foll.

7 Only very general references such as trepi!aka or vinayadhara are found occasion­ally in Mathurii or Amariivan.

196 . OSKAR v. HINUBER

dhammaii ca vinayaii ca sal'J'lgiiyiima pure adhammo dippati dhammo pa!i­biihfyati avinayo dippati, vinayo pa!ibiihfyati pure adhammaviidino bala­vanta hanti, dhammaviidino dubbalii hanti ... , Vin II 285,4---8

"Come, let us chant dhamma and discipline before what is not dhamma shines out and dhamma is withheld, before what is not discipline shines out and discipline is withheld, before those who speak what is not-dhamma become strong, and those who speakdhamma become feeble ... " (1. B. Homer).

The purpose is obviously to preserve and to defend an orthodox tra­dition. This must have been something quite new in ancient India at that time, a new and considerable literary challenge to be confronted not only by early Buddhists, but also by the followers of other new systems created at that time in eastern India such as Jainas or A.jlvi­kas. This change in paradigm, the preservation of orthodoxy and no longer the continuation of the orthopraxy of the Veda, also called for new literary forms. For this purpose veyyiikaralJas and dhammapari­yiiyas, or suttantas as they were called later, were developed, per­haps after some experiments with the prose of the Brahmlll,las, but certainly based on this model. The model of Vedic prose is easily detected in the Sagiithavagga of the Sal1lyuttanikaya, whose form closely corresponds to the stories in the BrahmaI.1as and which even continues Vedic topics such as the fight between gods and asuras. The many short episodes telling the reasons for the rules in the Mahiivagga and the Cullavagga of the Vinaya recall the structure of Brahmal).as, as was observed by Erich Frauwallner long ago.8 More­over the story of the Buddha sneezing reads like an answer to a story in the Jaiminfya-BriihmalJa, as noticed by William Dwight Whitney (1827-1894) more than a century ago.9

If the individual stories neatly connect Brahmal).a prose and early Buddhist literature, the Buddhists went far beyond their model and composed the first really long texts in ancient India, as shown by the

8 HPL § 32.

9 Henry C. Warren: On superstitious customs connected with sneezing, JAOS 13. 1889, p. XVII-XX, esp. p. XX, where W. D. Whitney refers to Jaiminfya-Bri'ihmal}a II 155.

HOARY PAST AND HAZY MEMORY 197

overall structure of the Khandhaka in "the Vinaya or the Mahiipari­';ibbiinasuttan~a as an individual text. Moreover, the Mahiipari­nibbiinasuttanta is the fIrst text ever composed in ancient India, as far as we can see, with the explicit purpose of commemorating a historical event, the death of the Buddha and thus, at the same time, the first attempt to compose a long and coherent story.

The many difficulties encountered by those who shaped or made use of this new literary form, perhaps for the first time, can be traced easily in many details in the Mahiiparinibbiinasuttanta. It was, e. g., very obviously a matter of great effort to keep the story on track and not to get lost in numerous narrative side alleys: Once eight reasons for an earthquake are enumerated, which fits well into the story, a cascade of totally unrelated groups of "eights" follows suit, as if in the oral period of the early Buddhist tradition hearing or mentioning the fIgure "eight" immediately and almost unavoidably triggered the memory of the respective paragraphs from what we now call the AIiguttaranikaya.1O

In spite of evident diffIculties like these, which do not seem to have found much attention in research, those monks who created the Buddhist siUras had a very clear idea about the formalization of the new texts. The idea of remembering the places where the Buddha was supposed to have delivered a certain satra at the beginning of each individual text was certainly an innovation. This happy decision to provide the texts with a geographical frame, quite in contrast to the earlier Vedic literature, where very little is found on topogra­phy,l1 not only preserved a large numb~r of place names, both vil­lages and towns, in the Buddhist literature. In addition, the particular wording introducing these place names can tell us much about the development of the literary form of early Buddhist texts and about the historical memory of the early authors.

The opening formula of a satra is almost too well known to be repeated here in the standard wording:

10 HPL § 60.

11 On this point, see K. Hoffmann, as note 13 below, p.122.

198 OSKAR v. HINUBER

eva/I! me sutal'!! ekm'[!samaym?! bhagavti Stivatthiyal'!! viharati Jetavane Anti­thapilJrj.ikassa tirtime

Thus I have heard. At onetime the Lord stayed at Savatthi in the Jetavana, the park of AnathapiI:tt;lika.

This very wording continues after arame either by ... tatra kho bha­gava bhikkhu amantesi, MN I 6,27foll. (No.2., Sabbasavasuttanta) with the local adverb tatra, by the developed wording ... atha kho bhagava pubba1J.hasamayaf!1. .. " MN I 160,27foll. (No. 26., Ariya­pariyesanasuttanta) or, finally, by '" tena kho pana samayena ayasmaAnando ... , MN III 189,27 (No. 132., Ananda-Bhaddekaratta suttanta 2). Whereas the very beginning evaf!1. me sutaf!1. ekaf!1. samayaf!1. has been discussed perhaps much more often than it really deserves ever since John Brough's (1917-1984) article published almost sixty years ago,12 little if any attention has been paid to the much more interesting place names and to the way in which they are introduced.

Besides this well-known introduction there are others, used much more rarely and phrased in a slightly different way, such as:

eval'!! me sutal'!! ekal'!! samayal'!! bhagava kurttsu viharati - kammasa­dhammal'!! nama kurttnal'!! nigamo - fatra kho bhagava bhikkha amantesi, MN I 55,28foll. (No. 10., Satipatthanasuttanta)

... the Lord stayed in the land of the Kurus - there is a market place in the land of the Kurus named Kammasadhamma - there the Lord addressed the monks ...

The phrase "there is a market place in the land of the Kurus named Kammasadhamma" syntactically forms a parenthesis, which does not seem to be an exciting observation. However, almost half a cen­tury ago Karl Hoffmann (1915-1996) demonstrated that this particu­lar way of introducing place names can be traced back to Jndo-

12 Thus have I heard ... , BSOAS 13. 1950, p. 416-426, reprinted in J. Brough: Col­lected Papers. London 1996, p. 63-73; for further references see HPL § 53 and add: M. Tatz: Thus have I heard: At one time, IIJ 40. 1997, p. 117fo11.; B. Galloway: A reply to Professor Mark Tatz, IIJ 40. 1997, p. 367-371; F. Tala, C. Dragonetti: Ekaql samayam, ill 42. 1999, p. 53-55.

HOARY PAST AND HAZY MEMORY 199

Iranian syntax.13 For the Pali sentence just quoted is exactly parallel to the Old Pei~ian phrasing found in the Achaemenian inscriptions of Dareios (521-486) at Behistun: "when he arrived in Media - a town Miiru by name is in Media - there he joined battle with the Medes."14 The use of phrases like this one continues through rare examples from the Vedic language only into the earliest layers of Pali. Com­parative syntax here allows the detection of a wording that is obvi­ously a very early predecessor to the later common formula introducing suttantas by the names of towns like Savatthi, Rajagaha or others.

The place names mentioned in the older place name parenthesis are quite different from these towns. Hardly any of the famous Bud­dhist nagaras is mentioned, but only fifteen different market places nigamas occur such as kammiisadhamma and once a Brahmin vil­lage, a briihma1J.agiima in:

eva1!l me suta1!l eka1!l samaya1!l bhagavii Magadhesu viharati - piicfnato Riijagahassa Ambasafltfii niima briihmaflagiimo - tass'uttarato Vediyake pabbate indasiilaguhiiy~. tena kho pana samayena Sakkassa ... , D II 263, 2ff. (No. 21., Sakkapaiihasuttanta)

Thus I have heard. At one time the Lord stayed in Magadha - to the east of Riijagaha there is a Brahmin village named AmbasaI.1c;lii - north 'of it ... in the Indasiila cave '"

This rather exceptional formulation is due to a seemingly exact description of the location of that particular cave.

These nigamas also occur in a slightly developed wording:

eva1!l me suta1!l eka1!l samaya1!l bhagavii Kurusu ciirika1!l caramlino mahatii bhikkhusa1!lghena saddhi1!l yena thullakofthita1!l niima kuruna1!l nigamo tad

13 K. Hoffmann: Die Ortsnamen-Parenthese im Altpersischen und Vedischen (ZDMG 110. 1960), in: AuJsatze zur Indoiranistik ed. by J. Narten. Volume 1. Wiesbaden 1975, p. 120-129, on Piill S. 128f., cf. also G. E. Dunkel: Naming parenthesis in Indo-Iranian and Indo-European, MSS 41.1982, p. 11-21.

14 R. Kent: Old Persian. Grammar, Text, Lexicon. New Haven 1953, p. 121: ya8ii Madam pararasa - MaruS nama vardanam Madaiy - avada hamaranam akunalls, DB II, line 22fo11. § 22.

200 OSKAR v. HINDBER

avasari. assosU/!l kho Thullakot?hitii briihmaflagahapatikii ... , MN II 54,25foll. (No. 82, Ranhappalasuttanta)

... at one time the Lord walking on tour among the Kurus ... where there was the market place of the Kurus called Thullakonhita, there he went ...

In such phrases, describing the Buddha and his followers travelling, "the Lord walked in the land of ... , where there was a place called so and so there he went", not only nigamas are mentioned but, in addi­tion to a very few nagaras, also more frequently again brahnwlJaga­mas, "Brahmin villages," which occur almost only in the following formula:

eva'!! me suta,!! eka,!! samaya1J2 bhagavii Kosalesu ciirika'!! caramiino mahatii bhikkhusaT!lghena saddhi,!! yena nagaravindaT?2 niima kosaliinaT!l briihmafla­giimo tad avasari. assosu'!! kho Nagaravindeyyakii brahmaflagahapatikii ... , M III 290,26foll. (No. 150., Nagaravindeyyasuttanta)

Thus I have heard. At one time, the Lord, walking on tour in Kosala together with a large group of monks, where there is the Brahmin village of Kosala named Nagaravinda, there he went.

Interestingly, nine of the altogether fourteen Brahmin villages men­tioned in the Theravada-Tipi!aka are situated in Kosala, four in Magadha, and only one in the MalIa country. IS This compares well with the evidence gathered from Vedic literature on the history and geographical distribution of the Vedic schools. As research by M. Witzel has shown, Kosala was at the eastern fringe of later Vedic literature, and the Brahmins there used to study the Kal)va Sakha of the Satapathabrahmal)a.16 These then could well be the very Brah­mins traced in ancient Buddhist literature.

In the immediate predecessor of the later formula, which men­tions a place name such as Savatthi together with a monastery such

15 This is, at the same time, the only reference to the word brahma~1Ggama used in the Vinaya in the definition of majjhimadesa at Vin 1197,27, but not in the usual formula as in Ud 78,5, the second of the only two references to the brahma~1Ggama ThuI:1a in the Thera­vada-Tipitaka, cf. also IlJ 45.2002, p. 79.

16 M. Witzel: The Development of the Vedic Canon and its Schools: The Social and Political Milieu, in: Inside the Texts, Beyond the Texts ed. by M. Witzel. Harvard Oriental Series. Opera Minora Vol. 2. Cambridge!Mass. 1997, p. 257-345, esp. p. 313foll. § 5.2

HOARY PAST AND HAZY MEMORY 201

as the Jetavana of Anathapi~<;lika, a wording without parenthesis and without naming a monastery occurs when a Brahmin village is referred to:

eva1J1 me suta1J1 eka1J1 samaymJ1 bhagavil Kosalesu viharati sillilyal'rl" brilhma­lJagilme. tatra kho bhagavil bhikkha ilmantesi, S V 144,12fo11. == 227, 12fo11.

Thus I have heard. At one time the Lord stayed in Kosala in the Brahmin vil­lage SaIa. There the Lord addressed the monks ...

Interestingly, there were no vihiiras in Brahmin villages, but, much more importantly, also not in the nigamas.

Taking together the very old place name parenthesis with the Brahmin villages and market places (nigamas), the missing nagaras and, above all, the missing vihiiras, it is more than evident that these formulas belong to a very ancient layer of the formulation of Bud­dhist texts as preserved within the Theravada-Tipi!aka. Moreover, going back to the old parenthesis of place names, it is possible to trace the reason for the word order - the town preceding and the monastery following the verb viharati: SiivatthiYaJ!l viharati Jetavane ... - in the sentence opening satras, which is clearly conditioned by the stylistic prehistory of this formula.

Furthermore, the preponderance of Kosala as a location of Brah­min villages matches Vedic evidence. Consequently, we can be fairly confident of finding here really ancient village names pre­served in the memory of the early Buddhists. This is confirmed by the simple fact that these early locations of the beginnings of Bud­dhism very soon faded into the background and were superseded by the five prominent cities enumerated at the beginning of the Mahasu­dassanasuttanta, No. 17. in the Dighanikaya: Campa, Rajagaha, Sa­vatthi, Saketa, Kosarnbi, Bara~asi, D II 169,11. First of all, Savatthi emerged as the prominent town, figuring at the beginning of 5 of 34 suttantas in the Dighanikaya, but already in 67 of 152 in the Majjhi­manikayaand in innumerable texts of the SaqIyutta- and AIiguttara­nikayas. Still later texts were almost flooded by references to Sa­vatthi, to such a degree that the Millasarvastivinaya, as G. Schopen

202 OSKAR v. HlNOBER

has shown, suggested inserting Sravastl whenever a menk forgot the place name when reciting a satraY

In the list of the five tdwns prominent in the Buddhist tradition, one place name is conspicuous by its absence, namely Pataliputta, the later Maurya capital. The reason is obvious. Pataliputta did not exist during the time of early Buddhism. Its foundation is described in a well-known paragraph at the beginning of the Mahiiparinibbii­nasuttanta, where the Buddha makes the following prediction during the reign of Ajatasattu: "As far as there are settlements of the Aryas, as far as there are trading routes, this will be the first city (aggana­gararrz) Pataliputta, a place where customs are collected (putabhe­dana)," D II 87,33-88,1. At the same time, the Buddha changes the name of the place from Pataligiima to Pataliputta and calls the new city a puta-bhedana, most likely in a word play with patali-putta. No mention is made of Pataliputta as the capital (riijadhiinf, e.g., D II 7,29) of the Maurya empire, in spite of the fact that Mauryas are indeed referred to at the very end of the same text, when the relics are distributed.

The Moriyas of Pipphalivana18 learn very late of the death of the Buddha, and when their envoy arrived at the site of the nibbbiina, all relics had been distributed and only charcoal was left, over which the Moriyas of PipphaIivana erected a stapa.19 This rather meagre result of the efforts made by the Moriyas to secure a share of the relics also points to a time long before the ascent of the Maurya-dynasty. Later this episode was obviously considered embarrassing and conse­quently cancelled by the redactors of the Sanskrit version of the M ahiiparinirvii1}asatra. 20

17 G. Schopen: If You Can't Remember, How to Make It Up: Some Monastic Rules for Redacting Canonical Texts (1997), in: Buddhist Monks and Business Matter. Still More Papers on Monastic Buddhism in India. Honolulu 2004, p. 395-407. In later texts, the place names did not really matter, because there was no longer any immediate reference to an old tradition anyway.

18 Although it is tempting to compare Pipphalivana to modem Piprahva, the difficulties involved are considerable.

19 D II 166,2lfoll.; 167,17fo11.

20 A survey of the relevant material can be found in A. Bareau (1921-1993): Re-

HOARY PAST AND HAZY MEMORY 203

Of course the prophecy of the Buddha about the future of Patali­putta caught the attention of scholars at an early date, at least since 1879, when H.' Oldenberg (1854-1920) published the introduction to his edition of the Mahiivagga of the Vinaya, which contains a parallel to this part of the Mahiiparinibbiinasuttanta. One of the last in this line of scholars dealing with this reference seems to be K. R. Norman in his history of Pali literature a century later in 1983.21

Strangely, all modem scholars seem to follow the conclusion drawn by H. Oldenberg that the Mahaparinibbanasuttanta must have been composed during the time of the Maurya dynasty because the Buddha is assumed to be referring to the capital of the Maurya empire, which he is certainly not. On the contrary, the Buddha men­tions very clearly a place where merchandise is exchanged, an important city certainly, but not a capital. This, however, was per­haps not too evident before B. Kolver (1938-2001) finally clarified the meaning of putabhedana,22 badly understood previously and still most strangely misunderstood as "scattering its seeds far and wide" (!?) instead of "market place" in a recent Dighanikaya-translation published two years after B. Kolver's article.23

Now, if the Mahiiparinibbiinasuttanta, or more cautiously, this paragraph, was composed by the end of the fourth century, as K. R.

cherches SUT la biographie du Buddha dans les Siitrapitaka et les Vinayapitaka anciens II, 2: Les demiers mois, Ie parinirvii~lQ et les fimerailles. Publications de l'Ecole Fran~aise d'Extreme-Orient 77. Paris 1971, p. 303. However, Bareau's assumption that the Moriyas of Pipphalivana were only introduced at a late date and only by the Theravadins obviously turns the development of the text upside down. For, in addition to the reason given above, it is easy to see that the obscure pipphalio was replaced by the much more common pip­pala in: pippaliiyanai} mii(lQvai} pippalavatyiim migiirastr1pa1]l pratiNhiipayati, Mahiipari­nirviilJasiitra 51.21. On the other hand, going back from pippala to pipphali does not make any sense at all.

21 The Vinaya Pitaka1]l ed. by H. Oldenberg. London 1879, p. XXXVII; K. R. Norman: Piili Literature including the canonical literature in Prakrit and Sanskrit of all the Hfna­yiina Schools of Buddhism. A History of Indian Literature VII,2. Wiesbaden 1983 p. 38.

22 B. Kolver: Kautalyas Stadt als Handelszentrum: der Terminus putabhedana-. ZDMG 135.1985, p. 299-311.

23 The Long Discourses of the Buddha. A Translation of the Dfgha Nikiiya by M. Wal­she. Boston 1987, p. 238.

204 OSKAR v. HINtrBER

Norman conjectures, it would be rather strange tnat neither the Mauryas nor Pataliputta, as the capital of a state or at least as a city of any political importance, are referred to. This omission, on the other hand, makes a lot of sense if the text is pre-Mauryan, that is earlier than the accession of Candragupta Maurya in about 320 BC, and most likely quite a while earlier, because it can and has been demonstrated that the parallel to this part of the Mahaparinibbana­suttanta preserved in the Vinayapitaka is linguistically a slightly modernized version?4

Leaving aside the question of the date of this linguistic moderni­zation of the story of the foundation of Pataliputta, a more interesting question is whether the omission of the Mauryas can be used at all to determine a date. An answer to this question can be found only by investigating whether ancient Indian authors, given their presumed lack of historical interest, did pay enough attention to changing political situations to adapt their texts accordingly.

For this purpose it is necessary to look, at least very briefly, for references to historical events in older Buddhist literature.

Even a superficial inquiry limited only to those Buddhist texts preserved in Sanskrit yields some examples. A parallel story also concerning Pataliputta and found in the Divyavadana, which is derived from the MUlasarvastivadavinaya, is particularly illuminat­ing. When the Buddha makes a prediction referring to Pataliputra in the Asoka legend he says:25 var~asataparinirvrtasya tathagatasya Pataliputre nagare Asoko namna raja bhavi~yati caturbhagacakra­vartf dharmiko dharmaraja yo me sarfradhiitfin vaistarikan kari~yati, Divy 368,25foI1.:

24 This can be seen by comparing the place name Nadika, which is preserved in its original eastern form only in tbe DIghanikaya (D II 91,15), but changed to Natika in the Vinayapi!aka (Vin I 232,31); the old historical gen. pI. Ta/lfial!! (D II 87,2 etc.) is regularly modernized as rajt7IW1!l (Vin I 228,30 etc.), cf. O. v. Hiniiber: Der Begilln der Schrift !lnd friihe Schriftlichkeit ill Indien. Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Mainz. Abhandlungen der geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, Jg 1989, Nr. 11, chapter X, p. 46fo11.

25 Cf. J. Strong: The Legend of King AsiJka. A Study and Translation of the Asokava­dana. Princeton 1983, p. 61.

HOARY PAST AND HAZY MEMORY 205

A century after the Tathagata entered the Nirv1iI).a there will be a king named Asoka in the city of Pataliputra, a conqueror of the four quarters of the world, a righteous king, who will spread my relics.

Here, long after the Maurya period, this dynasty is conn~cted to Pataliputra. A similar reference comes from the Bhai~ajyavastu of the same Vinaya:

caturvar~a.§ataparinirvrtasya mama ... {Ku~a~wva1Jl.§ya(tJ Kani:jko nama raja bhavi:jyati. so 'smin pradde (i.e. Kharjarika) sUipa1Jl prati:jthiipayati, tasya Kani~kastapa iti sa1?ljiia bhavi'fyati, GM ill 1,2,3 foIl .

... there will be a king named Kani~ka in the Ku~1iI).a family. He will establish a sUipa in this country (Kharjiirika) which will be called Kani~ka­Stiipa.

Now a third reference in an unclear fragmentary context found only recently by R. Salomon can be added. Most likely it is some Ava­dana text, where it is said: [maha]yiinasamprasthito Huve~ko nii[ma riijii] , "a king named Huve~ka, who has set forth on the Great Vehicle.,,26

These three references demonstrate that Buddhist authors did indeed pay some attention to historical events, if only to honour rul­ers whose patronage was appreciated by the Buddhist saf!1.gha. The Miilasarvastivadavinaya, which gained its shape much later than that of the Theravadins, was evidently adapted to the politics of its time. And, as we can be fairly certain about the year 127 as the date of Kani~ka since the research done by H. Falk,27 the redaction can be dated at the earliest to the first half of the second century.

Although it is true that the examples are few and far between, they show nevertheless that there was much more awareness of his-

26 R. Salomon: A fragment of a Collection of Buddhist Legends, with Reference to King Huvi~ka as a Follower of the Mahayana, in: Jens Braarvig [Ed.]: Buddhist Manu­scripts Volume II. Manuscripts in the Schl'lyen Collection III. Oslo 2002, p. 255-267. -There seems to be even a portrait of Huvi~ka recently discovered on a relief from Gan­dhara, cf. F. Grenet: Note additionnelle on B. Marshak: Vne peinture kouchane sur toile, Academie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres. Comptes rendus des seances de l'annee 2006. 2006 [2008], p. 947-954 + 955-963, esp. p. 957.

27 H. Falk: The yuga of Spujiddhvaja and the era of the Ku~aJ!.as. Silk Road Art and Archaeology 7. 2001, p. 121-136.

206 OSKAR v. HJ:NlJBER

tory than mostly assumed, not only in Buddhist literature. As M. Witzel has pointed out, the text of the Mahiibhiirata responds to political developments lJP to the Ku~aI.la times, whereas peoples intruding into India as late as during the Gupta period are included.28

And as it seems, particularly the Buddhists always had an eye on his­tory, as the tradition on the date of the Buddha and other indications also demonstrate.

Consequently, it may be meaningful that the Buddha ~s said to have predicted a brilliant future for Pataliputra as a city of commerce and not of politics. Moreover, given the great affection and admira­tion for Asoka found everywhere in Buddhist texts, it is indeed hard to conceive a date contemporaneous with, and still less likely after Asoka.29

Given the importance of the rise of the Maurya empire even under Candragupta, who is better known for his inclination towards Jainism, one might conjecture that the latest date for the composition of the Mahiiparinibbiinasuttanta, at least for this part of it, is around 350 to 320 BC.

If this is not altogether too far off the mark, and if it is remem­bered that the date of the nirviilJa can be assumed to be about 380 BC, this dating of the text certainly has also some consequences for the assessment of the content. For a distance in time of roughly thirty to sixty years from the event recorded to the text conceived allows for a fair chance to trace true historical memory.

Of course it is not intended to tum the Mahiiparinibbiinasuttanta as a whole into a full historical record now and to read it as a histori­cal account instead of hagiography, which it is. However, while

28 M. Witzel: The Vedas and the Epics: Some Comparative Notes on Persons, Line­ages, Geography, and Grammar, in: Epics, Khilas, and Purtil}as: Continuities and Rup­tures. Proceedings of the Third Dllbrovnik International Conference on the Sanskrit Epics and Purtil}as. September 2002 ed. by P. Koskikallio. Zagreb 2005, p. 21-80, esp. p. 63.

29 An extremely late date for the composition of the Mahtiparinibbtinasuttanta during "the 2nd or 3'" century of the Common Era" (!) was recently assumed without any reason given by C. Woodford Schmidt: Aristocratic Devotees in Early Buddhist Art from Greater Gandhara, SASt 21. 2005, p. 25-45, esp. p. 25. This date, which is perhaps due to a misreading of "AD" for "BC" (??), can be safely and confidently ruled out.

HOARY PAST AND HAZY MEMORY 207

many references to Indian history found in the Tipi!aka remain d~ubtful, one .point should be beyond any reasonable doubt: the death of the Buddha occurred at some point in history and at a cer­tain place. A second point is no less important. The death of the Bud­dha as the founder of the Buddhist sal'!lgha was an event of huge consequences for the then contemporary Buddhists, and an event witnessed by many monks and deeply penetrating into the collective memory of all Buddhists of the time. In contrast, the bodhi, certainly of prime importance for Buddhism and Buddhists, was not witnessed by any future monk and no collective memory could spring up from this event.

Although there were witnesses present at the nirvii1!a, mythologi­cal features abound in the description of the death of the Buddha because at that time no religious person could possibly die without accompanying miracles, and at the time after the Buddha's death, no text describing the career of the founder of any religion could have possibly found acceptance without miraculous features.

Between fact and fiction are the earthquakes at the moment when the Buddha gives up his vital force and again at the moment of the nirvii1!a.30 Although geophysics does not necessarily rule out that they occurred, in all likelihood they did not; nobody would take them to be historical events. And the divine flowers showering on the deceased Buddha in such a quantity that they filled the whole small town of Kusinara knee deep with heavenly mandiirava flowers31 is just as evidently mythology as it is indispensable in any record of an event such as the Buddha's nirvii"(ta.

So, even if there had been the will or at least the intention of the early Buddhist authors of the Mahiiparinibbiinasuttanta to portray a more or less exact historical record of the nirvii1!a, miraculous and supernatural events were impossible to avoid in an environment in which the practice of all sorts of yogic achievements was common-

30 iiyusaJ?lkharaJ?l ossaji, D II 106,22 and D II 156,36.

31 D II 160,31.

208 OSKAR v. HINOBER

place. Miracles simply were part of the world-view of the authors of the Mahiiparinibbiinasuttanta.

Consequently, if there are details that might be called historical, they are necessarily buried in what we call mythology. However, we can try to unearth a bit of history, as Gary Beckman has suggested in his lecture, by replacing the rather credulous question "Why might it be false?" by the more sceptical one: "Why should it be true?" if we venture to attempt to separate fact from fiction. 32

For instance the route taken by the Buddha to Kusinara might be such a detail based on remembered history, if the names of the many otherwise unknown villages are recalled. The same might be said perhaps in the case of the earliest record of what was possibly an epidemic at Nadika, where twelve persons recently deceased are enumerated by name, among them strange names such as S~a, Nika!a or Ka!issabha not mentioned in any other source.33 The name of the very last monle ordained by the Buddha, Subhadda,34 may be historical memory and, of course, the absence of nuns during the nirvii~1Q. 35

In contrast, another famous paragraph cannot be historical as it stands. These are the last words of the Buddha:

handa diini bhikkhave iimantayiimi va: vayadhammii saJTlkhiirii appamiidena sampiidethii ti. ayafJ1 tathiigatassa pacchimii viicii, D II 156,lfo11.

Now, monks, I address you: Decay is inherent in all component things. Work out your salvation without indolence.

32 JAOS 125,2005, p. 349.

33D IT 91,26-92,1l.

34 so bhagavato pacchimo sakkhisiivako ahosi, D IT 153,1l.

35 O. v. Hinliber: The Foundation of the BhikkhunTsaqJgha. A contribution to the earli­est history of Buddhism. Annual Report of the Intemational Research Institute for Ad­vanced Buddhology at Soka University for the Academic Year 2007 (ARIRIAB 11). Tokyo 2008, p. 2-29, esp. p. 22. - One of the most likely candidates for historical memory is per­haps the famous name of the last meal of the Buddha. In all likeliness the obscure suka­ramaddava (D IT 127,5) is the name of a local dish, which was piously preserved, while the true meaning was soon forgotten: O. v. Hinliber: The Cause of the Buddha's Death: The last Meal of the Buddha. A Note on siikaramaddava. JPTS 26. 2000, p. 105-117.

HOARY PAST AND HAZY MEMORY 209

We can be sure that this is not exact historical memory, correct in spirit and content at best, but certainly not in wording, because the Buddha did not speak PilIi.

However this may have been in detail remains, to a considerable extent, a matter of conjecture, because our sources never allow us to go beyond more or less likely or probable conclusions about the roots of the texts that reach far back into the period of early Buddhism. On the other hand, determining the date of the closure of a text remains a still thornier problem. However, we can be sure to find quite a lot of very old material in the Theravada tradition and we can, therefore, hope with a little confidence that the wonderfully solemn and unique conclusion of the Mahiiparinibbiinasuttanta may not be altogether wrong:36

Abbreviations

ARIRIAB

BSOAS

D

Divy

EI

GM

HPL

IIJ

JAOS

36 D II 167,20.

evam etaf!L bhiltapubbaf!L

"Thus it was in the days of yore."

Annual Report of The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology at Soka University

Bulletin of the School of Oriental and Mrican Studies

DIghanikaya

Divyavadana

Epigraphia Indica

Gilgit Manuscripts. Ed. by N. Dutt. Srinagar, 1939-1959.

O. v. Hintiber: A Handbook of Pilli Literature. Berlin 1996.

Indo-Iranian Journal

Journal of the American Oriental Society

210

JPTS

MSS

S

SASt

Ud

Yin

ZDMG

OSKAR v. HINDBER

Journal of the Pali Text Society

Mtinchener Studien zur Sprachwissenschaft

Sal1lyuttahikaya

South Asian Studies

Udana

Vinayapitaka

Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenliindischen Gesellschaft

ON DIGNA.GA'S THEORY OF THE OBJECT OF COGNlTION

AS PRESENTED IN PS(V) I'

JUNJIECHU

I. Introduction

1-1. In the first chapter of his magnum opus, the PramiilJasamuccaya (PS) with its Vrtti (PSV),l Dignaga (ca. 480-540) asserts that percep­tion, being free of conceptual construction, takes svalak~alJa as its object-field (vi~aya),2 whereas objects other than this svalak~alJa are objects of conceptual construction, i.e., they are associated with name, genus, etc., and thus are imagined, conventionally existent, or the conceptualization of something that has been perceived earlier; he also provides a list of objects that belong to the so-called "pseudo­perception" (pratyak~iibhiisa).3 Thus, for Dignaga the svalak~alJa -usually translated as "particular" - is the only real object of cogni-

* I am indebted to Prof. Dr. Eli Franco for his valuable comments on the first draft of this paper, which allowed for great improvements in both content and language. I am also indebted to Ven. Prof. Dammajoti who has made many valuable suggestions on a part of this paper which I read as one of my lectures during my visit to the Centre of Buddhist Studies of the University of Hong Kong in Feb. 2006.

I A new Sanskrit reconstruction based on linguistic materials collected from Jinendra­buddhi's commentary has been offered by Steinkellner; see PS(V) 1. All quotations appearing in this paper refer to this edition.

2 The Sanskrit words vi~aya, alambana, and artha refer to the object of cognition; however they are used with some differences in meaning, for example, regarding to the difference between vi~aya and alambana Vasubandhu says: "Furthermore, what is the difference between the object-field and object-support? If one thing has activity (karitra) in respect to another thing, the former has the latter as its object-field; and that which is grasped by the mind and mind-associates is the object-support." (AKBh 19,16-17: kab punar vi~ayalambanayor vi§e~ab. yasmin yasya ktiritram, sa tasya vi~ayab. yac cittacaittair g,hyate, tad alambanam.) In this paper I try to render these Sanskrit words with different English words:" "object-field" for vi~aya, "object-support" for alambana, and "object-re­ference" for artha.

3 CfPS(V) 1.2-3, 7cd-8ab; Hattori 1968: 24-25; 28. Cf. also Chu 2004.

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 29 • Number 2 • 2006 (2008) pp. 211-253

212 JUNJIECHU

tion. However, other than mentioning that svalak~aJJa is "inexpressi­ble" (avyapade§ya),4 he does not offer a clear explanation of the term.

1-2. In another part of the PS(V} 1, as we will see in the following (IT-I), in talking about the svalak~m:ta of cognition sphere (ayatana), Dignaga also states that in respect to its cognition sphere, perception is said to take the samanya, a term used here referring to many sub­stances or atoms that constitute visible matter as a who'le, as its object. This statement is criticized by his opponent as being contra­dictory to his refutation of an object-support (alambana) that con­sists of many atoms. In my opinion, this problem has arisen owing to his being misunderstood as referring to the external things. However, in following I shall argue: (1) Dignaga regards the samanya, no mat­ter how it is interpreted differently by different schools, as an inter­nal part of a cognition, the so-called self-cognizable (svasarrzvedya). (2) Based on the Sautrantika's idea that the cognition sphere (aya­tana) is not real, Dignaga denies the reality of an object having an external existence; and furthermore, he maintains that the self­cognizable or the internally cognizable is the source of cognition. (3) Granting the Sautrantika's theory of cognition having aspects (akiira) , he interprets the object's aspect as the self-cognizable. Based on these points, I shall conclude that Dignaga's theory of object of cognition presented in PS(V) 1 is consistent, and that he can be characterized as "advocator of the theory of internal object" (antarjfieyavadin), a term used by his commentator Iinendrabuddhi.5

II. siimiinya

II-I. In PS(V) 1.4cd-5ab, in reply to an objection to his statement that perception is free of conceptual construction, Dignaga gives some additional information about his idea of savalak~m:ta. The opponent

4 Cf PSV 1.1,24-25 (ad PS 1.2'cd'): svasiimiinyalakea/;ziibhyiil!l hy avyapadesyavan:za­tviibhyiil!l van:ziidi g,hftviinityatayii ciinitya'!l van:ziidfti manasii sandhatte, Cf. Hattori 1968: 24.

5 See below n. 46.

ON DIGNA.GA'S THEORY OF THE OBJECT OF COGNITION 213

argues that although it is said in the Abhidharma treatise that a sense awareness is a direct awareness of something blue, etc., and not a determination in the form "this is blue," or a cognition of a property of the object,6 and thus that perception is free of conceptual construc­tion; it is also stated in the Abhidharma treatise that the five groups of awareness take an agglomerate (saficita)7 of atoms as their object­support.8 How can it be possible, the opponent asks, that these awarenesses take an agglomerate as th~ir object-support, if they do not image it to be a unity (ekataft)? And how is it to be understood that such a sensory awareness takes the particular (svalak$Wza) as its object-field in respect to the particular characteristic of the cognition sphere (iiyatanasvalak$a1Ja) , and not to the particular characteristic of the substantial element?9 Dignaga's answer is as follows:

[Perception] is said to take the siimiinya as its object-field in respect to its [external] cognition sphere ([biihya-jiiyatana), because [perception] is pro­duced by many substances [i.e. atoms], but not because of the conceptual construction of non-difference with respect to difference. 10

11-2. Based on the original meaning of the word, Jinendrabuddhi, the only Indian commentator of Dignaga's PS(V), interprets siimiinya in

6 Cf. PSV 1.2,20-21: abhidharme 'py uktam -cak~urvijfitinasamaTigfnflaf!l vijtinati no tu nflam iti, arthe 'rthasaiijfifna tu dharmasaiijfifiti.

7 Dignaga uses the word saTtcita in the sense of samudtiya, as Iinendrabuddhi says. See below n. 25 and n. 40.

8 Cf. AKBh 34,1-2: na caika indriyaparamtil}ur vi~ayaparamti!utr vti vijiitilWl?ljana­yati, saficitasraytilambanatvtit pmlctintif!l vijntinaktiytintim. "No single atom of the sense faculty or a single atom of the object-field can produce awareness, because the five groups of awareness have the agglomerate of [atoms] as their basis [of cognition, i.e. the sense faculty] (tiSraya) and object-support."

9 Cf. PSV 1.2,22-23: kathaf!l tarhi saiicittilambantib panca vijntinaktiytib, yadi tad ekato na vikalpayanti. yac ctiyatanasvalak~a!lm?l praty ete svalak~a!lavi~ayti na dravyasva­lak~al}am iti.

10 PSV 1.2,25-26 (ad PS 1.4cd): anekadravyotptidyatvtit tat sviiyatane siimiinyavi~a­yam uktam, na tu bhinne~v abhedakalpantit. Cf. also PV 3.196: a~Utntil!l sa vise~a§ ca ntintarel}tipartilwl}iin I tadektiniyamtij jfitinam uktaT!l stimtinyagocara,!l II "And the special quality of atoms [of producing cognition] cannot [occur] without other atoms. Thus, since the cognition is not restricted to a single [atom], it is said to have the stimtinya as its cognition sphere." (Cf. also the translations in Dreyfus 1997: 87-88 and in Dunne 2004: 396-7.)

214 JUNJIECHU

the sense of the "common property" of all the atomscconstituting an agglomerate and their thus becoming the cognition sphere, i.e., the object of awareness. He writes:

These many atomic things, expressed [collectively] by the word "agglomer­ate" (sancita) and the word "particular characteristic of cognition sphere," are common by being similar in the capacity of producing corresponding awareness in dependence on each other. A common property is indeed common [to many things] ... [followed by a grammatical explanation] 11

That is to say, cognition is produced by atoms, all of which have the common property in their being capable of producing a cognition; thus they are collectively the object-cause (alambanapratyaya) of cognition and the single word "agglomerate" can be used for them. Jinendrabuddhi emphasizes that Dignaga's reason for using the term siimiinya is to eliminate the restriction (niyama) of the object of a cognition to a single atom-substance. Nevertheless, this does not imply, through the usage of the word siimiinya, that the perception takes the universal characteristic of many atoms as its object-field: thus the contradiction mentioned by the opponent does not exist. At another point, in explaining why it is said in the Abhidharma treatise that the five groups of awareness take an agglomerate as their object­support, Jinendrabuddhi expresses also this idea:

Those atoms, generated through their own causes and conditions, inasmuch as each being capable of producing awareness when they are situated in close proximity to each other, are called "agglomerate" (sancita) ... For by virtue of the conditions of getting close to each other they are agglomerated, gathered together. Through these many atoms in such a state, [the five groups of awareness] that bear their own appearance are produced. There­fore, it is said: "[the five groups of awareness] take the agglomerate as object-support" in consideration [of the fact] that [these awarenesses] sup-

11 PST 45,11-12: yat tat saficita§abdeniiyatanasvalak~a1}a§abdena coktam anekal!! pa­ramiil}uvastu tad eva pratiniyatavijl1iinajananasiimarthyena siidharmye1}a paraspariipek/fa­yii samiinam. samiinam eva siimiinyam, ...

ON DIGNAGA'S THEORY OF THE OBJECT OF COGNITION 215

port themselves, without distinction, on all these [atoms], called "agglomer­ate,,,12 but definitely not on a single substance.13

This samanya is also interpreted by Manorathanandin in his com­mentary on Dharmaklrti's PV. In comparison to that of Iinendra­buddhi, his interpretation is quite simple. According to him, taking Samanya as the operation-sphere means taking the agglomerate, namely a kind of collection (sanghata) of atoms, as the operation­sphere and not the universal (samanya), which is different from the individual atoms. Thus the undesired consequence (prasanga),.i.e., the self-contradiction, would not follow, namely, such a perception would be accompanied by conceptual conception on account of hav­ing taken the universal as its object. 14

II-3. Dignaga's above statement, which is in fact based on Vasuban­dhu's idea as stated in the AKBh,15 is interpreted by Iinendrabuddhi

12 I do not follow the Tibetan translation which corresponds to: sarviirrzs tiin saFicitii­khyiinavise~e7Jiilambante. Cf. Psrr D 21b5-6: de rnams thams cad la 'ang bsags pa zhes bya ba'i khyad par gyis dmigs pa ste ...

13 PST 44,12-45,5: svahetllpratyayebhyo ye paramii7Javojiiyante, te 'nyonyasannidhii­niivasthiipriiptii eva santaJ:z pratyekarrz vijfiiinopajananasamarthii/:z saficitasabdenoktii/:z ... parasparopasarpa7Japratyayair hi te saiicitii!1 sarrzhatfkrtiiJ:z. tais tathiividhair anekaiJ:z sva­pratibhiisii janyanta iti saiicitiilambanii ity uktiiJ:z, sarviirrzs tiin saiicitiikhyiin avise~e7Jiilam­bante, naikam eva dravyam iti krtvii.

14 Cf. PVV ad PV 3.196: siimiinyagocararrz saiicitaparamii7JllSmighiitavi~aya1J1 jiiiinam uktarrz tattvaviidinii, na tll paramii7Jvatiriktasiimiinyavi~ayam. tat kathal?z siimiinyavi~aya­tviit savikalpatvaprasmigaJ:z. (For the analysis of the compound saiicitaparamii7Jusalighiita­vi~ayarrz cf. AKBh 23,24: paiicendriyadhiitavaJ:z paiica vi~ayiiJ:z saFicitii/:z, paramii7Jll­salighiitatviit. )

15 Cf. AKBh 7,22-24: nanu caivarrz samastiilambanatviit siimiinyavi~ayiiJ:z parka vijiiii­nakiiyii!z priipnuvanti na svalaqa7Javi~ayiiJ:z. iiyatanasvalak~a7Ja,!z praty ete svalak~a7Javi­~ayii i~yante na dravyasvalak~a7Jam ity ado~aJ:z. "[Objection:] Since in this circumstance the five groups of [sensory] awareness take an aggregate (samasta) [of atoms] as their object-support, they must take the universal (siimiinya) as their object, not the particular (svalak~a7Ja). [Reply:] In respect to the particular characteristic of the cognition spheres, these [five groups of sensory awareness] are accepted as having the particular characteris­tics [of the cognition spheres] as their objects, not in respect to the particular characteristic of the substances [viz. an atoms]. Therefore the fault does not exist." Cf. Hattori 1968: 26 §Dab, and 89, n. 39. Cf. also MVBh 65a12-16: F"~ji,{iiJ ~ID\\i~:tt:f§mo 8.liID\\i~~ El i'§i\"9:o ~ El i'§iCflo -* El i'§o =~ El i'§o l'f** M§~Ml'"o .liID\\i~oH~M§o l'f*~ El 1'1'1 g~o JlIj.liID\\iIll~~ El f§o i\"9:/ff§~o "Question: 'Why does tactile awareness take the

216 , JUNJIECHU

as an attempt to solve the problem that the perception of an object consisting of many atoms would be not free of conceptual construc­tion. However, another serious problem arises. As pointed out by Hattori,16 Dignaga's idea as stated here is vehemently attacked by Mallavadin in NC 86,6ff. The troublesome point is as follows: to say that perception is produced by many atoms and therefore takes the siimiinya of these atoms as its object seems to be similar to the thesis Dignaga himself criticizes in the AP(V) and in PS(V) 1.14ff, regard­less of whether it is referring to all things possessing the' common property of being capable of producing a cognition, as interpreted by Jinendrabuddhi, or simply to the entire collection of all atoms, as interpreted by Manorathanandin. Thus it seems to contain a self­contradiction in another sense. I shall argue in following discussion ' that this is actually a misunderstanding of Dignaga's idea on the part of his opponents because of their realistic viewpoint.

11-4. Here, before we begin to discuss the problem of the siimiinya, it is necessary to outline the thesis Dignaga criticizes, first in the AP(V) and then again in PS(V) 1.14ff., for this is the starting point of the discussion. It is well known that in the AP, Dignaga presents the theory that expresses the two conditions a thing must fulfill to be an object of cognition, i.e., (1) it must be a real existence so that it can produce the cognition with its own form and thus be a real cause of cognition; (2) it must have a gross form so that the cognition can bear its appearance. l ? There are three different alternatives to inter-

universal as its object-support, since the five kinds of awareness take the particular as their object-support?' Answer: There are two kinds of the particular, one is the particular characteristic of substance (dravyasvalak~alJa), the other is the particular characteristic of the cognition sphere (iiyatanasvala~alJa). In respect to the particular characteristic of substance, the five kinds of awareness take also the universal as their object-support, in respect to the particular characteristic of the cognition sphere, the five kinds of awareness take only the particular characteristic [of the cognition sphere] as their object-support. Therefore, there is no contradiction,"

16 Cf, Hattori 1968: 90, n.1.41.

17 Cf. APV 176,12-13: yuI zhes bya ba ni shes pas rang gi ngo bo nges par 'dzinpa yin te de'i roam par skye ba'i phyir ro II "[We call something] object-field (vi~aya), because

ONDIGNAGA'S THEORY OF THE OBJECT OF COGNITION 217

pret the object-support (iilambana), as stated both in A.P(V) and then again in PS(V) 1.14ff., but none of them can fulfill both of these conditions. The first alternative can fulfill only the first condition; it holds that the object-support is the things as they are, i.e., the atoms of color, etc., which become the cause of the cognition, even though the cognition bears a different appearance than what they really are. IS And the other two alternatives can fulfill only the second condition; both of them maintain that the object-support is that with the appearance of which the cognition arises with respect to the color, etc.19 According to the materials available to us, each of these alternatives has been advocated by certain Indian philosophical schools at various points in time. The first one is mentioned in the VS as being held by the V ai§e~ika.20 This alternative does not need to be discussed here, because the school advocating it is not the school under examination. The second and third alternatives agree on one point - a cognition bears the appearance of the object-sup­port, and this appearance is produced by many atoms; they disagree only on the nature of the appearance, i.e., whether it is of an agglomerate of atoms as a whole, or of many individual atoms that are gathered together. These two alternatives are attributed by the commentaries to the Sautrantika21 and the Vaibha~ika/Neo-Sarvasti­vada respectively,22 and thus I will refer to them in this paper as the "Sautrantika-theory" and the "Sarvastivada-theory." These two theo­ries are described in the PSV as follows:

the cognition, grasping it as its proper form (svanlpa), arises with the aspect (akara) of this [object-field]."

18 Cf. PSV 1.6,8-9: yathavidyamana anyabhasasyapi vijiianasya kara1}a1]l bhavanti.

19 Cf. PSV 1.6,7-8: yadabhasa1!! teeujiianam utpadyate, tatha ta alambanam ...

20 Cf. VS 6,27-28: yat tad nlpadikam ayatana1!! nlptidivijl1aptfnal!! pratyeka1]l vieaya(1 syat tad eka1]l va sytid yathavayavintpa1!! kalpyate vaisesikaih. However, according to Kui ji, the Chinese commentator of Xuan zang's Vijiiaptimatratasiddhi, this is advocated by SfupmitTya. Cf. CWSLSJ 269c16: Jlt<:piil-liltiE:A:ll1l.

21 Cf. TrBh 16,20-21: sa11citalambanas ca paiicavijiianakayas tadakaratvtit. "And the five group of awareness have the agglomerate [of atoms] as their object-support, for [awareness] has the appearance of that [agglomerate]." Cf. Kui ji's CWSLSJ 270a14: J1UJ1ii *£tfBgijiH ... Cf. also de la Vallee Poussin 1928: 43.

22 See n. 29, 31.

218 JUNJIECHU

[Sautrantika-theory:] If cognition arises from those [color, etc.,] in the form as [they] appear, then the object-support exists only conventionally, since in this case the five groups of awareness take an agglomerate (sancita) [of atoms] as their object-support.23

[Sarvastivada-theory:] To be sure (kiimam), in the case of the awarenesses with appearances of something blue, etc., the awareness produced from that object [i.e. the atoms of something .blue] must be the perception. That is to say, in these [awarenesses with appearances of something blue, etc.], even though the gathering (samudiiya) of those [atoms] is nominally 'existent, the aspect (iikiira) of what substantially exists [i.e., each atom] is found. 24

II-5. Jinendrabuddhi does not offer a detailed explanation concerning the Sautrantika-theory, but just paraphrases the word sancita used by Dignaga with samuha, and adds that if we have in mind that the term "things agglomerated" (sancita) has the same meaning as the term "agglomerate of the things" (sancaya); and thus sancaya means samuha. 25 However, interestingly, he attributes the Sarvastivada­theory to "the advocators of the theory of objects having the aspect of many [substances/atoms]" (anekiikariirthaviidin),26 and says that they hold the following opinion:

Surely, the atoms which are definitely substantially existent have such an aspect (iikiira). Precisely those atoms, inasmuch as they support one another

23 PSV 1.6,10-11: yadi yathabhasafT! teeu jiiiinam utpadyate, tatha saFicitiilambanatviit panciiniil]'l vijniinakiiyiiniiIJ1 SafT!Vftisad eviilambanam iti.

24 PSV 1.6,12-13: kiimafT! nfladyiibhaseeu viji'iiineeu tato 'rthad utpannafT! vijliiilwfT! pratyakeafT! syiit. tatha hi teeu tatsamudiiye prajFiaptisaty api dravyasadiikiiro labhyate.

25 PST 91,13-14: saiicitiilambanatviid iti sanu7hiilambanatvat salicital]'l sancaya iti krtvii. salicayas ca samiihalJ.

26 The Tibetan translation of this term, mam pa du ma'i don du smra ba (PSTT D 42a3), "the advocator of the theory of object with multiple aspects," seems incorrect to me. The relation between aneka and iikiira should be a Tatpuru~a, not a Karmadharya, and thus aneka should refer to "many atoms." Cf. dravyasatiim eva sa paramiilJiiniim iikiiralJ quoted in n. 28.

ON DIGNA.GA'S THEORY OF THE OBJECT OF COGNITION 219

(paraspartinugrhfta),27 appear [to cognition] in this way [i.e., with this

aspect]?8

Kui ji, the commentator of Xuan zang, identifies the advocator of this opinion as Sanghabhadra C~Jf) who is called "Neo-Sarvasti­vadin."29 However, as Kat6 has already pointed out,3D VinItadeva attributes this opinion to "Vagbhata and others" (phakhol la sogs pa)Y

27 But in PST 44,13, where Dignaga's own position is explained, anyonyasannidhiinii­_ vasthii is used, cf. n. 13.

28 PST 92,2-5: nanu dravyasatiim eva sa paramiilJiiniim iikiiraf:!. ta eva hi paraspariinu­grhftiis tathii pratibhiisanta ity anekiikiiriirthaviidinah ... (cf. VinItadeva's description of this opinion quoted in n. 31.) This idea is reported and criticized also in Sthiramati's TrBh and Xuan zang's CWSL. Cf. TrBh 16,26-27: ekaikaparamiilJur anyanirapek~o atfndriya/:z, bahavas tu paraspariipeqii indriyagriihyii/:z. The same idea is also found in CWSL 4b: ;ff ~{M~--i1i~o ~fO~~~F:limtlo *fo~{il:~~Il~;fff![~Il1:.o ~J1:tmtlo fJfffl:i:' 1lo ~Jl:tm~o The word paraspariipeqii (cf. phan tshun nye bar 'gro ba in PVP: 221a4, ad PV 3.196) should be understood as interchangeable with paraspariinugrhfta (=phan tshlln phan btags pa) in the PST.

29 Cf. CWSLSJ 271al0: J1:tmll!U;lcXlX'jf~gilitli"im~$~o Cf. Cox's remark: "Though Sailghabhadra's interpretations are generally consistent with the Sarviistivada-Vaibhii~ika position, especically as presented in the *Mahiivibh~ii, he is influenced by Vasubandhu's criticisms and attempts to reformulate many Sarviistiviida-V aibhii~ika positions in re­sponse to them ... Sailghabhadra's works mark a turning point in the development of Sarviistiviida-Vaibhii~ika thought; as a result, Sailghabhadra is acknowledged as the inaugurator of the so-called 'neo-Vaibhii~ika' period." (Cox 1995: 58) Cf. de la Vallee Poussin 1928: 45, n.1.

30 Cf. KatO 1973: 134, Kata 1989: 179.

31 Cf. APT .189a7-b2): phyi rol gyi don du smra ba'i phyogs 'di la yang / pha kholla sogs pa kha Gig / rdul phra rab mams 'dus pa 'i mam pa dag dbang po 'i mam par shes pa 'i rgyllr 'dod do II de dag 'di skad du rdul phra rab mams la ni 'dus pa'i mam pa yang yod do II rdul phra ba mams la gang cung zad cung zad du ci yod pa thams cad ni rdzas su yod pa yin no II rdzas su yod pa'i phyir 'dus pa'i mam pa mam par shes pa'i rgyu nyid du 'gyur TO II rags pa'i phyir na mam par shes pa la rang gi ngo bo yang 'jog par 'gyur te / de bas na rdul phra rab mams tshlll gzhan gyi yul nyid yin no zhes zer TO II Also among the adherents of the theory of [the existence ot] the external object-reference (biihyiinhaviida), some [masters], Viigbhata and others, hold that the gathered aspects of atoms are the cause of the sensory awareness. They say: "Atoms have also the gathered aspect. Everything, what ever exists among atoms as single particle, is substantially existent. Because of being substantially existent the aspect of gathered [atoms] is the cause of the awareness, because of the gross form (sthiila) it makes the awareness obtain its proper form (svariipa'. There­fore, the atoms are the object-field [of the cognition] in a different way [than what they exist]."

220 JUNJIECHU

II-6. From the report given in Sanghabhadra's Nyayanusara (NA) , we know that there was a sharp controversy on the topic of the object of cognition between the Sautrantika/Dar~tantika (hereafter only "Sautrantika") and the SarvastivadaNaibha~ika (hereafter only "Sarvastivada"). According to Sanghabhadra, the Sautrantika's opin­ion, advocated by "the venerable" (sthavira) - a title used to refer to SriJata32 - is as follows:

In this regard the venerable (sthavira, i.e. SrIlata) holds the foll.owing opin­ion: Neither the basis [asraya, i.e. the sense faculty] nor the object-support (alambana) of the five groups of [sensory] awarenesses are real existence, because each individual atom cannot be the basis and object-support [of those awarenesses], and because only an agglomerate CfOil) of many atoms can constitute a basis and object-support. ... They, the master and the followers, also .used worldly examples incorrectly; they use the simile of blind men to prove their doctrine. It is said: Like blind men, who if separate and alone, have no action of perceiving a visible form; when they gather together (fO~), they still have no action of perceiving. Atoms are the same: when they are separate and alone, they do not perform the function of basis and object-support; when many [atoms] are gathered together, they still do not perform such a function. Therefore, the cognition spheres (ayatana, i.e., the sense faculties and their objects) are unreal; only the constituent ele­ments (dhatu) are real.33

This is to say, the Sautrantika holds that neither sense faculties nor object-support really exist, because as an agglomerate they can be reduced to atoms. Actually in AKBh, in reporting a debate on what is the agent and what is the object of cognition, Vasubandhu ascribes to the Sautrantikas the opinion that this kind of debate is useless, for the visual awareness arises in dependence on the visual sense and the visual matters, there is nothing that sees or is seen, there is merely

32 The sthavira mentioned in the NA is identified in the later sources as SrIlata, a Sautrantika master (cf. Cox 1988: 71, n. 9.). Kui ji, for instance, idendifies him as SrIlata, the second of "the three Sautrantika masters," who composed the Sautrantika-Vibh1i~a. Cf. CWSLSJ 358a,1l-12: =~fljj,l)!~o mJ£ff/lm~i'yo lEJ:!l!PJT~ J:.)]H~:o

33 Cf. NA 350c5-17: 1L~i&f.w{llJ-F.ffo ;fn.E1Jl!.t--::fJ:i.X;mi&m~**o XlA1%9:fQifo j]J:i.X;FJTi&FM.w*il"5co ...... :z1B<~iji1~$'I§'tJt~o 5IX1A~ot.io mB~*o iJ§Ji;o j(D~--4l­{to llW.R;§Jjio XIA~fQ~o JtJtliJl'llWo j(D~tlli1%9:--4l-1to llWi&~Jtlo XIA~fQ~o Ji:~Jtl iJl'llWo *~~j~o oftl'jl~.o Cf. Dhammajoti 2004: 89, also Dhammajoti 2004a: 20.

ON DIGNAGA'S THEORY OF THE OBJECT OF COGNITION 221

the dharma that is devoid of any activity, and there is merely cause and effect. 34

Sanghabhadra himself, supporting Sarvastivada, holds the follow-ing opinion:

The five groups of awareness do not take non-reality as their object-support, because they take the gathered atoms (11J~*,)l1)\'x) as their object-support. And because the five groups of awareness (*paiicavijiiiinakiiya) are free of conceptual construction, they do not take an agglomerate of many atoms (m 1)\'x11J-6') as their object. There is no other kind of dhamJa that is called "agglomerate" and that can be an object seen by, [heard by, smelled by, tasted by,] up to touched by an [awareness] that is free of conceptual construction (*nirvikalpaka), because that agglomerate is nothing other than that which is grasped by the discriminating imagination (*abhinin7pa1}avi­kalpa). But the five groups of awareness do not have the function of discriminating, [and] therefore they do not take an agglomerate as their object. That is to say, the atoms, inasmuch as they are gathered together and structured [in a certain way] (*sannivi.y!a), are always the basis and object­supports for the arising of the five groups of awareness, because there is no atom that is not gathered; even if atoms were not gathered, they would still be the basis and the object-support because they have the same nature. However, because the five groups of awareness exclusively (*eva) take gathered [atoms] as their object-support, they do not arise in taking that [agglomerate] as an object-support.35

Here, the Sautrantika-theory is criticized: an agglomerate of atoms cannot be an object-support because it is grasped by conceptual con­struction, but the five groups of sensory awareness are free of con­ceptual construction. We shall see below that Dignaga's opponents also criticize him in this way. For Sanghabadra, atoms are always a real existent. The difference between the state of being gathered and

34 AKBh 31,12-14: atra sautrantika ahu!:z -kim idam akasa!!l khiJdyate. cak~ur hi pra­tftya riipa(zi cotpadyate cak~urvijl1anam. latra katz pasyati, ko va drsyate. nirvyaparaJ!! hfdaJ!l dharmamatra1J! hetuphaiamatra1J! ca. Cf. Dhammajoti 2004: 51-52.

35 NA 350c19-27: ]imlVF~MF.*mo 1p~*,.E1i&lom~,w:Afco :.z]imit!il'~:5j-jJljtjJ:o l' ~m1i&1p-;§,lomo oJ-F1p-;§,4',jJlj I§ j;-¥~"IiilH,'jJljm Jl!JJ~mfli!l*JJX:o J2l.1I!Z1P-;§'~jJlj¥~Afco nttlHt!t:5j-jJljmJ&o ]i~~*jjt!t;r;l]Ii~o £Afc1'~,w:1p-;§,lomo llP~*,.E1i&o 1P~3Z:1i1o t§: lo]im1=.Jtg{J',::~,w:o ~*tElHi&1'1P~tjJ:o ~**,.E1i&1'1P~lli\ £11!{~tjJ:o Zil'Jf,{J',::~,w:o f't;]i mgyo 1)ltF!l1p~lom~,w:Afco 1'~11!{Jtgo

222 JUNJIECHU

not gathered is that the former is invisible, but the latter is visible; the nature of being a real existent of the two states is the same.36

II-7. The passages of NA quoted above suggest that the two words, he-he (fOif) and he-ji (fO~), used in this context separately for the Sautrantika-theory and Sarvastivada-theory, were two different words in the original Sanskrit text, and therefore, some modern scholars hold that he-he and he-ji refer to two different theories being advocated by the Sautrantika and the Sarvastivada, and also suggest that their Sanskrit origins were different.37

Of course, he-he and he-ji used in Sanghabhadra's context clearly refer to two different things. According to my understanding, he-he refers to a state in which many atoms are integrated into a single unity with no space between them, and he-ji, a state in which many atoms are merely gathered, but with spaces in-between. This kind of difference, as implied by the two words used for the two theories, is also mentioned by Vinltadeva in his commentary on the VS:

[The gross fonn such as a color, etc.,] as many atoms standing with inter­space (*siintara), cannot be an object-field; it cannot be an object-field also as atoms standing without inter-space (*nirantara).38

Kui ji interprets he-ji as follows:

36 NA533a10-11: >f'f/J~a~o ;ttR&t'ffo *!UiIt>f'i1o 1iI!?FMiSo 37 Cf. the discussion of these two words in Kato 1973: 137, Kato 1989: 180. According

,; to him, the original forms of he-ji used by Sarvastiviida and he-he used by Sautriintika could be respectively *saficita and *sal'[lhata, the latter is used in VS for the Sautriintika­theory; and it is also possible, KatO suggests again, based on the statemente in Abhidhar­madlpa, that the venerable Vasumitra (sthaviravasurnitra), one of the four great masters of the Sarvastivada, refutes the twenty-five true principles (tattva) of SiiiJkhya and destroys the Sautriintika-theory of the agglomerate of atoms, mentioned as paramiinusaficayaviida (AD 260,14-15: tad ebhyas caturbhyaT:z sarviistiviidebhyas trtfyaT:z sthaviravasurnitraT:z paficavil'[lsatitattvaniriisf pararnlilJusaficayaviidonrniirthf ca ... ), that Sautriintika's he-he is the renderings for saficaya. Cf. also Cox 1988: 74, n. 23. However, as we have seen above (n. 23 and n. 24), in Dignaga's PSV, saficita is used for the Sautriintika-theory, and sarnudiiya for Sarvastivada-theory; they are translated in Tibetan respectively as bsag pa and tshogsltshogs pa (see Hattori 1968: 188,16b4-5, 189,97a6-7.) .

38 VST 219al-2 : rdul phra rab phrag can du gnas du rna yang yul rna yin no II du phra rab dag bar rned par gnas pa yang yul rna yin te I

ON DIGNAGA'S THEORY OF THE OBJECT OF COGNITION 223

In the proximity of the same place is called he [*sal!!-], not integrated into a single entity is calledji [*-udaya]; this is because they [i.e. atoms] are put in proximity, but they are different entities.39

ll-8. Nevertheless, I do not think that these two words under discus­sion were necessarily different words in the· Sanskrit original. Or if they were indeed different words, then they must have had the same meaning. The reason is as follows. First of all, Jinendrabudhi regards all of the words in this semantic group to be synonyms.40 And if we analyze the compounds used by Sailghabhadra, zhong-wei he-he em ~flJJS-) and he-ji ji-wei (flJ~;f~1~), we find that the syntactic relationship between the two elements of each compound is differ­ent. This difference is expressed through the different word orders in which these two elements are arranged. In the case of zhong-wei he­he, we arrive at something like paramiilJusaficita, -smighiita, or -safi­caya, which all appear in the AKBh,41 or paramiilJLlniiJ?1 sanghiitaJ:t, which appear in V.s 7,11; thus the syntactic relationship between the two elements is that paramiilJu depends on saficita or its variants which as a noun is the modified element, and the meaning therefore is "an agglomerate of many atoms." In the case of he-ji ji-wei, we arrive at something like saJ?1hatiiJ:t paramiilJavaJ:t, which appears in V.s 6,29, or paramiilJuJ:t sanghiitaJ:t in V.s 8,6, or the plural form paramiilJava eva saiicitiiJ:t, which appears in TrBh 16,23-24; in this case the syntactic relationship is that saJ?1hata or sanghiita as an attribute modifies paramiilJu, and thus the meaning becomes "gath­ered atoms." The difference between these two theories would thus not necessarily be demonstrated through using different words, but rather through the different syntactical relationships between the two elements, i.e., through the different emphasis, whether on the agglomerate, as in the case of the Sautrantika-theory or on the atoms themselves, as in the case ofthe Sarvastivada-theory.

39 Cf. SWSLSJ 217a18-19: -~t§JlI1JfQo /F;:¥.o-JII1J~o llP;&t§JlIo JII~3IJ$o

40 Cf. PST 44,1-2: saiicitasabdena samudiiya ucyate, bhiive ni~thiividhiiniit. saiiciti/:l saiicitaf!! sal1caya(l samudiiya iti hi paryiiyii/:l.

41 See Hirakawa 1973: 225. Cf. also n. 14.

224 JUNJIECHU

Xuan zang also uses the two words, he-he !md he-ji, in his translations of other texts in which only one word is used in the original. For example,. in the Tibetan translation of the M(V), the one term 'dus pa is used for both theories; however, Xuan zang translates this single word with either he-he or he-ji. Also in the San­skrit text of V.s 11 with its Vrtti, only one word, saf(lhatti, is used, which is translated in Tibetan as 'dus pa;42 however, again Xuan zang translates it with different words: "he-he, etc." (flJil~) in the verse, and "he-he and/or he-ji" (flJil bZ.flJ~, flJilflJ~, flJil~flJ~) in the Vrtti.43 Of course, the short form "he-he, etc." is the same as "he-he and/or he-ji," it being abbreviated for metrical reasons. In this case, Xuan zang regards saJ!lhata as referring to a kind of collection that comprises the meanings of both he-he and he-ji. In short, Xuan zang's translations of these two terms are of an explanatory nature.

II-9. Indeed, this kind of difference, i.e., an agglomerate of atoms or gathered atoms, is significant only for the Sautrantika and the Sarvastivada, as Bahyarthavada; both hold that the object-support is the external existent. This difference is not significant for the Yoga­cara, the Antarjfieyavada. For the latter, the object-support, regard­less of whether it is "an agglomerate of atoms" or "gathered atoms," does not exist separately from an awareness; its external form is merely an image or aspect (pratibhiisaltiktira) produced by the awareness. The main purpose of PS(V) 1. 14ff. is to refute the Bahyarthavada, the theory that the object of cognition exists externally, and therefore the words used there, according to

. Jinendrabuddhi, are synonymous. Jinendrabuddhi tells us:

In this regard, the disputants are divided into two groups: Those who advo­cate [that the object-support is] an internal cognizable (antarjiieyavZidin) and those who advocate [that the object-support is] an external object (bahyZir­

thavZidin). Of these [two groups], for those who advocate [that the object­support is] the internal cognizable, in the state that the reality is not per­ceived, the [distinction between] the valid cognition and the cognizable object, is only an imperfect [view] according to reality. Only people who are

42 Cf. VST 7b3-4.

43 Cf. vsc 75c17-25. Cf. Kala 1973: 137, n. 28, Kala 1989: 179-180.

ON DIGNAGA'S THEORY OF THE OBJECT OF COGNITION 225

confused have this view of distinction between a valid cognition and a cognizable object, based on their [false] vision. This has already been explained.44 Those who advocate [that an object is] an external object assert that there are external cognizable objects absolutely in the sense of ultimate reality and the valid cognition which takes that [object] as its object~field. In order to explain how this [view] is incorrect, now he [Dignaga] says the following, in order to undertake an examination with reference to the object­support: "However, with reference to color-form, etc. the meaning of the object-support should be explained." (PSV ad PS 1.14cd45).46

At the beginning of this section Dignaga states his hesitation in accepting the popular saying that the Va.davidhi is a work of Vasu­bandhu, holding that this is not to be accepted, or, if it is accepted, an affirmation must has been made by Vasubandhu himself that this work lacks quintessence.47 On the last point of this statement Jinen­drabuddhi offers a remark, saying that even if it is accepted that this work is composed by him, it must be composed in his earlier life when his insight is not perfect; later, being purified in understanding, he made the affirmation of the lack of the quintessence in this work.48 That is to say, if the Va.davidhi is composed by Vasubandhu, it must be composed by him when he was still a Bahyarthavadin; later, when he became an Antarjiieyavadin, he changed his opinion. Thus, the central topic in the section beginning with PS 1.14 is a refutation of the statement found in the Va.davidhi, which is formu­lated according to Bahyarthavada doctrine, that perception is an awareness arising directly from a certain object-reference (tato 'rthiid vijiia.naJ!l pratyak~am). Jinendrabuddhi emphasizes that the

44 Cf. PST 73, 10-74, l.

45 Cf. Hattori 33 §D.

46 PST 90,6-11: iha dvaye viidino 'ntarjiievaviidino biihviirthaviidinas ca. tatriintarjiie­vaviidiniil1l adr§{atattviivasthiiyii1"(l pral1lii~Wl!l pra111eya1!1 caparini§panna111 eva tattvatalJ. kevalaJ?l bhriintiiniil!l yathiidarsana111 idaJ?l 111iinal1leyavyavasthitidarsana111. etae ea prii,? eva pratipiidita111. biihviirthaviidinas tu para111iirthata eva biihYaJ!l pra11leya1!1 tadvi§ayaJ?l ca praI1liiIJaJlI icehanti. tae ea yatha na yujyate, tathii pratipiidayitul1l idiinfin iila11lbaniidhi­kiire~w viciiram iirabdhu11l iiha - rupiidieu tv iilambaniirtho vaktavya iti.

47PS I.13ab: na viidavidhir iieiiryasyiisiiro veti nikayalJ /

48 PST 86,10-12: yady api ca tena e.Q viracita(J, tathiipi prathamal1l anupajiitaprajiiiiti­sayena satii. pasciid vyavadiitabuddher asva tatriisiiraniseayo jiita iti.

226 JUNJIECHU

purpose of this section is not merely to refute the t!leory of the Wida­vidhi, but to demonstrate in general that the division of cognition and its object, based on the assumption that the object exists externally, is incorrect. He says again that in this regard, among those who advocate that objects exist externally, the Buddhists Csvayuthyiif:t, i.e. the Hlnayanists) are very strong, and when they are defeated, the others will also be defeated, just as when the chief wrestler is defeated, the other wrestlers are also defeated; therefore the only opponent in his discussion is the Buddhist who advocates that objects of cognition exist externally.49 Here svayuthyiif:t apparently refers to the Sarvastivada and the Sautrantika. Actually, the refutation of the object-support was carried out in different steps: First, the theory of the object-support as advocated by the non­Buddhists, the Vaise~ikas, who hold that the externally existent atoms, even if not in a gross form, are the object-support, is refuted from the standpoint of the Buddhist, the Sarvastivada, who accepts the existence of atoms, but asserts that the gathered atoms in their gross form is the object-support. Then, the theory of the object­support as advocated by the Sarvastivada is refuted from the standpoint of the Sautrantika, as SrTIata had done, who accepts the existence of atoms, but asserts that the agglomerate of atoms in its gross form is the object-support. And finally, all the theories of the object-support advocated by the Sarvastivada and the Sautrantika are refuted from the standpoint of the Yogacara, who does not accept any external thing as being the object-support, as Vasubandhu and Digana had done, for instance, in the VS and the AP.50

II-lO. According to Jinendrabuddhi in his conclusion to this section, Dignaga's answer to the question about the meaning of the object­support Ciilambaniirtha) asked at the beginning of the section was already given in PS 1.5cd, namely: "The visible matter that is self-

49 PST 91,2-6: tasmtlt samanyenaiva bahyarthtisrayil}l pramapadivyavastha na ghatata iti pratipadanaparo 'yam lirambha iti veditavyam. tatrapi bahyarthavadisu balinal;z sva­y,tthyah. te~u nihate~v itare nihata eva bhavanti, jye~thamalla iva nihate tadanye maUa iti tair eva saha viCara/!I karoti.

50 Cf. also the analysis in Mimaki 1972: 88.

ON DIGNAGA'S THEORY OF THE OBJECT OF COGNITION 227

:Cognizable and inexpressible is the operation-sphere of the ~ense Jaculty.,,51 This is also the same as that which is stated in AP 6, where, employing the Yogaciira's idea of the "image-part" of cogni­tion,52 he states that only the internal cognizable form (antarjiieya­rupa) that appears as if externally is the object of cognition, for the feason that it has the form of this cognition and it is its cause.53

Thus, in following Jinendrabuddhi, it is quite clear that Dignaga is an Antarjfieyaviidin, advocating the doctrine that accepts only the mternal object, without, however, committing himself to the exis-. tence of external things, holding only that external things are not the object of cognition. As we shall see below Jinendrabuddhi mentions dgain this distinction between the Antarjfieyavada and the Biihyiir­thavada in another context. 54 This special term, antarjiieyaviida, is thus used by Jinendrabuddhi only in the epistemological sense, and therefore is a proper designation of the epistemological theories advocated by the special group of the Y ogiiciiras which I shall dis­cuss in more detail in the following pages. 55

11-11. To sum up, Dignaga holds perception to take siimiinya as its object-field, because perception is produced by many atoms. This

51 PST 90,12-91,4: ~ hi manyante - viidavidhid~aT}apara eviiyam iirambha iti, tesiim yad uktam - svasll1!'vedyll1!' tv anirde§yll1!' riipam indriyagocara ity atra gacariirtha vaktav­ya/:t. kiTp yadiibhiisaTp tatra jiiiinam utpadyate tatoo tad gacara ityiidi tulyal;t paryanuyaga . iti pratividheyam.

52 Cf. MS 2.11 (p. 29,8-12): de Itar mam par rig pa 'di dag thams cad ni don med pas de tsam yin la I mig la sags pa'i mam par rig pa dag ni gzugs la sags pa rgyu mtshan yin pa dang I de dag gi mam par shes pa Ita ba yin pa nas Ius kyi mam par shes pa Ita ba yin pa'i bar gyis rgyu mtshan dang Ita ba dang bcas pa'a II "Thus, all these representations are merely themselves (tanmiitra), for they lack objects. The visual representation, etc. (calquriidivijiiapti), has visible matter, etc., as its image[-part] (nimitta[-bhagaJ), and the awareness of these [visible matter, etc.] as the perceiving[-part] (dar.fana[-bhagaD, up to having [the tangible object as its image[ -part] and the awareness of the tactile repre­sentation as its perceiving[-part]. Thus it has the image[-part] and the perceiving[-part]."

53 AP 6 (quoted in TSP 582,11-12): yad antarjiieyarupaTp tu bahirvad avabhasate I so 'rtha jiiiinarupatviit tatpratyayatayiipi ca II

54 Cf. n. 104.

55 Cf. ill-3 and V-3.

228 JUNJIECHU

siimiinya, I repeat,56 is interpreted by Iinendrabuddhi as "common property," i.e. all atoms have the capacity of the producing cogni­tion, that is to say, all atoms are active in generating the cognition, they are the cause of the cognition. This seems to be similar to the Sarvastivada-theory. Manorathanandin on the other hand interprets this siimiinya as "an agglomerate, or a kind of collection of atoms," i.e., all atoms agglomerated as awho1e. This is probably the Sautran­tika-theory. To be sure, if this siimiinya is understood in. the sense of an external object, it is similar to the theory rejected by Dignaga himself, and thus, of course, Dingaga is involved in a contradiction. However, if we understand Dignaga as making this statement from the viewpoint of Antarjfieyavada, the siimiinya made up of many atoms no matter what it may be, is thus a reflection of awareness as external many individual atoms or many atoms as a whole, which becomes the cognition sphere (iiyatana) that is unreal. In this case he is not involved in a contradiction and his theory is consistent.

III. iiyatana

111-1. In the AKBh, ayatana is "etymologically" explained as having the meaning of the iiyadviira, "the gate of approaching [the mind and mind-associates]," and dhiitu as having the meaning of gatra, "ge­nus," which is further glossed as iikara, "origin" or "sources.,,57 According'to Sanghabhadra, the Sautrantika holds iiyanata to not really exist; only the dhiitu is real existence. Sanghabhadra himself on the other hand, as an advocator of Sarvastivada, has the opposite opinion, and in his NA criticizes the former at length. The Sautran­tika's opinion that the iiyatana is not real is derived from its position

56 Cf. n. 11 and n. 14.

57 Cf. AKBh 13,19-21: yathaikasmin parvate bahiiny ayastamraritpyasuvan.ladigotra~li dhatava ucyante. evam ekasminn asraye santane va a~tadasa gotra~li a~tadasa dhatava uc­yante. akaras tatra gotra~ly ucyante. "Just like in a mountain there are many genera [of elements] such as iron, copper, silver and gold, which are called elements, in the same way, in a single basis [of personal existence, i.e. the body, = atmabhava] or a [single] continuum, there are eighteen genera [of elements], which are called the eighteen [psycho­physical] constituent elements (dhatu), here the origins (akara = 'byung gnas = 1=:;$:) are called genera." Cf. also Dhammajoti 2004a: 20.

ON DIGNA.GA'S THEORY OF THE OBJECT OF COGNITION 229

.. that the basis and the object-support of the five groups of awareness ~.are not real. As we have seen above, the argument that only the agglomerate (he-he) of many atoms can constitute the basis and ob-ject-support is concluded by stating that "the iiyatana is unreal, only

(the dhiitu is real.~'58 Here the iiyatana, the cognition sphere, includes the five sense faculties that are the basis (iisraya) of cognition and

,the five object-fields that are the object-support (iilambana) of cogni­tion. Actually, the Dar~!antikas already held the opinion that cogni­

. tion can take the non-existent as its object-support,59 just like cogni­·tions that take magic creations, Gandarva-city, fire-brand, mirages, etc. (miiyiigandharvanagariiliitamrgatr~1Jiidivat), as their object­

•. support. The Vaibha~ika, in contrast, holds that all cognitions take only existent object-references as their object-support.6o Following the Dar~!antika tradition, the Sautrantika maintains that even when a cognition arises from the non-existent, the two [requisite conditions, i.e., iilambana and iisraya] are still determined (*niscita) by the reasoning through which the causality [between cognition and its conditions] is mutually inferred.61 The cognition sphere is unreal because the agglomerate of atoms that constitutes this cognition sphere is only conventional reality, since when the agglomerate is analyzed into its pieces, according to the Sautrantika's theory of two realities, there is no cognition of this agglomerate.62

111-2. The idea that the cognition sphere is not real is repeatedly criti­cized by Sanghabhadra in his NA. He says that if the Sthavira main­tains that the iiyatana is unreal and the dhiitu is real, his statement violates the utterances in the Siitras. He quotes some passages from the Siitras, one of which is also quoted in the AKBh and AKV, to the

58 Cf. n. 33.

59 Cf. Cox 1988: 43ff.

60 MVBh 228b21-24: mt~1ft@l.a 1f~1!\Ii~tlD¥Dt!i*a ~{1=;IHJia lf~~l*~~~~ &~*~~~~~~~1!\Ii~a ~~~~D-~~~~1f~a

61 NA 628c4-5: ~~#1fa dF=J9:t:lEa m~~*~iI!$J:!I!i\il:a

62 Cf. AICBh 6.4: yatra bhinne na tadbuddhir anyilpohe dhiyil ca tat / ghatilmbuvat sQ/p.vrtisat paramiirthasad anyathii II Cf. also AKBh (ad lac.) 334,1-7. This theory is reported by SaiJ.ghabhadra in his ASP 666a9-27.

230 JUNJIECHU

effect that the phrase "all things" mentioned by -the Blessed One (bhagavat) refers to the twelve ayatanas.63 Moreover, he says, the Blessed One would not say something is ultimately real if it were unreal, and also, one would not accomplish perfect Buddhahood (*samyaksaY(lbuddha) if one were only aware of unreal things. Only the nihilist (*khapu~pavadin) would make this kind of statement, not those who respect the Buddha as their teacher.64 His conclusion is as follows:

Therefore, all twelve iiyatanas are real existents. One cannot talk about the ultimate reality with respect to unreal things. Thus, in the statements of Sthavira many contradictions are found between that which was said earlier and that which was said later (*pLlrvottaravacanavyiighiita). Those who have faith without insight respect him; however, those who have both faith and insight would certainly not follow him. And the simile of the many blind persons65 is also contradictory to his doctrine. The theory that each atom cannot possess the nature of being the basis and object-support, and the agglomerate of atoms (mi~1tl1f) can be the basis and object-support does not conform to the simile of blind persons at all. The theory that the gathered atoms (fQ:*t!lli*J) are the basis and object-support is not contradictory to the simile of blind persons, because it holds that each atom is the basis and object-support. If it is held [by you Sautrantika] that each atom is invisible, then the agglomerate of atoms would also be invisible, because it is just like what is said in the simile of the blind persons - it is the same as in the state of not being agglomerated (fQ1f: e1f?). Therefore, the five groups of sen­sory awareness definitely do not take the agglomerate as their object. How­ever, there must be an object, and thus, it is established that they take real things as their object. 66

63 Cf. AKBh 301,8: sarvarrz astfti briihmaIJa yiivad eva dviidasiiyataniini. AKV 5,28-29: sarvarrz sarvam iti briihmaIJa yiivad eva dviidasiiyataniinfti satre vacaniit.

64 NA 352a5-12: :X:~~iRl'f.£)l~Hi~o J:J~HUii;{fi!t~~g~o frD~~~§5io ~~~.~~ §5i~0 'ft:!'l:-tDo {:&{iiJ-tD~'ft:!'l:l!Ilo iJftlJl!.l!~OOJlJ¥~:fftto iJt.~EL }'E~'It~0 ~­tD11fo ~+=l!io Jl:tJlJ¥~:ffo ~~~{~o iJt.7FH!l{:&7F.tt§5iJlJ¥~:ffo :X:Zil'7FH!liJft~{~ :ffP.X;~JE:!'l:o 'i1::/t~iiil4!f"n5iJl:t~0 WH!Il~~ilio 7FH!lilUto

65 Cf. n. 33.

66 NA 352a12-21: ~+=~~£.:ffo ?F.oN~ttl'iJ§5iJlJ¥~o frD£J:Jlli~:ffm~o M Wmffilo 1fp.x;i!t~0 {~rm~1' 0 FiiJmW)c*o J'l..11'{~ Ao ~,~JIlI)I~o :X:'\'i'.r~Uf,jo i!tl1Hl *0 --ii>Jj~?F{:&~!lto xt\1!i!C¥Dil-P.X;{:&~~tiiilo 1BOW~Uf,jo ~7Ft§:j':.q:o 1D~ii>Jj1~~{:&~~tiiilo Jl:t

ON DIGNA.GA'S THEORY OF THE OBJECT OF COGNITION 231

The key-point of the difference between the Sautrantika and Sarvas­tivada is the fo.llowing: For the Sautrantika the agglomerate consist­ing of many atoms is the basis and object-support, i.e., the iiyatana, but it is not the real existent, because it can be analyzed into the individual atoms, whereas for the Sarvastivada, each atom is the basis and object-support, i.e., the iiyatana, and they are the real exis­tent, and furthermore, when many atoms are gathered together they are visible.

1II-3. The Sautrantika's idea that the cognition spheres are unreal conforms to Dignaga's consistent thought quite well. When discuss­ing the sources of our knowledge, he prefers to use negative formulations. Formulas such as "P is not/is free of Q," and "Qj, Q2> etc., are not P," are used in his definition of perception in PS 1.3cd (pratyak~a1!'L kalpaniiporjharrz niimajiityiidiyojanii /I). Also in his ear­lier work, the *HastaviilaprakaralJa,67 basing himself on the famous snake-fOpe-hemp simile in MS 3.8,68 he states that all phenomena which are examined according to their own nature (*svan7pa) are the operation-spheres of conventional cognition (kun rdzob shes pa'i spyod yul, *sarrzvrtijiiiinagocara); even the partless infinitesimal particle, the atom, does not really exist, for such particles are not able to be the object-support owing to their ungraspable nature, just like sky-flowers, hare-horns, etc.69 That which cannot be perceived cannot be held as an existent object of cognition; since the object does not really exist, a cognition of this object must also be errone-

fY'ilfIlj,{f!!N!l)g;o llq:--il'lHi!,:{t*~;lij:o ~--1l¥HFI'lJ Yf.1lf 0 Ali:il'&:¥o.,g.iJ'J'J!lIFF Yf.o !liJliill.® ;lij:o )lD;lF~.,g.o "IiY::limlli~o ij(:JE::;r:Jfl:¥D.,g.l.?o~o ~~'1f~o ~J;(.~l.?o~~Mo

67 Cf. the critical edition of the Tibetan translation in Frauwallner 1959: 153-156; a Japanese translation and Sanskrit reconstruction are found in Harada 1993. There is also an early edition and English translation, see Thomas & Ui 1918.

68 Cf. MS 3.8. (p. 52,12-16): mun khung na sbrul du snang ba'i thag pa bzhin du 'jug ste I dper na med pa'i phyir thag pa la sbrul ni nor ba ste I de'i don rtogs pa rnams ni med pa la sbrul gyi blo ldog eing I thag pa'i blor gnas so II de yang rnam par phra mar bya na nor ba ste I kha dog dang I dri dang ro dang reg bya'i mtsan nyid yin pa'i phyir ro II Cf. Nagao 1991: 67ff.

69 Cf. HVP karika 3ab (154,13-14): eha med brtag par bya min phyir I tha rna yang ni med par mtshung I and the prose that follows.

232 JUNJIECHU

ous. Also in another earlier work, the *Upadayaprajfiaptiprakara­lJa,70 he denies the existence of an object of cognition in the same way. There, in opposition to the extremist ideas of sameness (-'fi, *ekatva), separateness (~di, *prthaktva) and non-existence (?-I=ff, *asattva) , he explains that the Buddha designates things merely according to conditioned labels (1&IEI{I~U!it, *upadayaprajfiapti). Thus, phenomena exist nominally: they appear either as a conglo­merate (*l@.~, *smighata, or similar expression), i.e., as th,e conceptu­ally constructed unity of spatial manifoldness; or as a continuum (.t§ t', *santana), i.e., as the conceptually constructed unity of temporal manifoldness; or again as a special condition (:B-{lz:~55Ij, *avastha­vi§e~a),i.e. either as a particular component in the conglomerate or a particular stage of the continuum. The conclusion is that phenomena in all three forms exist merely nominally and thus do not really exist. Such concepts are found in the Bodhisattvabhitmi of the Yogiiciira­bhiimi. As has been demonstrated by Schmithausen, in this chapter we can find a nominalist philosophy according to which all things ultimately are merely a "Setzung der Sprache," or, as is said at another point in the same text, that all objective appearances have their root in a conceptual construction (vikalpa). According to Schmithausen, this kind of theory is a special form of Mahayanistic illusionism and is a preliminary stage of Yogacara idealism.71 I believe that this kind of theory, as a special branch of the Y ogacara system, is the basis of Dignaga's thought, and that he fully developed it in his last work, the PS(V).72

1II-4. The link between Dignaga's concept of ayatana and that of Vasubandhu is very clear. As mentioned above, the background of

70 Cf. Frauwallner 1959: 83-164 (on this treatise: 121); Ui 1958, 167-232; Kitagawa 1957: 126-137.

71 Cf. Schmithausen 1973: 166f.

72 Also with regard to another part of the iiyanata, "the basis," i.e. the sense faculties, Dignaga accepts the basic idea of the Sautrantika's position. In the ApV he maintains: "The sense faculty is inferred from its effect [i.e., from cognition] as something the nature of which is power, not as [something material] that is constituted by elements (bhautika)" (MV 179,5-6: dbang po ni rang gi 'bras bu las nuspa'i lio bo Hid du rjes su dpag gi , byung ba las gyur pa Hid du ni ma yin no /!)

ON DIGNAGA'S THEORY OF THE OBJECT OF COGNITION 233

Dignaga's discussion on this problem is a passage found in the AKBh.73 According to Y asomitra' s commentary, "the particular of the cognition sphere" refers to "the condition of being cognizable by visual awareness, etc., or[, put in other words,] the condition of being the cognition sphere such as visible matter, etc.;"74 Jinendra­buddhi and Vibhiiti also say that this is "the condition of being graspable by visual awareness" (cak~urvijfianagrahyatvadi)?5 This cognizable or graspable object is simply that which we perceive. Thus, it is said that cognition arises in respect to the particular of this cognizable or graspable object, not in respect to the particular of substance, which, according to Yasomitra, refers to homogenous substances, such as the color blue?6 In this case, a mental generaliza­tion takes place and consequently the object of the cognition is no longer the particular, but the universal. The conclusion is that a cognition which arises with respect to the cognition's appearance, namely, with respect to self-awareness, is perception; a cognition that arises with respect to the thing itself, namely, with respect to the atoms or substances, is a conceptual construction. Actually, Dignaga also says that even a mental construction (kalpana) is perception insofar as it perceives itself with respect to self-awareness, but it is not perception with respect to the thing itself (artha), because in that case it conceptualizes its object.77

III-5. Thus, for the Vaibha~ika the ayatana is the atoms, which are ultimately real, but for both the Sautrantika and the Y ogacara this ayatana, i.e. that which we perceive, is not real. The question arises: if it is not real, where does it come from? As far as I can see, this question is not answered by the Sautrantika, and this is the weak

73 Cf. n. 15.

74 Cf. AKV 30,15-16: iiyataniinii1J1 svalakea~1Qm iiyatanasvalak~a1Jam, cakeurvijiiiina­viji1eyatviidi ntpiiyatanatviidi vii.

75 Cf. PST 44,6 and PVV 176, nA (Vibhii).

76 Cf. AKV 30,16-17: dravyiilJiil?J nfliidikiiniil?1 svalakeww1J1 nfliidyiikaracak~urviji1a­niidiviji1eyatvam, nfliikiiriidi vii.

77 Cf. PS(V) 1.3,12-13: yadi riigiidisvasa1J1vitti{l pratyakeam, kalpaniijl1iinam api nama. satyam etat. kaZpaniipi svasa1J1vittiiv i~tii niirthe vikaZpaniit / (l,7ab)

234 JUNJIECHU

point of their theory, a point open to attack by -the Vaibha~ika or other opponents. In this regard, the Yogacara goes further, offering a clear answer, namely; that it is a mental product. Vasubandhu, the Kosakara,78 says in the VS(V) that a cognition bearing the appear­ance of visible matter (rapa) comes forth on account of its own seed, and these two, i.e., the seed, or the visual sense, and the visible mat­ter, are said to be the cognition's two kinds of cognition sphere.79 In other words, only those things whose appearance the cognition bears while arising are the cognition spheres, i.e., the visible matter, etc. This is also as Dignaga sees it. Based on the Yogacara's common ground with the Sautrantika, the object of sensory cognition is reduced to the "cognizable" or "graspable" of the visual awareness. Thus, the object of cognition is dependent on the cognition itself, and only an object of this nature is its cognition sphere. That is to say, what a cognition cognizes is sense data, not an independent sub­stance. This idea is clearly stated in PS I.Scd. There, Dignaga con­cludes that visible matter that is self-cognizable (svasaY!lvedya) and inexpressible is the operation-sphere (gocara) of the senses.80 This half-verse is repeated in PSV ad PS 1.4Iab, where Dignaga states:

The object-reference of the senses that, although possessing manifold properties,Sl appears to the senses in its particular character, is the cause of the arising of the cognition bearing its appearance. As a part of the cogni-

78 I follow Schmithausen 1967: 136 in holding Vasubandhu, the author of the AK(Bh), is also the author of the VS and TriI)1s; this is accepted in Frauwallner 1994: 425. The latter earlier proposed the theory that there were two persons bearing the name Vasuban­dhu (Frauwallner 1951), Vasubandhu the younger who was the author of the AKCBh), and Vasubandhu the elder, the brother of AsaiIga, the Mahayanist; Frauwallner did not, how­ever make a decision about which of the two authored the VS and TriI)1s (cf. ibid. 56). Cf. Franco 1997: 77, n. 27; Kritzer 2005: xxiv-xxvi.

79 VS(V) 9 (5,25-6,1): yataJ:! svab"ijiid vijiiaptir yadiibhiisii pravartate I dvividhiiyata­natvena te tasyii munir abrav"it II (9) kim uktal)1 bhavati. n7papratibhasa vijiiaptir yatal; svabfjat pariIJamavi§e~apraptad utpadyate, tac ca bfjal)1 yatpratibhasii ca sii te tasyii vijiiapte§ cak~rtn7payatanatvena yathakramal)1 bhagaviin abravft.

80 PS 1.5cd: svasal)1vedyam hy anirde§yal)1 n7pam indriyagocaral; II = NMukh 16cd: III 1*i$IUlfE~, ~-§'~~l'tl'f·o Cf. n. 51.

81 Cf. PS 1.5ab: dharmiIJo 'nekarrtpasya nendriyiit sarvatha gatil; I

ON DIGNAGA'S THEORY OF THE OBJECT OF COGNITION 235

tion,s2 it is exclusively individually self-cognizable; and owing to its nature [as individually self-cognizable] it is inexpressible, since an expressible thing is the object that consists in the universal. 83

The "self-cognizable," according to Jinendrabuddhi, refers to some­thing that is not cognized through communication, i.e., is of an inter­nal nature.84 Here it is quite clear that, based upon Y ogacara' s com­mon grounds with the Sautrantika, Dignaga says that the "particular" refers to the cognition sphere that depends on sensory awareness; further, as a Yogacara, he says that this "particular" is the self­cognizable, a part of the cognition, and thus, what the cognition cog­nizes is the cognition itself. However, I do not suggest that Dignaga went as far as those Y ogacaras who belong to the fully-developed idealist branch of Y ogaciira, according to whom the sense faculty and the object-support such as visible matter are the transformation (pari1:ujma) of storehouse-awareness.85

IV. aMra

IV-l. Another interesting point that demonstrates Dignaga's position on the nature of the object of cognition is his treatment of the so­called "aspect" (iikiira) , a term used in the Sautrantika system to

82 This translation, following Steinkellner's reconstruction, is based on Vasudhara­rak~ita's translation: shes pa'i rang gi eha shas bzhin du. Kanakavarman's translation deviates from this: shes pa'i rang gi bdag nyid bzhin du. This possibly can be recon­structed as jfilinasvlitmavat, "the cognition itself."

83 PSV ad PS 1.41ab: anekadharmo 'pfndriylirtho yo 'slidhliral}enlitmanendriye 'va­bhasamlina(1 svtibhtisajfitinotpattihetu(1, sa pratytitmavedya eva jiilinasvlil?lSavat. sa tad­titmantiSakyanirdesa(1, nirdeiyasya stimtinyavieayatvtit (reconstructed by Steinkellner, ava­bhasamtinas tadtibhasajiitinotpattihetu(1 is changed to °mtinab svtibhasao, according to the suggestion kindly given by Eli Franco, which is also accepted by Steinkellner per e-mail).

84 PST 47, 6-7: svasaTflvedyam antigamikam.

85 For example, cf. TrBh 16,2-4: tatra litmlidivikalpavtisantiparipoetid rLlptidivikalpa­vtisantiparipoetie ca tilayavijJ1lintid titmlidinirbhtiso vikalpo rLlptidinirbhlisas ea utpadyate. "With regard to this [pari!llima or transformation], owing to the complete development of the latent psychological impression (vtisanti) of the conceptual construction of 'self,' etc., owing to the complete development of the psychological impression of the conceptual construction of 'the visible matter,' etc., the conceptual construction with its manifestation as 'self,' etc. and as visible matter, etc., arises from the storehouse-awareness."

236 JUNTIECHU

refer to something that connects a cognizing subJect with the cog­nized object. Dignaga does not reject the Sautrantika's presuppo­sition, but he develops upon it, coming to the conclusion that an object of cognition must be internal, since the Sautrantika also main­tains that the object of a cognition can only be cognized by means of the fact that the cognitioq has an aspect (akara) as its medium to grasp the object. The basis of this kind of development may be the fact, I would like to suggest, that for this special branch of Yogacara system (vide supra III-3) the state of being existent or non-existent is not an ontological assertion, but rather a phenomenological descrip­tion of what has been experienced by awareness; thus, the essential point of the discussion is whether an experience is obtained inter­nally or externally, not whether a perceived object really exists externally or not.

IV -2. In holding this, Dignaga would not be involved in a doctrinal conflict with the Sautrantika, because such a viewpoint is, to some extent, actually also shared by the Sautrantika. For the Sautrantika, an object is not directly perceivable, there is no direct connection be­tween an object and its subject, and cognition is produced only through this (the object's) "aspect." According to Mok~akaragupta, this is the Sautrantika's tenet:

The Sautrantika maintains: everything that appears in the form of something blue, etc., is nothing but the cognition [itself], not the external object, because an insentient thing is not able to illuminate [itself to the cognition]. [This is] just as it is said that the visible [objects] that produce the cognition in their own aspects are not the operation-spheres of sense faculties (indriya­gocara).86

This intermediate thing, the "aspect" (aMra), also called "appear­ance" (or abhiisa, pratibhiisa, or expressed in the verb form prati­..fbhas, "to appear," etc.), must be the productive cause of internal cognition, and this is cognition itself, i.e., self-awareness. In contrast,

86 TBh 63,17-20: sautrtintiktinti'!l matam - jiltinam evedQlJ! sarva,!! nfltidytiktirel}a pratibhtisate, na btihyo 'rtlla!!, jat;lasya praktiStiyogtit. yathoktam - svtiktirajl1tinajanakti drsyti nendriyagocarti!:z iii.

ON DIGNAGA'S THEORY OF THE OBJECT OF COGNITION 237

the external object, insofar as being independent of cognition since it is insentient, cannot be perceived directly.

IV-3. The Sautrantika defines this akiira as "a specific way (prakara) in which all minds and mind-associates grasp the object-support."87 It is also mentioned that the mind and mind-associates are accompa­nied by an object-support (stilambana) , because they grasp their object-field; and they have an aspect (sakara) of the object, because precisely this object-support gives its aspect to the mind and mind­associates in this specific way (prakara).88 Put in other words, the mind and mind-associates never come forth without an object-sup­port, and the object-support appears in the mind and mind-associates only in a special way, i.e., through an aspect that presents the particular character of the object-support. This idea is explained in the AKV as follows:

The reason why these [mind and mind-associates] are accompanied by an object-support is that precisely this object-support is grasped in a specific way. How? For an awareness is aware of a blue or yellow thing, it perceives it [in this way] - this is the meaning; a sensation experiences precisely this thing as its object-support as such [i.e., as blue or yellow]; the ideation deter­mines [this thing in that way], and the intention (cetana) forms [a volition about this thing in that way], and other [cognitions] work the same way.89

That is to say, without this "aspect" the object-support cannot be perceived in its specific way; the distinct visible form of an object is made known only by virtue of this "aspect," because an object itself in its real form, i.e., in the form of atoms, as the real cause of a cognition, does not present a distinct form. Thus, this "aspect," though reflecting a thing that is not really existent, not the real cause

87 Cf. AKBh 401,20-21: eva'!l tu yukta'!l syiit -sarveeiilJ1 cittacaittiiniim iilal1lbanagra­ha(wprakiira iikiira itL Yasomitra idendifies this as Sautrantika opinion (AKV 830, 32: eva1J1 tu yuktaJ!l syiid iti sautriintikal1latam. Cf. Kritzer 2005: 374.

88 Cf. AKBh 62,5-6: ta eva hi cittacaittiii2... siilambanii vieayagrahaTJiit. siikiiriis tasyaiviilal1lbanasya prakiirasa iikiira(liit.

89 AKV 165,17-21: yena te salambaniilJ tasyaiviilambanasya praktireTJa grahaTJiit. kathal1l. vijiiiina,!l hi nfia,!l pfta1J1 vii vastu vijiiniiti, upalabhata ity arthab. tad eva tathii­lal1lbana,!l vastu vedaniinubhavati. safijiiii paricchinatti. cetaniibhisaJ?lSkarotfty evam iidi.

238 JUNITECHU

of cognition, is the only indispensable link betw~en the object and subject.

IV-4. When discussing, in PS(V) 1.8cd ff., the identity of the means of cognition with its result, Dignaga asserts that self-awareness is the result. In doing so, he very clearly presents his Y ogacara position with regard to the problem of the object of cognition. Although he bases his idea evidently on Y ogacara concepts, he tries to make the Sautrantika's position fit his Y ogacara understanding of the object of cognition.90 A complete translation of this section is found in Hattori 1968: 28ff. In the following, I will briefly paraphrase those points of this section that concern our topic, and introduce some relevant interpretations of Jinendrabuddhi. In some places I deviate from Hat­tori.

IV-5. In PS(V) 1.8cd-9a Dignaga states that his position is different from that of those who maintain that an object of cognition exists externally, since for him the means of cognition is the result. And this result, i.e., the cognition, is apprehended as accompanied by an act of cognizing, for it arises with the aspect of an object-field (vi~a­yiikiira) , and thus, although without action, it is metaphorically called a means of cognition. 91 Or more precisely, Dignaga rephrases,

90 Cf. Iwata 1991 I: 1-4, where the different doctrinal backgrounds of Sautrantika and Y ogacara of each statement in PS 1.8ab-9cd are analysed.

91 As Tosaki pointed out (1979: 44), this Sautrantika idea has its origin in Vasuban­dhu's AKBh 473,25-474.2: yat tarhi vijlliina1J1 vijiiniitfti siitra uktam, kilT! tatra vijHiinaIJ! karoti. na kiHeit karoti. yathii tu kiiryaIJ! kiiral}am anuvidhfyata ity ucyate siidrsyeniitma­liibhiid akurvad api kiileit, eva1J1 vijHiinam api vijiiniitfty ucyate siidrsyeniitmaliibhiid akur­vad api kil1cit. ki/?l punar asya siidrsyam. tadiikiiratii. ata eva tad indriyiid apy utpannaIJl vieaya/?l vijiiniitfty ucyate nendriyam. "Then, as to what is said in the Sutra that awareness is aware [of an object], what does awareness do in that case? It does nothing. However, just as it is said that an effect always conforms to the cause, on account of it acquiring its existence by being similar [to the cause], although it does nothing whatsoever, in the same way, it is also said that an awareness is aware [of an object] owing to the fact that it ac­quires its existence [from the object] by being similar [to it], although [the awareness] does nothing whatsoever. Now, what is its similarity? It is the fact that it has the aspect of that [object]. Precisely for this reason, although it is also produced by the sense faculties, it is said that [the awareness] is aware of the object and not of the sense faculties." (Cf. the translations in Cox 1988: 39 and in Dhammajoti 2004: 90f.)

ON DIGNAGA'S THEORY OF THE OBJECT OF COGNITION 239

self-awareness is the result. Cognition arises with two appearances: the appearance of the cognition itself and the appearance of the object-field. A self-awareness of these two appearances is the result.92 Jinendrabuddhi adds here: "Regardless of whether there is an external object or not, the cognition is cognized as bearing both

,,93 appearances.

IV -6. In the next passage Dignaga offers two interpretations that are based on the Yogacara system and the Sautrantika system, respec­tively. He explains in PS 1.9b that the reason for an awareness being the result is that a determination of an object-reference, i.e., the cognition of an object-reference, has the nature of that awareness (tadriipa).94 This can be interpreted in two different ways. First, according to the Yogacara-system, which does not accept external objects, a cognition that is accompanied by [the aspect] of its object­field (savi~aya/?1.jfi.iinam) is the object-reference, and thus the object­reference is apprehended as being pleasant or unpleasant according to the form of self-awareness (svasaf!1.vedaniinuriipam artham).95 And secondly, according to the Sautrantika-system, a system origi­nating in the Sarvastivada, which accepts external objects, the exter­nal object-reference is a cognizable object, and thus the cognition's simply possessing the appearance of the object-field (vi~ayiibhii­

sataiva) is the means of cognition. 96 Dignaga emphasizes that although an object-reference as the proper form of cognition (sva-

92 PS(V) 1.Se-9a: atra ca savyiipiirapratltatviit pramii1}aTfl phalam eva sat. (Sed) na hy atra Mhyakiiniim iva pramiipiid arthiintaraTfl phalam. tasyaiva tu phalabhatasya jiiiinasya vi'fayiikiiratayii utpattyii savyiipiirapratlti/:l. tam upiidiiya pramiipatvam upacaryate nir­vyiipiiram api sat. svasaTflvitti1;t phalaTfl viitra (9a) dvyiibhiisaJ?l hi jiiiinam utpadyate svii­bhiisaTfl vi'fayiibhiisaTfl ca. tasyobhayiibhiisasya yat svasa'!lvedana'!l tat phalam.

93 PST 69,13-14: saty asati vii Milye 'rtha ubhayiibhiisaTfljiiiina'll saTflvedyate.

94 PS 1.9b: tadrapo hy arthaniicaya/:l /

95 Cf. PSV ad PS 1.9b: yadii hi savi'fayaTfljfiiinam artha/:l, tadii svasaTflvedaniinurapam. artha'll pratipadyata i'ftam ani'fta'll vii.

96 Cf. PScY) 1.ge-d1: yadii tu Mhya eViirtha/:l prameya/:l, tadii vi'fayiibhiisataiviisya pramii1}Qm.

240 JUNJIECHU

n7pam)97 is the self-cognizable within the cognition, nevertheless under the Sautrantika's ontological presupposition mentioned above, that the object-referem::e exists externally, this point is disregarded in order to avoid a doctrinal conflict with the Sautrantika-system; thus, by seeking common ground by putting aside differences, both systems may agree on the point that the object-reference is cognized simply through the cognition's possessing the appearance of the object.98 With regard to this point, linendrabuddhi states:

Even though at any time [the object-reference as] the proper form [of cognition] is the self-cognizable [of the cognition], nevertheless, irrespec­tive of this [nature, we say that] only the cognition's bearing the appear­ance of its object-field in respect to the external cognizable is the means of cognition, not its bearing the appearance of [the cognition] itself, because this [bearing the appearance of itself] is unacceptable as producing [the cognition] (sc1dhanatva) with respect to an external object, and it is unaccept­able because it takes another thing [i.e. the internal aspect] as its object. For insofar as the aspect of the grasping subject takes itself to be the object-field, how could it be the means of cognition with respect to the external thing? Indeed it is not possible to be means of cognition (prc1/nc1lJya) for one thing with the object-field in another thing. 99

Thus, it is quite clear that under the Sautrantika's ontological pre­supposition it must be said that a cognition bears the aspect of an external object, not the internal aspect of the cognition. Dignaga's purpose of stating this, I believe, is to show that even under the Sautrantika's presupposition, it is still valid to say that a cognition cognizes its object by means of an aspect and not directly.

97 This "proper form of cognition" is regarded as "the grasped part of cognition," for instance, Vinltadeva paraphrases the phrace vijifiinasvariipe in TrBh 16,8 as mam pa shes pa'i gzung ba'i cha (TrT 7bl). Cf. n. 17 andjfiiinasviil!lsa in n. 83.

98 Cf. PSV ad PS 1.9c-d1: tadii hi jfiiinasvasal!lvedyam api svanlpam anapek~yiirthii­bhiisataiviisya pramiir.zam.

99 PST 72,6--9: yady api sarvakiilal!l svasar[lvedyam asti svariipam, tathiipi tad ana­pek~ya jiiiinasya bahye prameye vi~ayiibhiisataiva pramiir.zam, na sviibhasatii, biihye 'rthe tasyall siidhanatviiyo giit. ayo gas tv apariirthatviit. griihakiikiiro hy atmavi"ayaJ:t kathal!l biihye 'rthe pramiir.zal'!! syiit. na hy anyavi~ayasyiinyatra priimaflyal!l yuktam.

ON DIGNA.GA'S THEORY OF THE OBJECT OF COGNITION 241

IV-7. Dignaga continues: "the object-field is cognized as this or that form, exactly according to the way in which the aspect of the object (arthiikara) appears in the cognition, as being pleasant or unpleasant, etc."lOO Jinendrabuddhi says straightforwardly that this sentence sim­ply means that "an external object is determined by means of the aspect of the cognizable of the cognition."lOl This "aspect" is, in the ultimate sense, self-awareness. Thus, according to Dignaga's inter­pretation, the Sautrantika's theory agrees with that of the Yogacara in any case. To this point Jinendrabuddhi states:

And in this case, just as it is said: "The fire is inferred from the smoke," but· this [fire] is not directly inferred from that [smoke], [but] rather from the cognition of the smoke that is caused by that [smoke], in the same way, even though it is said: "this object is cognized through that [i.e., through the cognition's possessing the appearance of the object]," yet it should be understood as being through self-awareness, which is brought about by that [appearance]. This is to say, exactly according to the way in which the aspect of object-reference (arthakara) takes its form (sannivisate)102 in the cognition in the form of pleasant or unpleasant, etc., the self-awareness comes forth (prathate); and exactly according to the way in which this [self­awareness] becomes known (khyiiti), the object is cognized as a pleasant or unpleasant thing, etc. For, if [the cognition possessing] this aspect be pro­duced, it must be the awareness of [the cognition] itself with such an [aspect], and thus on account of this [self-awareness] the object-field should be established, not otherwise. For this reason, possessing the appearance of the object-field is the means of cognition.103

100 PSV ad PS 1.9dz: yathti yathii hy arthtikiiro jiiiine pratibhtiti subhtisubhtiditvena, tat­tadntpab sa vi~ayab pramfyate.

101 PST n,11:jl1iinasyajfieyiikiiravasena biihyo 'rtho nisefyata ity arthab.

102 The word sannivisate is used to paraphrase the word pratibhtiti that is used in the PSV.

103 PST 72,11-73,2: atra ea yathii dhiimeniignir anumfyata ity ueyate, na ciisau siik~iit teniinumfyate, ki/?l tarhi taddhetukena dlulmajfiiinena, tathii yady api - so 'rthas tena mf­yata ity ucyate, tathiipi tatsiidhanayii svasa1JLVideti veditavyam. tathti hi yatha yathartha­karo jiiane sannivisate subhasubhadinlpe(la, tathii tatha. svasa1Jlvittily prathate. yathti yathti ca sii khyiiti, tathii tathtirtho nise/yate subhtisubhtidiriipadily. yadi hi tadiikiiram utpanna1Jl syiit, tadii tiidrsasyiitmanab sa1!lvittib syiit. talas ea tadvasiid vi~ayaniScayo bhavet, niinyathti. tasmiid vi~ayabhasata prama1}am.

242 JUNJIECHU

That is to say, the object-field of this or that form,(rilpa) is cognized according to the aspect (aMra) that the cognition possess when it arises, and this results in a self-awareness; it is precisely through this self-awareness that the object is cognized, not through the object­field itself, Thus, this position of the Sautrantika does not contradict that of the Y ogacara.

IV-S. On the above-mentioned twofold interpretation of the cogniza-ble, Iinendrabuddhi comments: .

In this regard, in the tenet of the internal cognizable (antarjfieyapak~a), accompanied with its object-field [means accompanied] by an object-field that is characterized as the grasped part [of the cognition], because only in respect to this [grasped part] is the object-field established; in the tenet of external object-reference (bahyarthapak~a), however, [it means accompa­nied] by the external [object-field]. Since in [our system of] representation­only, [i.e., in the system of Antarjfieyavada,] nothing exists that is separate from awareness, it is exclusively the cognition that determines the object­reference to be pleasant when it experiences its own aspect as pleasant. From the opposite [experience, i.e. one that is unpleasant, the object is determined as being] the converse [i.e., unpleasant].104

Thus, the cognitive aspect is a necessary medium for cognizing an object, and only through this aspect can the cognition be produced. Iinenedrabudhi continues:

In this case, only the aspect of something blue, etc., alone is experienced. This [aspect] must be necessarily accepted as the cognition itself (vijfia­nasyatmabhata), otherwise this [cognition] would have no connection with the object-reference. And a thing (vastu) external to or separated from this [cognition], no matter whether with the aspect of this [thing] or without the aspect of this [thing], is never perceived, nor is it possible to be the object­support. How is this impossible? In [the section] "examination of the Vada­vidhi" [i.e., PS(V) 1.13-16] it is explained in which sense it is impossible.105

104 PST 70,6-10: tatrantarjFieyapakse grahyarrzsalak:ralJena vi:rayeIJa savi~ayam, tatrai­va vi:rayavyavasthanat. bahyarthapakse tll bahyena. tatra vijiiaptimatratayam vijFianavyati­riktasya vastuno ' bhiivad buddhir eva yadeerarrz svam aka ram anllbhavati, tade:rram artharrz niscinoti, viparyayad viparftam.

105 PST 68,4-7: iha nfladyakara eka evanubhiiyate. sa vijFianasyatmabhiito 'vasyam abhyupeya~. anyathii tasyarthena sambandho na syat. na ca tasmat tadakaram atadakararrz

ON DIGNA.GA'S THEORY OF THE OBJECT OF COGNITION 243

Therefore, according to Jinendrabuddhi, Dignaga's thought in this regard is consi~tent: Only the internal cognizable, the so-called "as­pect," is the object of cognition, not the external object, because this is not perceived.

IV-9. Jinendrabuddhi's following remark gives the gist of Dignaga's thought in this regard:

Therefore, no cognition (saY[Lvitti) of something other than awareness (vijiiii­na) is possible. Rather, only a self-apprehended awareness arises. Thus, only self-awareness is the result. There may be an external object-reference; even so, the object-field is determined exclusively according to [self-] awarenes s. Therefore, it is only possible for this [self-awareness] to be the result. For it is not the case that the object-reference is experienced according to its inde­pendent existence (svabhava), so that according to this [experience] the distinct proper-form [of this object-reference] could be determined, because otherwise the undesired consequence would follow that all [different] cogni­tions would have the same form. However, the subjective representations (viji'iapti) are of many [different] forms. For instance, it is observed that with respect to a single thing alone, different cognizers acquire their awarenesses with [different] aspects, according to [their mind] being sharp or slow. But a single thing does not have many [different] aspects, because otherwise it must follow that it would not be a single thing. 106

Therefore, in Dignaga's system, regardless of whether the external object exists or not, that which is cognized is the aspect of self­awareness which is the SUbjective product: either the aspect of the cognition itself as the grasped part of cognition according to Y oga­cara, or the aspect of the external object according to Sautrantika. It is never the external object itself. To this point Jinendrabuddhi states quite decisively:

va bahir vyatiriktal[! vastapalabhyate. na ciilambanafJ! ghatate. kathal[! ca na ghatate. yatha ca na ghatate, tatM vadavidhiparfksayam vak~yati.

106 PST 68,11-69,3: tasmad na vijiianavyatiriktasya kasyacit sal[!vitt* sambhavati. vi­jfianam eva tu svasaJ'[!viditam utpadyata iti svasal[!vittir eva phalam. bhavatu nama bahyarthaJ:t, tatMpi yatMsafJ!vedanam eva vi~ayo niscfyata iti tad eva phalal[! yuktam. na hi yathasvabhavam anubhavo 'rthasya, yato yathasau vyavasthitasvarfipas tatha sakyeta niicetum, sarvajiiananam ekakaraprasGligat. anekakaras tu vijfiaptayaJ:t. tatha hy ekasminn eva vastuni pratipattrbhedena patumandatadibhir akarair anugatani vijiianany upalabh­yante. na caikal[! vastv anekakaram, anekatvaprasGligat.

244 JUNITECHU

First, when [the cognition] is free from conceptual construction, the aspect of grasping is the means of cognition, [namely] perception which is free from conceptual construction; the particular, as the aspect of the grasped object with a clear appearance, is the object of cognition. I07

V. Conclusion

V-I. We have mentioned above that Dignaga's theory was falsely interpreted by his opponents as coming from a realistic standpoint, and thus that it contained an internal contradiction. However, as we have discussed, if we understand Dignaga as maintaining that the object is a mental product, an internal aspect of object that appears as externally existent, this problem will disappear. For Dignaga, an object in any combined form of many atoms is not real. Thus he refutes both the Sautrantika-theory and the Sarvastivada-theory. For him, the cognition sphere (iiyatana) is unreal in any case, as it also is for the Sautrantika, as reported by Sangabhadra. Thus, although the cognition sphere may be analyzed as an agglomerate of atoms as a whole, or as the gathered individual atoms, this is not important for him. From the Y ogacara viewpoint, it is not necessary to make a distinction between the two. For in any case it is clear for him that external existents cannot be the cause of our cognition, since as atoms the cognition cannot bear their appearance, and as an agglom­erate of atoms they cannot be real existent, i.e., the real cause. There­fore, the only possible conclusion is that the object of cognition is the internal cognizable, is the grasped part of cognition, is the self­cognizable, and any cognition is self-awareness in nature. He also says that cognition arising with respect to self-awareness is percep­tion; with respect to an object itself, namely outside this self-aware­ness, it is conceptual construction. !Os Thus, every true cognition can only be self-awareness in its true sense. Therefore, for Dignaga, the svalak:far:ta cannot be an independent external thing, for in that case it would either be unreal or something of which a cognition cannot

107 PST 74,11-12: nirvikalpe liivat griihakiikiira(z kalpaniipoljhaqz pratyak~a,!, pramii­r:zam, spa~rapratibhiiso griihyiikiira(z svalak~a!1al!Z prameyam .. ,

108 Cf. n. 77.

ON DIGNA.GA'S THEORY OF THE OBJECT OF COGNITION 245

have an appearance; only as a cognition sphere of cognition, as self­cognizable, or. as internally cognizable, can it be a real cause of cognition. In this way, Dignaga's theory of object of cognition pre­sented in PS(V) 1 is consistent.

V-2. Dharmaklrti explains svalako!ana along other lines. He explic­itly states that the object of a perceptioI:l is capable of fulfilling a pur­pose (arthakriyii), but an object of inference is not. And the particu­lar and the universal are different: one is capable of fulfilling a pur­pose and is real in the ultimate sense, the other is real only in a conventional sense. 109 This description of svalaksalJa is, at least prima jacie, based on something external. Thus DharmakIrti is a realist in this regard, although in other parts of PV 3 he presents other views. As expressed by Dunne, Dharmaklrti presents different "scales of analysis," which in some cases represent the viewpoint of the "epistemic idealist."llo This is not the case in Dignaga's work, since for him, as an Antarjiieyavadin, an ultimately real existence, being an existent outside mind, is non-perceivable, since a cognition can not bear its appearance. What can be perceived is only an appearance or an image, it does not exist in its real form, i.e., in the

. form of atoms. Dignaga expresses his skepticism about external real­ity being perceivable; the idea of fulfilling a purpose is unknown to him. The difference between DharmakIrti and Dignaga is clear: DharmakIrti believes that there is a cognition of certainty based upon an external real existence that can independently fulfill a human being's purpose, and searches for the rules of its cognition. Dignaga is skeptical in this regard. Thus the words such as "non-erroneous"

lO9 Cf. PV 3.1a-c: miinalJ'l dvividhalJ'l meyadvaividhyat saktyasaktita~ I arthakriyiiyii'11; PV 3.3 arthakriyiisamarthaJ'(l yat tad atra paramiirthasat I anyat saJ?lvrtisat proktaJ?l te sva­samanyalak~a(1e II. And in PVSV 84,3-11: sa piiramiirthiko bhiivo ya eva arthakriyiik~a­ma~ I (l66ab) idam eva hi vastvavastunor la~wzalJ'l yad arthakriyayogyata ayogyata ca iti vak~yama!l I sa ca arthakriyayogyo artha!l niinveti yo anveti na tasmiit kiiryasambhava~ II (166cd) tasmat sarvaJ'(l samanyam anarthakriyiiyogyatvad avastu I vastu tu viseea eva tata eva tanniepatte!l I (Cf. English trans!. in Dunne 2004: 80f. n.4l.)

IlO Cf. Dunne 2004: 53ff, 59.

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(abhriinta), "fulfilling a purpose," "trustworthiness" (avisaf!lviida),111 etc., can only be found in Dharmaldrti's vocabulary. Dignaga tells us what is not a real object, whereas Dharmakirti tells us what real cog­nition is. ll2 Because of this difference, Dharmaldrti develops his own complete theory of perception. In the PVin and later in the NB, he adds the new element "non-erroneous" to the definition of percep­tion.ll3

V-3. As for the problem of Dignaga's doctrinal affiliation, I would not like to give decisive conclusion, because the distinction between the Sautrantika and Yogacara as two different schools 114 is an unsolved problem, at least for me.

m the case of Vasubandhu, by whom Dignaga was undoubtedly strongly influenced, more and more evidence has come to light showing that many "Sautrantika" theories found in Vasubandhu's AKBh are similar to those advocated in the Y ogacarabhumi. Some scholars maintain that the former have their origin in the latter, and thus, Vasubandhu was already a Mahiiyanist Yogacara when he com­posed the AKBh, not changing his doctrinal affiliation from Hina­yana to Mahayana. liS However, in a recently published paper

111 The word avisafJ,viida was used by Dignaga, but in another context, cf. Chu 2004: 115, n. 12.

112 This characteristic of Dignaga' s thought is also presented in his theory of inference. Hayes has correctly pointed out: "[L]ogic for Dinnaga is not intended to serve as a means of adding to our knowledge but rather as a means of subtracting from our opinions. The criteria of inferential certainty that Diimaga puts forward are very strict, so strict that very few of our opinions can measure up to them. Whereas Dharmaldrti tended to see this strictness as a weakness in Diimaga 's logic, since it was in Diimaga's system virtually impossible to arrive at any sort of reasonable inductive certainty, I shall argue that the strictness of Diimaga's criteria was not oversight on this part but was quite deliberate, for it served his overall skepticism quite well." (Hayes 1988: 35)

ll3 Cf. PVin 1.4ab: pratyakeal!l kalpaniipoifham abhriintam; NB 1.4: tatra pratyakeal]' kalpaniipodham abhriintam.

114 Cf. the discussion on the use ofthe word "school" in Franco 1997: 90-92.

115 Cf. Kritzer 1999: 20, 204; 2005: xxvii. Since the 1980s, a number of Japanese scholars have been involved in studies on Sautrantika and have re-examined the information on the history of Sautrantika contained in Chinese materials. The most important results can be found in Kati5 1989; cf. also Kritzer 2003, especially, 218f.

ON DIGNA.GA'S THEORY OF THE OBJECT OF COGNITION 247

Ohammajoti maintains that "the early Dar~tantika-s and (Sarvasti­vadin) Y ogacara-s all belong to the same Sarvastivada tradition originally."Jl6 And based on the assumption of this historical back­ground he says:

Of course, being within the same milieu, the Dar~tantika-Sautantika and Mahayanic Yogacara - particularly those who are praxis-oriented - must have been mutually influenced doctrinally. Accordingly, it should not be surprising to find doctrinal parallels between what Vasubandhu identifies as Sautrantika doctrine in AKB on the one hand, and some of the doctrines in the Yogacarabhami on the other hand. This does not necessarily imply that Vasubandhu bases his Sautrantika doctrines on the Yogacarabhami. 117

Actually, half a century ago Yin shun has already pointed out that in the sectarian period of Buddhism there was no theory of awareness­only in the ontological sense, however the theory of awareness-only without external object in the epistemological sense was already well-developedYs Thus, it may be safe to say that some Yogacara theories, especially those in the field of epistemology, are much ear­lier than the Yogacara that is generally regarded as a Mahayanic "school." The persons who hold special Yogacara theories may be called "Yogacara-Sautrantika" based on the differentiation between the Hmayana Sautrantika and the Mahayanist Sautrantika made in the Uighur version of the Tattviirtha,119 or "Yogacara with Sautran­tika presupposition" in following Schmithausen's influential paper "Sautrantika-Voraussetzungen in ViIpsatika und TriIpsika. ,,120 Based on my studies in this paper, I tend to assume that Dignaga's theory of the object of cognition also belongs to this kind of Yogacara theo­ries. However, since the nature of these special Yogacara theories -whether they are Mahayanic or remain IDnayanic - has not yet been

116 Dhammajoti 2006: 195

1I7 Dhammajoti 2006: 195-196.

118 Yin shun 1970: 200.

119 Cf. Dhammajoti 2006: 199.

120 Cf. Franco 1997: 94; Schmithausen: 1967. I do not suggest that the difference be­tween this special group of Yogiiciiras and the rest of Yogiiciiras is the basis of the division of Yogiiciira system into lung gi rjes 'brang and rigs pa'i rjes 'brang in the later Tibetan grub mtha' texts.

248 JUNJIECHU

clarified, it seems to me too early to make decision with regard to Dignaga's doctrinal affiliation. Thus, in this paper, I would like to let it remain open. Actually, for me to label him as Yogacara or a Sautrantika is less important than to understand what his statements about the object of cognition really mean. In any case, one point is clear: Dignaga treats the object of cognition as something inside cognition, and regards its appearance as external thing as unreal. This point is clearly close to the Mahayanic Y ogacara system, however it is apparently also shared by the Hlnayanic Sautrantika to a certain extent. Thus, we are not in the position to label Dignaga simply as Yogacara or Sautrantika, rather, it seems to me proper to refer him as a "theoretician of an internal object of cognition" (antarjiieyaviidin), as Iinendrabuddhi did. 121

Abbreviations and literature

1. Primary literature

AD Abhidharmadfpa: Abhidharmadfpa with Vibhii:;iiprabhiivrtti. Ed. by P. S. Iaini, Patna 1959.

AKBh

AKV

ASP

AP APv CWSL

CWSLSI

121 Cf. n. 46.

Abhidharmakosabhii:;ya: Abhidharmakosabha:;yam of Vasu­bandhu. Ed. by P. Pradhan, Patna 1975.

Abhidharmakosavyakhya: The Abhidharmakosa & Bha:;ya of Acarya Vasubandhu with Sphutarthii Commentary of Acarya Yasomittrii. Vol. I-IT. Ed. by S. D. SastrY, Varanasi 1998.

*Abhidharmasamayapradfpika = jliiJmi¥~~*j*1lffii, T 1563 (vol. 29T29).

Alambanaparfk:;a: in Frauwallner 1930: 176-179.

Alambanaparfk:;iivrtti: in Frauwallner 1930: 176-179.

Cheng wei shi lun [pX;Illiill\i~ifj; = Vijiianamiitrasiddhi.§astra]: T 1585 (vol. 31).

Cheng wei shi lun suji [pX;Uliill\i~ifj;Jz!):jj[,]: T 1830 (vol. 43).

HVP

MS

MVBh

NA

NC

NB

NMukh

PST

PS(V) 1

PV

PVP

PVin

PVV

ON DIGNA.GA'S THEORY OF THE OBJECT OF COGN1TION 249

Hastaviilaprakara1J.a: in Frauwallner 1959: 153-156.

Mahiiyiinasmigraha: in E. Lamotte: La Somme du Grand Vehicule d'Asmiga, Tome I, Versions tibetaine et chinoise (Hiuan-tsang), Louvain 1973.

Mahiivibhii~iisiistra = A pi da mo da pi po sha lun [~iiJm:@€!l'*m ~rYmili], T 1545 (vol. 27).

*Nyiiyiinusiira = A pi da mo shun zheng li lun [~iiJ m:@€!l'JIIJlJEJ:!~ilii ] T 1562 (vol.29).

Nayacakra: Dviidasiiral?l Nayacakral?l of A.ciiraya Srf Mallaviidi K~amiiSrama1J.a with the Commentary Nyiiyiigamiinusiiri1J.f of Srf Sif!1hasLlri Ga1J.i Viidi K~amiiSrama1J.a. 3 vols. Ed. by Muni JamMvijayajI, Bhavnagar 1966.

Nyiiyabindu: in Pa1J.r!ita Durveka Misra's Dharmottarapradfpa. [Being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara's Nyayabindup1ca, a commentary on Dharmakirti's Nyayabindu]. Ed. by D. Malvania. Patna 21971.

Nyiiyamukha = Yin-ming zheng li men lun [IEJIlJlJEJ:!r~~ilii]: T 1629 (vol. 32), and in Katsura 1982.

linendrabuddhi's Visiiliimalavatf Pramii1J.asamuccayatfkii, Chap­ter 1, Pari I: Critical Edition. Ed. E. Steinkellner et aI., Beijing -Vienna 2005.

Pramii1J.asamuccayatfkii (Tibetan translation) = Yangs ba dang dri ma med pa dang ldan pa zhes bya ba tshad ma kun las btus pa'i 'grel bshad, Derge ed., Tshad rna, vol. 20, no. 4268, Ye 1b1-314a7.

Pramii1J.asamuccaya( vrtti): Digniiga ' s Pramii(wsamuccaya, Chapter 1, A Hypothetical Reconstruction of the Sanskrit Text with the Help of the Two Tibetan Translations on the Basis of the Hitherto Known Sanskrit Fragments and the Linguistic Materials Gainedfrom linendrabuddhi's Tlkii. Ed. Ernst Steinkellner, pub­lished at: http://www.oeaw.ac.at/ias!Mat/dignaga_PS_1.pdf.

Pramii(wviirttika: in PVV.

Pramii1J.aviirttikapafijikii (Devendrabuddhi) = Tshad ma mam 'grel gyi dka' 'grel, TP vol. 130, 5717(b), Che, 1-390a8.

Pramii1J.aviniscaya: Dharmakfrti's Pramii1J.aviniscaya, Chapter 1 and 2. Ed. E. Steinkellner, Beijing - Vienna 2007.

Pramii1J.aviirttikavrtti: R. SaiJlqtyayana (ed.), Dharmakfrti's Pra-

250 JUNJIECHU

mii~aviirttika, with a commentary by Manorathanandin. Patna 1938-1940.

T Taish8 Shinsha Daizokyo [klEtfr{IIf*it~£]. Ed. Takakusu Jun-JITO (il1li iffl JI~ IX Jl!~) and Watanabe Kaikyoku Uli' jl ~:fIg), Tokyo: TaishO Issakikyo Kankokai 1924-1932.

TP The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition - Kept in the Library of the Otani University, Kyoto. Ed. by Daisetz T. Suzuki, Tokyo­Kyoto 1957.

TBh Tarkabhii-?ii: in H.R. Rangaswami Iyengar (ed.), Tarkabhii-?ii and Viidasthiina of Mok-?iikaragupta and Jitiiripiida. Mysore 1952.

TrBh Tril]1sikiivijiiaptibhii-?ya: in S. Levi, Vijiiaptimiitratiisiddhi, deux traits de Vasubandhu. Vil]1satikii (la vingtaine) accompagnee d'une explication en prose et Tril]1sikii (la trentaine) avec Ie eom­mentaire de Sthiramati, original sanscrit publie pour la premiere fois d'apres des manuserits rapportes du Nepal. Fe Partie: Texte. Paris 1925.

TrT

Vibhii

V.s

V.sT

VST

Tril]1sikiitfkii = Sum eu pa'i 'grel bshad, TP 5571 (vol. 114), Ku, lal-69a5.

Vibhilticandra's marginal notes: cf. PVV.

Vil]1satikii Vijiiaptimiitratiisiddhi: see TrBh.

Tibetan translation of V.s = Nyi shu pa'i 'grel pa: in TP 5558 (voL 113), Si, 4bl-11al.

Chinese translation of V.s = Wei shi er shi lun: in T 1590 (vol. 31).

Prakara~a-Vil]1satikatfkii = Rab tu byed pa nyi shu pa'i 'grel bshad, TP 5566 (vol. 113), Si, 201b81-232a8.

II. Secondary literature

Chu 2004

Cox 1988

J. Chu, "A Study of Sataimira in Dignaga's Definition of Pseudo-Perception (PS 1.7cd-8ab)," in Wiener Zeitsehrijt fUr die Kunde Sudasiens 47 (2004) 113-149.

C. Cox, "On the Possibility of a Nonexistent Object of Consciousness: Sarvastivadin and Dar~tantika Theories," in Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 11/1 (1988) 31-87.

ON DIGNAGA'S THEORY OF THE OBJECT OF COGNITION 251

Cox 1995 C. Cox, Disputed Dharmas: Early Buddhist Theories on Existence. Tokyo 1995.

Dhammajoti 2004 Bhikkhu KL. Dhammajoti, Abhidhamw Doctrine and Controversy on Perception. Dehiwala 2004.

Dhammajoti 2004a Bhikkhu KL. Dhammajoti, Sarvastivada Abhidharma. Centre for Buddhist Studies, Sri Lanka, 2004.

Dhammajoti 2006 Bhikkhu KL. Dhammajoti, "Sarvastivada, Dar~!antika, Sautrantika and Yogacara - Some Reflections on Their Interrelation," in Journal of the Centre for Buddhist Stud­ies Sri Lanka 4 (2006) 184-214.

Dreyfus 1997 G. Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality: Dharmakfrti's Philoso­phy and Its Tibetan Interpretations. Albany 1997.

Dunne 2004 J. D. Dunne, Foundations of Dharmaklrti's Philosophy. Boston 2004.

Frauwallner 1930 E. Frauwallner, "Dignagas AlambanaparIk~a. Text, Uber­setzung und Erlauterungen," in Wiener ZeitschriJt flir die Kunde des Morgendlandes 37 (1930) 174-179.

Frauwallner 1951 E. Frauwallner, On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu. Serie Orientale Roma 3. Roma 1951.

Frauwallner 1959 E. Frauwallner, "Dignaga, sein Werk und seine Entwick­lung," in Wiener ZeitschriJt flir die Kunde Siid- und Ost­asiens 3 (1959) 83-164.

Frauwallner 1994 E. Frauwallner, Die Philosophie des Buddhismus. 4th edi­tion, Berlin 1994.

Franco 1997 E. Franco, Dharmakfrti on Compassion and Rebirth. Wien 1997.

Harada 1993 W. Harada (W,S3fr:J*), ~Dignaga (J) HastavalaprakraIJa & Vrtti" - fr:J~ 2:: Skt. ~:7t;~(J)W:i\Jj. -j in n~:'§*"¢

1~~"¢.jjJf5-E*±P¥1U , 6 (1993) 92-110.

Hattori 1968 M. Hattori, Dignaga, On Perception, being the Pratyak:ja­pariccheda of Dignaga's PramaIJasamuccaya. Cam­bridge, Mass. 1968.

Hayes 1988 R. Hayes, Dignaga on the Interpretation of Signs. Dordrecht 1988.

Hirakawa 1973 A. Hirakawa, Index of the Abhidharmakosabha:jya, Part One, Sanskrit-Tibetan-Chinese. Tokyo 1973.

252

Iwata 1991

Kato 1973

Kato 1989

Katsura 1982

Kitagawa 1957

Kritzer 2003

Kritzer 1999

Kritzer 2005

La Vallee Poussin 1928

La Vallee Poussin 1971

Levi 1932

Mimaki 1972

Nagao 1991

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T. Iwata, Sahoplambhaniyama, Struktur und Entwicklung des Schlusses von der Tatsache, daj3 Erkenntnis und Ge­genstand ausschliej3lich zusammen wahrgenommen wer­den, auf deren Nichtverschiedenheit. Teil I-II. Stuttgart 1991.

J. Kato (jJQ,iji*,;:g~), ~1.ii*xO)fo~ c fOE - *tf~ C (f,Itf~O) tjWif{O):rJE::tj] -ll in ~lhu~~j['¥:*4i;*~~ll 1 (1973) 129-137.

J. Kato (jJQ,iji*,;:g~), ~{f,I:I;tf~O)1i7f~ll (Etude sur les Sautriintika). Tokyo 1989.

S. Katsura (1UiH~), ~lEll¥llE:@,P~~ifij1i7f~ll en.), in ~J1;.:~*#Jt#tf~tc.~ll 42 (1982) 84--100.

H. Kitagawa (::it! 11*.&Ij): "A Study of a Short Philosophi­cal Treatise Ascribed to Dignaga," in Sino-Indian Studies 5/3&4 (Liebenthal Festschrift), 1957, 126-137.

R. Kritzer, "General Introduction [to the issue of the International Association of Buddhist Studies entitled The Sautriintikas]," in Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, 26.2 (2003) 201-224.

R. Kritzer, Rebirth and Causation in the Yogiiciira Abhi­dharma. Wien 1999.

R. Kritzer, Vasubandhu and the YogiiciirabMimi, Yogii­ciira Elements in the Abhidharmakosabhii~ya. Tokyo 2005.

L. de La Vallee Poussin, La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang. Traduite et Annotee. Tome I-II. Paris 1928.

L. de La Vallee Poussin, L'Adhidharmakosa de Vasuban­dhu. 6 vols. 2nd edition, Brussels, 1971.

S. Levi, MateriaL/x pour l' etude du systeme Vijiiaptimiitra. Paris 1932.

K. Mimaki (iW!:9:R:c), n)JMIIl~~~iI=f;::liHt Q

Sautriintika IDl.ll , in U~:j]~ll 43 (1972) 77-92.

G. M. Nagao, Miidhyamika and Yogiiciira, A Study of MahiiyiinaPhilosophies, Selected Papers of C. M. Nagao. Edited, collated, and translated by L. S. Kawamura in collaboration with G. M. Nagao. New York 1991.

Schmithausen 1967 L. Schmithausen, "Sautrantika-Voraussetzungen in Virp.-

ON DIGNAGA'S THEORY OF THE OBJECT OF COGNITION 253

satikii und TriI1Isikii," in Wiener Zeitschrift flir die Kunde Siid- und Ostasiens 11 (1967) 109-136.

Schrrrithausen 1973 L. Schrnithausen, "Spirituelle Praxis und Philosophische Theorie im Buddhismus," in Zeitschrift fUr Missions­wissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft 57 (1973) 161-186.

Thomas & Vi 1918 E. W. Thomas and H. Vi, "'The Hand Treatise,' A Work . of Aryadeva," in The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and lrland, 1918,267-310.

Tosaki 1979 H. Tosaki (p~;eiE), W{b~~~rnHO)li7f~ - $~~ '(7' 7 7--;-· r'f 7 -}vT 1 tJ.!l O);m;'rnH - ..t. ' -r

!1fU . Tokyo 1979.

Vi 1958 K. Vi ('¥:t!={B~), WlljfOjB~{'FO).JiJf~~ . Tokyo 1956.

Yin shun 1970 Yin shun (I=P)IWi), WIlft~¥~tlU . Taipei 1970.

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies

Volume 29 • Number 2 • 2006 (2008) pp. 255–303

ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NON-MENTATION

(AMANASIKĀRA) DOCTRINE IN INDO–TIBETAN BUDDHISM*

DAVID HIGGINS

I. Introduction

The first widespread use of amanasikāra1 (‘non-mentation’) as a spe-cific description of Buddhahood occurs within the Indian Siddha movement, although the term is not unknown in the Pali canon.2 The

* I would like to take this opportunity to thank Dr. Tom Tillemans for his valuable comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper. I am also much indebted to the late Herbert Guenther with whom I had the opportunity to study and discuss many of the texts I have cited. The paper also benefited from dialogues with several participants of the 2006 Graduate Students Conference at Hsi Lai Temple, Los Angeles, where I presented a much abridged version of this paper. In particular, I would like to thank Elon Goldstein and Ching Keng, both of Harvard University. It would be remiss not to offer sincere thanks to the editors of JIABS, Helmut Krasser and Birgit Kellner, and the two reviewers for their close reading of the paper and many cogent suggestions and clarifications, espe-cially Klaus-Dieter Mathes who kindly made available his forthcoming paper on Maitrīpa’s Amanasikārādhāra during final revisions of this paper. 1 ‘Non-mentation’ and ‘non-egocentricity’ are two possible translations of amanasi-kāra (T. yid la mi byed pa), a technical term that is as rich in nuances as its counterpart manasikāra/manaskāra (T. yid la byed pa). In Abhidharma exegesis, manaskāra occurs as the last in a sequence of five omnipresent (Skt. sarvaga, Tib. kun tu ’gro ba) mental events (caitta) that are present, overtly or covertly, in all conscious processes. See, for example, Abhidharmasamuccaya p. 6. As the natural culmination of the third omnipresent mental event ‘intentionality’ (cetanā) which describes the general object-directedness of mind, manaskāra has the function of ‘bringing to mind’ or ‘setting one’s mind upon’ (focusing on) a particular object and remaining involved (conceptually and affectively) with it. When used as verbs, I have translated the terms accordingly. While ‘mentation’ and ‘non-mentation’ are generally adequate as translations of manasikāra and amanasikāra in their deployment as abstract nouns (and have been adopted throughout this paper for the sake of consistency), ‘ego-centricity’ and ‘non-egocentricity’ are more precise in contexts where the Sanskrit or Tibetan terms have been interpreted in line with the nuanced Cittamātra conception of manas as both an intentional (object-intending) and reflexive (‘I-intending’) operation that structures experience in terms of an ‘I’ (subject) and ‘mine’ (object). See below sections VIII and XII and notes 37 and 41. 2 In Majjhimanikāya (I 436) and Aṅguttaranikāya (IV 425), the amanasikāra of the

DAVID HIGGINS 256

term and its Apabhraṃśa variant amaṇasiāra are associated in particular with the mystical songs (dohā or vajragīti) of Saraha, the most famous of the early Siddhas,3 and a cycle of texts attributed to his commentator Maitrīpāda (aka Maitrīpa, b. 1007 or 1010)4 re-ferred to in Tibet as the Yid la mi byed paʼi chos skor or “The Cycle of Teachings on Non-mentation.”5 The term also appears in certain songs of Tilopa (988–1069),6 the Siddha from whom the Tibetan bKaʼ brgyud tradition claims descent. We find in the relevant pas-sages of these authors the seeds of an Indo-Tibetan hermeneutical tradition according to which amanasikāra is understood as a descrip-

concept of the multiple (nānattasaññā) is identified as the goal in the ākāsānañcāyatana. On later Mahāyāna sources, see note 37 below. 3 The dates of Saraha remain subject to controversy. The problem is compounded not only by textual references to more than one Saraha but by the numerous appellations used for the different Sarahas, such as Rahūlabhadra, Śabari, Sarojavajra, Saroruha, and Saroruhavajra (Shahidullah 1928: 29). Moreover, Tibetans refer to the Siddha Saraha by various names such as Sa ra ha, Sa ra ha chen po, Bram ze chen po, mDaʼ bsnun pa (= Sarahan, “one who has shot the arrow"), Ri khrod pa chen po Saraha. This Saraha seems to have lived sometime between the seventh and early eleventh centuries CE. See Kvaerne (1977) and Ruegg (1981) for an examination of the available research on possible dates. Rahūl Sāṃkṛtyāyan (1957: 1–39) establishes Saraha’s lineal successors as contemporaries of King Devapāla (810–850), and links him with the beginning of the renaissance of Bud-dhism during the Pāla Dynasty, particularly at Nālandā university, under the reign of King Dharmapāla (970–810). Shahidullah places Saraha at around 1000, a date supported by the tradition that Saraha conferred initiation on a king named Ratnapāla. This could refer to the Ratnapāla who reigned in Assam from 1000 to 1030. Support for this date is also found in a Tibetan tradition which makes Maitrīpa (eleventh century) a direct disciple of Saraha. See Guenther (1969: 13). In support of this thesis, Guenther mentioned in personal correspondence the existence of a Tibetan ʼBrug pa bKaʼ brgyud work he had seen in Ladakh that purports to be a record of a dialogue in the form of question and answer be-tween Maitrīpa and his master Saraha. 4 On Maitrīpāda (alias Advayavajra and Avadhūtipāda), see Deb ther sngon po, da, fol. 2af. (BA 841f.). See also Mathes (2006). 5 This cycle is listed in Bu ston’s gSan yig, fol. 58b1 and Padma dkar po’s gSan yig, fol. 33b2. Its history and general significance are dealt with in Padma dkar po’s Phyag chen gan mdzod, fol. 16a3. For a comparative listing of Bu ston’s and Padma dkar po’s versions supplemented with listings from the Advayavajrasaṅgraha and the Tohoku cata-logue to the bsTan ʼgyur, see Broido (1987), Appendix B, p. 55f. 6 On Tilopa (alias Tillopa, Tillipa, Tailopa, Telopa, and Taillikapada), see Hoffman (1956: 140–45) and Guenther (1963: xiv).

NON-MENTATION DOCTRINE IN INDO–TIBETAN BUDDHISM

257

tion of, and often also defended as a theory of, the highest experience of Buddhist Tantrism known as Mahāmudrā (phyag rgya chen po).

This paper will inquire into the shifting meanings of amanasikāra as it developed in various contexts of Buddhist discourse, Indian and Tibetan. Attention has recently been drawn to its occurrence in cer-tain polemical contexts surrounding the Sino-Indian controversy be-tween Instantaneist (cig car ba) and Gradualist (rim gyis pa) ap-proaches to the goal of awakening (byang chub) as they were repre-sented at the so-called bSam yas debate by the Chinese Chʼan master Hva shang Mahāyāna (Mo ho yen) and the Indian Buddhist monk Kamalaśīla (750–795) respectively.7 We will begin by sketching the genealogy of the term in these contexts, touching only briefly on those issues concerned with the debate which have been treated at length by others. Attention will then shift to the main focus of this paper: a preliminary survey of non-mentation teachings in the tradi-tion extending from Saraha and Maitrīpāda down through a long line of Tibetan bKa’ brgyud masters. While these teachings by their na-ture elude intellectual comprehension and resist easy classification, they have been too influential with Tibetan bKa’ brgyud traditions to simply leave aside. It is therefore hoped that this cursory overview will broaden our limited understanding of this important tradition and shed light on the still poorly understood complex of influences that inspired the non-gradual Mahāmudrā teachings of Tibet.

II. amanasikāra and bSam yas polemics

In the sBa bzhed,8 an early Tibetan chronicle (probably eighth cen-tury) on the bSam yas debate, amanasikāra is presented as repre-sentative of an instantaneist doctrine attributed to Hva shang advo-cating the suppression of all mental activity. Kamalaśīla criticizes a

7 See Demièville (1952), Ruegg (1989: 192f.), David Jackson (1994), Roger Jackson (1982), van der Kuijp (1984), Broido (1987), and Gomez (1987: 96f.). 8 A succinct account of the bSam yas debate according to the early sBa bzhed is given by Faber (1986). Relevant materials on the debate from the later (Zhabs btags ma) version are found in Houston (1980). On the probable history of the earlier and later versions, see Ruegg (1989: 67f.).

DAVID HIGGINS 258

similar doctrine (although the concepts used, such as āsaṃjñisam-āpatti are unmistakably Indian) in his first Bhāvanākrama without identifying its proponent (Hva shang is mentioned nowhere in his three Bhāvanākramas). The gist of his critique is that amanasikāra does not imply the suppression or cessation of mental activity but rather its progressive refinement through the gradual elimination of subjective distortions. The relevant passage from the Bhāvanākrama I9 reads:

When the Nirvikalpapraveśadhāraṇī (NPD) states that “non-mentation aban-dons characteristics (mtshan ma = nimitta) such as [material] ʻformʼ (gzugs = rūpa),” what it means is that there is no mentation directed toward things that are not perceived when analyzed though discerning insight but it does not [mean] a simple absence of mentation.

It is not an abandonment as in the conceptless absorptions (ʼdu shes med paʼi snyom par ʼjug pa = āsaṃjñisamāpatti) and so forth, [i.e. an abandonment] due to simply giving up mentation which has been attached to form and so forth since beginningless time.

Thus, Kamalaśīla singles out mistaking amanasikāra for the absolute non-existence of manasikāra10 as the major misinterpretation of this concept, a point he further clarifies in his Nirvikalpapraveśadhāraṇī-ṭīkā.11 But this non-existence insofar as it is no thing whatsoever (dngos po med pa), cannot serve as a cause of anything and thus leaves no possibility of genuine conceptual analysis (yang dag par so sor rtog pa = bhūtapratyavekṣā). And without such analysis, Kama-laśīla argues, it is impossible not to mentally engage (yid la mi byed

9 Tucci (1958) 261. In the following passage, I have standardized Tucci’s translitera-tion: rnam par mi rtog pa la ’jug pa’i gzungs las yid la mi byed pas gzugs la sogs pa’i mtshan ma spong ngo zhes gsungs pa gang yin pa de yang shes rab kyis brtags na mi dmigs pa gang yin pa de der la yid la mi byed par dgongs kyis / yid la byed pa med pa tsam ni ma yin te / ’du shes med pa’i snyoms par ’jug pa la sogs pa ltar / thog ma med pa’i dus nas gzugs la sogs pa la mngon par zhen pa’i yid la byed pa spangs pa tsam gyis spong ba ni ma yin no // 10 In Sanskrit, the negative prefix a- may be taken either as an absolute, non-affirming negation or as a relative, affirming negation whereas in Tibetan, these are generally, though not always, distinguished by the use of med for the former and min or ma yin for the latter. 11 P v. 105 118.5.7f.

NON-MENTATION DOCTRINE IN INDO–TIBETAN BUDDHISM

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pa) in the characteristics of material forms and the other groupings (skandhas) present to cognition. Thus there is no amanasikāra apart from this manasikāra (yid la byed pa de las gzhan yid la mi byed pa yang ma yin) taken in the sense of “genuine conceptual analysis.” Kamalaśīla goes on to show that what is intended by amanasikāra is none other than this genuine analysis, the former being the result (phala) of the latter’s operation as a counter-agent (pratipakṣa) to ordinary mentation (manasikāra). Conceptual meditation, in other words, is a necessary condition for non-conceptual realization:12

The characteristics of genuine conceptual analysis are what is intended in [using the term] “non-mentation.” While it is of the essence of divisive conceptualizing, it is nonetheless burned away by the fire of genuine gnosis arising from itself, just as a fire kindled by rubbing two sticks burns these very pieces.

As recently noted by Klaus-Dieter Mathes,13 Kamalaśīla’s gradualist view of amanasikāra as the non-conceptual outcome (phala) of conceptual analytical meditation reinterprets the NPD’s understand-ing of amanasikāra as direct, non-conceptual realization to bring it into line with the traditional progressivist Mahāyāna-Madhyamaka paradigm. This revisionist interpretation was not always endorsed by later Tibetan bKa’ brgyud scholars. ’Gos lo tsa ba gZhon nu dpal (1392–1481), for example, contrasts this gradualist interpretation of amanasikāra with the interpretation advanced by Maitrīpa advocat-ing direct, non-conceptual realization and the abandonment of men-tal constructs through unmediated recognition of their luminous na-ture. As gZhon nu dpal states in his commentary to the Dharmadhar-matāvibhāga-kārikās (Mathes’ translation):14

As to what has thus been taught in the DhDhV, it is the meaning of entering the non-conceptual that has been established [here]. There are obviously two

12 The following passage is quoted in Mathes (2005) 32, n. 48. The translation is my own. yang dag par so sor rtog pa’i mtshan ma ni ’dir yid la mi byed par dgongs so // de ni rnam par rtog pa’i ngo bo nyid yin mod kyi / ’on kyang de nyid las byung ba yang dag pa’i ye shes kyi mes de bsregs par ’gyur te / shing gnyis drud las byung ba’i mes shing de gnyis sreg par byed pa bzhin no // 13 See Mathes (2005) 12f. 14 Mathes (2005) 13–14.

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traditions [, however,] of how to comprehend the meaning of this sūtra. Kamalaśīla maintains that the [interpretative] imaginations that must be given up can be only given up on the basis of insight resulting from thorough investigation. It is maintained in the commentary on Maitrīpa’s Tattvadaśa-ka, by contrast, that they are not given up as a result of thorough investiga-tion, but of a “meditative stabilization which [experiences] reality exactly as it is” (Skt. yathābhūtasamādhi). The latter knows the own-being of [even] that which must be given up as luminosity. Here it is reasonable to follow Maitrīpa, who [re]discovered this treatise.

In Tibet, the association of amanasikāra with a doctrine of the Chi-nese Hva shang purportedly encouraging the supression of all mental activity was introduced in several works by Sa skya Paṇḍita Kun dgaʼ rgyal mtshan (1182–1251) in order to attack, by way of anal-ogy, a certain non-Tantric “present-day Mahāmudrā system” (da ltaʼi phyag rgya chen po) which he describes as being for the most part (phal cher) a Chinese doctrine or even as Chinese-style rDzogs chen (rgya nag lugs kyi rdzogs chen).15 This criticism and the subse-quent charges of philosophical incoherence by the dGe lugs pas and 15 Sa skya Paṇḍita’s critique of the “Present-day Mahāmudrā” or “Neo-Mahāmudrā” is found in his sDom gsum rab dbye, Thub paʼi dgongs pa rab tu gsal ba and sKye bu dam pa rnams la spring baʼi yi ge. Sa skya Paṇḍita’s source appears to have been the sBa bzhed since he refers to a dPaʼ bzhed, dBaʼ bzhed, or ʼBaʼ bzhed in his discussions of Hva shang’s doctrines. It is important to note that that Sa skya Paṇḍita never directly criticizes the amanasikāra tradition of Saraha and Maitrīpāda. This is not surprising given that the Siddha Virūpa, who is regarded as spiritual progenitor of the Sa skya tradition, similarly extols non-mentation in his spiritual songs. See for example his Dohākośa, in ’Phags yul grub dbang rnams kyi zab mo’i doha rnams las khol byung mi tig phreng ba, pp. 158–9. Sa pan’s critique was mainly directed at some of the non-gradual Mahāmudrā teachings associated with sGam po pa emphasizing the direct introduction (ngo sprod) to one’s natu-ral mind. These were repudiated on the grounds that (1) they were being taught independ-ently of the Tantric system of mudrās elaborated by Nāropa and transmitted in Tibet by his disciple Mar pa, that (2) they represented newly introduced doctrinal innovations of questionable (i.e., non-Indian) provenance and that (3) they advocated an erroneous non-conceptual, non-gradual approach to goal-realization. See David Jackson (1994: 72f.) In this connection, it is worth noting that the Mahāmudrā teachings of the Indian Siddhas were decidedly non-gradual, encouraging direct, non-conceptual, spontaneous forms of meditation and instruction, and were frequently taught independently of the Tantric system of four mudrās. Whatever the non-Indian influences on sGam po pa’s varied discourses on Mahāmudrā, it is in the teachings of the Indian Siddhas and their Tibetan successors (such as Mar pa and Mila ras pa) that we find the major source of inspiration for sGam po pa’s own non-gradual Mahāmudrā teachings.

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Sa skya pas (who, by the sixteenth century, had both become politi-cal rivals of the bKaʼ brgyud pas)16 led many bKaʼ brgyud masters including gZhon nu dpal, Padma dkar po (1527–92), Situ bsTan pa nyin byed (dates unknown), Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507–54), Dvags po bKra shis rNam rgyal (1512–87) to respond by (i) refuting allega-tions that their tradition had any connection with Hva shang (the rNying ma pas were less reluctant to acknowledge his influence or Chinese influence in general);17 and (ii) defending amanasikāra both

16 The sixteenth century was marked by power struggles between the Karma pas and dGe lugs pas for territory in Khams and gTsang. At this time the Karma pas, Sa skya pas and dGe lugs pas all vied for patronage and assistance at the Mongol court of Gengzhiz Khan and his successors. The ʼBrug pa sect of the bKaʼ brgyud was also drawn into the political turmoil. Ngag dbang rnam rgyal (1594–1691), the recognized incarnation of Padma dkar po (1527–1592), was forced to flee to Bhutan (in 1616) under the enmity of the House of gTsang and Rva lung monastery, the seat of the ʼBrug pa bKaʼ brgyud, and its affiliates were seized by the gTsang authorities. See Smith 1970: 6. By the seventeenth century, the dGe lugs pas had gained the upper hand in these political struggles and were to maintain a theocracy up to the time of the Chinese invasions of the last century. See Stein (1962: 80f.), and Snellgrove & Richardson (1968, chapters 7–9). 17 Klong chen rab ʼbyams pa makes two intriguing references to a “Ha shang Mahā-yāna” in his writings. In discussing the historical genesis of Mantrayāna (gsang sngags ji ltar byung ba'i tshul), Klong chen pa (Grub mtha' mdzod, fol 139b4f.) argues for a much larger number of authentic sūtras and tantras than the gSar ma redactors allowed for. He notes the presence in Tibet of “many sūtras and tantras that were to be found in India, as well as many that were not.” Concerning sūtras, he mentions “many sūtras translated into Chinese before Sūryasiddhi destroyed the manuscripts in a fire”. According to Tāra-nātha’s History of Buddhism in India, pp. 141–3, Sūryasiddha (Tibetan Nyi ma dngos grub) was an anti-Buddhist king responsible for a fire at Nālandā university that destroyed a large number of Sanskrit Buddhist texts. Klong chen pa goes on to say that many of the Chinese translations including the Avataṃsakasūtra, [Mahā]parinirvāṇa[sūtra], and Vina-yāgama ('dul ba lung) “were translated by Vairocana and ʼBaʼ sang shi based on originals deriving from the mind of the Chinese Pandit Ha shang Mahāyāna” (rgya nag gi pan di ta ha shang ma hā yā na'i blo las). It is not possible, Klong chen pa concludes, for any but the omniscient to assess the measure/scope of a teaching or an individual (chos dang gang zag gi tshad). Vairocana (renowned rDzogs chen scholar, translator, and student of Pad-masambhava) and ʼBaʼ sang shi (ta) have been clearly identified with the early residents at bSam yas and are counted among the seven original Sangha members (sad mi mi bdun) who were ordained by Śāntarakṣita in the eighth century. (Tucci 1958: 12f.) ʼBa’ sang shi served as an envoy sent by the Tibetan king Mes ag tshom to the T’ang court of China on account of the emperor’s interest in Buddhism. Among the supporters of Hva shang in the ensuing rift between Indian and Chinese factions are mentioned mNya Bi ma or sNa Bye ma (possibly Vimalamitra) and Myang/Nyang Ting nge ʼdzin bzang po, both important figures in the early history of rDzogs chen. rDzogs chen works from the early period such

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as a valid description of the experience termed Mahāmudrā (“Su-preme Seal”) and as an authenticated tradition of Mahāmudrā instructions inspired by Saraha and systematized by his commentator Maitrīpa. The corpus of twenty-five texts known in Tibet as the Yid la mi byed paʼi chos skor nyi shu rtsa lnga, most of which are avail-able in Sanskrit in the Advayavajrasaṅgraha,18 form the main textual basis for this tradition.

as the Chos 'byung Me tog snying po of Nyang ral Nyi ma ʼod zer (1124–1192) and the bSam gtan mig sgron of gNubs Sangs rgyas ye shes (probably eighth century) give an impartial account of Hva shangʼs teachings. The latter interestingly considers both Kamalaśīla’s and Hva shang’s positions to be deviations (gol sa) from the more inclusive rDzogs chen perspective.

One clear instance of Hva shang’s influence on classical rNying ma thought is a passage in Klong chen pa’s gNas lugs mdzod (fol 6b1 and auto-commentary, fol 33b2 f) which be-gins: “The sun of self-originated pure awareness (rang byung rig pa), the ultimate reality (don dam), / Is equally obscured by the white or black clouds [of] virtue or evil …” See Faber (1986: 47–8) for Hva shang’s virtually identical statement recorded in the sBa bzhed. Klong chen pa’s commentary on this passage is most interesting (33b6): “Although at the time the Mahāpaṇḍita Ha shang made this statement, narrow-minded people could not comprehend it, it in fact holds true. It is kept secret from those on the lower spiritual pursuits; were they to denigrate it because their minds could not comprehend it, they would only plunge, on account of this karma, into the lower destinies.” (slob dpon chen po ha shang gis gsungs pas de dus blo dman pa’i blor ma shong yang don la de bzhin du gnas so / theg pa ’og ma gsang ba blor mi shong bas skur pa btab dus kho las des ngan song du ltung ba’i phyir ro //)

Later rNying ma pas did not necessarily share Klong chen pa’s high estimation of Hva shang. Mi pam rgya mtsho (1846–1912), for example, distinguishes the correct under-standing of yid la mi byed pa – “non-mentation [resulting] from not seeing any character-istics of objective references whatsoever once all attachments to entities have been under-mined” (dngos zhen thams cad khegs nas dmigs gtad kyi mtshan ma ci yang ma mthong nas yid la mi byed pa …) – from Hva shang’s annihilationist version which supports the suppression of all thoughts. Concerning the latter, Mi pham cites a passage from the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga (pp. 37–8) which presents amanasikāra as one of five factors that are to be eliminated. See dBu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad ʼjam dbyangs bla ma dgyes paʼi zhal lung, p. 57.1f. 18 See note 5 above and Bibliography under Maitrīpa.

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III. Maitrīpa on amanasikāra

It is of interest to note that Maitrīpa’s views regarding amanasikāra as set forth in his Amanasikārādhāra19 are characterized by a conspicuous concern to defend the concept against possible misinter-pretation. This concern, also evident in the Siddha literature we will examine, again indicates that the Gradualist opposition to amanasi-kāra was prevalent in Indian, as well as Tibetan, polemical con-texts.20 Maitrīpa begins his short text by noting that this term ama-nasikāra has been widely misunderstood. Maitrīpa takes up first (i) the objection by some people that the term is ungrammatical (apa-śabda) because “in compound [the correct form] should be amanas-kāra.”21 Maitrīpa responds by quoting Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī (6,3,14) where it is stated that “in the case of tatpuruṣa and kṛt [the com-pound] is irregular.”22 Maitrīpa goes on to show that the term is both found in the sūtras (here he quotes the NPD) and attested in the tantras in order to refute two further objections: (ii) that the term

19 Sanskrit passages are based on the Japanese edition of the Amanasikārādhāra (here-after AMĀ; see Bibliography). I have incorporated corrections made by Mathes in his forthcoming paper. Tibetan passages are from D v. 28, p. 276.4f.; P v. 68 p. 286.56f. 20 One must nonetheless be wary of the temptation to derive “historical connections from conceptual correlations.” (See Gomez 1987: 139 n. 14) Gomez argues convincingly that “the sudden-gradual opposition only reflects a very general, sometimes vague, intui-tion of a tension or polarity between two approaches to knowledge and action” (p. 131). 21 AMĀ 136,3–4: tatra kaścid āha / apaśabdo ’yam iti / samāse ’manaskāra iti bhavi-tum arhati / Tib: D v. 28, p. 276.5: yid la mi byed pa zhes bya ba ’di la phal cher log par rtogs pa ste / de la kha cig ’di skyon can gyi tshig tu smra ste / bsdus pas yid [la] mi byed pa zhes rtogs par ’gyur ro / In the last sentence, the Tibetan yid la mi byed pa could be cor-rected to yid mi byed pa to avoid confusion of amanaskāra, which it translates, with amanasikāra, which is invoked in the beginning of the passage. 22 “Constructions such as manasi + kṛ are common in Sanskrit. Because a close association developed between manasi and kṛ, a syntactic compound came into being be-tween the locative manasi and the verbal noun kāra derived from kṛ. When, against the general rule, the case suffix of the first member is not dropped, the compound is called aluk (ʻnon-deletionʼ).” I thank Dr. Aśok Aklujkar for sharing these grammatical observa-tions (in personal correspondence) and refer the reader to his Sanskrit: An Easy Introduc-tion to an Enchanting Language (Richmond: Svadhyaya Publications 2003), sections 29.11 fn. 7, 33.16, 34.22.

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does not belong to Buddhism; (iii) that it belongs only to the sūtra corpus but not to the tantras.23

The remainder of Maitrīpa’s short text addresses a fourth objec-tion which acknowledges the presence of the term’s meaning in the tantras but absurdly contends (iv) that amanasikāra there constitutes an absolute, non-affirming, negation (prasajyapratiṣedha = med par dgag pa) given that manasikāra is the subject of the negative particle (naño viṣayaḥ = med pa’i yul) in a non-affirming negation. To this Maitrīpa replies:24

That is not the case. [A non-affirming negation] is a negation of a different type; it is a prasajyapratiṣedha (“prasajya negation”) in the sense that it does not negate what is not applicable (aprasajya). An illustrative example: the wives of the king do not see the sun. The meaning of this is as follows: the wives of the king are kept hidden so that they do not see even the sun. This does not mean that the sun is non-existent. So what does it mean? What we negate is [only] what is applicable (prasajya), viz., that the king’s wives see the sun. In the case of amanasikāra (“non-mentation”) too, what we negate

23 Maitrīpa responds to the latter objection by saying (Mathes’ translation): “That is not so, for it is stated in the Hevajra[tantra], in the chapter on reality [I.5.1]: ‘Neither mind nor mental factors exist in terms of an own-being.’ Moreover, according to the sense, [HT I.8.42ab may be] understood in terms of amanasikāra [as well]: ‘Therefore the whole world is meditated upon [in such a way], because it should not be produced by the intel-lect.’” AMĀ 136,10–138, 3: tan na / uktam hi hevajre tattvapaṭale / svarūpeṇa na cittaṃ nāpi cetasam / tathā / bhāvyate hi jagat sarvaṃ manasā yasmān na bhāvyate / arthād ama-nasikāreṇeti gamyate / Tib. D v. 28, p. 277.3f.: de ni ma yin te / he ba dzra las gsungs pa / ngo bo nyid kyis sems med cing / sems ’byung ba’ang med pa’o / de bzhin / gang phyir yid kyis ma bsgoms na / ’gro ba thams cad bsgom par bya / zhes pa’i don gyis yid la mi byed pa’o zhes rtogs par bya’o // 24 AMĀ 138,8–15: tan na / prakārāntarasya pratiṣedhaḥ / nāprasajyaṃ pratiṣidhyata iti prasajyapratiṣedhaḥ / yathāsūryapaśyā rājadhārāḥ / ayam arthaḥ / evaṃ nāma tā guptā rājadhārā yat sūryam api na paśyantīti / atra na sūryābhāvaḥ kṛtaḥ / kin nāma rāja-dhārāṇāṃ yat sūryadarśanaṃ prasajyaṃ tan niṣiddham / amanasikāre ’pi nañā manasika-raṇaṃ yad grāhyagrāhakādi prasaktaṃ tan niṣiddham / na manaḥ / ato na doṣaḥ / Tib. D v. 28, p. 277.5: de yi ma yin na / yod pa’i dngos po’i dgag pa ni med par dgag pa’o / yang na thal ba med pa’i thal bar ’gyur ba ’gog pa’o zhes pa ni / med pa dgag pa’o / ji ltar rgyal po’i btsun mo nyi ma mthong ba ni ’di’i don to / ’di lta bu mi min zer zhes pa yang rgyal po’i chung ma de shin tu sbas pas nyi ma yang mi mthong ba’o / ’dir bkag pa’i nyi ma med par ma byas ba’o / gang zhe na / rgyal po’i chung ma rnams gang gis nyi ma mthong ba yod na de ’gog pa ste / yid la mi byed pa la yang yid la byed pa gang gzung ba dang ’dzin pa la sogs par yod pa de ’gog pa ste / yang ni ma yin te / ’di la skyon med do //

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by means of the negative affix [a] is only that which is applicable, viz. manasikaraṇa (“mentation”) consisting in [dichotomies] such as subject and object. The mind itself is not [negated]. Therefore there is no mistake.

The non-affirming negation here applies to the dichotomizing acti-vity of mind, not to mind per se. This will enable Maitrīpa to argue that the absence of dichotomic mentation, with its clinging to ex-tremes of existence and non-existence, can allow mind’s true nature, its radiant clarity to show itself. Maitrīpa goes on to consider reifica-tions associated with mentation, particularly constructs concerning eternalism and nihilism and concludes that amanasikāra refers to a state in which all such superimpositions or denigrations have been completely left behind (sarvavikalpanimittasamatikrāmatā).25

Maitrīpa is now in a position to indicate how amanasikāra can also be understood in terms of a relative, affirming negation (pary-udāsa-pratiṣedha = ma yin par dgag pa). As he states (Mathes’ translation):26

Even [when amanasikāra is taken] in the sense of an affirming negation, there is no fault. When [someone] says “Bring a non-Brahmin,” the bringing of somebody similar to a Brahmin, a Kṣatriya or the like [is intended], but not a low-caste person of base origin, such as a wagon maker. Here, too, [where amanasikāra is taken as an affirming negation,] an awareness of essencelessness is maintained. Hence the tenet of Māyopamādvaya is estab-lished. From what, then, does the [undesired] consequence of the view of annihilation follow?

25 For a full translation of the relevant passage, see Mathes (forthcoming). 26 AMĀ 140,8–11: paryudāsapakṣe ’pi na doṣaḥ / abrāhmaṇam ānayety ukte brāhma-ṇasadṛśasya kṣatriyāder ānayanaṃ bhavati / na tu vijātīyasya kaṭādeḥ / atrāpi niḥsvabhā-vavedanasya saṃsthitiḥ kṛtā / etena māyopamādvayavādasthito bhavet / kuta ucchedavā-daprasaṅga iti / Tib. D v. 28, p. 278.3f.: ma yin par brtags pa’i phyogs kyang skyon med de / bram ze ma yin par khrid la shog ces pas bram ze dang ’dra ba’i rgyal po la sogs pa khrid la shog ces par gsal gyi / rigs mi mthun pa shing shing rta mkhan la sogs pa ni ma yin no / ’di la yang rang bzhin med pa’i rig pa la gnas par byas pa ste / de dag gis ni sgyu ma lta bur gnyis su med par smra bar gnas par ’gyur ro / ganga las chad par lta bar ’gyur /

a Text reads grang but P, v. 68, 287.2.7 correctly has gang.

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Understood in terms of an affirming negation, amanasikāra negates those base dualistic thought-processes that obscure reality while pre-serving the latter’s essenceless, non-dual, illusion-like nature.

Maitrīpa finally turns his attention to understanding the specific meaning of the negative affix a/mi in amanasikāra/yid la mi byed pa. He notes that the negative particle is here taken only in a convention-al (tha snyad pa) sense, viz. that everything is (i) illusory (sgyu ma) and (ii) not truly established (yang dag par grub pa med pa). There-fore the a neither negates existence nor non-existence and cannot, on the basis of this reasoning, be taken in a nihilistic sense. He further explains that amanasikāra

is manasikāra with the primary letter a. It is a compound in which the mid-dle word is omitted, as in the case of ‘king [fond of] greens.’ In this sense, all and any mental engagement is of the nature of non-origination, i.e., a.27

Padma dkar po will later (seventeenth century) help to clarify this passage (along with its grammatical example; see below section V), contending that ‘non-mentation’ is the same as ‘proper mentation’ (tshul bzhin yid la byed pa = yoniśomanasikāra) or prajñāpāramitā, a positive application of the mind that reveals its natural condition of non-origination, unimpededness and non-duality.

Maitrīpa concludes his short text with a response to objections that his interpretation of the negative prefix a in terms of ‘non-origination,’ ‘emptiness’ and the like do not derive from the Buddha. We can briefly paraphrase the author’s closing arguments in terms of the principal meanings he finds ascribed to this privative prefix in certain tantras.28 (a) Firstly, in defence of understanding a in terms of non-origination, Maitrīpa quotes the Hevajratantra [I.2.1] which states that “the letter a is at the beginning because all phenomena

27 AMĀ 142,1–3 akārapradhāno manasikāraḥ / śākapārthivavat madhyapadalopī sam-āsaḥ / etena yāvān manasikāraḥ sarvam anutpādātmaka<ḥ / a> ity arthaḥ / Tib. D v. 28, p. 278.5: a yig gtso bor gyur pa’i yid la byed pa ni yid la mi byed pa ste / lo ma’i rgyal po bzhin tshig dbus ma phyis pa’i bsdus pa’o / de gang gis ni yid la byed pa gang thams cad ni a ste skye ba med pa’i don do /. The grammatical example is found in Jayakṛṣṇa’s Subho-dinī commentary on the Siddhāntakaumudī. See Mathes (forthcoming) n. 60. 28 For a full translation of this section, see Mathes (forthcoming).

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have been unoriginated since the very beginning”29 and the Mañju-śrīnāmasaṃgīti [V.1c-2b] which similarly mentions “non-origina-tion” as one of the senses of this ‘ultimate letter’ (paramākṣara = yi ge dam pa). (b) Secondly, in defence of understanding a in terms of essencelessness, Maitrīpa notes that a is the ‘bija or seed syllable of Nairātmyā,’ a feminine archetype of selflessness (anātman). When the Hevajratantra [II.4.22a] states “The first vowel symbolizes Nairātmya,” the a here indicates that “all acts of mentation, being de-void of self, have no abiding essence.”30 (iii) Thirdly, a can refer to radiant clarity:31

Moreover, a is a term for radiant clarity (prabhāsvarapada = ʼod gsal baʼi tshig), and manasikāra is a term for self-inspiration (svādhiṣṭhāna = bdag la byin gyis rlabs). Being both a and manasikāra [i.e., amanasikāra is a karma-dhāraya compound], it is called amanasikāra.

IV. Maitrīpa’s legacy

Before considering some key doctrinal developments of amanasi-kāra by the Siddhas and their Tibetan interpreters, it is worth briefly

29 AMĀ 142,4–5: akāro mukhaṃ sarvadharmāṇām ādyanutpannatvād ityādi / The Ti-betan here simply transliterates the Sanskrit D v. 28, p. 278.6f. 30 AMĀ 142,12–13: … sarvamanasikāro ’nātmako ’svabhāva ity uktaṃ ca bhavati / Tib. D v. 28, p. 279.1f.: … yid la byed pa thams cad bdag med pas rang bzhin med pa / 31 AMĀ 142,17–18: yadi vā / a iti prabhāsvarapadaṃ / manasikāra iti svādhiṣṭhānapa-dam aś cāsau manasikāraś cety amanasikāraḥ / Tib. D v. 28, p. 279.2: yang na a zhes pa ni ’od gsal ba’i tshig la / yid la byed pa ni bdag la byin gyis brlab pa’i tshig ste / ’di yang a yang yin la yid la byed pa yang yin pas yid la mi byed pa’o // The term svādhiṣṭhāna is important in Tantric systems such as the Pañcakrama where it constitutes one of the five stages and involves intitation by and self-identification with the deity. In the Siddha tradition, however, this ritual initiation and consecration is internalized such that the individual becomes directly attuned to reality without ritual mediation. Thus Maitrīpa’s student Sahajavajra states in his Tattvadaśakaṭīkā: “The expression “fully adorned by self-inspiration” means being inspired in oneself (bdag nyid) in terms of the self-nature (bdag nyid) of the continuum of one’s mind stream becoming attuned to the self-nature of genuine reality itself. What emanates from the nature of suchness naturally adorns one …” rang byin brlabs pas rnam brgyan pa’o zhes bya ba ni rang nyid gnyug ma’i de kho na nyid kyi bdag nyid du ’byor pa’i sems kyi rgyun de’i bdag yid du byin gyis brlabs pa’o // de bzhin nyid kyi rang bzhin las ’phro ba rang bzhin gyis rgyan pa …” Cited in Mathes (2006) n. 59. Translation is my own.

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assessing the impact that the interpretations of Kamalaśīla and espe-cially Maitrīpa exerted on subsequent bKaʼ brgyud authors who continued defending the term against possible misrepresentation. Situ bsTan paʼi nyin byed (seventeenth century), for example, up-holds Maitrīpa’s elucidations of amanasikāra against those who had attempted to realign it with the instantaneist doctrine of Hva shang:32

In the context of this statement “Freedom from mentation (yid byed bral ba) is Mahāmudrā” [from stanza 19 of Rang byung rdo rje’s Phyag chen smon lam], some people supposed to be analytical (dpyod ldan) think that explain-ing absence of mentation as being Mahāmudrā is absurd (ha cang thal ches). But [we reply] there is no fault. [The reason is as follows:] The letter a occurring in the Sanskrit term amanasikāra conveys the meaning of “selflessness” (bdag med) or “non-origination” (skye med) and the like, i.e., the emptiness (stong pa nyid) that transcends all discursive elaborations. The remaining letters convey the idea of mentation divested of mentation (yid la byed dang bral baʼi yid la byed pa) where there is no attachment (zhen) even to emptiness itself, thus [amanasikāra] is established as the “Mahāmudrā of integration free from the extremes [of eternalism and nihilism]” (mthaʼ bral zung ʼjug gi phyag rgya chen po).

Stated otherwise, yid la mi byed pa is a non-reifying understanding of emptiness in which even the tendency to identify with emptiness is abandoned. bsTan paʼi nyin byed’s seemingly contradictory defi-nition of the component manasikāra as “mentation divested of men-tation” (yid la byed dang bral baʼi yid la byed pa) points to a charac-teristic ambivalence among the defenders of Maitrīpa’s doctrine. On the one hand, manasikāra refers to a positive application of the mind (akin to such terms as prajñā, dharmapravicaya and bhūtapratyave-kṣā). On the other hand, it refers to a negative, egocentric operation

32 Nges don phyag rgya chen po smon lam gyi ʼgrel pa, fol. 34a1: yid la byed bral ba ’di ni phyag rgya che / zhes pa ’di’i skabs su dpyod ldan du zhal gyis ’ches pa kha cig yid byed dang bral ba phyag rgya chen por ’chad pa ni ha cang thal ches so snyam du dgongs mod kyi skyon med de / legs sbyar gyi skad du a ma na si ka ra zhes ’byung ba’i a yig gis bdag med dang skye med la sogs pa spros pa thams cad las ’das pa’i stong pa nyid kyi don ston la / yi ge lhag ma rnams kyis stong pa de nyid la’ang zhen pa med par yid byed dang bral ba’i yid la byed pa ston pas mtha’ bral zung ’jug gi phyag rgya chen por grub pa yin te //

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of mind that hinders spiritual awakening (akin to the negative application of terms such as vikalpa, mati, and smṛti).

V. Padma dkar po’s defence

A more elaborate defence of the term is offered by Padma dkar po in his Phyag chen gan mdzod.33 There he delineates three conceptions of amanasikāra that represent the authentic interpretation of Maitrī-pa’s Yid la mi byed paʼi chos skor, a cycle of non-gradual Mahā-mudrā teachings considered valid and important by bKaʼ brgyud traditions generally. Against this background, we may paraphrase his summary:

(i) First, amanasikāra is considered in terms of the locative case used with reference to mind [indicated by the i of manasi/la of yid la]. Since the locative case refers to a locus or founding basis, the privative a of amana-sikāra implies the absence of a locus or founding basis for any intentional object (gang du dmigs paʼi gnas sam rten gzhi med pa). This is the view expressed in the Saṃvarodaya.34 Since the sense of having such a locus is refuted by the initial letter a, we speak of amanasikāra. While this firm mental fixation which holds tightly to its intentional object through a mode of apprehension characteristic of the manasikāra included in the five omnipresent mental events is deemed necessary in the context of establishing an ordinary calm abiding (thun mong gi zhi gnas), it is re-futed here [in Padma dkar po’s tradition] .

(ii) Second, when amanasikāra is rendered as a tatpuruṣa compound, this manaskāra/yid byed pa [in which -i/la is not present] seems to be con-strued as a genitive form of the tatpuruṣa and is glossed as yid kyi las = yid kyi byed [i.e., activity of the mind], it is the activity of the mind which is here claimed to stand in need of refutation. More precisely, it is the arduous application belonging to the mode of apprehension of a grasping ‘intentionality’ (sems pa) among the five mental events that is refuted. The mental event of intentionality refers to mental activity which builds up conditioning factors in mind and has the function of setting the mind on wholesome, unwholesome or indeterminate actions. Such conditioning

33 For the full passage from Phyag chen gan mdzod, v. 21, p. 38.5f. (paraphrased above), see Appendix. 34 P v. 52, n. 2230.

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factors are refuted. While they may establish a calm abiding, Mahāmudrā is beyond such activities and has nothing to do with karma that is built up. Thus, he concludes, “everything that functions as mental activity, having been established in conjunction with an intentional object – here it is shown definitively that all [such] intentional objects are completely stilled.”

(iii) Third, the prefix (yar bcad) a in amanasikāra may be understood in the sense of non-origination (anutpāda = skye ba med pa): Manasikāra is ex-plained as yid la byed pa; in this case the meaning of the letter a is that of ‘proper mentation’ (tshul bzhin du yid la byed pa) or ‘taking things as they are’35 and may be termed a yid la byed pa, ‘bringing to mind a [non-origination]. “In that case, the intermediary ‘mi’ does not figure just as [in the case of] the “king fond of greens” (lo ma’i rgyal po) whose name is [truncated to] “king greens.” In this case, any mental engagements (mana-sikāra) are of the nature of non-origination. Thus, Padma dkar po con-cludes, a refers to the transcending function of discerning insight (shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa = prajñāpāramitā). By way of such expres-sions as ‘non-origination,’ ‘unimpededness’ and so forth, such insight is able to reveal all the teachings of non-duality. As the commentary on the Mañjuśrīnāmasaṃgīti indicates, in the Mantrayāna approach, “non-duality” refers to the intrinsic essence of supreme bliss (bde ba chen poʼi ngo bo nyid) in which there is no duality between discerning insight (prajñā) and skilfull means (upāya). In the Pāramitāyāna approach, all dualities between subject and object, knowing and the known, “I” and “mine,” which persist so long as there are the vacillations of ego-mind (ji srid yid kyi rnam par g.yo ba), become resolved into non-duality. The lack of individuating principle (bdag) in all phenomena devoid of discursive elaborations is the intrinsic nature of non-duality. Since amanasikāra is revealed by meanings such as those [summarized above], we speak of the “Cycle of Teachings on Non-Mentation,” teachings that were composed by the great teacher Maitrīpa, alias Advayavajra.

To summarize, amanasikāra can be understood in any of three ways, depending on how its grammar is construed: (i) no engagement in mind [locative], (ii) no engagement of mind [genetive], or (iii) 35 In Phyag chen gan mdzod (p. 280.1), Padma dkar po quotes a sūtra entitled Sangs rgyas yang dag par sdud paʼi mdo (not included in catalogues to the Peking or Derge edi-tions) in which “appropriate” is given as the meaning of “non-origination” (skye ba med pa ni tshul bzhin no).

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proper mental engagement in the sense of prajñāpāramitā. Of parti-cular interest in Padma dkar po’s account is his equation of amana-sikāra with proper mentation (tshul bzhin yid la byed pa = yoniśoma-nasikāra), an equation he returns to frequently in his Phyag chen gan mdzod and other works.36 In a later passage of the Phyag chen gan mdzod (101.6 f) which glosses two quotations from the Hevajratan-tra, Padma dkar po describes proper mentation as the ever-present primordial gnosis (elsewhere specified as pure awareness: rig pa or even rig pa chen po, 265.2) that reveals itself through the purifying (dag) of improper mentation (tshul bzhin ma yin paʼi yid la byed pa). This improper mentation is the source of mental agitation or distract-edness (yengs pa) that arises owing to the power of beginningless latent tendencies (thog ma med paʼi bag chags kyi mthu las byung). Mentation is a state of ignorance (ma rig pa) which, as mental agita-tion, constitutes a deviation away from proper mentation (tshul bzhin yid la byed pa las gzhan du phyogs pa). The retrieval of proper mentation involves firmly deciding between pure awareness and ignorance (rig ma rig gnyis su kha tshon gcod), the roots of nirvana and samsara respectively.

Now the terms yoniśomanasikāra and its counterpart ayoniśoma-nasikāra have a long history in Buddhist thought, their earliest deployment being found in the Pali canon.37 Padma dkar po’s spe-

36 For example, Phyag chen gan mdzod, pages 38.2, 102.2, 116.2, 265.3, 271.3, 280.1, 287.6 and Klan ka gzhom paʼi gtam bzhugs, v. 21, p. 559.3. 37 On yoniśomanasikāra (Pāli yonisomanasikāra), see Dīghanikāya III 227, Vibhaṅga 373. On ayoniśomanasikāra (Pāli ayonisomanasikāra), see Dighanikaya III 273, Vibhaṅ-gātthakatha 148. The two terms are also found in certain works attributed to Asaṅga/Mai-treya; yoniśomanasikāra: Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra I 16; ayoniśomanasikāra: Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra XI 4; Uttaratantra I 55–6, 58–9. Padma dkar po’s understanding of improper mentation as an adventitious distortion of appropriate mentation or pure awareness closely resembles Uttaratantra I 56 where improper mentation, the basis of adventitious karma and kleśas, is said to be itself based entirely on the clarity of Mind (sems kyi dag pa la rab gnas).

Where the term amanasikāra occurs in Asaṅga/Maitreya’s works, it is generally given a negative valuation. In Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra XI 3, amanasikāra and ayoniśomanasikāra are both included in a list of sixteen obstacles to the accumulation of merit and knowledge. In Dharmadharmatāvibhāga (p. 37 f), amanasikāra is included in a list of five impedi-ments (pratipakṣa) to non-conceptual primordial gnosis (avikalpajñāna) whereas manasi-

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cific (and decidedly Tantric) usage of a standard Buddhist term as a synonym for amanasikāra invites comparison with the synonyms in-voked by both Kamalaśīla – “genuine conceptual analysis” (yang dag par so sor rtog pa = bhūtapratyavekṣā)38 and Maitrīpa – “genu-inely valid cognition” (yang dag par rig pa). What these terms com-monly imply is a mode of cognizing things that is not channelled through the dualistic categories of representational thinking, the cru-cial difference being whether this cognition is “arrived at” as the fruition (phala) of a long drawn-out process of moral refinement and elimination of hypostases through analytical investigation (Kamala-śīla) or “disclosed” in its originary condition through a more radical clearing of dualistic tendencies (Maitrīpa and Padma dkar po).

VI. sGam po pa on manasikāra in Madhyamaka and Mantra-yāna

The attempt made by various Indian and bKaʼ brgyud authors to equate amanasikāra with a positive appraisal of manasikāra may be viewed in the light of their more general concern with legitimizing controversial ideas by showing their continuity with Mahāyāna and Mantrayāna modes of discourse. A case in point is an analysis of manasikāra by sGam po pa bSod nams rin chen (1079–1153) in which he compares Madhyamaka and Mantrayāna conceptions in or-der to show that both lead to goal-realization, albeit in different ways.39 The Madhyamaka involves bringing to mind the general idea (don spyi yid la byed pa) of reality such that the negation (bkag) of

kāra provides access to non-conceptual primordial gnosis. See, however, Madhyāntavi-bhāga V 12 and Vṛtti where manasikāra, understood as the belief in an “I” or “mine” (ahaṃkṛti = ngar ʼdzin), is presented as one of six types of distractedness (vikṣepa) and is said to be characteristic of the narrow-mindedness (chung nguʼi sems) resulting from the application of manasikāra in the Hīnayāna. In a similar vein, Abhisamayālaṅkāra V 28–9 (together with Haribhadra’s Sphuṭārthā) specifies not setting one’s mind (amanasikāra) on the quintessence of awakening (bodhigarbha) as characteristic of the manasikāra of the Śrāvaka family (gotra) amongst the Hīnayāna. 38 In Phyag chen gan mdzod, p. 116.2, Padma dkar po equates yid la byed pa with so sor rtog pa. 39 Zhal gyi bdud brtsi thun mongs (sic!) ma yin pa, v. DZA, fol. 7b1f.

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the four extremes (mthaʼ bzhi) pertaining to the conventional (kun rdzob) reality – namely, existence, nonexistence, both or neither – is claimed to yield, on the ultimate level (don dam par), freedom from discursive elaborations (spros bral) which eludes all positions (khas len pa). Thus the Prajñāpāramitā [i.e., Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya] states that although from the conventional standpoint, form is emptiness and emptiness is form, these being non-dual, from the ultimate perspective, no entities are perceived (mi dmigs par) at all. The Mantrayāna involves bringing to mind the actual reality (don dngos yid la byed pa), as illustrated by Tilopa: “Alas, self-awareness (rang gi rig pa) is primordial gnosis of suchness (de kho na nyid kyi ye shes); it is nothing whatsoever that could be shown by me!” In this case, states sGam po pa, view (lta ba) is devoid of any duality; felt experience (nyams myong) flows unobstructedly (rgyun chad med); cultivation (bsgom pa) does not succumb to bias (phyogs su ma lhung pa); conduct (spyod pa) is free from acceptance or rejection (dgag bsgrub dang bral ba); and the goal is free from hope and fear (re dogs bral ba).

VII. amanasikāra as description and explanation

The various interpretations of amanasikāra formulated in response to criticisms raised at the bSam yas debate or in Indian circles should not allow us to overlook the fact that the idea first gained currency as a description of goal-realization in contexts of a mystical, rather than polemical, nature. Within the Siddha genre of mystical songs, ama-nasikāra is used to describe certain transformative experiences and modes of being, characterized by ecstacy, radiant clarity and loss of the customary sense of self, rather than to define or defend a particu-lar line of Buddhist thought. This contrast can perhaps be best under-stood in terms of the distinction between a ʻdescriptionʼ and an ʻexplanation.ʼ A description is the immediate articulation, verbally and conceptually, of an actual experience one is having. Where the available words and concepts in their possible semantic combina-tions are inadequate to convey the experience, new words or new nu-ances of old words are coined. Explanation is any concept or theory that attempts to go behind an experience or description of an experi-

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ence, to account for it or legitimize it, in terms of something other than what is experienced, and often for purposes extraneous to experience, be they doctrinal or tactical.40 It would be wrong to make this distinction a categorical one. Every description, by virtue of its communicative thrust and its participation in the “system of associ-ated commonplaces” (Max Black) surrounding every word, carries with it the sedimentation of explanatory rules. Likewise, every explanation, by virtue of its rootedness in the referential ground of language, reveals something about the world.

While it is true that the descriptive and explanatory uses of amanasikāra have tended to overlap in the history of its usage so that it could come to function simultaneously in soteriological and doc-trinal contexts, the tradition of the Siddhas in which the term was first widely used paid curiously little attention to sectarian issues of doctrinal affiliation, even when adopting or reinterpreting standard Buddhist concepts. A matter of greater importance to them was how to actually convey an extraordinary experience by means of a me-dium that almost invariably falsifies, distorts or conceals what it tries to express. This factor accounts for the Siddhasʼ frequent use of unconventional and antinomian uses of standard terms, one obvious example being the recurrent espousal of ʻselfhoodʼ (ātmya = bdag nyid) in flagrant opposition to the central Buddhist doctrine of ʻself-lessness’ (anātman). In this light, it is not hard to see how amanasi-kāra could constitute a semantic inversion of the notion of manasi-kāra, an idea which was generally favoured in the Buddhist tradition and endorsed by the Buddha himself who frequently admonished his disciples to apply their minds (Pali: manasi karotha) to his teachings. It will become clear from the Siddha elucidations of amanasikāra examined below (section IX) that the later attempts to legitimize and domesticate the concept by bringing it into line with such standard notions as manasikāra and ayoniśomanasikāra by no means reflect

40 Schmithausen (1981: 200) draws a similar distinction between an “immediate verbalization of an actual experience” and “the secondary transformation of such a pri-mary verbalization effected for logical, doctrinal or even tactical reasons.”

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the intentions of those who first popularized the term as an apophatic description of Buddhahood.

VIII. The Siddha conception of manas

Central to Tibetan developments of the amanasikāra doctrine were the varying conceptions of mind (manas) elaborated in the Indian Buddhist philosophical systems. The Yogācāra-Cittamātra concep-tion of ego-mind41 (manas) as a bipartite Janus-faced process of constitution – reflexively constituting itself as a self (‘I’) by looking back upon the horizon from which it emerges while intentionally constituting its world by looking outward in the act of structuring its sensory-ideational information into an intelligible unity – and the possibility of reversing (parāvṛtti) this process, had particularly far-reaching consequences for later Tibetan interpretations of amanasi-kāra. One such interpretation will be discussed below in section XII. At this juncture, however, we will briefly consider another concep-tion of manas which is of immediate relevance to the Siddha interpretations we will be examining. Padma dkar po draws our attention to a specifically Tantric and Siddha use of manas42 which diverges from both the Abhidharma conception of the mental faculty

41 This conception is traditionally distinguished from the Abhidharma-based Śrāvaka (Vaibhāṣika and Sautrantika) interpretation of manas, as summarized, for example, by mChims ston Blo bzang grags pa (probably fourteenth century) in his commentary on the Abhidharmakośa (Chos mngon pa gsal byed legs par bshad paʼi rgya mtsho, fol. 27a2f.):

The two Śrāvaka schools [Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas] maintain a six-fold pattern of conscious operations (rnam shes tshogs drug). The two Ācārya brothers [Vasubandhu and Asaṅga], however, maintain an eight-fold pattern [which expands the six to in-clude]: (1) a substratum consciousness (kun gzhiʼi rnam par shes pa) which by objecti-fying the totality of external and internal, phenomenal and individual, referents, re-mains [itself] qualitatively non-distinctive (rnam pa mi gsal) and uninterrupted (ma chad pa); and (2) an emotionally tainted ego-mind which, by objectifying this [sub-stratum consciousness], has the aspect of believing in an “I” (ngar ʼdzin paʼi rnam pa can).

Whatever its philosophical limitations as an idealist construct, the Cittamātra eightfold model of mind provided a fruitful and highly influential conceptual scheme for elucidating the genesis, and possible transcendence, of dualistic experience. 42 Phyag chen gan mdzod, 270.3f.

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(yid dbang shes) that becomes apparent when the six modes of perception cease and the Yogācāra-Cittamātra conception of an ʻIʼ and ‘mine’ intending process (nga dang ngar sems pa). These latter, Padma dkar po argues, fail to describe the mind of yogis (rnal ʼbyor paʼi yid) who have gone to the heart of meditative composure (mnyam bzhag gi ngo bor song ba). For such individuals, mental activity (yid kyi las), by which we can understand thinking, feeling and conceptualization in general, continues in various forms on the level of subjective mind, but is now fed, so to say, from a higher source. The Siddhas therefore use certain terms such as genuine mind (gnyug maʼi yid) or mind devoid of objective reference (dmigs pa med paʼi yid) to describe this transformed or ex-centric subjectiv-ity. As Padma dkar po goes on to elaborate:43

Next, if one has to purify the whole complex of mind involving active dichotomic cognition (rnam shes bya ba dang bcas paʼi yid) at the time of settling in the realization of genuine mind (gnyug ma’i yid), then it [is mind (manas) which] serves to demarcate realization from non-realization. Here in this context of calm abiding (zhi gnas), the type of mental engagement that is to be abandoned (yid byed spang rgyu) consists in the improper forms of mental engagement.

Mind thus emerges within the field of consciousness as the pivotal factor from which the dual inclinations toward realization [direct self-recognition] or non-realization [non-recognition] proceed.

IX. Siddha interpretations of amanasikāra

The idea of non-mentation as it is developed in certain mystical songs attributed to Saraha and Tilopa, serves as one among many negative descriptors of an experience considered so rich and pro-found as to defy expression in thought and language. It is akin to, and frequently occurs alongside, a variety of other negative descrip-tors such as ‘transcending intellect’ (blo las ʼdas pa), ‘devoid of

43 Phyag chen gan mdzod, 271.2f.: de las gnyug ma’i yid bsgrub pa la bzhag pa’i tshe rnam shes bya ba dang bcas pa’i yid de thams cad dag pa dgos pa na rtogs ma rtogs kyi mtshams ’byed pa la yin no / zhi gnas kyi skabs ’dir yid byed spang rgyu ni tshul bzhin ma yin pa’i yid la byed pa de dag go //

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representational thinking’ (bsam med, bsam du med pa), ‘devoid of subjective grasping (ʼdzin med), ‘free from discursive elaborations’ (spros bral) ‘devoid of meditation’ (sgom med, bsgom du med pa), terms which commonly refer to a depth dimension of experience that eludes the appropriations of dualistic mentation. It is of interest to note that Saraha elaborates on the term in a relatively small number of his many Dohās. The term scarcely occurs in his famous and much commented upon Dohā Trilogy (Doha skor gsum),44 for exam-ple, or in his Kakhasyadohā45 (for which we have his Tippana), or in the songs attributed to him that are included in Munidatta’s Caryāgī-tiviniścaya.46 It is a central theme, however, in his Vajragīti Quartet comprising the Kāyakośāmṛtavajragīti, Vākkośarucirasvarajagīti, Cittakośājavajragīti, and Kāyavāccittāmanasikāranāma,47 as well as in his Mahāmudropadeśa.48 It is unfortunate that the term is given detailed attention in works for which we have no Indian or Tibetan commentaries. In the case of Tilopa, the term occurs in several of his mystical songs on Mahāmudrā including the Dohākośa, Acintyama-hāmudrā, and Mahāmudropadeśa.49

At the outset, we must note a certain ambivalence in Saraha’s use of amanasikāra and its variants. When regarded as a polemical posi-tion, Saraha is as quick to criticize its (anti-intellectualist) supporters as its (intellectualist) detractors. Early in the Kāyakośa we find Saraha critically assessing various Buddhist and non-Buddhist ap-

44 See Guenther (1993). A Hindi translation and transliteration of the trilogy has been made by R. Sāṃkṛtyāyan (1957) 38f., 83f. and 99f. respectively. 45 P v. 69, nos. 3113 and 3114 respectively. A Hindi translation and transliteration from the Tibetan Kakhasya dohā (but not ṭippaṇa) is given in Sāṃkṛtyāyan (1957) 127f. 46 See Kvaerne (1977) songs 22, 32, 38, and 39. 47 P v. 69, nos. 3114–3118. In Sāṃkṛtyāyan (1957) 141f., 185f., 203f. and 215f. respectively. 48 P v. 69, no. 3119. In Sāṃkṛtyāyan (1957) 249f. 49 P v. 69, no. 3128, vol 82, no. 4635, and v. 69, no. 3132 respectively. Even a cursory comparison of existing Apabhraṃśa and Tibetan versions of the Dohās reveals consider-able differences in content and arrangement and indicates that various recensions of the songs must have been in circulation. See R. Jackson (2004) 48f.

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proaches to realization, among which he includes the tendency to find fault with either yid la mi bya ba or its opposite yid la bya ba:50

Though true understanding varies with knowledge interests, In non-reflection (dran med),51 there has never been anything false. Though the goal varies according to efforts on the path, In reflection (dran pa), there has never been anything true. Though each one’s meditative fixation varies with his state of indifference, In non-origination (skye med), there has never been any duality. Though people ascribe fault to either ‘mentation’ or ‘non-mentation,’ In transcending intellect (blo ʼdas), there has never been anything to search for.

Saraha’s critique of the opposing positions regarding amanasikāra provide further evidence that the type of contentious issues staged at bSam yas during the Sino-Indian controversy were prevalent in India (though dates are less certain). What is of particular interest, how-ever, is Saraha’s exposé of the vain purposiveness common to both intellectualist and anti-intellectualist positions, the former disparag-ing non-mentation, the latter disparaging mentation. Both fail to go beyond intellectual deliberation.

Tilopa begins a song entitled Dohākośa by admonishing his listeners not to reduce amanasikāra to popular prejudices or to subjective demands:52

50 P v. 69, p. 103.4.3; D v. 28, p. 196, 213.3.

mos pa’i shes pas rtogs pa tha dad kyang / dran med ’di la brdzun pa yod re skan / lam gyi rtsol bas ’bras bu so so yang / dran pa ’di la bden pa yod re skan / btang snyoms dbang gis re ’jog tha dad kyang //

51 On the four symbol (brda’ bzhi) terms dran pa, dran med, skye med, and blo ʼdas see Guenther (1969) 11f. and 14. I have somewhat loosely rendered dran pa (smṛti) as ‘reflec-tion’ to cover the two basic cognitive operations it describes, namely, ‘memory’ (mnemic reflection) and ‘attention’ (thematic reflection), both involving reflexivity, a reflecting on experience. See Padma dkar po’s cogent analysis of the concept as it relates to Mahāmudrā teachings in his Phyag chen gan mdzod, 271.4f. 52 P v. 69, 131.2.3; D v. 28, p. 204, 271.6:

yid la ma byed gnyug ma’i rang bzhin la / brdzun pa rnams kyis skur ba ma ’debs shig / rang dbang yod pas rang nyid ’ching ma byed //

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Non-mentation, [one’s] genuine nature – Do not disparage it by way of lies! Since it is present by its own power, do not hold it as one’s own ‘self’!

A recurrent paradox in Siddha descriptions of goal-realization is that what is most natural comes most naturally precisely when egocen-tred identifications subside. Herein lies the basis for the Tantric distinction between the sense of self (bdag) which, as a subjective construct, is amenable to deconstruction, as in the Buddhist no self doctrine (anātman = bdag med), and authentic selfhood voiced in the first person (bdag nyid) which is precisely what the Siddhas mean by non-mentation. As Tilopa states it (Dohākośa):53

The natural expression of stainless mind Should be known by anyone [in] self-awareness (rang rig). I myself am ‘living being,’ I myself am ‘Buddha.’ I myself am non-mentation (bdag nyid yid la mi byed pa).

The term self-awareness (rang rig or rang gi[s] rig pa), as elaborated by Saraha, describes the experience of recognizing spontaneous ever-present gnosis as it is, stripped of all subjectivizing and objectifying tendencies. When fully recognized, it is open awareness (rig pa). When not recognized, it is ignorance or un-awareness (ma rig pa), a process-product term which at once describes the non-recognition of one’s natural condition (not understanding it as it is) and the ensuing mis-apprehension (taking it for something it is not, viz. a ‘self’). Saraha begins his Cittakośa with the following pas-sage:54

53 P v. 69, 131.3.4; D v. 28, p. 204, 272.7:

dri med sems kyi rang bzhin la / gang zhig rang rig shes par bya / bdag nyid ’gro ba bdag nyid sangs rgyas te / bdag nyid dri ma med cing bdag nyid yid la mi byed pa //

54 P v. 69, p. 107.3.3; D v. 28, p. 198, 230.5: skye bo lhan cig skyes pa’i ye shes ni / rang gi nyams su myong ba de kho na / rig dang ma rig rang rig gsal ba de kho na / mar me mun gsal rang gi rang gsal rang la sad / ’dam gyi padma ’dam la ma zhen kha dog legs / gzung ’dzin dri ma ma spangs snying po gsal /

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Spontaneous gnosis [in each] person – That alone is felt and experienced individually. That alone is the radiance of self-awareness in awareness and un-awareness, A darkness-illumining light, intrinsically self-luminous, aroused in oneself. A lotus in a swamp resplendent in colours, unconditioned by the swamp, One’s vital quintessence shines without removing the grime of subject and object. As a deer living in an alpine forest wanders alone, That alone is goal-realization, unconditioned by causality.

Like the lumen naturale (natural light) of the medieval scholastics, self-awareness comes to light naturally for the very reason that self-illumination and self-disclosure are intrinsic to being human.55 That our vital quintessence (snying po) can shine forth without having to remove the accretions of subject and object is only possible because humans are always already pervaded by spontaneous gnosis (lhan cig skyes paʼi ye shes).56

The possibility of existential recovery would be of little relevance if the tendency to glide away or go astray (ʼkhrul pa) from authentic possibilities into a world of appropriated objects (yul) were not like-

nags khrod gnas pa’i ri dags gcig pur rgyu / rgyu la ma zhen ’bras bu de kho na //

55 See Heidegger’s discussion of lumen naturale in Being and Time, pp. 133 and 170 and in several essays such as “Moira,” in Early Greek Thinking (1975: 97), and “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” in Basic Writings (1977: 286). In “Moira” (p. 97), Heidegger writes: “The essence of aletheia [i.e., truth as ʻunconcealednessʼ] remains veiled. The visibility it bestows allows the presencing of what is present to arise as outer appearance [Aussehen] (eidos) and aspect [Gesicht] (idea). Consequently, the perceptual relation to the presencing of what is present is defined as ʻseeingʼ (eidenai). Stamped with this character of vision, knowledge and the evidence of knowledge cannot renounce their essential derivation from luminous disclosure, even where truth has been transformed into the certainty of self-consciousness. Lumen naturale, natural light, i.e., the illumination of reason, already presupposes the disclosure of the duality [i.e., of the presencing of what is present]. The same holds true of the Augustinian and medieval views of light – not to mention their Platonic origins – which could only develop under the tutelage of an Aletheia already reigning in the destiny of the duality." 56 According to sGam po pa bsod nams rin chen, “ʻspontaneous primordial gnosisʼ (lhan cig skyes paʼi ye shes) refers to one’s natural awareness in the present moment (da ltar gyi tha mal gyi shes pa) as it is primordially present (ye nas yod pa).” In Zhal gyi bdud rtsi thun mongs (sic!) ma yin pa, v. dza, fol. 7a2.

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wise constitutive of the kinds of being (ʼgro drug) we are. According to a beautiful passage from Saraha’s Kāyakośa quoted below, ‘going astray’ is engendered by mnemic and thematic reflection (dran pa, see n. 51) which mentally and subjectively schematizes its content into particular appearances (snang ba). By this is meant not that these reflected-on appearances (dran paʼi snang ba) conceal an origi-nal something of which they are a mere copy or distortion but that perception is normally reduced to certain aspects of what is per-ceived as dictated by subjective demands (things appear as this or that in accordance with this or that purpose). Just as the true enjoy-ment of what life has to offer is only possible when one stops look-ing for it, so authentic subjectivity, as a process of individuation,57 can only blossom in the absence of subjective deliberations. The Kāyakośa states:58

57 The term ʻindividuationʼ was coined by Carl Jung to describe the process of becom-ing a complete individual who is aware of his or her unique individuality. It refers specifi-cally to the gradual opening of an individual’s consciousness to the complete range of possible elements that are already inherent in the individual at a preconscious level. The Siddhas seemed well aware that the opening of ego-mind (manas) to non-egocentricity (amanasikāra), not unlike the conscious ego’s integration of unconscious elements in Jungian psychology, does not lead to the annihilation of the subject (bdag med) but rather to its fulfillment in authentic selfhood (bdag nyid). 58 P v. 69, p. 104.3.8; D v. 28, p. 196, 217.5:

gang la mi gnas chags pa med par spyod / me tog sbrang rtsi sbrang mas ’thung dang ’dra / so sor rtog pa’i ye shes thabs yin te / ro dang phrad na ro la zhen pa med / de ltar kun gyis shes par ’gyur ma yin / snying po’i don gyi ’gro drug khyab mod kyang / ’gro ba dran pas bcings te pad tra’i srin / sems las dran pa byung phyir ’khrul pa’i rgyu / yid la mi byed shes na sangs rgyas nyid / ’khrul pa de la thabs dang shes rab med / kye ho dbyer med shes na thabs mchog de kho na / sangs rgyas sems can chos rnams thams cad kun / rang gi sems nyid dag dang lhan cig skyes / yid la mi byed yid la skyes tsam na / dran pa’i snang ba nub ste bden brdzun med / de phyir de nyid kho na’i yul ma yin / dper na mig gi yul du sgra mi snang / rnam par mi rtog rtog pa’i yul ma yin /

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Like a honey bee sipping honey from flowers, Not staying anywhere [but] enjoying [each] without attachment, So individually-conceiving gnosis is the skillful means [To] encounter [aesthetic] flavours without attachment to [any] flavour.

It is not known by all in this way. Though life’s vital quintessence pervades the six kinds of beings, Beings become imprisoned by reflections [like] insects by a flower’s petals. Because mind-based reflections arise, they become the cause of errancy.

If one recognizes non-mentation, this is Buddhahood. [But] in this errancy, there is neither skillful means nor insight. Alas! If one knows their indivisibility, that alone is the highest means!

Buddhas, sentient beings, the whole phenomenal [world], Arise together with one’s own pure Mind itself. At the time when non-mentation emerges in mind, Reflection’s appearances vanish so nothing of ʻtrueʼ or ʻfalseʼ remains.

Therefore [non-mentation] is not an object for itself, Just as sound does not appear as an object for seeing. Non-conceptuality is not a conceptual object. But when reflections become illumined by the condition of emptiness, Reflection’s appearances vanish and there is no more looking.

This lengthy passage helps us to understand how amanasikāra is able to function in the Siddha mystical songs as a negative description of a positive experience. The apophatic description serves as a counter-tendency to any assertive claims about the experience, be they epistemological (the attempt to reduce it to an object of knowledge), ethical-axiological (to evaluate it as good as opposed to evil) or ontological (to assert it as real as opposed to unreal). According to the Kāyakośa:59

Where there is no egocentric deliberation, [that] is Mahāmudrā.

stong pa’i rkyen gyis dran pa gsal tsam na / dran pa’i snang ba nub nas mthong ba med //

59 P v. 69, p. 105.2.6; D v. 28, p. 221.1: gang la yid la byar med phyag rgya che / mtshan ma’i dran rig sna tshogs ji snyed pa / de nyid phyag rgya che la dbye ba med / rtogs dang mi rtogs gnyi ga so so min //

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However varied awareness’s reflections on its [self-imputed] characteristics, These are indivisible with Mahāmudrā. Conceptualization and non-conceptualization are not two separate things.

If apophatic descriptions point to what is ineffable in experience, they are nonetheless frequently used alongside more positive (cata-phatic) descriptions such as ʻradiant clarityʼ (ʼod gsal) or ʻultimate reality’ (chos nyid), expressions that emphasize the positive, fecund character of mystical experience. A clear example of the mixing of the apophatic and cataphatic orders of discourse is found in the open-ing verse of Tilopa’s Acintyamahāmudrā:60

Radiant clarity, ultimate reality unborn and unceasing is The way of Mahāmudrā, inexpressible in thought and language. It is non-mentation, beyond what can be identified. Homage to the unconditioned, profound and calm!

The peculiarities of negative description have enabled us to see how amanasikāra could paradoxically serve as a primary description, and later as a key hermeneutical definition, of the utterly positive experi-ence known as “Mahāmudrā.” But given that amanasikāra is pre-cisely that which eludes positive assertions, how then is it to be culti-vated (sgom)? Saraha’s answer is, as we could expect, negative: The best cultivation (sgom mchog) is that which comes of its own accord in the absence of any willful cultivation. As Saraha states in his Dohākośanāmamahāmudropadeśa:61

In Mahāmudrā which is non-mentation, Since there is not the slightest reason to meditate, there’s no meditation. Without meditating or being divorced from what its is about is the best meditation!

60 P v. 82, n. 4635, p. 38.5.4 f; D v. 28, 490.4:

skye ’gag med pa’i chos nyid ’od gsal ni / smra bsam brjod med phyag rgya chen po’i lam / ngos gzung dang bral yid la mi byed pa’o / zab zhi ’dus ma byas la phyag ’tshal lo //

61 P 69, 110.5.3; D v. 28, p. 246.3: yid la mi byed phyag rgya chen po la / sgom rgyu rdul tsam med pas mi bsgom ste / sgom med don pa ’bral med sgom pa’i mchog //

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The theme is elaborated in another passage from the author’s Dohā-kośanāmamahāmudropadeśa:62

Mind cut off at its root is like the open sky. There being nothing to meditate on, there’s no mental engagement because Ordinary awareness, perfectly natural in its own way of being, Is not deceived by artificial thought objects. There is no need to fake this naturally pure mind. So, without holding or dismissing it, leave it where it is most happy!

As ʼBaʼ ra ba rGyal mtshan dpal bzang (1310–1391) notes in con-nection with these two preceding passages,63 the term “meditation” (sgom) is to be understood in the sense of “preserving the Mahā-mudrā experience” (phyag rgya chen po skyong ba) or “non-menta-tion” (yid la mi byed pa), terms which similarly indicate that “there has not for a moment been any cause to interfere with it” (de nyid la yengs rgyu skad cig kyang med pa). The term “ordinary awareness” (tha mal [gyi] shes pa) also requires explication. According to Padma dkar po (mDzub tshugs & Phyag chen gan mdzod),64 it is syn-onymous with “natural awareness” (rang bzhin gyi shes pa), tha mal and rang bzhin both being translations of the Sanskrit prakṛta. In

62 P v. 69, p. 110.4.7; D v. 28, p. 245.7:

rtsa ba chod pa’i sems nyid nam mkha’ ’dra / sgom du med pas yid la mi bya ste / tha mal shes pa rang lugs gnyug ma la / bcos ma’i dmigs pa dag gis mi bslad de / rang bzhin dag pa’i sems la bcos mi dgos / ma bzung ma btang rang dga’ nyid du zhog //

63 Ngo sprod bdun maʼi ʼgrel pa Man ngag rin po cheʼi sgron me, v. 11, p. 234.1f. Yang dgon pa’s Ngo sprod bdun ma is found in the Pha jo ldings edition of the author’s bKaʼ ʼbum (mGur ʼbum collection, v. 3, p. 274.1). The song is not contained in the rTa mgo edition which has a much shorter mGur ʼbum but is otherwise identical in contents. ʼBaʼ ra ba was regarded as a re-embodiment of Yang dgon pa and was heir to his lineage, the sTod ʼBrug, through his own root teacher Zur phug pa Rin chen dpal bzang, a student of Yang dgon pa’s leading disciple Spyan snga rin chen ldan (1202–1329). See Smith (1970: 9f.) and Deb ther sngon po, ja, fol. 127af. (BA 692f.). As Smith (p. 7) notes, “The sTod ʼBrug … gave rise to a host of important schools: the Ne-rings bKaʼ brgyud pa, the Mdo bo che ba, and the Yang dgon bkaʼ brgyud pa among others. The Yang dgon school produced ultimately the ʼBaʼ ra bKaʼ brgyud pa, a sect that had maintained its identity up to 1959.” 64 rNal ʼbyor bzhi mdzub tshugs, p. 484.3f. See also Phyag chen gan mdzod, p. 103.5f.

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Padma dkar po’s ‘language of experience’ (myong baʼi skad), it re-fers to that free-rising cognition (thol skyes kyi rig pa) which is aris-ing continuously (shar shar ba) but only becomes fully manifest once the net of concepts (rtog pa) that obscures it has cleared.65

The unwilled cultivation of non-mentation is described in the Sid-dha texts as a process of “spiritual attunement” (rnal ʼbyor = yoga). This process, according to Saraha’s own definition (Kāyavāccittama-nasikāra),66 is a matter of remaining attuned to one’s natural condi-tion (rnal maʼi don la gnas paʼi rnal ʼbyor). Since this occurs only in the absence of subjective interference – either accepting or rejecting – of a grasping subject, it is known as the true concentration (bsam gtan nyid) as distinct from ordinary fixation involving dualistic ob-ject apprehension. When all representational and objectifying think-ing has dissolved into the single flavour of non-mentation, gnosis is present as one’s vital quintessence. As stated in Saraha’s Kāyavāc-cittamanasikāra:67

Without accepting or rejecting, it is naturally free in every respect. The attunement without grasping or egocentricity is the true concentration. Since that which cannot be cultivated as anything or sought anywhere is Inconceivable, Alas! it is the same flavour as non-mentation. Gnosis, inconceivable and uncontrived like the sky, one’s vital quintessence: Alas! It is nothing that can be intellectually thought about or verbalized!

Mahāmudrā as an absolutely positive experience is characterized negatively during the path of recovery where its self-disclosure is made possible by a via negativa which gradually strips away the egoic projections and appropriations that attempt to make of it some-thing other than it is. From the perspective of self-disclosure, how-

65 rNal ʼbyor bzhi mdzub tshugs, p. 485.1f. 66 P 69, 108.4.7. 67 P v. 69, p. 108.5.6; D v. 28, p. 199, 237.3:

btang gzhag med cing rang bzhin rnam par grol / ’dzin med yid la bya med rnal ’byor bsam gtan nyid / gang la mi bsgom gang du’ang btsal ba med pa de / bsam du med pas yid la mi byed ro snyoms kye / ye shes mkha’ dra bsam bral ma bcos snying po don / ’di la blos yis bsam zhing brjod du med do kye //

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ever, where the positive stands completely in the open and is no longer cognized as ʻother,ʼ propositions about mentation and non-mentation no longer apply. The Kāyakośa states:68

Settled in what is neither mentation nor non-mentation, Since self-awareness emerges as Mahāmudrā itself, Mahāmudrā reveals itself to itself by itself.

X. The Siddha impact on bKa’ brgyud pa views of amanasi-kāra

What can we conclude in this final section of the paper about the Siddha interpretation of amanasikāra and its impact on later developments? First, it must be recognized that the idea at this formative stage in its development had not yet been codified into a unified, systematic doctrine, even if contemporary opponents of the term already identified it with the Siddha teachings. Perhaps the polyvalent significations of the term in Siddha contexts and its resis-tance to any univocal or unequivocal definition reflects the general tenor of the Siddha movement: its spirited disavowal of intellectual systems of any variety and of ideological identification in general. This aspect of the movement should be borne in mind when examin-ing later attempts by Tibetan authors to retrospectively identify the concept with particular schools of Buddhist thought. For example, Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507–1554), the eighth Karmapa, discusses amanasikāra in his commentary on Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāva-tāra and Bhāṣya69 as if it were a Madhyamaka doctrine (yid la mi byed pa’i dbu ma) of Maitrīpa in which he had synthesized the Madhyamaka teachings of Saraha (younger and elder), Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti. Although the influence of Madhyamaka on Maitrī-pa’s doctrine is unmistakable, one is hard pressed to identify Sara-ha’s teachings with the Madhyamaka (apart from certain conceptual

68 P v. 69, 105.3.2; D v. 28, p. 197, 221.4:

yid la bya dang mi bya med par gzhag / rang rig phyag rgya chen po nyid la byung / phyag rgya chen po nyid la nyid kyis bstan //

69 dBu ma la ʼjug paʼi rnam bshad, fol. 5a4f. See also Ruegg (1988) 125.

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correlations) given his own frequent critiques of all the Buddhist phi-losophical systems, Madhyamaka notwithstanding. In fact, Saraha’s Kāyakośa, the work in which he gives the fullest elaboration of amanasikāra, begins with such a critique:70

The Vaibhāṣikas, the Sautrāntikas, The Yogācāras, the Madhyamakas and the rest, Find fault with one another and engage in [endless] disputes. Oblivious to That itself, the sky[-like] sameness of appearance and empti-ness, They turn their backs on spontaneity.

Despite the multiplicity of connotations in the Siddha treatment of amanasikāra, we can extract from the passages we have examined two overlapping deployments which strongly influenced later Ti-betan interpretations: (i) Firstly, its use in didactic and rhetorical contexts as a critique of subject-centered rationality in intellectual and ethical pursuits. This is evident in the two passages of Saraha and Tilopa that were cited at the beginning of the previous section. (ii) Secondly, its use in descriptive contexts to provide a phenomeno-logical-psychological account of the transcendence of subject-cen-tered mind and the recovery of non-dual gnosis. This is apparent in the apophatic descriptions of amanasikāra examined throughout the previous section. Some examples of these influences will now be examined.

XI. amanasikāra and the critique of purposive rationality: sGam po pa and Rang byung rdo rje

What the use of amanasikāra as a counter-measure to the subjecti-vizing and objectifying tendencies of dualistic mind principally seeks to undermine is the purposiveness or instrumentality that surrepti-

70 P v. 69, p. 103.3.5; D v. 28, p. 212.5:

bye brag pa dang mdo sde sngags pa dang / rnal ’byor pa dang dbu ma la sogs te / gcig la gcig skyon ’gel zhing rtsod par byed / snang stong mkha’ mnyam de nyid mi shes pa / lhan cig skyes la rgyab kyis phyog par ’gyur //

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tiously controls all rational-calculative thinking. We have seen that non-mentation (yid la mi bya) becomes no less an impediment to the free flow of experience than mentation (yid la bya) so long as willful deliberation is involved. For several bKaʼ brgyud pa authors includ-ing sGam po pa bSod nams rin chen (1079–1153) and the third Kar-mapa Rang byung rdo rje (1284–1339), Mahāmudrā is precisely what comes to the fore in the absence of instrumental rational or moral deliberation. sGam po pa, for example, defines Mahāmudrā as follows:71

Here, “Mahāmudrā” means not reducing anything to ego-mind (yid la ci yang mi byed pa): one neither cultivates any qualities such as “non-divided-ness” or “emptiness” nor eliminates any defects such as conceptualizing. That which is naturally free (rang grol ba) from the intellect with its dualis-tic beliefs is what is [meant by] “Mahāmudrā.”

The third Karmapa Rang byung rdo rje similarly disclaims the valid-ity of a moralism which belies subjectivistic deliberations in his commentary on Tilopa’s Mahāmudropadeśa (stanza 10):72

In the context of worldly appearances, it is commonly declared that awaken-ing to Buddhahood is attained solely on the basis of accumulating stores of merits. But when life’s vital quintessence is no longer reduced to ego-mind (yid la ma byed pa), then ʻgoodʼ does not yield the slightest benefit and ʻevilʼ does not bring the slightest harm. If one goes to the core of radiant clarity, beyond all attachments and desires, and deeply understands it, then all phenomena belonging to samsara and nirvana [in their] multiplicity assume the single flavour of basic equality and all the masses of notions that arise in one’s ego-mind (rang gi yid), apart from becoming friends with the Dharma-kāya in its basic equality, do not become harmful.

71 Phyag rgya chen po rtsa ba la ngo sprod pa, v. YA, fol. 2b5f. 72 Phyag rgya chen po Gang ga maʼi ʼgrel pa, p. 42.1f. The arrangement of lines in this version of the Dohākośa are quite different from the bsTan ʼgyur version. … ’jig rten pa’i snang ngo la bsod nams kyi tshogs gsog pa’i rten ’ba’ zhig bsgrub cing ’di yis sangs rgya bar byed zer yang / snying po’i don yid la ma byed pa / dge bas phan spu tsam ma byas / sdig pas gnod pa spu tsam yang ma bskyel zhing / zhen pa dang ’dod pa kun dang bral ba’i ’od gsal ba de nyid khong du chud cing rtogs na ni / ’khor ba dang mya ngan las ’das pa’i chos thams cad mnyam pa nyid du ma ro gcig par ’gyur zhing rang gi yid la byung ba’i rtog pa’i tshogs thams cad ni / mnyam pa nyid chos kyi sku’i grogs su ’gyur pa ma gtogs pa gnod par mi ’gyur ba yin te / …

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XII. amanasikāra and transformed subjectivity: Yang dgon pa’s Cittamātra-Mantrayāna synthesis

The Siddha conception of amanasikāra in terms of a goal-sustained transformation of subject-centered consciousness was to be given its most lucid expression in the Cittamātra-based interpretations of amanasikāra, such as we find, for example, in the writings of the sTod ʼbrug mystic rGyal ba Yang dgon pa (1213–1258).73 It is of interest to note that Karmapa Mi bskyod rdo rje, who has traced three distinct Madhyamaka lines of interpretation of the amanasikāra doctrine in Tibet, specifies the Cittamātra-based interpretation (more specifically the sems tsam rnam rdzun gyi dbu ma) as the one which follows the sense of the Dohās. This tradition, represented by Yang dgon pa, who evidently received it from rGod tshang pa (1189–1258?),74 is distinguished from the Mantra-Madhyamaka (sngags kyi dbu ma) and Sūtra-Madhyamaka (mdoʼi dbu ma) interpretations which are said to derive in their entirety from Marpa and Mila ras pa. The Sūtra-Madhyamaka tradition was chiefly represented and widely propagated by sGam po pa. The Cittamātra-Madhyamaka interpretation, like the Dohās, emphasizes an awareness devoid of the subject and object (gzung ʼdzin gyis stong paʼi shes pa) character-ized as self-radiant self-awareness (rang rig rang gsal).

The interweaving of Cittamātra and Siddha views regarding the transformation of ego-mind is conspicuous in Yang dgon pa’s interpretations of yid la mi byed pa as presented in certain of his “Mountain Teachings” (Ri chos) texts. His most extensive account is

73 On Yang dgon pa, see above note 63. 74 dBu ma la ʼjug paʼi rnam bshad, fol. 6a2f. This line is said to have been widely represented in India and Tibet by Phyag na (Vajrapāṇi) of India, a direct disciple of Maitrīpa. Yang dgon pa claims to have received a cycle of Mahāmudrā teachings from his root teacher rGod tshang pa called the Phyag rgya chen po skor tsho that passed through Maitrīpa (Me tri pa) and Vajrapāṇi (rgya gar Phyag na). See Ri chos kyi phyag len gsal baʼi sgron me, v. 1, fol. 2b5f. On the importance of rGod tshang pa in the transmission of Maitrīpa’s Mahāmudrā teachings, as later noted by ’Gos lo tsa ba and Karmapa Mi bskyod rdo rje, see David Jackson (1994) 82ff.

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given in first part of his Ri chos kyi rnal ʼbyor bzhi pa within the con-text of a lengthy elucidation of Mahāmudrā:75

The meaning of the term yid la mi byed pa [derives from] the term amanasi-kāra in the Sanskrit language. As derived from this term used in the locative case, manas is rendered as yid, sikara is rendered as [la]byed pa and these are negated by the a. One thus speaks of an absence of mentation (yid la byed pa med pa) in the sense of not dwelling in ego-mind (yid la mi gnas pa), being free from ego-mind (yid las grol ba) or transcending ego-mind (yid las ʼdas pa). If we translate it as “not dwelling in ego-mind,” the meaning of the term is easy to understand.

However [the translation] yid la mi byed pa (non-mentation; literally, “the ego-mind not focusing upon”) [means that] divisive concepts (rnam rtog) and hypostases (kun rtog) [i.e., the ego-mind] arisen from sources of error are taken as the subject, and then [yid la mi byed pa] is “these agents (de byed pa) not doing.” Given that understanding [of the term], then even when there is non-mentation [in this sense], there will nonetheless be activity in oneʼs mind. The point is that however the all-pervasive substratum (kun gzhi) and its five sensory operations arise, they are but the self-effulgence of the conceptless and this is the intrinsic dynamics of “Mahāmudrā.” Thus, when the emotionally-tainted ego-mind (nyon yid) gazes inwardly upon the all-pervasive substratum, it holds it to be its ‘self.ʼ And when the egoic con-

75 Ri chos kyi rnal ʼbyor bzhi pa Phyag rgya chen po snying poʼi don gyi gter mdzod, in rGyal ba Yang dgon pa bKa’ ’bum (rTa mgo edition), v. 1, p. 247.5f.: yid la mi byed pa zhes bya ba’i sgra don ni / saṃ tri [sic!] ta’i skad du / a ma na si ka ra la zhes bya ste / yi ge bdun po de’i sgra las drangs na / a ma na yid / si ka na [sic!] byed pa yin la de as bkag pas / de ltar na yid la byed pa med pa zhes bya ste / yid la mi gnas pa’am / yid las grol ba’am / yid las ’das pa zhes pa la ’jug la / de yid la mi gnas par ’gyur na sgra don go bde ba la / yid la mi byed pa la ’khrul gzhi byung nas / rnam rtog dang kun rtog gis yul can byas nas / de byed pa la mi byed par go nas yid la mi byed par rang yid la byed par yong ba yang ’dug / de’i don ni kun gzhi dang sgo lnga ji ltar shar yang rtog med du rang gsal ba phyag rgya chen po’i rang gshis yin / [248] de la nyon yid kyis kun gzhi la kha nang du bltas nas bdag tu bzung / yid shed [sic!] kyis sgo snga la phyir bltas nas rigs su bcas [sic!] / de ltar yid gnyis kyi bzung ’dzin ni ’khor ba’i chos dang / bzang ngan gyi ’dzin pa thams cad yid yin la / de las ’das shing mi gnas pa phyag rgya chen po yin no / / Unfortu-nately, both the available editions of Yang dgon pa’s bKaʼ ʼbum are rife with spelling er-rors. Many of the works in this collection were committed to writing by Yang dgon pa’s leading disciple, sPyan snga rin chen ldan. The passages pertinent to this essay are particu-larly problematic because of the transliterations from Sanskrit, a language with which the author, scribe and copyist were probably not too conversant.

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sciousness (yid shes)76 looks outward through the five sensory gates, it di-vides it into the categories [of the life-world] (rigs su bcad).77 Hence, all that presents itself as samsara, as the subject object [duality] of the two-fold ego-mind (yid gnyis), and all our beliefs in good and evil are what is meant by “ego-mind” (yid). To go beyond this and not remain in it is “Mahāmudrā.”

Through a masterful synthesis of the Cittamātra model of consciousness and the Siddha interpretation of amanasikāra, Yang dgon pa is able to account for both the genesis and transformation of subject-centered con-sciousness. The emergence of ego-mind, the sense of ‘self’ through which experience is structured in terms of subject (‘I’) and object (‘mine’) is elaborated according to the Cittamātra notion of an all-perva-sive substratum (kun gzhi) and its concomitant intentional and reflexive conscious operations. On this account, it would be incorrect to characterize the transcendence of dualistic consciousness in terms of the type of suppression or cessation of mental activity associated with Hva shang. Yid la mi byed pa does not imply the suspension of all mental activity but only of those subjectivizing and objectifying operations which concurrently give rise to our hypostatized sense of self and ob-jects.

How then is non-egocentric, selfless experience possible and how is its possibility actualized? Yang dgon pa articulates the Cittamātra eightfold ensemble of consciousness (rnam shes tshogs brgyad) as a process of co-constitution, simultaneously constitutive of objects (intentionality) and the subject to whom they belong (reflexivity). We gather from his account that this process of co-constitution ac-tually prescinds from what is non-constitutive, the pre-reflective non-thematized flow of experience. In other words, when the inci-pient phase of constitution is attended to closely, what is disclosed is not a transcendental subject or foundational presence of any sort, but rather a sheer absence, a non-constitutive, non-subjectivizing expe-rience which makes possible the self-manifesting of dualistic expe-rience. Thus Yang dgon pa can speak of the emergence of the perva-sive substratum and its conscious operations as self-effulgence of the

76 The text incorrectly has yid shed. 77 The text incorrectly has rigs su bcas.

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conceptless and this latter as the intrinsic dynamics (rang gshis) of Mahāmudrā. Going beyond subjectivizing experience really means going back before it, but this “going back” is more properly “not dwelling” (mi gnas) in it in the first place. What is actually meant by this latter expression is clarified by the author when he returns to the theme of amanasikāra in his Ri chos Yon tan kun 'byung gi lhan thabs chen mo:78

Yid la byed pa is amanasikāra in the Sanskrit language. Its meaning may be rendered as ‘not dwelling in ego-mind (yid la mi gnas pa)’ ‘the ego-mind not focusing upon [various objects] (yid la mi byed pa),’ or ‘free from ego-mind (yid las grol).’

If it had been translated as ‘not dwelling in ego-mind,’ this would have been straightforward. But as it was translated as yid la mi byed pa, certain people went somewhat astray. When they said ‘the ego-mind does not focus upon the past, the future or the present,ʼ ‘the ego-mindʼ served as the subject (yid kyis yul can byas) and those [three times] served as the object (de dag gis yul byas), and then they said that not focusing on them (de la mi byed pa) was the ego-mind not focusing upon [objects]. But here, the past, the future, the present, existence, non-existence, samsara and nirvana are all superimposi-tions of ego-mind (yid kyi sgro btags pa), and the point of the above [render-ings of amanasikāra] is that Mahāmudrā [whether understood as] ‘the ego-mind not focusing uponʼ or ‘[oneʼs] not dwelling in ego-mindʼ (yid la mi byed pa'am mi gnas pa), is, to put it concisely, not dwelling in existence, non-existence, past, future, samsara or nirvana. Thus the terms "transcending the intellect" (blo 'das), "free from discursive elaborations" (spros bral), ‘integrationʼ (zung 'jug), and ‘Mahāmudrāʼ (phyag rgya chen po) are all syn-onymous.

78 rGyal ba Yang dgon pa bka’ ʼbum (rTa mgo edition), v. 2, 76.4f.: yid la mi byed ces pa ni / sang kri ta’i skad du na / a ma na sri [sic!] ka ra / de’i don yid la mi gnas pa’am / mi byed pa’am / yid las grol zhes bya ba la ʼjug ste / yid la mi gnas par bsgyur na bde ba la / yid la mi byed pa zhes bsgyur nas / ʼgaʼ zhig cung zad nor nas / ʼdas pa yid la mi byed / ma ʼongs yid la mi byed / da lta ba yid la mi byed ces / yid kyi[s?] yul can byas / de dag gis yul byas / de la mi byed pa la yid la mi byed zer / ʼdir ʼdas pa’am / ma ʼongs pa’am da lta ba’am / yod pa’am / med pa’am / ʼkhor ba’am / ʼdas pa’am / de thams cad yid kyi sgro btags pa yin cing / de la phyag rgya chen po yid la mi byed pa’am / mi gnas pa de / mdor na yod med du mi gnas / ʼdas ma ʼongs la mi gnas / ʼkhor ʼdas la mi gnas te / gong ma rnams kyi don no / blo ʼdas zhes bya / yid la mi byed pa zhes bya / spros bral zhes bya / zung ʼjug zhes bya / phyag rgya chen po zhes bya / de thams cad don gcig pa yin //

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Not dwelling in ego-mind means not remaining stuck in constructs of what is itself already a construct. It is not enough to go about suppressing the subjectivizing or objectifying tendencies of thought while leaving intact the insidious habit of labeling experience and identifying with these labels. It is in and through language that hu-mans constitute themselves as subjects. This is not to say that lan-guage causes subjectivity, but only that it determines the sense the experiencer has of being a psychic unity that transcends actual expe-riences.

Yang dgon paʼs elucidation of amanasikāra here brings the deconstructive strategies of Madhyamaka philosophy to bear upon the Cittamātra phenomenology of constitutive experience. This move is not arbitrary, for any attempt to examine the constitutive activity of expe-rience must eventually grapple with the role of language in this activ-ity.79 The emphasis here shifts from what we experience to how we experience what we experience by means of the sedimented cultural- 79 Language plays a central role in self-representation, the construction of an ‘I who’ experiences which lies at the heart of subjectivizing-objectifying awareness. One contribu-tion of recent neurophysiological research has been to elucidate some of the neurological processes at work in the construction of a sense of self. In the words of one neurophysiol-gist, Sam Harris:

The sense of self seems to be the product of the brain’s representing its own acts of representation; its seeing of the world begets an image of a one who sees. It is impor-tant to realize that this feeling – the sense that each of us has of appropriating, rather than merely being, a sphere of experience – is not a necessary feature of conscious-ness. It is, after all, conceivable that a creature could form a representation of the world without forming a representation of itself in the world. And, indeed, many spiri-tual practitioners claim to experience the world in just this way, perfectly shorn of self.

A basic finding of neurophysiology lends credence to such claims. It is not so much what they are but what they do that makes neurons see, hear, smell, taste, touch, think, and feel. Like any other function that emerges from the activity of the brain, the feel-ing of self is best thought of as a process. It is not very surprising, therefore, that we can lose this feeling, because processes, by their very nature, can be interrupted. While the experience of selflessness does not indicate anything about the relationship between consciousness and the physical world (and is thus mute on the question of what happens after death), it has broad implications for the sciences of mind, for our approach to spirituality, and for our conception of human happiness.

See his The End of Faith: Religion, Terror and the Future of Reason (New York: Norton, 2005) p. 212.

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linguistic patterns at our disposal. The subject can never be present to himself as a pure prelinguistic subjectivity but only as an emergent cen-tre of operations who is inexorably caught up in the flux of experience and linguistic self-implication. The point of not dwelling in ego-mind is to catch oneself in the act, so to speak, of linguistically implicating one-self as the proprietor of this or that situation as it unfolds. It is in this moment of losing one’s self that the dominative and instrumental deliberations of dualistic thought lose their hold. An account of the contemplative practices for experiencing non-mentation or loss of self obviously falls outside the scope of this preliminary survey. A wide range of Buddhist practices may be said to have amanasikāra as their aim. Thus Yang dgon pa can mention several synonyms of amanasi-kāra80 (see above quotation) deriving from a variety of Buddhist teach-ings: “Dissociation from discursive elaborations” (spros bral) is a term used in Madhyamaka thought but also constitutes the second of sGam po pa’s four yogas (rnal byor bzhi)81. “Transcending the intellect” (blo [las] 'das) constitutes the fourth of Sarahaʼs four symbol terms (brda bzhi)82 and is met with frequently in teachings on Mahāmudrā. “Integration” (zung 'jug) is a term well known in Buddhist Tantrism which refers, in particular, to the indivisibility of insight (prajñā) and action (upāya). “Mahāmudrā” is of course the sine qua non of Tantric and Siddha praxis. Suffice it for the present to close this essay with a passage from Yang dgon pa that indicates how the four yogas facilitate the transformation of egoic mind through the clearing of the eightfold con-sciousness as anticipated in his account of amanasikāra:83

80 A much longer list of synonyms is given in the Ri chos kyi rnal 'byor bzhi pa Phyag rgya chen po snying po don gyi gter mdzod, 4b2 f.

81 Namely, rtse gcig, spros bral, ro gcig, and sgom med. Yang dgon pa diverges from the majority of Tibetan authors on the rNal 'byor bzhi who take pains to establish Indian sources for this doctrine, in the sūtras as well as the tantras. According to Yang dgon pa, “… these teachings on the rNal 'byor bzhi are not actually expressed in the tantra corpus because their content corresponds to things as they are (don ji lta ba). They are therefore special teachings that cannot be compared to the tantra corpus but which represent the doctrine of Dvags po rin po che (i.e., sGam po pa)” (ibid., fol. 2b1 f.). 82 See above note 51. 83 rGyal ba Yang dgon pa bka’ ʼbum (rTa mgo edition), fol. 8b3f.

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The manner in which the presencing of the eight-fold pattern of conscious-ness (tshogs brgyad) is cleared away ('dag) in the post-composure awareness (rjes shes) through a deep understanding (rtogs) which is free from the five constituents [that make up an individual] in the composure state (mnyam bzhag) is as follows: During time of single-pointed focusing (rtse gcig), one is free from the constituent of form (gzugs) and the five sensory operations are cleared away. During the time of freedom from discursive elaborations (spros bral), one becomes free from the constituents of feeling (tshor ba) and conception ('du shes) and subjective consciousness (yid shes) is cleared away. During the time of one-flavouredness (ro gcig), one is free from the constituent of motivational tendencies ('du byed) and the emotionally-tainted subjectivity (nyon mongs pa can gyi yid) is cleared away. During the time of non-meditation (bsgom med), one is free from the constituent of conscious-ness (rnam par shes pa) and the all-pervasive substratum awareness (kun gzhi'i rnam par shes pa) is cleared away.

Appendix

Phyag chen gan mdzod, v. 21, p. 38.5f. (cf. n. 33 above)

de yang yid la mi byed pa zhes pa’i don la rnam pa gsum gsungs pa’i dang po / (1) a ma na si kā ra zhes pa’i si’i ī yig ni / yid la zhes pa’i la yig bdun pa’i don yin / bdun pa ’di la gnas gzhi’i rkyen zhes bya bar sgra’i mdor /

gang kun nas ’dzin pa de gnas gzhi’o zhes ’byung //

de ltar gnas gzhi can gyi don de thog ma’i a [39] yig gis bkag pas / a ma na si ka ra zhes pa / gang du dmigs pa’i gnas sam rten gzhi med pa la bya dgos par shes te / sdom ’byung las

dngos med dngos po la rten nas / brten pa med pa’i bsgom pa bya / yid med yid kyi byas nas su / cung zad tsam yang mi bsam mo //

zhes gsungs so / de bas sems byung yid la byed pa’i ’dzin stangs kyis / dmigs pa la bsgrims nas sems ’dzin dam por byed pa thun mong gi zhi gnas bsgrub pa’i skabs la dgos kyang ’dir de bkag pa yin no / de yang thogs med kyis / de la ’jog par byed pa dang / yang dag par ’jog par byed pa la mi bsgrims te ’jug pa’i yid la byed pa yod do zhes pa’o //

(2) gnyis pa a ma na si kā ra zhes pa’i bdun pa’i ī de’i skyes bu’i bsdu ba byas nas yid mi byed pa zhes pa / la yig mi mngon par byas pa’i bshad pa gnyis pa mdzod do / de’i don ltar na’ang / yid mi byed pa zhes pa yid kyi las ’dir dgag

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byar bzhed pa ste / mngon par /

yid kyi las gang zhe na / sems pa yid kyi las yin no //

zhes sems byung sems pa’i ’dzin pa’i ’dzin stangs la nan tan du byed pa de [40] dgag pa’o / sems byung sems pa’ang sems mngon par ’du byed pa’i yid kyi las te / de nyid du /

dge ba dang mi dge ba lung du ma bstan pa rnams la sems ’jug par byed pa’i las can no zhes ba’o / don mngon par ’du byed pa dgag pa’o / nyes pa lnga spong ba’i ’du byed brgyad lta bu zhi gnas bsgrub pa la yin gyi / phyag rgya chen po la ni byas pa rnams dang bral zhing bsags pa las min

zhes dang /

nga ni ’gro ’ong mi len mi ’dor ro

dang / dgyes rdor las /

gang phyir yid kyis mi bsgom par /

zhes pas so // des na /

yis kyis de nyid dmigs pa bcas //

zhes yid kyi las su bya ba gang yin thams cad ’dir dmigs pa dang bcas par gzhag nas dmigs pa thams cad nye bar zhi ba cig nges par bstan no / des bas na /

kun tu rtog pas ma brtags pa / rab tu mi gnas pa yi yid / dran pa med cing yid byed min / dmigs pa med la phyag ’tshal ’dud //

ces ston pas gsungs pa de legs par bshad do / dran pa med pa sogs rgyas pa ’og tu ’byung ngo /

(3) gsum pa / a ma na si kā ra zhes pa’i a yar bcad nas / a yig skye ba med pa’i don du [41] byas te / ma na si kā ra yid la byed par bshad do / de ltar na a yig gi don tshul bzhin du yid la byed pa ni / a yid la byed pa zhes byar te / de yang / bar gyi tshig mi mngon par byas pa lo ma la dga’i rgyal po la lo ma’i rgyal po zhes pa bzhin no / ’dir a ni shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’o / a nu tpa nna / a ni ro dha zhes pa lta bu’i sgo nas / skye med ’gag med sogs gnyis su med pa’i rnam grangs thams cad mtshon nus so / mtshan brjod las /

a ni yig ’bru kun gyi mchog / don chen yi ge dam pa yin / kong nas ’byung ba skye ba med //

sogs kyis so / mtshan brjod kyi ’grel chen las /

sngags kyi tshul gyis ni shes rab dang thabs ni gnyis so / de gcig tu gyur pa ni gnyis su med pa ste / shes rab dang thabs gnyis su med pa bde ba chen po’i ngo bo nyid ni gnyis su med pa yin par ’dod de / de las byung ba’o / pha rol tu phyin pa’i tshul gyis ni / gzung ba dang ’dzin pa’am / bdag dang bdag

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gi’am / shes pa dang shes bya ste / ji srid yid kyi rnam par g.yo ba de srid du gnyis so / g.yo ba de srid du gnyis so / g.yo ba thams cad dang bral zhing / spros pa med pa chos thams cad bdag med pa ni gnyis su [42] med pa’i ngo bo nyid chos nyid kyi bdag nyid can gyi sku ’byung ste / de bas na gnyis su med par ’byung ba’o / gnyis su med par ’byung ba yang mi skye ba’i rnam pas khyad par du dbye ba’i phyir / mi skye’i chos can zhes bya ba smos te

zhes gsungs pa’o // de lta bu’i don gyis yid la mi byed pa ston pas yid la mi byed pa’i chos skor zhes bya’o / de thams cad slob dpon nges par sbyangs pa gnyis su med pa’i rdo rje zhes sam / grub pa’i slob dpon chen po mnga’ bdag Mai tri pas mdzad pa’o //

Abbreviations and bibliography

D Derge Tibetan Tripiṭaka. The Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Taipei Edition. Taipei, Taiwan: SMC Publishing 1991.

P Peking Tibetan Tripiṭaka. The Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Peking Edition. Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan Tripiṭaka Research Institute 1957.

I. Primary sources

A. Indian sources (Sanskrit and Tibetan by author):

Kamalaśīla

Bhāvanākrama I. Sanskrit and Tibetan texts edited by Tucci in Minor Bud-dhist Texts (Part II). See Tucci.

Avikalpapraveśadhāraṇīṭīkā. Tibetan translation in P vol. 105, no. 5501.

Maitreya/Asaṅga

Abhidharmasamuccaya. Edited by Pralhad Pradhan. Santiniketan: Visva Bharati 1950.

Abhisamayālaṅkāra. Edited by Stcherbatsky. Bibliotheca Buddhica, vol. 23. Leningrad 1929.

Dharmadharmatāvibhāga. Edited by J. Nozawa. In: Studies in Indology and Buddhology Presented in Honor of Prof. Susumu Yamaguchi on the Occasion of his 60th Birthday. Kyoto: Hozokan 1955.

Madhyāntavibhāga. Edited by G.N. Nagao. Tokyo 1964.

Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra. Edited by S. Levi. Paris: Champion 1925.

Uttaratantra. Edited by E.H. Johnson. Patna: Bihar Research Society 1950.

DAVID HIGGINS 298

Maitrīpāda

Amanasikāradhara. (AMĀ) In Advayavajrasaṃgraha, Edited by M. H. Shas-tri. GOS, vol. 60. Baroda: 1927, 60–62. Also in Advayavajrasaṃgraha. Ed. by the Study Group on Sacred Tantric Texts. Annual of the Institute for Comprehensive Studies of Buddhism (AICSB) 11 (March 1989) 136–143.

– For reproduction of original Sanskrit manuscript, Nepal German Manu-script Preservation Project B 22/24.

– For Tibetan translations, Peking Tanjur (P), v. 68 p. 286.5.6 f and Taipei Tanjur (D), v. 28, p. 276.4f.

Saraha

Cittakośājavajragīti. Tibetan translation in P vol. 69, no. 3117.

Kāyakośāmṛtavajragīti. Tibetan translation in P vol. 69, no. 31135

Kāyavāccittāmanasikāranāma. Tibetan translation in P vol. 69, no. 3118.

Mahāmudropadeśa. Tibetan translation in P vol. 69, no. 3119.

Vākkośarucirasvarajagīti. Tibetan translation in P vol. 69, no. 3116.

Tilopa

Acintyamahāmudrā. Tibetan translation in P vol. 82, no. 4635.

Dohākośa. Tibetan translation in P vol. 69, no. 3128.

Mahāmudropadeśa. Tibetan translation in P vol. 69, no. 3132.

Vasubhandu

Abhidharmakośa. With Bhāṣya and Yasomitra’s Vyakhya. Edited by Swami Dwarikadas Shastri. 4 vols. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati 1970–73.

Trimśikāvijñapti. With Bhāṣya. Edited by S. Levi in Vijñaptimātrasiddhi. Paris: Champion 1932.

Various authors

ʼPhags yul grub dbang rnams kyi zab mo’i doha rnams las khol byung mu tig phreng ba (A Selected Anthology of Dohās from private collection of Herbert Guenther; no publication information given)

B. Tibetan sources (by author)

ʼBaʼ ra ba rGyal mtshan dpal bzang

Ngo sprod bdun maʼi ʼgrel pa Man ngag rin po cheʼi sgron me. In: A Tibetan Encyclopedia of Buddhist Scholasticism: The Collected Writings of ‘Ba’ ra ba rgyal mtshan dpal bzang, vol. XI. Dehra Dun: Ngawang Gyaltsen and Ngawang Lungtok, 1970.

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sBa gSal snang, sBa Sang shi, et al.

sBa bzhed ces bya ba las sBa gsal snang gi bzhed pa bzhugs. Edited by mGon po rgyal mtshan. Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang 1982.

Bu ston Rin chen grub

bKaʼ drin rjes su dran par byed paʼi gSan yig (= gSan yig). In The Collected Works of Bu-ston, vol. LA (26). Edited by Lokesh Chandra. Śata-Piṭaka Series 66. Delhi: International Acamdemy of Indian Culture 1971.

Blo bzang grags pa, mChims ston

Chos mngon pa gsal byed legs par bshad paʼi rgya mtsho. Sarnath: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies 1986.

sGam po pa bSod nams rin chen

Collected Works of sGam po pa. Dvags lha sgam po edition. Darjeeling 1982.

Phyag rgya chen po rtsa ba la ngo sprod pa, vol. VA.

Zhal gyis bdud brtsi thun mongs (sic!) ma yin pa, vol. DZA.

ʼGos lo tsa ba gZhon nu dpal

Deb ther sngon po. Translated as The Blue Annals (= BA) by G. Roerich. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas 1949.

Klong chen rab ʼbyams pa

Grub mthaʼ rin po cheʼi mdzod. Gangtok: Dodrup Chen Rinpoche edition 1969.

gNas lugs rin po cheʼi mdzod. Gangtok: Dodrup Chen Rinpoche edition 1969.

Mi pham rgya mtsho

dBu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad ʼjam dbyangs bla ma dgyes paʼi zhal lung. In: Collected Writings of Jam-mngon ʼJu Mi-pham rgya-mtsho. Gangtok 1971. vol. XII.

Mi bskyod rdo rje

dBu ma la ʼjug paʼi rnam bshad dPal ldan dus gsum mkhyen paʼi zhal lung dvags brgyud grub paʼi shing rta. Rumtek: Dharma Chakra Centre 1969.

gNubs Sangs rgyas ye shes

bSam gtan mig sgron. vol. 74 of Smanrtsis Shesrig Spendzod series. Leh: S.W. Tashigangpa 1974.

Nyang ral Nyi maʼi ʼod zer

Chos ʼbyung me tog snying po sBrang rtsiʼi bcud. In: Rin chen gter mdzod chen poʼi rgyab chos, vols. 5 & 6. Paro: 1979.

DAVID HIGGINS 300

Padma dkar po

The Collected Works of Kun-mkhyen Padma-dkar-po. Gnam ʼBrug edition. Darjeeling: Kargyud Sungrab Nyamso Khang 1973.

bKaʼ brgyud kyi bkaʼ ʼbum gsil bu rnams kyi gSan yig. (= gSan yig). vol. 4, no. XII.

Klan ka gzhom paʼi gtan bzhugs. vol. 21, no. XI.

rNal ʼbyor bzhiʼi bshad pa don dam mdzub tshugs su bstan pa. (= rNal ʼbyor bzhi mdzub tshugs). vol. 21, no. IX.

Phyag rgya chen po man ngag gi bshad sbyor rgyal baʼi gan mdzod. (= Phyag chen gan mdzod). vol. 21, no. I.

Rang ʼbyung rdo rje (Third Karmapa)

Nges don phyag rgya chen poʼi smon lam. Blockprint (Lahul, n.d.)

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THE'MYSTERIES OF BODY, SPEECH, AND MIND:

THE THREE ESOTERICA (SANMI) IN MEDIEVAL SINITIC BUDDHISM

RlCHARD D, MCBRlDE, II

When observed through a Japanese Shingon lens the "three eso­terica" or "three mysteries" (Ch. sanmi, Jpn. sanmitsu .::::. W, Skt. *tri-guhya) is generally considered a seminal component of the radi­cal, ritual-oriented approach of "Tantric" or "Esoteric" Buddhism! by which a practitioner attains buddhahood in this very body (soku­shin jobutsu ~p ~ )JX;1J1l). The three esoterica, as a ritualized replica­tion of the body, speech, and mind of the Buddha, is seen as a key practice described in the Da Piluzhena chengfo jing A ~l!ilih33~ JJX: 1J1l fr..& (Satra on Vairocana's attaining buddhahood, T 848), which Ku­kai 2m (774-835) mastered during his visit to China.2 Because of its centrality in "esoteric" ritual, the meaning of the three esoterica was a source of debate in the medieval Tendai Esoteric tradition

An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the panel "Tantric Buddhism through the Chinese Looking Glass," at the Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion, Washington, D.C., November 21, 2006, The author of this article would like to thank George A. Keyworth, III, Charles D. Orzech, and the peer reviewer, whose comments and suggestions greatly improved the quality of this essay.

1 Although the category Tantrarrantric is a modem scholarly invention, I still prefer it to Esoteric Buddhism, which is just as problematic. On problems with the term Tantra see Hugh B, Urban, Tantra: Sex, Politics, and Power in the Study of Religion (Berkeley: Uni­versity of California Press 2003) 271-281; see also McBride, "Is there really 'Esoteric' Buddhism?" Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 27/2 (2004) 329-356.

2 See Ryiiichi Abe, The Weaving of Mantra (New York: Columbia University Press 1999) 129-132. Abe also notes that Kiikai wrote three short essays on the body, speech, and mind - Sokushin ji5blltsugi HP ~ Ji!t{J!l~ (Attaining buddhahood in this very body, or Transforming one's body into the realm of enlightenment) T 2428, 77; Shi5ji jissi5gi §* .;f!j~ (Voice, Letter, Reality) T 2429, 77; and Unjigi Qf*~ (On the Sanskrit Letter Hiiq:t) T 2430, 77 - which represent the "core of Kiikai's philosophy." See Ryiiichi Abe, "Buddhahood in this Lifetime," in Buddhist Scriptures, ed. Donald S. Lopez, JT. (London: Penguin 2004) 497.

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 29· Number 2·2006 (2008) pp. 305-355

306 RlCHARD D. MCBRlDE, II

(Taimitsu €:lW): Rival interpretations deriving from Tiantai Zhiyi's ::K15~n~ (538-597) commentaries on the Lotus Sutra and the views of Tendai thinkers influenced by Shingon ~ j§ (Tomitsu )If~') texts vied for supremacy.3If so important in Japan, what of this concept when viewed through a Chinese looking glass? This paper will ad­dress three questions - how did medieval Chinese Buddhist intellectuals understand the term, how did early Tantric practitioners understand it, and did its meaning change?

In this paper I address these interrelated questions by analyzing several of the most instructive instances of the use of the term "three esoterica" and related terms by Buddhist scholiasts in medieval Sinitic Buddhism.4 After first discussing the origins of the term in Chinese Buddhist literature during the Northern and Southern Dynasties period (Nanbeichao, ca. 317-589), I will analyze the term as it was used by eminent translators and scholars of the Sui-Tang transitional period (ca. 589-712), the High Tang period (ca. 712-756), and the mid and late Tang period (ca. 756-907). The concept of the three esoterica has not been examined in detail by Western scholars of either mainstream Chinese Buddhism or Chinese Tantric/ Esoteric Buddhism.s In earlier research I have sought to place the

3 See, for instance, Kubota Tetsumasa ~ EB 1!f iE, "Nihon Tendai no okeru yuso san­mitsu hoben setsu" B ;$:7i:in;:: tnt ;s~t§=W:iJ~~)I, (On arguments about the meaning of sanmitsu [Three Mysteries] in the Japanese Tendai Sect), Nihon Bukkyo gakkai nenpo B ;$:1Mj:~i<i¥~q~ 57 (1992) 145-162; Okubo Ryoshun *~ 1JiH~.W3t, "Taimitsu no sanmitsu ron" a*O)=*~ (The Three Secrets Theory of Taimitsu), Tindai gakuho 7i:it ~¥R 34 (1992) 109-113; Otsuka Nobuo *~1$7c, "Sanmitsu shiso ni tsuite" =W,\!l,r~';:: ":J,' l (On the concept of the tri-guhya), Indogaku Bukkyogaku kenkyii 34/1 (1995) 174-176.

4 What I call China's medieval period refers to the years between 317 and 907 C.E.

5 Tajima Ryujun treats the three mysteries from a Japanese Shingon perspective but not the earlier exegetical tradition in his Etude sur Ie Mahtivairocana-sL7tra (Dainichikyo) (paris: Adrien Maisonneuve 1936) 44-54, 91-98; see also Tajima, "A Study of the Mahavairocana-sntra," in The Enlightenment of Vairocana, trans. and ed. Alex Wayman (Dehli: Motilal Banarsidass 1992; rpt. 1998) 245-247, 293-298. Much more detailed assessments are available, of course, in Japanese. A detailed treatment may be found in Mochizuki Shinko i€'Jl1§~, ed., Bukkyo dai jiten 1*~*ill¥~ (Encyclopedia of Bud­dhism), rev. ed. 10 vols. (Kyoto: Seikai Seiten Kanko Kyokai 1954-1963) 2:1682c-1684b, s.v. "sanmitsu" and "sanmitsu kaji." Nakamura Hajime rpH:7I; only treats the mikkyo interpretation in his Bukkyogo dai jiten 1*~~::kill¥~ (Dictionary of Buddhist technical

THE MYSTERIES OF BODY, SPEECH, AND MIND 307

rhetoric and practices of the nascent Tailtric tradition within the con­text of mainstn;:am Sinitic exegetical Buddhism.6 This, I believe, is a fruitful approach to understand what is shared and what is new and provides important insight into the dynamic nature of medieval Sinitic Buddhism. By understanding the exegetical and rhetorical usage of the term over time we can better understand how the Tan­tras were seen as a continuation of the Mahayana and we can discern those points that appeared novel, because the term always described a complex intellectual understanding of the nature of buddhahood.

Before I launch into my study of the three esoterica I should ex­plain why I choose to translate sanmi as "three esoteric a," rather than the more common "three mysteries." The use of "three mysteries" derives ultimately from the French trois mysteres used early on by Tajima RyUjun and, in places, by Etienne Lamotte. 7 Lamotte, nevertheless, did not always find that translation suitable because he also uses trois secrets. Perhaps following Lamotte, Yamasaki Taik6 and Kenneth R. White translate the concept more or less consistently as "three secrets."g Although Hakeda Yoshito uses "three mysteries," by contrast, Kiyota Minoru prefers the more Sanskritic reconstruc-

terms) (3 vols., Tokyo: Tokyo Shoseki 1975; 1 voL rpt. Tokyo: Tokyo Shoseki 1999) 490b-<:, s.v. "sanmitsu." Lii Jianfu §3!fill has examined the "three esoterica" in early Tantric literature (viz. T 848). See his Zhongguo Mijiaoshi <P OOffi'~5:. (History of Eso­teric Buddhism in China) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe 1995) passim, esp. 97-99,242-244.

6 McBride, "Is there really 'Esoteric' Buddhism?" (cf. n. 1 above); and McBride, "DharaI,ll and Spells in Medieval Sinitic Buddhism," Journal of the International Associa­tion of Buddhist Studies 28/1 (2005) 85-114.

7 See Tajima RyUjun, Etude sur le Mahavairocana-siitra (cf. n. 5 above) 93-94, pas­sim, and Etienne Lamotte, trans., Le traite de la grande vertu de sagesse de Niigiirjuna (MahaprajfiClpClramitiisClstra), 5 vols. (Louvain: Institut orientaliste, Universite de Louvain 1944--1981) 1:19-20.

8 Lamotte, trans., Le tmite (cf. n. 7 above) 1:560; Yamasaki Taiko, Shingon: Japanese Esoteric Buddhism (Boston: Shambhala 1988) 30--32, 106--122. Kenneth R. White, in his The Role of Bodhicitta in Buddhist Enlightenment Including a Translation into English of Bodhicitta-sastra, Benkemmitsu-nikyoron, and Sammaya-kaijo (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press 2005), typically employs the translation "three secrets," although he also calls them "three mysteries" in a few places (pp. 199,441). White also translates adhi~tha­na (kaji :lJQf,f) as "three secrets practice," which I [md problematic.

308 RICHARD D. MCBRIDE, II

tion tri-guhya or his translation "three secret acts."9 More recently, with the rise of Daoist and Chan/Zen studies, scholars have also be­come accustomed to translating the word xuan 15: as "mystery," as in chongxuan £ 15: (twofold mystery) and sanxuan .::::.15: (three myster­ies).10 Both sanmi and sanxuan should not be the "three mysteries" because mi (secret, intimate, confidential) and xuan (dark, arcane, profound, subtle), though similar in some respects, ultimately invoke different meanings and I think that xuan is more ~ppropriately

"mysterious." My more technical translation of "three esoterica" allows for a wide range of meaning to be added to the term. Further­more, it also permits a linguistic link to the related polemical terms mi * (esoteric) and xian fflJ~ (exoteric), which figure in any discussion of scholastic and Tantric Buddhism in East Asia.

I will not treat the views of the Japanese monk Kukai in this study. Kukai's views on the three esoterica are varied, complex, and deserving of their own study, but they do not jibe with my present purposeY My reasons for this are twofold. First, I do not find the position compelling that Kukai preserves unaltered the views of his Chinese master Huiguo ;!5f!: (746-805), with whom he studied a mere six months. Second, Kukai did not participate in the continental

9 Yoshito S. Hakeda, Kakai: Major Works (New York: Columbia University Press 1972) 87-93, 97, 152, 225-235, 251; Kiyota Minoru, Shingon Buddhism: Theory and Practice (Los Angeles and Tokyo: Buddhist Books International 1978) 175-176; and Kiyota, Tantric Concept of Bodhicitta: A Buddhist Experimental Philosophy (An Exposition based upon the Mahavairocana-siltra, Bodhicitta-sastra, and Sokushin-jBbutsu) (Madison: South Asian Area Center, University of Wisconsin-Madison 1982) 153.

10 See, for instance, Robert H. Sharf, Coming to Terms with Chinese Buddhism: A Reading of the Treasure Store Treatise (Honolulu: University of Hawai 'i Press 2002) 47-71.

11 See, for instance, Kongo hannya haramitsukyo kaidai itJMJU~;s:;!Bi:!i,£:MfMJI!, T 2201, 57. Ie, 2e; Nihonkyo kaidai B ;$:1i&MJI!, T 2211, 58.4c; Kongojo kaidai itJMJUUiMJI!, T 2221, 61.4b-c; Rishukyo kaidai MUIlBIi&iJf'JI!, T 2236, 61.612a; Himitsu mandara jajiishinron tlrW:lUt;!i+f±'L.'~ 1, T 2425, 77.303a, roll 10, T 2425, 77.361b; Sokushin jobutsugi (six editions) T 2428, 77.381c, 383a, 385a, 386a, 387b-c, 389c, 393c, 391b, 395b, 400a-b (Hakeda, Kakai: Major Works [cf. n. 9 above] 225-234); ShOji jissogi ~'* :lUlU!, T 2429, 77.401c (Hakeda, Kakai: Major Works, 239); and Unjigi Pf'*t%, T 2430, 77.405b (Hakeda, Kakai: Major Works, 257); Heianjo taijo tenno kanjomon "f~:IJi!(;;;(I:J:~ ~ilu!)c, T 2461, 78.1a, 2a, 2e; and Benkenmitsu nikyo ron 1'Jil'l\'iW=~fu1lJ, T 2427, 77.375a (Hakeda, Kiikai: Major Works, 152).

THE MYSTERIES OF BODY, SPEECH, AND MIND 309

discourse on intellectual Buddhism aftel: his return to Japan. As Abe Ryiiichi has shown, he created a new Buddhist discourse. No one on the continent was familiar with his work and they probably would have been surprised at some of his conclusions because they reflect Kiikai's (successful) attempt to change the views of the proponents of Nara's *' ~ exegetical schools (Nanto Bukky6 i¥i=tl~1L.~~). Furthermore, because later Shingon proponents placed many doc­trinal arguments and positions in Kukai' s mouth I am sufficiently skeptical of including him here.12

The origins of the concept of "three esoteric a"

The first scripture to mention the three esoterica individually is the Miji jin 'gang jing lli'jJ£1i£~U*,~ (The Satra on the Vajrasattva Esoteric Traces),13 which was translated by Dharmarak~a (Pahu ¥:t:-iif, ca.

12 See Abe, The Weaving of Mantra (cf. n. 2 above) 152-154; Omura Seigai :k;J;1iffim, Mikkyi5 hattatsushi if~§6Ji~ (History of the development of Esoteric Buddhism) (To­kyo: Kokusho Kank5kai 1918; rpt. Tokyo: DaitB Shuppansha 1972) 373-375 and passim; Yamaori Tetsuo lir:lfit!i'ti, "Sannin no nitt5s5 to komikky5" ':::::,AO) Ar.ll'1111 i: ilif~ (Three monks who went to Tang China and old Esoteric Buddhism) in Chingo kokka to jujutsu: Nihon Bukkyi5 no hajimari $I\!ilOO* i: u5t#J: a*1l.~O)fril it '? (State protection and spell craft: The origins of Japanese Buddhism), ed. Uehara ShBichi ...t@Jg- and Yamaori Tetsuo (Tokyo: Shiieisha 1989) 143-146. Misaki Ry5shil .:::::wi\jll:!.m, Taimitsu no kenkyt7 tJifO)1iifJE (Research on Tendai Esoteric Buddhism) (Tokyo: S5bunsha 1988) 146-150, gives an overview of these problems in a short discussion of the problems regarding the late terms junmitsu I.\lliif (pure esotericism) and zi5mitsu ltif (mixed esoteri­cism).

13 Although cited by KumarajIva, could the Miji jin 'gang jing really date from the time of the later Bodhiruci (d. 727)7 The evidence suggests that such a sfitra did exist because it was known to KumarajIva, Lushan Huiyuan 1i!L!J:fl,J! (334-417), and Sengzhao 1111!l (374---414). The earliest references to the scripture are from the early fifth century. KumarajIva quotes from or alludes to the satra four times; see Dazhidu lun :k1!i' JjJ{oj I, T 1509, 25.59a, roll 26, T 1509, 25.248b; roll 57, T 1509, 25.466b; and roll 88, T 1509, 25.684a-b. Huiyuan and KumarajIva discussed it in their correspondence; see Jiwnoluoshi fa dayi Mi)J},'m1ttt;Bijj:k~ 1, T 1856, 45.125c; roll 2, T 1856, 45. 130b. Sengzhao refers to it twice in his Commentary on the Vimalakfrtinirdefa Satra; see Zhu Weimoji jing tlj,l)J),' ~~*~ 5, T 1775, 38.37Ia7-1O; and roll 9, T 1775, 38.404b. The scripture was also known to and used by scholars of the sixth century. Sengyou 1111#5 (445-518) was familiar with a Miji jing, in five rolls, also known as Miji jin 'gang jing, in either five or seven rolls. He gives the date on which the translation was completed as the eighth day of the tenth month of the ninth year of the Taikang .:kll reign period (October 18,288), and he included it in

310 RICHARD D. MCBRIDE, II

265-316)14 and later collected in the Dabaoji jing A.fJ:~ (Mahii­ratnakiita, T 310) by Bodhiruci (putiliuzhi i?fm¥Atx, fl. 693-727):15

At that time [the Bodhisattva] Quiescent Thoughts (Jiyi ;f,j[~) again ques­tioned the Vajrasattva Esoteric Traces (Miji jingang lishi W~ii:lllJtl}J±): "The Tathiigata possesses a few things that are secret and important. They are those things that all iriivakas and all pratyekabuddhas are unable to ac­cess. How much more so for the ilk of the common masses and the be­nighted [icchantika]! Well done!"

Esoteric Traces desired to think of a blissful abode [sukhavihiira]. He promulgated the Tathiigata's secret and important [things] everywhere.

All the living beings assembled together and desired to hear them. The Vajrasattva Esoteric Traces addressed Quiescent Thoughts saying, "Listen up! Listen up! Ponder this well. I will now discourse on the Tathiigata's se­cret and important [things]. There are three things (sanshi .=.JJ). What do we call these three? The first is called body-esoterica (shenmi 5:tW), the sec­ond is called speech-esoterica (yumi ~W), and the third is called mind-eso­terica (yimi ~W).16

This scripture goes on to provide many details on the Buddha's body-esoterica. In particular, it repeatedly refers to the Buddha's ability to manifest his physical majesty everywhere. In essence the scripture introduces these three types of esoterica to rationalize many of the more unbelievable aspects of the Buddha Sakyamuni's minis­try and supernormal powers as described in the fully developed leg-

his catalog Chu sanzang jiji tf:l'::::::~iiG~ 2, T 2145, 55.7bI8. Bodhiruci (Putiliuzhi 'lttlHiIi: iil;;, ca. 508-535) alluded to portions not discussed by previous scholars in his translation of the Mile pusa suwen jing iun 5rnb'lti\iJiJfr.ll~~ 3, T 1525, 26.245a23-25. The siitra was also used by Jizang ~~ (549--623) in his Weimo jing yishu ~*~tlWlE 6, T 1781, 38.983b; and Guanding JilJi (531-632) in his Daban niepanjing shu */.Jl!:¥3!~~WlE 19, T 1767, 38.147c. Hence, the evidence strongly suggests that a Mijijing did exist prior to the later Bodhiruci's inclusion of it in the Dabaojijing.

14 For the biography of Dharmarak~a see Gaoseng zhuan ~1\W1f 1, T 2059, 50.326c2-327a12; see also Eric Ziircher, The Buddhist Conquest of China, 2nd ed. (Leiden: E. J. Brill 1972) 1:65-70.

15 For the biography of Bodhiruci see Song gaoseng zhuan *~1\W1f 3, T 2061, 50.720b4-c12.

16 Mijijingang lishi hui W~:&~~;iJ±1r (The convocation of the Vajrasattva Esoteric Traces), in Dabaoji jing *~~~ 10, T 310, 11.53b9-15; see also Stanley Weinstein, Buddhism under the T'ang (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1987) 44, 49.

THE MYSTERIES OF BODY, SPEECH, AND MIND 311

end of the Buddha's life. The scripture does not develop the meaning of these three 'types of esoterica in any systematic manner, however. The Vajrasattva Esoteric Traces' intent, it seems, is to cause the ~embers of the crowd to accept these logical inconsistencies as as­pects of the wondrous power of the Buddha. This scripture is a suit­able beginning in that Dharmarak~a does not use the term "three eso­terica" (sanmi). Instead he calls them "three things."

As with many seminal terms and topics of interest among Maha­yiina Buddhists' in the Sinitic cultural sphere, the locus classicus of the term is, in fact, found in the first roll of KumarajIva's (Jiumo­luoshi ~.!l1t, 343-413) Dazhidu lun *~ J.t~1fU (Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom, T 1509), attributed to Nagarjuna (Longshu fi~1t1, ca. 50-150 C.E.):17

Just as the buddha body is immeasurable, bright and clear sounds and echoes are also immeasurable. Morality, meditation, wisdom, and so forth, all the meritorious virtues of all the buddhas are immeasurable. Likewise, in the sa­tra on Esoteric Traces, the three esoterica (sanmi) are mentioned. In this [scripture] they are described in great detail. Furthermore, when the Buddha was first born he fell to the ground and walked seven paces. From his mouth, by himself, he uttered speech. When his speech ended he was then silent just like all infants and he neither walked nor spoke. He ate mother's milk for three years. All of his mothers raised him and he grew up gradually. Nevertheless, buddha bodies are without number and exceed [the number of] all world systems. Because there are living beings they [buddhas] appear like ordinary people. This is because when ordinary people are born their bodies divide all roots and their [capacity for mental] consciousnesses is imma­ture. ls

17 See Lamotte, trans., Le traite (cf. n. 7 above). On many different names by which this text was known in medieval China and on the attribution of the text to Nagiirjuna see Paul Demieville' s review of the second volume of Lamotte's translation (originally pub­lished in 1950), in Choix d'etudes bouddiques (1929-1970) (Leiden: E. J. Brill 1973) 470, n. 1,475-476. For the biography of Kumarajlva see Gaoseng zhuan illii~1.J 2, T 2059, 50.330a-333a; see also Kenneth Ch'en, Buddhism in China: A Historical Survey (prince­ton: Princeton University Press 1964) 81-83. For the problem of Nagarjuna's existence and dating in Indian literature see Joseph Walser, "Niigarjuna and the Ratniivali: New Ways to Date an Old Philosopher," Journal of the 1nternational Association of Buddhist Studies 25/1-2 (2002) 209-262.

18 Dazhidulun 1, T 1509, 25.59a2-8; cf. Lamotte, Le traite (cf. n. 7 above) 1:19-20.

312 RICHARD D. MCBRIDE, II

At this stage of the project, Kumarajiva conceptualizes the three eso­terica as one of the virtues of a buddha that enable him to do things with his body, speech, and mind that are beyond the capabilities of ordinary living beings and alludes, of course, to the satra treated above. Later in the work, Kumarajiva further develops the idea of the three estoerica when he analyzes a scriptural passage stating that the spiritual power of the Buddha Sakyamuni is his ability to appear in the SaM world system in the desire realm to preacp. the Prajiia­paramita (Perfection of wisdom) to the bodhisattva-mahasattvas. Nevertheless, the Buddha's real preaching is accomplished without speech. Kumarajiva explains that the Buddha's method of preaching is produced from his awakened observation - but awakened observa­tion is a coarse thing. He elucidates further:

The Buddha does not move, but constantly abides (ru A, lit. "enters") in dhyana-meditation. Because of causal connections due to meritorious virtues of previous lifetimes, the edges of his body emit sounds and resonate with objects like echoes. Just like a heavenly skilled musician [gandharva] pro­duces sounds spontaneously and, furthermore, just as a ma~i-jewel gives a person whatever he wants instantly - if he wants clothing and quilts, food and drink, or music, personal lusts and necessities, he acquires them all spontaneously. The Buddha is also like this. From the edges of his body, all the pores of the skin, there are sounds in accordance to his thoughts that preach the Dharma spontaneously. The Buddha does not reflect upon these things and also he does not distinguish between them. It is just like that which he preached in the Sutra on the Vajrasattva Esoteric Traces: "The Buddha possesses three esoterica - body-esoterica, speech-esoteric a, and mind-esoterica." All gods and humans neither comprehend nor know them.

[If] there is a single assembly of living beings, some see the Buddha's body as yellow gold, white silver, or all the colors of miscellaneous treasures. [If] there are people who see the sixteen-foot body of the Buddha, some see one li, ten Ii, a hundred, a thousand, ten thousand, a hundred thousand, up to something boundless, measureless, everywhere in space. Things like this, and so forth, are called body-esoterica.

As for speech-esoterica, [if] there are people who hear the sounds of the Buddha's voice at one Ii, there are those who hear them at ten Ii, a hundred, a thousand, ten thousand, a hundred thousand, numberless, measureless, everywhere in space. In an assembly, some hear [the Buddha] preach about giving liberally [dana], others hear him preach about observing the precepts,

THE MYSTERIES OF BODY, SPEECH, AND MIND 313

and others hear him preach about enduring abuse, making seminal progress, dhyana-meditation, and wisdom. [It is] like this up to the twelve sections of the canon. 19 In a dharma assembly of 80,000, what each person hears is in accordance to their mind. This is called speech-esoterica.2o

Kumarajiva then goes on to illustrate how the sounds of the Bud­dha's voice may be heard anywhere and everywhere in the universe by relating a story about the Buddha's disciple Mahamaudgalyayana (Mulian § Jl). This monk famous for his psychic power (shenzuli t$ fEj]) desired to know if the sounds of the Buddha's voice are near or far. So, at this instant he manifested his mental power and pro­duced an immeasurable number of buddha world systems. He report­edly heard the sounds of the Buddha's voice no different than if he were nearby. In the world systems he produced the buddhas and the people in the great assemblies were very large in stature. Because of this Mahamaudgalyayana stood on his bowl out of respect. The disciples of those buddhas insultingly asked those buddhas about the small people21 of other world systems like Mahamaudgalyayana. They wanted to know where the insects on the heads of these people came from and why they were allowed to walk around wearing the

19 The twelve sections of the canon (shierbu jing +=~~*.lJl:, also shierfen jing +=* ~~) are (1) sLltra (xiuduoluo 1~$.\i, scriptures, discourses), (2) geya (qiye fi£1:lt, long poems), (3) vytikara!1a (shoujijing :'¥:rr:'.Ii.lJl:, scriptures about those receiving prophesies of future buddhahood), (4) gtithti (jiatuo 11mWt;, verses, songs of praise), (5) udtina (youtuona ilWt;JJ~, song of joy, utterance), (6) nidtina (yinyuanjing l29#lM[, scripture on the causal connections or origins of something), (7) avadtina (apotuona ~ilJ~Bi.Wt;jj~, parables, meta­phors, stories, illustrations), (8) itivfttaka (rushiyujing ~o£~~Ii.lJl:, scriptures in which the Buddha tells of the deeds of his disciples and others in previous lives), (9) jtitaka (ben­shengjing 1js::i:Ii.lJl:, stories of the previous lives of the Buddha), (10) vaipulya (guangjing fiIi ~, broad scriptures, general scriptures), (11) adbhuta-dhanna (weizengyoujing '* 'i§\' fjli.lJl:, scriptures telling about the inconceivable spiritual penetrations of the Buddha), (12) upadesa (lunyijing ~jHj'U~, treatises and exegeses). See Dazhidu lun 33, T 1509, 25.306cl6-20.

20 Dazhidu [un 10, T 1509, 25.127c, cf. Lamotte, Le traite (cf. n. 7 above) 1:559-560.

21 The large sentient beings in the other world systems referred to beings of ours and other world systems - such as Mahamaudgalyayana in this story - in a derogative manner as "small people" (xiaoren IJ\ A) because their stature was considerably smaller than the people in the other systems. The implication is that beings who reside in world systems that are considerably impure possess bodies that are small in size and the lengths of their lives are comparatively short.

314 RICHARD D. MCBRIDE, II

clothing of sramalJas. Those buddhas responded saying, "Do not take these people lightly. From here, in the eastern region, crossing over measureless buddha lands, there is a Buddha called Sakyamuni. Here is that Buddha's disciple who specializes in psychic power." That buddha told Mahamaudgalyayana, "You are investigating where the sound of the Buddha crosses over measureless, hundreds of thousands of kalpas - but one is able to ascertain their bounds and limits. Once again, the Buddha leaves the world to resolye the doubts of living beings; hence, he preaches the Dharma. Here he does not respond to the difficulty of explaining how this is possible just like he does not respond to the question how does one remove ignorance? The Buddha is also like this. He does not respond to the question what is Buddha by answering."22

For KumarajIva, the concept of the "three esoterica" is essentially a convenient way to talk about the inconceivable properties of buddhahood. Although living beings continually produce the "three types of karma" (sanye =~t Skt. tri-karma): referring to karma pro­duced via the body (shenye ~~t kaya-karma) , speech (yuye ~~~t vak-karma), and the mind (yiye ;!:~, mana~-karma), what a buddha produces with his body, speech, and mind is incomprehensible by ordinary, rational thought. Perhaps because a buddha acquiesces to the non-production of dharmas and does not infuse a misplaced no­tion of self into his actions - hence, in this sense he does not "act" like ordinary beings - what a tathiigata does fundamentally tran­scends what ordinary people can do and, thus, can be used like an expedient means (jangbian 1J{£, upaya) to preach the Buddha­dharma. The three esoterica are also related to the emerging doctrine of the three bodies of the buddha (sanshen .::::..~) and how the true body (zhenshen ~~) or Dharma body (jashen ¥t:!i'l', dharmakaya) produces other types of bodies in response to the needs of living be­ingS.23

22 Dazhidu fun 10, T 1509, 25.127c-128a; cf. Lamotte, Le traite (cf. n. 7 above) 1:560-562.

23 See, for instance, Sharf, Coming to Terms with Chinese Buddhism (cf. n. 10 above) 100-111; and David W. Chappell, "Chinese Buddhist Interpretations of the Pure Lands," in Buddhist and Taoist Studies I, Asian Studies at Hawai'i 18, ed. Michael Saso and David

THE MYSTERIES OF BODY, SPEECH, Al'ID MIND 315

Kumarajlva's translation of the Rem-vang jing 1=.:£J.& (Book for h[;mane kings, T 245) also introduces other concepts that will be conflated with the three esoterica by later scholiasts. In this connec­tion, the scripture says: "Of the Tathagata's three types of karma, there is no limit to his virtue.,,24 Furthermore, "The so-called three types of karma are the same as morality (jie itlt), the same as sight (jian .%), and the same as learning (xue ~)."25 By linking this specialized conceptualization of karma to a buddha or bodhisattva's "virtue" (de 1i), the concept of the three esoterica is primed to frame the true meaning of nirvalJa to a Mahayana bodhisattva.

The Sui and early Tang period

In the late sixth century, Tiantai Zhiyf6 used the concept of the "three esoterica" to describe the fruits attained by a bodhisattva practitioner who magnifies his practice continually and cultivates the virtues associated with buddhahood. In his Miaofa lianhua jing wenju Y'y~!Ji:tE*&Jt1J] (Passages from Lotus Sutra of the Sublime Dharma, T 1718), Zhiyi concretized the one Buddhist path leading to nirvalJa in terms of the three actions, which calls to mind the three virtues, the three esoterica, and other lists of three. The three eso­terica are the fruit of cultivating the three types of karma appropri­ately:

In summary, these three actions27 are the path to nirviil}a. In summary, with respect to the condition of the three virtues (sande = iliff,) in practice, the

W. Chappell (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press 1977) 23-53.

24 Renwang bore boluomijing 1=xJl£*i'ffi'!.ilHl1lliif 1, T 245, 8.828a3.

25 Renwang bore boluomijing 2, T 245, 8.831b6.

26 For the biography of Zhiyi see Xu gaoseng zhuan 17, T 2059, 50.564a-568a; see also Leon Hurvitz, Chih-i i\'l'ifi (538-597): An Introduction to the Life and Ideas of a Chi­nese Buddhist Monk, Melanges chinios et bouddhiques (Bruxelles: 1 'Institut Beige des Hautes Etudes Chinoises 1962), and Ch'en, Buddhism in China (cf. n. 17 above) 303-313.

27 The three actions (sanxing .==:: 1'r) are essentially interchangeable with the concept of the three types of karma (sanye). They refer to body-actions (shenxing ~1T), speech ac­tions (kouxing piT), and mind actions (yixing :\t.iT). See Dazhidu lun 36, T 1509, 25.325b21-26.

316 RICHARD D. MCBRIDE, II

condition is designated as "peace and bliss" and the, path is designated as "practice. "

The Treatise on the. Great [Perfection of Wisdom] says: "The bodhisattva from his initial arou'sal of the bodhicitta lfaxin ~JL'), constantly visualize~ the path of practice [leading to] nirvli:l)a.,,28 When the seed [is planted], he uses this dharma of the three practices, [and] instructs about the three types of karma (sanye) by practice. Because the three types of karma are pure, they are pure in the six roots.29 If the six roots are pure, by giving rise to the marks and resembling. the understanding [of an enlightened being], they en­ter into reality. When they are brought to fruition they are called buddha eyes, ears, and so forth. The seed is called the practice of calmness and the fruit is called the virtue of severing (duande Iltfitti). The seed is called the practice of insight [visualization] and the fruit is called the virtue of wisdom (zhide t'1i&\). The seed is called the practice of compassion and the fruit is called the virtue of kindness (ende }~Hi&\).

Furthermore, if the seeds are called the three types of karma, the fruits are called the three esoterica (sanmi). When the seed [is planted] compassion leads to benefiting others by means of the three types of karma. When it comes to fruition, it is called the inconceivable transformation of the three wheels (sanlun =-~). Like this, when in visualization, he does not discrimi­nate between things. All dharmas possess the quality of peace and bliss. All living beings will then [attain] great nirvlil)a, quiescence from which it is impossible to return. Practicing in the wrong path lfeidao ~Fm:) [the mun­dane world], he completely accomplishes the path to buddhahood. This then is the incomparably bright practice of peace and bliss. This practice accords with the meaning of nirvlil)a.

That [the Lotus Satra] says: "Again, [if] there is a single practice, this is a . tathligata practice. A tathligata is a person and peace and bliss is a dharma. Tathligatas are people of peace and bliss. Peace and bliss is the tathligata's dharma." Speaking of it in summary, its meaning is not different and its particulars also are not different. 30

28 Typically Da lun :k~ is a reference to the Dazhidu [un. This is not a direct quote; however, it bears similarities with the following passages: Dazhidu lun 41, T 1509, 25.362c27-363a26 and Dazhidu [un 54, T 1509, 25.448b28-c3.

29 T)J.e six roots (liugen ;\":m.) are those of the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body, and mind that respond to sense objects.

30 Miaoja lianhuajing wenju 8, T 1718, 34.1l8b27-c18.

THE MYSTERIES OF BODY, SPEECH, AND MIND 317

Zhiyi implies that when one arouses the bodhicitta and becomes a bodhisattva that places him on the path toward nirvii':la. The cultiva­tion of appropriate bodhisattva practices of body, speech, and mind is like planting a seed that will eventually and inevitably bear fruit causing that person to acquire the three esoterica described in detail in the Dazhidu fun. Zhiyi introduces the concepts of the "three vir­tues" and "three wheels" as roughly interchangeable with the three esoterica. The three wheels are defined as referring not only to the karma produced by body, speech, and mind,3! but also to magical power (shenzu t$ ,IE), preaching the Dharma (shuofa ~5?¥t;;), and remembrance and recollection (yinian '1,!~),32 which bear a close resemblance to the spiritual penetrations (shentong t$iffi) acquired by advanced bodhisattvas and manifested by enlightened beings. The spiritual penetrations come in lists of five or six, and include the ability to work miracles, supernormal hearing, the ability to read minds, recollection of one's past lives, the ability to discern the previous lives of others, and comprehension that one's spiritual state is no longer plagued by any form of defilement.33 The spiritual

31 See Dabaojijing jcWfj\*,¥ 52, T 310, 11.303c9-11; ro1186, T 310, 11.493b17-24; Dafangguang fa huayan jing shu jc1JJlI(f:lll*M#,¥i!j[ 16, T 1735, 35.621a4--7; and roll 19, T 1735, 35.642b8-9.

32 See Dafangguangfo huayanjing jc1JJlI(17Il*Mfi'¥ 6, T 278, 9.435c13; roll 31, T 278, 9.596b27-28; and Dafangguang fa Iwayan jing shu 11, T 1735, 35.574b15-16. Later, during the Song period they were described as an enlightened being's spiritual penetrations (shentong), or powers of bodily transformation, which is associated with the body; his discriminating mind (jixin llc,L.'), which is able to understand the thoughts of others, which is associated with mind (yi); and his oral powers of teaching and warning (jiaojie ~~) or correct teaching (zhengjiao IE~), associated with speech (kou). See Jin'gang jing zuanyao kandingji ~~U#'¥~~fIJJEllc 1, T 1702, 33.178c18-21.

33 The five spiritual penetrations (Ch. wu shentong E1$lm, wutong Elm, Skt. paiica­abhijl1iifz) are the 1) divine eye (divyacakeus, tianyan tong ;JC§~lm), 2) divine ear (divya­srotra, tianer tong ;JC:&:lm), 3) knowledge of the thoughts of others (paracittajiiiina, taxin tong ft!l,L.,lm), 4) recollection of former incarnations (pl7rvanirviisiinusmrti, suzhu tong tEl ftlm), 5) deeds leading to magical power and release (rddhivimokeakriyii) or direct experi­ence of magical power (rddhisiikeiitkriyii, shenjing tong :j<$±ilm). See Apidamo da piposha lun ~iiJ gl,~mjcmtt~lj;~ ([Abhidharma-JMahiivibhiieii) 411, T 1545, 27.728b12-24; 727b22-24. The six spiritual penetrations (Ch. liu shentong 7\1'$lm; Skt. earjabhijiitih) are 1) psychic power (rddhividhijiiiina, shenZLt tong 1'$ )Elm), magical power; 2) heavenly ear (divyasrotrajiiiina, tianer tong ;JC:&:lm) , supernormal hearing; 3) cognition of others'

318 RICHARD D. MCBRIDE, II

penetrations are marks or proofs of an advanced. bodhisattva and aid him in liberating beings.

In the Guanyin x.uanyi ilI.if±r~ (Arcane meaning of Avalokites­vara, T 1726), which is reportedly a discourse spoken by Zhiyi that was recorded by his disciple Guanding 11J~ (561-632),34 Zhiyi is even more explicit in his practical application of the three esoterica and his conflation of them with the spiritual penetrations:

Next, as for spiritual penetrations, if he desires to convert others he displays the three esoterica. Spiritual penetrations are displaying the material body [rilpakaya] and, by expedient means, displaying thoughts similar to living beings.35 Preaching the Dharma is displaying vocal [karma] in accordance to its various sounds. This is the second order of converting others. Making offerings to all the buddhas forms one's conduct. Not only flowers, incense, and the four things [food, clothing, bedding, and medicine] are offerings: in accordance with cultivated conduct is the offering of the Dharma. With re­spect to offerings, the greatest, the siltras say: "If you follow my words, then make offerings to the Buddha."36 He practices by requesting to teach. This forms his personal conduct. As for perfecting living beings, this forms the conversion of others. Among the four dignified rites of the bodhisattva,37 he still does riot forget living beings. How much more so does he enter all ap-

thoughts (paracittajfilina, taxin tong 1t!!.,L.'Jili), the ability to read minds; 4) recollection of past lives (parvanirvlislinusmrtijlilina, sllming tong fEl1l'l:rJili), 5) heavenly eye (divyacak~us­jlilina, tianyan tong * HIllJili) , the ability to discern the previous lives of others; and 6) cognition of the extinction of outflows (lisravak~ayajlilina, loujin tong ooillJili), a state in which one is no longer plagued by any form of defilement. See Apidamo da piposha [un 102, T 1545, 27.530aI8-blO; and Dazhidu lun 28, T 1509, 25.264a-266b; see also Lamotte, Le traite (cf. n. 7 above) 4:1809-1838. By means of the spiritual penetrations a bodhisattva purifies his buddhak§etra; see Mohe zhiguan ~foJJtIll. 2a, T 1911, 46.14a-b.

34 For the biography of Guanding see Xu gaoseng zhuan 19, T 2060, 50.584a25-585bll. See also Chen Jinhua, Making and Remaking History: A Study of Tiantai Sectarian Historiography, Studia Philologica Buddhica Monograph Series no. 14 (Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies 1999); Linda Penkower, "In the Beginning ... Guanding lim (561-632) and the Creation of Early Tiantai," Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 23/2 (2000) 245-296.

35 Literally, "[beings possessing] passions/affections" (qing ·t~).

36 Cf. Da niepanjing :k1.!E~f..¥ 5, T 374, 12.396a2.

37 The four dignified rites of the bodhisattva (siweiyi II!! ffil(; {j'ji:) refers to all the actions and practices of a bodhisattva, but particularly walking (xing 'iT), resting (zhu 11), sitting (zuo ~), and lying down (wo ~). See Dafangguang fo huayanjing 5, T 278, 9.424a28.

THE MYSTERIES OF BODY, SPEECH, AND MIND 319

pro aches to Dharma and pure buddha lands. All [bodhisattvas] liberally benefit all living beings. Hence, this one expression forms the conversion of others.38

The three esoterica are what the advanced bodhisattva Avaloki­tesvara actually manifests when he appears in the mundane world and performs actions to save and benefit living beings. Bodhisattva actions are the three esoterica because they lead living beings to ac­cept the Buddhadharma. Zhiyi's position, mediated by Guanding, bears some surprising similarities to that which will be expounded by the early Tantric masters a century later. A bodhisattva, such as Avalokitesvara, uses the three esoterica when he does what the Bud­dha would do to convert others. If he manifests in physical form or gives of himself to benefit beings, or if he makes offerings to the Buddha, that is body-esoterica. If he uses his voice to preach the Dharma, that is speech-esoterica.

In his own writings, Guanding equates the three esoterica to the supreme dharma or superior teaching, the final teaching of the Bud­dha as described in Dharmak~ema's (Tanwuchen {t;f!lHli, 385-433)39 "Northern Translation" of the Mahayana Mahiiparinirviir,ta Satra. In his Daban niepan jing shu A~11f.@~j&WiE (Commentary on the Ma­hiiparinirviir,ta Sidra, T 1767), Guanding explains that although there are three esoterica, they are no different than the four virtues of con­stancy, joy, personality, and purity. These are the fundamental characteristics possessed and taught to living beings by the Buddha:

Next, as for the Abhidharma (duifa lM~!), this, verily, is the three esoterica. Life-force (ming in) is the mind-esoterica, the pacification of physical power [lust] is body-esoterica. Non-obstruction is speech-esott~rica. They [the three esoterica] are also called the four virtues.40 Mind is the virtue of constancy.

38 Guanyin xuanyi IDl.i'if1r~ 2, T 1726, 34.888b20-28.

39 For the biography of Dharmak~ema see Gaoseng zhuan 2, T 2059, 50.335c-337b; see also Ch'en, Buddhism in China (cf. n. 17 above) 88,114.

40 :The four virtues (side 12]1~) are constancy or permanence (chang 'ill); joy (Ie ~); personality, the soul or the self (wo :f,Ii;); and purity (jing ¥*). Dharmak~ema's "Northern Translation" of the Mahayana MahaparinirvQ(la Satra discusses these four terms as a group 135 times beginning with Dahan niepanjing *fJl(:¥1I!~~ 1, T 374, 12.365a21; see also Dahan niepanjing shu *fJl(:¥1I!~fo.ifiUri 1, T 1767, 38.44b5-6.

320 . RICHARD D. MCBRIDE, II

Body is taking pleasure in the self. Speech is verily-the virtue of purity. If one can obtain this [state of] mind, all dharmas everywhere are nothing but these five. The Buddha is [also] endowed with these five; hence, he bestows them on people. He bestows the five constancies41 also without exhaustion. What I mean by "without exhaustion" is verily the five fruits.42

Although Guanding's numbered list games become muddled because he conflates the three esoterica with the four virtues and also the five constancies and five fruits, it is clear that he conceptu~lizes them as representative not only of appropriate bodhisattva practice but also of the manifestation of the fruits leading to buddhahood. Guanding uses the concept of the three esoterica to correspond to three aspects of the attainment of enlightenment in another passage in this commentary:

The old one [Faxian's translation of the Nirva1J-a Satra?] says this chapter illuminates the three esoteric a and does not illuminate the three virtues. It also says this chapter illuminates the three virtues and does not illuminate the three esoterica. Furthermore, it says that it only illuminates the three eso­terica, which verily explain the three virtues. It explains that speech-eso­terica is prajiia, it explains that body-esoterica is the Dharma body, and it explains that mind-esoteric a is liberation. The [understanding of these] three depend on [each other] but are not the same, and yet are three expressions. Presently my elders use these three expressions to extinguish [reliance on]

41 The five constancies (wuchang n 11\) are (1) humaneness (ren 1=), which is equated to not killing; (2) righteousness (yi ~), which is equated to not stealing; (3) propriety (Ii t!), which is equated to not misusing sex or participating in licentiousness; (4) wisdom/ knowledge (zhi ~), which is equated to not drinking alcoholic beverages; and (5) faith (xin 1~), which is equated to not using false speech. See Guang hongming ji Jjl(s"aJl~ 3, T 2103, 52.107b22-25.

42 Daban niepan jing shu 3, T 1767, 38.57c6-10. The five fruits (wuguo n*, SkI. paiicaphaIani) are (1) fruit ripening divergently (yishuguo Jl~-!\*), which refers to the idea that pleasure and wholesomeness are in different categories and that one's present situation accords in pain and pleasure with past wholesome and unwholesome deeds; (2) fruit of the same order (deng/iuguo ~Vi1JI":), which refers to wholesomeness reborn from previous wholesomeness; (3) present position and function fruit (tllyongguo ±ffl *), which refers to the rewards of meritorious actions from previous lives; (4) superior fruit (zengshangguo :tfli 1:*), which refers to one's position arising from previous seminal progress and spiritual capacity; and (5) fruit in freedom from miscellaneous bonds (ZaxigliO ¥.lt~*), which refers to the fruit of nirv[l1:za. See Apidamo jushe fun ~PJ~:iill1i'1~ ~~ (Abhidharmakosa) 17, T 1558, 29.91a25-b8.

THE MYSTERIES OF BODY, SPEECH, AND MIND 321

literary descriptions. Nevertheless, they are named the three esoterica also [because] they are mutually similar. Following many classifications I regard them as the three esoterica.43

In spite of the fact that neither Faxian's nor Dharmak~ema's transla­tions use either the term "three esoterica" or "three virtues," the point of Guanding's rhetoric is obvious. Although the three esoterica are often equated to the three virtues, they are, in fact, a slightly different way of describing the characteristics of an enlightened be­ing. Each of the three concepts equated individually to the three eso­terica correspond to different ways of describing the ineffable goal of bodhisattva practice. The attainment of prajiiii is the new goal of the Mahayana bodhisattva described verbally in the Prajfiaparamita literature and other Mahayana siltras. The Dharma body - the dharmakiiya or dharmadhiitu - the universe - is the very bodily form of reality as it is with all of its endless transformations. And libera­tion is, for lack of a better way to express it, the state of mind en­joyed by advanced bodhisattvas. These three esoterica are what bodhisattvas seek and use in their practice of converting others. Guanding describes this clearly in the final passage we will observe from his commentary on the NirviiIJa Sfitra:

If there are bodhisattvas who dwell peacefully below, the second [issue I treat here] broadly illuminates converting others in four [practices]. First, transforming their bodies to be like the Buddha; second, returning to their original location; third, severing other's delusion; and fourth, manifestation of the three esoterica.

This manifestation, furthermore, is of four kinds: first, speech-esoteric a; sec­ond, body-esoterica; third, doubly illuminating speech-esoterica; the former, verily, is a different adaptation to all sounds and the present one illuminates a different adaptation to all dharmas; and fourth, rnind-esoterica.44

In other words, bodhisattvas are expected to manifest the three eso­terica while they abide in the world and it is what they use to convert beings.

43 Dahan niepanjing shu 9, T 1767, 38.86c28-87a4.

44 Dahan niepanjing shu 22, T 1767, 38.167a9-13.

322 RICHARD D. MCBRIDE, II

The Chinese Madhyamaka (Sanlun -~) exegete Jizang E~ (549-623)45 uses the concept of the three esoterica as a heuristic de­vice to describe the symbolic and practical importance of the name of A valokitesvara in the famous "Gateway to everywhere" chapter (pumen pin il1'fF~ p~) of the Lotus Satra. Rather than regarding the three virtues and the three esoterica as different aspects of the same thing, in his Fahua xuan fun ¥!*1r~ (Arcane treatise on the Lotus Satra, T 1720), Jizang combines them and introduces th,e concept of the "virtues of the three esoteric a" (sanmide =Wi~) to describe the latent power in the name of the bodhisattva:

Fourth is one pair of name virtues. Avalokitesvara is said to have three kinds of names. The "Gateway to everywhere" chapter calls them the virtues of the three esoteric a (sanmide). The three names are: first, the sound "observer of the world" produces wholesome verbal karma in living beings; second, the thought "observer of the world" produces wholesome mental karma in living beings; and third, the body "observer of the world" produces wholesome physical karma in living beings.

The virtues of the three esoterica of the "Gateway to everywhere" chapter are: first, knowing the thoughts of others everywhere; second, preaching the Dharma everywhere; and third, [manifesting] spiritual penetrations every­where. If the three names, it is said, produce the three wholesome [actions] in living beings, then they produce wholesome meaning in their environs. The virtues of the three esoterica then respond to living things and exhaust wholesomeness.46

The Lotus Satra does not actually use the term "virtues of the three ." esoterica." Nevertheless, as we have seen before, the concept of the three esoterica had become a catch phrase to describe the powers, capabilities, and responsibilities of bodhisattvas. In his Fahua yishu ¥!¥~itJit (Commentary on the Lotus &"ltra, T 1721), Jizang uses the three esoterica in roughly the same manner used by Kumarajlva - to explain the special powers possessed by advanced bodhisattvas and buddhas. He invokes the three esoterica in the tenth of ten general

45 For the biography of Jizang see Xu gaoseng zhuan 11, T 2059, 50.513c-515a; see also Ch'en, Buddhism in China (cf. n. 17 above) 132-134.

46 Fahua xuan lun 10, T 1720, 34.447b20-26.

THE MYSTERIES OF BODY, SPEECH, AND MIND 323

meanings of the doctrine that the Buddha dwells constantly in purity arid meditation:

Tenth, the three esoterica benefit living beings. It is said that mind-esoterica is entering meditation, body-esoterica is emiting light, and speech-esoteric a is preaching the Dharma. Furthermore, if one is quiescent, it is used for leav­ing [sm!1sara]. If used being quiescent, [it] becomes entering [samadhi]. For this reason, the function of quiescence is non-hindrance; hence, it is a name for leaving and entering.47

He then goes on to describe how the act of entering samiidhi is the manifestation of mind-esoterica. In other words, the three esoterica are manifestations of the Buddha in samiidhi responding in accor­dance to circumstances. Entering samiidhi is thus understood as the "good medicine" causing a practitioner to cultivate unexcelled bodhi.

In his Niepan jing youyi Y~~*~:@f~ (Musings on the Nirvii]Ja Su­tra, T 1768), Jizang not only reconfirms the connection between the three virtues, three esoterica, and the three types of karma but ex­plains how the three esoterica demonstrate that the bodhisattva has transcended the cycle of rebirth and death (saf!Lsiira):

Furthermore, I will clarify that the three virtues are explained as the three esoterica of the Tathagata. Hence, Kasyapa asked desiring that the Buddha would explain the "subtle esoterica" (weimi 1)jj[~) in detail and preach it to living beings. Just like this, the three esoterica and the class of the four marks48 are an example. Also, these match the three types of karma of ordi­nary people because the three types of karma of ordinary people are not eso­teric (mi). Furthermore, by matching them to the three hindrances of sal'(lsa­

ra49 one illuminates the three virtues of nirval}a. By matching them to the hindrance of recompense [the inability to hear the Dharma due to bad rebirth because of unwholesome karma] one clarifies the Dharma body. By match­ing them to the hindrance of karma [the inability to accept the Dharma be-

47 Fahuayishu2, T 1721, 34.469al-4.

48 The class of the four marks (sixiang pin l1!I~§,\l,) here probably refer to birth (sheng !:t.), abiding existence (zhu it), change (yi ~), and extinction (mie ~).

49 The three hindrances of sal!lsiira (sanzhang =~Jij:, Skt. iivarartatraya) are the hin­drance of karma 6'ezhang !t~Jij:), the hindrance of defilements (jannaozhang j:Jl:'r&~Jij:), and the hindrance of recompense (baozhang W~Jij:), also called the hindrance of ripening (yishuzhang ~~MJij:). See Apidamo jushe lun ~iiJ ~J£~1!!*~ 17, T 1558, 29.92b23-24.

324 RICHARD D. MCBRIDE, II

cause of language, behavior, mind], one clarifies ligeration. By matching them to the hindrance of defilements, one clarifies prajfiii. Because sa1'[lsiira is merely the three hindrances, nirvii1Ja only has the three virtues.5o

Once again we return to the idea that the three esoterica .manifested by buddhas and the three types of karma produced by ordinary living beings are correlated. But to Jizang the three esoterica have another meaning apart from referring to the powers of body, speech, and mind produced by advanced bodhisattvas and buddhas. As with Guanding, they also compare with the three virtues or Mahayana­style enlightenment - Dharma body, prajfiii, and liberation.

In his lin' guangming jing shu ~:JIt ~ *~~ (Commentary on the Sutra of golden light, T 1787), Jizang is even more explicit in his promotion of the three esoterica as a heuristic device to classify and explain the significance of the preface to the sutra and its relation to the rest of the sutra:

"Vulture Peak in Rajagrha is like the constant Sakyamuni. .. "

There is a difference, in particular, between what is introduced in the preface (xu J'F) and the remaining scriptural prologue (yujingxu M*~J'F). Merely take the mystical endowment (mingjia ~1Jr.l) of the three esoterica as the pro­logue. The three esoterica are the esoterica of body, speech, and mind (shen kou yi mi ~ r:l ~*). When he wants to preach this sutra, his body resides in Vulture Peak and explains the superiority of this sutra. Verily, this is the body-esoterica. His mind recollects the name of dharmas and protective maintenanceS! of the four buddhas up to procedures for repentance, and so forth. Verily, this is mind-esoterica. Furthermore, he desires to preach these deep procedures [dharmas] in the future. This, verily, is speech-esoterica. Take this as a form of faith in the mystical endowment of the three esoterica. Hence, the form of faith is suspicious, resonates with the buddhas of the four directions, 52 and preaches on the fruit of limitations of lifespan. Furthermore,

50 Niepanjing youyi 1, T 1768, 38.237a15-21.

51 Protective maintenance (huchi iiiM', Skt. anuplilanli) is a by-product of practicing prajfilipliramitli. It is a type of recollection that enables bodhisattvas not to begrudge their physical bodies and their lives. See Dazhidu lun 74, T 1509, 25.578a28-blO.

52 The buddhas of the four directions according to the Suva77;laprabhlisa Satra are Alajobhya (Achu ~iiJM) in the East, Jeweled Marks (Baoxiang JU§) in the South, Amita­yus (Wuliangshou ~:i:.), in the West, and Subtle and Miraculous Sounds (Weimiao-

THE MYSTERIES OF BODY, SPEECH, AND MIND 325

the form of faith in the three esoteric a resonates with dreams and preaches procedures of repentance, and so forth. This is because the Four Heavenly Kings and so 'forth made a vow to magnify the sLltra up through preaching the chapter on forsaking the body. It is said that the three esoterica are pro­moted in the prologue.53

Because the current preface to the lin' guangming jing ~7t SA ~& (Su­van:taprabhasa Satra, Satra of golden light, T 663) by the Chan *~ monk Cijue %tJl: dates to the Five Dynasties period (ca. 907-960) and because the passage Jizang quotes at the beginning is not found in any extant version of .the scripture, I am not sure whether Jizang refers here to an earlier preface that circulated with the satra or to the long gatha that comprises the prologue to the satra (jingxupin ~& r¥&).54 Although the concepts of body and mind (shen yi) appear toward the end of the gatha, nowhere is there a direct reference to the idea of the mystical endowment of the three esoterica. Neverthe­less, the three esoterica serves conveniently and successfully as a classification device.

Like Jizang, the Chinese Yogacara (Faxiang ~:t1§) monk Ci'en Kuiji %t}~,~~ (632-682),55 a disciple of Xuanzang "E"~ (ca. 600-664), uses the concept of the three esoterica to explain how the Bud­dha appears to do things although, in actuality, he is constantly in meditation. Also, like Jizang, in his Miaofa lianhua jing xuanzan ~ ¥t:Ji:J:tJ&"E"Jr (Arcane praise of the Lotus Satra of the sublime law, T 1723), Kuiji emphasizes the three esoterica as comprising the tenth and final proof of this situation:

Question: The Buddha has his mind in complete meditation and his conduct [is to] dwell permanently in meditation. He manifests majesty by not giving rise to meditation on extinction. What does he need now enter?

Answer: There are ten meanings. First, entering and leaving, he moves following connections because in stillness he benefits living beings. Second,

sheng jlijjryil.\') in the North. See Jin'guangmingjing ~:7'taJlfiil! I, T 663, 16.335bI2-13.

53 Jin'guangmingjingshu I, T 1787, 39. 160c17-25.

54 Jin'guangmingjing I, T 663, 16335b5--c15; see 335c12 for body and mind.

55 For the biography of Kuiji see Song gaoseng zhuan *il'lJ{'1I!{$ 4, T 2061, 50.725b--726c; see also Ch'en, Buddhism in China (cf. n. 17 above) 320-321.

326 RICHARD D. MCBRIDE, II

if he does not enter meditation, he emits light witholJt cause and manifests auspicious signs. If he does not enter meditation he fears that there will be no auspicious signs of buddhahood. Third, when he wants to preach the Dharma he shows that he deliberates opportunity. Fourth, because he mani­fests the bizarre profundities of the Dharma he enters meditation and insight causes reverence. Fifth, manifesting wisdom necessarily attests to principle (li :1£); entering meditation he is actually able to arouse it. An instructor later teaches him causing him to cultivate meditation: hence, [producing] wisdom. Sixth, showing meditation is a fullness of wisdom. Preachi~g the Dharma shows a fullness of wisdom. This is because entering meditation manifests a fullness of meditation. Seventh, due to the regulations of the final age [of the Dharma], persons who preach the Dharma must first calm their minds them­selves. Eighth, he shows wholesome pensiveness and the marks of intelli­gence. Also, he causes other people to examine phenomena. Ninth, he enters meditation, manifests auspicious signs, and gives rise to three questions and answers. If not this then he will ask questions without Maitreya and so forth. 56 Tenth, he manifests the three esoterica. This is because entering meditation is mind-esoterica. Emiting light, and so forth, is body-esoterica. Preaching the Dharma is speech-esoterica.

The ode says: accordance, auspiciousness, examination, profundity, instruc­tor, fullness, pensiveness, question, esoterica.57

By associating the threeesoterica to entering meditation, emitting light, and preaching the Dharma, the evidence suggests that although Jizang and Kuiji belonged to different exegetical traditions, they shared a common understanding of the meaning of the three eso­terica as indicative of the enlightened state of advanced bodhisattvas and buddhas.

The monk Wonch'lik IJjU~~ (613-696) of the Korean state of Silla fJT*I was a fellow disciple of Xuanzang with Kuiji at Ximingsi ® IW

56 The context alluded to in this passage seems to refer to the belief, commonly held among medieval Buddhist scholars and proponents of Yogacara especially, that by enter­ing into samadhi one can ascend to Tu~ita heaven, see Maitreya, ask him questions, and receive his clarifications regarding their doubts concerning the complex and often contradictory doctrines contained in Mahayana Buddhist scriptures. See Etienne Lamotte, Historie de Bouddhisme Indien (Louvain: PublicationsUniversitaries 1958) 787.

57 Miaofa lianhuajing xuanzan 2, T 1723, 34.679b3-15.

THE MYSTERIES OF BODY, SPEECH, AND MIND 327

.. ~ in the Tang capital Chang'an -R~.58In his Inwang-gyong so 1=.:£ *~WiE (Commentary on the book for humane kings, T 1708), Wanch'uk suggests that the three esoterica is the initial theme cov­ered by the first gathii in Kumarajiva's translation of the Renwang jing,59 although more direct connections may be found at the end: "Of the Tathilgata's three types of karma, there is no limit to his vir­tue."60 Nevertheless, Wanch'uk locates the three esoterica even in epithets applied to the Buddha:

The first two phrases eulogize the Buddha's three esoterica. The first one of these phrases eulogizes the esoteric a of the Buddha's body, which contains all virtues. Because [he] is honored and esteemed by living beings he is called "World-Honored One." Because his marks are good, perfect, and full, and [because] he leads and guides living beings, [he] is called "The Guide" (tosa, Ch. daoshi ~Bijj). Because his body does not decay and is similar to adamant (hlmgang, Ch. jin'gang ~jl\jtl, vajra) it is called the "essence of ada­mant" (kllmgangch'e, Ch.jin'gangti ~jl\jtl~l).

Later phrases eulogize two other kinds of esoterica. The first four characters eulogize his mind-esoteric a (llimil, Ch. yimi), because it is internally realized true thusness and, marked by the ability to forsake, it is called quiescence of mental practice.

The later three characters eulogize the speech-esoterica (omit, Ch. yumi). It is heard the same both far and near, without being obstructed and it is called "turning the wheel of the Dhmma." If you want more detailed distinctions go to the Satra on the Three Esoterica (Sanmijing =W~£).61

The Sanmi jing alluded to by Wanch'uk no longer exists. Excerpts from this scripture - the full title of which was probably Rulai sanmi jing :fio* - **~ (Satra on the Tathagata's three esoterica) - are pre­served, however, in two passages from the Boredeng lun shi JlI9:'5~!f ~~~ (PrajfiapradfpamaZamadhyamakavrtti, Analysis of the treatise

58 For the biography of Wanch'uk see Song gaoseng zhuan 4, T 2061, 50.727b5-14; see also Shotaro Iida, "The Three Srnpas of Ch'ang An," in Papers of the First Interna­tional Conference on Korean Studies (Seoul: Academy of Korean Studies 1979) 484-497.

59 Renwang bore boluomijing 1, T 245, 8.827b8-828a8.

60 Renwang bore boluomijing 1, T 245, 8.828a3.

61 Inwang-gyiJng so 1=:EMll:i9iE 2A, T 1708, 33.393a8-15; HPC 1.68bI7--c2.

328 ~ICHARD D. MCBRIDE, II

on the torch ojprajfiti, T 1566).62 The original tre;ltise was putatively written by Nagarjuna and then explored by the Bodhisattva Bha­vaviveka (Bhavya, Fenbieming :5J'JJIj~, d.u.). It was translated by Prabhakaramitra (Borepomiduoluo ~MlBi:fi!&:$Ml, d.u.) into Chinese in 632.63 In particular, the second passage quoted from the Satra on the three esoterica refers to several wondrous qualities of the Bud­dha's body. Because no other exegete refers to this siUra it was probably not well known.

In his Haesimmil-gyong so ~i¥~lli'~~~1t (Commentary on the Sal'fl­dhinirmocana Sutra),64 W6nch'uk alludes to the three esoteric a to explain the existence of various transformation bodies (hwasin, Ch. huashen 1t:§:t, Skt. nirmtilJaktiya) , reward bodies (suyongsin, Ch. shouyongshen :¥:ffl:§:t, Skt. saf!lbhogaktiya), buddha bodies and bud­dha lands, spiritual penetrations, Brahma sounds (pomum, Ch. janyin ~.y), and so forth:

Mental dharmas are trifling and forsake wisdom. They do not resonate with explanations of the One. The one sound, and so forth, verily, is the body­and speech-esoterica of the three esoterica of the Tathagata. With respect to body-esoterica, it is like it says in the first roll of the Treatise on the {Great]

Peifection of Wisdom:

When the Buddha first turned the wheel of the Dharma it resonated with and was maintained by the bodhisattvas. When it came from others, they desired limited buddha bodies. Ascending and transcending empty space and measureless buddha lands he arrived in the Lotus World System (hwasang segye, Ch. huashang shijie • ..ttt!J'l'-). Because he saw the thusness of the Buddha's body, he preached a gatha and eulogized a larnent.65

62 Boredeng lun shi 11, T 1566, 30.108c23-29; and roIll3, T 1566, 30. 121a20-b4. The Torch of Prajiia later became one of the principal commentaries adopted by the Nara schools in Japan. See Abe, The Weaving of Mantra (cf. n. 2 above) 214.

63 For the biography of Prabhiikaramitra see Xu gaoseng zhuan 3, T 2060, 50.439c26-440c3; see also Mochizuki, Bukkyo daijiten (cf. n. 5 above) 5:4277c-4278a. For a biogra­phy of Bhavaviveka see Mochizuki, Bukkyo daijiten 3:276lc-2762a.

64 Although Wanch'uk was considered an outsider in China, his commentary on the Sal!ldhinirmocana Satra (Satra on freeing the underlying meaning) was influential later in Tibet. See Matthew T. Kapstein, The Tibetan Assimilation of Buddhism: Conversion, Con­testation, and Memory (New York: Oxford University Press 2000) 78-83.

65 Haesimmil-gyong so 1, HPC 1:131cl8-23.

THE MYSTERIES OF BODY, SPEECH, AND MIND 329

At this point Wonch 'uk quotes verbatim the discussion of the three esoterica as found in the Dazhidu [un's precis of the Satra on Va­jrasattva Esote'ric Traces.66 The intellectual heritage and exegetical importance of the Dazhidu lun continued through the seventh cen­tury. No matter what other directions exegetes directed their interpretations of this concept, KumarajIva's work remained the ba­sis.

At this point, let us summarize the views held by the exegetes of the Sui and early Tang period. The three esoteric a refer to the three types of karma, the three virtues, three wheels, and so forth, which are produced and manifested by buddhas and bodhisattvas. In order to explain the term "three esoteric a of the Tathagata" (rulai sanmi ~D *':=:!&;), medieval Buddhist scholars connected the three esoterica to several numbered doctrinal conceptions on the nature of buddha­hood. The three esoterica are related to the spiritual achievements and acquisitions of advanced bodhisattvas - A valokitesvara in particular. It is representative of the enlightened state and the powers associated with enlightenment. Although its role was not emphasized previously, the three esoterica appears to have been a term whose importance was emerging in mainstream Sinitic Buddhism to de­scribe the nature of buddha hood.

The High Tang Period

Because the mature Japanese Esoteric tradition emphasizes the ritual replication of the body, speech, and mind of the Buddha as a key component of the Vajrayana, I originally expected that the concept of the three esoterica would receive its most explicit explanations in the writings of the early Tantric masters on efficacious ritual prac­tices. Subhakarasirpha (Shanwuwei ~M,{lt, 637-735)67 and Yixing's -iT (683 or 673-727)68 Da Piluzhena chengfo jing shu (Com-

66 Haesimmil-gyong so 1, HPC 1: 132a-b; cf. Dazhidu lun 10, T 1509, 25. 127c-128a.

67 For the biography of Subhakarasirp.ha see Song gaoseng zhuan 2, T 2061, 50.714b-716a; see also Chou Yi-liang, "Tantrism in China," Harvard loumal of Asiatic Studies 8 (1945) 251-272.

68 For a study on Yixing that provides a compelling argument that Yixing was actually

330 RICHARD D. MCBRIDE, II

mentary on the Sutra on Vairocana's attaining bud,dhahood, T 1796), for instance, uses the term more than twenty times, suggesting that it was a major theme in practices the early Tantric master sought to promote during the first half of the eighth century. The sutra on which their study is based, their translation of the Da Piluzhena chengfo jing (also called Dari jing A B *£, T 848), completed in 725, however, only uses the term "approach of the three esoterica" (sanmi men =WF~) twice in the seventh roll.69 This is significant because the seventh roll is comprised of ritual procedures not found in the later Tibetan translation of the sutra.70 Nevertheless, body, speech, and mind are alluded to repeatedly throughout the SLttra.11 The open­ing of the sutra alludes to important thematic concepts associated with the three esoterica:

Because of the empowerment (jiachi ;/JON, adhi.ythana) of the Tathagata Vai­roc ana, there was an exhibition of supernatural power (jenxun 11m, vikrf­(iita), the storehouse of the inexhaustible ornamentation of the body (shen wujin zhuangyanzang ~*ljl1n1±~~). Like this, there was [another] exhi­bition of supernatural power, the storehouse of the inexhaustible orna­mentations of the universality of speech and mind (yu yi pingdeng ~~f ~). It is not produced from the body, or speech, or mind of the Buddha Vairocana. All places (chu ~, sthana) arise [from it]; [and as for its] destruction, its fringes are unattainable.

Yet, all of Vairocana's bodily acts (shenye), all of his vocal acts (yuye), and

all of his mental acts (yiye), [and] all places and all times are proclaimed as

true words (zhenyan if( i3, mantra), spoken phrases of Dharma (daojufa i!!-iiJ

born in 673 and not 683 see Jinhua Chen, "The Birth of a Polymath: The Genealogical Background of the Tang Monk-Scientist Yixing (673-727)," T'ang Studies 18/19 (2000-2001) 1-39.

69 The concept of the "approach of the three esoterica" (sanmi men =ffi'F5) is alluded to twice; see Da Piluzhena chengfo shenbianjiachi jing jcffi1liil,ltl;l~p.x;1!1ll~$~1Joj;ffo.![ 7, T 848, 18.51c10, 52b2.

70 For an English translation of this chapter see Chikyo Yamamoto, trans., Mahi'ivairo­cana-Siitra (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture and Aditya Prakash an 1990) 175-199; see also Rolf W. Giebel, trans., The Vairocaniibhisa1'(lbodhi Satra (Berke­ley: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research 2005) 227-277.

71 There are 10 references to body, speech, and mind clustered, more or less, in two rolls of the satra. See Da Piluzhena chengfo jing 1, T 848, 18.1a24, 6a25-b8; and roll 5, T 848,18.31bl-20,36c8.

TIIE MYSTERIES OF BODY, SPEECH, AND MIND 331

. i*) in the realm [of living beings] who p~ssess passions (youqing jie 1Hf ~).72

Once again body, speech, and mind are linked with supernatural powers. In this instance, the miraculous power is attributed to Vairo­cana. Following the Avatarrzsaka Sutra, the sutra repeatedly uses the concept of universality (pingdeng -'f~): That these attributes of Vai­roc ana are, in fact, a common heritage of all living beings and of the nature of the universe itself.73 Furthermore, this passage alludes to the idea that the Tathagata has inexhaustible body, speech, and mind, which also seems to draw upon themes found in the Avatarrzsaka Sutra.74 Although it is not described clearly in the sutra, there are hints of connecting the three types of karma to particular ritualized practices, such as mantras.

Several passages in the commentary describe the three esoterica in detail. Although there is a new frame emphasizing mantra, SubhakarasiIpha and Yixing's understanding of the three esoterica is actually quite similar to the views held by the great exegetes of the Sui and early Tang period in the late sixth and seventh centuries:

Entering the approach of mantra (zhenyan men Jl § r~) may be summarized as being comprised of three phenomena: The fIrst is the approach of body-

72 Da Piluzhena chengfo jing 1, T 848, 18.1a25-b2; cf. Tajima, Etude sur Ie Mahiivai~ rocana-satra (cf. n. 5 above) 44-45, 53-54.

73 I translate the Chinese term pingdeng 3f~ as "universality" and "universal." This term is often employed as a translation for such Sanskrit words as stimtinya (universal, equal, common, joint), stimya (equipoise, equality), and stidhiira1;za (universality, common to all), and so forth. The concept of pingdeng is used 517 times in the 60-roll version of the Huayanjing, T 278; 636 times in the 80-roll version of the Huayanjing; and 20 times in the Da Piluzhena chengfo jing, T 848. Although the concept of the "universality of body" (shen pingdeng) is found twice in Huayan jing, T 278, and 9 times in Huayan jing, T 279, the concepts of universality of speech and mind are not found in either translation of the Huayan jingo

74 Body, speech, and mind (shen yu yi) are alluded to 56 times in the Huayanjing, T 279. See, in particular, the chapter on "Pure Practices" (jingxing pin 7J~r.R.), Huayanjing 14, T 279, 1O.69b2O--c22, which emphasizes the fundamental purity of body, speech, and mind. In the Tibetan version of the sutra, Alex Wayman says this idea is found in the "Arising of the Tathiigata" chapter; see The Enlightenment of Vairocana (cf. n. 5 above) 49. See also Stephen Hodge, trans., The Mahti-Vairocana-abhisalJ1bodhi Tantra, with Buddhaguhya's Commentary (London: RoutledgeCurzon 2003) 49.

332 . RICHARD D. MCBRIDE, II

esoterica, the second is the approach of speech-esoteric a, and the third is the approach of mind-esoterica. These phenomena will be explained in detail be­low. The practitioner should regard these three expedients (jangbian) as three kinds of karma that are pure of themselves and [he] will verily be empowered by the three esoterica of the Tathagata and he will be able [to at­tain buddhahood] in this life, satisfy the [ten bodhisattva] stages and the [ten] piiramitiis, not have to pass through successive numbers of kalpas, and culti­vate in preparation all antidotal practices. Hence, the Large perfection of wisdom satra (Dapin ::kff'Q) says: If there is a bodhisattva, when he initially arouses the mind [bodhicitta] he verily ascends the bodhisattva levels and at­tains [the stage of] non-backsliding. When someone initially arouses the mind he verily attains unsurpassed bodhi and then turns the wheel of the Dharma.

Nagarjuna regarded these as distant practices. A person riding a goat will ar­rive after a long, long time. A horse, then, provides a difference in speed. If someone rides a person with spiritual penetrations, he will arrive where he is going in the instant he gives rise to the thought. He is not able to say when he gave rise to the thought or how he arrived. The marks of the spiritual penetrations, and so on, do not resonate with or produce doubt, which, consequently, is the profound purpose of this Slttra.75

The three esoteric a are still related to the three types of karma, but they are inherently pure; they are expedients; and they are associated with the transcendent nature of buddhahood that transforms beings. Rather than being something that the practitioner does on his own, the three esoterica are a way of referring directly to the spiritual penetrations of the Buddha. By relying on these powers - by being empowered by them - the practitioner is spiritually transformed into an enlightened being. The powers associated with the three esoterica are universal and inherently pure. Universality is one of the primary themes of the sutra and resonates with the popular doctrines of the inherence of Buddha nature (foxing iiJt't1) in all living beings, the Tathiigatagarbha (rulaizang ~Q*~). This concept is described more fully in the following passage, in which we can see how the previous

75 Da Piluzhena chengfo jing shu 1, T 1796, 39.579b27-c7; cf. Tajima, Etude sur Ie Mahavairocana-satra (cf. ll. 5 above) 91-92.

THE MYSTERIES OF BODY, SPEECH, AND MIND 333

understanding of the three esoterica is extended to indicate their manifestation in the practitioner through ritual and empowerment:

What was the Dhanna preached by the Buddha at this time? Verily it is the Dhanna Approach of the triple universality of body (shen), speech (yu), and mind (yi). Whatever the nature of the Tathagata's three kinds of kanna, they all arrive at the edge of the sublime extreme of primordial reality. Body is equivalent to speech. Speech is equivalent to mind (xin). It is similar to the great ocean's extending the same saline flavor everywhere it goes. Hence, it is said to be universal. The tenn in Brahmic [Pralqit?] is pada (Ch. botan, Kor. paltam ifi-ft) ...

Thus, empowennent by the esoterica (mimi ;jiJb1f,<) of body, speech, and mind, which are universal, is the approach of entry. It is said to be the esoteric seal [mudra] of body universality (shen pingdeng :!l'f~), the true word [mantra] of speech universality (yu pingdeng ~f~), and the sublime visualization of mind universality (xin pingdeng JL'f~). Because they are expedients one is caused to see the reward body (shouyong shen ~ffl ~, sal'flbhogakiiya) of empowennent.

Like this, the reward body of empowerinent, verily, is Vairocana, the omni­present body. The omnipresent body, verily, is the body of knowledge of the universality of the practitioner. For this reason, those who abide in this vehicle go without going and arrive without arriving, which is the name of the phrase "universality." All beings that have entered therein have, in actu­ality, neither penetrated it nor been penetrated by it. Hence, it is called uni­versality. The Dhanna Approach of Universality is the main intent of this ~~ .

The reward body of empowerment represents what Buddhists gener­ally consider to be the type of buddha that they worship; the type of buddha represented in icons and images. It is the buddha who resides in a buddha land (buddhak~etra), displays the physical marks of his position, and is constantly in meditative absorption (samiidhi). Through the process of equating concepts, because of their uni­versality, the commentators link this reward body not only to Vairo­cana, the symbolic representation of the universe as it is in buddha form, but also to the universality of knowledge residing in the

76 Da Piluzhena chengfo jing shu 1, T 1796, 39.583a12-15, 20--27; cf. Tajima, Etude sur Ie Mahavairocana-satra (cf. n. 5 above) 93-94.

334 RICHARD D. MCBRIDE, II

practitioner. In essence, the practitioner is transformed into an icon for the period of ritual practice, which alludes to a new dimension to practice and understanding. Can the universality of knowledge be anything other than an allusion to the Tathagatagarbha?

The language of the commentary suggests that the three esoterica are an expedient and also spiritual power used by Vairocana. This power transforms and purifies the three types of karma produced by living beings. In other words, the power of this expedient turns mun­dane human karma into the acts of an enlightened being. This power, ultimately, is none other than the inherent Buddha nature that resides within the practitioner. Nevertheless, the power of the expedient is dependent upon recognizing the innate purity of original nature. An­other passage in the commentary relates:

As for bringing expedients to their ultimate conclusion, this means that the myriad practices are perfect, reach the extreme, and are impossible to aug­ment. The power to resonate with/respond to material objects, examine exhaustively, and be competent [lit. "able in phenomenal affairs"], verily, is ghee,77 the profound fruit, the source of the three esoterica. Furthermore, those who purify the bodhicitta may be compared to pure gold. Their origi­nal nature is bright and clean, forsaking all excesses and evil. Great compas-

77 "Ghee" (tihu, Jpn. daigo 1\Ik1\i\ll) is clarified butter. Traditionally an offering poured over sacred icons, it means the "cream" (Skt. mmJ';la) and symbolically suggests the good­ness of the Buddha and the excellence of man's talents. Essentially, "ghee" functioned as a referent to buddhahood, enlightenment, the cream or best of what the Buddhadharma had to offer. For instance, in a passage from his Arcane Meaning of the Lotus Satra of the Sublime Dharma, which uses "ghee" 29 times, Zhiyi said, "Hence, it is said that the Bud­dha/buddhahood is like ghee .... If you are able to cultivate the eightfold [path] and then see your Buddha nature it is called obtaining ghee .... By means of the principle and wis­dom of the middle path you become ghee." Zhiyi also explains that the perfect teaching (yuanjiao ~~), as he describes it, is also "ghee." See Miaofa lianhuajing xuanyi i!Yi'!Ji ~IH&!:~ 5, T 1716, 33.739c-740b. Another extensive discussion of ghee is found in the final roll of the same work. Here Zhiyi says that those who embody the perfect and sudden [teaching] (yuandun ~'ill'l) and become awakened, verily, are ghee; see roll 10, T 1716, 33.807a21-22. Also, "Acquiring the acquiescence to the non-production of dharmas is performing like ghee"; see roll 10, T 1716, 33.807b6. "Again, as for what we refer to as 'ghee,' it is after the taste of the throngs [of sentient beings]; nirvQT}a is designated as ghee;" and, of course, the lotus is ghee; see roll 10, T 1716, 33.808a19-20, a25. Surpris­ingly enough, to Zhiyi, even drhats, pratyekabuddhas, and buddhas are like ghee; see roll 10, T 1716, 33.81Ob26.

THE MYSTERIES OF BODY, SPEECH, AND MIND 335

sion is like learning an ingenious skill. Taking all manner of medicinal drugs and practicing cures up to a "mirror penetrates softness, pliability, and self­existence" [are all examples of expedients]. Expedients are like the comple­tion [siddhi] of ingenious arts. What one creates is all completed according to one's wishes.78 .

This rhetoric on the original cleanliness and purity of one's original nature and that all practices lead toward this goal sounds surprisingly similar to what will emerge in Chan discourse later. In fact, corollar­ies to the three esoterica, the three mysteries (sanxuan -= %) and the three essentials (sanyao =JO developed within the Chan *~ tradi­tion during the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms n 1~+~ (907-978) and Northern Song ::it* (960-1127) period.79 A description of a practical procedure for developing the three esoterica is only al­luded to at best, although the commentators are convinced that they describe it in detail:

Now, this approach of mantra is comparable to memorizing and chanting (chisongzhe ff~i'li1!f), which is also like this. It is described in detail in the text below. In accordance to cultivating and practicing the three esoterica, you attain and complete all peculiarities and inconceivable phenomena. Even though you scrutinize among the connections of each and every thing, in the end you forsake four-part [differentiation].80 The Dharma, and so on, is like this. [It is] no different than the pure mind.Sl

A practitioner develops the three esoteric a in the same manner that he learns and practices mantras: memorizing and chanting. The by­product of this practice is the cessation of discriminating mental con-

78 Da Piluzhena chengfo jing shu 1, T 1796, 39.587a27-b4; cf. Tajima, Etude sur Ie Mahiivairocana-sL7tra (cf. n. 5 above) 97-98.

79 See George Keyworth, "The Body, Speech, and Mind of the Patriarchs: The Three Mysteries and Three Essentials of Chinese Chan Buddhism," a paper delivered at the Western Conference of the Association for Asian Studies, Phoenix, Ariz., October 11, 2003. He is currently revising the paper for publication.

80 Four-part differentiation (sijufenbie i1!l1:iJ51-JjiJ) is the standard Mahayana intellectual conceptualization of phenomena as being existent, non-existent, neither, or both; or phenomenal, noumenal, neither, or both; double, single, neither, or both. See Fayuan zhu/in 5, T 2122, 53.306a.

81 Da Piluzhena chengfo jing shu 3, T 1796, 39.607a3-9.

336 RICHARD D. MCBRIDE,II

ceptualization and the awakening of the pure mind. Practices involv­ing ma1J-{iala are described briefly in the following passage:

I now also desire to .continue the works of the Tathagata by following that which has been practiced by the Buddha. For this reason, draw this mm)ljala.

Even though I have not yet attained everything like unto a Tathagata, never­theless, because I am empowered by the three esoterica of Vairocana, I will also be able to manifest the Dharma body and universally (pu ~) collect a great assembly of all ma~/.(jalas. For this reason, you should ~ow also mani­fest evidence [of your buddhahood] and cause all demons to be unable to op­press or dwell within yoU.82

SUbhiikarasiIpha and Yixing describe the three esoterica as playing a dual role in this commentary. On the one hand they are described as something outside of the practitioner, the three esoterica of Vairo­cana, which purifies and empowers him. On the other hand, by means of the ma1J-{iala the practitioner is supposed to ritually recog­nize his dominance over an interior realm populated by demons. 83

This duality ,is transcended, however, because all enlightened beings are no different than Vairocana at the moment of awakening. It is the inherent Buddha nature within that, when it is activated, empowers the practitioner. Within this symbolic context, demons represent defilements. By activating the three esoteric a the practitioner mani­fests evidence of his buddhahood, symbolically represented as the suppression of demons. Hence, defilements are subdued immediately and reco~gnized as inherently powerless.

In his Zunsheng fading xiu yugafagui yi #JltHlHJJ1~fIDj11Jn~~{i (Ritual procedures for cultivating yoga by means of the Paramount Buddha Crown [spell], T 973), SubhiikarasiIpha describes numerous ritual procedures using dhiira1J-l, mantra, ma1J-{iala, and homa. The ninth chapter, "Manifesting evidence of yogasiddhi [yogic accomp­lishment by means of] the Paramount Mantra" (zunsheng zhenyan

82 Da Piluzhena chengfojing shu 4, T 1796, 39.619c6--10.

83 On the practice of dominating an interior realm populated by demons see Ronald M. Davidson, Indian Esoteric Buddhism: A Social History of the Tantric Movement (New York: Columbia University Press 2002) 113-144.

THE MYSTERIES OF BODY, SPEECH, AND MIND 337

zheng yuga xidi #MJI{.§Mt£Htr11JO~J:t!!), contains an instructive pas­'sage:

The three types of kanna, verily, are the three esoterica. The three esoterica, verily, are the three bodies [of the Buddha]. The three bodies, verily, are the wisdom of the Tathagata Mahavairocana. If you' acquire, in this manner, the body of Vairocana and if you attest that the Dhanna realm everywhere mani­fests fonn bodies [n7pakilya], it is the same as a Dhanna realm [dharma­

dhatu] and the same as a svabhava [essential nature]. Outside of the One Mind, moreover, there is not one material object that can be established. All buddhas [possess] the mark of emptiness. Emptiness [is] also the markless mind, [and it] is the same as emptiness; hence, those who cultivate [the prac­tices of] the yogin are also the same as the essence.

In an instant, the length of a single thought, you transcend the three absurd graspings84 and transcend trikalpilsarrzkhyeya [worth of] practices. When you initially arouse the mind [bodhicitta] you will then achieve complete buddhahood (zhengjue iEJi, saf!lbodhi). Verily, this is the body of siddhi

(xidi ~f-fu, accomplishment, completion). This, among the markless siddhi, is the dhanna of the most superior siddhi.85

The language of this passage is surprisingly straightforward and clear. Employing the concept of universality, the practitioner's own karma of body, speech, and mind produces the three bodies of the buddha, which is merely another name for Vairocana. Although un­stated, the concept of acquiescence to the non-production of dharmas (wushengfa ren ~1:.¥!Je" Skt. anutpattikadharmak~iinti)86 is alluded to by such positions as no material forms can be established outside of the mind and all buddhas possess the mark of emptiness. Subhakarasir!ilia's explanation that the achievement of buddhahood is as immediate as the arousal of the bodhicitta - in which the three esoteric a play a central role - is actually quite similar to some as-

84 The three absurd graspings (sanzhi ::::¥il.) are grasping the concept of self, grasping the concept of the dhannas, and the delusion of ignorance. See Da PilLlzhena chengfo shenbianjiachijing 1, T 848, 18.3a.

85 ZLlnsheng foding XiLl YLlgafagLli yi #JlJj-MllJj1~rtufJJO¥t;~fj 2, T 973, 19.380a25-b3.

86 Obtaining the "acquiescence to the non-production of dhannas" (wLlshengfa ren ~10 i*B) is the phrase commonly used in the Mahayana teachings to reflect an adherent's awakening to the ultimate truth of reality, the way things really are; see Weimoji sLloshLlO jing ~*~JiJT~#,l[ 1, T 475, 14.539a, 540c; roll 2, 14.546a.

338 RICHARD D. MCBRIDE, II

pects of the doctrinal position held by Huayan ~M proponents. In­stead of suggesting that all ten or fifty-two bodhisattva stages are interconnected, Subhakarasirpha promotes a position influenced by the rhetoric of subitism. In the realm of reality, complete enlighten­ment is instantaneous. This is the most superior of all spiritual attain­ments.

The third great Tantric master, Amoghavajra (Bukong /G3::, 705-774),87 adds new attributes to the three esoterica that ,accord with aspects of Tantric doctrine and practice he promotes. Just as Subha­karasirp.ha emphasized universality with respect to the esoterica of body, speech, and mind, Amoghavajra accentuates its constancy and firmness. In his Dale jin'gang bukong zhenshi sanmeiye jing bore

. boluomiduo liqu shi jc~~~V /G 3:: ~. - ~It~ *~~~~*1 ~ $:El@ ~~ (Analysis of the principle and intention toward Prajfiiipiiramitii and the Sutra on the samaya [coming together] of great bliss, vajra non-emptiness and true reality, T 1003), for instance, he likens it to vajra or adamant:

Vajra (jin'gang ~[jlJU, adamant) attests to attaining the state of buddha hood in which aIr dhannas are self-existent. One attains and attests to the vajra [adamantine nature] of the three esoterica of body, speech, and mind. Within the storehouse consciousness [alayavijiiana] one cultivates the [religious] path, defilements [kle.sa], and habits [vasana]. "Finnness" accords with vajra and is difficult to destroy. One should employ the samadhi on the vajra­knowledge of great emptiness and attest to and attain the Dhanna body, the universal radiance of glorious brightness (guangming bianzhao :J'ta)Hl1!i~¥'),

the Tathagata Vairocana.88

My understanding of this passage is that enlightened beings should manifest vajra-like samiidhi. The primary purpose of ritual involving the body, speech, and mind is to develop the samiidhi that will render the practitioner - actually the practitioner's mind - firm, immove-

87 For the biography of Amoghavajra see Song gaoseng zhuan 1, T 2061, 50.712a-714a; see also Chou, "Tantrism in China" (cf. n. 67 above) 284-307.

88 Dale jin 'gang bukong zhenshi sanmeiye jing bore boluomiduo Jiqu shi ::k~~l*Jtl/fq ~.='*If~~~Jll1:*~MBi'i$JJlbllB*i 2, T 1003, 19.607b25-28.

THE MYSTERIES OF BODY, SPEECH, AND MIND 339

able, and bright in nature, making him thereby functionally no differ­ent than Vaircicana.

Amoghavajra's translation of the Wuliangshou ntlai guanxing gongyang yigui f*:I::;'~D*ft1T1j:!;.1~UfL (Ritual procedures for making offerings related to the visualization practice of the Tathii­gata Amitayus, T 930) suggests another way in which the concept of the three esoterica came to be understood in the nascent Tantric tradition: It was used as a key phrase encapsulating the approach to Buddhist practice that uses dhara1J,l and mantra:

At that time the Bodhisattva Vajrapani resided in the midst of the great assembly of the Buddha Vairocana. Arising from his seat he joined palms and respectfully addressed the Buddha saying, "World Honored One, for the sake of living beings plagued by unwholesome karma in world systems characterized by sundry defilements (zaran !ftl~, saJ?1klesa) in the future during the age of the decline of the Dharma (mofa ?Kit), I will preach the dharal},l of the Buddha Amitayus [by which one] cultivates the approach of the three esoterica (sanmi men), attests to [the power of] the buddhanusmrti­samadhi (nianfo sanmei 2iiJll =1liK), acquires rebirth in the Pure Land, and enters the proper position/level of the bodhisattva.89

One does not acquire rebirth in that k:jetra by means of a few meritorious [deeds] and expedients devoid of wisdom. For this reason, if one relies on this teaching and cultivates this practice with correct contemplation (zhengnian iE2), he will assuredly be reborn in the highest grade of the highest class of the world-system SukhavatI and attain the initial stage [of the bodhisattva path].

If one is either a householder or a renunciant who desires rebirth in the Pure Land, he should first enter the mal'}rJala and obtain consecration [abhi~eka]. Thereafter he should receive the Ritual guide on chants and intonations (Niansong yigui 2~ili{~UJL)90 from his master. On either a superior site or

89 The proper level or position of the bodhisattva (zhengwei iE 1Jr, Skt. niyiima, samyaktva). See Weimojie suoshuo jing M£~~?JTWl:!.<& 1, T 475, 14.542b; roll, 2, 545c; roll 3,553c.

90 The Niansong yigui referred to here, if it does not refer to the current text, probably refers to the Wuliangshou ndai niansong yigui !l\I;:i:3~D*:&:~ili1iiiJL (Ritual guide on chants and intonations of the Tathiigata Amitiiyus), twelve sheets in one roll, translated by Amoghavajra, which, though now lost, was listed repeatedly in catalogs prepared by Yuanzhao II!I~~ (fl. 794): Da Tang zhenyuan xukaiyuan shijiao lu *H!'i ffil:5G#Jlr,lj5G~~tt

340 RICHARD D. MCBRIDE, II

residence paint, wipe, and cleanse [the area] and set up a square altar. Spread a heaven-shaped [round] covering on top and hang banners around the circumference. The top of the altar is divided into an eight[ -sectioned] ma,:uj.ala. Grind white sandalwood incense paste and smear it on the positions of the holy [deities]. Enshrine an image of AmWiyus on the western face of the altar. He [the aspirant] sits on the east of the altar. He sits facing west opposite the image. I either spread a reed mat or sit with my legs on a small table.

Three times a day scatter various types of flowers, bum various types of incense, and place two queqie M1ilO-dishes. Either use bowls or cups and utensils of gold, silver, bronze, stone, earthenware, tile, and so forth. Fill one that has not yet been used with perfumed water and place it on top of the altar. Enshrine four worthy [wish-fulfilling] vases on the four horns [comers] of the altar. Bum incense, light lamps, daub incense, and [make sure that] food and drink, in accordance to their power, are set out. Empower (jiachi JJot~, adhi~thana) [the objects] one by one and attentively make offerings.

The practitioner [should] wash or bathe daily and put on new clean clothes. [If he cannot] he should use the empowerment of the true word (zhenyan jiachi ~ 1§JJQ ff, mantra-empowerment) to render them clean. In pensive visualization all beings possessing desires are originally clean and pure: for all are covered over with transient dust. [If] they have not awoken to the truth, they are deluded and have lost bodhi. They are drowning in life and death [saJ?1Sara] and endure immeasurable suffering.

For this reason, I preach the empowerment of the three esoterica (sanmi jiachi =ffi'JJQff). Now both self and others may attain cleanliness and purity. Taking a lotus flower in one's two hands and joining the palms one should then intone the 'True word that purifies the three kinds of karma' (jing sanye zhenyan ¥J¥'::::'*~ 1§) three times."91

This guide provides one of the most succinct descriptions of ritual procedures for cultivating the three esoterica and ritual empower­ment by means of the three esoterica. What is striking is the similar­ity between the stated goals and benefits of this ritual and the

1, T 2156, 55.749bI2; roll 3, T 2156, 55.767b20; ZhenYllan xinding shijiao mulu ~;7I;¥JiJE ~~~J::ltj 1, T 2157, 55.772b29; follI5, T 2157, 55.879c18; roIl 21, T 2157, 55.924c12-13; and ro1127, T 2157, 55.1011aI4-I5.

91 Wuliangshou rulai guanxing gongyang yiglli 1, T 930, 19.67b--c.

THE MYSTERIES OF BODY, SPEECH, AND MIND 341

purposes of mainstream Sinitic Pure Land practice.92 Although the rhetoric of empowerment (jiachi) pervades, the fundamental goal is rebirth in Sukhavatl and attainment of the aspirant's proper bodhi­sattva level. It is merely a repackaging of mainstream Mahayana ritual with flashy new terminology and ritual accoutrements. Effi­cacy (lingyan :!:,~) is the critical issue here. The name of the mantra the aspirant is supposed to chant is also significant because the chanting of the spell is said to ritually purify the three types of karma produced by the aspirant, thus transforming them from ordinary karma into the three esoterica. It is both the "dhiiranl of the Buddha Amitayus" and the "True word that purifies the three kinds of karma." In this manner the aspirant ritually becomes a bodhisattva by the power of the dhiirm}l/mantra and is assured rebirth in the Pure Land. In this connection we can see that the concept of the three eso­terica as used in the early Tantric literature of the High Tang period encapsulates the universal approach of the Mantrayanaor Vajrayana within the larger context of mainstream Mahayana Buddhism. In other words, the three esoterica becomes a catch-phrase to refer to the putatively more efficacious approach utilizing mantra, dhiirm}l, ma1}rjala, and so forth.

Amoghavajra's most straightforward statement on the meaning of the three esoterica is found in his translation of lin' gangding yuga­zhong fa anouduoluo sanmiao sanputi xin lun ~~0J.\'lItu1nDr:p~~~iiJ~Ji ~il =&i-=~:tJtJt;~ (Treatise on producing the thought of anuttarii­samyaksaY[lbodhi in the yoga of the vajra-crown [vajrasekhara] , T 1665).93 This undated discourse, erroneously attributed to Nagarjuna

92 For more on this ritual manual and its procedures see Charles D. Orzech, "A Tang Esoteric Manual for Rebirth in the Pure Land: Rites for Contemplation of and Offerings to Amitayus Tathagata" (forthcoming in a festschrift for Roger Coreless). I would like to thank Charlie for sharing his study of this interesting text with me.

93 Abe Ryiiichi translates the title as Discourse on the Enlightened Mind; see The Weaving of Mantra (cf. n. 2 above) 255. Ken White calls it the Bodhicitta Sastra and pro­vides an annotated translation of the entire text in his The Role of Bodhicitta in Buddhist Enlightenment (cf. n. 8 above) 209-235. I agree with White that the text was spuriously attributed to Nagarjuna (ca. 150-200 C.E.), but wonder why he holds to an Indian heritage for the document? See White, The Role of Bod hie itt a in Buddhist Enlightenment, 13 n. 5, 33.

342 RICHARD D. MCBRIDE, II

(Longshu ll~fM, ca. 150-200),94 was probably composed in China because it alludes to Subhakarasirp.ha and Yixing's Da Piluzhena chengfo jing ShU.95 The title suggests it is an exegesis on the vajra­sekhara literature, although the body quotes a passage from only one such text towards the end (Jin'gangding yugajing ~llijtlm:Etu1hD~&, T 865).96 It may date to after the rebellions of An Lushan i<t1:ili and Shi Siming .se.,\!lJ~J§ (ca. 755-763), In my opinion, the short treatise was crafted for a non-specialist audience - probably Tang scholar­officials - because it briefly describes the meaning of ritUal practices from the Da Piluzhena chengfo jing in a straightforward manner and squarely within the conceptual and practical framework of the bodhi­sattva path found in mainstream Mahayana scriptures, by quoting and alluding to such works as the A vatalflsaka Satra, Nirvii/'}a Sutra, Mahiiprajfziipiiramitii Sutra, and Lotus Sutra. Its explanation of the three esoterica comes toward the end:

Generally, practitioners who cultivate yogic visualization (yuga guan ftu{ho im) should necessarily cultivate all the practices of the three esoterica (sanmi xing =~1T) and give evidence of and awaken to the meaning of "complet­ing the body of five marks."97 With respect to the three esoterica, the first is

94 There is a great debate as to whether Nagarjuna actually existed or whether he is a literary creation concocted by Mahayana writers. This is unimportant to our discussion because he existed to the Chinese. In India Nagarjuna is referred to variously as the author of one or another particular essay. For the problem of Nagarjuna's existence and dating in Indian literature see Joseph Walser, "Nagarjuna and the Ratnavalf" (cf. n. 17 above).

95 Jin'gangding yugazhong fa anouduoluo sanmiao sanputi xin lun, T 1665, 32.574a23; cf. Da Piluzhena chengfo jing shu 14, T 1796, 39.723b.

96 Jin'gangding yugazhong fa anouduoiuo sanmiao sanputi xin lun, T 1665, 32. 574c11-13. The Jin'gangding yugajing is another name for the Jin'gangding yiqie rulai zhenshi she dasheng xianzheng dajiaowang jing i:~tlrn-i;)]~o*Jj;.JI:k*lJHi:ktz.:E !.\¥ (Sarvatathagatatattvasaligraha), in three rolls. The portion paraphrased in this essay is from rollI, T 865, 18.207c7-1O.

97 "Completing the body of five marks" (wuxiang chengshen 1L~§pj(;~) is also called "completing the body of five dharmas" (wufa chengshen 1Litpj(;~) and "completing the body of five turnings" (wuzhuan chengshen 1Liltpj(;~). The five marks are (1) the penetrating and accomplishing mind (tongda xin iffiii,l,'), (2) [cultivating] the bodhicitta ([xiu]putixin 1~'8'm,1,')' (3) [achieving] the vajra mind ([cheng] jin'gang xin pj(;i:~tl,l,')' (4) [giving evidence of] the vajra body ([zheng] jin'gang shen ~~~tl~), and (5) giving evidence of unsurpassed bodhi (zheng wushang puti ~~..titm). Ultimately, manifesting the five marks was tantamount to "achieving the body of the Tathagata Vairocana in the

THE MYSTERIES OF BODY, SPEECH, AND M1ND 343

body-esoterica (shenmi) , like binding seals (qiyin ~[OP, mudrii) and sum­moning the saintly assembly here. The second is speech-esoterica (yumi), like secretly chanting true words (zhenyan, mantra). The passages are clear and distinct and devoid of obstruction and error. The third is mind-esoterica (xinmi), like abiding in yoga, mutually resonating with the white and pure full moon and visualizing (guan) bodhicitta (putixin *!lfAJ,).98

This passage is the most succinct statement on the nature and pur­pose of the three esoterica in the early Tantric tradition. The three esoteric a are clearly labeled as the ritualized practices of making mudra, chanting mantra, and abiding in yogic meditation and are said to produce the ultimate goal of enlightenment - "completing the body of the five marks." Although concise, when seen in the context of other passages in siitras and commentaries of the time, it is far from being a representative statement about the three esoterica. Amoghavajra's views presented here later became the orthodox posi­tion in the mature Esoteric traditions in Japan. I think it is both important and ironic that a discourse probably composed as a simpli­fied statement to promote aristocratic and official support for his form of Mahayana Buddhism would ultimately exert so much influ­ence on the understanding of three esoterica.

Mid and late Tang Period

By the mid-Tang period the meaning of three esoterica as used in the growing literature used in the circles of early Tantric practitioners appears to have become relatively fixed. This is because there was no need for translators and scholars to explain what the three eso­terica were or referred to in either the newly translated siitras or in prefatory or exegetical materials. Not only was the meaning fixed but the concept of the three esoterica was presented as one of the primary teachings of the Tantric movement. This is the way the Silla

Vajra Realm (jin'gangjie 1i£~UJf.) See lin'gangding yugazhong fa anouduoluo sanmiao sanputi xin lun, T 1665, 32.574b17-20.

98 lin'gangding yugazhong fa anouduoluo sanmiao sanputi xin lun, T 1665, 32.574bIl-16.

344 RICHARD D. MCBRIDE, IT

monk Hyech'o ~~ (704-d. after 780),99 one of the recognized disciples of Amoghavajra, uses the concept of the three esoterica in his preface to the Dasheng yuga jin' gang xinghai Manshushili qian­bei qianba dajiaowang jing ::k*ftu{lla:sl£~ti'~i.~§!J3K~5fUT.Tffi;tk ~±~~ (Satra of the king of the great teaching, the thousand armed thousand alms-bowl carrying Mafijusrf who possesses an ocean of yoga vajra nature in the Mahiiyana, T 1177A). Hyech'o considers himself one who has been consecrated to transmit the three esoteric a by covenant. 100 Amoghavajra's translation of this siitra, which Hyech'o calls for short the Satra of the thousand alms-bowl carrying Mafijusrf, refers to the three esoterica in a variety of constructions: an approach of the three esoterica (sanmi men), as it is found in Subhakarasirpha and Yixing's translation of and commentary to the Da Piluzhena chengfo jing; and in lists of euphemisms for Buddha nature: "minds of the thus-come buddhas, the three esoterica, the thirty branches,101 the vajra-wisdom mirror, the way of the sages, and the ocean of the bhatatathata [the all-containing immaterial nature of the dharmakaya]," and so forth. 102 Another example is the Tang Emperor Daizong's 1~* (r. 762-779) preface to Amogha­vajra's retranslation of the Renwang jingo Here the concept of the three esoterica is again used as a term encompassing the Tantric approach to Mahayana practice: "The trepitaka [master of the Tripi-

99 See Daizong chaozeng sikong dabian zheng guangzhi sanzang heshang biao zhiji 1~ *Wl~~i5J3:':kmiEmtt'=jUQ..t.*1Iiu~ 3, T ZIZ0, 5Z.844bl-3; for a brief biography of Hyech'o see Yang Han-sung, et al., trans., The Hye Ch'o Diary: Memoir of a Pilgrimage to

: the Five Regions of India (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press 1984).

100 "Taesung yuga kumgang songhae Mansusilli ch'onbi ch'onbal taegyowang kyong so" :k*Jtu1hoiz[llJutt~~53t~:5fU+'ifTfIi*:k~::E~&ff, HPC 3.381c9, 38Za3.

lOt The thirty branches (sanshizhi =+;0 is a term found only in this satra, where the term appears 18 times, not counting Hyech'o's use of it in the preface. It always appears in lists following the "approach of the three esoterica" (sanmi men) and usually precedes the concept of samiidhi (sanmodi =~:lih). See Dasheng yuga jin'gang xinghai Manshushili qianbei qianba dajiaowang jing 1, T 1177A, ZO.725c1Z-13, 727cZ-3; roll 5, T 1177A, ZO.750a9, 750aZ5, 750aZ9; ro116, T 1177A, ZO.75Z, c9-1O.

102 "Taesling yuga kumgang songhae Mansusilli ch'onbi ch'onbaI taegyowang kyong so," HPC 3:38Za3; T 1177A, ZO.724cZO--Zl; see also Dasheng yuga jin'gang xing/wi Manshushili qianbei qianba dajiaowang jing I, T 1177A, ZO.725cZ-3, 727cZ-3, roll Z, T 1177A, ZO.731aZ9-bl, and so forth.

THE MYSTERIES OF BODY, SPEECH, Ai'ill MIND 345

taka] studies and researches the two truths [absolute truth and coiwentional truth] and teaches and transmits the three esoterica."103

The monk Liangben 5:!.~ (717-777)104 was also a disciple of Amoghavajra and served on his team that executed the retranslation of the Renwang jing in 765-766.105 This exegete served as a bridge between mainstream Sinitic intellectual Buddhism and Amoghava­jra's Tantric tradition. As in commentaries on Kumarajlva's trans­lation above, Liangben's Renwang huguo bore boluomiduo jing shu 1=I§f~~;5~~:£:$*£.iWt: (Commentary on the Peifection ofwis­dom sutra for humane kings who wish to protect their states, T 1709) locates the concept of the three esoterica in references to the three types of karma:

Question: The Buddha does not have frivolous thoughts. They are com­pletely and entirely fixed [in meditation] (ding 1£). Why then does this scrip­ture repeat the word "enter" [as in enter samiidhi]?

Answer: The Buddha does not have frivolous thoughts. Because he is an instructor he manifests wisdom in accordance to meditation. For this reason he showed his first entrance [into samiidhi]. For this reason he dually culti­vates meditation and wisdom and he neither falters nor moves [from samiidhi]. When he enters meditation he emits light and, in regard to preach­ing the Dharma, the three types of karma (sanye), he instructs, are verily the three esoterica (sanmi).

The Tathligata constantly [abides in the] Dharma and reveres prajiiii. He

desires to discourse and show respect for the rites. Profound samiidhi only

the Buddha alone attains; hence, it is claimed to be "profound." As for

samiidhi, this is said to be "universal maintenance" [samiidhi] (dengchi ~

fif). Its substance is separate from sinking or shaking; hence, it is said to be

"universal." It solely fixes on one position; hence, it is said to be "main-

!O3 "Renwang huguo bore boluomi jing xu" 1=3:j:f~itllt;§,¥Bi*i'£:*~ff T 246, 8.834b8.

[04 For the biography of Liangben see Song gaoseng zhuan 5, T 2061, 50.735a26-c22.

[05 For historical background to the translation of this satra and detailed study and translation of this satra see Charles D. Orzech, Politics and Transcendent Wisdom (University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press 1998). In this book Orzech refers to Liangben as Liang-pi; the logograph ben # can also be read as bi andfen.

346 RICHARD D. MCBRIDE, II

tained." Because its universality is maintained it is also-said that the meaning of samtidhi is the same as "ground/stage/bhami" (di ±if!.).106

As before, the Buddha's power to emit light, preach the Dharma, and abide in prajfia for the benefit of beings is described as the three esoterica. Liangben holds that the Buddha is absorbed in a constant state of samadhi in his pure land and that this samadhi is universally maintained or, in other words, pervades everywhere. The three eso­terica are the three types of karma of the Buddha because the Bud­dha has never really left samadhi in his pure land. He is grounded there and by means of the three esoterica seems to do the things he does. His teaching skills, compassion, and even his first entrance into samadhi are all a show: He has never left samadhi. He is grounded in the unaltered stage or bhumi of buddhahood. This point is reiterated later, when he comments on the following passage from one of the scripture's gathas:

The abodes of the three worthies107 and ten saints108 are fruition rewards. 109

A buddha only is the one person that dwells in a pure land. All living beings have temporary abode rewards [Yet] when they ascend to the adamantine source they dwell in pure lands. The virtue of the Tathagata's three kinds of karma (sanyede =~tt\) is immeasurable. Consequently all living beings equally receive his compassion.lIo

106 Renwang huguo bore boluomiduo jing shu 2, T 1709, 33.449a4--16.

107 The three worthies (sanxian ':::::Jl:) are bodhisattvas, prior to the bhiimis, who have achieved the level of the ten abidings (shizhu +i±), the ten practices (shixing +11'), and the ten transferences (shi huixiang +§l rtJ). See Dasheng yizhang jc*~Uil: I7A, T 1851, 44.788b27-28.

108 The ten saints (shisheng +~) are bodhisattvas above the sage of the ten transfer­ences (shi huixiang). See Renwang bore boluomijing 1, T 245, 8.827bI2; 828al.

109 A fruition reward (guobao *~, Skt. phala, vipaka) is retribution for good or evil deeds, implying that different conditions in this life or any other life are the fruits of seeds sown in one's previous life or lives. See Miaofa lianhuajing fr!);lt;;Ji1tf..& (Saddharmapu(z­tjarfka Siitra) 7, T 262, 9.56a8-9.

110 Renwang huguo bore poluomiduo jing 1, T 246, 8.838aI-3; for an alternate transla­tion see Orzech, Politics and Transcendent Wisdom (cf. n. 105 above) 234. The same passage in the earlier recension of the siitra (T 245) reads: "The abodes of the three wor­thies and ten saints are fruition rewards / A buddha only is the one person that dwells in a

THE MYSTERIES OF BODY, SPEECH, AND MIND 347

Liangben interprets the meaning of the virtue of the Tathagata's three kinds of karma as follows:

Because the eulogy speaks of 'virtues,' the foregoing virtues of the three types of karma are verily the approach of the three esoterica (sanmi men). In this function of affairs, verily, [they are] the three extraordinary occur­rences.l1l

The three extraordinary occurrences (san shidao .=..~~, Skt. trllJi priitiharyiilJi) refer to three miraculous ways that bodhisattvas re­spond to living beings suffering in hell (diyu :tiMli\) and work to save them. For the most part these are manifestations of the inconceivable power of the spiritual penetrations. The first is the employment of spiritual transformation or magical performance (shenbian shidao 1$ ~ffi~, rddhipriitiharya) demonstrating the bodhisattva's ability to manipulate the phenomenal world because of his acquiescence to the non-production of dharmas. The second is the use of mind-reading (jixin shidao §GJc.'ffi~, iide§aniipriitihiirya) in order to observe the spiritual state of the audience so as to gage his remarks appropriately to encourage them to convert. Third is the miracle of admonition (jiaojie shidao $j~jffi~, anusiisanapriitiharya) through which the bodhisattva's compassionate mind reaches out to strike a chord with a listener causing the latter t'o destroy his desires for mistaken views and practices that lead to unwholesome consequences.l12 Liangben's position is fundamentally and strikingly mainstream Mahayana, especially for a disciple of Amoghavajra commenting on a putatively "Tantric" or "esotericized" recapitulation of the Renwang jingo His equating the three esoterica to the three extraordinary occurrences demonstrates that the inclusive spirit of the earlier intellectual approaches to defining this concept were preserved within the cadre of monks associated with the early Tantric masters.

pure land / All living beings have temporary abode rewards / [Yet] when they ascend to the adamantine source they dwell in pure lands / The virtue of the Tathagata' s three kinds of kanna (sanyede) is boundless (wuji f!\T;@) / I now, by the light of the moon, worship the three treasures [Buddha, Dhanna, sQ/igha]." See Renwang bore boluomiduo jing 1, T 245, 8.828al-3.

III Renwang huguo jing shu 3, T 1709, 33.427a5-8.

112 See Apidamo jushelw! IWJ 1!J!~{~*~6ii 27, T 1558, 29. 143c7-144a23.

348 RICHARD D. MCBRIDE, II

The Tiantai monk Zhanran #frrrit (711-782), I13 heir to the exegeti­cal tradition of Zhiyi and Guanding, followed the example of schol­ars of the times in locating the three esoterica in the earlier sLltras. In his Weimo jing We shu ~t)]JH&ru~iB!f. (Concise commentary on the Vimalakfrti Satra, T 1778), Zhanran comments on the first giitlui­verse (jiesong {I~) in the first chapter, "Buddha Land" (joguo pin 1~~ J'b), of Kumarajlva's translation of the Vimalakfrtinirde.sa Satra (T 475). The second half of the giithii uses the terms "ten powers" (shili + jJ) and "spiritual power" (shenli 1$ jJ) repeatedly, alluding to the Buddha's employment of his spiritual penetrations in preach­ing the Dharma. Zhanran's analysis begins in this part of the verse:

Question: The Great Saint, over the next fifteen lines,114 specifically de­scribes and praises the three esoterica of the Buddha in three passages. In the first two lines he praises the body-esoterica. In the next six lines he praises the speech-esoterica. And in the next seven lines he praises the mind-eso­terica.

The three esoterica verily are the inconceivable transformations (busiyihua /F}§JMHt) of the three wheels. The three are not lost and the three cannot be protected. The throngs who take refuge in the Great Saint and the Dharma King are those who praise the superior response of the Dharma bodyy5

A passage from his Fahua wenju ji ¥t¥}(t:o~ (Record of literary passages from the Lotus Satra, T 1719) explains what Zhanran means by equating the three esoterica to the three wheels:

In order to differentiate their changing functions, it is said that the three types of karma, and so forth, are called by the different names of the types of karma, three esoterica, three wheels, and the three virtues. Mind-esoterica

113 For the biography of Zhaman see Song gaoseng zhuan 6, T 2061, 50.739b9-740a16. For more on Zhanran see Chen Jinhua, "One Name, Three Monks: Two Northern Chan Masters Emerge from the Shadow of Their Contemporary, the Tiantai Master Zhanran i! P& (711-782)," Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 22/1 (1999) 1-91. See also Chen, Making and Remaking History (cf. n. 34 above).

114 Zhanran reports that it is the part of the verse beginning withjinfeng shizun 4-*t!:!: #; see Weimo jing We shu 2, T 1778, 38.587b8; cf. Weimoji suoshuo jing 1, T 475, 14.537c25-538a14.

115 Weimo jing We shu 2, T 1778, 38.587b18-22.

THE MYSTERIES OF BODY, SPEECH, AND MIND 349

(yimi) is namely prajJ1a. Speech-esoterica (koumi) is namely liberation. Body-esoterica (shenmi) is namely the Dharma body.l16

His position is essentially the same as Zhiyi's.

The diction of a passage in Zhanran's short exegesis titled Shi buermen +/G=F~ (The ten non-dual approaches, T 1927) strongly suggests that, with respect to his understanding of the three esoteric a, he was somewhat influenced by the literature translated or composed by Subhakarasirpha and Amoghavajra. The primary thrust of the exegesis is to demonstrate the ultimate non-duality of reality, the "consummate interfusion and entry into the sublime" (rongtong rumiao M~JiAM;). Although these terms, consummate interfusion, in particular, seem to indicate a Huayan scriptural or exegetical setting, they are actually found repeatedly in the writings of Zhiyi and other early exegetes, including Amoghavajra. In this connection, the three esoterica or three types of karma are ultimately interchangeable with the Dharma body and Vairocana:

8. The non-dual approach of the three kinds of karma. With respect to the approach of transforming others, phenomena (shi $) are divided into the three esoterica. Accordingly, the principle of material objects (wuli ~:FJI!.) ac­quire the deSignation "not the same." The mind-wheel (yilun ~ ~, "thought") mirrors potentiality and the two [other] wheels estab­lish/engender transformation. The presently-appearing body preaches the Dharma and does not have a hair's difference [from the true Dharma body]. With reference to this body, distinctions lie between the true (zhen Jli,) and the false (ying 1l\I.\). With reference to the Dharma, distinctions lie between expediency (quan ti) and reality (shi .).

If the two bodies are different, why then do we call it the "Dharma body"? If the two types of preaching are perverse, why then do we say "all complete the Path to Buddhahood"? If only the Dharma body responds and does not condescend to the [mundane] world and if there is only the Path to Buddha­hood, who exhibits/bestows the Three Vehicles? The body is still a non-body and the preaching [is] necessarily a non-preaching. Body and speech are universal (pingdeng) and are equal to that mind-wheel. Mind forms are all thus, they transform without a [pre-determined] plan. Are there not a hun­dred spheres in one mind? All these spheres are nothing but the three types

116 Falnta wenjuji 9, T 1719, 34.317a6--8.

350 RICHARD D. MCBRIDE, II

of karma. A sphere still is a recollection (nian 2", "thought"); so how are the three types of karma peculiar? The function of a result never deteriorates; its cause must be designated a result [of some other cause]. If you believe in causes and results, you should know that the three esoterica are the basis. The hundred spheres and the three types of karma are fully prepared in emptiness (kong Y:), the provisional (jia &), and the mean (zhong 'P). Hence, by employing the designation that is appropriate everything goes to fruition. Each and every response form, each and every word sound are nothing but the hundred spheres and the three types of karma all complete. Transformation repeatedly begets transformation: Thus it is said! Hence, one recollection is every mind and already possesses the nature of principle Clixing :FJlHi) and the ocean of marks of the three esoterica. One mote of dust recompenses form and the same resides in the original principle Vairocana. Forthwith they are named as the three indistinguishables. This, by means of self and others, completes the approach of non-duality.1l7

In Zhanran's own words the three indistinguishables (san wuchabie - ~§:)JIJ) are those of the mind (xin JL.'), the Buddha (fo 1Jt), and living beings (zhongsheng ffR:1:.).118 This is a grand statement on the fundamental non-duality of phenomena with respect to the nature of ultimate reality. The three esoterica, which in the beginning are equated to the three types of karma, are quickly substituted for the nature of all manifested phenomena. Yet these manifested phenom­ena - people, things, objects, ideas that have meaning in provisional contexts - are merely mental phantasms produced by the mind and are ultimately indistinguishable from body, speech, and the realm of reality. This is essentially the same as the refrain of the Huayan tradition's cosmic ecology (but which was also shared in most of the mature exegetical traditions as well as Chan): all in one and one in all. The three esoterica are the cause of the transformations of all things and yet they are indistinguishable from Vairocana, the nature of reality, because they are ultimately empty of self-nature.

117 Shi buermen 1, T 1927, 46.704a26-b11.

118 Fahuaxuanyi shiqian yt,;¥t"~JIi~ 6, T 1717, 33.858c2.

THE MYSTERIES OF BODY, SPEECH, AND MIND 351

What are the three esoterica?

We are now ready to return to the questions that have guided our investigation of the concept of the three esoterica. First, how did medieval Chinese Buddhist intellectuals and early Tantric practitio­ners understand the significance of this term? The evidence is clear that the three esoterica recalled much more than the ritualized ap­proach of mudrii, mantra, and yogic meditation. In medieval Sinitic Buddhist scripture and exegesis the three esoterica have many snugly-packed layers of meaning. Although single layers of meaning can be peeled off, no one layer can account for the wide range of semantic usage. Many of the major scholar-monks of the medieval period sought to locate traces of the three esoterica in scripture and used them as a heuristic device to talk about unexplainable aspects of the Buddhadharma and, especially, the nature of the actions of enlightened beings such as bodhisattvas and buddhas.

The idea of the three esoterica first appeared in an early Maha­yana scripture in the early fourth century, the Miji jingo Its basic con­tours, however, were actually set in Kumarajlva's Dazhidu [un, be­cause most exegetes alluded to this work's presentation of the three esoteric a as referring to the inexplicable spiritual powers of the Bud­dha as a result of his constantly abiding in samiidhi and manifest in his preaching the Dharma. Kumarajlva also linked the three esoterica to the concept of the virtue of the three types of karma. Zhiyi built upon this foundation by using the three esoterica as a heuristic de­vice to talk about the three types of karma, three virtues, three wheels, which he associated with the spiritual penetrations, and gen­eral bodhisattva actions employed in preaching the Dharma. Guan­ding expands upon his master's position by describing the three eso­terica as bodhisattva powers and virtues and connecting them to other lists, such as the four virtues, five constancies, five fruits, and four bodhisattva practices, which all describe either the enlightened state or the method by which a bodhisattva converts others. In Guan­ding is also found an interpretation of the three esoteric a shared by Jizang: that the three esoterica refer to prajfiii, the Dharma body, and liberation: all terms to describe absolute reality.

352 RICHARD D. MCBRIDE, IT

Jizang applied the three esoterica directly to the Bodhisattva. A valokitesvara to speak of his spiritual penetrations and wholesome actions to convert living beings. He suggests that they refer to the bodhisattva's entering meditation, emitting light, and preaching the Dharma: a view he shares with Kuiji. Jizang compares them to the three virtues, but adds another list, the four marks, to explain their meaning. He also refers to a mystical endowment of the three eso­terica by which buddhas and bodhisattvas preach siitras and convert beings by making their message fit the audience. W<Snch'uk also explains the three esoterica as associated with the spiritual powers used in preaching the Dharma, referring directly information in KumarajIva's Dazhidu lun. He also connects them to the adamantine (vajra) nature of the Buddha's body and as what enables buddhas to tum the wheel of the Dharma while remaining in samadhi.

This leads us to the question: Did its meaning in Sinitic Buddhist literature change prior to its use in Tantric literature and ritual? The simple answer is yes. In medieval Sinitic Buddhism, the three eso­terica came to represent not only the method but the means of bodhi­sattva practice: the way by which bodhisattvas both resonate with and manifest the Dharma body. In other words, the term was used to account for the essence and function of enlightenment. The three esoteric a were not completely redefined in the newly emerging Tan­tric literature. The Tantric masters use slightly different terms but the semantics are essentially the same. Furthermore, there is no liter­ary evidence of disputes over the meaning of the term. New meaning is simply added to the term. The whole of the preexisting exegetical tradition's understanding was preserved and new meanings were assimilated with the translation of new siitras and the production of new commentaries. Some were conceptual like universality (ping­deng) , as found in Subhiikarasilpha and Yixing's translation of and commentary on the Da Piluzhena jing, and others were practical. Perhaps because the practical definition applied by Amoghavajra, equating the three esoteric a to the mudra, mantra, and yogic medita­tion, is the most simple to understand and put into practice it later became a preferred understanding of the term. Among exegetes, ·however, this was merely one of a many of ways of describing the term and certainly not the most common.

THE MYSTERIES OF BODY, SPEECH, A.."ID MIND 353

The early Tantric master SubhakarasiIpha and Yixing attempted to . remove the mystery surrounding the three esoterica by clearly labeling them as expedients by which one is empowered to attain buddhahood in this life. Like previous exegetes, the two scholar monks also directly associated them with arousing the bodhicitta and turning the wheel of the Dharma. Although they still refer to the three types of karma, Subhakarasirpha also combines them with concepts that resonate more fully with his message: sfinyatii (emptiness), sar[tbodhi, and siddhi. By employing the concept of universality, he made more concrete ideas developed in earlier exegesis: their being what resonates with and responds to things, their ability purify the bodhicitta, and their explanation as the Dharma body and Vairocana himself. The three esoterica are put into action in practices involving malJt;lala and mantra, which cultivate a pure mind and provide for interactions with all things. Following Kumarajlva, Vajrabodhi saw the three esoterica as associated with constancy and firmness, the vajra-like nature of samiidhi. They still refer to the three types of karma, of course, but they also refer to Vairocana, the Dharma body. Vairocana is not an exterior entity; he is the buddha within that is manifest when the practitioner cultivates the three esoterica.

In the mid-Tang period, Hyech'o described the three esoterica in language recalling Buddha nature: the mind of the thus-come ones, the way of the sages, the vajra-wisdom mirror, and the Dharma body. Liangben shows that the ideas of the earlier exegetical tradi­tion still had currency by combining the newly employed concept of universality with older ideas of entering samiidhi, abiding in prajfiii, emitting light, and preaching the Dharma. They are still the three types of karma and their association with the spiritual penetrations is found in his explanation of them as the three extraordinary occur­rences. Zhanran merges ideas found in the writings of Zhiyi (the three wheels) and Guanding (prajfiii, liberation, the Dharma body) with concepts introduced by the early Tantric masters (universality, Vairocana, the Dharma body) - all within the context of the com­monly shared exegetical frame of consummate interfusion and entry into the sublime (the realm of reality), the nature of principle.

354 RICHARD D. MCBRIDE, II

All of the Buddhist exegetes linked the three esoterica with the three types of karma produced by Tathagatas, the three virtues, the three wheels, and so forth. The workings of these threeesoterica are ultimately inexplicable and beyond human understanding. Fbr this reason, I think that they understood them as representing the per­fectly interfused reality of emptiness in active form and as resonating with mainstream Mahayana doctrinal concepts such as the Dharma body (dharmakaya), the dharmadhiitu (the realm of reality), and Vairocana. The three esoterica are expedients (upaya) and are also directly linked to the spiritual penetrations manifested by buddhas and bodhisattvas. These powers are associated not only with the marks of spiritual attainment but also with the way these Buddhist figures preach the Buddhadharma and convert living beings. The strong connection to the spiritual penetrations may explain why it was an increasingly important topic in exegesis and account for its importance in nascent Tantric literature.

The meaning of the three esoterica eludes simple definition. Be­ing empty of individual meaning, it was freely interconnected and interfused with any and all terms defining the nature of buddhahood. The term was conceptualized as transcending duality and, ultimately, as the perfect manifestation of the universality that enables living beings to be fundamentally and functionally not different from Vairocana, or the nature of the universe as it is. As a pithy catch phrase it came to represent the inherent potential for buddhahood in all things, as well as the buddhahood manifested in the actions of all

Jiving beings, and recalls what Buddhist scholiasts typically and . more familiarly render as "Buddha nature" or the "Tathagatagar­

bha." In this connection it is indelibly tied to the great secret or eso­teric teaching of the Mahayana, the one mind, the one vehicle, the Mahayana vision of reality, and, because it is a product of constantly dwelling in samadhi, the bodhisattva's "acquiescence to the non­production of dharmas."

What are the implications for the study of Tantric or Esoteric Buddhism in China? This research questions some assumptions that have been made about the nature and contributions of Tantric Bud­dhism in East Asia. First, Sinitic Buddhist scholiasts had a sophisti­cated understanding of the ineffability of the Dharma body - Vairo-

THE MYSTERlES OF BODY, SPEECH, AND MIND 355

cana, the dharmadhiitu - long before the arrival of the Tantric mas­ters, so the claim cannot be advanced that this was a Tantric doc­trinal innovation.1l9 Also, the concept of the body, speech, and mind of the Buddha, the three esoterica, is not a unique or defining characteristic of Tantric Buddhism in China without some important qualifications. In other words, we cannot make a strong case for Tantric Buddhism as a distinctly different tradition using exegetical materials or in intellectual history because what we see in the litera­ture is also highly influenced by or indicative of the Huayan rhetoric of universality and consummate interfusion. Nevertheless, efficacy in ritual and Indianness are key themes. It is presented as more efficacious than mainstream Sinitic Buddhist cultic practices to which it bore many superficial similarities, such as the use of dhiira1Jf and other types of ritual procedures to accomplish particular purposes. It was fresh from India and seemingly promoted as such. Do we underestimate the importance of its exoticness to its Chinese audience? Although agreement on a tighter definition of Tantric or Esoteric Buddhism may be impossible for specialists, I think the evidence for the role of the three esoterica in mainstream inter­pretations of Buddhist practice strongly encourages us to limit it to include the replication of the body, speech, and mind of the Buddha, within the narrower context of rituals involving mantra, mudrii, and meditation perfonned in new specialized ma1Jtj.ala under the auspices of a master to produce enlightenment immediately. A broad defi­nition, in my opinion, makes it hard to distinguish from mainstream Sinitic Mahayana.

119 See, for instance, Matsunaga Yiikei t~ftll jJ., "Esoteric Buddhism: A Definition," in Mikkyo: KobO Daishi Ktikai and Shingon Buddhism (Bulletin of the Research Institute of Esoteric Buddhist Culture, special issue, K6yasan: Research Institute of Esoteric Buddhist Culture, K6yasan University, October 1990) 23-40, esp. p. 25: "In The Differences be­tween Exoteric and Esoteric Buddhism Kiikai states that Esoteric Buddhism differs from the earlier Nara schools and the Tendai school in regard to the following four points: 1) it asserts the possibility of becoming a Buddha in this very body; 2) it recognizes that the dharma-kaya may preach; 3) its asserts the effability of the state of buddhahood; and 4) the benefits deriving from its teachings are superior to those of Exoteric Buddhism."

ON DOCTRINAL SIMll.,ARITIES BETWEEN

STHIRAMATI AND XUANZANG

RIDENORl SAKUMA

O. Introduction: Reasons for comparing Sthiramati and Xuanzang

The foundations of the system of doctrinal theories in the Chinese Faxiang y:t;J:§ school lie in the Cheng weishi lun pxllft~~ffil, translated into Chinese by Xuanzang 2:* (with the wishes of his disciple Kuiji %L~ being said to have been also strongly reflected in this transla­tion). In the Rosso y~;J:§ school of Japan too, efforts were made to preserve this tradition as faithfully as possible. Furthermore, in the traditions of the Faxiang school it is believed that the Cheng weishi [un was compiled on the basis of several commentaries on Vasu­bandhu's Trif(lsikii, with Dharmapala's interpretations being deemed to represent the legitimate interpretation. The Cheng weishi lun is not, in other words, a translation of a single scholar's commentary, and the legitimate view was determined by picking and choosing among several diverging views. The same method had been used when Xuanzang translated the Buddhabhiimisiistra ten years earlier, with the interpretations of Bandhuprabha being deemed to represent the legitimate interpretation among those of several other scholars.

In the Faxiang school, the views of various Indian scholars were assessed in accordance with their treatment in the Cheng weishi lun. With the views of Dharmapala being deemed to represent the legiti­mate view, the ideas of other scholars were recorded and judged to be not legitimate, and one gains the impression that Sthiramati in particular was an important target of criticism. This can also be in­ferred from Fukaura Shobun' s detailed study of the Cheng weishi [un, in which he remarks more than once that Sthiramati was the scholar who stood on a par with Dharmapala. 1

I Fukaura gives, for instance, the following explanation (1954, vol. 1: 341): "Were one to seek a great figure comparable with Dharmapli:la among the ten great Y ogacara

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 29' Number 2· 2006 (2008) pp. 357-382

358 HIDENORI SAKUMA

Here we need to consider the question of how to deal with Dharmapala. While we can accept that the Cheng weishi tun was compiled from a position that regarded Dharmapala' s views as legitimate, there survives no commentary on the TriY[lsika by Dharmapala himself in either the original Sanskrit or a Tibetan translation. In addition, to the best of my knowledge the only other work attributed to Dharmapala survives only in Chinese translation.2

If translations can be said to reflect the aims of the translator, this means that there exist no sources by which we can ascertain Dharmapala's true intent. If, as the traditional view would have us believe, Dharmapala died at the early age of twenty-nine and Sila­bhadra, thought to have been one year older, succeeded him as head of Nalanda University and met Xuanzang when he was over one hundred years old, it must be assumed that Dharmapala's all-impor­tant system of doctrinal theories to be seen in the Cheng weishi tun

scholars, one would indeed have to point to Sthiramati. But his style of scholarship, as has already been mentioned, differs completely from that of DharmapaJa and adopts the stance of the merging of essential nature and external characteristics, recognizing the identity of phenomena and thusness." It has been recognized in Japan too that Sthiramati has traditionally been understood as standing in opposition to Dharmapala. But the assertion that Sthiramati' s philosophical tendencies are the same as those of Paramartha, who trans­lated the Mahiiyiinasal!lgraha and Mahi'iyiinasraddhotpiidasiistra, is no more than specula­tion on the part of Fukaura, and there is a strong possibility that Sthiramati's works were modified when being translated into Chinese as a result of the Chinese predilection for Tathagatagarbha thought. It is questionable whether it is valid to go beyond the reflection of this predilection in the Shelun Jlilffil school and link it to Sthiramati in India. In my experience, it is difficult to fmd any proof in extant commentaries by Sthiramati of Fu­kaura's assertion that Sthiramati'sstyle of scholarship, characterized by the merging of essential nature and external characteristics, was taken over by Paramartha and developed into a doctrine asserting that all beings have one and the same nature. It should be noted that Sthiramati is not mentioned in the main text of the Cheng weishi lun and appears only in the afterword in a reference to the ten great bodhisattvas "Dharmapala, Sthiramati, and so on."

2 Tsukamoto et al. (1990: 174-175) mention a commentary on the CatuftSataka by Dharmapala which survives only in Chinese translation. Apart from this, the Cheng weishi lun baosheng lun P.!GII/tm&!ii1i'!lf1:.ilffil (T. 31, no. 1591) and Guan suoyuan lun shi .m~ilffil:fli' (T. 31, no. 1625), both translated by Yijing ~1ii-, are also attributed to Dharmapala. To the best of my knowledge, these too have not survived in the Sanskrit original or Tibetan translation. In addition, as is also noted by Tsukamoto et al. (ibid.: 362), among the ten scholars said to have written commentaries on the Tril!lsikii, only Sthiramati's is extant, and it survives, moreover, in the original Sanskrit.

SIMILARITIES BETWEEN STHIRAMA TI AND XUANZANG 359

had been transmitted by Silabhadra. But in the doctrinal theories that I have studied. to date this has not been the case. For example, whereas the correspondences between the eight consciousnesses (vi­jfiana) and four knowledges (jfiana) , regarded as a matter of com­mon knowledge in Faxiang doctrine, are firmly entrenched in the Cheng weishi [un, they are still in a transitional stage in Silabhadra's Buddhabhfimivyakhyana, which survives in Tibetan translation. How is one to comprehend the fact that something which ought to have been finalized at the time of Dharmapala is still in a transitional stage in Silabhadra's writings? We may have to conclude that Dhar­mapala did not give any thought to the correspondences between the eight consciousnesses and four knowledges.

Sthiramati (Anhui *~), meanwhile, is said to have been based at Valabhl and to have been a contemporary of Dharmapala.3 But the scholar mentioned by Xuanzang alongside GU1).amati (Dehui 1!~) in the Datang xiyu ji in his accounts of Nalanda (9.3.5) and Valabhi (11.8.4)4 is not Anhui but Jianhui ~~. In the Datang Daciensi san­zang fashi zhuan *m*~,~, ~ .:=.iU:ft§jjJ{t his name is given as An­hui. Among works included in the TaishO edition, the author of the Dacheng fajie wuchabie lun *~i:ft9f.~~55Ij~ (T. 31, nos. 1626 & 1627; neither translated by Xuanzang) is given as Jianhui, while the author of the Dacheng apidamo zaji [un *~/liiJmJ¥M~~~ (T. 31, no. 1606; translated by Xuanzang) and Dacheng guang wuyun lun * ~.3ia~llB (T. 31, no. 1613; translated by Divakara) is given as An-

3 This is based on the Cheng weishi [un shuji pj(;lJtilllliJffil~~c (T. 43: 231cI9ff.): :::.'lti': ;>g;jfC",f,i*!l'£o J\lf~~~o llPg*Jt*o ;jjl({f!,~ilffilll&'lEJO!l!~ijjo Mii'Mffii~ijjillJa;!f7\:;1i&o i¥iFPOCm ,f,i,f,i~}..ilio WPfY1'IZ9Ij!j~jj'ljpg~ffilo ~1'\&lttbt/J'~o mM¥~**o 1$~~iil'iIl!ilJifH1H~o Details about the "land of Palapi (Valabhi, Vallabhi)" f::UILE<e. ~ can be found in the Da­tang xiyu ji *J\lfgglJi\Z~c (T. 51: 936bI6ff.; cf. Mizutani 1999: 318). Sthiramati has been associated with ValabhI on account of an inscription issued by Guhasena II in A.D. 588-589 (see Shizutani 1979: no. 177; Tsukamoto 1996: Wa!a 7), according to which the king made a donation to the Bappapadlya temple founded by Sthiramati at ValabhI, and this Sthiramati has been identified as the commentator Sthiramati. According to the Cheng weishi [un shuji quoted above, Sthiramati was a contemporary of Dharmapala and came from the "land of Luoluo" ,f,i,f,i~ in south India. "Luoluo ,f,i,f,i" corresponds to GujaratI La(a=La!a, which was the name of an ancient kingdom affiliated to ValabhI. It is also evi­dent from sources cited in Law 1976 and Dey 1927 that Wa!a refers to ValabhI.

4 Mizutani 1999: 168 & 321.

360 . HIDENORI SAKUMA

hui. While a detailed examination of this state of affairs will be omit­ted here, the original Sanskrit equivalent of both Jianhui and Anhui may be considered to have been Sthiramati.5 Further, a possible point of contact between Sthiramati and Xuanzang would have been Shengjun Jl%.'ij[ (*Jayasena), a contemporary of Dharmapala who is mentioned in the Datang Daciensi sanzang fashi zhuan together with GUI).amati in connection with both Nalanda and Valabhl. It is re­corded that Shengjun, under whom Xuanzang studied or with whom he spent time, had studied under Sthiramati and SIlabhadra, and since it is not stated that Xuanzang actually met Sthiramati, it would be reasonable to assume that there was no direct contact between Xuanzang and Sthiramati.6 A point worth noting is that nowhere in these works is it stated that the ideas of Xuanzang were in conflict with those of Sthiramati. JUdging from the inscriptions at ValabhI, there was not just one scholar named Sthiramati.7 But in order to simplify the following discussion, I shall proceed on the assumption that the Sthiramati who wrote a commentary on the Mahayanasatra­larrzkiira, the Sthiramati referred to in inscriptions at Valabhl, and the Sthiramati under whom Jayasena studied were all the same person, and that he was, moreover, an important figure at Valabhl, which

5 Tsukamoto Keisho (1996: ~26, Wapi 1) already equates Dehui and Jianhui with Gu­I).amati and Sthiramati respectively. In Li Rongxi's translation of the Datang xiyu ji in­cluded in the BDK English Tripilaka, Jianhui is rendered as "Sthiramati" (Li 1996: 284,3 & 343,4). Likewise, in Li's translation of the Datang Daciensi sanzang fashi zhuan Anhui is also rendered as "Sthiramati" (Li 1995: 126,21). Previously, Hirakawa Akira (1979: 14) had already suggested that Jianhui might be the same person as Anhui: On the assumption that this view has become established in academic circles, I have therefore decided to re­gard both Jianhui and Anhui as Chinese equivalents of Sthiramati.

6 Datang Daciensi sanzangfashi zhuan (T. 50: 244a7ff.): 1fEJi:t1lf±tt;j;jqLJJi5±~.i1i11i ~ijimo .*if*lj{t~Ao *U*fUfl-llo ~ffilfrt~o 5tlf~'Jl:~i1i11i~ijim~lZ9lj1jo J<.1fE*~~ ~Ji!,~IjIj*/H!~i1i11io X1fEJ1:\G'iI:~~ijiJi!,fili<1!JDi1i11io The person by the name of Shengjun re­ferred to here is thought to be Jayasena, who according to Xuanzang studied under Sthiramati and SIlabhadra. In connection with the original Sanskrit equivalent of Sheng­jun, we fmd in the Datang xiyu ji (T. 51: 920a15) the words A!lI[Jl~J3~;g-(m~~.), and this Jayasena may be assumed to refer to the person under whom Xuanzang studied. The Datang xiyu ji (T. 51: 899a13) also mentions a king by the name of Prasenajit whose name is also rendered in Chinese as Shengjun (#:j,I~l3~'I;'f$::E(m~~.», but he was a legendary figure and differs from the person under whom Xuanzang studied.

7 Tsukamoto 1996: 527, @ & @.

SIMILARITIES BETWEEN STHIRAMATI AND XUANZANG 361

ranked with Nalanda as a centre of Buddhist learning. On this basis, I shall set abol,lt ascertaining the fact that the theories presented in Sthiramati's commentary on the Mahiiyiinasfitriilaf!lkiira and the theories deemed to be legitimate in the Cheng weishi lun bear a close resemblance to each other.

Now, even if Dharmapala was a contemporary of Sthiramati, there would still seem to be difficulties in immediately equating the views deemed to be legitimate in the Cheng weishi lun with those of Dharmapala when one considers that none of his writings have sur­vived in the original and one also takes into account the passage of time within the confines of Nalanda from Dharmapala to Silabhadra and then to Xuanzang. But if one posits a picture pitting Sthiramati, based at Valabhl, against Dharmapala, based at Nalanda,8 it seems strange that Sthiramati should have already completed the systemiza­tion of the correspondences between the eight consciousnesses and four knowledges.

At any rate, a scheme of correspondences between the eight con­sciousnesses and four knowledges cannot be found in Silabhadra's writings but does exist in Xuanzang's translations. It thus seems that this theory was either formulated by Xuanzang, who had an extra­ordinary enthusiasm for Abhidharmic systemization, during the course of translation or else he knew of the interpretation given in Sthiramati's commentary on the Mahiiyiinasfitriilaf!lkiira and

8 It seems to me that this kind of confrontational schema does not accord with the ac­tual situation in India at the time. The Mahayana movement is thought to have spread with considerable speed from southern India to northern India, and when one considers the re­mains, etc., centred on Gandhara and extending over a wide area, it is inconceivable that there would have been any clear-cut segregation between so-called Hlnayana and Maha­yana such as we tend to posit today. Because Xuanzang saw divisions between schools when he viewed his longed-for India from the vantage point of China, he probably as­sumed that Nalanda and ValabhI stood opposed to each other. One should rather also take account of the fact that Xuanzang travelled to many places in India, including ValabhI.

Hakamaya Noriaki once wrote that it was Xuanzang's disciples who first began saying that Dharrnapala and Sthiramati were divided on all matters, and that one can find in­stances suggesting that there were in fact surprisingly close connections between the two (Kuwayama and Hakamaya 1981: 238). I go one step further and consider there to be a close relationship between not DharrnapljJa, but Xuanzang, and Sthiramati.

362 HIDENORl SAKUMA

adopted this as the legitimate interpretation. Xuanzang would naturally have known of Prabhakaramitra's translation of the Mahii­yiinasiitriilaYJ1kiira.9 Here I shall assume that since comparatively few typically Chinese interpretations seem to have found their way into the Chinese translation of the MahiiyiinasiitriilaYJ1kiira, unlike in the case of the MahiiyiinasaYJ1graha, Xuanzang did not produce a new translation. That being so, it is probably safe to suppose that although Xuanzang translated neither the verses of the Mahiiyiinasu­triilaYJ1kiira together with Vasubandhu' s commentary, which together constituted an important work, nor the commentaries by Asvabhava and Sthiramati, he was fully cognizant of their content.

Similar evidence can in fact also be found in connection with sev­eral other doctrinal theories. In order to make clear the thread of my arguments, I shall therefore in the following proceed on the assump­tion that the views deemed to be legitimate in the Cheng weishi lun were not advocated by Dharmapala, but were actually propounded by Xuanzang at the instance of Kuiji. As for Sthiramati, I shall put to one side his connections with ValabhI and Dharmapala and focus solely on the content of the commentaries attributed to him, which I shall consider to represent Sthiramati's theories.

1. Focal points for a comparative examination of the doctrinal theories of Sthiramati and Xuanzang

When undertaking a comparative study of the doctrinal theories of Sthiramati and Xuanzang, it is necessary to indicate the criteria on which such a study is based. In the case of Sthiramati, I consider the Sanskrit originals and Tibetan translations of works attributed to him (the latter of which may be regarded as word-for-word translations)

9 The Mahayanasfitralal!1kara is frequently cited as a doctrinal authority in treatises composed by Xuanzang's disciples: Kuiji, Cheng weishi lun shuji (T. 43: 599b21ff.); Hui­zhao ~m, Cheng weishi lun liaoyi deng pj(;PIU$i~iiilT~~ (T. 43: 809cl8ff.); Zhizhou ~ Jll!J, Cheng weishi lun yanmi pj(;1lft~~i1il:~1', (T. 43: 976alOff.). It is clear from the Datang Daciensi sanzang fashi zhuan that Xuanzang received instruction from Jayasena in the MahayanasatralalJ!kara (T. 50: 244a21ff.: r:t:~i!i*tz1t*='"F,f1~dl!t~i;k:f'Hiiil;l!~J:!ll~iiilpj(;~ :!lI:fiiil/F{ti!E.@IH =1EI~~j/UU&fiiil).

SIMILARITIES BETWEEN STHIRAMATI AND XUANZANG 363

to represent his views. In the case of Xuanzang, on the other hand, I consider the Mahiiyiinasa1!lgraha, Buddhabhiimisiistra, and other

. works translated by him to represent his views. To regard Tibetan translations as the equivalent of originals while viewing Chinese translations as expressions of the thought of their translator Xuan­zang may seem to indicate a lack of consistency in my criteria. But grounds for equating Xuanzang's translations with his own thought can be found in the findings of several researchers,JO and this ensures the validity of my criteria. Nonetheless, it is true that there is a difference between the criteria, and scrupulous care will be taken in the treatment of all material.

Next, I wish to mention the doctrinal theories I shall use as indi­ces in my comparative examination. I shall focus on the following three topics, regarding which I have already achieved some results in past investigations.

1. Correspondences between the four knowledges and eight consciousnesses11

2. Correspondences between the four knowledges and three bodies12

3. The formation of the five-gotra system13

10 The following research may be cited as corroboration of this. Basing himself on a comparison of Xuanzang's Chinese translation and the Tibetan translation of Asvabhava's commentary on the Mahtiyanasal?lgraha, Hakamaya (1969) pointed out early on that whereas the correspondences between the eight consciousnesses and four knowledges are clearly indicated in Xuanzang's translation, they are not found in the Tibetan translation. This article has been reprinted in Hakamaya 2001 (490-503) with the addition of many subsequent research findirigs, and considerable depth has been added to his observations. For a history of research on this subject, cf. the supplementary section of Hakamaya 2001.

11 See Sakuma 1983, 1984, 2002.

12 See Sakuma 1982, 1987.

13 See Sakuma 2007a, 2007b.

364 IDDENORI SAKUMA

1.1. Similarities between Sthiramati and Xuanzang as seen from Cor­respondences between the four knowledges and eight conscious_ nesses

The correspondences between the four knowledges and eight consciousnesses are not mentioned in either the verses of the Maha­yanasiitralalflkara or the prose commentary attributed to Vasuban­dhu, both preserved in Sanskrit,14 nor are they mentioned in the Ti­betan translation of Asvabhava's commentary on the Mahayanasam­graha. 15Jn Silabhadra's Buddhabhfimivyakhyana (preserved in Ti­betan) we find evidence of a transitional stage in the formulation of these correspondences. 16 The finalized scheme of correspondences is

14 MSA(Bh) IX.67 (F: 38,18-23; L: 46,15-19): buddhajiiiinavibhiige dasa slokii~ I iidarsajJ1iinam acala/?I trayajJ1iinal!l tadiiSritam I samatiipratyavek~iiyii1?1 krtyiinu~thiina eva ca II 67 II caturvidha/?I buddhiiniiJ?1 jiiiinam iidarsajl1iina/?1 samatiijJ1iil1aJ?1 pratyavek~iijiiii­naI!l krtyiinu~thiinajiiiina1?1 ca I iidariajiiiinam acalaJ?1 trD!i jJ1iiniini tadiiSritiini caliini I

15 See n. 10. The relevant passage in the Tibetan translation begins as follows (Haka­maya 2001: 496): rnam par shespa'i phung po gyur pas ni me long Ita bu dang I mnyam pa nyid dang I so sor rtog pa dang I bya bas grub pa'i ye shes la dbang 'byor pa thob ste I. Correspondences with the eight consciousnesses are not mentioned in any subsequent pas­sages either. It is obvious from the material cited by Hakamaya that the correspondences between the four know ledges and eight consciousnesses are given in the corresponding Chinese translation by Xuanzang (see n. 17).

16 Nishio 1940, voU: 120,17-121,15: rnam pa gcig tu na dngos po shes pa dang I de dmigs pa zhes bya ba zlas dbye ba yin te I gnas nganlen mtha' dag gi gnas kun gzhi mam par shes pa gnyen po'i stobs kyis gnas ngan len ma Ius pa dang bral bas yongs su gyur pa me long Ita bu'i ye shes zhes bya ba gzhan gyi dbang dag pa zhes tha snyad gdags pa sems kyi rnam par TtOg pa thams cad med pa'i ngo bo la 'di ni dngos po tsam mo zhes spyi'i rntl1n par sgro btags nas dngos po 'i sgra brjod do II me long Ita bu 'i ye shes dmigs par bya ba dang I dmigs pa mnyam pa 'i mam pa yang gnas ngan len gyi gnas yongs su gyur na I de ltar mam par bzhag go II dngos po de shes pa ni dngos po shes pa ste I de la dmigs pa zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go I de yang mnyam pa nyid kyi ye shes yin no II de'i rjes la thob pa dag la 'jig rten pa rang gi rtog pa yongs su gcod pa 'i mam pa gang yin pa de'i spyod yul yang gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid yongs su {{yur pa yin no II ries las thob pa'i ve shes de ni so SOT rtog pa'i ye shes kho na yin te I de rang gis rtogs pa la so SOT

rtog pa'i tshe I de gnyis yul yin pa'i phyir TO II de la 'am de gnyis la dbang ba ste I 'di de la zad mi shes pa'i mtshan nyid yod pas zhes bya bar tshig mam par sbyar TO II 'dis mtshon par byed shes par byed pas na zhes byed pa'i byed pa por byas pa'i phyir ro II dngos pa shes pa de dmigs pa de la 'am dngos po shes pa dang I de dmigs pa de gnyis la dbang zad mi shes pa'i mtshan nyid ces bya ba'i tha tshig ste I 'dis ni lam gnas yongs su

SIMll..ARITIES BETWEEN STHIRAMATI AND XUANZANG 365

found in Xuanzang's translations of the BuddhabhamiSiistra 17 and Cheng weishi fun, 18 and the same theory appears in Sthiramati's commentary on the Mahiiyiinasiltriifarrtkl'ira.19 These points were touched on briefly in the previous section.

gyur yang bstan pa yin no II mon mongs pa cart gyi yid yongs S<! gyur na I me long ita bu'i ye shes chos kyi dbyings ia dl11igs nas I11nyal11 pa mid kyi ye shes skye ste I de bzhin yongs su dag na de ia yang dbang zad mi shes pa 'thob po II The correspondences between iilayavijfiiina and iidarsajfiiina and between kii~tamanas and samatiijfiiina are clearly defined here, but it is not clear which consciousness is trans­formed into pratyavekCfiijfiiina, and there is no explanation here or elsewhere regarding krtyiinuCfthiinajl1iina. The corresponding passage in Xuanzang's translation of the Buddha­bhamisiistra (T. 26: 324b4ff.) reads as follows: ff~Jltl!llgH!E-5Jo f!!ll5f1:I19%\'llP:kt§'i' J3 '1i-5Jo ff~:9.Jli1!il:t1!fllPftl:*~~1l'o S3f.n€5"7':J~'ft-~!\l:m:ffl*~iillffl[~~llt ~11joijlfi-¥ {t{m~'~!Eo iiJlf!-~,C"rt5JjJIL ffl*~il:g*~.lfL~.lfL~/fPJ~~o *~101':t'J+.E/Ft(§l/FiFeito J7<Jffi fH§fjgm -~~I:t~{~o :fj~-~m~il:gJffi 7 J!\Ii5JjJiJ;!;y:o *J!).~;:g, i':t%\' 1!f 0 llPftl:.lfL~'~!E1l' 0

S3 mil 7':J ~'ftjiAlf1K1o.& i:tm t510J~o ~11joijlfl-¥* {mJEa'~!E~~%\' ~.& i-¥i:t3il.lfL~.lfL~o J7<J~1Tt§;!;Y:;:g,J¥S%\'o fElffl~~ llP~=1l'o S3f.tlil7':J~'fti:!tr.95JjJiJ:k~o ~11joijlfi-¥*{mJEat!Eo ~1±li:!tr.9o ~i:!tl±li:!to fEl :f&PJT11jo~J:.~:!(O'&1:t%\'~o *{mJEa'J+.EbUf,~m3ilo J!\IijiA5JjJIHl<lffl~mo 5J31J J3 J7<JPJT~u:g ~o fflfElJ:.~~froi':t1l' 0 J¥Sffl*~w:;:g,1Elffl~o

Here the original would seem to have been been modified, and it is stated that the other two knowledges are connected to the six consciousnesses, although the translator did not go so far as to state which knowledge is connected to which consciousness.

17 An explicit indication of the relationship between the four knowledges and eight consciousnesses is found in the following passage (T. 26: 302b29ff.): ~~a*11joI19J!\1ij,ffi %\'t§J!!,c"o ~~*~~,c"m~7J~P.ltfflfF'C"o ~m)\.~f1jo*~~1l't§J!!,c"o il:gj:lf-~:9.Jiil!i f.lETil:gmil:g1o-~!¥r±1l'~{~;!;Y:o ~mt~f1jo.lfL~'Ii%\,t§J!!,C"o i8!Jilf!=jiA J3 {t!Lfii:jJIJffi1~ -~.lfL1iH!EW:o ~m:k~f1joM;ilW,1l't§J!!,c"o il~il!-W~J!\IiliJkw:o ~nm~f1joP.ltpMF1l' t§ J!!,c"o ImmP.ltrMi-fflf'Fw:o No variants have been reported for this passage. It is thus evident that it presents the legiti­mate view of the Faxiang school in an unadulterated form. The corresponding section is, moreover, completely missing in the Tibetan translation of STIabhadra's Buddhabhamivyii­khyiina. One is thus compelled to accept that this passage was added by Xuanzang.

18 Having resolved the question of the relationship between the Abhidharmic catego­ries of consciousness, belonging to the category of the mind, and knowledge, belonging to the category of mental attributes, by stating, "consciousness is associated with the mind" (~t§JZ,c,,), the Cheng weishi iun continues as follows (T. 31: 56b2ff.): Jlt~ffi,ffi)\. t:kn ~t§J!!rf'Po frol'1zlffif1joo 1l'l!ltj'F~lffi*~~~J¥S±;!;y:~!jIT!,l~f1joo In other words, it treats the correspondences between the two as if they were self-evident.

19 SeizQ Bunten Kenkyukai 1979: 32,4ff. (D. 113b3ff.; P. 128a3ff.): yang na gzugs dang I tshor ba dang I 'du shes dang I 'du byed dag dang I mam par shes pa brgyad ia yod pa'i stong pa nyid dag na chos kyi dbyings mam par dag par 'gyur ro II mam par shes pa

366 HIDENORI SAKUMA

In addition, it is also clear that the correspondences found in Pra­bhakaramitra's Chinese translation of the MahayanasutralalJ1kara20

and Xuanzang's Chinese translation of Asvabhava's commentary on the MahayanaSal?lgraha2i differ from those given by Sthiramati and in Xuanzang's translations of the Buddhabhumisastra and Cheng weishi lun. In the former group the correspondences are alayavijiiana - adarsajiiana, manas - samatajiiana, manovijiiana - krtyanu~thana­

jiiana, and five active consciousnesses - pratyavek~ajiiana, while in the latter group the correspondences are alayavijiiana - adarsajiiana, manas - samatajiiana, manovijiiana - pratyavek~ajiiana, and five active consciousnesses - krtyanu~thanajiiana. Since I have already demonstrated elsewhere that originally the former set of correspon­dences would have been the more natural interpretation, I shall not go into any further detail here.22

Important in this regard is the fact that Prabhakaramitra' s transla­tion of the MahayanasutralalJ1kara and Xuanzang's translation of Asvabhava's commentary on the MahayanasalJ1graha were trans-

brgyad las kun gzhi dag na me long Ita bu'i ye shes su gyur ro II nyon mongs pa'i yid dag na mnyam pa nyid kyi ye shes su 'gyur ro II yid kyi mam par shes pa dag na so sor kun du rtog pa'i ye shes su 'gyur ro II mig nas Ius kyi bar du mam par shes pa Inga dag na bya ba grub pa'i ye shes su 'gyur te I ye shes bzhi dang chos kyi dbyings mam par dag pa Inga thob pa la gnas gzhan du gyur pa Inga zhes ba'o II Similar explanations can also be found elsewhere in the same work.

20 T. 31: 606c23ff. - ~!@i~~1ti -=-!@i~m{t }\. -t;:li:t:;~ ~~i)if1~$: ~8o ~!@i~~Iti-=-!@i~m{t'1fo -1W~{?Ilfr~f!Ii;!@io -'1f~!@io ='1fIJZ~!@io -=-'1fWl.!@io IZ9 '1ff1=:$!@io :f&'~!@iJJ,~Iti$t§o t§:$~-=-!@i~m{tlL {iiJJJ,$:o -=-!@iItiMco )~ -t;:li:t:;~ ~~i)if1~i'ij:'1fo i)if~}\'~1~~!@io i)if~-t;~1~IJZ~!@io i)if:li~1~Wl.!@io i)if~:t:;~1~{1=. !@i 0 :!jbj~B!~Oo This represents the reading of the old Song edition, the oldest manuscript used by the editors of the Taish6 edition when editing this text.

21 T. 31: 438a13ff. - J33i)ifror*!fJlIl~~}\.:$~li1~:kmJ~.l!@i~~f!Ii;M!!@io t/o!Jl&~~jj\(; ili!mB!o i;mJit'Pi)if~iiJ*Jf!rll~Mc1M,,~~!@io li!tm~:!l~~:(:EilrTjjj]IiHSH~aif~o it -1W:!lm-~~ffo j!\UJ-5JiJhlitlJffi','tJtlo {?Il!@i~~o i)if~t5*lJIlMc1~IJZ~'t!l:!@io fJJ~fi aifo *E~1~o n-NitJ!l:fli:i)ifii1j!fl'¥o J33Ji:t*{11!\1i{1~g~o :k~:k?~tE!.~t§B!o ~iIi!m~ ~{~a~{~o i)if:li~~i'ij:11'H1j;Wl.~!@i 0 J'l.JE-1W~t,f,iJEP~-=-Jlitt{fl,P~o 5JGt/o';{Jilli[o 1t-:k1f'P Iitl~-1W i3 :(:E{1=Jtlo ~Ilt'i~~litlffil~ffio i)if~~Mc1~)J)Gm{1=!@i 0 'If it +::!J--i:lJJ iltJilo ~ ~~{l:AX:'I!J!5!:'~::R'8jjj]¥9.7J:Vg~o Iitl~{1ff-1Wfr'lWflj~:$Mco This too represents the reading of the old Song edition.

22 See Sakuma 2002, based on the Sanskrit text of the Mahayanan7tralay[!kara and other works.

SIMILARITIES BETWEEN STHIRAMATI AND XUANZANG 367

lated earlier than Xuanzang's translations of the BuddhabhUmisiistra and Cheng weishilun.23 The legitimacy ofthe correspondences is ex­plained in the Buddhabhamisiistra, but the only reason given is the weak reason that the former set of correspondences is irrational be­cause it does not follow the regular order, while the latter set repre­sents the legitimate view because it follows the regular order.24 Why would Xuanzang have been compelled to give such a reason? If Sthiramati had prior to this set forth this latter set of correspon­dences, it would mean that Xuanzang rejected the views of SIla­bhadra and Prabhakaramitra, the latter of whom is thought to have studied at Nalanda,25 and emended it on the basis of Sthiramati's view. If Sthiramati's view should prove to have been formulated around the same time as Xuanzang advanced this view, it would be­come necessary to rethink Sthiramati' s dates. Such is the positional relationship between Sthiramati and Xuanzang as deduced from our first index.

1.2. Similarities between Sthiramati and Xuanzang as seen from correspondences between the four know ledges and three bodies

In order to simplify things, I first wish to confirm the following facts. The purity of the Dharma-realm (dharmadhiituvisuddhi) was added to the four know ledges as a distinguishing feature of the state

23 According to Kuwayama Shoshin (Kuwayama and Hakamaya 1981: 49ff.), Xuan­zang would have met Prabhakaramitra shortly before his departure for Central Asia and India and would have obtained from him information about these regions and about Sna­bhadra at Nalanda. I too believe that this is highly likely to have been the case. As is noted by Hakamaya (ibid.: 195), it may be safely assumed that Prabhiikaramitra translated the Mahiiyanas!7traia1Jlkara during Xuanzang's twenty-year absence from China. A list of works translated by Xuanzang with their dates can be found in the same work (252ff.).

24 T. 26: 302c7ff. - 1iff~;g-, i)lmA~1~jjJ(;m{t, i)l3iffl,~1~M;li~, Jlt/F~ jIl', ~F!Xm"/jj[, One cannot help feeling that the citing of the fact that the order does not follow the regular order as the reason for rejecting this correspondence is an extremely weak reason, and it is to be surmised that Xuanzang too was unable to fmd any other legitimate reason for doing so.

25 Xu gaoseng zhuan ~~I~{J, T. 50: 439c26ff. - iiJ<,mJ.mim!MBK~ML ~~1t~5ffi mlIl, git-i5:iiJ<J.m, Jlti5::J'tl?, <p7<:~.A.ili, ;;js:*UfrJ::Ef!E, ~UUfJj*, +ID:ti:ll¥:, flIgiji~ ~, ~iIi-m;z.j::J1Hifl'iJ +i1it{'%, ~Jl,E..1~{jI!~~Hl, mlmJl!i:i1:I'J,t"~jfr".JilJ,, Xfll}19H~lrt~ k*, 1Z91rt/FJtfif+ =1f-*1i~jQf~{j]O~tlmjj~jf',!1~t'i'F, 11lJl!i:'Uiiligiji~ij.L +-t;±!!l~iili,

368 HIDENORI SAKUMA

of Buddhahood, and together these are referred 10 as the five dharmas (or five elements). The purity of the Dharma-realm is characterized as principle and the four know ledges as wisdom. Originally the five dharmas and three bodies represented different schemata, and the process of their development also differed. The four know ledges of the Buddha appear in their finalized form al­ready in the Sanskrit verses of the MahiiyanasatralaJ?Lkara (IX.67-76). Since there are no earlier passages indicative of the develop­ment of this concept, the circumstances of its establishment are not known. As for Buddha-bodies, the basic theory until then had posited two bodies, namely, the physical body (ntpakaya) and the Dharma­body (dharmakaya). With the emergence of the Yogacara school, a three-body theory consisting of the dharmakaya or svabhavakaya, the saJ?Lbhogakaya (enjoyment-body), and the nirma7Jakaya (trans­formation-body) came to be advanced from the standpoint of Mahayana Buddhism. Because of the use of the two different terms dharmakaya and svabhavakaya, these came to be treated as two separate bodies, resulting in effect in a four-body theory. In later times, the four-body theory developed into a five-body theory and other theories of multiple Buddha-bodies.26

The four knowledges and three bodies are mentioned in chapter 9 of the MahiiyanasatralaJ?Lkara, with the purity of the Dharma-realm being discussed in verses 56-59, Buddha-bodies in verses 60-66, and the four knowledges in verses 67-76. But there is no mention of any correspondences between them in either the verses or Vasubandhu's and Asvabhava's commentaries, and they appear only in Prabhakara­mitra's Chinese translation of the MahiiyanasatralaJ?Lkara and in the Tibetan translation of Sthiramati's commentary (SA Vbh). Apart from this, the correspondences between the four knowledges and three bodies are also described in the Tibetan translation of Sua­bhadra's Buddhabhamivyakhyana. 27

26 I have previously discussed the development of Buddha-body theory in the direction of theories of multiple bodies on the basis of the "Dharmakiiya Chapter" in the Abhisama­yiilal!lkiira; see Sakuma 1992a, 1992b, 1994.

27 Because the relevant passages in these works are all lengthy, and also because com­plex procedures are necessary to demonstrate the correspondences, the passages wiII not

SIMILARITIES BETWEEN STHIRAMATI AND XUANZANG 369

The correspondences between the five dharmas and three bodies are clearly described in Sthiramati's SAVbh. In SAVbh IX.60 they are explained with reference to iiSrayaparilvrtti: illayavijfiilna turns into ildarsajiiilna and is associated with the dharmakilya, which also corresponds to the svabhilvakilya; kli~tamanas turns into samatil­jiiilna and manovijiiilna into pratyavek~iljiiilna, and these are associ­ated with the sa1"!lbhogakilya; and the five active consciousnesses tum into krtyilnu~thilnajiiilna, which is associated with the nirmill}a­kilya.

In Prabhakaramitra's Chinese translation of the Mahilyilnasutril­laT!lkilra these correspondences are indicated in X.53ff., correspond­ing to IX.59ff. in the Sanskrit text. Prabhakaramitra presents the relationship between the eight consciousnesses and four know ledges in a form different from that of Sthiramati and Xuanzang, and it may be summarized in the following, manner: illayavijiiilna turns into ildarsajiiilna and kli~tamanas into samatiljiiilna, and these are associated with the dharmakilya; the five active consciousnesses tum into pratyavek~iljiiilna, which is associated with the sa1"!lbhogakilya; and manovijiiilna turns into krtyilnu~thilnajiiilna, which is associated with the nirmill}akilya.

In the case of STIabhadra's Buddhabhumivyilkhyilna, on the other hand, in which the correspondences between the four knowledges and eight consciousnesses have not been finalized, one must posit the following relationships. First, it is stated that illayavijiiilna turns into ildarsajiiilna and kli~tamanas into samatiljiiilna, but no relationships are posited between the other consciousnesses and knowledges. Under these circumstances, the correspondences between the five dharmas and three bodies are as follows: the purity of the Dharma­realm and ildarsajiiilna are associated with the svabhilvakilya (= dharmakilya), samatiljfiilna and pratyavek~iljfiilna are associated with the sa1"!lbhogakilya, and krtyilnu~thanajfiilna is associated with the nirmill}akilya.

be quoted here. Reference should be made to my earlier studies on this subject (Sakuma 1982, 1987, 1989).

370 . IllDENORI SAKUMA

Thus, the correspondences between the five dharmas and three bodies differ from one text to another, and in content they are even more complicated than has· been indicated in the above.

That being so, how are these correspondences treated in Xuan­zang's translations of the Buddhabhamisiistra and Cheng weishi lun? First, in the case of the Buddhabhiimisiistra it is difficult to compre­hend even the gist of the relationship between the five dharmas and three bodies. If one assumes that Xuanzang considered the .connec­tions between the two with reference to Silabhadra's Buddhabhiimi­vyiikhyiina, it is to be surmised that he decided that it would be diffi­cult to deal with the relationship between the five dharmas and three bodies, and also the eight consciousnesses, with the consistency of Abhidharmic categories. It is obvious, in other words, that Xuanzang was rather perplexed about the relationship between the five dhar­mas, three bodies, and eight consciousnesses when he translated the Buddhabhiimisiistra.

How much clearer, then, had the relationship between these three become when Xuanzang translated the Cheng weishi lun ten years later? ill the Cheng weishi lun, the relationship between pratyavek~ii­jfiiina and the three bodies is by no means clear, but it can be generally inferred that the purity of the Dharma-realm is associated with the svabhiivakiiya, iidarsajfiiina with the self-enjoyment body, samatiijfiiina with the other-enjoyment body, and krtyiinu~thiinajfiii­na with the nirmiiT}a-kiiya. Pratyavek~iijfiiina is subtly related to both the other-enjoyment body and the nirmiiT}a-kiiya,28 but I cannot go into details here.29

The concepts of self-enjoyment body and other-enjoyment body had in fact already appeared in Xuanzang' s translation of the Bud­dhabhiimisiistra,30 but it was only in the Cheng weishi lun that they

28 T. 31: 56c29ff. - JltI2!lIL'.lUfH~'~~jgtf--!iJJ$ffiJ}lHlAo mMf~.f'~~I!El'tm~f¥ ±1§~1!\Ii¥Ailllo :ljl~~.f'~~ftll.'~:m~~±;j:!lo JiX;*~.f'R~~~1~~&±1§o D~~£l1 ~ f!:I fill.~~jgJ&J~~*$~1i&~~~flj~ff'~ 0 :tzD~~~~~J.lIj$lIo

29 See Sakuma 1987.

30 T. 26: 294b3ff. - lt1rm~f!:IfIj1!\li~~±lITI29~1J;Ij[~--!iJJ~~-"WJ~:::f~f'f ;l:1f:~~~o ~.JIf~§'tm-M! ±$Ii! f!:I §'tm ~{'fm~.!l:~o f1Htl1.1!\Ii¥Ail~±"lITI29~1J;Ij[1Ill

SIMILARITIES BETWEEN STHIRAMATI AND XUANZANG 371

were to some extent clearly utilized in explaining the relationship between the five dharmas and three bodies, and they result in effect in a four-body theory. The four-body theory is discussed at great length in the AbhisamaytilaY[lkara, and possible connections with this work raise some interesting questions. But the AbhisamayalaY[lkara was not translated into Chinese, and I shall not delve any further into this subject since it would lead us away from the question at handY

As for the two concepts of self-enjoyment body and other-enjoy­ment body, it is in fact possible to detect intimations of the former in Sthiramati's SAVbh.Unfortunate1y the procedures necessary for demonstrating this are somewhat involved, and limited space does not allow me to reproduce them here. Reference can be made to my previously published study on this subject.32

If my above analysis is correct, it is possible to infer the follow­ing process. The five dharmas and three bodies initially developed as two separate theories, but by the time of Sllabhadra and Prabha­karamitra correspondences between the two had been established. Xuanzang had doubts about his teacher Sllabhadra' s views in terms of Abhidharmic categories, and his solution could be easily ex­plained were one to assume that he borrowed the notion of the self­enjoyment body and the schema of correspondences between the four knowledges and eight consciousnesses from Sthiramati. This is, of course, no more than a possibility, but in light of the investi­gations I have conducted until now, it would seem natural to me to view the situation in this fashion. Such is the positional relationship between Sthiramati and Xuanzang as deduced from our second index.

{jjJJ1JJJ:: tfi¥im:§:~~.i'¥ ±o lit! J\~!(;*lit~litMJo ~{jjJ/§tffl!lt{'Fm{t(ll::~o m~t}]±!!ltfi¥i Bf:§:~!J'~~o :!m~~iJitIl7J~+±!!l~*~MJo ~±1JJ±!!lCPtJJCP1&~#~tzo~o Also 294b14ff.: § '§tJfl ±!!i£il!l:¥i;]'i!.-- § ~'fr § ~±/ft§~~mo {J!l.'§tJfl Hi~{~~~--&i1'§ #-t§,iltm'§t~±/ff§~~mo There are no corresponding passages in the Tibetan transla­tion of SIlabhadra's Buddhabhiimivyiikhyiina.

31 See Sakuma 1992a, 1992b, 1994.

32 Sakuma 1987: esp. 394.

372 HIDENORI SAKUMA

1.3. Similarities between Sthiramati and Xuanzang as seen from the formation ofthefive-gotra system

One theory propounded by the Faxiang school in China and Japan that became the cause of much debate with other schools was the five-gotra system presented in the BuddhabhLimisiistra translated by Xuanzang. When one traces its content back to India, one can cer­tainly detect a process whereby the part of the five-gotra system relating to beings without any possibility of attaining Buddhahood and the part relating to the three vehicles gradually merged. It is to be surmised that Mahayana Buddhism advanced the idea of the three vehicles of the sriivaka, pratyekabuddha, and bodhisattva out of a need to assert its legitimacy vis-a.-vis Mainstream Buddhism, but ini­tially beings without any possibility of attaining Buddhahood were not juxtaposed to the three vehicles. The question of gotra (lineage) was simply discussed quite separately from the idea of three vehicles in terms of beings with the possibility of attaining Buddhahood (gotra) and beings without any possibility of attaining Buddhahood (agotra). It would appear that these two separate groupings were first brought together as five categories in Sthiramati's SAVbh.

The overall current of thought leading to the five-gotra system can be understood in the following manner. Initially, the vehicle among the three vehicles to which a practitioner belongs is not deter­mined, and if one supposes that his association with one of the vehi­cles is gradually determined in the course of his practice, then the initial stage corresponds to the indeterminate lineage and the stage when his lineage has been determined corresponds to one of the three vehicles. Therefore, the indeterminate lineage and the three vehicles are not parallel categories. The question of gotra and agotra had already been raised from the time of the YogiiciirabhL""imi, and it can also be readily inferred that there was some connection between the state of having the possibility of attaining Buddhahood (gotra) and the three vehicles. But it was in Sthiramati's SA Vbh that agotra is first presented alongside the indeterminate lineage and the three vehicles. The LankiivatiirasLitra is often considered to provide a theoretical basis for the five-gotra system, but as is indicated in the Yuqielun ji fil«1iJDllfljj~c, it was known from an early stage that the

SIMILARITIES BETWEEN STHIRAMATI AND XUANZANG 373

Lmikiivatiirasatra was unsuitable as the theoretical basis of the five­gotra system.33 In light of the above, I wish to show the process leading to the five-gotra system with reference to the "Gotra Chapter" in the MahiiyiinasatriilaT(lkiira.

In the Sanskrit text of the MahiiyiinasiUriilm!lkiira, the first ten verses of the "Gotra Chapter" explain the existence of gotra and the eleventh verse explains the absence of gotra, or agotra. Within this overall framework, the verses necessary for the establishment of the five-gotra system were verses 6 and 11. It would presumably be safe to assume that originally there was no intention in either the verse section or Vasubandhu' s commentary to forge a direct link between these two verses.

A verse on the distinction between the kinds [oflineages]:

The lineage may be determinate or indeterminate, shaken or unshaken By conditions. This distinction between lineages is, in brief, fourfold. (v. 6)

In brief, lineages are fourfold. They are determinate and indeterminate, and these are in [that] order unshaken and shaken by conditions. (Mahayanasil­

tralaY[lkara III.6)34

As can be seen in this verse, there are lineages that are determinate and others that are indeterminate. Since the term "three vehicles" is used in Vasubandhu' s commentary on verse 2, "determinate" means belonging to one of the three vehicles. "Indeterminate," on the other hand, means that the practitioner, under the guidance of a teacher, is still in a state of vacillation regarding his lineage. This later became the independent category of "indeterminate lineage," but it is unlikely to have been regarded as an independent category at this stage. This verse simply gives expression to the process of practice, that is, to the fact that there are both those who, under the guidance of a teacher and so on, are no longer in a state of vacillation and those who are still vacillating in the midst of their practice.

33 On the subject of the above process, see Sakuma 2007a.

34 MSA(Bh) m.6 (F: 21,14-18; L: 11,20-24): prabhedavibhage slokaf:z. niyattiniyata1Jl gotram ahiiryaql haryam eva ca / pratyayair gotrabhedo 'yaql samiisena caturvidha(l / / 6 / / samiisena caturvidhaql gotram. niyatiiniyata1rz tad eva yathiikramarrz pratyayair ahiiryarrz haryarrz ceti.

374 HIDENORI SAKUMA

In contrast, it is evident that in Asvabhava's commentary (MSAT)35 and Sthiramati's SA Vbh36 these four categories have clearly come to be treated as the three vehicles of the sriivaka, praty­ekabuddha, and bodhisattva and, independent of these, an indetermi­nate lineage.

Next, Asvabhava's MSAT and Sthiramati's SAVbh begin their explanations of Mahiiyiinasutriila1!1kiira III. I I in the following man­ner. Asvabhava's commentary on verse 11 begins by commenting directly on Vasubandhu' s commentary with the statement "Where it says, 'In this sense "he who does not have the quality for parinir-

35 MSAT ID.6 (D. 51b6-52a3; P. 58b6-59a2): rigs nges pa ni nyan thos dang I rang sangs rgyas dang I sangs rgyas kyi rigs su nges par gnas pa gang yin pa ste I nyan thos nyid thob (D: 'thob P) par nges pa'i rigs gang yin pa de ni nam yang rang sangs rgyas dang sangs rgyas nyid 'thob pa'i rgyur mi 'gyur ro II de bzhin du rang sangs rgyas dang I sangs rgyas kyi rigs dag kyang sbyar bar bya'o II

ma nges pa ni (em.: pa'i DP) rkyen gyi dbang gyis nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas dang I sangs rgyas kyi (D: kyis P) rigs rnams kyi rgyur 'gyur te I dper na ri'i phyogs gang dag la (P: las D) gdon mi za bar gser 'ba' zhig 'byung gi I dngul 'ba' zhig kyang ma yin la I zangs 'ba' zhig kyang ma yin pa de Ita bu yang yod ia I phyogs gang zhig 'jim gong drii ba la sogs pa'i bcos legs (P: lags D) bya ba'i dbang gyis (D: gyi P) gdon mi za bar res 'ga' gser 'byung la I res 'ga' dngulla sogs pa 'byung bar yang yod pa de ita bu' 0 II de nyid kyi phyir rigs nges pa ni I rkyen rnams kyis mi 'phrogs la ma nges pa ni 'phrogs pa yin no II

36 SAVbh ID.6 (D. 45a4-45bl; P. 49a3-49bl): de ia rigs nges pa ni gang nyan thos su rigs nges par gnas pa dang I rang sangs rgyas su rigs nges par gnas pa dang I sangs rgyas ,sit rigs nges par gnas pa ste I nyan thos su rigs nges par gnas pa yang rigs des nyan thos kyi byang chub nyid 'thob kyi ji itar byas kyang nams kyang rang sangs rgyas kyi byang chub dang I sangs rgyas su 'thob pa'i rgyur mi 'gyur ro II rang sangs rgyas kyi rigs nges pa yang rigs des rang sangs rgyas kyi byang chub nyid thob kyi ji itar byas kyang nams kyang nyan thos dang sangs rgyas kyi byang chub 'thob pa'i rgyur mi 'gyur ro II sangs rgyas kyi rigs can yang rigs des sangs rgyas kyi byang chub nyid 'thob (D: thob P) kyi ji ltar byas kyang nams kyang nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas kyi byang ch!,b tu mi 'gyur ba'D II

rigs ma nges pa ni rkyen gyi dbang gis nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas dang sangs rgyas (D: dang sangs rgyas, missing in P) kyi rigs gang yang rung ba cig gi (D: gyis P) rgyur 'gyur te I nyan thos kyi dge ba'i bshes gnyen dag gis bsgral na ni nyan thos kyi rigs can du yang 'gyur I rang sangs rgyas kyi dge ba'i bshes gnyen gyis bsgral na ni I rang sangs rgyas kyi rigs can du yang 'gyur I byang chub sems dpa'i dge ba'i bshes gnyen gyis bsgrai na ni sangs rgyas kyi rigs can du yang 'gyur ro (D: gyur ba'o P) II

SIMILARITIES BETWEEN STHIRAMATI AND XUANZANG 375

va7Ja" is meant by "he who dwells in no lineage''', "37 but Sthiramati adds: "Where it says 'a verse on the distinction of the lineage-less,' having earlier explained the lineage of the sravaka, the lineage of the pratyekabuddha, the lineage of the bodhisattva, and the indetermi­nate lineage, it now explains the lineage-less."38 Whereas Asvabhava clearly refers to the lineages of the three vehicles and the indetermi­nate lineage in his commentary on verse 6, but does not link them directly to the verse on agotra, there is clear evidence in Sthiramati's commentary of an intent to create a scheme of five gotras. Here one can discern the manner in which the scheme of five gotras gradually evolved.

In Xuanzang's translation of the Buddhabhumisastra this scheme developed into five categories consisting of the lineages of the three vehicles, the indeterminate lineage, and the lineage-less, the last of which was simplified to mean those without any possibility of attain­ing Buddhahood.39 In the Tibetan translation of STIabhadra's Bud­dhabhumivyakhyana there is no mention whatsoever of these ideas. Originally, MahayanasutralaY(lkara III.II referred to two kinds of agotra, namely, those who are unable to attain Buddhahood at the present point in time but will be able to after a certain period of time, and those who will never attain Buddhahood.40 It is to be surmised, therefore, that in order to simplify the five gotras, Xuanzang

37 MSAT m.ll (D. 52blf.; P. 59a8f.): don 'di la ni rigs med pa la gnas pa yongs su my a ngan las mi 'da' ba'i chos can yin par bshad do zhes bya ba na.

38 SA Vbh m.ll (D. 48a3ff.; P. 52b3ff.): rigs med pa la mam par dbye ba'i tshigs su bead pa zhes bya ba la I gong du nyan thos kyi rigs dang I rang sangs rgyas kyi rigs dang I byang chub sems dpa'i rigs dang I rigs ma nges pa bshad nas I da ni rigs med pa 'chad de I

39 T. 26: 298a12ff. - ~~i;a<'f*-~'¥f'rj!f'¥f:li'ft*H:(or~)o -§r,fJ'ft*H:o =~!I\l:l\!;'ft* tto ':::'~O*'ft*'l1:o 1m /fJE'ft*-t!Eo :li~'¥f tfj i:!t;IJi'tll'ft*'l1:o ~otl'<*if~~~IDI.A;f§o 71J3IJl.l :li:JltrIm'ft*'l1:o li!t~a<'fB1tM;'¥f *~1~~1i':JtIlo ~f?ll~l~Pjjy19!il!co ~:lifl*'t!E~'¥f tfji:!t;IJ l.'tlllZ9il!co *JE~'¥f1~~1i':JtIlo ~f?Ilf.§. OJ~~jy19!:iJ'~ll.t$iffio IDI.Jiljt~itII!1:.~itII!f~o ~li!t* ~ilJf~~tz;l1~1:.AitII!o J:7~?Fm,?F#)'l\JJIi!;o &:'~mrl!!~~itII!o ~f?lljy19!1l~:mimJ3/,~ ~f[:;o ~1lf~~1~1:.~itII!o 1&~ml!!~~'1!i''f~o ~f?lljy19!1lJl:tlzi'J!\'o ~oRo~~~** ~o /ffjg~A*~~1i'o

40 MSA(Bh) m.ll (F: 22,21-23,3; L: 12,19-13,2): agotrasthavibhiige slokal;. ekantiko duscarite 'sti kascit kascit samudghiititasukladharma I amokeabhiigfyasubho 'sti kascin nihlnasuklo 'sty api hetuhfnal; 1111 II

376 HIDENORI SAKUMA

restricted the meaning of agotra to those without any possibility of attaining Buddhahood.

To sum up, the five categories of the five-gotra system do not ap­pear in the verses of the Mahiiyiinasutriilarphira or Vasubandhu's commentary; in Asvabhava's commentary the content of III.6 was clarified in the form of the lineages of the three vehicles and an indeterminate lineage, and Sthiramati further linked this verse to agotra mentioned in III.ll; Xuanzang, it is to be surmised, simpli­fied the content of agotra by restricting it to those without any possibility of attaining Buddhahood and thus brought to completion the five-gotra system, regarded as one of the distinguishing features of Faxiang doctrine. Here too one senses greater similarities between the doctrin:i.l theories of Sthirarri.ati and Xuanzang than between those of other scholars.

2. A comprehensive assessment: by way of conclusion

On the basis of the data on the three doctrinal theories summarized above, I wish to focus here in particular on the doctrinal similarities to be observed between Sthiramati and Xuanzang. The doctrin:i.l theories selected here for the purpose of comparison represent of course just one part of the theories of the Y ogacara school, and therefore it is not my intention to apply the conclusions reached be­low to the entire body of Y ogacara theories. The correspondences between the four lmowledges, the eight consciousnesses and the five­gotra system taken up in the above are doctrinal theories that in the Faxiang school of China and Japan are treated as if they are self-ex­planatory, but they were not necessarily clearly defined in India, and therefore they are unlikely to have been centr:i.l th~ories of the Y ogacara school. In point of fact, the correspondences between the four lmowledges and eight consciousnesses as clarified in the Cheng weishi lun and the correspondences between the five dharmas and three bodies, clarified to a certain degree in the Cheng weishi lun, are not mentioned at all in the Sanskrit text of Sthiramati's commentary on the Tri1'[!sikii, on which the Cheng weishi lun would natur:i.lly have been based. Since it is to be surmised that Xuanzang would have been motivated by. different aims in the case of the five-gotra sys-

SIMILARITIES BETWEEN STHIRAMATI AND XUANZANG 377

tern, it is not surprising that this is not· mentioned in Sthiramati' s commentary on the Tril'!tSika. But in verses 29 and 30, which discuss asrayaparav!tti, the body of emancipation (vimuktikaya) , and the dharmakaya, Sthiramati neither mentions the four know ledges nor touches on the three bodies.41 In addition, there is no mention of the four knowledges in Xuanzang's translation of the Abhidharrna­samuccayabha~ya, 42 attributed to Sthiramati, nor do they of course appear in the Sanskrit Abhidharmasamuccayabha~ya, said to be the work of Jinaputra, although the question of its authorship has not yet been resolved.43 This means that there is a need to consider why Xuanzang should have attributed it to Sthiramati. Likewise, there are no references to any such ideas in Sthiramati' s commentary on the Madhyantavibhaga. 44 At any rate, when one considers that in his commentary on the Mahayanasutralaf!lkara Sthiramati would seem to display an enthusiasm for using his encyclopaedic knowledge to systematize the doctrinal theories of the Y ogacara school in line with Abhidharmic categories, it seems strange that he makes no mention whatsoever of the four knowledges in his commentary on the Trif!lsikii. Assuming that, as is currently estimated, he lived during the period between 510 and 570, would he have mentioned the four knowledges and discussed their relationship with the eight con­sciousnesses only in his commentary on the Mahiiyiinasutriilaf!lkiira among the voluminous commentaries he composed during his life­time simply because the four knowledges happened to be mentioned in the verse section of the Mahiiyiinas~ttriilaf!lkiira? If that were the case, then Sthiramati's failure to mention the four knowledges and three bodies in his commentary on the Trif!lsika could be explained by the fact that they do not figure in the verses of the Trif!lsikii.

41 Cf. TV 29-30. As far as I can see, there is no discussion of these correspondences anywhere in Sthiramati's commentary.

42 This is based on a search of the SAT and CBET A electronic versions of the text.

43 Cf. my index to the Abhidharmasamuccayabha~ya (Sakuma 1996). On the question of its authorship, see Schmithausen 1969: 100, note y.

44 Cf. Yamaguchi Susumu's index (Yamaguchi 1966).

378 . RIDENOR! SAKUMA

There is one further moot point, namely, the fact that up until the time of Xuanzang's translations of the Buddhabhamisiistra and Cheng weishi lun one cari trace in the Tibetan translation of the Buddhabhumivyiikhyiina (thought to be the work of Silabhadra), Pra­bhakaramitra's Chinese translation of the Mahiiyiinasutriilarrzkiira, and Xuanzang's Chinese translation of Asvabhava's commentary on the Mahiiyiinasarrzgraha a process whereby the doctrinal theories of the four knowledges and eight consciousnesses gradually .merged and their correspondences were developed. The same process can be seen in the correspondences between the five dharmas and three bodies, and if one recognizes a similar process with regard to the five-gotra system too, the theories presented in Sthiramati's com­mentary on the Mahiiyiinasutriilarrzkiira tum out, as is evident from our above investigations, to have overly close similarities to the theories ultimately formulated by Xuanzang. It might be suggested that one should consider Sthiramati's commentary on the Mahiiyiina­sutriilarrzkiira separately from all his other works and regard it as the work of someone else with the same name, but it is not such a simple matter. When one also takes into account developments in the idea of asrayapariivrtti and questions relating to the treatment of the trisva­bhiiva theory, it becomes exceedingly complicated. Therefore, it is desirable to reach a conclusion here with the qualification that it applies only to the topics dealt with in the above. With such a quali­fication, it may be assumed that the relationship between Sthiramati and Xuanzang in the realm of philosophical thought was closer than· we have until now imagined. With this as my conclusion for the time being, I wish to bring this paper to a close.

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SIMILARlTIES BETWEEN STHIRAMATI AND XUANZANG 381

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Zaidan &fl*,**fJl1ffl.

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies

Volume 29 • Number 2 • 2006 (2008) pp. 383–400

CONCEPTS, INTENSION, AND IDENTITY IN TIBETAN PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

JONATHAN STOLTZ

Indian Buddhist philosophers’ task of accounting for the meaningful-ness of language is perhaps most famously addressed in Dignāga’s doctrine of apoha, which claims that general terms do not possess meaning by referring to positively existing universals, but instead impart meaning through a negative process of exclusion. As Mark Siderits points out, this Buddhist theory of language “forced [Dignā-ga and his followers] to say that there is more to linguistic meaning than just reference.”1 Siderits’ own contention is that, beyond refer-ence, Buddhist philosophers were “forced to recognize sense – the mode of presentation of the reference of an expression – as a distinct element of meaning.”2 There is something importantly correct about Siderits’ remarks, but to the extent that Buddhist philosophical theo-ries differ from school to school and time period to time period, more needs to be said about Buddhist theories of word meaning.

In this article I will examine one highly localized set of develop-ments to the Buddhist doctrine of word meaning that was made by twelfth and thirteenth century Tibetan Buddhist epistemologists primarily schooled at gSa� phu Monastery in central Tibet. I will show how these thinkers developed the notion of a concept (don spyi) in order to explain how it is that words are capable of applying to real objects, and how concepts can be used to capture elements of word meaning extending beyond reference to real objects. In particu-lar, I will focus on the developments made by Phywa pa Chos kyi se� ge in the middle of the twelfth century, as well as on reactions to those developments by Sa skya Pa��ita in the first half of the thir-

1 Siderits (1986), p. 343. 2 Ibid, p. 331. Italics mine.

JONATHAN STOLTZ 384

teenth century. My investigation will begin by explaining how Ti-betan Buddhist epistemologists make use of concepts in order to ac-count for how it is that words are capable of applying to particular objects. I will then focus on one particular area where this appeal to concepts plays a central role in Tibetan accounts of word meaning – namely, with regard to the relation of sameness or identity (gcig pa). Finally, I will tie this discussion to the views of the Tibetan polymath Sa skya pa��ita, showing how he reacts against earlier Tibetan theories of word reference.

1. bKa’ gdams epistemologists on intentional objects and inten-sional objects

It is often asserted that Buddhist philosophers uphold the view that certain objects or experiences are ineffable, unable to be communi-cated in language. While many claims are made by Indian and Ti-betan Buddhists about the limitations of language, one particular claim that was important within the Buddhist epistemological tradi-tion was the declaration by the tradition’s forefather, Dignāga, that verbalization can only occur in conceptual thought – thought that takes general entities, and not concrete particulars, as its object. Given this foundational assertion, how then can Buddhist epistemologists account for the referential nature of language? How is it that words can refer to objects in the external world?

In order to see how bKa’ gdams Tibetan epistemologists were able to make sense of the referential capacity of language, it is important to locate these thinkers’ theories of language within their general accounts of conceptual thought, for it is out of a more gen-eral account of cognitive objects that Tibetan thinkers construct their theories of language. Even though the Indian and Tibetan Buddhist epistemological traditions accept Dignāga’s root assertion that conceptual thought takes general entities (sāmānyalak�a�a) – which are unreal – as its objects, thinkers as early as Dharmakīrti sought also to explain how conceptual thought can be grounded in reality. A major step is taken by the eighth century philosopher Dharmottara,

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who delineates two different aspects of the objects of cognition.3 These items are refined by Tibetan thinkers at gSa� phu Monastery in central Tibet in such a way as to expose both the phenomenal na-ture of thought and the intentional nature of thought. According to r�og Blo ldan śes rab and Phywa pa Chos kyi se� ge, two major 11th and 12th century thinkers from gSa� phu Monastery, conceptual thought bears on two distinct kinds of objects.4 The object that di-rectly appears to a person’s mind in conceptual thought is a mentally constructed – i.e., non-objective – phenomenal object (gzu� yul or sna� yul). Phywa pa provides a name for these phenomenal objects of conceptual thought. He calls them “concepts” (don spyi). The Ti-betan term don spyi – or at least its Sanskrit equivalent, arthasāmā-nya – is present in the works of Dignāga, but this particular role as the phenomenal object of conceptual thought appears to begin with Phywa pa. While Phywa pa and his followers accept the existence of concepts, conceptual thought isn’t typically about concepts. Thought typically bears on, or is directed toward, external reality.5 The ob-jects that conceptual thought is directed toward are called intentional objects (źen yul) – where these intentional objects are not mental constructions, but are, rather, (typically) objects or properties in the external world.

This distinction between phenomenal objects and intentional ob-jects is quite sensible. When I think about something like the Potala Palace, what directly appears to my mind is a concept, or maybe even an image, of it. Nevertheless, my thoughts are not about the concept of the Potala, my thoughts are about the Potala Palace itself. Similarly, in the Buddhist context, when a person in conceptual thought infers the existence of a fire on a hill from having perceived smoke, even though what directly appears to the person’s mind is the concept of a fiery hill, the inference is not about a concept. Rather, the inference is about a real fire on a real hill. As the thirteenth cen-

3 Dharmottara, 179a4: śes pa rnams kyi yul ni rnam pa gñis te / gzu� ba da� źen pa’o /. 4 See Phywa pa (2006b), 1b–11a, and r�og (2006), 8b–9a. 5 Conceptual thought needn’t necessarily be directed toward external reality. Thought can be about mental episodes (śes pa) or about concepts (don spyi).

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tury Tibetan scholar Sa skya Pa��ita (henceforth, Sa pa�) sarcasti-cally notes,6

When someone says, “Pour water into pot!,” I [automatically] understand the object of application [i.e., the intentional object] to be a real particular, and don’t ask, “[Should I] pour the water into a real pot or [should I] pour the water into the concept of a pot?”

This distinction between the phenomenal objects and intentional ob-jects of conceptual thought is projected by early Tibetan epistemolo-gists onto their theory of language. Phywa pa and his followers agree that when a person utters a word like “snake,” what the word directly signifies (d�os kyi brjod bya) is the concept of a snake. Yet, these Ti-betan thinkers also hold that, insofar as language is intentional and attempts to describe reality, the word “snake” has as its intentional signification (źen pa’i brjod bya) a real, objectively existing snake.7 It is a phenomenal object – a concept – that is directly signified by words, but the words are not about the phenomenal object. Instead, words are directed toward, or denote, the real object that is the words’ intentional signification.8

We can also, by drawing a comparison to Western philosophical theories of language, identify an important link between directly and intentionally signified entities. Georges Dreyfus understands the distinction to be comparable to Gottlob Frege’s famous distinction between sense and reference. 9 The concepts that are directly 6 Sa skya pa��ita, p. 122: bum par chu blugs śig ces brjod pa na’a� ra� mtshan gyi bum par chu ldugs sam don spyi’i bum par ldugs źes mi ’dri bar ’jug yul don ra� mtshan ñid go ba yin te.

Admittedly, Sa skya pa��ita puts forward this quote within the context of how language can be efficacious, and not exactly so as to distinguish phenomenal objects from inten-tional objects. As such, he speaks of the object of application (’jug yul), which, in concep-tual thought is equivalent to the intentional object (źen yul). 7 In Phywa pa’s Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel and Tshad ma rnam �es kyi ’grel pa there is no full discussion of this distinction, though the distinction is clearly presupposed when he uses the terms. My explanation comes primarily from Sa skya pa��ita’s much fuller discussion of the terms. 8 Of course, all this is consistent with there being a failure of reference. Sometimes I can use a term, intending to signify a real object, and yet fail to do so. 9 Dreyfus (1997), pp. 261–74. Cf. Frege (1980).

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signified by words are taken to be analogous to Frege’s senses, whereas the real particulars that are intentionally signified are said to be analogous to Frege’s referents. Now, for Frege, it isn’t simply that word meaning consists of two freestanding elements. Rather, he contends that it is a word’s sense that determines its referent. Each sense determines a unique referent. As such, identifying the referent of an expression is typically accomplished by grasping the expres-sion’s sense. Much the same idea appears to hold true in the Bud-dhist context as well. Words are capable of intentionally signifying real particulars by virtue of the relation that those particulars bear to the concepts that are directly signified by the words.10

By thus distinguishing the intentional signification of words from the words’ direct signification, these Tibetan thinkers believe that they have successfully accounted for how language can apply to real-ity – i.e., how particulars can be effable – while still holding true to Dignāga’s root assertion that verbalization can only occur in mental states that take universals (sāmānyalak�a�a) as their objects. In addition to particular objects in the external world, there are also mentally constructed concepts. It is these concepts that help link lan-guage to objectively existing particulars. Having established this, we can now examine a more specific role that concepts play in Tibetan Buddhist theories of language, in the development of a philosophical account of identity.

2. Identity and intensionality

To the extent that both Tibetan Buddhist thinkers and Gottlob Frege held the belief that a fully adequate theory of language requires an appeal to some sort of intensional element – either a concept (Tib: don spyi) or sense (Ger: Sinn) – it is not surprising that we can find similarities in these thinkers’ views on identity. In fact, the stated goal of Frege’s essay “On Sense and Reference” is precisely to ex-plain just what we mean when we assert identity statements. His pa-per begins with the question of whether identity statements assert “a

10 See Siderits (1987) pp. 342–3 and Tillemans (1986) p. 215.

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relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects.”11 Similarly, in the Tibetan Buddhist context much ink has been spilled in trying to explain the complex nature of the identity relation, and just like in Frege’s case, Tibetans attempt to make sense of identity by appealing to something like a term’s sense or intension. One nota-ble contrast, however, involves the relata of the identity statements themselves. Frege’s central concern is with proper names, whereas Buddhist thinkers are focused principally on identity statements con-structed with general terms. The central question that I will be addressing in what follows is that of what conditions twelfth and thirteenth century Tibetan epistemologists, and Phywa pa Chos kyi se� ge in particular, held to be necessary and sufficient for the truth of identity statements involving two general terms.

Tibetan philosophers describe various types of identity relations – identical essence (�o bo gcig), identical substance (rdzas gcig), identical extension (don gcig), and so forth. Many of these forms of identity have been carefully discussed in articles by Tom Tillemans (1983 and 1986), and will not be addressed here. My concern in this section of the essay is with the relation of identity simpliciter, and focuses on the simple question: when is an identity statement con-structed with two general terms true? Operating under the presump-tion that identity simpliciter (gcig) in the Tibetan Buddhist context is an identity between qualities or dharma (chos gcig), the question can be stated: when do two general terms express the same quality?

A natural reply to this question by Indian Grammarians would be to claim that such identity statements are true if and only if the two general terms pick out the same universal. This option is not open to Buddhist philosophers, however, as they generally reject the exis-tence of universals. Given this rejection, one might be tempted to conclude that what a general term expresses is the class of particular objects formed through a process of exclusion – excluding all those objects to which the general term does not apply. This is, after all, the heart of Dignāga’s apoha project. Were this interpretation cor-rect, it would follow that statements of identity are true whenever the 11 Frege (1980), p. 56.

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two general terms are coextensive. Indian and Tibetan Buddhist epistemologists overwhelmingly maintain, however, that two differ-ent qualities can be coextensive, thus showing that a term’s exten-sion alone is insufficient for determining a quality’s identity condi-tions. That two different qualities can be coextensive is seen from the fact that there are non-trivial inferences involving coextensive qualities. When, for example, a person infers that sound is imperma-nent because it is a product, the two qualities, impermanence and be-ing produced, are extensionally equivalent. Yet, the fact that this inference is non-trivial implies that these two terms possess distinct meanings. Needless to say, it is apparent that the meaning of a gen-eral term must indeed consist of more than the extension of that term.

It is at this point where the developments made by the twelfth century Tibetan epistemologist Phywa pa Chos kyi se� ge help to provide a novel explanation of what this element of meaning is over and above the term’s extension. As shown above, in addition to the particular objects falling within the exclusion classes of general terms, twelfth century Tibetan thinkers claim that for each term there is also a corresponding, mentally constructed concept (don spyi), and it is these concepts that provide us with something like intensional elements of meaning. Identity and difference of these intensional ele-ments are captured with the relations of ‘identical connotation’ (ldog pa gcig) and ‘different connotation’ (ldog pa tha dad).12 Two quali-ties satisfy the ‘identical connotation’ relation just in case the con-cepts that arise in one’s mind when conceiving of the two qualities are identical.13 Expressed linguistically, this is to say that the concept 12 The translation of “ldog pa” as “connotation” is, quite obviously, far from literal. Nevertheless, it is meant as a good approximation of the role played by the term in this particular philosophical context. Translating “ldog pa” as “distinguisher” or “isolate,” as some have done, does produce a somewhat more literal translation, but does so by using words in English that have no standard philosophical meanings. 13 This equivalence is never directly stated by Phywa pa himself. There are several places where he expresses half of this equivalence, by stating that ldog pa tha dad entails don spyi so sor sna� pa. For example, in Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel 6b3: ldog pa tha dad pas don spyi so sor sna� par ‘gyur te. (This line appears within a hypothetical opponent’s argument, but Phywa pa never questions the veracity of the claim.) In dBu ma śar gsum

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that dawns in a person’s mind when she cognitively entertains (and grasps the meaning of) the one term is the same as the concept that dawns when she grasps the other term.14 When this condition is not met, the two qualities stand in the ‘different connotation’ relation.

The further question that needs to be addressed is how appeals to concepts and the ‘identical connotation’ relation can help solve the problem of when two general terms pick out the same quality. A natural thought at this point is that satisfaction of the ‘identical connotation’ relation might be sufficient for identity simpliciter. This would mean that if two terms give rise to the very same concept – that is, if they are intensionally/connotatively identical – then the two terms express the same quality. My own belief is that this is, in fact, the most philosophically tenable position to hold. While this view fits well with the commonly held belief that connotation determines denotation, it is not entirely obvious whether Tibetan philosophers actually accept this view, or whether they have an even more strin-gent requirement for identity simpliciter.

3. Ultra-intensionality

Tom Tillemans (1986) claims that Tibetan philosophers – and here, he is referring principally to dGe lugs thinkers – uphold a thesis of ultra-intensionality for terms – each term has a different intension from every other distinct term. Tillemans derives this thesis by analyzing the conditions under which Tibetans assert the identity

gyi sto� thun 2a1: rdzas gcig ñid la ltos sa log sa tha dad las log pa la ltos pas don spyi so sor śar te sgro ‘dogs tha dad bsal nas �es par bya ba bum pa’i byas pa da� mi rtag pa ltar �o bo gcig la ldog pas byas pa’i tha dad pa’am / śi� da� ljon pa ltar chos gcig ñid la rnam gra�s pa’i sgras tha dad lta bur brjod pa yin. In this longer quote, it is not only clear that ldog pa tha dad entails don spyi so sor sna� ba – which means, when stated in the contrapositive, that sameness of concepts (don spyi gcig) entails sameness of connotation (ldog pa gcig), it is also reasonable to think that sameness of connotation entails sameness of concepts. 14 In some sense, these two phrasings of the ‘same connotation’ relation are not iden-tical. The difference here arises in connection with the fact that there are terms – those like “son of a barren woman” and “horn of a rabbit” – that give rise to concepts but do not ex-press qualities (dharma) at all.

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relation. Tillemans’ claim is essentially that, for any two qualities and ,

(a) is identical to ( da� gcig yin)

if and only if

(b) “” is identical to “.”

Simply put, two terms express the same quality if and only if the two terms are themselves identical. Thus, on this account it is true that

(e1) Cordate is identical to cordate

but false that

(e2) Cordate is identical to renate.

Despite the fact (assuming, rather obnoxiously, that it is a fact) that the general terms “cordate” (creature with a heart) and “renate” (creature with a kidney) have the same extensions, the fact that these two terms are not identical gives us grounds for concluding that “Cordate is identical to renate” is false.

Expounding on this a bit more, it is important to note that there are two distinct readings possible for sentence form (b). On the first reading, we can take the expressions in quotes – “” and “” – to be instances of what Frege calls indirect reference, where the indirect referent of a term is taken to be the ordinary sense of that term. Replacing Frege’s term “sense” with Carnap’s term “intension,” on this first reading of (b) we get,

(b1) the intension of is identical to the intension of

On the second reading of (b), what this condition requires is that the general terms “” and “” be two tokens of the very same sign. That is, (b) is claimed not to be stating an identity of the intensions of and , rather, it is stating the identity of the signs “” and “” them-selves. On this reading we get,

(b2) The sign “” is identical to the sign “.”

There is no question that these two readings – (b1) and (b2) – are not logically equivalent. Condition (b2) entails (b1) but not vice versa, since two distinct terms can possess the same intension, as for example with the words “horse” and “steed.” We may suppose along

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with Frege that the words “horse” and “steed” have not only the same extension but also the same intension. There may be aesthetic reasons for preferring the word “steed” over “horse” in certain con-texts, but in point of meaning the two terms are identical. Neverthe-less, the two signs “horse” and “steed” are obviously distinct.

Since the two conditions, (b1) and (b2), are logically distinct, the question of which of the two conditions is actually the right one for Tibetans to adopt for identity simpliciter, (a), is a pressing concern. Should we hold, as I suggested earlier, that connotative sameness is sufficient for sameness simpliciter, or should we say that two terms pick out the same quality only if the two terms are themselves identi-cal?

Tillemans’ contention is essentially that Tibetan philosophers do not distinguish these two different interpretations of condition (b). He believes that Tibetan thinkers uphold the view that (b1) is, in fact, equivalent to (b2), for he takes them to adopt the view that two dis-tinct terms cannot possess the same intension. This is precisely the thesis of ultra-intensionality: each term possesses a different inten-sion from every other term. As Tillemans puts it,

For a Fregean “bachelor” and “unmarried man” would express the same sense (intension). But for a Buddhist, they would have different sense be-cause the names are different. Hence, I will speak of the Buddhist entities as being “ultra-intensional.”15

Indeed, there is a large quantity of textual support corroborating Tillemans’ belief that Tibetan philosophers of the dGe lugs sect view language as ultra-intensional. Tillemans gives an extensive quote from the Collected Topics textbook of the nineteenth century writer Phur lcog pa,16 in which the author not only sets condition (b2) as a

15 Tillemans (1986), p. 213. 16 In the Tibetan exile community this author – Yo�s ʼdzin phur lcog pa blo bza� tshul khrims byams pa rgya mtsho – is commonly called “Phur bu lcog.” This rendering of his name is derided as a linguistic corruption by scholars in Tibet itself where he is usually called “Phur lcog pa” or, sometimes, “Phur bu lcog pa.” In any case, this epithet is given to the author due to his having supposedly lived, from ages 5 to 10, in the Phur bu lcog mountain range just north of Se ra Monastery.

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necessary condition for identity – viz., “because if [two items] are identical, then they must be identical in both name and referent”17 – but also contrasts this with cases in which two qualities (dharma, chos) are taken to be distinct precisely because a person can validly ascertain the one without ascertaining the other. But this ability to ascertain one quality without ascertaining a second quality that is coextensive with it is generally rooted in those two qualities having distinct concepts/connotations associated with them. In thus drawing the contrast between two elements being identical in both name and referent and having different connotations at least indirectly suggests that Phur lcog pa took conditions (b1) and (b2) to be equiva-lent.

This view was certainly not universally accepted by twelfth and thirteenth century Tibetan philosophers, however. There are several cases of twelfth century Tibetan philosophers unmistakably dis-tinguishing condition (b1) from (b2). In two different texts18 Phywa pa Chos kyi Se� ge briefly describes a number of different forms of identity and difference. In each case, he claims that it is possible to have two distinct terms that pick out the very same quality/dharma (chos gcig ñid la rnam gra�s pa’i sgras tha dad). Moreover, it is apparent from the context in which these claims are made that he takes these two terms to have exactly the same intensions.19 That is, the very same concept dawns in one’s mind when thinking about each of the two terms. Phywa pa’s example of two distinct words having the same intension are “śi�” and “ljon pa” – both of which carry the same meaning as the English word “tree.” One of Phywa pa’s successors, the author of The Summary of the Quintessence of Epistemology (Tshad ma’i de kho na ñid bsdus pa), makes a similar claim.20 He states that there are cases in which two distinct terms 17 Yongs ’dzin (2000), p. 31. 18 For the quote from the dBu ma śar gsum gyi sto� thun see footnote 13. Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel 11b8: śi� da� ljon pa ltar ldog pa cig ñid la rnam gra�s kyi sgras brjod pa. 19 These cases are contrasted with cases in which the terms have distinct connotations (ldog pa tha dad) and distinct concepts arising. 20 Klong chen rab ’byams, p. 51: ldog pa da� d�os po gñis ka tha dad med pa zan da� bśos lta bu. This text is credited to the fourteenth century scholar Long chen pa. However,

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have the same connotation (ldog pa) and refer to the same material thing(s) (d�os po). As an example, he offers the terms “zan” and “bśos,” both of which carry the meaning of the English word “food.”

These illustrations of a theory of word meaning in which distinct linguistic signs possess the same connotation or intension go a long way toward helping us to understand some key issues in early Ti-betan philosophy of language. First, we can see that, pace Tillemans, not all Tibetan philosophers accept the thesis of ultra-intensionality. It would have been a remarkable historical fact about Tibetan philosophical thought had they never recognized the possibility of two distinct terms possessing the same meaning. Nevertheless, Phywa pa’s recognition of this possibility appears to have largely fallen on deaf ears with his Tibetan successors. While a close examination of the philosophical writings of other twelfth and thir-teenth century Tibetan thinkers may yet yield many more examples of a rejection of ultra-intensional word meaning, Tillemans is quite right that in the more recent philosophical texts of the Tibetan epistemological tradition many of the most famous authors do adopt this thesis of ultra-intensionality.21 Another moral we can draw from this discussion is the fact that, in Phywa pa’s opinion, the actual requirement that must be met in order for two terms to pick out the same quality (simpliciter) is that the two terms be intensionally identical. The two terms need not themselves be identical. In this

as van der Kuijp (2003) has documented, this attribution is highly dubious. Many contextual clues suggest that this work was composed shortly after Phywa pa’s famous Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel. 21 One contemporary writer, however, is very explicit in his rejection of the ultra-intensionality thesis. In a book (derived from his MA thesis) written by a young Tibetan scholar named ’Bum skyabs a very provocative account of concepts (don spyi) is put for-ward. The author straightforwardly proclaims that multiple terms can give rise to the same concept. His example is of the five terms “gtan tshigs,” “rtags,” “rgyu mtshan,” “phyogs kyi chos,” and “de sgrub kyi bsgrub pa’i chos,” all of which carry the meaning of the Eng-lish terms “evidence” or “reason.” Explicitly, he claims, (’Bum skyabs, p. 43): don spyi gcig la mi� du ma ʼjug pa yod de / rtags rigs kyi skabs su gtan tshigs da� / rtags / rgyu mtshan / phyogs kyi chos / de sgrub kyi bsgrub pa’i chos rnams la don spyi gcig las med kya� mi� l�a yod pa lta bu’o //.

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way, Phywa pa adopts the view that (b1) is the correct requirement for identity simpliciter, not (b2).

Finally, this discussion provides us with clear examples of early Tibetan philosophers making use of concepts in order to capture ele-ments of word meaning extending beyond extensionality. Not only can two different terms express the same quality – by virtue of those two terms giving rise to the same concept – two different qualities can be distinguished from each other by way of these associated con-cepts. Thus, even when two terms are coextensive – such that any object instantiating the one term also instantiates the other term, and vice versa – the qualities they express can be distinguished in a per-son’s mind through the different concepts to which they give rise.

4. Sa skya Pa��ita on concepts and reference

Stepping back from the specific case of identity and returning to the central theme, what all of this serves to show is that by employing the notion of a concept (don spyi) bKa’ gdams epistemologists were able to explicate certain elements of cognition and language use in a clear and interesting manner. In what follows I will raise one diffi-culty with this bKa’ gdams Tibetan account as it plays out in the writing of the thirteenth century polymath Sa pa�. The claim by bKa’ gdams Tibetans that word meaning consists of both direct signification and intentional signification makes it possible to ex-plain how Buddhist philosophers can connect language to external reality without falling into the Indian Grammarians’ trap of granting that words directly express particulars or universals. Sa pa� cannot accept the details of the bKa’ gdams account, however, for he rejects the existence of concepts (don spyi).22 Insofar as this is the case, Sa pa� cannot accept that concepts are the entities directly signified by language. In fact, Sa pa� explicitly denies that there is anything at all that words directly signify. He states, “Ultimately, what is called ‘signified’ (brjod bya) is not established at all.”23 This would not be a

22 For more on this, see my article, Stoltz (2006). 23 Sa skya pa��ita, p. 121: don dam par na brjod bya źes bya ba grub pa ci’a� med de /.

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big deal, except that, as was pointed out above, words are capable of successfully applying to real things only indirectly. On the bKa’ gdams account, language directly signifies concepts, and these con-cepts in turn make it possible for language to apply indirectly to real particulars. Once one eliminates concepts from this theory of lan-guage, as Sa pa� desires to do, it is difficult to see how words could still be capable of intentionally signifying real things.

What we have here is an apparent conflict between Sa pa�’s pre-ferred accounts in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of lan-guage. When presenting his theory of mind and mental content at the beginning of his Tshad ma rigs gter (Epistemology: Treasure of Reasoning), Sa pa� goes through pains to argue that concepts (don spyi) do not exist. Yet, when he presents his own positive theory of language later in the same text, Sa pa� wishes to make use of the bKa’ gdams distinction between direct signification and intentional signification, even though the former requires an appeal to a cate-gory of entities whose existence he rejects. The challenge that Sa pa� faces is that of explaining how language is capable of intentionally signifying particular objects given that concepts do not exist – that is, given that there is nothing at all that language directly signifies.

Sa pa�’s preferred method for dealing with this challenge is to look back to the Indian Buddhist tradition. Whereas Phywa pa Chos kyi se� ge’s mode of operation is to account for the meaningfulness of language by inventing a new role for concepts (don spyi), Sa pa� rejects this bKa’ gdams pa creativity and instead seeks to provide an explanation of word meaning that is modeled after that given by the Indian Buddhist masters. That said, the actual explanation given by Sa pa� blends elements of the traditional Indian view together with elements of the bKa’ gdams pa account. On the one hand, he repeat-edly acknowledges that there are, in fact, no objects directly signi-fied by language (since the entities directly signified by language would be concepts, whose existence he rejects). Yet, at the same time, when he attempts to explain how it is that language can be di-

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rected toward real things and how words can be used efficaciously, he repeatedly appeals to concepts. Sa pa� states,24

Insofar as conceptual thought is essentially mistaken, An image, which is the object [indicated by] words (sgra yi don), dawns. Through that one longs for an external object, And that is posited as what the words signify.

The view presented here is quite similar to his predecessors’. Two different sorts of entities are at work. There is both a mentally con-structed image (or ‘reflection’) dawning in one’s mind and a real external object. As becomes clearer in subsequent passages, how-ever, the image dawning in one’s mind is none other than a concept (don spyi).25 For Sa pa�, this concept is required in order for lan-guage to be applicable to reality, for he contends that it is only by virtue of conceptual thought mistakenly conflating concepts with real objects that language can be directed toward real particulars. This exposes even more clearly the conundrum that Sa pa� faces. He wants to hold that concepts do not exist, and yet at the same time he wants to hold that language is capable of applying to reality only be-cause of a mistaken conflation of concepts with external objects. But how can concepts be conflated with real particulars if concepts don’t even exist? It seems that Sa pa� can’t have it both ways. I will con-clude by offering one possible explanation for how Sa pa�’s theory of language can be rendered sensible, and how this explanation shows quite clearly that Sa pa� rejects the notion that external reality is ineffable.

The explanation that I think Sa pa� would offer in reply to the above problem is one involving a nuanced understanding of the ontological status of concepts. I’ve mentioned above that Sa pa� spends the first several pages of his Tshad ma rigs gter arguing against the existence of concepts. This is true, but it also glosses over important details about the very notion of existence. For Sa pa�, to

24 Ibid, p. 121–2: rtog pa �o bos ʼkhrul pa la // sgra yi don gyi gzugs brñan śar // de la phyi rol don du źen // de ni sgra yi brjod byar btags //. 25 Ibid, p. 126: ’jig rten pa rnams don spyi la ra� mtshan du ʼkhrul nas ra� mtshan ñid bla� ba da� dor ba la ’jug pas na tha sñad rgyun ga la chad /

JONATHAN STOLTZ 398

say that something is existent (yod pa) is equivalent to saying that it is an object of epistemic evaluation (gźal bya). Thus, what he is specifically denying is that concepts could be objects of epistemic judgment. This does not preclude the possibility that concepts “exist” in a more minimal way. Concepts might “exist” as mere fleeting im-ages in one’s mind; images incapable of being evaluated in judg-ment. By granting such a minimal status to concepts it would then be possible for these entities to be mistaken for real objects in the exter-nal world, thus making Sa pa�’s theory of language comprehensible. Ultimately, what this amounts to is an account of the efficacy of lan-guage that on the one hand calls upon concepts in order to explain how the mind works so as to provide semantic content to language, but on the other hand does not postulate the genuine existence of concepts.

Why is it, though, that Sa pa� argues against the existence of con-cepts? It is in answering this question that our investigation comes full circle. Sa pa� offers two arguments against the existence of con-cepts, with his second argument much more detailed and sophisti-cated than the first. This second argument focuses in on the absurd consequences that he believes would follow were one to accept the existence of concepts. At the heart of his argument is the contention that inasmuch as concepts are mind dependent entities, they are, therefore, private objects, incapable of being communicated to oth-ers. Sa pa� states, “If they are dependent solely on an individual’s mind, although one could, through introspection, express [concepts] to another person, they would not understand.”26 Language could not be used to communicate the existence of these private concepts to others. In short, Sa pa�’s argument is essentially that concepts do not exist because if they did they’d be ineffable. What this means is that, on Sa pa�’s account, far from it being the case that language is incapable of referring to real particulars, just the opposite is the case. Words can be used to reference real things, but cannot be used to reference mentally constructed items such as concepts.

26 Ibid, p. 42: ra� ra� gi blo kho na da� ’brel na ra� rig pa bźin du gźan la bstan kya� go bar mi ʼgyur ro //

TIBETAN PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

399

Bibliography

’Bum skyabs. 2000. Bod kyi gtan tshigs rig pa’i spyi don go bder brjod pa. Chengdu: Sichuan People’s Press.

Dharmottara. Tshad ma rnam par �es pa’i ʼgrel bśad. D: 4229.

Dreyfus, Georges. 1997. Recognizing Reality: Dharmakīrti's Philosophy and its Tibetan Interpretations. Albany: SUNY Press.

Frege, Gottlob. 1980. “On Sense and Reference,” in P. Geach and M. Black (eds.), Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Oxford: Blackwell.

Klo� chen rab ʼbyams pa (attributed). 2000. Tshad ma’i de kho na ñid bsdus pa. Chengdu: Sichuan People’s Press.

van der Kuijp, L. 2003. “A Treatise on Buddhist Epistemology and Logic Attributed to Klong chen rab ʼbyams pa (1308–1364) and its Place in Indo-Tibetan Intellectual History.” Journal of Indian Philosophy 31: 381–437.

r�og Blo ldan śes rab. 2006. Tshad ma rnam �es kyi ʼgrel ba. In bKa' gdams gsu� 'bum phyogs sgrig, vol. 1. Chengdu: Sichuan People’s Press.

Phywa pa Chos kyi se� ge. 2006a. dBu ma śar gsum gyi sto� thun. In bKa' gdams gsu� 'bum phyogs sgrig, vol. 7. Chengdu: Sichuan People’s Press.

Phywa pa Chos kyi se� ge. 2006b. Tshad ma rnam �es kyi ’grel pa. In bKa' gdams gsu� 'bum phyogs sgrig, vol. 8. Chengdu: Sichuan People’s Press.

Phywa pa Chos kyi se� ge. 2006c. Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel. In bKa' gdams gsuṅ 'bum phyogs sgrig, vol. 8. Chengdu: Sichuan People’s Press.

Sa skya pa��ita Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan. 1989. Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter gyi rtsa ba da� ʼgrel pa. Qinghai: Tibet People’s Press.

Siderits, Mark. 1987. “The Sense-Reference Distinction in Indian Philosophy of Language.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 14, 331–355.

Stoltz, Jonathan. 2006. “Sakya Pandita and the Status of Concepts,” Philosophy East and West 56, 567-82

Tillemans, Tom. 1983. “The ‘Neither One nor Manyʼ Argument for śūnyatā and its Tibetan Interpretations.” In Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist Relig-ion and Philosophy, eds. E. Steinkellner et H. Tauscher, 305–320. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien.

Tillemans, Tom. 1986. “Identity and Referential Opacity in Tibetan Buddhist apoha Theory.” In Buddhist Logic and Epistemology, Studies in the Buddhist

JONATHAN STOLTZ 400

Analysis of Inference and Language, eds. B.K. Matilal and R.D. Evans, 207–227. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

Yo�s ʼdzin phur lcog pa blo bza� tshul khrims byams pa rgya mtsho. 2000. Rigs lam ʼphrul lde. Gansu People’s Press.

REPORT ON THE XyTH CONGRESS OF

THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BUDDHIST STUDIES.

TOM J.F. TILLEMANS

General Secretary IABS

The Xyth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (lABS) was held at Emory University, in Atlanta, Georgia, from the 23 rd until the 28th of June, 2008. Participation in IABS con­gresses has been steadily increasing over the years, and this was no exception to that trend: four hundred twenty-five people attended over the six day period. The congress was very capably prepared by a planning committee chaired by Professor Sara McClintock, and benefitted from the support of staff and students of the Department of Religion of the Faculty of Arts who helped with the considerable tasks involved. The organization was absolutely exemplary.

The academic program began with a convocation ceremony at which the President of the IABS, Professor Oskar von Hintiber, delivered his address intitled "Hoary past and hazy memory. On the history of early Buddhist texts." Over the next days there were morning and afternoon sessions of paper presentations, approxi­mately two hundred fifty presentations in total. These were complemented by several evening events - notably a program of Tibetan sacred music and dance performed by the monks of Drepung monastery and the construction of a sand mm:u;lala - as well as recep­tions, excursions, a general meeting and a memorable farewell dinner.

Sections and panels

As in other recent congresses of the lABS, paper presentations were assigned to either 'sections' on the various broad themes treated in Buddhist Studies or to 'panels' centered upon specific topics. Panels were organized by one or more conveners, who were responsible for

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 29· Number 2·2006 (2008) pp. 401405

402 TOM J.P. TILLEMANS

determining content and structure. Sections were organized by the conference planning committee, who grouped together papers that were submitted individually. Here is a list of the panels and their convenors:

1. Tibetan Scholasticism in the 11th and 12th Centuries. Pascale Hugon,Ka­zuo Kano, Kevin Vose.

2. Chinese Buddhist Meditation Practices and Chan. John McRae, Eric Goodell.

3. Universal Claims, Postcolonial Frames: An Interdisciplinary Session on Bodhgaya. Tara Doyle, David Geary.

4. The Academic Discipline oj Buddhist Studies in North America. Charles Prebish.

5. Indian Buddhist Metaethics. Martin Adam.

6. Rebirth oj Buddhist Scholasticisms in Twentieth-Century China. Eyal Aviv, Jason Clower.

7. Analyzing and Advancing Buddhist Philosophy: The Two Truths. Jay Gar-field, Jan Westerhoff.

8. Miracles and Superhuman Powers in Buddhism. David Fiordalis.

9. How Theraviida is Theraviida? Peter Skilling.

10. Mahiimudrii: Approaching the Great Seal. Roger Jackson, Lara Brait­stein.

11. New Research in Avadiina Literature. Andy Rotman.

12. Buddhism in the Writings oj Ippolito Desideri, S.J. (1684-1733). Trent Pomplun.

13.Theory and Practice oj Healing, Medicine and Longevity in Buddhism. Robert Mayer, Geoffrey Samuel.

14. Mahiiyiina Sutras. Jonathan Silk.

15. Beyond Simple Constructions oj So-called Humanistic Buddhism (renjian jojiao): Reinterpreting Modernity in 20''' Century Buddhism in China and Taiwan. Esther-Maria Guggenmos.

16. Representations oj Brahmins and Brahmanism in Early Buddhist Litera­ture. Brian Black.

17. Buddhist Monumental Sculpture and Architecture. Cameron David War­ner.

REPORT ON THE XVTH CONGRESS OF THE lABS 403

18. Madhyamaka and Yogacara Models of Truth or Reality in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. Klaus-Dieter Mathes.

19. "Terms of Art" in Indian Esoteric Buddhism. David Gray, Christian Wedemeyer.

20. Gandhiiran Manuscripts and Gandharan Buddhism. Richard Salomon.

21. Wonhyo (617-686) and his Comprehensive Buddhist Philosophical Vision. Charles Muller.

22. Buddhist Funerary Cultures: Art, Text, Ritual, Performance. Justin McDaniel, Pattatorn Chirapravati. .

23. Borobudur in International Perspective. Hudaya Kandahjaya.

24. Humor and Buddhism. Shayne Clarke.

25. Buddhist Theories of Self-Awareness (svasaTpvedana): Interpretations and Critiques. Birgit Kellner.

26. Reexamining Tibetan AutolBiographical Writing. Sarah Jacoby, Andrew Quintman.

27. Recovering Anew the Lotus SCUra's Originality as a Religio-Philosophi­cal System. Joseph Logan.

28. Pioneer Translators, Missionaries, and their Transmitted Texts. Mariko Namba Walter.

29. Yogacara Buddhism: Approaches. Tao Jiang.

30. Facets of Esoteric Buddhism and the Tantras in East Asia. Charles Orzech.

31. Santideva and the Bodhisattvacaryiivatiira. Ani Kunga Chodron.

·32. Buddhist Commentarial Traditions: Transdiscursivity and Textual Production in Buddhist Intellectual History. Mark Dennis.

33. Uses and Abuses of the "Modem" in Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism.Leigh Sangster, Robbie Barnett, Laura Harrington.

The sections were as follows:

1. Early Buddhism

2. Himalayan Buddhism

3. Textual and Philological Studies

4. Vajrayana Buddhism

5. Narrative Studies

6. Buddhism and the West

404 TOM J.F. TILLEMANS

7. Buddhist Art

8. Vinaya Studies

9. Contemporary Developments in Buddhism

10. Hermeneutics, Scholasticism, and Commentarial Techniques

11. Dunhuang Studies

12. Indian and Tibetan Buddhist Philosophy

13. Ethnographic Studies

14. South Asian Buddhism

15. Buddhist Theories of Mind and Meditation

16. East Asian Buddhism

17. Logic and Epistemology

18. Technology and Resources

19. Southeast Asian, Inner Asian, Korean and Mongolian Buddhism

20. East Asian Buddhist Philosophy

21. Mahayana Buddhism

The combination of sections and panels once again seems to have successfully provided an organizational structure that represented the diversity of the field and allowed for specialized discussions within it.

lABS business

Here is a summary of the various resolutions passed at the lABS Board Meeting and at the General Meeting of the members.

1. The IABS decided to accept the invitation of Dharma Drum University / Chung Hwa Institute of Buddhist Studies in Taiwan to host the next lABS congress (June 20-25, 2011, Iinshan, Taiwan).

2. The lABS Board decided to raise dues moderately, i.e., by 10 USD for students, 15 USD for regular members and 20 USD for institutions. This increase will take effect at the beginning of 2010.

3. The financial statement for 2007, as prepared by KPMG Accountants (Lausanne), was approved and will appear in the next issue of the IIABS.

REPORT ONTRE XyTH CONGRESS OF THE lABS 405

4. Ernst Steinkellner, Tilmann Vetter and Richard Gombrich were named honorary members of the lABS in recognition of their important contributions to the field of Buddhist Studies.

5. The General Meeting ratified the following amendment to the lABS constitution:

"The dissolution of the lABS shall be treated in accordance with Article XII. If the lABS should be dissolved, its financial assets will revert to a recognized not-for-profit international association to be used for the continuation of scientific activities that are, as far as possible, compatible with the Objectives outlined in Article II of the lABS Constitution. "

The amendment was presented to the lABS General Meeting on Friday, June 27,2008 and received the members' unanimous approval with no abstentions. It now figures as Article XIII in the lABS Constitution (see http://www.iabsinfo.net/iabs. pdf).

It remains for me, in the name of the lABS, to thank again the organizers of the XVth Congress for their excellent preparation. The Congress represented the "state of the art" of Buddhist Studies and bodes well for the future of this flourishing field.

IABS TREASURER FINANCIAL REPORT

mROME DUCOR, Treasurer IABS

Below are reproduced the financial statements for the IABS prepared by KPMG Accountants, Lausanne, Switzerland, April 28, 2008.

These statements were approved by the Board at its meeting in Atlanta, Georgia, June 23, 2008.

1:1 1:1 1:1

International Association of Buddhist Studies

Lausanne

i. Balance sheet as of December 31. 2007

2.' Profit and loss statement from January 1st, 2007 to December 31! 2007

April 28, 2008 FGJlh

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 29· Number 2·2006 (2008) pp. 407--409

408 .JEROME DUCOR

International Association of Buddhist Studies

Balance sheet as of December 31, 20.0.1

Current assets

Petty cash BCV, account no L 0.983.51.02 BCV, account no C 0983.51.04 BCV, account no Z 5042.0.9.62 Withholding tax to recover

Total cilrrent assets

TOTAL ASSETS

LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL

Short-teRn liabilities Accrued Dabilities

Capltal-FDrtune Fortune as January 1 st Result for th~'~eriod Fortune as December 31

TOTAL LIABIUTIES AND CAPITAL

31.12.2007 CHF

97.0.5 2'133.25

50.'529.10. 1'589.85

18.03

54'367.28

54'367,28

4'033.35 4'033.35

66'190.22 -15'856.29 50'333.93

54'367,28

31.12.2006 CHF

10.0..75 1'0.69.90.

67'731.55 3'30.0.85

16.87

72'219.92

72'219.92

6'0.29.70 6'029.70

80'839.07 -14'648.85 66'190..22

72'219.92

lABS TREASURER FINANCIAL REPORT

International Association of BUddhist Studies

Profit and loss statement

for the period from January 1st. 2007 to December 31,2007

Dues, sub., back issues and donations Interests income Exchange gain

Total income

Gross salaries Social charges Office supplies Communication

Postage Subscription Accounting fees Computer fees Printing, books Bank fees Exchange loss

Total expenses

Result for the period

2007 CHF

35'060.44 3.39

59.90

35'123,73

-14'007.90 -1'004.10 -1'926.20

-240.00 -3'627.72

0.00 -1'464,70

..{i42.20 -23'110.60

-267.86 -4'688.74

·50'980.02

·15'856.29

409

2006 CHF

25'581.06 46.67

0.70

25'628,43

-14'131.50 -1'009.20

-31.85 -240.00

-3'180.61 -86.70

-2'130.50 0.00

-12'939.05 -568.12

-5'959.75

-40'277.28

-14'648.85

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Junjie CHU is an Indologist and Tibetologist, and teaches Indo­Tibetan Buddhist philosophy, Sanskrit and classic Tibetan in the Department of Indology and Central Asian Studies at the University of Leipzig, Germany. His current research centers on the Yogacara system, especially its epistemological theories and its relationship to the Sautrantika system.

David HIGGINS is a doctoral candidate at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland, in the Section de Langues et Civilisations Orientales and a Sessional Lecturer in Religious Studies at the University of Victoria, Canada. His current research concerns the phenomenologi­cal distinction between dualistic mind (sems) and primordial aware­ness (ye shes) as was articulated and defended in the Tibetan rNying rna tradition from the 7th to 14th centuries. His dissertation will offer a critical study of rNying rna views on mind and attempt to clarify their complex relationship to earlier Madhyamaka and Y ogacara views.

Richard D. McBRIDE, IT, is an assistant professor of history at Brig­ham Young University-Hawaii. He earned a Ph.D. in East Asian Languages and Cultures (Buddhist Studies) from UCLA in 2001. He is the author of Domesticating the Dharma: Buddhist Cults and the Hwaom Synthesis in Silla Korea (University of Hawaii Press, 2008) and is currently completing a manuscript on the cult of Amitabha and Pure Land Buddhist scholiasts in Silla Korea titled Aspiring to Enlightenment. He was a Fulbright senior researcher in Korean his­tory during the academic year 2007-2008.

Jonathan STOLTZ is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of St. Thomas. He specializes in contemporary philoso­phy of logic as well as Tibetan Buddhist epistemology. His current research examines epistemological developments made by thinkers

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 29 • Number 2 • 2006 (2008)

412

in the bKa' gdams and Sa skya schools of Tibetan Buddhism, as well as philosophical debates between these two schools of thought. His most recent articles include "Sakya Pandita and the Status of Con­cepts" (2006, Philosophy East and West) and "Gettier and Factivity in Indo-Tibetan Epistemology" (2007, The Philosophical Quarterly).

Hidenori SAKUMA is a professor at the Institute of Philosophy of the Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University ,of Tsukuba, Japan. He is the author of Die Asrayaparivrtti-Theorie in der Yogaciirabhiimi, Teil I & II (1990), and Sanskrt Word-Index to the Abhidharmasamuccayabha/iyam edited by N. Tatia with the Corrigenda (1996). The main focus of his research is the history of changes in Y ogadira theories as they spread from India to China and Japan.

New fy01tl<L! if j F ~c~

.. ' .......... : ...... r:It .. ....... 1 . .1. '.J .. a. i A . . . A .... / .. ;is V~J?VVVVV' t' .',-'e';"- . ./'_,- -<,'. - i"', - '~'-': - -;.- -. -"" -<.,

SOOALLY ENGAGED BUDDHISM Sallie B. King DIMENSIONS OF AsIAN SpooruALriY

ANCIENT CHINESE DIVINATION Stephen 1.. Field

EMINENT NUNS: Women Chan Masters of SeventeenthcCenturyChina Beata Grant

MAKING TRANSCENDENTS Ascetics and Social M"moryin Early Medieval China Robert Ford Campany

THE CHINESE CLASSIC OF FAMILY REVERENCE A Philosophical Translation of the Xiaojing Henry Rosemont, Jr. & Roger TAmes

THE SHAOLIN MONASTERY History, Religion, New ill paper and the Chinese Martial Arts Meir Shahar

CAMBODIAN BUDDHISM History and Practice Ian Harris

New in paper

BODHISATTVAS OF THE FOREST AND THE FORMATION OF THE MARA YANA: A Study and Translation of the Rti§trapaiapariprcchii-sfttra Daniel BOilcher StuDIES CN THE BUDDHisT TAADmoNs Published in association-with the Institute for the Study of Buddhist Traditions, University of :Michigan

Incest and Schism in Indian Buddhist Legend and Historiography Jonathan A. Silk

DEATH AND THE A:FrERLIFE INJAPANESE BUDDHISM Edited by Jacqueline 1. Stone & Mariko Namba Walter

THE FOUR GREAT TEMPLES Buddhist Art, Archaeology, <'l!ld Icons of Seventh-Century Japan Donald F. McCallum

IMPERIAL POLmCS AND SYMBOLICS IN ANCIENT JAPAN The Tenmu Dynasty, 650-800 Hennan 00111S

WHEN TENGU TALK Hirata Atsutane's Ethnography of the Other World Wilburn Hansen

THE RECORD OF LINJI Translated by Ruth Fuller Sasaki Edited by Thomas Yah!; Kirchner NANZAN LrnRM.Y OF AsIAN RELIGION AND CULTURE

SOTO ZEN IN MEDIEVAL JAPAN William M. Bodiford New in paper 5ruorES IN EAST AsiAN BUDDHISM, No.8 Published in association with the Kuroda Institute

WWW.UHPRESS.HAWAII.EDU • ORDER TOLL FREE 1-888-UHPRESS

The International Association of Buddhist Studies

Prof. Oskar von Hiniiber (Freiburg) President

Prof. Cristina Scherrer-Schaub (Paris) Vice-Presiden t

Prof. Tom Tillemans (Lausanne) General Secretary

Dr. Jerome Ducor (Lausanne) Treasurer

Regional Representatives:

Prof. Janet Gyatso (Cambridge, MA.) Prof. Kazunobu Matsuda (Kyoto)

Prof. David Seyfort Ruegg (London) Mr. Peter Skilling (Bangkok)

Directors at large:

Dr. Nalini Balbir (Paris), Prof. Georges Dreyfus (Williamstown, MA.) Prof. Robert M. Gimello (Notre Dame, IN), Prof. Paul Harrison (Los Angeles)

Dr. Helmut Krasser (Vienna), Dr. Li-ying Kuo (Paris) Prof. Ulrich Pagel (London), Prof. Richard Salomon (Seattle)

Prof. Lambert Schmithausen (Hamburg), Mr. Peter Skilling (Bangkok) Prof. Jikido Takasaki (Tokyo)

The International Association of Buddhist Studies, founded in 1976, is devoted to promoting and supporting scholarship in Buddhist Studies in all its aspects, past and present, around the world. Membership is open to scholars of all academic disciplines.

Membership dues are USD 40 for full members, USD 20 for student members, USD 1000 for life members. Subscriptions to the JIABS for libraries and other institutions are USD 70. Dues and subscriptions may be paid in the following ways:

1. by direct bank to bank transfers in US dollars or in the equivalent amount in Euros or Swiss francs. The transfers should be to the lABS accounts at the Banque Cantonale Vaudoise, PI. St-Fran90is, Ch-lOOI Lausanne, Switzerland (SWIFT CODE: BCVLCH2L, clearing no. 7677), account numbers, 983.51.04 for US dollars, 5042.09.82 for EUR and 983.51.02 for Swiss francs.

2. by Visa or Mastercard

3. by cheque payable to the "Association Intemationale d'Etudes Bouddhiques (lABS)." There will be .no supplementary charges for cheques drawn in Swiss currency on Swiss banks. Otherwise, please add 10 dollars or 15 Swiss francs to cover our processing charges.

4. by Euro cheque in Swiss francs.

Prospective members from developing countries may contact the Treasurer concerning subsidized membership rates. Dues and subscriptions are payable per calendar year by December 31 of the previous year. Payments other than direct bank transfers should be sent to Dr. J er6me Ducor, Dept of Oriental Languages and Cultures, Anthropole, University of Lausanne, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland.