JIABS 26-1

JIABS Journal of the International

Association of Buddhist Studies

Volume 26 Number 1 2003

In Memoriam Professor Akira HIRAKAWA

by Kotabo FUJIJA......... ...................................................................... 3

Paul M. liARRrSON

Relying on the Dharma and not the Person: Reflection on authority and Transmission in Buddhism and Buddhist Studies.............. ....... 9

Colette CAILLAT Gleanings from a Comparative Reading of Early Canonical Buddhist and laina Texts......................... ......................................................... 25

Robert H. SHARF Thinking through Shingon Ritual.................................. ... ...... ... ........ 51

Giulio AGOSTINI

On the Nikiiya Affiliation of the Srlghaniiciirasaligraha and the Sphutiirthii Srzghaniiciirasaftgrahatlkii...... ....................................... 97

Mario D'AMATO

Can all Beings Potentially Attain Awakening? Gotra-theory in the Mahiiyiinasutriilarrzkiira ................................... 115

Dan ARNOLD Candrakirti on Digniiga on Svalak~alJas ......................................... 139

Cannen MEINERT

StnlcturalAnalysis of the bSam gtan mig sgron. A Comparison of the Fouifold Correct Practice in the Aryiivikalpaprave.saniimadhiiralJl and the Contents of the four Main Chapters of the bSam gtan mig sgron 175

Notes on the Contributors................................................................. 197

watermarkThe Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (ISSN 0193-600XX) is the organ of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Inc. It welcomes scholarly contributions pertaining to all facets of Buddhist Studies. JIABS is published twice yearly, in the summer and winter.

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© Copyright 2003 by the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Inc.

Printed in Belgium

EDITORIAL BOARD

SCHERRER-SCHAUB Cristina A. TILLEMANS Tom J.P. Editors-in-Chief

BUSWELL Robert

COLLINS Steven

Cox Collet

GOMEZ Luis O.

HARRISON Paul

VON HINtmER Oskar JACKSON Roger

JAINlPadmanabh S.

KA TSURA Shoryu

KuoLi-ying

LOPEZ, JI. Donald S.

MAcDONALD Alexander

SEYFORT RUEGG David SHARF Robert

STEINKELLNER Ernst

ZDRCHER Erik

IN MEMORIAM

PROFESSOR AKIRA HIRAKAWA

KOTABO FUJIJA

Professor Akira lIIRAKA WA, known widely not only in Japan but throughout the world as a respected authority in Buddhist Studies, passed away of natural causes on March 31, 2002, at the age of 87.

Born in Toyohashi City in Aichi Prefecture on January 21, 1915, Hirakawa studied as an undergraduate and then graduate student (1939-1945) at the Department of Indian Philosophy and Sanskrit Philology, Faculty of Letters, Tokyo Imperial University (now University of Tokyo), and became Research Assistant of that department in 1946. He was appointed Associate Professor of the newly established Department of Indian Philosophy at Hokkaido University in 1950. After teaching for four years in Hokkaido University, he returned to Tokyo in 1954 to become Associate Professor of Buddhist Studies at his alma mater. Hirakawa was granted a full professorship in 1962, a position he held until reaching the University of Tokyo's mandatory retirement age of 60 in 1975, at which time he received the title of Professor Emeritus. After his retirement he taught for 10 years (1975-1985) Buddhist Studies at Waseda University, Department of Oriental Philosophy, School of Literature. Hirakawa also served as Chairman of the Directors of the Japanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies for eight years (1983-1991), where he made tremendous contributions toward the advancement of the Association. In 1993 he was selected to be a member of the Japan Academy. He went on to become Chairman and Professor at the International College for Advanced Buddhist Studies (established in 1996), where in addition to his duties as the director of research and education, he was responsible for the general administration of the College. He held this position until passing away.

In a career that spanned over 60 years, Hirakawa brought to fruition vast achievements in the various fields of Indian, Chinese and Japanese

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 26 • Number 1 • 2003

4 KOTABO FUJITA

Buddhist studies. Hirakawa was extremely polific in his publications, and his works attest to the brilliance of his accomplishments. While the list of his works is too long to enumerate here, particularly worthy of mention is the Hirakawa Akira chosakushU (The Collected Works of Akira Hirakawa), 17 vols. (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1988-2000), on which he spent 12 of his later years in completing. This work actually comprises two sub-collections: Bukkyo shiso kenkyii (Studies in Buddhist Thought), Vols. I-VIII, and Bukkyo no karitsu (The Buddhist Discipline), Vols. lXXVII. Most of the main contributions Hirakawa made to the field of Buddhist Studies are included in this collection. I should therefore wish to briefly summarize its contents below.

Of the first collection, the first two volumes, Ho to Engi (Dharma and Pratltyasamutpada) (1988) and Genshi Bukkyo to Abidaruma bukkyo (Early Buddhism and Abhidharma Buddhism) (1991), examine from various angles the basic teachings of Early and Sectarian Buddhism. The second of these includes a revised Japanese version of "An Evaluation of the Sources on the Date of the Buddha", an English paper presented at the Fourth Symposium on Buddhist Studies at Gottingen University in April 1988 (published in The Dating of the Historical Buddha ed. H. Bechert, Part 1, Gottingen, 1991, pp. 252-295).

Vols. ill (1989) and IV (1990), Shoh daijo bukkyo no kenkyii (Studies in Early Mahayana Buddhism) I, II, are based on an earlier volume of the same name (1968) with significant additions and revisions. These two volumes further develop his revolutionary and now famous theory that Mahayana Buddhism developed out of groups of lay Buddhists centered around stiipa worship. In order to advance his theory, Hirakawa criticized both the notion that Mahayana sutras do not represent the words of the Buddha and the theory that Mahayana developed out of the Mahasiiqlghika sect; and he sought evidence for his theory in a wide range of literary sources. The ideas and methodology presented in this work had their beginnings as early as 1954, in a paper entitled "Daijo bukkyo no kyodanshiteki seikaku" (The Historicity of the Mahayana Buddhist Order). Over the course of the next few decades his theory became widely accepted in Japan, and the main points of his theory eventually gained the attention of Buddhist scholars worldwide through the publication in English of "The Rise of Mahayana Buddhism and Its Relationship to the

IN MEMORIAM: PROFESSORAKIRA HIRAKAWA 5

Worship of Stilpas" (1963). In recent years, however, Hirakawa's theory has come into question, and has been met with criticism both within and outside Japan. The majority of these criticisms tend to be based on the view that Mahayana developed from within the traditional Buddhist sects. It must be said through that the origin of Mahayana Buddhism is not a settled matter. Nonetheless, Hirakawa's theory is, as an academic achievement, worthy of praise for - at the very least - bringing the matter into question and for ushering in a new phase in the attempts to answer unresolved problems.

Although it may be what he is best known for outside of Japan, Hirakawa's accomplishments in Mahayana research are by no means limited to the above mentioned theory. Of his Collected Works, the following are also representative of his immense knowledge of and contribution to the field of Mahayana studies: Daijo bukkyo no kyori to kyodan (Mahayana Buddhism: The Order and Its Doctrine) (VoL V, 1989), Shoki daijo to hokke shiso (Early Mahayana and the Philosophy of SaddharmapUlJcJarika Literature) (Vol. VI, 1989), JOdo Shiso to Daijo-kai (Pure Land Philosophy and the Mahayana Morality) (Vol. VII, 1990), Nihon bukkyo to chUgoku bukkyo (Japanese and Chinese Buddhism) (Vol. Vill,1991).

The second half of his Collected Works is a compilation of various studies dealing with the Buddhist Discipline. Vols. IX (1999) and X (2000), Ritsuzo no kenkyu (A Study of the Vinaya-pitaka) I, II, constitute a reworking of his doctoral dissertation and first published book of the same title (1960). Based on the groundwork laid out in these two volumes, which can be considered his most monumental achievement, Hirakawa then went on to paint a historical portrait of the early Buddhist order in Vols. XI (2000) and XII (2000), Genshi bukkyo no kyodan soshiki (The Structure and Form of the Early Buddhist Order) I, II, which is likewise a revised and expanded version of his earlier Genshi bukkyo no kenkyu (A Study of Early Buddhism) (1964).

The last five volumes are not based on any previous work. Vol. xm (1998), Bikuni-Ritsu no kenkyu (A Study of the Precepts for Nuns) and Vols. XIV-XVII, Nihyakugojikkai no kenkyu (A Study of the 250 Precepts for Monks) I (1993), II (1993), ill (1994), IV (1995), are all devoted to examining the articles of the priitimok~a and carefully comparing

6 KOTABO FUJITA

the extant versions of the various sects. With respect to both detail and sheer volume, such research had until then not been undertaken in either Japan or elsewhere, and it is unlikely to be surpassed in the foreseeable future. It would not bean overstatement to say that Hirakawa's professional career began and ended with the study of the Vinaya-pitaka.

While the above is a summary of Hirakawa's publications of Vinaya studies in Japanese, amongst his international contributions in this field, we may mention the following two works published in India: Shan-ChienP'i-P'o-Sha: A Chinese Version by Sanghabhadra of Samantapasiidika, by P.V. Bapat, in collaboration with A. Hirakawa (Poona, 1970); Monastic Discipline for the Buddhist Nuns: An English Translation of the Chinese Text of the Mahasarrtghika-Bhik~ulJl-Vinaya, by A. Hirakawa, in collaboration with Z. Ikuno and P. Groner(Patna, 1982).

In addition to the works cited above, Hirakawa produced other works in a variety of fields that deserve mention. Kusharon sakuin (Index to the Abhidharmako§abha~ya), 3 vols. (1973-1978), which received the Japan Academy Award in 1980, is a work which was painstakingly compiled in collaboration with his students (S. Hirai, S. Takahashi, N. Hakamaya, and G. Y oshizu). This landmark reference work continues to be of great benefit to scholars all over the world.

Furthermore, Hirakawa edited the Bukkyo Kan-bon daijiten (Buddhist Chinese-Sanskrit Dictionary) (1997) which is based on the U. Wogihara and N. Tsuji's Kanyaku-taishO bon-wa daijiten (Sanskrit-Chinese-Japanese Dictionary) (1979), though the planning of this work originally began with a request from the late Professor John Brough. Needless to say it is a useful contribution to the study of Buddhist texts in Chinese translation.

Hirakawa also authored several general surveys, including a two volume work entitled Indo bukkyoshi (A History of Indian Buddhism) (1974, 1979), and Indo-Chugoku-Nihon bukkyo tsushi (A Historical Survey of Indian, Chinese, and Japanese Buddhism) (1977). The first volume of the former has been translated into English (A. Hirakawa, A HistOlY of Indian. Buddhism: From Sakyamuni to Early Mahayana, translated and edited by P. Groner, University of Hawaii Press, 1990). Hirakawa, in addition to the works of primarily academic interest mentioned above, also produced . more than 10 books intended for a more general readership, not to mention the numerous academic articles not included in the Collected W orks_.

IN MEMORIAM: PROFESSOR AKIRA HIRAKAWA 7

Of these, more than a few have been translated into other languages such as Chinese and Korean.

A booklet surnmarizinghis career and listing his work was issued by the Library of the International College for Advanced Buddhist Studies to mark the first anniversary of his death. The College is planning to put out a more thorough version of the same in March 2004, to be published in the Journal of the International College for Advanced Buddhist Studies, Vol. Vll: Akira Hirakawa Memorial Volume.

It should also be said that Hirakawa was a warm-hearted man. He was kind to his students and colleagues, of a humble and friendly disposition, and was loved and respected as both a person and scholar by people all over the world. Upon completing his Collected Works, he remarked that "there still remain many problems, for example that of the basic needs of the Early Buddhist Order (i.e. food, clothing, and shelter), which require further consideration, and I would like to deal with them in future investigations" (preface to Vol. XU). Even in his old age, he never lost his intense passion for discovering and facing new problems, and one cannot help but be struck with wonder and admiration for such boundless dedication. Throughout his writings, when he came across a problem that was beyond the scope of the work on which he was laboring, he sometimes just identified the problem and commented that he would take it up at the next available opportunity. Unfortunately though, we may no longer look forward to such opportunities. It is left to the rest of us now to solve the problems remaining in the Buddhist Studies of Akira Hirakawa.

RELYING ON THE DHARMA AND NOT THE PERSON: REFLECTIONS ON AUTHORITY AND TRANSMISSION

IN BUDDHISM AND BUDDHIST STUDIESl

PAUL HARRISON

Your Royal Highness, venerable members of the Sangha, colleagues, friends. Grandmothers are often fonts of folk: wisdom, and one of the things my grandmother used to say was: Sin in haste, repent at leisure. I always think of this when I sit down at last to write a conference paper, take out the abstract sent off six or eight months previously, and see what I promised in a rash and unguarded moment to do. In this case, I undertook to reflect on the current state and future prospects of Buddhist Studies, on the relations - past, present and future - between the Buddhist Order and the Western university, and on issues of authority and transmission in Buddhism and Buddhist Studies, linking these reflections to the Mahtipaddasutra and the Catul;pratisaralJasutra. So much for what the abstract commits me to, but of course while doing all this I should also avoid the temptation-which increases with age - to pontificate or lay down the law for everybody else, and finally, I might consider myself obliged to satisfy the expectations of those of you who have heard me speak before that I might occasionally say something amusing. I clearly have much to repent, but no more leisure in which to do so.

lt is customary on such occasions as these to assess what is called "the state of the field." Attempts to review the special character and problems of Buddhist Studies as a discipline (or congeries of disciplines) have already been made at previous meetings of our organisation, especially the one held in Mexico City in 1994, and a whole issue of our journal was

I This is the lightly edited text of the plenary address presented at the opening session of the XIIIth Conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies at Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, on 9 December 2002, in the presence of Her Royal Highness Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn, representatives of the Sangha, and members of the Association.


10 PAUL HARRISON

subsequently devoted to publishing the relevant addresses by Professors David Seyfort Ruegg, Luis Gomez, Jose Cabezon ~d others.2 Things would be moving very fast indeed if the field itself had changed to any significant degree since these colleagues surveyed it. However, nobody has been shifting the boundary pegs at night while we all slept, no impious local spirits - to advert to the story of the building of Samye - have been dismantling the entire structure in the dark so that I have to start all over again. There have, of course, been a few interesting developments since 1994 - and I will come to them in due course - but on the occasion of this conference, the first in the new millennium by the Western calendar, and given this particular audience, I want to take a different tack altogether, and reflect on the institutional context of our work, and the ways in which that context influences what we do. For it is true that these previous reflections, useful as they are, generally pay only passing attention to the environment in which we operate, 'and the ways in which it affects our work.3 It is after all not only what we do that is important, but how and particularly where we do it. This is perhaps an unwelcome gambit: we come to conferences like this partly because they enable us temporarily to get away from, even to forget, the contexts in which we work. And even when we are at home, we may not care to spend too much time reflecting on the material circumstances of our lives as scholars. Yet such reflection is entirely appropriate, especially for those of us here who are academics. After all, many of us have taken to emphasising the need to study the physical, material, economic circumstances of Buddhists past and present, the everyday realities of their lives, in contrast to investigating such things as the doctrine, philosophy, logic and other more abstract and theoretical products of elite Buddhist culture, which is partly why, for example, we have seen an efflorescence of Vinaya

2 See especially D. Seyfort Ruegg, "Some Reflections on the Place of Philosophy in the Study of Buddhism," Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (JIABS), Vol. 18, No.2 (1995), pp. 145-181; Luis O. Gomez, "Unspoken Paradigms: Meanderings through the Metaphors of a Field," ibid., pp. 183-230; and Jose Ignacio Cabezon, "Buddhist Studies as a Discipline and the Role of Theory," ibid., pp. 231-268. See also an earlier presidential address by Ruegg, "Some Observations on the Present and Future of Buddhist Studies," JIABS, Vol. 15, No.1 (1992), pp. 104-117.

3 Seyfort Ruegg's 1992 article is an exception.

RELYING ON THE DHARMA AND NOT THE PERSON 11

Studies in our field of late. It is only fair then to turn the same spotlight on ourselves, and examine our lives rather than our texts.

Of course, we are not all inhabitants of academia, university teachers and graduate students. There are in fact two principal groups of people gathered here today, the second being members of the Buddhist Sangha. Thus two great institutions are represented in this room, one, the Sangha, being now almost two and a half thousand years old, the other, the Western university, which began life in Europe around the 12th century, being a comparative novelty, historically speaking. This week, then, we gather together from monastery and campus, united by a common interest in the study of Buddhism, even if we may be divided by our ideas about what Buddhism is. To put it like this involves considerable oversimplification, I admit. Not all Buddhist scholars are academics, nor do all members of the Sangha, in its broadest sense, live in monasteries. Furthermore, there are many who possess dual citizenship, who are both Sangha-members and academics. But you will permit me, I trust, to distinguish the two institutions and their members for the purposes of this lecture. What I want to address today is the way in which they have come together in' the field we know as Buddhist Studies. For it is certainly not the case that the Sangha simply provides academia with its object of study, that being the only connection between them. Far from it.

Earlier this year I spent a term visiting an American university well known for its contributions to Buddhist Studies. In the Department of Asian Languages and Literature at that university, on the door of the photocopying room, next to the mailboxes, where it would have to be seen many times each day, was a large poster from the Office of Student Affairs proclaiming the message: "Honouring and respecting our differences and similarities." This is a small example of the fatuous nonsense circulating in our institutions of higher learning. In this case the entirely reasonable summons to respect other people's differences has been engulfed by such a pious concern for inclusiveness that even their similarities cannot go unhonoured and unrespected. Nobody must be left out, nobody is unworthy of honour and respect, and all must answer the call to provide them, even if it is now meaningless.

Well, although there are many differences between them, the Sangha and academia also share many similarities. Some of these similarities are

12 PAUL HARRISON

what you might call generic. Recently in the contex( of another (as yet unpublished) paper I had occasion to reflect on the 18 ways in which Buddhaghosa in his VisU(ldhimagga says a monastery can be unfavourable to meditation practice, to the development of concentration.4 The 18 features include - to paraphrase Buddhaghosa lightly - too many administrative tasks, frequent distractions from students, constant official meetings (sangha-kamma), too much construction activity, too many people coming and going for their own purposes or wanting things from you (worse, he says, when the place is famous), and the need to deal with fractious or incompatible colleagues. I am not the first person to observe that Buddhaghosa's comments about the monastery apply just as well to the modern university,s indeed I doubt that anybody in this room could read the passage and fail to see the likeness. One could say that all institutions in which people gather to live and work togetlJ,er naturally display certain family resemblances, but I think there is more to it than this, that there are ways in which, because of their special orientation, the monastery and the university campus share particular features not so evident in other institutions, that there is, in short, some kind of deeper connection between their respective enterprises. Given the pedigree of the Western university and its relations with the Church, and the traditional role of the Buddhist monastery in Asia as a major centre of higher learning, this is perhaps hardly surprising.

In the past, these two institutions developed along their separate lines, but more recently, for a century or so, the Sangha has in many ways also been appropriating some of the structural and attitudinal features of Western academia, a process which is seen most clearly in the emergence of Buddhist universities. This is nothing new: it began in Japan about a century ago, and in that country the number of Buddhist universities and colleges is now quite considerable. Many of them have a long history, others have only recently arrived on the scene, so the process is clearly

4 See Ven. Bhikkhu NiiI;lamoIi, trans., The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga) by Bhadantiicariya Buddhaghosa (Seattle: BPS Pariyatti Editions, 1999), pp. 118-121.

5 See, e.g., Florin Deleanu, "A Preliminary Study on Meditation and the Beginnings of Mahayana Buddhism," Annual Report of the International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology, Vol. 3 (1999), p. 84.


ongoing. Sri Lanka saw similar developments about 50 years ago, as did other parts of the Buddhist world. Now the Chinese Sangha - or to be more precise, the Taiwanese Sangha - is entering this phase with especial vigour. Some months ago, for example, Hsi Lai University in Los Angeles announced in the newspapers that its progress towards official accreditation had proceeded to the point where it could offer doctoral degrees.6

This is one example among many. Everywhere the educational operations of the Sangha are appropriating the modes of discourse ofthe Western university. At the same time, growing numbers of Buddhist monks and nuns have been taking degrees at Western universities in Buddhist Studies, and in this way a convergence of approaches has continued to unfold. This is not without its occasional problems, because of different cultural presuppositions and ways of doing things, or divergent understandings of what education and scholarship are about, as any Western academic who has supervised Asian Sangha-members as graduate students can testify. All relationships involve conflict and compromise, these are no different, and in most cases the problems can be worked through.

However, behind all these more day-to-day difficulties looms a bigger systemic problem. The system into which the Sangha has been busily integrating itself is arguably in a state of collapse. The Western university is, if not actually in ruins, to advert to the title of the relevant study by Bill Readings,7 at least in a critical structural condition, to the extent that all of us should now be warning our graduate students that they enter it at their own risk. The problems of the system differ from country to country, but many trends are universal, they are simply mixed in varying proportions. The list includes sinking government funding, rising costs, burgeoning administrative superstructures, rampant managerialism, the

6 Hsi Lai University, located at Hsi Lai Temple in Hacienda Heights, Los Angeles, is part of the educational arm of the Buddha Light International movement, whose base is Foguangshan in Taiwan.

7 The University in Ruins (Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press, 1996). For a more readable and less theoretically overburdened treatment of the same issues, see Cary Nelson & Stephen Watt, Academic Keywords: A Devil's Dictionary for Higher Education (New York and London: Routledge, 1999). The latter work restricts itself largely to the North American situation, but much of the ground it covers will be familiar to those elsewhere.

14 PAUL HARRISON

growth of an all-pervasive accounting mentality, in<;:reasingly intrusive ~urveillance and record-gathering, more intense competition for resources, increasing insistence on "relevance" (however that is defined), and a decline in the morale of the academic profession and of its status in society. The university as we knew it - if we ever really knew it - is disappearing, and scholars as disinterested seekers after truth, motivated only by intellectual curiosity, leading the life of the mind at a leisurely pace with all material needs taken care of, have long since left the building, to be replaced by corporation workers like any other, members of "cost centres" rather than departments or disciplines, monitored and reported on by people ever alert to the ratio of outputs to inputs, and thus continually worried lest the satisfaction ratings provided by their "customers" or "clients" (who used to be called students) drop below 3.5 (or whatever the magic figure is) on the scale, and chronically appre1!ensive about their continuity of employment. Tenure is an island whose surface area is shrinking as the tide of casualisation rises, and at the lower levels tenured academics with a long-term commitment to their institutions are increasingly replaced by mobile staff on fixed-term contracts or by underpaid graduate students whose exploitation is one of the major scandals of higher education. We are all familiar with the general picture. There may be some who have risen so high into the Brahmaloka of academia that they believe the destruction of the system will not affect them, but even though the view from the upper stories can still be quite good, most of us are faced with the effects of all these changes on a daily basis. All this has been well said by other people, so there is no need for me to dwell on it further, even if I can warm to this topic to the point of meltdown. I am not here to give you a tirade on the decline of the university, composed in equal parts of romantic nostalgia and peevish frustration. Such a mixture tastes extremely sour; you would not want to imbibe it. But I do want to reflect on how all this impacts on what we do.

One of the most obvious consequences is that we now have less time for scholarship, to say nothing of the serene and untroubled state of mind necessary for the prolonged periods of intense concentration which certain work requires - as Buddhaghosa was no doubt aware. But since the pressure to raise publication rates grows ever stronger, the result is an increase in quantity accompanied by a decline in quality, and I am sorry


to say that this is as apparent in our field as it is in others.8 Among the many new activities diverting us from what are now known as our "core business operations" of teaching and research, at the upper levels the professor has added fund-raising to the list of tasks needing to be performed. It is no longer a case of protecting disciplinary territory within the institution, as the pie is cut up and shared out: now there is often no pie at all, and professors must forage outside the walls to maintain their disciplines9• Here, in the matter of fund-raising, the linkages between academia and the SaiJ.gha and between Buddhist scholars and Buddhist believers become ever more important, for it is in donations from believers and institutional links with Asian Buddhist groups that Buddhist Studies is finding some of the means to survive in this more competitive environment. The global network of visiting chairs in Buddhist Studies funded by the generosity of Mr Yehan Numata is the most prominent example, but there are many others, including the endowment of positions, the provision of scholarships, the funding of conferences, the subvention of publications, and the underwriting of various projects to digitise the canons, where the generosity of Buddhist donors has been instrumental to the progress of Buddhist Studies in the academic environment. It is perhaps an irony that Buddhist scholars should be required to tum for funding to those whom they study, and, like members of the SaiJ.gha, take to mendicancy. But here one can easily overstate the analogy, since there is no spiritual value ascribed to the process, begging is not embraced as a means to greater humility or to the conquest of pride and egotism, but seen merely as a necessary evil. And we will be seeing a lot more of fund-raising, along with all the other allegedly necessary

8 This decline in quality is also a reflection of specific work practices. Pressure to publish in the world of academia conspires with cost-cutting by publishing houses to produce, courtesy of the use of word-processing technology, books which frequently add little or nothing to our knowledge and understanding of Buddhism. These same books, having been printed from camera-ready copy (yet another burden transferred to the shoulders of academics), betray no sign of an editor's hand, and are therefore often longer than they need to be, and riddled with mistakes.

9 One telling indication of this trend is the announcement by the American Academy of Religion of a summer workshop entitled "The Entrepreneurial Chair: Building and Managing your Department in an Era of Shrinking Resources and Increasing Demands," to be held at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 19-21 June 2003.

16 PAUL HARRISON

evils of maintaining high teaching loads, writing repor:s, generating plans and mission statements, engaging in research assessment exercises, and so on.

We all know that these things are only means to an end, and most of us have a pretty clear idea what that end is, even though, caught up in the interminable planning and the tedious reviewing now deemed necessary for quality assurance (or quality management) in our universities, we might be forgiven sometimes for losing sight of it. What is that end? It is the preservation, generation and transmission of knowledge, in our case about the Buddhist religion, and it is something more than that as well, it is a kind of practice to do with that knowledge. And this is analogous, I would contend, to the purpose of the Sangha, the institutional core of the religion we study, a purpose the Sangha has been pursuing now for almost two and a half millennia: the transmission and reali~ation of the dharma. Its members too have had occasion to reflect on the problems that sometimes arise in pursuing that purpose, and some of these reflections have crystallised into sacred writ. One example of this is the well-known CatuJ}pratisaralJ-asutra, the Sutra of the Four Refuges or Four Reliances, as studied in an important paper by Etienne Lamotte.1O Many of you will be familiar with this short text, which presents guidelines for the interpretation of tradition. It maintains that when assessing teachings which have been passed down, one should rely on four things: on the dharma itself rather than the person (pudgaZa) teaching it, on the meaning (artha) rather than the letter (vyaftjana), on the sutras of explicit or definite meaning (nftiirtha) rather those those which require further interpretation (neyiirtha), and on direct knowledge (jftiina) rather than discursive sensory consciousness (vijftiina).l! Some of these terms are far from

10 See Etienne Lamotte, "La critique d'interpretation dans Ie bouddhlsme," in Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales et Slaves, Vol. 9 (Brussels, 1949), pp. 341-361. This has been translated into English by Sara Boin-Webb as "The Assessment of Textual Interpretation in Buddhism," in Donald S. Lopez, ed., Buddhist Hermeneutics (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988), pp. 11-27. The same material is usefully recapitulated in the more comprehensive survey by Ronald M. Davidson, "An Introduction to the Standards of Scriptural Authenticity in Indian Buddhism," in Robert E. Buswell, ed., Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1990), pp. 291-325.

11 The core of the sutra text, as cited by Yasomitra in his Sphuttirthti Abhidharmakosavytikhyti (ed. Wogihara Unrai, Tokyo, 1932-1936), p. 704, runs as follows:


straightforward, and I have skated over the difficulties with these renditions of them, but in attempting to assess the applicability of these guidelines to the work of academia I will try to pick some of the problems up. First, however, there is a general principle here worth noting, applicable to all the pratisaralJas, which is this: in each pair, one term does not completely cancel out the other, but is accorded priority over it.12

For example, in "the dharma and not the person," it is not that persons are unimportant in teaching, just that they are and should be ultimately secondary to what is taught. Indeed our greatest successes as teachers come from inspiring students to want to emulate us, and in more than just our scholarship, but our primary aim should be to cultivate in them a relationship not with ourselves, but with knowledge, and a passion for it so intense that eventually they surpass us in its pursuit. Our supreme achievement as teachers is to be eclipsed rather than replicated by our students, even though our personal example is hardly unimportant to the process. Yet any standards or values we pass on should lie outside our own persons.

The second pratisaralJa, the primacy of artha over vyafijana, appears to be the easiest to assimilate, used as we are to the distinction between the letter and the spirit, and so may appear to need no further comment. But we should reflect on the importance of the letter before we rush to accord priority to the spirit. One of our hardest tasks as academics is to act as custodians of language, to inculcate in our students a concern for clarity of formulation and elegance of expression. In an increasingly visual culture this becomes ever more difficult, and so the Sangha is not alone in preserving, as it often does, a language which is not the common tongue of the day. I am not here to lament declining standards of spelling, but to observe that if the vyafijana is confused and unclear, the artha is likely to be so as well,u Yet there is no doubt that the meaning, the spirit is primary, and we should be teaching our students - and attempting ourselves

catviirfmiini bhik~ava~ pratisaraT}iini I katamiini catviiri I dharma~ pratisaraT}aJ?l na pudgala~ I artha~ pratisara7JaJ?l na vyaiijanaJ?l1 nftiirthasiltraJ?l pratisaraT}aJ?l na neyiirthaJ?l I jfziinaJ?l pratisaraT}aJ?l na vijiiiinam I.

12 The point is made in Lamotte, "Textual Interpretation," p. 12. 13 So too Lamotte, "Textual Interpretation," p. 14, in noting that though the letter is to

be subordinated to the spirit, it is still important.

18 PAUL HARRISON

- always to go beyond the letter of whatever lan~age we are dealing with, in order to arrive at what is truly meaningful, or what has purpose. Artha in Sanslcrit has many senses, and the sense of purpose, or benefit, is surely in play here (as it is in the treatment of the four reliances in cer-tain Mahayana texts).14· .

The distinction between sutras of definite or explicit meaning (nitiirtha), and those whose meaning is implicit, or needs to be drawn out or interpreted (neyiirtha) is perhaps the most difficult to apply to the academic operation, given its specific and technical reference in Buddhist hermeneutics,15 but at the same time we are familiar enough with the need to read evidence in more than one way and the dangers of an excessive literalism to see how it might be applied to our own work, if only loosely, by analogy. We all need to know what to take seriously, or au pied de la lettre, and what not. Thus while the nftiirthalneyiirthp distinction may appear at first sight to be relevant only to a closed system which maintains an orthodox position and therefore needs to come to terms with pronouncements from authoritative sources ostensibly at odds with that position, it can at the same time be read more generally as a summons to employ a certain degree of hermeneutical sophistication when dealing with so-called authorities. Yet academia supposedly thrives on open-ended interpretation, questioning and doubt, and ought never to privilege clear, unambiguous and definitive statements of truth, since it does not see that there is one truth, or one way of expressing it, to which everything else has somehow to be made to conform. On this point, it seems, the Sangha and academia must part company, or at least agree to differ.

Finally, as for the primacy of direct knowledge over discursive sensory consciousness, jiiiina over vijiiiina, one thing it does do is point up the inadequacy of "consciousness" as a translation for vijiiiina. I take it

14 Indeed, in the restatements of the four pratisaralJas in Mahayana terms found in the Bodhisattvapifakasutra and the Ak~ayamatinirdeSasutra, the formulations of the vyafijanalartha distinction often make no sense unless one understands artha as "purpose" or "intent."

IS See for example David Seyfort Ruegg, "Allusiveness and obliqueness in Buddhist texts: Sa![1dha, sal'{ldhi, sal'{ldhyii and abhisal'{ldhi," in Colette Caillat, ed., Dialectes dans les litteratures indo-aryennes (Paris: College de France, Institut de Civilisation Indienne, 1989), pp. 295-328.


to mean that it is better to have direct knowledge of something, or direct understanding of it, than merely to know about it. For the academic study of Buddhism I think this pratisaral}a is of the essence, in that it reminds us that information about Buddhism, no matter how much we accumulate of it, is no substitute for understanding, for cognition in its strongest sense. This raises a number of thorny questions, not least the contentious insider-outsider issue, which are of general relevance to the entire academic enterprise. Information, after all, can be accessed these days so much more easily, and in vast quantities, through the internet, but what is important is the ability to know what to do with it, which no amount of surfing the web can ever impart. That ability, the ability to think critically, weigh evidence, evaluate arguments, exercise judgement and so on can only be acquired through the kind of training which universities impart, at least when they are doing their job properly. As valuable as they are, we can pile up editions of manuscripts, translations of texts, and ethnographic studies until they reach the height of Mt Sumeru, yet we may still be no closer to understanding Buddhism. For that to happen, scholars need to leave the campus and enter the monastery, in one way or another, they need to look real Buddhists in the eye, otherwise we run the risk of the Buddhology of idealisation, or the Buddhology of contempt, of admiring or deploring an abstraction of our own making.

You see how hard it is after all to avoid the temptation to be prescriptive, but in fact I have merely been taking my cue from the Catu}JpratisaralJasiltra, which is unashamedly so. Its guidelines bear on the transmission and interpretation of a tradition of knowledge, in this case of the dharma, but that dharma, as is well known, is both teaching in the form of text and practical realisation (ddanii and adhigama). This is equally true of Western academia, at least in its .ideal form, in which what is supposed to be transmitted is not information - that is in a sense merely the carrier for something else -but the critical spirit of free inquiry and rigorous intellectual honesty, a species of practice, in short, which needs to be realised in actual experience.

All very well, I hear you thinking, a fine piece of exegetical whimsy, but what about the real world in which this practice unfolds, with all the

20 PAUL HARRISON

stresses and challenges which I mentioned before. Eyen granted that this is our purpose, how is its pursuit affected by the environment in which we are situated? Well, there's no doubt that this environment is having effects on current trends in our field. I've already mentioned some of the less fortunate ones, now it's time to tum to the positive side of the ledger.

Consider, if you will, the smallness of our field. To give you an illustration: by way of experiment, I went through the list of 190 participants posted on the website for this conference and counted 71 people I knew personally, over one third of the total (this doesn't include the people I know who haven't come, who would easily push the figure over the hundred mark). I am sure many of you would arrive at a similar result. We are comparatively few, and scattered all over the globe, even in the most unlikely places, like New Zealand, and it is therefore not surprising that we seek each other out, cultivate relationships with each other, and maintain them assiduously. In this matter of global linkages we are of course encouraged by our institutions, each one of which vaunts its international excellence, excellence being one of the most popular and most meaningless buzzwords of the modem university. In fact, we may not all be excellent, but we are all international, and becoming more so. This can be seen very clearly in the current tendency in our field towards collaborative or group work, with the collaborations or groups in question often spanning national boundaries. There are many reasons for this. One is the fact that it is becoming less likely that a single scholar possesses all the necessary skills and abilities, especially linguistic, required for the kind of work we do, and this is especially true of the philological side of our field, where this trend is most noticeable. Here the death of Jan Willem de Jong in January 2000, shortly after our last conference, marks the passing of an era in the field, since he was in many ways an exemplary figure. To the best of my knowledge, he never collaborated with anyone on any thing. 16 Despite his wide influence, he was sufficient to himself. The multilingual erudition he commanded, however, is increasingly rare, not because of any diminution in natural talent, but because the social and institutional conditions that fostered it and permitted its operation no longer

16 That is to say, in the bibliographies of his writings for the years 1949-1997 published in the H okke bunka kenkyu not a single co-authored piece is listed.


obtain. So we pool our resources, with two; three, or more scholars doing the work that previously one might have done alone. We come as yet nowhere near the'sciences in multi-authored pieces of work, where the list of contributors sometimes seems as long as the paper itself, but 'fie are making a modest start. This is not at all a bad thing, since it enables different perspectives to be brought to bear on the material. Indeed, there is also something very fitting about it, since, as far as Buddhist philology is concerned, the texts we work on were often generated in this way, as group projects. It thus seems appropriate, for example, that the Chinese translations of Buddhist texts, which were produced by teams, should now be studied, edited and translated by teams. In both cases the teams were and are international, providing yet another example of how we mimic the supposed object of our study. We might take a positive view of this trend, emphasising its undoubted benefits, but at the same time it also reflects the globalisation of knowledge and its production, in which scholars are becoming detached from their home bases, able to be deployed anywhere and everywhere. In a casualised academic workforce, this is not always a cause for self-congratulation, nor is the fact that we now move about so much more, as our graduate students often find to their cost.

I expect we will see more such international co-operation, and expect too that increasingly it will bring the Sangha and academia closer together in collaborative undertakings. In a way it provides a solution to the problem of authority in our field, insofar as the agreement by groups of scholars as to what is worthwhile to work on, to devote time and resources to, helps to determine the directions which our work and our field as a whole take. It is perhaps not too far-fetched to derive a lesson from the Mahii

'paddasutra here, that for any tradition to continue, in the absence of a single personal source of authority, it must ideally be sanctioned by a "formally constituted community" and should at the same time be consistent with what has gone before. I? Like the Catu!;pratisarw;asutra, this

17 The Mahiipaddasutra, versions of which are found in the Dfghanikaya, the Aizguttaranikaya and in various other sources, holds that members of the Sangha should accept teachings as authentic if they receive them from one of four great authorities (rnahapadda), namely (1) the Buddha himself, (2) a Sangha of elders, (3) a group of elder monks specialising in the transmission of Dharma (i.e. Satra), Vinaya or Maq-ka (interpreted either as proto-Abhidharma lists or as the Pratirnok~a), or (4) a single elder specialising in the

22 PAUL HARRISON

set of prescriptions is designed for a situation where authority is in dispute, and where there may be serious disagreements about what the dharma actually is. We all know there have been plenty of these in the history of Buddhism. As the Mahiipaddasutra suggests, t:4e values of the tradition cannot be dispensed with, no matter who says so: another way of stressing the primacy of the dharma over the person. 18 But that of course is to set up a standard that may well shift over time. Certainly, what counts as authoritative transmission in Buddhist Studies is now rather more vigorously contested than it used to be. It was much easier to determine in former times, when the philological approach was dominant, and editions and translations of texts could be judged with relative ease as accurate or flawed, good or bad, on the grounds of a scholar's knowledge. of the relevant languages and mastery of the canons of textual criticism. In such circumstances a polymath like de Jongcould set himself up as gatekeeper, and with his reviews determine who was worthy of admission and who was not, like a Buddhological equivalent of Cerberus. Nobody could take his place in that capacity these days, not because of any lack of erudition, but because there are now simply too many gates to guard. The dominance of philology is a thing of the past.

Philology itself, however, is certainly not dead, although reports of its demise regularly corne to our ears. Indeed, there is a continuing need for it, and it is flourishing quite strongly at the moment, stimulated by the discovery during the last decade of large quantities of Buddhist manuscripts in Afghanistan and elsewhere. The interest these fmds generate, judging by the panels at our last conference in Lausanne in 1999 and no doubt at this one, and the capacity audiences they draw, show that research into

transmission of these texts. But teachings heard from any of these authorities should only be accepted if they are also in agreement with the Sutra and Vinaya, i.e., with existing scriptural tradition. For a detailed discussion and references see Etienne Lamotte, "La critique d'authenticite dans Ie bouddhisme," in India Antiqua (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1947), pp. 213-222. An English version, again by Sara Boin-Webb, appears as "The Assessment of Textual Authenticity in Buddhism," in Buddhist Studies Review, Vol. 1, No.1 (1984), pp.4-15.

18 This is accentuated in certain Sanskrit formulations of the text, which add the proviso that received teachings should also be consistent with the way things are (dharmatiirrz ca na vilomayati). Clearly an understanding of the way things are is determined to a large extent by existing tradition. .


Buddhist texts has hardly become a marginal activity. I for one certainly hope that this is not the swansong of Buddhist philology, for even without the newly discovered manuscripts, there is still a great need for this kind of work. So much literature remains unexplored, and so many editions and translations made a century or more ago are still being heavily used, even though they now show clear signs of being seriously deficient and in need of replacement.

But that said, our field is increasingly diverse. Many of us approach our work with methods and theoretical tools drawn from anthropology, sociology, feminist studies, cultural studies, literary theory and so on. And we work in different areas, as can be seen in many of the panels offered at this and previous conferences: Buddhism in the West, environmental issues, gender, ethics (particularly as applied to the tougher moral problems of our age, like euthanasia, abortion, violence and conflict). Such diversity, in a field as small as ours, is admirable. But, as diverse as our methods and areas of interest may be, we should ideally continue to be able to talk to each other, to pool our resources, and make common cause in a much harsher and more materialistic environment where the study of Buddhism, however it is defined or pursued, may be questioned as an unaffordable luxury, and in which it may well become much more difficult to produce scholarship of quality. It will certainly be harder to do so if we do not all help each other to work with the needs of the subject and not the enhancement of our own CVs in mind (dharma, not pudgala), to make meaningful contributions rather than simply swelling the wordcount (artha, not vyafijana), and to foster useful understanding rather than merely amplifying the buzz of information (jfiana, not vijfiana). Try as I might, I am unable to work the nitarthalneyartha distinction in here, but since the Western academic system thrives on drawing things out, on meanings which require interpretation, this is hardly surprising.

In many respects, as I've attempted to show, the world of Buddhist Studies is rather similar to the world it takes as its object of enquiry, and these similarities are far from superficial or accidental. Both the Sangha and academia are decentralised institutions engaged in passing down a tradition and a practice of knowledge, and both are no strangers to internal disagreement about what that knowledge should be (as is indicated in the Sangha's case by the very existence of the texts I've referred to). Both

24 PAUL HARRISON

the Sangha and academia are also institutions susta41ed by the economic surpluses of society, in which people are afforded the leisure and the means to pursue objectives which many outside simply do not understand or see the point of. Monks and nuns, like academics, have throughout the history of Buddhism been regularly denounced as parasites, and have just as enthusiastically been supported by the societies in which they lived. This support could never be guaranteed, it had to be continually renegotiated and carefully cultivated. And yet, despite the unreliable and at times even hostile nature of its social matrix, the Sangha is now halfway through its third millennium, and it is still very much alive. It has changed a great deal during its history, but it remains recognisable. Whether the Western university, faced as it is with similar challenges to its existence, will last as long or as well is not so clear. Its demise is predicted by many, but similar predictions have been made in the past about the decline and disappearance of the Sangha. Somehow we are always in mapp6, the pascimakiila or last days of the Dharma, but somehow the institutions survive, and they survive of course precisely by changing.

Our field too is part of that process of change. As we look forward to the next thousand years, the next century, even the next decade, the opportunities and challenges are unpredictable, and it would be foolish of me to attempt a forecast. It is clear enough, however, that we are engaged in an ongoing relationship and an ongoing conversation, both of which are centred on something which is itself in perpetual flux, Buddhism. But lack of identity does not mean lack of continuity, and hopefully we can continue to negotiate the increasingly closer relationship between academia and the Sangha, and the increasingly diverse conversation about Buddhism, to our mutual benefit, with a sense of the two long traditions which stretch back into the past behind us. In doing so it may not be possible, or even necessary, to honour and respect all our differences and similarities, but it certainly may pay us to know what they are, and even occasionally to rise above them, and look each other in the eye, in mutual recognition.

GLEANINGS FROM A COMPARATIVE READING OF EARLY CANONICAL BUDDHIST AND JAINA TEXTSl

COLETTE CAILLAT

Following many other scholars, it is proposed, in this paper, to consider some parallelisms or similarities, in beliefs and customs, that can be seen to exist in Buddhism and Jainism. Naturally, since the XIXth century, such questions have been investigated more than once2. Nevertheless attention can be drawn to various interesting details that have come to the fore in the last decades, but risk being completely ignored in the present circumstances, when we all are eager to know more concerning the recent discoveries of Buddhist documents, that have been so remarkably presented in 1999, in Lausanne, during the XIIth International Conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, and again in Bangkok, at the XIIIth International Conference.

As far as ancient Buddhism in particular is concerned, Ludwig Alsdorf has emphasised that "C'est ... Ie bouddhisant pour qui la connaissance du jainisme et la comparaison des deux doctrines peuvent etre d'une grande importance ... les memes conditions leur ont donne naissance, elles ont de

1 This is an enlarged version of the presidential address delivered at the 12th International Conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies at Lausanne in August 1999.

2 Cf. among others the survey by Ernst Leumann, Buddha und Mahiivfra. Die beiden indischen Religionsstifter, Miinchen 1922 (Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Buddhismus 6). His student Walther Schubring in tum drew attention to "the consonance with the tipitaka and the anga of the Buddhists" of Mahavlra's teaching, which, in the

. Svetambara canonical texts, is called duviilas'anga ga/;ti-pitjaga, "the basket of the teacher(s) containing 12 Angas", or, more generally, niggantha-piivayalJa (cf. Pali piivacana, the technical name of the Buddha's predication according, in particular, to AggavaIpsa's Pili grammar, cf. Helmer Smith, Saddanfti. La grammaire palie d'Aggavarrzsa IV.l, Lund 1949, p. 1130 § 5.3.3.1). Cf. Schubring" Die Lehre der Jainas. Nach den alten Quellen dargestellt von.", Berlin und Leipzig 1935 (GIAPhA IIL7) / The Doctrine of the Jainas. Described after the old Sources by ... , Translated from the revised Gennan edition by Wolfgang Beuden, Delhi ... 1962) §37 [= Lehre / Doctrine].


26 COLETTE CAILLAT

nombreux traits communs, a ce point qu' on a pris recemment 1'habitude en Inde d' opposer leur civilisation monacale et asc6tique, que l' on qualifie de "sramanique"~ a la civilisation "brahmanique"3. As a matter of fact, the versatile scholar P.S. Jaini, in the Preface to his Collected Papers on Jaina Studies and Collected Papers on Buddhist Studies explains: "Seven papers in the Buddhist Studies volume appear under a sectional heading of Buddhism and Jainism. These are primarily based on Buddhist material but include also a number of Jaina sources. Seven papers in the volume on Jaina Studies are also relevant to Buddhist studies. They demonstrate the interdependent nature of these two traditions and stress the need for exploring them together"4.

Such a comparison is all the more natural as the two spiritual teachers, the Jina Mahavrra and the Buddha Gautama are more or less contemporary - a point that has easily been deduced from the sutras of both their communities, and is regarded as practically certain by scholars including those who, in recent years, have reexamined "The Dating of the Historical Buddha"5. Further, the two Masters stem from neighbouring

3 Les etudes jaina. Etat present et taches futures. Conferences par ... , [Paris] College de France, I?65, p. 3. Alsdorf observed that less attention has been yaid to the Digambara than to the Svetiirnbara church: this is mainly due to the fact that Svetiirnbara documents have been more easily available. Hence, in most cases, the present paper also will mostly refer to the latter (though, thanks to several prominent Digambara scholars' efforts and publications, their achievements are now better known).

4 The preface is almost identical for the two volumes, Delhi 2000, 2001, p. xiv. Compare Jacobi's Preface to his translation of the Ayarailga Sutta (p. viif.): "The insertion of a Jaina text in the publications of the Pilli Text Society will require no justification in the eyes of European scholars. For them all Jaina documents would have an interest of their own, even if they did not throw a light on the times, or the moral and intellectual world, in which Buddha lived. But it is possible that Buddhist subscribers, who aid our labours by their accession to the Pil.li Text Society, and by the interest they show in it, might take umbrage at the intrusion, as it were, of an heretical guest into the company of their sacred Suttas. Yet if they look him attentively in the face, they will fmd there many traces that will interest them strongly, though they may not come to like them. The NigaI,ltha Nataputta was, it is true, an opponent, if not an enemy, of Gotama the Buddha. Still he was one of his contemporaries; and in the writings handed down amongst his successors and followers there are treated many of those questions and topics for which the superior genius of Buddha found the solutions which still form the tenets of the Buddhist Sa~gha in Burma, Siam, and Ceylon ... "

5 Cf. Heinz Bechert (ed.), The Dating of the historical Buddha / Die Datierung des historischen Buddha. Parts 1-3. Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung IV/I-3 (Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Gottingen, Philologisch-Historische Klasse, Dritte

CLEANINGS FROM A COMPARATIVE READING 27

kingdoms and from comparable k~atriya families, at a time when these social groups seem to have developed "an independent world-view ... which was opposed to many brahmanic ideas rooted in ritualistic thinking"6. They moreover appear to have boldly vindicated their rights and status against the brahmanic claims to superiority: both the Buddha and the Jina are regarded as having embodied the "sramanic" ideals, as illustrated in many of their pamphlets, where attacks are repeatedly made against the Vedic animal sacrifice and the violence it involves, as well as against the social hierarchy that is upheld in the brahmanical cast-system: J.q;atriyas and brahmaIfas are contrasted in many Buddhist and Jaina poems with "the true brahmin" and with "the true sacrifice" which is internal and purely spirituaF.

1. Did the J aina attitude towards the brahmanic system even harden at some time? Perhaps this could be deduced from details that, in the Svetambara canonical tradition, surround Mahavfra's prebirth. In an old text, the Ayiiranga-sutta, it is reported how the future Vardhamana "first took the form of an embryo in the womb of Devanandi, wife of the BrahmaIfa ~~abha ... 8 Then ... the compassionate god (Indra), reflecting on what was

Folge, Nr. 189, 194,222), Gottingen 1991, 1992, 1997. Cf. the critical review by D. Seyfort Ruegg, "A new publication on the date and historiography of the Buddha's disease (nirviil}a): a review article" (BSOAS 62.1, 1999, p. 82-87); see the conclusion: "a time frame between 420-350 B.C. emerges as most likely" (p. 86); contra Alex Wayman, Indologica Taurinensia 23-24 (1997-98), p. 205-216, who prefers the "long chronology".

6 Cf. Hans-Peter Schmidt, "Ahirp.sa and Rebirth", in Inside the Texts, Beyond the Texts. New Approaches to the Study o/the Vedas. Edited by Michael Witzel (HOS Opera Minora 2), Cambridge 1997, Department of Sanskrit and Indian Studies, p. 207-234 (p. 219), referring, in particular, to the comprehensive study by Paul Horsch, Die vedische Giithii- und

'Sloka-Literatur, Vorstufen der indischen Seelenwanderungslehre, Asiatische Studien 25, Bern 1971. - But H.-P. Schmidt also points to the necessity of taking into account the multiple aspects of the Vedic culture, and the gradual interiorization of the ritual.

7 Cf., e.g., the 25th and the 12th lessons of the Uttarajjhiiyii, respectively on the "true sacrifice", and on the "mum" HarikeSa, of svapaka descent: the latter has been compared with the PaJi Miitaflga-liitaka (cf. Michihiko Yajima, "A Note on Uttarajjhaya 12 and PaJi Matailga-Jataka", CASS Studies 5, University of Poona, Pune 1980, p. 179-185, ubi alia).

8 In another important canomcal text, it is recorded how MahavIra himself once declared to his chief disciple that his real mother was the briihrnaI)I Devananda: Deviinandii miihal}/ mama ammagii, aharrz l}a,!l Deviil}andiie miihal}fe attae, Viyiihapannatti IX 33 (ed. JAS I p.453.13f.).

28 COLETIE CAILLAT

the established custom (with regard to the birth of TIrthakaras) removed the embryo from the southern brahmanical part of.:. Kundapura to the northern k~atriya part of the same place ... , lodged the fetus in the womb of Trisala..., wife of the K~atriya Siddhartha"9. Another siltra, the lil:wcariya, explains the reason: "the following ... idea" had occurred to Sakra: "It never has happened, nor does it happen, nor will it happen that Arhats ... in the past, present or future should be born in low families ... beggars' families ... or brahmanical families. For indeed, Arhats ... are born in high families, noble families, royal families .. 10". Then he entrusted the task of removing the embryo to "Ha.riJ;legamesi, the divine commander ofthe foot troops", who perfectly executed the orderll. This prebirth episode is unknown to the Jaina Digambara tradition. It is nevertheless famous, for it is represented on a Jaina relief found in Mathura12,

and is often depicted in J aina manuscripts 13 , where Ha.riJ;legamesi is shown on his delicate mission, respectfully bowing to, and transporting Vardhamana's embryo. In any case it is significant of the Jainas' old, lasting and unflinching opposition to the brahmanic hierarchical order.

To a certain extent, this episode has a Bu~dhist counterpart, viz. in the Pali Nidanakathii. While he prepares for his rebirth on earth, and looks for the suitable country, etc., and family in which to be reborn, it occurs to the Great Being that it is unsuitable for Arhants, etc., to be reborn in mean families; but it seems there was no fundamental objection to Buddhas being reborn in brahmaI).a as well as in k~atriya kulas. Nevertheless,'

9 Cf. Ayar II 15, Jacobi's translation, SBE XXII, p. 190; Jacobi's ed. p. 121.23-122.13 (JAS 2.1 §§734 f.): Usabhadattassa miihal)assa ... Deviil)aT[ldiie miihal)fe ... kucchiT[lsi gabbhaT[l vakkante ... - tao l)aT[l ... al)ukampantel)aT[l devel)aT[l jfyaT[l eyaT[l ti kattu ... diihil)a-miihal)a-Kul)tjapura-saT[lnivesiio uttara-khattiya-Kul)tjapura-saT[lnivesaT[l Niitiil)aT[l khattiyiil)aT[l Siddhatthassa khattiyassa Tisaliie khattiyiil)fe ... kucchiT[lsi gabbhaT[l siiharati.

10 Lives ofthelinas, Jacobi's translation, SBE XXII p. 223 ff.; ed. Jacobi §§16 ff.: tae l)aT[l tassa Sakkassa ... ayam eyiiritve ... saT[lkappe samuppajjitthii: Una eyaT[l bhityaT[l, na eyaT[l bhavvaT[l, na eyaT[l bhavissaT[l jaT[l l)aT[l arahantii ... anta-kulesu vii ... bhikkhiigakulesu vii miihal)a-kulesu vii iiyiiiT[lsU vii iiyiiinti vii iiyiiissanti vii. EvaT[l khalu arahantii ... ugga-kulesu vii bhoga-kulesu vii ... riiiTJl)a-kulesu vii ... iiyiiiT[lsU vii 3.

11 Ibidem, §§22-30. 12 Ascribed to the Ku~fu:ta period, cf. V.P. Shah, Studies in laina Art, Banaras 1955,

p.ll (referring to Biihler, EI II, p. 11ff.). 13 Cf. Iyotindra Jain and Eberhard Fischer, laina Iconography I, Leiden 1978 (Icono

graphy of Religions XIII.12), p. 4ff., plate N.


following the general consensus of the time, it is the k~atriya family that is actually chosenl4. Were the Buddhists more conciliatory than the Jainas? Or did they consider the matter to be irrelevant? Be that as it may, there is no doubt that, in the suttas, e.g. the Amba{tha-sutta, the superiority of the khattiyas, that of the Sakka princes in particular, is vividly vindicatedl5 . Thus, by comparing the Buddhist and the Jaina traditions, the modern reader can get a better glimpse of the ancient disputes, and see how they were liable to rise and to subside. Can they ever be extinct? Not long ago, it was observed by a respected Jain scholar that "in Jainism, the Sramm:ta replaces the Brahman in the caste hierarchy, leaving no truly defined station for the latter. The Jina or his mendicant disciple may be called miihalJ-a metaphorically, but he is certainly not a Brahman in the sense of a member of the classical Brabmm:ta varlJ-a" 16.

2. Even comparisons that, at first sight, would seem to be far-fetched might prove helpful in solving some vexed questions. The Jaina doctrine is repeatedly said to be very conservative and to have preserved archaic features - among others the theory of the "colours of the souls", the leSyii (lessii) doctrine17• According to it the souls are supposed to radiate a particular lustre which, in fact, is indicative of their spiritual level. Following its defilement by karman, or, more accurately, by the karmic matter, the soul (jiva) is black (kr~lJ-a), blue (nfla), grey (kiipota), or yellow (pita), lotus-pink (padma), luminous white (sukla) ... , so that six soul-types are

14 Ja I 49 [so read]. 21-25 (quoted in P.S. Jaini, The Jaina Path of Purification, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1979 [= Path], p. 7, n. 9): "Buddha nama vessa-kule va suddakule va na nibbattanti, loka-sammute pana khattiya-kule va brahmal}a-kule va dvfsu yeva kulesu nibbattanti, idani ca khattiya-kulaT(lloka-sammattaT(l, tattha nibbbattissami" ...

15 D I 87-110. 16 P.S. Jaini, "The Pure and the Auspicious in the Jaina Tradition", in Purity and Aus

piciousness in Indian Society, ed. John B. Carman and Frederique A. Marglin, Leiden 1985 (International Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology XLIII), p. 84-93.

Did comparable, albeit different, claims inspire Arnbedkar and those Indians who, in the course of the XXth century, encouraged conversion to Buddhism?

17 Cf. Schubring Lehre / Doctrine §§18; 97; P.S. Jaini, Path, p. 114. On the etymology and meaning of lessa / leiya, Jacobi, SBE 45, p. 196 n. 2; Kyoshu Tsuchihashi, "On the literal meaning of lesya", Indologica Taurinensia XI (1983), p. 195-202. - See, among others, Viyahapannatti I 2 (Deleu p. 76, ubi alia; etc.); Pannaval}a, chapter 17 (JAS 9.1, p. 274-303); Uttarajjhiiya, chapter 34; Tattvarthasutra 2.6, etc.

30 COLETTE CAILLAT

thus defined. This teaching has been scrutinized more than once, and, given the fact that, according to Jainism, karman is a material substance, it has been supposed to reflect "primitive conceptions" 18. On the other hand it has also been remarked that the Jaina theory is not totally isolated: "The notion of several soul-types, each with an identifying color. .. may have been a common belief among various sramaJ]a groups in ancient times" 19.

As a matter of fact, it appears tohave been accepted by the A.jlvikas, who, as stated by the Buddha, distinguish six classes of mankind (abhijati)20. As far as the Jainas are concerned, they, explicitly or implicitly, consider these colours to be either spiritual, psychic (bhava-idya) or material, physical (dravya-Idyafl. The latter are said, in particUlar, to characterize the three / four main categories of gods. Their colours are black, further blue and grey, as far as the groups of infernal deities are concerned, yellow for the luminous divinities of the middle

18 Cf. Schubring, Lehre / Doctrine §18. 19 P.S. Jaini, Path p. 114 n. 26. The colours of the three gUIJas of the Sfu1lkhya natu

rally come to mind; various other comparisons have been suggested, see Willem B. Bollee, Studien zum Siiyagmj.a, Die Jainas und die anderen Weltanschauungen vor der Zeitwende, I, Wiesbaden 1977 (Schriftenreihe des Siidasien-Instituts der Universitat Heidelberg 24), p. 144 ff., ubi alia.

20 See A.L. Basham, History and Doctrines of the A.jfvfkas. A vanished Indian Religion, London 1951, p. 139, 243ff., referring, in particular, to A III 383 f. (Sv I 162). He convincingly concludes: "The Ajrvika system of spiritual colours is a general classification of humanity according to creed or occupation, while that of the Jainas classifies man's psychic development and virtue ... It seems ... probable that the two systems of colour classification are derived from a common body of ideas which was widespread among ascetic groups in the days of the Buddha." According to the Buddhists, the Ajrvikas teach a supremely white group (comprising Nanda Vaccha, Kisa Sarpkicca, Makkhali Gosiila), a white category (containing the Ajrvikas and AjlvikinIs), a green one (the householder clad in white robes, the disciple of the acelakas), a red one (nigaIJthas who wear a single garment), a blue one (bhikkhus who live as thieves, believers in karma), and a black abhijati (whose members live by violence). The Ajlvika enumeration, which refers to the six constituents of the society, appears to partake of both the Jainas' (supra) and the Buddhists' (infra) scheme.

21 Cf. PannavaJJa chapter 17.2 (ed. JAS I p. 279 ff.); further, Viyahapannatti XIl5.3; the notes ad Tattvarthasiitra 4.2, by Sukhlalji and N. Tatia (referring to the Svopajiiatlka).

22 Six distinctive colours are also attributed to the 24 irrtharpkaras: the majority, 14, are golden, 2 are yellow, the 8th and 9th are white, the 6th and 12th are red, the 19th and

CLEANINGS FROM A CO:MPARATlVE READING 31

world, yellow, pink, white as far as the. gods of the upper world are concerned22.

The Buddhists- did not share such a belief in soul-Iesyas, that would evidently have been incompatible with their doctrinal tenets. But they also made use of colours as identifying marks: this is how, in particular, they distinguished the components of the social groups, whether divine or human. In the M ahaparinibbalJa-sutta, the Buddha draws the attention of the monks to the clothes and ornaments of the troup of the Licchavis, whom he describes as being formed of four groups, each characterized by one colour, viz. black, yellow, red, white. He adds that this colourful procession is, on earth, an image of the Tavatirp.sa gods23 . It has been convincingly argued that this fourfold Buddhist division results from the early adaptation to the fourfold varlJa system of the Indian society of a prehistoric Indo-European scheme: India appears to have transformed an older tripartite functional classification, that can similarly be traced in Rome, where such coloured symbolism is also seen to be in use24• In this connexion, it is noteworthy that the Pili commentators specify that the gods' colours are purely symbolic, it is "not their natural colour" (na tesal'fl pakati-valJlJa .. . )25. But these colours serve to distinguish different categories in an organic whole26.

The above set of Jaina leSyas could thus be seen as a sort of synthetical representation, referring both to the metaphysical equality and similarity of all the jfvas, and, at the same time, to the various aspects of the transmigrating jfva, to the complexity of the existent; thus they remind us, ultimately, of the "two fundamental principles of life" taught by the TattvarthaSutra: "that of spiritual and physical symbiosis and that of cause and effect" (through karma)27. To sum up, thanks to the above

21st blue, the 20th and 22nd black, cf. Mrs. Sinclair Stevenson, The Heart of Jainism, Oxford University Press 1915 (Indian edition 1970), p. 312-314; A. Guerinot, La religion djafna. Histoire, Doctrine, Culte, Coutumes, Institutions, Paris 1926, p. 100ff.

23 See D II 96.5ff. 24 Thus, to distinguish those who participate in a race, d. Georges Dumezil, La cour

tisane et les seigneurs colores et autres essais, Paris 1983, p. 17-27. 25 Cf. Sumangalavilasinf, 1096-97, quoted by J.J. Jones, in the notes to his translation

of the Mahiivastu I, London 1949 (PTS, SBB XVI), p. 214 n. 2. 26 For identifying colours in the Epics and Hinduism, see V.M. Bedekar, ABhORI

1968, p. 329-338; W.B. Boilee, ad Suy 2.1, p. 145, ubi alia; T. Goudriaan, Maya divine and human, Delhi [1978], ch. 4, "Bewildering colours".

27 Cf. N. Tatia's Introduction to his translation of TS, p. xix.

32 COLETTE CAllLAT

"sramaJ.la" records, the modern reader can get a glimpse of an antique ideology and of old mental tools and methods28 •

3. Considerable signifiCance being attached, in ancient India, to behaviour and discipline, it is not surprising that conduct has been, and remains, of vital concern in Buddhism29. The subject has naturally led to numerous comparisons between Buddhism and Jainism, and between the latters' monastic laws and certain prescriptions formulated in the early Brahmanic literatures, e.g. concerning "non injury": H.-P. Schmidt recalls how "the renouncer (sannyiisin) or wandering ascetic (pravriijaka, parivriijaka) is subjected to the strictest rules of ahif!1sii", how "rules similar to those for the sannyiisin apply to the viinaprastha, the hermit in the forest"3o. But these prescriptions concern individuals and definite circumstances, not a whole, well organized, community. On the contrary, at an early age, the Buddha and the Jina succeeded in bringing their followers together and organizing comparative large, long lasting saf!1ghas, united by clear codes of conduct. So doing, they naturally borrowed various rules and models accepted in the Indian society, viz. those that had been set by the Brahmanic ascetics, as demonstrated more than a century ago: H. Jacobi recalled how "Professor Weber has pointed out the near relation existing betweeen the five great vows of the Jainas and the five cardinal sins and virtues of the Buddhists; and Professor Windisch has compared the Jaina vows (mahavrata) with the ten obligations of the Buddhists (dasasil)"; on the other hand Jacobi emphasized that "it can be shown however, that neither the Buddhists nor the Jainas have in this regard any claim to originality, but that both have only adopted the five vows of the Brahmanic ascetics (sa.I!IDyasin)"31. Such is the general situation; nevertheless it is remarkable that the Buddha and the Jina did

28 Compare, e.g., the similar composition of two canonical treatises, following the increasing number of topics, the Buddhist AnguttaraNikiiya, and, among the Svetfunbaras, the ThiiIJanga (in fact a common composition device, cf. that of a Saiva manual edited by Bruno Dagens, Le florilege de fa doctrine §ivai"te - Saiwigama-paribhCi:jlimafijarf de Vedajfiiina, edition critique, traduction et notes, PondicMry 1979).

29 As testified by several papers presented in the 1999 Lausanne Conference. 30 H.-P. Schmidt, 1. c. p. 210. 31 H. Jacobi, SBE XXII, p. xxii f., ubi alia; quoted in O. von Hiniiber, A Handbookof

Piili Literature, Berlin New York 1996 (Indian Philology and South Asian Studies 2


succeed in their organizing efforts. At the same time, the fact should not be minimized that an important process of methodical reflexion and redaction took place in both communities, resulting, in particular, in the composition of the Buddhist Pratimok~a (included in the Pali Vinaya)32, and, as far as the Jainas are concerned, of the Svetambara Chedasfitras.

The formation of the Theravada Patimokkhasutta has recently been minutely investigated, and it has been shown how inherited material has been fundamentally reshaped and formulated anew, so as to result in a rationally and aesthetically well balanced law code33. In his essay Das Patimokkhasutta der Theravadin, O. von Hiniiber develops the views he had already expressed in A Handbook of Pali Literature, and shows how "the legal structure of the Patimokkha is quite obvious. The rules are arranged in such a way that the severest offenses are named first and the lightest. .. are placed at the end. The textual structure, on the other hand, shows that the Patimokkha must have developed over a certain period before it was shaped by some redactor(s) to its present form"34.

As far as the Jainas are concerned, they have elaborated a list of ten, or nine, atonements (payacchittas, prayascittas)35 that include, apart from

[= Handbook] §18, with notes. - As far as MahavIra is concerned, he is regarded as having accepted, completed and perfected, the rules set by his predecessor (infra).

32 As is well known, the Pili Patimokkha "is a set of 227 rules for bhikkhus and 311 for bhikkhunfs", K.R. Norman, Piili Literature. Including the Canonical Literature in Prakrit and Sanskrit of all the Hfnayiina Schools of Buddhism, Wiesbaden 1983 (A History of Indian Literature. Edited by Jan Gonda VII 2), p. 18. Also see The Piirimokkha.227 Fundamental Rules of a Bhikkhu, with Introduction by Phra Sasana SobhaJ.la (Suva<;l<;lhano). Translation of the PaIi by Ven. Nal).amoli Thera, Bangkok 2535/1992.

33 Cf., recently, o. von Hintiber, Handbook §§15-21; Idem, Das Piitimokkhasutta der Theraviidin. Seine Gestalt und Entstehungsgeschichte. Studien zur Literatur des TheravadaBuddhismus IT. Stuttgart 1999 [=Piitimokkhasutta]; Idem, "Nochmals tiber das Patimokkhasutta. Anmerkungen zu K. Klaus: "Zur Entstehung des Patimokkhasutta der Theravadin", WZKS XLV (2001), p. 41-58.

34 Cf. o. von Hintiber, Handbook §18; and the table, in von Hintiber's Piitimokkhasutta, p. llf.; also Norman, I.c. p. 18f.: 1. piiriijika ("Defeat", 4 rules), 2. sarrzghlidisesa ("Formal meeting", 13 rules), 3. aniyata ("Undetermined", 2), 4. nissaggiya-piicittiya ("Forfeiture", 30), 5. suddhika-p. ("Expiation", 92 rules), 6. piiridesanfya. ("Confession", 4 rules), 7. sekhiya ("Training", 75 rules), adhikarm;a-samatha ("Legal questions", 7 rules).

35 Cf. Uttarajjhiiya 30.31: payacchittarrz tu dasaviharrz; Uvaviiiya (ed. E. Leumann) § 30; cf. also the DigambaraMalacara 5. 164f. (10 payacchittas: payacchittarrz ti ... dasaviharrz tu); but TattviirthaSatra 9.2lf. (9 priiyascittas).

34 COLETTE CAILLAT

(1-2) "confession" and repentance (aloymyi, a/ocana; paejikkamalJ-a, pratikramalJ-a), etc., such sanctions as (6) ascetic exerCises (tava, tapas)36, further (7-8) partial or radical suppression of religious seniority (cheya, cheda; mUla), ultimateiy (9-10) demotion and total exclusion from the sarp.gha (alJ-avatthappa, anavasthapya; paraficiya, paraficiya). The latter has naturally been compared with the Buddhist parajika37 • On the other hand, the Jainas, besides the Ayaraliga-sutta (the ftrst sfitra of the fust section of the Svetfunbara canon) that teaches right conduct, have devoted a section of their canon to the enumeration of the faults and expiations possibly incurred by the monks and nuns: the name, Cheyasutta (Chedasutra), apparently borrows that of the seventh prayascitta (supra). This section includes seven treatises, traditionally referred to as the Dasa-KappaVavaMra. Thus this ancient threefold dvandva refers (i) to the ancient "Ten (books)", the last of which, the PajjosavalJ-a-kappa (or Samayari) collects prescriptions for the right monastic conduct during the rainy season. The above dvandva further refers to the two important sfitras concerned (ii) with the "Rules"(kappa, Sk. kalpa) prescribed for the lives of the monks and nuns (niggantha [nirgranthaj, nigganthl; also bhikkhu; infra), and (iii) with the "Procedures" (vavaMra, Sk. vyavaMra). The fust twenty sfitras of the latter also feature in the twentieth and last chapter of the next Cheyasutta, the Nislha-sutta38 • Viewed as a Cheyasutta, the Nis seems more or less to aim at a systematic and comprehensive reorganization and continuation of the Kappa-Vavahara codes39 . But, according

36 In the Svetambara tradition, tava, tapas (often interpreted as "fasting"), appears to have replaced the so-called parihiira: the latter, that is prescribed in the Kappa- and Vavahiira-suttas, consisted in the temporary isolation from the sal'{lgha (infra). The Digambara list reads: ... tava chedo mUlal'{l pi ya parihiiro c'eva saddahaJpi, Muiiiciira S.16S; TS 9.22: tapas-cheda-parihiiropasthiipaniini.

37 Already by Sylvain Levi, "Observations sur une langue precanonique du bouddhisme", JA 12.2 (1912), p. 49S-S14 (p. S03ff.). - On the piiriijika, cf. infra.

38 On this title, see W. Schubring, Doctrine §S1, Vav p. 9 « niseha, "prohibition" x nislhiyii, "place for study").

39 On the composition of the Nis, Doctrine §Sl, Drei Chedasutras p. 92. Like K-Vav, it is concerned with the parihiira. It offers lists of transgressions and sanctions reaching successively from one to six months, liable to be reduced or not: uddesa 1, 1 month with no reduction; udd. 2-S, 1 month, liable to be reduced; udd. 6-11,4 months, no reduction; udd. 12-19, 4 months, liable to be reduced udd.20: up to 6 months. - According to Schubring, though apparently well balanced, the detail of the Nis is chaotic!


to the Svetfunbara tTadition, the Nis, before being an independant treatise, had served as the last "appendix" (cilIa) of the Ayarangasutta (supra)40. To conclude, there can be little doubt that the Cheyasutta section of the Canon has been submitted to a deliberate, protracted, process of remodelling41 . But, whereas the Buddhist Pratimok~a fInally appears as defmitely well planned, the Jaina Chedasiltras are seen, so to say, as still in the process of rearrangement. .

In this matter the Buddhists' approach appears to have been much bolder than that of most of their contemporaries. Indeed, the example had been set by the Buddha who, having experienced, and discarded, the ways of the practitioners of meditation as well as ascetic training, had attained the Bodhi all by himself, had discovered the "Four Noble Truths" and taught the "Noble eightfold Path" which avoids the extremes of pleasure and selftorture. Though more conservative, MahavIra nevertheless can also be regarded as a successful reformer and organizer: having fIrst accepted the dharma preached by his predecessor Parsva, that was characterized by four restraints42, he soon replaced it by the "dharma of the five great vows, with <confession and> repentance included" , or "including meditation "43, thus insisting on the ethical and spiritual aspect of his message. Assuredly, it is not to be denied that, in contradistinction to the Buddha's "Middle Path", the Jina's dharma lays more emphasis on the benefits to be derived from asceticism44, but it should be kept in mind that tavo, tapas, in Jainism, is said to be twofold, both external and internal. The latter includes expiations, good behaviour, service to others, study, meditation, abandonment (of all activity, so as to remain in a motionless position and meditate)45.

40 On this restructuring, cf. Jacobi, SBE XXII, p. L; Schubring, Vay p. 8. 41 Schubring also notes how, in the K / Vay, the niggantha- and bhikkhu-suttas tend

to be specialized in different subjects, Vay p. 5ff. 42 All Trrthmpkaras, except the 1st and 24th ones, are said to haye preached the caujjama

dharnrna, Thfu.! §§ 266, 692; Doctrine §16. - For a different interpretation, P.S. Jaini, Path, p. 17, ubi alia.

43 It is known as the paiica-rnahavvaiya sa-parjikkarnal}a dharnrna, cf. Doctrine § 16; Viy XX 8; JAS ed. p. 877; Deleu p. 256; or sa-bhiival}a dharnrna, Thfu.! § 693.

44 Cf. E. Leumann, Buddha und Mahiivfra, passim, opposing their names (p. 17ff.), their goals and means ("Askese und Samyak", p. 22ff.), etc.

45 Cf. Doctrine §179, ubi alia; see the lists, in Ernst Leumann, Das Aupapatika Sutra, Leipzig 1883 (AKM 8.2), p. 40ff.: payacchitta, vil}aya, veyavacca, sajjhiiya, jhiil}a, viu/ossagga.

36 COLETTE CAILLAT

4. The Jaina Smpgha has always been fourfold, being composed of lay men and women, and of companies of ascetics, either men or women. The ascetics were to be totally "free from all ties", whether external or internal, and hence were technically caned ni( g)gantha, ni( g)ganthl in Prakrit, nirgrantha, -I in Sanskrit. They are also named bhikkhu, bhikkhw}1 (cf. Pali bhikkhu, bhikkhunf). But, unlike the early Theravada Buddhists, the Jainas composed no special section for their nuns in their canonical law books - though, naturally, some rules were completed, or added with the bhikkhw}-ls in vie~. On the other hand, though in religion as in society women are always dependent, their presence seems to have been readily accepted at least in the Svetambara Sarp.gha, where they have always been, and still are, by far in the majority47. The Svetambaras even consider that the 19th Trrtharpkara, Malli, was a woman48• The Digambaras, though, were not as tolerant49•

In religion, the general rule for the Buddhists and Jainas is to live as members of a given group (the gafJa or gaccha of the Jainas). But the old Svetambara disciplinary texts mention exceptions (whether momentary or definitive) that are sporadically alluded to or discussed in the

46 Concerning the Buddhists, cf. U. Hiisken, "Die Legende von der Einrichtung des buddhistischen Nonnenordens im Vinaya-Pitaka der Theravadin" (ubi alia), Studien zur Indologie und Buddhismuskunde, Festgabe des Seminars fur Indologie und Buddhismuskunde fur Professor Bechert, hrsg. von R. Griinendahl, J.-U. Hartman, P. Kieffer-Pillz, Bonn 1993 (Indica et Tibetica 22); Idem, Die Vorschriften for die buddhistische Nonnengemeinde im Vinaya-Pi{aka der Theraviidin, Berlin 1997 (Monographien zur indischen Archaologie, Kunst und Philologie 11). - It has been suggested that the Buddha's hesitation concerning the ordination of women was not due to personal reluctance, as he was broad-minded, but to the desire not to hurt the feelings of his contemporaries, not to go against the normally accepted behaviour. Nuns in early Buddhism have recently been the subject of several papers, e.g. by Peter Skilling, also in recent issue of nABS, 24.2 (2001), an issue precisely on "Buddhist Nuns".

47 Doctrine §20, ubi alia, in particular Viy IX 33, concerning the conversion of Devananda, who is entrusted to Ajja-CandaI).a. - The Jaina tradition mentions no episode comparable to MahaprajapatI's request to be ordained as a nun, and the rebuff she and her companions first had to suffer from the Buddha. Or is it significant that the frrst Jaina schism is ascribed to Jarnali, the husband of Mahavrra's daughter?

48 With this belief compare the story of "Gautarna's last Female Incarnation", cf. the two articles by P.S. Jaini, reproduced in his Collected Papers on Buddhist Studies, Delhi 2001, chapters 22, 23. - The above data would tend to show that the position of women has been a disputed subject, at least in srarnanic circles, cf. Doctrine § 16.

49 Cf. P.S. Jaini, Path, p. 39f., on the position of women, one of the "Points of Controversy between the Two Major Sects".


corresponding commentaries. Exceptionally, some religious are seen to be. "apart from the flock", or "indifferent towards it"5o. In such cases, they are mentioned under three headings: the jinakalpikas (Amg. jilJakappiya), the parihiira-visuddhikas (Amg. parihiirakappa-tthiya), the yathiilanda-(pratimii-)kalpikas (Amg. ahiilandiya). Following the observance called yathiilanda-pratimii (which is particularly obsolete), the niggantha imposes upon himself, among other things, time limits: hls quest in one particular area must not exceed five days. If submitted to the parihiira-kappa penance, he lives, for a limited time (theoretically from one to six months) separated from his gaccha: he is gaccha-niggaya, niravekkha51 • As for the jilJakappiyas I jinakalpikas, they conform to Mahiivrra's standards, as recorded in the accounts of his last years 52.

According to this "rule" (kalpa), ascetics go about naked, .have no baggage, observe severe penances, and, in particular they stay apart from the galJa and are constantly alone. This description reminds us of the Pratyeka-Buddhas, mentioned in Jainism as well as in Buddhism53 . It also reminds us of the ascetic behaviour known thanks to the famous Buddhist poem that extolls the khaqga-vi!fiilJa-kalpa. Transmitted in several Buddhist traditions, whether in Pali54, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit or Gandhari Prakrit, it "espouses the virtues of solitude"55. The meaning of the compound has been abundantly discussed, and the refrain in which it is used (pali: eko care khaggavisiilJa-kappo) has been variously translated: "one should wander alone like the rhinoceros" or "one should wander

50 Ardhamagadhi gaccha-niggaya, niravekkha, cf. Caillat, Expiations, p. 52ff. [cf. n. 62].

51 Cf. Expiations, p. 52f.; p. 171ff. 52 Especially as summarized in Ayiiranga 1, Uvahiir;a-suyaT[!, "The Pillow of Right

eousness" (Jacobi), "Die Uberlieferung vom Fasten" (Schubring). 53 Cf. the four Pratyekabuddhas in the Pilii Jiitaka III 381.16*f., and in the Jaina Uttara

jjhiiyii 18.46 (cf. Jacobi, Ausgewiihlte Erziihlungen in Miihiirii-rtrf, 1886, p. 34): Karakar;cji1 Kalingesu Paftciilesu ya Dummuho / Namf riiyii Videhesu Gandhiiresu ya Naggal.

54 Sn 35-75. 55 Solitude is also praised in many other passages, e.g. in the Thera- and Therf-giithiis,

cf. Th 6, 31, 41, etc.; 49: na me taT[! phandati cittaT[!, ekatta-nirataT[! hi me, "Amidst the ... cries of the birds, this mind of mine does not waver, for devotion to solitude is mine" (translation K.R. Norman). - Also compare the "arar;ya-dwellers" (examined by Sasaki Shizuda at the XIIIth Bangkok IABS Conference, December 2002, quoting a number of previous studies).

38 COLETTE CAILLAT

alone like the rhinoceros horn" .. 56. Though the Pali commentaries understand -kappa as meaning csadisa, "like", an explanation that seems to have been often accepted, it would seem preferable, considering the above Jaina testimony, to retain the full meaning of the substantive kappa, kalpa, "usage, practice" (ifc.: "following the regulations or rule")57, thus, for kha4ga-vi~iil}a-kalpa, "following the habits of the rhinoceros"58. Such an animal comparison is not surprising in India, and would not be exceptional in a Buddhist context59 : the fifth stanza of the same "Rhinoceros Sutra" compares "an understanding man" with "a deer which is not tied up" and "goes wherever it wishes in the forest for pasture"60; and the Dhammapada recommends, "if one does not find a zealous companion ... , one should wander alone like a matailga naga elephant in the forest,,61. As for the Jainas, the commentaries of some Chedasutras liken

56 For the references to, and summaries of the numerous discussions on the meaning of the compound, see K.R. Norman, "Solitary as Rhinoceros Hom", Buddhist Studies Review 13.2 (1996), p. 133-142; Richard Salomon, A Gandhiirf Version of the Rhinoceros Sutra. British Library Kharo~thI Fragment 5B, Seattle and London 2000. Concerning "the Meaning of Khagga-visa'.la I Kha4ga-vi~a'.la", p. lOff., he decides "not entirely without doubts, to understand the primary sense of the refrain of the verses of the G1indhiirI text, eko care khargavi~a'.lagapo as 'one should wander alone like the rhinoceros', with the proviso that the other possible sense, 'one should wander alone like the rhinoceros hom,' is by no means ruled out and in fact may have been understood to be equally and simultaneously valid" (p. 14). - For the association of the Rhinoceros Siitra with the Pratyeka-Buddhas, or "solitary enlightened ones", Idem, ibidem, p. 8, ubi alia.

57 Cf. M. Cone, A Dictionary of Pali, S.v., 2.(i) (m.) a rule, ... a practice; CPD III, s.v. 4kappa, m., usage, praCtice; also 7kappa, mfn. following the regulations or rules (of a religious community).

58 Salomon (p. 11) refers to Norman's comparison of the Pali simile with a prose passage of the J aina Kalpa-sutra (Jacobi's "Jinacaritra" edition § 118): khaggi-visa'.laJ?1 [ sic] va ega-jae (i.e. [Jacobi's translation], "single and alone like the hom of a rhinoceros"), "where the neuter form" -visa'.laJ?1 "proves that it means 'rhinoceros hom' and not 'rhinoceros'''. But, in the Jinacaritra, the prose passage is followed by a summary in the arya metre (even pada): vihage khagge ya bharuJ?14e ("a bird, a rhinoceros, and BharuI).Qa", Jacobi's translation) which would tend to show that the comparison is with the animal (or both?).

59 Cf. the siJ?1ha-nada, or lion's roar of the Buddha, etc. Also see Jeannine Auboyer, Le trone et son symbolisme, quoting Jean Przyluski, on "Le symbolisme du pilier de Sarnath", p. 488. - C. Rhys-Davids, "Similes in the Nikayas", JPTS p. 52-151.

60 Sn 39 (K.R. Norman's translation): migo arafzfzamhi yathii abaddho I yen' icchakarrz gacchati gocaraya, I vifziiu naro... .

61 Dhp 329 (K.R.Norman's translation): no ce labetha nipakaJ?1 sahayaJ?1 I ... eko.care matang' araiifze va nago = Ja III 488.20ff.


the young bhik~u to the m[ga, the more senior monk to the vuabha, the master to the sif!lha: these comparisons are conspicuous in the ritual of confession62•

5. Confession plays an essential role in Jainism as well as in Buddhism63 •

According to the old Jaina disciplinary books, it leads the transgressor from the avowal to the expiation of the fault. The process includes: (I) the declaration of the fault, (2) the repentance, (3) the gUilt which he feels in his own conscience, (4) his self-reproach in the presence of the guru, (5) the repudiation of the sin, (6) the total purification, (7) the finn purpose of amendment, (8) the performance of the appropriate atonement64• According to a later text, one has to remove all "darts" (sal/a, satya) or unconfessed faults in order to acquire superior knowledge and supreme perfection65•

Similarly, in several passages of the Vinaya concerning lay or religious trangressors, it is underlined that confession will result in spiritual progress: "in the discipline of the noble, this is growth: whoever having seen a transgression as a transgression, confesses it according to the rule, he attains restraint in the future", vut/,ghi h' esa ... ariyassa vinaye yo accayaf!l accayato disva yatha-dhammaf!l patikaroti ayatif!l saf!lvaraf!l apajjatfti66 • The appropriate behaviour of the CUlprit is detailed e.g. in the development concerning Pacittiya VI: the lay follower, "saluting the

62 For references, cf. S.B. Deo, History of Jaina Monachism, Poona 1956 (Deccan College Dissertation Series 17), p. 226; Colette Caillat, Les Expiations dans Ie rituel ancien des religieux jaina, Paris 1965 (Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne 25) [= Expiations. Revised English edition: Atonements in the Ancient Ritual of the Jaina Monks, Ahmedabad 1975 (L.D. Series 49)], p. 31, 47, 15U., ubi alia.

63 For I. Duncan M. Derrett's views on "Confession in Early Buddhism", cf. Bauddhavidyasudhiikara/:t, Studies in Honour of Heinz Bechert on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday, edited by P. Kieffer-Ptilz und I.-U. Hartmann, Swisstal-Odendorf 1997 (Indica et Tibetica 30), p. 55-62. Reference could also be made to the recent book by Kuo Li-ying, Confession et contrition dans Ie bouddhisme chinois du Ve au Xe siecie, Paris 1994 (EFEO, Monographies n° 170).

64 Kappasutta 4.25; Vavahiirasutta 1.35: bhikkha ya annayara7[l akicca-tthiilJa7[l sevitta icchejja aloettae, ... aloejja paejikkamejja nindejja garahejja viu{{ejja visohejja akaralJayae abbhutthejja ahii'riha7[l tavo-kam'ma7[l payacchitta'rz paejivajjejja. Cf. Caillat, Expiations, p.136f.

65 Mahiinisfhasutta 1.16. 66 Yin I 315.18ff. = II 126.18ff. = 192. 20ff. (Translation I.B. Homer).

40 COLETTE CAILLAT

feet of the venerable Anuruddha with her head, spoke thus to the venerable Anuruddha: 'Honoured sir, a transgression has overcome me, in that I acted thus, foolish, misguided, wrong that I was. Honoured sir, let the master, acknowledge fot me the transgression as a transgression for the sake of restraint in the future,,67. Such assertions can be compared with the conclusive sentence of the text introducing the "recitation of the Rule", according to Venerable Nfu:1amoli' s text and translation of the Patimokkha: "false speech in full awareness has been pronounced by the Exalted One to be a thing obstructive (to progress); therefore any actual (undeclared) fault should be declared by a bhikkhu who remembers to have committed it and who looks for purification. To have declared it is for his good", sampajiina-musiiviido kho . .. antariiyiko dhammo vutto bhagavatii. Tasmii saramiinena bhikkhunii iipannena visuddhapekkhena santi iipatti iivikatabbii, avikatii hi'ssa phiisu hoti68 • In this conclusive phrase, the adjective phiisu, a Middle Indo-Aryan derivative related to Pali phasseti (Sk. sparSayati), "to cause to touch, bring into contact", "to touch", retains its full meaning: it indicates the transformation of the fault which, thanks to the avowal, has become exactitude, truth, hence reaches, and leads to (the spiritual goal)69.

Such an asseveration is best understood in the light of the historical and prehistorical confession doctrine. The latter has been reexamined recently by Calvert Watkins 70, who refers to Indo-European data, several Vedic passages (and Sylvain Levi's remarks on the subject71): "by the verbal act ... of confession the sin itself becomes exactitude, reality, truth: Vedic

67 Vin IV 18. 32ff. (translation I.E. Homer): ... ayasmato Anuruddhassa padesu sirasa nipatitva ayasmantaf!1. Anuruddhaf!1. etad avoca: accayo maf!1. bhante accagama yatka balaf!1. yatka mulhaf!1. yatka akusalaf!1. ydhal?! evam akasif!1..

68 The Pafimokkha. 227 Fundamental Rules of a Bhikkhu ... Translation of the Pali by Ven. Nfu:1amoli Thera, Bangkok 2535/1992, p. 66f. cf. Vin 1103.8-11.

69 Cf. Journal Asiatique 1960, p. 41-55; K.R. Norman, Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda XI (1962), p. 32-34.

70 Calvert Watkins, "On Confession in Slavic and Indo-European", in Calvert Watkins, Selected Writings, ed. Lisi Oliver, Innsbruck (lnnsbriicker Beitrage zur Sprachwissenschaft, Bd. 80), 1994, IT p. 602-621 (first published in Studies in Honor of Horace G. Lunt, ed. by E. Scatton et al., Folia S1avica 2.1-3, Columbus (Ohio) 1978, p. 340-359).

71 Sylvain Levi, La doctrine du sacrifice dans les BrdhmaiJas, Paris 1898 (2eme edition 1966), p. 158, quoted by C. Watkins: "L'aveu retablit les faits; il ne rep are pas moralement la faute, ilIa fait dispara'itre, en effet, puisque l' acte et la parole sont des lors conformes".


satyam", "the acknowledged existence of the transgression reestablishes exactitude, reality, truth"n.

Further, Watkins emphasizes that confession is intimately bound up with the 'Act of Truth' (Sanskrit * satyakriya) 73. Examples of the latter in Buddhist literature have been recently examined in a study that shows the vitality of this belief in Buddhism, in any case if one is to judge by the many occurrences quoted especially (though not exclusively) from Pali texts74. The formulated Truth, conjuring up, as it does, an essential character of the performer, has an infallible issue. Similarly, an essential lie will entail the direst consequences. Both situations (first the negative, then the positive one) are enacted in the 12th lecture of the Svetambara UttaraJJhiiya. The hero is Harikesa Bala,

"(1) born in a family of svapakas; he became a monk and a sage, ... who had subdued his senses.

(3) Once on his begging tour, he approached the enclosure of a Brah-manical sacrifice ...

(7) 'Who are you, you monster? .. go, get away ... ' (8) At this turn, (a) Yak~a... spoke the following words: (9) 'I am a chaste sramaI).a ... 1 have no property ... and do not cook my

food. 1 have come for food ... (10) 1 subsist by begging; let the ascetic get what is left of the rest ... ' (11) - 'We shall not give you such food and drink ... (16) This food and drink should rather rot, than we should give it you,

Nirgrantha. (18) Are here ... no teachers with their disciples, who will beat him ... and

drive him off?' (19) On these words of the teachers, many ... rushed forward, and they

all beat the sage with sticks, canes, and whips.

72 Cf. C. Watkins, ibid., p. 613, 617; p. 616 notes "the efficacy of the act of confession in ancient India".

73 Ibidem, p. 614. 74 Toru YAGI, "Once again on the Forms of Oath in Classical India (Ill): in Connec

tion with saccakiriya-", Bulletin of the Cultural and Natural Sciences in Osaka Gakuin University, Nos. 43-44, Osaka, December 2001, p. 47-90 (ubi alia); p. 59ff.: "(II. Three types of the Act of Truth)"; p. 60, "the asseveration of truth". Also see Michael Witzel, "The case of the shattered head", in Festschrift Wilhelm Rau, Studien zur lndologie und Iranistik 13/14 (1987), p. 363-415, ubi alia (see p. 383 n. 39; 41Of.).

42 COLETTE CAILLAT

(20) At that turn king Kausalika's daughter, Bhaqra, ... appeased the angry youngsters.

(21) 'He is the very man to whom the king ... had given me, but who ... has refused me.

(22) He is that austere ascetic, of noble nature, who subdues his senses and controls himself.'

(25) Appearing in the air ... the Asuras beat the people. When Bhadra saw them with rent bodies, spitting blood, she spoke again thus:

(26) 'You may as well dig rocks with your nails ... as treat contemptuously a bhikkhu ...

(28) Prostrate yourself before him for protection ... if you want to save your life and your property ... ' "75

It will have been observed that the situation brought about by the brahrnins who made false statements concerning Harikesa is reversed thanks to the intervention of a witness, who, moreover, is intitled to make a *satyakriyii. By uttering a superior (! metaphysical, ultimate, eternal) truth, she contributes to the restoration of the right order of the society and of the world (she restores [ta).

Similarly, according to the Buddhists, because Devadatta pretends to be, or tries to be considered as, the supreme sage, superior to the Buddha, he signs his death sentence, that will be executed some way or other: blood spurts from the apertures of his face, etc76• The Buddha himself, when he dismisses some brahrnaI).as' claim to a status superior to the

75 Uttarajjhaya 12, Jacobi's translation. For philological remarks and corrections (inserted infra), see L. Alsdorl, IIJ 6 (1962), p. 128-133 (=Kleine Schriften, ed. A. Wez1er, Wiesbaden 1974, Glasenapp-Stiftung 10, p. 243-248):

Hariesabalo nama asi bhikkhuji'indiyo (1) II 'samalJo aharrz sarrzjao bambhayarzvirao ... I annassa atthti iha-m-agao mi (9) II ... sesavasesarrzlabhau tavassf' (10) II 'na u vayarrz erisam anna-palJarrz I dtihtimu tujjharrz (11) II ke ettha ... I eyarrz khu dalJq.elJa phalelJa hanta ... khalejja jo lJarrz?' (18) II ... tattha bahU kumara I dalJq.ehi vittehi kasehi c' eva samagaya tarrz isi talayanti (19) II ranno tahirrz Kosaliyassa dhuya Bhadda ttL. I ... kuddhe kumare parinivvaei (20) II 'dinna mu ranna ... /. .. jelJ' amhi vanta isilJa sa eso' (21) II te ... (A)sura tahirrz tarrz jalJii talayanti I te bhinna-dehe ruhirarrz vamante pasittu Bhaddii ilJa-m-ahu bhujjo (25) /1 'girirrz nahehirrz khalJaha ... I ... je bhikkhul?l avamannaha (26) II szselJa eyarrz saralJarrz uveha ... I ja! icchaha jfviya . . .' (28) II

76 On the numerous accounts of Devadatta's crimes and fate, cf., e.g., Ma1alasekera, Dictionary of Pali Proper Names I, s.v. (p. 1107ff.); A. Bareau, Recherches sur la


Tathagata's, indirectly explains why Devadatta met such a gruesome fate: "the brahmin of Verafija spoke thus to the lord:

'I have heard, good Gotama, that the recluse Gotama does not greet brahmins who are worn, old, stricken in years ... ; nor does he stand up or ask them to sit down. Likewise, ... that the revered Gotama does not greet brahmins who are worn ... ; nor does he greet them or stand up or ask them to sit down. Now this, good Gotama, this is not respectful.' .

'Brahmin, I do not see him in the world of devas including the Maras, including die Brahmas, including recluses and brahmins ... , whom I should greet or rise up for or to whom I should offer a seat. For, brahmin, whom a tathagata should greet or rise up for or offer a seat to, his head would split asunder.' "77

In all the above examples, the transgression does not concern just some individua1(s), but endangers the whole social group. Hence it is fundamentally heinous, and has to be dealt with appropriately, viz. by the complete annihilation of the danger.

Bearing this general conceptual context in mind, it might be worthwhile to reconsider once more the pdrdjika rules as taught in thePratirnok~a. They have lent themselves to repeated comparisons both with prescriptions detailed in the Buddhist Vinaya itse1f78 and with prescriptions valid among the Brahmanic and Jaina ascetics (supra). The technical

biographie du Buddha dans les Sutrapitaka et les Vinayapitaka anciens ... III, Paris 1995 (pEFEO 178), p. [239 ff.] = BEFEO 78 (1991), p. 105ff. (his death, p. [246] = p. 112).

77 Vin III 1.22-2.13: atha kho Veranjo briihmal}o yena bhagavii ten' upasarrzkami, upasarrzkamitvii bhagavatii saddhirrz sammodi ... Eka-m-antarrz nisinno kho Veranjo briihmal}o bhagavantarrz etad avoca: "sutarrz m' etarrz, bho Gotama, na samal}o Gotamo briihmal}e Fl}l}e vurjrjhe mahallake ... abhiviideti vii paccuttheti vii iisanena vii nimantetfti. Ta-y-idarrz bho G., tatth' eva, na hi bhavarrz Gotamo briihmal}e jil}l}e v. m .... abhiviideti ... nimanteti. Ta-y-idarrz bho Gotama na sampannam evii ti. - Nahan tarrz, briihmal}a, passiimi sadevake lake samiirake sabrahmake ... , yam aharrz abhivadeyyarrz vii paccuttheyyarrz vii iisanena vii nimanteyyarrz. Yarrz hi, bnihmal}a, Tathiigato abhiviideyya vii paccutfheyya vii iisanena vii nimanteyya, muddhii pi tassa vipateyyii ti" . Translation, I.B. Homer, Book of the Discipline I p. 2f. (q.v. for concordances, and similar assertions in Theravada literature). "The Shattered Head Split ... ", a well-known Vedic motive, has many later parallels, cf. Michael Witzel, l.c., p.381ff., §5, for references to "early Buddhist texts"; also to Mahiivastu (ed. Senart 3, p. 114.12: nastica so satvo vii satva-kiiyo vii yasya Tathiigate pratyupqsthihante na saptadhii murdhnarrz na spahaleyii). Also see Stanley losIer, in Bulletin d'Etudes Indiennes 7/8 (1989-1990), p. 97-139.

78 Cf. O. v. Hiniiber, Patimokkhasutta, p. 24ff. Also cf. the 4 akaral}lyas, p. 41ff.

44 .COLETTE CAlLLAT

term piiriijika has been translated as "Defeat" by LB. ,Horner, a translation that has been widely accepted. It has generally been admitted that the Buddhist pariijikas have been rearranged on the model of the Buddhist sllas, the moral "habits" or precepts, of which the counterparts are also prescribed for the Brahmanic and Jaina ascetics, though in a different order. Among others, the Svetambara Dasaveyiiliya-sutta prescribes the abstention (1) from injuring any [living] being, (2) from false speech, (3) from taking that which is not given, (4) from sexual acts79. The fact that, in the Buddhist list, false speech is not the second but the fourth item is evidently intriguing, all the more as telling a conscious lie again recurs as the first of the piicittiya transgressions. But the latter is comparatively trivial, whereas the object of the fourth parajika is fundamentally different80• The exceptional nature of the 4th piiriijika did not escape I.E. Horner8l. She remarks: "The first three Parajika rules are levelled against the breach of a code of morality generally recognized among all civilised communities: against unchastity, against the taking of what was not given, and against the depriving of life ... The curious fourth Parajika, concerned with the offence of 'claiming a state of further-men' (uttarimanussadhamma), seems to have been fashioned in some different mould, and to belong to some contrasting realm of values. It is by no means a mere condemnation of boasting or lying in general, for it is the particular nature of the boast or the lie which makes the offence one of the gravest that a monk can commit..82". As a matter of fact, it is exactly comparable to Devadatta's attempts to supplant the Master, to control, and ultimately

79 Cf. Dasaveyaliya-sutta, ed. Ernst Leumann, p. 615: paIJtiivayao veramalJaIJI ... musavayao veramaIJalJl... adinn' adaIJao veramaIJalJl.·. mehuIJao veramaIJalJl (cf. Schubring's translation).

80 Cf. O. v. Hiniiber, Patimokkhasutta, p. 45 (ubi alia). 81 Yin III 90.32**-91.2**: yo pana bhikkhu anabhijanalJl uttarimanussa-dhammalJl

attupanayikalJl alamariya-ftanadassanalJl samudacareyya iti janami iti pa,ssamfti, tato aparena samayena samanuggahiyamano va ... evalJl vadeyya: ajanam evalJlavuso avacalJl janami, apassalJl passami, tucchalJl musa vilapin ti, ayalJl pi parajiko hoti asalJlvaso ti

82 BD I, p. xx-xxv. She adds: " ... the boast of having reached some stage in spiritual development, only attainable after a long training in the fixed and stable resolve to become more perfect, and to make the potential in hinl assume actuality". A complementary interpretation is proposed here. O. v. Hiniiber's suggestion that the parajilcas could have been arranged following a decreasing order of gravity does not seem convincing.


destroy the Sa:qlgha and the Doctrine. Hence the fourth piiriijika naturally entails the religious death of the transgressor.

Could the exceptional character of the transgression explain why "falsely claiming a state of further men" occupies the fourth rank in the parajika list, whereas avoiding false speech is mentioned as the second vow of the Brahmanic and Jaina ascetic83 ? But perhaps there is more to it. For there seems to be some affinity between speech, language, and the number "4". O. v. Hiniiber points to the fourfold expansion musiiviida + pisu[lii viicii pharusii viicii samphappaliipa84, merging in the cattiiro vohiirii, "the noble usage, noble mode", mentioned in the Sal(lgltiSutta85 .

Further, in the Jaina AyiiraftgaSutta the rules concerning speech (bhiisajiiya) are dealt with in the fourth lecture of the second section. It is stated that "For the avoidance of these occasions to sin, a mendicant should know that there are four kinds of speech: the first is truth; the second is untruth; the third is truth mixed with untruth; what is neither truth nor untruth, nor truth mixed with untruth, that is the fourth kind of speech: neither truth nor untruth. Thus I say"86. The prominence of the number "four" in developments concerning speech is striking and reminds us of the four pada-jiitiini in Patafijali's Mahiibhii~ya Paspasii, commenting upon the catvdri paddni in which vdc is measured according to RS 1.164: in the world-view of the Vedic poet, only one quarter of speech is used in every day language, whereas the other three quarters, dealing with esoteric, secret Truth(s), remain hidden to ordinary men. Given this general

83 Cf. Charles Malamoud, in Cuire Ie monde, Paris 1989, p. 137-161 (in the chapter "Semantique et rhetorique dans la hierarchie hindoue des 'buts de l'homme'''), the considerations on "Quatre egale trois plus un" [4=3+1], where it is observed that in a fourfold scheme, the quarters are not equal: "Ie quatrieme element complete, ou bien englobe, ou bien encore transcende les trois premiers" (p. 142).

84 D I 4.13-29. - Compare Manu 4.138: satya,!! bruyat priya,!! bruyant na bruyat satyam apriya,!! / priya,!! ca nan[ta,!! bruyat, "Let him say what is true, let him say what is pleasing, let him utter no disagreeable truth, and let him utter no agreeable falsehood" (Biihler's translation, SBE 25). Also "Prohibited speech and subhasita in the Theravada Tradition", Indologica Taurinensia XI1 (1984) p. 61-73.

85 Dill 232. 7f. - Cf. Patimokkhasutta p. 27f.; IT XI1 (1984) p. 67f. 86 Ayar II 4.1.4: bhikkhu jal}ejja cattari bhasa-jayai,!!, ta,!! jaha: sac cam ega,!!

paq,hama,!! bhasa-jaya,!!, bfya'!! mosa,!!, taiya'!! sacca-mosa,!!, ja,!! n' eva sacca,!! n' eva mosa,!! n'eva sacca-mosa,!!, a-sacca-mosa,!! ta,!! cauttha'!! bhasa-jayal]l, se bemi; translation H. Jacobi, SBE 22 p. 150 (n. 2: "The fIrst, second and third cases refer to assertions, the fourth (asatyam[iia) to injunctions").

46 . COLETTE CAlLLAT

context, it can be surmized that, by pushing the offence 9f falsely "claiming a state of further men" to the 4th rank of the piiriijika series, the P iitimokkha warns that such a pretence should not be considered inconsequential: attention is drawn to the pregnant potency of such utterances87, to the fact that such deceptive speech and imposture in fact endanger the Community, will set it into chaos, hence finally entail the destruction of the Sarp.gha.88

The Jainas apparently do not enter into such considerations: they are more matter of fact, as can be seen in the Ayiiranga (2.4, supra), or the DasaveyiiUya (chapter 7). The latter states that the monk "should not say that he will explain all, really all: a thoughtful [monk] should in all cases make a precise [and] complete report". The chapter concludes: "[He who] speaks after consideration, controls his senses well, has overthrown the four passions, [and] is without [worldly] support, purges [his soul] of the dirt resulting from previous evil deeds [and] is sanctified in this world and the next. Thus I say"89.

When faced with the same or similar problems, the Buddhists and the Jainas produced more or less comparable or divergent answers, as these had to fit into different systems. It is manifest that both Buddhism and Jainism have preserved a considerable amount of antique beliefs, customs, phrases ... 90 On the other hand it is no less evident that they have

87 It is therefore proper to distinguish this heinous offence from the false, abusive or slanderous speech for which pacittiyas 1-3 are prescribed. Compare the distinction made between killing a human (manussa) and another living being (pal}a), respectively sanctioned by parajika 3, and by pacittiya 61 (cf. O. v. Hinuber, Ptitimokkhasutta, p. 40).

88 It will also be remembered that, in the Brahmanic tradition, correct speech has more than once been considered to be of religious value, cf. L. Renou, Histoire de la langue sanskrite, Lyon 1956, p. 6: "L'idee de la grammaire comme instrument de purification est presente dans Ie plus ancien commentaire grammatical, la Paspasa du Mahabh~ya, comme a travers toute la Mimfupsa" (quoted IT XII, p. 71 n. 53, ubi alia). - For South-East Asia, see F. Bizot I F. Lagirarde, La purete par les mots, Paris ... 1996, EFEO (Textes bouddhiques du Laos).

89 Dasav 7.44,57 (Schubring's translation): 'savval!l eyal!l vaissami, savvam eyal!l' ti no vae I al}uvfi savval!l savvattha eval!l bhasejja pannaval!l II 44 II parikkha-bhasf susamahi'indie cauk-kasayiivagae al}issie I sa niddhul}e dhutta-malal!l pure-karJal!l, arahae logam il}al!l taha paral!lll 57 ti bemi.

90 Concerrring khaejga-viijal}a-kalpa (supra, § 4 and n. 56), Prof. K.R. Norman points out that the word kharJga is ambiguous, and may mean both "sword (hom)" or "rhinoceros". In the fil}acariya passage, therefore, it may signify that "the hom is solitary" or "the rhinoceros is solitary" [personal letter, January 2003].


transformed the old legacy, forged new conceptual frames and schemes, invented original rules, procedures and structures, that aimed at promoting the spiritual' as well as the material welfare of the group as a whole and of each of its members individually.

48 . COLETTE CAILLAT

TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS

BUDDHIST TEXTS (editions and abbreviations as in A Critical Fiili Dictionary)

Dhammapada DighaNikiiya liitaka Mahiivastu MajjhimaNikiiya NidiinaKathii, cf. liitaka I p. 1-94; The Story of Gotama Buddha ... Translated by N.A. Jayawickrama. Oxford 1990 (PTS). Piitimokkhasutta: The Piitimokkha. 227 Rules of a Bhikkhu ... Translation of the Pali by Ven. Nanamoli Thera, Bangkok 2535/1992. SaddanZti Suttanipiita Vinaya

JAINA TEXTS

Aciiriiftga / Ayiiraftga: The Ayararrzga Sutta of the C;vetambara lains. Edited by Hermann Jacobi, London 1882 (Pali Text Society). - Translated from Prakrit by Hermann Jacobi, Oxford University Press 1884 (reprint Delhi, etc., 1964, laina Sutras I (Sacred Books of the East 22).

Ayiiradasiio: see Chedasutra.

Chedas(ttra / Cheyasutta: Drei Chedasutras des laina-Kanons, Ayiiradasiio, Vavahiira, Nisiha, bearbeitet von Walther Schubring. Mit einem Beitrag von Colette Caillat, Hamburg 1966 (ANISH 11).

Dasaveyiiliya: Dasavaikiilika-sutra und -niryukti, nach dem Erziihlungsgehalt untersucht und hrsg. von Ernst Leumann, ZDMG 46 (1892), p. 581-663. The Dasaveyiiliya Sutta ... translated with Introduction and Notes, by Walther Schubring, Ahmedabad 1932.

Dasii-Kappa-Vavahiira: see Chedasutra.


JAS: Jaina .Agama Series, Bombay 1968 +.

linacarit(r)a 11iIJ-acaria: The Kalpasutra of Bhadrablihu ed .... by Hermann Jacobi, Leipzig 1879 (AKM 7.1). - Translated from Priikrit by Hermann Jacobi, "Lives of the finas", SBE 22, 1884 (repr. Delhi 1964).

Kappasutta: Das Kalpa-satra. Die alte Sammlung jinistischer Monchsvorschriften. Einleitung, Text, Anmerkungen, Ubersetzung ... von Walther Schubring, Leipzig 1905 (Indica 2).

Mahiinisihasutta: Studien zum Mahiinisiha. Kapitell-5 von Jozef Deleu und Walther Schubring, Hamburg 1963 (ANISH 10).

Malacara: Eine Digambara-Dogmatik. Das fonfte Kapitel von Vattakeras Malacara hrsg., iibersetzt und kommentiert von Kiyoaki Okuda, Wiesbaden 1975 (ANISH 15).

Nislha-sutta: See Chedasatra. - Ed. Walther Schubring, see Vavahiirasutta.

PannavaIJ-a: PaIJ-IJ-avaIJ-asutta1!l, Ed. Muni PUIJ.yavijaya, Dalsukh Malvat}ia, Amritlal Mohanlal Bhojak, Bombay 1969, 1971,2 vol. (JAS 9).

Tattvartha Satra, That which is, UmasvatilUmasvaml. Translated with an introduction by Nathmal Tatia, San Francisco, London, Pymble 1994 (Institute of Jainology).

Uttarajjhayii: The Uttaradhyayanasutra. Edited by Jarl Charpentier, 2 vol., K!I>benhavn, 1921-22 (Archives d'Etudes Orientales 18). - Translated from Priikrit by Hermann Jacobi, Oxford 1895 (SBE 45), (repr. Delhi 1964).

Uvaviiiyasutta: Das Aupapatika Sutra, erstes Upanga del' faina. 1. Einleitung, Text und Glossar. Von Ernst Leumann, Leipzig 1883 (AKM 8.2). Repr. Nendeln 1966.

Vavaharasutta: See Chedasatra. - Ed.: Vavahiira- und Nisiha-sutta. Hrsg. von Walther Schubring, Leipzig 1918 (AKM 15.1). - Vavahiira, in Drei Chedasatras des faina-Kanons (supra).

Viyiihapannatti: ViyahapaIJ-IJ-attisutta1!l: Part I, Ed. Bechardas J. Doshi, Bombay 1974, Part II, III, Ed. Bechardas J. Doshi, assisted by Arnritlal Mohanlal Bhojak, Bombay 1978, 1982 (JAS 4).

50 COLETTE CAILLAT

Further: Iozef Deleu, Viyiihapannatti (Bhagavai). Th.e fifth Anga of the Jaina Canon. mtroduction, Critical Analysis, Commentary & Indexes, Brugge 1970 (Rijksuniversiteit te Gent (Werken uitgegeven door de Faculteit van de Letteren en Wijsbegeerte, 151. Aflevering).

THINKING THROUGH SHINGON RITUAL

ROBERT H. SHARF

Preamble: Ritual Meanings

There must be readers who are shocked, angry, or depressed at the thought that ritual (not to mention religion and even language) is not only complex but also meaningless. I am not a bit sad about it. I prefer a thing, like a person, to be itself, and not refer to something or somebody else. For all we know life itself may be meaningless.

Frits Staal

In 1979 Frits Staal, a Sanskritist who specializes in Vedic ritual, published an article in which he proclaimed ritual to be devoid of meaning. Staal's argument, subsequently developed in a number of publications l ,

is at flrst glance deceptively simple: when we ask about the meaning of a ritual we seek an explanation in language. Such an explanation will always involve a conceptual reduction, in that we seek to transpose the lived complexity of a ritual performance to a verbal formulation. Ritual, according to Staal, resists such reduction by its very nature. Ritual is "pure activity" (Staal 1979a: 9); it is a "discipline engaged in for its own sake, which cannot therefore be thus reduced .... Basically, the irreducibility of ritual shows that action constitutes a category in its own right" (Staal 1983: 1.16).

A draft of this paper was presented at the symposium "Matrices and Weavings: Expressions of Shingon Esoteric Buddhism in Japanese Culture and Society," held at the University of Hawai'i, August 31 to September 2,2002. I would like to thank the participants of that conference, especially Torn Eijo Dreitlein of Koyasan University. for their com

, ments and advice. I am also indebted to Poul Andersen, Phyllis Granoff, Charlie Orzech, ; and Elizabeth Horton Sharf for their comments and suggestions.

1 See, for example, Staal 1979a; 1979b; 1983: 2.127-134; and 1990.


52 ROBERT H. SHARF

Staal's claim that ritual is meaningless is predica~ed on the corollary claim that ritual is antecedent to language. A variety of non-human species display ritual behavior, and ritual may well have been commonplace among Homo sapiens long before the advent of language and culture. (Staal argues that language is actually an outgrowth of ritual in general and ritualized vocalizations - the precursors of mantras - in particular.) Besides, individuals often acquire competence in a rite before they learn what, if anything, the rite signifies. Scholars are then wrong to assume that there are symbolic meanings running through the minds of ritualists and that such meanings constitute the sine qua non of ritual performance. According to Staal, people do rituals simply because they have been taught to do so, often from an early age.

If ritual is meaningless - if it does not refer to a domain of meanings extrinsic to ritual action itself - then popular theories such as "rituals enact myths," "rituals reflect social structures," or "rituals inculcate values and norms" are misguided as they confound the historical and logical relationship between ritual and meaning. Besides, says Staal, those who hold that rituals enact myths, encode social structures, or impart collective norms, fail to explain why anyone would want to use ritual for these tasks when words would serve just as well if not better (Staal 1979a: 7; 1990: 123).

Ritual, according to Staal, is behavior - acts and sounds - that is governed by rules. The rules constitute a "syntax" allowing the creation of infinitely malleable recursive structures not unlike those of language. But unlike language, ritual has no semantics; the acts and sounds that constitute ritual interact without reference to meaning (Staal 1990: 433). Ritual is then not so much like language as it is like dance, about which Isadora Duncan famously proclaimed: "If I could tell you what it meant, there would be no point in dancing it" (Staal 1979b: 120).

Needless to say, Staal does not deny that individuals do ascribe meanings to rituals. His point is that such meanings are secondary or superfluous and hence tell us little about the transcultural (not to mention crossspecies) phenomenon of ritual per se. Following the earlier observations of Arnold van Gennep, Staal notes that rituals may be transmitted through time with little or no change, despite changes in the meanings ascribed to them. If a rite remains the same irrespective of shifts in meaning, then

THINKING THROUGH SlllNGON RITUAL 53

meaning cannot be intrinsic to the rite. "In the development of our concepts and theories of ritual it is only a small step from 'changing meaning' to: 'no intrillsic meaning' and 'structural meaning,' and from there to: 'no meaning'" (Staal 1979a: 11). Moreover, if the goal of ritual were the conveyance of meaning, then ritual would admit change in so far as this or any other goal was well served. Thus rituals lack not only meaning but also a purpose or goal.

One reason that the absence of visible or otherwise detectable results causes [the ritualist] no concern is that large rituals are ends in themselves .... The rites have no practical utility and have lost their original function, if ever they had one. The ritualists perform them not in order to obtain certain ends, but because it is their task. Lack of practical utility, incidentally, is a characteristic that ritual shares with many of the higher forms of human civilization.1t may be a mark of civilization. (1983: 1.18)

Pushing this argument to its logical conclusion, Staal closed his original1979 article with a passage, used as an epigraph above, suggesting that just as ritual is meaningless, so too is religion, language, and even life itself (1979a: 22). In doing so, Staal unwittingly revealed his hand: he had stipulated the conditions for ascribing "meaning" such that they can never be met. Staal will only admit meanings that are both invariant and intrinsic to the phenomena under investigation. But this is to ignore the insight, fundamental to linguistics and semiotic theory, that meaning does not reside within a sign. Rather, meaning emerges from the complex cultural system, determined in part through social interactions, that marks a particular phenomenon as a "sign" in the first place. A signifier is meaningful only as a point in a set of relations. And since meaning never resides in the "thing itself," meaning must always be extrinsic, contingent, and variant2•

In claiming that the thing-in-itself has no meaning, Staal has uncovered hot the meaninglessness of the thing itself but rather the semiotic logic that renders meaning possible in the ftrst place3. Rituals trade in signs that

" , 2 Some might argue that there is one case in which we can talk of "fixed meaning," namely, as a defming feature of the class of proper nouns. Yet Derrida, for one, questions even this restricted sense of "fIxed meaning" (Derrida 1985) . . • 3 Or, one might say that Staal has simply reaffirmed the Wittgensteinian insight that

l:ile abstract "thing-in-itself" is a piece of philosophical nonsense. For a critique of Staal similar to my own, see Andersen 2001: 162-163.

54 ROBERT H. SHARF

don't possess meaning so much as they invite meaning. To speak of the meaning of a rite one must adopt a particular perspective - situate oneself in a particular world of discourse - and different perspectives yield different meanings. As anthropologists have noted since the time of Tylor, even participants in one and the same rite will hold various and often conflicting interpretations of the event, and the interpretations will change over time4. Moreover the "emic" accounts of ritual participants will differ dramatically from the plethora of "etic" readings offered by historians of religion, sociologists, anthropologists, or psychologists. But here ritual is surely no different from any other cultural product, including works of art and literatures.

Some of what is conveyed in a particular ritual performance may indeed be difficult if not impossible to convey in words. Even then it may be misleading to label these elements "meaningless." When Isadora Duncan says, "If I could tell you what it meant, there would be no point in dancing it," she does not mean that dance is meaningless but rather that she is incapable of putting into words that which she puts into dance. Staal has every right to stipulate that meaning only be predicated to properly formed linguistic utterances - to restrict meanings to language. But such a stipulation renders the rest of his argument tautological. Few would quibble with the claim that ritual is constituted not by language so much as by action.

This criticism aside, Staal does make several important points. Ritual activity qua activity is indeed difficult to translate into words. Moreover,

4 "The old and greatest difficulty in investigating the general subject [of idolatry 1 is this, that an image may be, even to two votaries kneeling side by side before it, two utterly different things" (Tylor 1920: 2.168-169).

5 Staal's argument was, I suspect, inordinately influenced by the archaic nature of the rituals he was studying. The Agnicayana is an ancient rite consisting largely of mantric utterances in Vedic, the meaning of which is inaccessible to most of the participants. The archaic character of the rite, and the fact that so much of the liturgical content is gibberish to the actors, may account for its seeming invariance across generations. But even then Staal likely overestimates resistance to change. It is precisely because the rite has only been practiced in fits and starts over the last hundred years that the Brahmins abide so closely to textual authority. (What other authority can they call upon, now that the authority of received tradition has been compromised?) Even then, many significant alterations were made in the performance Staal observed, including the use of plant offerings instead of goats.

THINKING THROUGH SHINGON RITUAL 55

rites have lives of their own, independent of the symbolic and mythological associations that may be ascribed to them. Finally, appreciation of the symbolic and mythological world of ritual does not in and of itself account for the obsessive, rule-bound character of ritual action. Adepts may spend years acquiring competence in elaborate and physically arduous rites the historical origins and symbolic associations of which remain obscure to them. To castigate such adepts for their "ignorance" would only betray our own.

Shingon Ritual

That ritual is resistant to conceptual reduction and discursive appropriation has posed a particular problem for modem Shingon exegetes. Shingon apologists, like their counterparts in other religious traditions, have felt compelled to respond to modem rationalistic and scientific critiques of religion in general and ritual in particular. This has led some writers to ignore or downplay elements of the tradition considered "unscientific" or "magical" in favor of Shingon teachings deemed properly philosophical, psychological, spiritual, or aesthetic. But this has not been easy, given that sacerdotal ritual lies at the heart of the Shingon tradition. Ritual performance was essential, of course, to virtually all schools of Buddhism throughout Japanese history, but other schools have had an easier time reinventing themselves in the light of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century modernist mores. Apologists for Zen, for example, insisted that "true" Zen eschews ritual altogether in favor of unmediated spiritual experience, while Pure Land exegetes recast their tradition in theological terms strikingly similar to Protestantism: Pure Land, we are told, is a doctrine of divine grace predicated on faith in an all-compassionate being6. Even Tendai and Nichiren partisans have gotten into the act: sectarian introductions to these traditions invariably foreground doctrine and cosmology at the expense of ritual practice.

Some Shingon exegetes tried adopting similar strategies. They produced books on Shingon that simply ignore ritual practice altogether7, or

6 For an alternative view of medieval Japanese Pure Land see Dobbins 2001. 7 Minoru Kiyota's book Shingon Buddhism: Theory and Practice (1978), for example,

,despite the title, is all theory and no practice. The English study of Kukai' s works by

56 ROBERT H. SHARF

, that depict Esoteric (mikkyo !$~) ritual as a means toward inculcating inner transformation and mystical experience8. Gi~en the intellectual genealogy of categories such as "mystical experience," such claims are always a bit suspect (Sharf 1995, 1998), but in the case of Shingon they are especially so.

The sticking point is not the absence of a sophisticated body of doctrine or theology through which to frame Shingon ritual. On the contrary, Shingon doctrine is conceptually rich and partakes of a certain literary and aesthetic elegance that may well appeal to modem sensibilities. One might cite, for example, the notion that the phenomenal world is the theophany of the dharmakiiya-buddha Mahavairocana (Dainichi *- 8), or the related doctrine that the enactment of the "three mysteries" (sanmitsu -=1$, the ritual performance of the body, speech, and mind of the deity) gives tangible form to the practitioner's primordial identity with the divine9.

Such tenets resonate, at least on the surface, with popular Western conceptions of mysticism and the "perennial philosophy."

The problem for Shingon modernists is not doctrine. Rather, it is that doctrine is patently secondary to a complex set of ritual procedures that constitute the core of the monastic curriculum. The early popularity and rapid growth of the Shingon lineage in Heian Japan was due to its possession of the exalted eighth-century "Tantric" rites that Kukai ~i'fij (774-835) brought back from the Tang capital. These rituals constituted a world unto themselves, and while their connections to "normative" Buddhist teachings were not always salient, they carried the imprimatur of celebrated Indian Buddhist masters. Most important, those with access to this ritual technology were promised the power to defeat their enemies, end droughts and famines, cure disease, and attain exalted states on the Buddhist path.

(Indeed, this is one reason why so many recent attempts to define "Tantra" have failed. To date, virtually all attempts begin by identifying the conceptual foundations - the soteriology, cosmology, metaphysics,

Yoshito Hakeda (1972), while learned and important, focuses exclusively on doctrine while remaining mute on the subject of rituaL

8 Matsunaga 1989: 25-27, 1990: 27. See also Toganoo 1982b: 23; Ishida 1987: 27; . Yamasaki 1988: 123; and the discussion in Sharf 200lb: 193-195.

9 On the sanmitsu see Hizoki ~.ii£ilG, KDZ 2.40.


or what have you - supposedly common to Tantric traditions across Asia. Even in so"called polythetic definitions of Tantra, the extended set of salient characteristics is comprised entirely of symbols and concepts - what Staal would classify as "meanings" - rather than of ritual implements, gestures, sounds, and procedures. Yet, if it makes sense to talk about a pan-Asian phenomenon of Tantra at all - and this is a big "if" - then I believe it is better approached not in terms of thought ["meanings"] but of practice ["actions"]. If the term Tantra has any cross-cultural referent, it is to a body of technological expertise comprised of certain powerful tools - mantras, mudriis, icons, altars, esoteric implements including ceremonial weapons, and so on - and the arcane procedural knowledge necessary to wield them. This technology could be, and apparently was, appropriated by diverse religious traditions and transmitted independent of any theoretical or doctrinal overlayyo

The fact that Shingon apologists may experience difficulty in recasting their ritual practices in an acceptably modem or rational light need not concern scholars who stand outside the tradition. There is no shortage of theoretical models and conceptual strategies on which scholars might draw. They could adopt a comparative approach, for example, noting structural similarities between Shingon and non-Shingon traditions. Think of the striking parallels between Shingon ritual and the traditions of shamanism, spirit mediumship, and possession that are so widespread throughout Asia. In each case an initiated master engages in an occult performance through which he or she comes to personify or embody a divine being. The performance endows the shaman or ritual master with the deity's power and authority by virtue of which the perforiner is able to intervene in worldly and otherworldly affairsll .

Comparativists might step back even further and view Shingon ritual under the rubric of "sacrifice" a la Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss

10 On the nature and status of Tantric Buddhism in China see Sharf 2002: 263-278. II It is unlikely that the structural parallels observed between East Asian shamanism

and Buddhist Tantra are entirely accidental. They may well be the product of shared ancestry or cultural diffusion and borrowing. Edward Davis, for example, shows how nonBuddhist ritual masters (jashi I*ffrJi) in Song China employed Tantric techniques (including mantra and mudra) to invoke their "guardian spirits" who were then used in rites of exorcism (Davis 2001: 49). On the connections between Buddhist Tantra and East Asian spirit possession see also Strickmann 2002: 198-218.

58 ROBERT H. SHARF

([1898] 1981). In Shingon, as in all sacrificial traditiops, particular goods are purified through consecration or aspersion rites and then offered to powerful supernatural beings in exchange for some boon12. Or, following van Gennep, scholars might foreground the initiatory, ascetic, or transformative dimensions of Shingon ritual, placing Shingon under the broad rubric of rites du passage. Shingon rites thus create a liminal situation in which the officiant is transformed, at least temporarily, from one social or sacerdotal state to another.

Such broad theoretical models, under the rubrics of shamanism, sacrifice, liminality, or what have you, mitigate some of the arcane "otherness" of Shingon ritual by framing it as an instance of a larger transcultural and transhistorical human phenomenon. But this conceptual gain comes at a price: these theories impose a set of foreign categories and concerns that obscure as much as they reveal. Moreover, as grand narratives they tend to reduce the distinctiveness, complexity, and internal coherence of the particular tradition at hand.

In this paper I will focus, instead, on an expository narrative that originates not from without but from within the Shingon tradition. This is the so-called guest-host paradigm, according to which all major Shingon ritual practices (Sk: s,ridhana) are structured as feasts or entertainments for visiting deities, wherein the practitioner assumes the role of host (shujin 3:.A), and the main deity takes the position of honored guest (hinkyaku ~~, daihin *~). This narrative, familiar to all Shingon priests, is of considerable antiquity and is believed to bespeak the ancient Indian provenance of the rites. The guest-host paradigm is used in both traditional commentaries and contemporary sectarian tracts to explain individual procedures and to relate them to the overall structure of the rite, lending narrative coherence to the wholel3 .

12 Precisely because such a notion of sacrifice is so broad, some would limit the term sacrifice to situations involving the slaughter of a sacrificial victim; on the concept of sacrifice see esp. the discussion in Heesterman 1993: 7-44. For a brief discussion of Shingon ritual in the context of sacrifice see Payne 1991: 88.

13 On the guest-host structure (daihin geisha no keishiki *~i!l!~i\'O)m'il:;), see Takai 1953: 109-110, 117; Toganoo 1982b: 45-46; Yamasaki 1988: 162; Strickmann 1989: 16-17; and Payne 1991: 88-89. The guest-host structure is also widely used in Tibetan exegesis of Buddhist Tantra, but that topic lies outside the confines of the present paper.


While this paradigm does account for the general structure of Shingon practices, it also engenders certain ambiguities and contradictions. These ambiguities, I will suggest, may shed light on features of the Shingon ritual system that relate to the early development of Buddhist Tantra. Thinking through the narrative will also allow us to revisit Staal's thesis concerning the relationship between ritual actions and meanings. Before turning to this narrative, however, it is necessary to say a few words about the Shingon monastic curriculum.

Shingon Training

Anyone wishing to become a Shingon priest today must undergo a sequence of four initiations known collectively as the Shidokegy6 1Z9~/JD1T or "four preliminary practices of liberation." Each of the practices is centered around the invocation of a particular buddha, bodhisattva, or other divine being (known as the honzon :<fs:# or "principal deity")14 and his or her retinue. The rite proper takes from two to five hours to complete and is repeated three times a day in the context of an extended ascetic retreat15 . In addition to the central rite, the priest undergoing Shidokegy6 training performs a variety of auxiliary practices, including daily visits to neighboring shrines and temples, ancestral rites for lineage patriarcj:ls, . offerings to hungry ghosts, and so on, leaving little time for meals or rest. If done in a traditional manner, the Shidokegy6 sequence requires over one hundred days to complete, whereupon the practitioner is eligible for consecration (kanjo ~:rn, Sk: abhi~eka) as a Shingon "master" (ajari JliiJM~, Sk: acarya). This consecration authorizes the priest to perform Esoteric rituals on behalf of others.

All Shingon rituals and ceremonies are organized as a sequence of smaller liturgical procedures that typically consist of an incantation

14 The term honzon (C: benzun) is likely derived from Tantric sources, but it lost its explicitly Tantric overtones rather early and came to be used by all sects of Japanese Buddhism. On this term see esp. the Benzun sanmei *-l¥':::11!< chapter of the Mahiivairocanasiitra (T.848: 18.44a-b); Hizoki, KDZ 2.30; Mikky6 Jiten Hensankai eds. 1983: 2068bc; Mochizuki 1933-36: 5A697b-4698a; and Goepper 1979.

15 The three daily performances, each of which is called a "single sitting" (ichiza gyob6 ,1!1H9$), are known respectively as "early night" (shoya fJJ1Jt), "late night" (goya 1f1Jt), and "mid-day" (nitchil 8'1').

60 ROBERT H. SHARF

(a mantra, dhtiralJ-l, hymn, etc.) accompanied by a hand gesture (mudrii) and a guided contemplation (kanso iI.;W). The four Initiations that comprise the Shidokegyo - namely the JUhachido + i\~ (eighteen methods), Kongokai ~lJlJtlJf..(vajra-realm practice), Taizokai n&iiiJf.. (matrixrealm practice), and Goma ~~ (fire ceremony)16 - consist of hundreds of such segments of varying duration and complexity. Of these hundreds, modern commentators regard three specific segments that usually appear in each of the Shidokegyo rites as the soteriological core of the practice. These three units - "interpenetration of self [and deity]" (nyuga-ga'nyu A:fJt:fJtA, #51), "formal invocation" (shonenju IE~~m, #53), and "syllable-wheel contemplation" (jirinkan ¥fifBiI., #55) - unite respectively the body, speech, and mind of the practitioner with the body, speech, and mind of the principal deity (honzon) of the rite. As such, they constitute the ritual instantiation of the "three mysteries" (sanmitsu), a cardinal Shingon doctrine that affirms the identity of practitioner and buddha!7.

Traditional Shingon ritual manuals, known as shidai ;b(~ (sequential programs) or giki {i!\lJL (ritual regulations), often list only the names ofthe dozens of procedures that comprise the rite. With less common procedures the manuals may include mnemonic aids such as the pronunciation of the mantras (in Siddham script, Chinese characters, and/or the Katakana syllabary), the text of liturgical hymns and recitations, directions on how to form certain mudriis, and diagrams to help in the contemplations. In any case, the manuals presume a vast store of ritual knowledge on the part of the practitioner. The more elaborate rites such as the Taizokai and Goma consist of hundreds of such procedures, many of them of considerable complexity .

Traditionally, these manuals were not printed but were hand-copied and transmitted from master to disciple. Thousands of such manuals survive in temple archives, and hundreds have made their way into modern printings of Buddhist and Shingon canonical collections. A comparison of the manuals quickly reveals a host of small but notable alterations in

16 Prior to undertaking the Iiihachido, the practitioner must complete the Raihai kegyo ~W1JOrr (preliminary prostration practice), which today takes from one to four weeks to complete. As such, the modem Shidokegyo sequence is actually organized into five segments.

I7 See, for example, the discussion in Toganoo 1982b: 66.


the liturgies: elements are added or removed, recitations and contemplations are modified, and some manuals include short expository directions and comments - interlinear notes that threaten to enter the liturgy proper - that may represent the "oral transmission" (kuden O«IJ) of a particular master or lineage. The Shingon ritual tradition, now many centuries old, was conservative but - pace Staal - by no means invariant.

These differences gave rise toa profusion of independent lines (ryu 1m) that differed in the details of their ritual performances and exegeses18. There was no opprobrium associated with amending the rites; all bona fide Shingon masters (ajari) were sanctioned to alter the rites as they saw fit. Two related reasons are given for this authority: (1) masters were regarded as spiritually advanced and ritually sanctified beings whose interpretations of the rites reflected their inner wisdom; (2) more practically, there was no single authoritative Chinese or Japanese textual source for the rites on which the Japanese could draw. There was, rather, a profusion of sanctioned texts and teaching lineages, a situation readily acknowledged by the tradition19. Annen 'tC~ (841 ?-915?), for example, notes that the reason there were so many differences in the ritual transmissions brought back to Japan by Ennin I1!H= (794-864) was that he studied under eight different teachers20.

At the same time, scholars should not exaggerate the differences between Shingon initiatory lineages. While these lines did compete for prestige and patronage, in the end the variations in ritual performance are relatively minor and rarely affect the rites' underlying structure21 .

18 According to tradition, there are twelve major Shingon initiatory lineages, six associated with the Ono line 1j\lJ!fmE and six associated with the Hirosawa line )j\;'~mE. However, there are dozens of sub-lineages, the two most important today being the Chuin-ryii. '1'l!it:mE now dominant on Mount Koya and the Sanboin-ryii. '=:'!ifll!tmE stemming from Daigoji lIJIMl9' in Kyoto. For a full discussion of the complex relationship between the various lineages see Toganoo 1982a: 239-266; 1982b: 33-40; and Takai 1953: 25-58.

19 The absence of a single authoritative ritual text and the freedom of an iiciirya to interpret and alter the ritual as he pleases is discussed in KakuchO's l\!iti1 (960-1034) Sanmitsu shOryoken .=:It:FJ>'iSf1lii (T.2399: 75.633c14 ff.) and Taizokai shOki JI/liM'I-;ti!9 (T.2404: 75.806cl ff.); see also Todaro 1986: 114.

20 Taizokai daihO taijuki JI/lil!ll-*It;~§l:ft!, T.2390: 75.54a22; Todaro 1986: 114. 21 The same can be said for the differences between Shingon mikkyo writ large (Tomitsu

*It:) and Tendai mikkyo (Taimitsu tl'lt:). The sequence in which Tendai priests perform the Shidokegyo is slightly different (in Tendai the Taiz6kai rite precedes the Kongokai), but the overall narrative structure and most of the individual procedures are identical.

62 ROBERT H. SHARF

This structure is rooted in a subset of eighteen ritual procedures known as the juhachido or "eighteen methods" which constitute a latticework around which are hung dozens if not hundreds of additional elements. Jiihachido is also the name of the first of the four Shidokegyo practices, and it is through this extended rite that a Shingon priest comes to acquire a basic understanding of the ritual system22• (In this paper I use lower case italics ["juhachido"] to refer to the original sequence of eighteen procedures, and capitalized unitalicized script ["Jiihachido"] to refer to the full Shidokegyo rite.) The guest-host narrative is captured in the root procedures of the eighteen methods.

History and Structure of the Eighteen Methods

The origin of the eighteen methods is far from clear. The DaishOten kangi soshin binayaka hO *~~iX:g:!l!g;ymJjB13{jWJ~, a work preserved in fascicle nine of Kfikai's Sanjujo sakushi =+~~~r, contains what some Shingon scholars believe to be the earliest record of the rite23. But the de facto locus classicus is another roughly contemporaneous text, the ]uhachi geiin +1\~~P (C. Shiba qiyin). Tradition holds that this text, extant only in Japan, is the work of Kfikai' s teacher Huiguo ;!;:W; (746-805) as recorded by Kfikai himself, but little is known with certainty about the provenance of the work24• The same is true of virtually all of the ritual manuals attributed to Kfikai, including his three other eighteen-methods

22 There are a variety of rites structured around the eighteen-methods sequence that can be used for the Shidokegy6 Jilhachid6 perfonnance. These ritual fonns, such as the Nyoirinb6 ~D:i:~I*, are referred to as "ritual sequences established on the eighteen methods" (juhachido date no shidai -ti\~lLO)~lIl); see Toganoo 1982b: 47-49. The Nyoirinb6 serves as the Jiihachid6 in the Sanb6in-ryil, using a manual derived from the Shonyoirin Kanjizai bosatsu nenju shidai lI!!~D:i:~IiIlEFt£i!iiii1$lm~lIl by Geng6 5C* (914-995); see the appendix to this paper.

23 The Sanjujo sakushi is traditionally considered a work by Kiikai dating to his years in China (Toganoo 1982b: 44; Ono 1932-36: 4.86).

24 In his ]uhachido kuketsu -ti\~r:Jl!t, Raiyu;m~ (1225-1304) writes that Kilkai received the eighteen methods from Huiguo (T.2529: 79.71c9ff). Most modem Shingon scholars accept this position and view the ]uhachi geiin as Kilkai's record of Huiguo's instructions (Takai 1953: 116-117). The ]uhachi geiin is reproduced in both the Taish6 canon (T.900), where it is attributed to Huiguo, and the KobO Daishi zenshU 'lkl**$i1i~~ (KDZ 2.634-645); where it is attributed to Kilkai.


manuals: the ]uhachid6 nenju shidai +l\J!!~~iIi*m, ]uhachid6 kubi shidai + l\J!!lJl~*m, and Bonji juhachido ~~+ /\J!!. While they are all likely early Shingon compositions, they may well postdate Kiilcai's death.

The sequence of eighteen root procedures appears to be a Japanese systematization of a ritual pattern found in group of related Chinese manuals associated with Amoghavajra. The texts most commonly mentioned as sources for the eighteen methods are the Wuliangshou rulai guanxing gongyang yigui ~:5;#t~O*ill1T{:Mt{iiM (T.930), Guanzizai pusa ruyilun yuqie ill !31:E%=iii~O;i:~ij{(ffJD (T.1086), Guanzizai pusa ruyilun niansong yigui ill!31:E%=iii~O;i:~~~iTHiiM (T.1085), and Dabao guangbo louge shanzhu mimi tuoluoni jing *_ .tt;ftM~{±jfJ1.WWEl.i~;f~ (T.1005a). In his Sangakuroku -=~~, Kukai mentions the first two as the basis for his own mhachido manuals (Takai 1953: 111-116), but all these texts were familiar to KUkai and all share a common ritual structure. I will have occasion to return to these texts below. Here I will only note that there is some question as to whether or not the Chinese texts, and the ]uhachi geiin itself, contain the segment known as the "contemplation of the sanctuary" (dojokan )i:l$}ill, #31), an important rite traditionally included among the list of eighteen25•

As mentioned above, the telTIl "juhachido" refers to (1) a skeletal structure of eighteen procedures that was incorporated into more complex rites such as the Taizokai, Kongokai, and Goma; and (2) a full-fledged rite in itself that, in its mature fOlTIl, consists of some seventy or eighty discrete procedures. The latter JUhachido rite, typically with Nyoirin Kannon ~o;i:~illif (CintamaJ).icakra Avalokitesvara) as the principal deity, was incorporated into the Shingon monastic curriculum by the end of Kukai' s lifetime. Kukai's Shingon denju saM ~i§~~{'F#;, for example, mentions the Juhachido as one of six practices mandatory for all Shingon priests26•

25 Takai 1953: 117-118. The d6j6kan is also known as the "Tathagata fist mudrii" (nyorai ken 'in ~D*lfif'IJ). The tenn d6j6kan is rare in Chinese texts; one of the few relevant instances is found in the Sheng huanxitian shifa lll11iXg3<A11;, a ritual manual ascribed to 'the somewhat obscure Tang monk from the "western regions" Prajiiacakra iN'~lili[~):Il,m (also known as Zhihuilun li\':;:~; the reference is found in T.1275: 21.325b5). However, the provenance of the work is unclear, and it may well be a Japanese apocryphon.

0026 These six rites are (I) Kechien-kanjo *lilii<i1Iilli (consecration establishing a bond with the deity); (2) Iilhachido; (3) Issonbo -#11; (single deity practice); (4) Kongokai; (5) Taizokai; and (6) Goma. These are followed by the Koka-kanjo ~'F;;rlililli and Jumyo·kanjo §I:'l!llililli initiations (KDZ 4.417ff.; see the discussion in Toganoo 1982b: 25-26).

64 ROBERT H. SHARF

And a court document dated 2-23-835, shortly before Kukai's death, records that the Hihachido was to be included among' practices compulsory for monks seeking ordination among the annual ordinands (nenbundosha fF:5J\.J3t1lf)27.

The Shidokegyo sequence was becoming standardized, with the JUhachido as the initial rite, by the time of Kakuban ~~ (1095-1143) who writes in his ShOjuhO shokan @,~r!i!1I1i that he received the Hihachido at age eighteen, the Kongokai and Taizokai at nineteen, the Koka-kanjo ~q:IlJ¥i:rn three times between the ages of twenty-two and twenty-seven, and lastly the DenbO-kanjo ~r!¥irn a total of eight times28• Today all Shingon (as well as Tendai) priests begin with the Hihachido, although the principal deity of the rite differs depending on the monk's initiatory lineage (ryu). Priests in the SanbOin-ryli =jt{llJ'GmE use Nyoirin Kannon as the principal deity while CMin-ryu I=j:lllJ'Gt'fE priests direct the ritual to Dainichi Nyorai :kBJ!D* (Mahavairocana). Even then, the differences between the rites as actually performed are relatively few and far between.

The overview of the original eighteen-methods structure that follows is based primarily on the manuals ascribed to Kukai, notably the ]uhachi geiin, ]uhachida nenju shidai, and ]uhachida kubi shidai29• I have also consulted a number of medieval texts on the juhachida, including the ]uhachida kuketsu +l\JlD~ (T.2529) by Raiyu ~fm (1225-1304) and the ]uhachi geiin gishaku shOki +l\~QJ~~~m; (T.2475) attributed to Jojin 11::i:m (fl. 1108), both of which provide considerable commentary30. I have subdivided the eighteen methods into "six procedures" (roppa

27 Study of the TattvasaJ?1graha and Mahiivairocana siitras was also compulsory as was facility with sJu5myo If'l~ chanting. See Todaro 1985: 104; on the system of annual ordinands see Abe 1999: 39-40.

28 Toganoo 1982b: 26. On the complex problem of the historical origins of the Shidokegy6 system see the discussions in Toganoo 1982b: 26-27; Takai 1953: 74-75; and Ueda 1986: 55-58.

29 There are any number of modem accounts of the eighteen methods. The most comprehensive accounts in Japanese are Toganoo 1982b: 44-53,286-318; Takai 1953: 109-216; Tanaka 1962: 95-151; Oyama 1987: 67-143; and Ueda 1986: 102-207. In English see Miyata 1984; Miyata and Todaro 1988: "Eighteen Rites"; and Payne 1991: 207-227.

30 There is some question about the authorship of the liihachi geiin gishaku shaki. The Shoshii shosho roku ml*1j;:iMl~ lists the author as J6jin of Kiyomizu-dera m7.l<'i'f, but other traditions attribute it to Shink6 ~!ll! of Kojima-dera INll,'i'f, or the Tendai monk Annen (Kamata et a:l. eds. 1998: 734).

THINKlNG THROUGH SHINGON RITUAL 65

:f\¥!), following a popular medieval mode of analysis31 . (The numbers given for the individual rites correspond to their place in the modem Iiihachido sequence provided in the appendix.)

(1) Procedure for Adorning the Practitioner (shOgon gyoja hO Jf:t.!Hr11f¥!, goshin b6 ~!Ht¥!). Traditionally, this section includes the fIrst five of the eighteen methods, all of which serve to purify, adorn, and protect the practitioner, rendering him or her a suitable host The practitioner begins by anointing his/her body with incense (zuko ~~, #6), followed by a sequence of three rites - the buddha family assembly (butsubu sanmaya fgjlffB-=Mc1f~, #9), lotus family assembly (rengebu sanmaya lI~fflEMc1f~, #10), and vajra family assembly (kongobu sanmaya ~lllltlffB-=Mc1f~, #11) - that call upon the deities of the three assemblies to empower (kaji 1JO~) and purify the practitioner. Then one protects the body (goshin ~!l) by donning armor (hiko f1!{1fl, kongo katchii ~lMltllfl~, #12); the mantra for this rite invokes Agni, and the sequence is said to protect the host from all manner of natural disasters, demons, and evil influences.

(2) Procedure for Binding the Realm (kekkai hO *S~¥!). Now one prepares one's abode - i.e., the sanctuary - for the deity. First, one secures the sanctuary firmly to the earth by driving a vajra pillar through the practitioner's seat to the center of the earth (jiketsu :!1l1*S, jikai :!1l1~, or kongoketsu ~lMltl;mt, #29). The four sides of the perimeter are secured (shihO ketsu JIg:1J*S, #30) by erecting an indestructible vajra wall (kongosho ~IMlUi];\j). The roof has not yet been sealed to allow for the descent of the deity.

(3) Procedure for Adorning the Sanctuary (shOgon doj6 hO Jf:tmc~~i!). According to virtually all medieval texts, this section consists of two rites: the "contemplation of the sanctuary" (or "contemplation of the

31 On the six procedures see the Juhachi geiin gishaku shi5ki, T.2475: 78.115c19-27; Oyama 1987: 69; and Takai 1953: 110. I have also consulted the Taizokai nenju shidai yoshuki !1lli;iM'I·$1iili~mJl!~rul (SZ 25) by GeM *_ (1306-1362). In this work GOM analyses the structure of the Taizokai rite into "seven limbs" (shichi shi t5i:), drawing on Annen's Kongokai daihi5 taijuki ~rnlmjdnf:'ltrul (T.2391: 75.170b8-1O); the seven are (1) gyogan rrllli, (2) sanmaya =:lIIollll, (3) jojin ~$t, (4) dojo ~~, (5) shi5seilhi5sei m~/.ilIi, (6) kuyo lJt3t, and (7) nenju $,ilj. This breakdown of the ritual is based, according to Gehe, on fascicle seven of the Mahiivairocana-sutra (T.848: 18:45a ff.); see the discussion in Toganoo 1982b: 54.

66 ROBERT H. SHARF

locus of enlightenment," dojokan ~~iI., #31)32 and the "universal offerings of the great sky-repository" (dai kokazo futsa kuyo *~~SillfJliiitl< ilE, #32). As mentioned above, the Jahachi geiin does not explicitly mention the dojokan - a rite that involves the visualization of the principal deity of the rite. However, there is a "contemplation" (so ~) that is clearly related:

Next imagine that in the middle of the altar there is a lion throne set on top of a great eight-petaled lotus blossom. On the throne is a seven-jeweled tower bedecked with colorfully embroidered banners and jewel-covered pillars arrayed in rows. Divine garments are hung about and it is surrounded by fragrant clouds. Flowers rain down everywhere and music plays. Jeweled vessels hold pure water, there is divine food and drink, and a mani gem serves as a lamp. Having performed this contemplation intone the following verse: "Through the power of my own merit, the power of the Tathagata's grace, and the power of the dharma-realm, I dwell in universal offerings." ~H!;\!i : ~:ti<pj\**Ji • ..tffllilTJilio Jili..tfft;'1lltOO~~Jj!J1Htll*rjtliJ(filT~Jo ~!I'J>x t<p.iJ;ffi"~~11fffillf£1't*ii\Hf~o ftlflj;ll-!J1lJn7<:~j!tI::flt~~m~o fFIJUl!Bffii~iliJ1t1l\: J.iJ.~J.lJ~::iJ, ~D*:!JDM'::iJ, "&J.iJ.'1MI·::iJ, 11fllHlHliHi.33

Note that this contemplation from the Jahachi geiin makes no reference to the presence of the principal deity. TIlls is striking, since the dojokan found in all later manuals, including the Jahachido nenju shidai attributed to KUkai (KDZ 2.621), foregrounds the appearance of the principal deity in his jeweled palace. The following liturgy, used in the SanbOinryu IUhachido, is typical:

Form the "tathagata fist mudrii" ~D*~I'P .... Contemplate li!l$ as follows: In front [of me] is the syllable ah (J: aku). The syllable changes into a palatial hall of jewels. Inside is an altar with stepped walkways on all four sides. Arrayed in rows are jeweled trees with embroidered silk banners suspended from each. On the altar is the syllable hrfh (kiriku) which changes and becomes a crimson lotus blossom terrace. On top is the syllable a (a) which changes and becomes a full moon disk. On top is the syllable hrfh (kiriku),

32 The tenn d6j6 is used as a translation of the Sk. bodhimar;ga, the seat upon which a buddha sits at the time of his enlightenment. Its use for the sanctuary - the site of practice - is thus metaphorical, and the title of this section might well be translated "adornment of the seat of enlightenment." See Takai 1953: 117-118, and Oyama 1987: 101-104.

33 T.900: 18.782cll-17. By the time of the compilation of the liihachid6 nenju shidai attributed to Kiikai, the verses at the end had become separated from the d6j6kan and appear in a recurring unit called the "three powers" (sanriki :=:':IJ; KDZ 2.620).


and to the left and right there are two triih (taraku) syllables. The three syllables change and become a vajra jewel lotus. The jewel lotus changes into the principal deity, with six arms and a body the color of gold. The top of his head is adorned with a jeweled crown. He sits in the posture of the Freedom King (Jizai {) !31:Ex), assuming the attribute of preaching the dharma. From his body flow a thousand rays of light, and his upper torso is encircled by a radiant halo. His upper right arm is in the posture of contemplation. His second right arm holds the wish-fulfilling gem. His third right arm holds a rosary. His upper left arm touches the mountain [beneath him]. His second left arm holds a lotus blossom. His third left arm holds a wheel. His magnificent body of six arms is able to roam the six realms, employing the skillful means of great compassion to end the suffering of all sentient beings. The eight great Kannons and the innumerable members of the Lotus realm assembly surround him on all sides34•

Commentaries typically interpret the dojokan as the moment in the narrative in which the practitioner first establishes contact with the deity, visualizing him in his divine abode35• But then the reference to the "sanctuary" (dojO) in the title to this section ("adornment of the sanctuary") is ambiguous: is the sanctuary being adorned that of the practitioner or the deity? (The term "d6jo" is most commonly associated with the site of practice - an earthly chapel - yet according to the narrative, the deity has not yet arrived on the practitioner's altar.)

There are a few ways to account for the anomalous nature of this ffthachi geiin segment. One possibility is that the ffthachi geiin preserves an early tradition that, in contrast with later manuals, remains closer to the narrative logic of the guest-host structure. The scene is not the principal deity's abode at all but rather the sanctuary being readied for the deity's imminent arrival. The altar is imagined as the site of the jeweled palatial tower, with various offerings (flowers, water, food, music, light) laid out and ready for the god's descent.

Alternatively, the ffthi:1chi geiin may be intentionally ambiguous as to the location of the divine altar: two of the important sources for the

34 Miyano and Mizuhara 1933: Nyoirin 13-14; cf. Ozawa 1962: Jahachido 51-53. The Chiiin-ryii dojokan for the Jiihachid6 is similar except for the identity of the principal deity.

35 Takai explains that the advanced practitioner will contemplate the dojo as within his own mind, but the novice practitioner must begin by viewing the dojo as outside of himself (1953: 161).

68 ROBERT H. SHARF

jilhachido sequence - the Wuliangshou rulai guanxing gongyang yigui and Guanzizai pusa ruyilun niansong yigui - contairi contemplations at this point in the sequence that, while not called "contemplation of the sanctuary" (C: daochang guan), are still close to the later Japanese dojokan in that they invoke the figure of the principal deity in his heavenly palace36• From a doctrinal rather than narrative perspective, the ambiguity is felicitous, since the term dojo refers to the locus of enlightenment itself. From this perspective there is no difference between the "abode" of the deity and that of the practitioner - they are ultimately coextensive.

Yet another possibility is that the lilhachi geiin was not intended to serve as a ritual manual at all but rather as a template on which manuals for individual rites might be drafted. As such, the ambiguity concerning the site to be visualized is created by the omission of any descriptive details associated with a specific deity and his divine abode; one was supposed to "fill in the blanks" later on.

(4) Procedure for Inviting [the Deities into the Sanctuary] (kanjo hO fi!.J~~#;). The practitioner dispatches a jeweled vehicle for the deity (hOsharo Jf$:~, #34). The deity and his retinue are beckoned into the vehicle (shO sharo ~$:~, #35), whereupon they descend into the sanctuary and are welcomed by the practitioner (geishO ill!~, #36). Early commentaries note that the practitioner should imagine the carriage as adorned with jewels and Indian in appearance37•

(5) Procedure for Binding and Protecting [the Sanctuary] (kechigo hO ~~#;). Horse-headed Wisdom King (Bat6 my66 ~jijillJEE, Bat6 Kannon 11!§ru:ii!1t #39), a wrathful incarnation of A valokitesvara, is stationed outside the sanctuary to guard the precincts38 • The roof is then covered with an impregnable vajra net (kongo rno ~/llIIj~, #40), and a wall of flames is established around the perimeter (kain .1<.1lJ'G, #41). The sanctuary is now sealed off from the outside, making it safe from all malevolent forces.

(6) Procedure For Making Offerings (kuyo hO ~~Y!). This is the final and culminating section of the original eighteen methods. First, pure water

36 See T.930: 19.69a27 ff. and T.1085: 20.205a7 ff. respectively. 37 See, for example, luhachi geiin gishaku shoki, T.2475: 78.121b20. 38 In later texts, notably those associated with the Chiiin-ryii, the wrathful deity G6zanze

my66 1l*=~IJIl:E (Trailokyavijaya-raja) is used instead.


is provided to wash the deity's feet (akaIUHfm, #43), and lotus seats are set out for the deity to sit upon (rengeza ~~J*, #44). The luhachi geiin ends with a section simply called "universal offerings" (jukuyo ~f:!J<~), in which the practitioner imagines five offerings, each limitless and boundless as the clouds or the sea: (1) powdered incense, (2) flower garlands, (3) burnt incense, (4) food and drink, and (5) light. In the luhachi geiin these five are accomplished together with a single mantra, bui: later manuals will specify a separate rite for each (go kuyolif:!J<~, #46). They will also add offerings of music (enacted by ringing a bell, shinrei :Jm~, #45), hynins (san ~, #47, #48), and so on.

The commentaries explain the content and function of each of the offerings in terms of ancient Indian protocol for receiving and feting an honored guest. When the deity arrives the host first washes the deity's feet, as was supposedly the custom in India (although the practice was not unknown in East Asia as well)39. Commentarial discussions of the sort of seat to be offered as well as the form and function of the five offerings (incense, garlands of flowers, and so on) similarly draw on East Asian conceptions of Indian etiquette4o. This is all in accord with the theme of the rite as a great Indian-style feast (kyoyo ~J!!., Takai 1953: 109-110).

The Invocation Procedures

The enumeration of the eighteen methods and six procedures, as well as the ordinances of the luhachi geiin, end here with the universal offerings41. The host has prepared his or her abode, summoned the guest, and provided a sumptuous meal and entertainment. Yet Shingon exegetes agree that the center piece of the rite lies in what follows, namely, the "invocation procedures" (nenju ht5 ~llm~). As noted above, in contemporary Shingon this section consists primarily of three elaborately scripted contemplations: the "interpenetration of self [and deity]" (nyuga-ga'nyu,

39 See, for example, ]ilhachi geiin gishaku sh6ki, T.2475: 78.l22b29-c8, which comments at length on the qualities and symbolic significance of the water offered to the deity.

40 Ibid. T.2475: 78.l22c9-l23b17. 41 The ]ilhachi geiin gishaku sh6ki acknowledges that this is where the eighteen meth

ods ends, and explains that since the procedures that follow differ according to the identity of the principal deity they are not recorded (T.2475: 78.123b17-19).

70 ROBERT H. SHARF

#51), "formal invocation" (shOnenju, #53), and "syllable-wheel contemplation" (jirinkan, #55). The historical, structural, and'doctrinal analyses of these three rites lies beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that they are said to unite the body, speech, and mind of the practitioner with the body, speech, and mind of the principal deity. Shingon commentators are quick to note, however, that the trope of "union" is yet another upiiya; the rites of the three mysteries do not bring about this union so much as they give form to it. In other words, the practitioner has always been one with the deity; the rites of the three mysteries merely enact, express, or realize this primordial state of affairs42•

Each of the rites of the three mysteries is punctuated by a short segment known as the "empowerment of the principal deity" (honzon kaji *#:tJD~, #52, #54, #56), consisting of the recitation of the three mantras of the principal deity. The three-mysteries sequence, interspersed by this empowerment, constitutes the core of the "invocation procedures" (nenju hO) and the heart of all Shidokegyo rituals.

The invocation procedures initiate an abrupt and somewhat dramatic shift in the liturgical narrative. The guest-host scenario is temporarily suspended, and the ritual takes a decidedly soteriological and "yogic" turn as the practitioner is instructed to "enter meditation" (nyu ja AlE) or "enter samiidhi" (nyu zanmai A-=llJK). This results in a two-tiered and somewhat incongruous structure that is sometimes explained by reference to the history of Buddhist Tantra.

Buddhist Tantra, we are told, emerged from a deliberate attempt to appropriate popular non-Buddhist Vedic or Brahmanic rites. Yixing -iT (683-727), in the Goma chapter of his Dapiluzhe 'na chengfo jingshu *~M!J![Jj~~{~M~iEfit, says that the Mahayana fire ritual was based on its Vedic counterpart in order to convert followers of the Vedas to Buddhism (T.1796: 39.779a19-21). "Buddha created this teaching out of his desire to convert non-Buddhists and allow them to distinguish the true from the false. Thus he taught them the true Goma .... The Buddha himself taught the very foundation of the Vedas, and in that way manifested

42 A comprehensive description of these rites along with an analysis of their symbolism and doctrinal significance can be found in Takai 1953: 192-206, and Ueda 1986: 168-182. See also the discussion in Sharf 2001b: 183-187.


the correct principles and method of the true Goma. This is the 'Buddha Veda' f?llij!:WE. '?43

While the Buddhist Goma may resemble the Vedic one, Yixing insists that only the Buddhist version leads to real knowledge and salvation. To this end Yixing repeatedly distinguishes between the "outer Goma" (wai humo ~Wl~), which is the manifest physical performance of the rite, and the inner Goma (nei humo j;I;j~~), which takes place in the practitioner's mind. The Vedas teach the outer Goma alone; the Buddhists, in contrast, understand the deeper significance and symbolism of the Goma and thus perform both inner and outer at once. The Goma fire, for example, is correctly understood by Buddhists to be the purifying wisdom of the Tathagata (T.1796: 39.662b7-13).

Buddhist polemics aside, this historical or pseudo-historical account does have a certain explanatory elegance. It seems plausible that the rise, popularity, and increasing status of non-Buddhist Tantric ritual in fifthand sixth-century India led Buddhist practitioners to appropriate the new ritual technology. Buddhist scholiasts legitimized the appropriation by reinterpreting the rituals (after the fact?) according to hoary Buddhist principles. On the one hand, specific elements in the liturgies were explained as symbols for Mahayana teachings (Goma fire = Buddha wisdom). On the other hand, the entire ritual performance was rationalized as a skillful means for manifesting one's intrinsic buddha-nature and realizing the bodhisattva vows. The constant refrain running throughout Yixing's commentary, and indeed all East Asian Esoteric exegesis, is that the practitioner must envisage his or her body as the body of the principal deity44. In a single stroke the guest-host narrative of the Indianpuja rites dedicated to a bewildering menagerie of deities is rendered a mere upaya for the realization of inherent buddhahood.

The early Chinese manuals - supposedly translations from Indic originals - lend further support to this theory. Recall that the locus classicus for the eighteen methods, the ]uhachi geiin, abruptly ends at the conclusion of the offering section, prior to the more soteriologically oriented

43 T.1796: 39.780bll-15; see the discussion in Toganoo 1982b: 85-86. 44 See, for example, T.1796: 39.582a26, 688c5, 688cl2-13, 701a6, 752b21, 781c27-

29, and so on.

72 ROBERT H. SHARF

"procedure for invocation." There is, as it were, no r90m for the invocation/contemplation procedures in this stripped down version of the guesthost paradigm. Most of the Chinese precursors of the eighteen methods do, however, continue past the guest-host narrative; the offering section is followed by a wide miscellany of samiidhis, discernments (guan iJl.), contemplations (nian ~), recitations (niansong ~~ili), and so on, all of which foreground traditional Mahayana doctrine and soteriological goals.

The offerings in the Wuliangshou rulai guanxing gongyang yigui, for example, are followed by a series of mantra recitations and guided contemplations centered around Arnitabha and A valokitesvara45 . These practices are said to induce a samiidhi wherein the practitioner's body becomes indistinguishable from the body of the deity (T.930: 19.71a28-29). The power of this samiidhi, claims the text, will bring about the eradication of defilement, allowing the practitioner to attain the highest level of rebirth in the Pure Land at death.

The Guanzizai pusa ruyilun niansong yigui, another text that closely follows the jiihachid6 structure, has a similar series of recitations (song santan jie ~ili~~{i1), contemplations (siwei ,~,it) of the principal deity, mantras, and dhiiralJl following the offerings (T.1085: 20.206a18 ff.). These practices culminate in the repeated recitation of the principal deity's mantra such that the "mind comes to rest in the samadhi of the principal deity" (206b22). The text goes on to promise those who practice the rite three times a day freedom from defIlement, the attainment of wisdom, perfection of samiidhi, a vision of the deity; and so on, "just as it says in the scriptures" (206c3-5).

The meditative exercises described in these Tang manuals are invariably framed in terms of traditional Mahayana doctrine and soteriology. At the same time, the meditations and recitations seem less mechanical or scripted than the concatenation of mantra/mudrii units comprising the

. earlier guest-host sequence. TheTang texts grant the practitioner greater latitude and flexibility in his or her approach to the invocation procedures, a flexibility redolent of more traditional Buddhist meditative practices (bhiivanii). The ad hoc quality of the invocation procedures in the

45 The offerings are accomplished with the "Offering of the Great Wish-fulfilling Gem" (guangda bukong mani gongyang ~*:;r-;~,*,JEIJ!i~) mudrii and accompanying dhdralJi (T.930: 19. 70b6ff.).


early manuals is further evidence of an underlying "two tier" structure to the rites.

As the rites developed in Japan, the invocation procedures following the offerings became more routinized, and by the medieval period they had come to assume the set form still practiced today: three discrete rites corresponding to the three mysteries. It is unclear, however, exactly when and how this transformation occurred. Two of the three-mysteries rites - the all important "interpenetration of self [and deity]" and "syllable-wheel contemplation" - do not appear in any of the Chinese sources for the eighteen methods. Indeed, they rarely appear in Chinese texts at all, and when they do they are not identified with the specific "mysteries" of body and mind46• Nor are they found in the JUhachid6 manuals attributed to Kukai. They do appear, however, in several other ritual manuals ascribed to Kukai, suggesting an early date for the establishment of these rites as set pieces in the Shingon curriculum47• Even then, with few exceptions, the early manuals do not construe the "interpenetration of self [and deity]" and "syllable-wheel contemplation" as part of the three-mysteries sequence48 •

In fact, the various invocation procedures found in the early manuals attributed to KUkai appear relatively fluid, with considerable variation from rite to rite much like their Chinese prototypes. One frequently comes

46 For a rare appearance of the phrase ruwo woru A'a'aA in the Chinese Buddhist canon see the lingangdingjing dayuqie himi xindi famen yijue jj);oo~m~*"'ilJu~lHl\"L.'i1!lI*F~ftiW< (T.1798: 39.813b15-17). Among the few Chinese references to "contemplating the syllable wheel" (guan zilun ij!!'i'~) see the.Achu rulai niansong gongyang fa il'Je.:lftD*~lililJ!i~1* (T.921: 19.15cll, 19c12), and Yixing's Dapiluzhe'na chengfo jingshu (T.1796: 39.689c9).

47 Mention of nyuga-ga'nyu is found, for example, in the Senju Kannon gyohO shidai T=Fij!!'/flTI*:bzm (KDZ 2.552), liM kongo nenju shidai #.f'lU[ilj~~lili:bzm (KDZ 2.567;cf. 2.580; 4.787), Mujin shOgonzo shidai ~milfJll'iil:bzm (KDZ 4.506), Taizo hizai shidai J!/lillliill'l'E:bzm (KDZ 4.616; cf. 4.659), Taizokai unji shidai lIiliillWII'14::b<:m (KDZ 4.694), Shugokyo nenju shidai "FlIl~~lili:bzm (KDZ 4.768), and Shari hO ~'fIJI* (KDZ 4.772). The jirinkan is found in the Kongokai dai giki jj);[:!~W*{lt'iil~ (KDZ 4.487), Taizo hizai shidai (KDZ 4.617; cf. 4.659), Taizokai unji shidai (KDZ 4.694), Shugokyo nenju shidai (KDZ 4.769), and Shari hO (KDZ 4.773).

48 Two notable exceptions are the sequences found in the Taizo hizai shidai (KDZ 4.616; cf. 4.659) and Taizokai unji shidai (KDZ 4.694). In both cases the sequences are almost identical to the one found in later medieval manuals, such as the manuals by Gengo, that form the basis of the modem rite. This may be evidence of a relatively late date for the Taizo hizai shidai and Taizokai unji shidai.

74 ROBERT H. SHARF

across units such as "formal recitation" (shanenju) anq "entry into meditation" (nyu ja .:A..5E)49, yet the specific liturgical content of these segments was not yet systematized .. Moreover, there are several instances in which the specific contemplations now associated with the "interpenetration of self [and deity]" and "syllable-wheel contemplation" are not Identified as discrete units under those headings, but simply appear as part of other liturgical units 50. It likely took several generations for the rites to crystallize into their current forms, but given the problems dating the extant manuals it would be difficult to determine precisely how this happened.

In any case, the available evidence of the Chinese and early Japanese manuals suggests that the two-tiered structure of the Shidokegyo rites is the result of a complex historical evolution, in which the "Vedic" guesthost narrative was both legitimized and confounded by the superimposition of an explicitly "Mahayana" bhiivana segment. This bhiivana segment was originally less structured and routinized than the rites of the guest-host narrative, which is not surprising given the greater antiquity of the guest-host rites. In any case, the guest-host sequence was reinterpreted in light of the bhiivana segment, transforming the entire rite into an extended meditation on, statement about, or performance of one's inherent buddha-nature. One might view this transformation as conceptually elegant and clever, or clumsy and confusing, depending upon one's point of view. Needless to say, such value judgments were not germane to traditional exegetes. These exegetes were, however, forced to confront the confusions that arose from the imposition of two somewhat discordant narratives.

The Dispersed Invocations

The structural ambiguity of the rite comes to a head in the "dispersed invocations" (sannenju f{~~m, #57), the segment that follows the three mysteries in the Shidokegyo liturgies. The dispersed invocations are followed by the "latter offerings" (go kuya 1&{l!<~), a ritual sequence that

49 See, for example, the Mujin sMgonzo shidai (KDZ 4.506); and SaM shidai j1'iS»zll';

(KDZ2.499, cf. KDZ 2.523). 50 See, for example, the SaM shidai (KDZ 2.503-504).


resumes the guest-host narrative and brings the ritual to a close. If only by virtue of their position in the rite, the dispersed invocations serve to negotiate the gap between the soteriological program of the three mysteries and the guest-host narrative that returns in the "latter offerings."

The latter offerings consist of many of the same procedures found in the eighteen methods, except that they are performed in reverse order and often abbreviated. Thus it begins with the five offerings and proceeds to offerings of water, music,hymns, and so on. Following these offerings there is a dedication of merit (eko ~~, #64), a standard element appearing near the close of all Buddhist rites. The sanctuary is then unsealed: the encircling flames and the vajra net are removed, Horse-headed Wisdom King is relieved from sentry duty, the vajra wall is withdrawn, and the principal deity is dispatched back to his abode (hakken ~Jt, #67). The rite closes with a repeat of a few of the apotropaic procedures that opened the performance (goshin bO). The final offerings serve as a denouement of the guest-host narrative, running the sequence in reverse.

The dispersed invocations that precede the latter offerings consist of a group of mantras that are repeated anywhere from seven to one thousand times each. The specific mantras used vary depending on the rite, the lineage (ryu), and the principal deity, although three of the mantras - Buddha-locana (Butsugen {~DN)51, Mahavajracakra (Dai kong6rin *~lllJtlJli$), and Ekak~ara-u~l)i~acakra (Ichiji kinrin -~~JIi$, Ichiji chOrinn6 -~mJli$::E) - always appe~2. In the Chliin-ryu JUhachid6 for example, in which l\1ahavairocana is the principal deity, the mantras used in the dispersed invocations consist of (1) Buddha-locana, repeated twenty-one times; (2) Garbhakosadhatu Mahavairocana, repeated one hundred times53 ; (3) Vajradhatu Mahavairocana, repeated one thousand times;

51 The Sanskrit reconstruction of the Buddha-locana mantra, which appears at the beginning and end of the dispersed invocations, is: Namo bhagavat-u:flJl:fa om ruru sphuru jvala-ti:ffha-siddha-Iocani sarviirtha-siidhanfye sviihii. Miyata and Todaro render this into English as "Homage to the u~lJfsa of the Bhagavat! Om Speak! Speak! Fill up! Radiate! Remain! Oh, the gaze of the accomplished ones! May you accomplish all aims! Sviiha" (1988: "Eighteen Rites," 31).

52 For an account of why these three mantras are always present see Raiyu's Usuzoshi kuketsu iW~TDtIt, T.2535: 79.178b27-cll.

S3 Reconstructed as: Om a vi ra hUm kham ("Om," followed by five seed syllables).

76 ROBERT H. SHARF

(4) the Four Buddhas - Ak~obhya (Ashuku-nyorai jliiJe.;l~D*), Ratnasarp.bhava (Hosh5-nyorai.1::~D*), Amitayus (Arnida-nyorai jliiJ5jWE~D *), and Amoghasiddhi (Fukii-joju /f~'*.l?;t), repeated one hundred times each; (5) Vajrasattva (Kongo satta ~illJIJiii~), repeated one hundred times; (6) Trailokyavijaya-raja (Gozanze myoo ~:=ii!:I3}EE), repeated twentyone times; (7) Mahavajracakra, repeated seven times; (8) Ekak~arau~r.U~acakra, repeated one hundred times; and (9) Buddha-Iocana, repeated seven times54. These mantras need not be accompanied by any specific contemplation; the manuals say only that the practitioner repeats the mantras using the rosary with hands forming the "preaching the dharma mudrii" (seppo no in ~~ZJP)55.

The mantras of the dispersed invocations, like most Japanese mantras, consist of Japanese pronunciations of Chinese transliterations of Sanskrit invocations, making it difficult for most priests to discern the semantic content (if indeed there is any) of the underlying Sanskrit phrases. (Contemporary training manuals and scholarly commentaries often provide Sanskrit reconstructions, Japanese translations, and explanations of the mantras.) As there are close to two thousand repetitions to perform, the dispersed invocations can take upwards of an hour to complete, constituting one-third to one-half of the duration of the rite.

Given their duration and their placement within the ritual sequence - situated immediately after the climax of the three mysteries - one might suppose that the dispersed invocations comprise a particularly important section of the Shidokegyo. practices. Yet traditional Shingon commentators have little to say about the meaning and function of this segment, and what they do say is often vague and equivocal. The meaning of the term sannenju itself is ambiguous (see below), and my use of "dispersed invocations" is little more than an expedient; "supplemental" or "scattered invocations" might serve just as well.

54 This list, typical of Chiiin-ryii manuals, is taken from Oyama 1987: 129-133, and Nakagawa 1986: ]ahachidi5. The mantras will differ depending in part on the identity of the principal deity used for the rite. On the dispersed invocations, in addition to Oyama see Toganoo 1982b: 66-67; Takai 1953: 206-208; Tanaka 1962: 147-148; Ueda 1986: 182-187; Miyata 1984: 91-94; Sawa 1975: 271b; Foguang da cidian zongwu weiyuanhui 1989: 5.4973c-d; Nakamura 1981: 496d; and Ding 1984: 1145d.

55 The rosary is used along with counting sticks to keep track of mantra recitations.

THINKING THROUGH SHINGON R1TUAL 77

The confusions are in part due to the absence of authoritative textual soirrces for the dispersed invocations. The sannenju segment does not appear in any of the dozens of Chinese texts on which t.~e Shidokegy6 liturgies were based; nor does it appear in the lahachi geiin, which concludes, as mentioned above, with the offerings at the end of the eighteen m~thods56. The dispersed invocations are mentioned, however, in many of the manuals attributed to KUkai, including the luhachido nenju shidai (KDZ 2.627)57. And even when the term sannenju does not appear, early Shingon ritual manuals that conform to the eighteen-methods structure will often prescribe mantra recitations immediately following the three-mysteries rites; these recitations appear to be the functional equivalent of the sannenju.

The absence of a canonical Chinese precedent meant that Japanese practitioners enjoyed considerable latitude in their approach to the dispersed invocations. Manuals and commentaries agree that practitioners - or at least advanced practitioners (itatsu B~) - are free to add, subtract, or substitute mantras in accord with their own predilections, to augment or decrease the prescribed number of recitations, or to omit this section entirely. Accordingly, the dispersed invocations were also known as the "discretionary invocations" (zuii nenju ro!i\~~m), and some medieval commentators alternate freely between the two terms58. Moreover, the

56 I have found only a single reference to the term san niansong m~iili in the "Esoteric teachings section" (mikkyo bu <til!:llil) of the Taish6 canon. This is in the Yaoshi yigui yizhu If!Mii<<liA-~ (T.924c: 19.32c23), a text of uncertain authorship and provenance, but here it refers to a segment occurring before the major invocations of the rite, and hence it appears of limited relevance to the discussion at hand. The lingangdingjing yuqie shibahui zhigui i!1!IJlfll&",ihu-ti\1tlliiliil translated by Amoghavajra contains a reference to an "esoteric dispersed recitation that augments skillful means" (bimi zhucheng fangbian sansong iiiI<tilliJpx1Ji!miili, T.869: l8.286a22). This locution may have influenced Kiikai's use of the phrase to sannenju shitchi hob en ~1llr~iili~ll!J1Ji! in the Ninno hannyakyo nenju shidai j::r:Jlll:'!5'l&~gili;9(jfl (KDZ 4.751); see the discussion in Ueda 1986: 183.

57 The sannenju is also mentioned in the following manuals ascribed to Kiikai: Fudo myoo nenju shidai 'Fj/J'lilr:~iili;9(jfl (KDZ 2.677), SahO shidai (KDZ 2.507); Issai nyorai taisho kongo shidai -lj1J~o*:kM1i!1!IJ;9(jfl (KDZ 2.609); Taizo bizai shidai (KDZ 4.617); Taizo bonji shidai Rilili!1t'l";9(jfl (KDZ 2.286); Bizai shidai friil':E;9(jfl (KDZ 4.659); Gumonji shidai *llIIffl;9(jfl (KDZ 4.701); and Ninno hannyakyo nenju shidai (KDZ 4.751). Usually the texts simply say, "Next, the dispersed invocations" ;9(m~Ni!i, although occasionally, as in the Fudo myoo nenju shidai and Issai nyorai taishO kongo shidai, the text will list the names of the mantras to be used.

58 See, for example, the Taizokai nenju shidai yoshaki by G6h6 (SZ 25.519b). Kiikai's SaM shidai contains a short gloss under the sannenju saying it is "optional" (nin'i ff:1ii:;

78 ROBERT H. SHARF

dispersed invocations are not found in the liturgies of the Tendai esoteric tradition (Tairnitsu trW), marking it as one of the few notable differences between the Shidokegy6rites of the Tendai and Shingon schools.

The origins and meaning of the term sannenju are unclear59• Commentators typically begin their discussions of the term by opposing the sannenju to the shonenju IE~~m or "formal· invocation" of the three-mysteries segment60 . In its narrow sense, the "formal invocation" refers to the second of the three mysteries - the "mystery of speech" (gomitsu mW) - realized through a stylized recitation of the mantra of the principal deity accompanied by an elaborate contemplation of the mantra circulating between the deity and the practitioner. However, the term "formal invocation" can also denote the entire three-mysteries sequence. In either case, the shO IE of shOnenju is interpreted as "formal," "solemn," and "direct," while san ~ is understood as "scattered," "dispersed," and "diffuse" (santa ~~). Whereas the shOnenju is a highly stylized invocation directed toward the principal deity alone, the sannenju is a less stringent "scattering" of invocations among a variety of supplementary deities. Thus the shOnenju, which is accompanied by a mudrii as well as an elaborate "visualization," is considered the "primary" recitation, while the sannenju, which is accompanied by a mudrii alone, is treated as "secondary."

Commentators also suggest that the sho of shonenju has the sense of shoshin IEJL\ meaning a "focused" or "directed mind," in contrast to san as sanshin ~JL' meaning a "diffused" or even "distracted mind. ,,61 According to this reading, during the three-mysteries segment

KDZ 2.507). And the reference to the dispersed invocations in the Jilhachido sata i-i\jlfJI/t by Kakuban lists the mantras to be included in this section, namely Buddha-locana, Mahavairocana, Trailokyavijaya-raja, Vajrasattva, and Acalanatha, following which one can "continue at one's own discretion" (sonogo zuii :Jt1fIl1l;'@;; T.2517: 79.26c8). Lexical sources note other names for the sannenju as well, including "supplementary invocations" (kayo nenju 1JQJ'Il~IDli), and "miscellaneous invocations" (shozo nenju il1l*lt~~ili; Foguang da cidian zongwu weiyuanhui 1989: 5.4973b; Sawa 1975: 271b).

59 See the sources mentioned in note 54 above. 60 The shOnenju is also known as sanmaya nenju. =J*J!1l~~ili, jo nenju ):E~~ili, and kaji

nenju 1JQI!f~~ili (Sawa 1975: 388b-389a). 61 See, for example, Ueda 1986: 182, who cites chapter six of the Zuigyo shishO

!i1lfTfMiI>.


the practitioner is one with the deity, in a state of meditation (jocha JE~) in which the practitioner enters into the deity's samiidhi. In the dispersed invocations that follow, the practitioner emerges from samiidhi in order to fulfill the bodhisattva vows, enlightening others by "scattering" mantras in all directions. How, one might ask, is the practitioner to practice if the mind is "scattered"? This question is raised in the luhachido kuketsu by Raiyu, who provides one of the more detailed discussions of the dispersed invocations62. Citing the Hizoki WJ1.iilac (thought to be Kilkai's record of Huiguo's teaching), Raiyu says that the practitioner and the deity have both merged into the single dharma realm (ichi hokkai -¥*~) during the previous invocations, and thus the practitioner is able to retain control fr3 even though his or her mind is scattered. Having just merged with the deity, the practitioner is able to reenter the phenomenal world while remaining identified with the principal deity63. Raiyu goes on to equate the formal invocation with meditation and the dispersed invocations with wisdom IE~JE1itli'::~64 .

Modern commentators pick up this opposition, saying that the formal invocation is the "practice of inner realization" (jinaisho no homon § pqruEO)¥*F~), while the dispersed invocations effect the liberation of others (keta {l::At!!)65. The liberation of others is achieved through the invocation of a host of deities (shoson ~#) that have a karmic bond (en ~) with either the principal deity or the practitioner, thereby augmenting the grace and power of the principal deity (Tanaka 1962: 147). The structural relationship between the formal invocation and the dispersed invocations is thus equated with the standard Mahayana moieties of buddha versus bodhisattva, emptiness versus skillful means, and so on.

62 T.2529: 79.70bll-c4. See also his Usuzoshi kuketsu, T.2535: 79.178b22-179al. 63 Moriya Eishun j:l<:jotJl!if31, a priest at K6fukuji, explained this to me by saying that dur

ing the sannenju the wandering mind of the practitioner is identical with the wandering mind of the principal deity, eliminating the need for any prescribed contemplations to accompany the sannenju recitations.

64 T.2529: 79.70c3. Raiyu also comments that since the dispersed invocations do not appear in the scriptures and early recitation manuals, it is optional in the Rishoin-ryu l1I!i'£rrJoiiil.

65 Tanaka 1962: 147. Tanaka notes that, according to exegetes such as Kakuban, the formal invocation is also effective in liberating others.

80 ROBERT H. SHARF

Ritual Incoherence

One question that arises is how, if at all, the dispersed iIlvocations fit into the overall narrative program of the Shidokegyo rituals. We have seen that there is a break between (1) the offerings segment that complete the traditional eighteen methods, and (2) the enactment of the three mysteries that follows. At best, the rites of the three mysteries would seem to render the preceding guest-host narrative an upiiya; the true relationship between practitioner and deity is not that of host and guest after all but rather one of identity. Yet the guest-host narrative recommences with the "latter offerings" that follow the dispersed invocations. If this denouement to the narrative, in which the host unbinds the sanctuary and bids farewell to the guest, is taken at face value, then at what point in the narrative does the practitioner "emerge from samadhi" and disengage from the deity? This question bears directly on the narrative significance and function of the dispersed invocations.

Commentators have explored, explicitly or implicitly, three possibilities. The first is that the practitioner disengages from the deity and reverts to his or her former self with the commencement of the dispersed invocations. The dispersed invocations then represent the activity of a bodhisattva; the practitioner, having "reentered the marketplace" (to borrow a popular Zen image), scatters invocations for the liberation of all sentient beings. The second possibility is that the dispersed invocations are themselves intended to reintegrate the practitioner into' the world; they facilitate a gradual and controlled emergence from samadhi66 • The third possibility is that the entire sequence of dispersed invocations is performed while ensconced in the samadhi of the principal deity.

There is a certain elegance to the last position, according to which the dispersed invocations are the manifest performance of the principal deity himself. This renders the dramatic narrative of the Shidokegyo rituals structurally analogous to the performance of a shaman or spirit

66 See esp. Miyata 1984: 91-94, who views everything following the three mysteries as a gradual process of "dissociation." According to Miyata, the process continues through the dispersed invocations to the latter offerings, the unsealing of the realm, and the departure of the deity.


medium, in which the raison d' etre of the ritual prologue is to efface the agency of the practitioner and invoke in his place the presence of the deity. In Shihgon, this is viewed not as possession, of course, but rather as an extended communion, referred to as "reciprocal resonance [with the deity]" (kanno doko ~E!J!!~), wherein practitioner and god act in total accord67 • This should not be construed merely as an interior "meditative state"; rather, the physical activity of the performer is precisely the physical activity of the embodied deity (sokushin jobutsu ~P:!ir~f9t).

This is how the practitioner is instructed to approach the fourth and final rite of the Shidokegy6 sequence, namely, the Goma. Like all Shidokegy6 rites, the Goma ritual is built around the eighteen methods of the juhachido. But there is an important difference: the Kong6kai and Taiz6kai rituals are constructed as expansions of the liihachid6 rite, with dozens of additional ritual elements interspersed among those of the IUhachid6. The Goma, in contrast, is constructed by taking the entire fire ritual segment and nesting it whole in the midst of the liihachid6 dispersed invocations. Thus the Shidokegy6 Goma opens with the liihachid6 sequence, running it all the way through the main offerings, threemysteries invocations, and most but not all of the dispersed invocations. The fire ritual proper commences just before the final three mantras of the dispersed invocations (Mahavajracakra, Ekak~ara-ugu~acakra, and Buddha-Iocana). When the Goma is complete the practitioner performs the three mantras that remain from the dispersed invocations and then continues through the "latter offerings" of the liihachid6 (Takai 1953: 389). The fire ritual is thus framed by the recitations of the dispersed invocations, and the practitioner is to remain in a state of unity with the principal deity throughout the fire offerings.

In the end, there is little agreement among traditional or modem Japanese exegetes as to the specific point at which the practitioner emerges from samadhi - the point at which, according to the logic of the narrative, guest and host are not one but two. This narrative ambiguity mirrors an ambiguity in the rites' underlying soteriology.

67 Toganoo 1982b: 66. On the notion of reciprocal accord with the deity see Hiz6ki, KDZ 2.36; Toganoo 1982b: 151; and Sharf 2002: 77-133.

82 ROBERT H. SHARF

Mahayana notions of tathagatagarbha and intrinsic l;lUddha-nature gave rise to a conundrum that captivated generations of scholiasts: if buddhanature is innate, why practice? The Zen patriarch Degen ~JI; (1200-1253) is often associated with the response that one practices not in order to attain buddhahood but in order to manifest it. But in viuiousguises this "solution" to the problem predates Degen by many centuries, and Degen's own approach may have been influenced by his mikkyo training at Enryakuji ~M~. In any case, Shingon ritual is predicated on a view of the phenomenal universe as the theophany of the dharmakiiya, a view that confutes, at least in theory, the notion that Shingon ritual is intended to bring about a fundamental change in the ontological status of either the practitioner or the world. The point of the rites, in other words, is not the attainment of buddhahood but rather its expression. This expression takes the form of an elaborately scripted drama wherein the practitioner compels the presence of a buddha only to reveal that the buddha was never absent68 . Among other things,this notion provides doctrinal justification for the seemingly obsessive character of mikkyo ritual; since there is no ultimate "goal" to be achieved, one is left, like SeW practitioners of zazen, with practice for its own sake. This also provides conceptual grounds for the ambiguity in the ritual narrative noted above: from the standpoint of tathagatagarbha theory and the doctrine of intrinsic buddha-nature, it makes little sense to mark a ritual moment at which one ceases to be a buddha.

Finally, a similar conceptual ambiguity can be discerned in the treatment of the central image (honzon) enshrined on East Asian Buddhist

68 This is made explicit throughout the liturgical recitations and contemplations of the Shingon ritual manuals. Take, for example, the "interpenetration of self [and deity]," the fIrst of the three-mysteries rites which brings about the union of the body of the practitioner and the body of the deity. The contemplation associated with this rite reads: "The principal deity sits on a ma7;uJala. I sit on a mm:uJala. The principal deity enters my body and my body enters the body of the principal deity. It is like many luminous mirrors facing each other, their images interpenetrating each other jlC~IjIj~t!l:l!t~~l!l'}dll" (Miyano and Mizuhara 1933: Nyoirin 27-28; cf. Ozawa 1962: Jilhachid6 78-79). Traditional exegetes interpret the use of the mirror image as showing that the body of the principal deity does not literally "enter" the practitioner; rather, one is to look upon the principal deity as if gazing at one's own reflection. The body of the principal deity and the body of the practitioner have always subsumed each other (Takai 1953: 194).

THINKlNG THROUGH SHINGON RITUAL 83

temple altars. In order to be ritually efficacious, such images must be consecrated in an "eye-opening" (kaigen ~~N) ceremony when first installed. Such a consecration transforms an image from a mere physical likeness into a vivified icon that literally embodies the deity69. At the same time, if one looks at the structure of the services regularly performed before such images (J: kuy6 ~~, from Sk: pilja, "rites of offering"), they typically involve a ritual segment, however brief, that invites the deity to descend into the image7o. This raises the question: if the icon was successfully consecrated at the time of its installation, thereby transforming it into the living body of a deity, what need is there to request the descent of the deity yet again at the time of worship? Is this merely a case of ritual anxiety fueling a ritual obsession that betrays a lingering doubt over the efficacy of the rites?

Phyllis Granoff has argued that this "confusion" can be explained by reference to the historical evolution of image worship in India7l . According to Granoff, the two moments of invocation - one during the initial consecration of the image and the other during regular "feedings" -may derive from two different paradigms of worship that became incorporated into the later image cult. One is an earlier "Vedic" model, in which the worshipper must solicit the presence of the deity prior to each sacrifice. This paradigm was established long before the use of sacred icons in India; Brahmin priests invoked invisible beings on an altar that was often a temporary structure built specifically for the occasion.

The spread of the cult of the image is associated with a later "Purfu:!ic" mode of worship focused around a consecrated icon permanently enshrined in a temple 72. The image, which some believe was introduced from Greece, was approached as the animate physical incarnation of the

69 See Sharf 2001 a; for references to the secondary literature on eye-opening ceremonies see Sharf2001b: 248n. 64.

70 This is true of both "exoteric" (kengyo IIllfl) and "esoteric" (mikkyo) Buddhism, but as far as I am aware only in the latter case is the deity explicitly sent back to his or her abode at the close of the rite.

71 See Granoff 2001, n.d.a, and n.d.b. I want to thank Phyllis Granoff for generously sharing and discussing her unpublished work with me.

n It is worth noting that the gap between these two paradigms was so great that the orthodox Brahmin priests originally distanced themselves from and castigated the emerging temple cult.

84 ROBERT H. SHARF

deity. The icon/deity became a permanent resident j.n the community; it needed to be bathed, dressed, fed, and entertained on a regular basis. But the earlier Vedic paradigm was soon superimposed on the treatment of these images; VediC-style incantations (mantras) were used to impel the deity's descent at the initial consecration and again during regular pftjii offerings. The Buddhist treatment of images appears to be based on this pan-Indian synthesis of Vedic and Purar:uc models. (In Shingon, the Vedic antecedents are somewhat more pronounced, as a new "temporary" altar is ritually constructed during the course of each performance.) If Granoff is correct, then the ambiguities, if not the discursive incoherence, that result from the fusion of Vedic and Purar:uc modes of worship is analogous in many respects to the narrative ambiguities that result from the fusion of Vedic ritual and Mahayana bhiivanii found in the EastAsian Esoteric rites discussed above.

Ritual Meaning

My musings on the history of Buddhist ritual and image worship are just that: the musings of an outsider based largely on the evidence of ritual texts the provenance and historical development of which are still poorly understood. Historical questions aside, however, my overview of the narrative content, structural logic, and doctrinal import of the ritual procedures is by no means an etic imposition. The guest-host narrative is made explicit in the sequence of Shidokegyo ritual procedures and is further amplified in oral and written commentaries from early on. Moreover, basic Shingon teachings concerning one's identity with the principal deity, the dependently arisen nature of all phenomena, the bodhisattva vows, and so on, are reiterated ad nauseam in the content of Shidokegyo recitations and contemplations73•

73 For example, the cuhninating moment of the Shidokegyo rites is the ritual identification of the mind of the deity with the mind of the practitioner. This takes place in the "syllable-wheel contemplation," which consists in a Madhyamika-style "deconstruction" of the principal deity's mantra. According to the discursive logic of this rite, to appreciate the dependently arisen nature of the deity's mantra, and thus the emptiness of the deity himself, is precisely to become one with the deity's mind. See Sharf 200lb: 184-185.


In a parenthetical comment earlier in this paper I suggested that what makes tantra "tantra," in any critical cross-cultural sense, lies not in its "meanings" but in its techniques. Tantra is an applied knowledge pertaining to the use of a cornucopia of ritual implements, icons, occult gestures and utterances. These techniques were adopted into diverse religious contexts across Asia and reinterpreted in the light of local tradition. There is thus no reason to assume that the specifically Shingon understanding of the narrative or doctrinal content of the rites examined above is commensurate with non-Buddhist interpretations of Tantra found in South or Southeast Asia. Buddhist exegetes would agree with this assessment, since by their own account the Buddha borrowed the outward forms of Vedic worship and supplied them with new Mahayana meanings.

But by the same measure, any robust account of Shingon Tantra must acknowledge the discursive content of the rites that was salient in the Shingon school. Each element in the rite was understood in the context of this content - its place in the overarching guest-host narrative - and modifications to the ritual form were made in full awareness of their narrative and doctrinal consequences. As such, Staal's thesis as to the essential invariance and meaninglessness of ritual cannot stand, for in Shingon we have a sophisticated ritual tradition of considerable antiquity in which (1) rituals underwent continual, albeit incremental, change, and (2) semantic content clearly mattered.

This still leaves us with the question as to why anyone would perform these rites in the first place. Here Staal raises an important point, for the meanings themselves cannot account for or justify the tremendous commitment of human and institutional resources necessary for the performance of these rites. Considerable expense is involved in the acquisition and preparation of the essential ritual paraphernalia, and a monastery must be willing to offer material support to the priests in cloistered retreat. More important, the rituals themselves are hard work: the retreats are long, arduous, and mentally and physically exhausting. Why spend years of one's life perfecting a surfeit of rites that all end up "saying" much the same thing?

Any full response to this question must take into account a host of sociological and psychological factors, bearing on everything from institutional structure, to issues of social status, to questions of identity formation and personal faith - issues that cannot be addressed here. But our

86 ROBERT H. SHARF

response must also take into account the power and. allure of the rituals themselves, an allure derived in part from the narrative explored above. This narrative situates the practitioner as the protagonist in a dramatic encounter with powerful and mysterious forces. The constru«ted, fictive, dramatic, and patently playful aspects of the encounter make it no less enchanting74.

74 See Sharf n.d. for an analysis of the element of "play" in the workings of ritual.

THINKING THROUGH SHINGON RITUAL

APPENDIX·

Procedural Sequence for the Eighteen-Methods Practice (Jiihachido nenju shidai +i\m~~ili*~)

87

The following outline of the Eighteen Methods sequence is that used by contemporary priests in the SanbOin-ryli, in which Nyoirin Kannon functions as the principal deity (see Ozawa 1962: Jahachid6, and Takai 1953: 109-216). Among the prototypes for the contemporary rite, the most influential manual is the Sh6-nyoirin Kanjizai bosatsu nenju shidai ~:flo;1itiiili~§f:E¥fjji~~ili*m by Genge j[;:li': (914-995). Genge's manual is in tum based on the Jahachi geiin +i\~I'IJ, Jahachid6 nenju shidai +i\m~~ili*m, and Jahachid6 kubi shidai +l\m~*m, all of which are attributed to Klikai.

The symbol" b," indicates a procedure included in the traditional list of eighteen procedures traced to the Jahachi geiin. The symbol "-:/' indicates a section included in the "six practices" (rokuhO r;#i).

Various ritual purifications precede the formal entrance to the hall.

* SECTION ONE: PROCEDURE FORADORNlNG THE PRACTITIONER ltf IHT1f#i

1. J::~ 2. ~f<t 3. 3fm 4. m{;!l; 5. ~~ 6. !:t~

b, 8. w=:~

b, 9. {9Il$=:~Jj~

b, 10. Ji.$=:~lfll b, 11. l'€illJU$=:~lfll

Enter the Sanctuary Universal Prostration [to all Tathiigatas] Sit Down Separate the hnplements Universal Prostration (as above) Rub Powdered mcense (powdered incense is rubbed on the hands and arms, and then across the chest, anointing the five-part dharma-body li?t#i,!!:t.) Contemplate the Three Mysteries (This contemplation uses the "urn" syllable to purify body, speech, and mind.)

The following five procedures constitute the goshin b6 ~,!!:t#i, or bodily purification and protection. Purify the Three Karmic Actions (body, speech, mind) Buddha Family Assembly Lotus Family Assembly Vajra Family Assembly

88 ROBERT H. SHARF

Don Annor and Protect the. Body

SECTION TWO: THE VOWS OF SAMANTABHADRA~I~JTJ!l.lll*

13. !JOj\f~7j(

14. !Joj\f{lii~

15. ~'¥fi!!

16. /*:tll! 17. lill.i?ll 18. ~lIilll~

19. 1i'~ 20. *8 21. t$j11JTJ!l.ll 22. n'ljij

/*~~

1i'~ 23. ~,!¥j)H,'

24. ~1l:I<1f~JtlZ

25. ~~ 26. n*~

Empower the Perfumed Water (ambrosia) Empower the Implements Contemplate the Character "ran" Purify the Earth Contemplate the Buddhas Arouse the Vajra Universal Prostration Declaration of Intent Siltra Offerings to Divine Spirits Five Repentances (Samantabhadra's vows) Purify the Three Karmic Actions (as above) Universal Prostration (as above) Give rise to the Mind of Awakening (Bodhicitta) Three Samaya Precepts Recite the Vows Five Great Vows (to save all beings, to cultivate all merits and wisdoms, to awaken to all the dharma-gates, to serve all tathagatas, and to realize unexcelled awakening) Universal Offering

"* SECTION THREE: PROCEDURE FOR BINDING THE [SACRED] REALM *liJf.l*

28. *~lIilllfnB

£::, 29. :tll!*Ii £::, 30. [9:1J*Ii(~IillUJjlj)

Great Vajra Wheel Bind the Earth (also called the Vajra Pillar) Bind the Perimeter, or the Vajra Wall

"* SECTION FOUR: PROCEDURE FOR ADORNING THE SANCTUARY jllli m~l*

£::, 31. m~lill.

£::, 32. *Eiff~iiia1i'Jm{liiJ1 33. Il\~IIilUfnB

Contemplate the Sanctuary Universal Offerings of the Great Sky-Repository Small Vajra Wheel


* SECTION FIVE: PROCEDURE FOR INVITING [THE DEITIES INTO THE SANCTUARy] lfb~1!

t;, 34. ~.M t;, 35. ~.M

Send Forth the Jeweled Vehicle Invite the Deities to Ascend the Vehicle and Ride to the Sanctuary

t;, 36. f3~ Welcome the Deities 37. IZEIjIj Four Syllable Mantra 38. jtJ~ Clap Hands (in welcome)

* SECTION SIX: PROCEDURE FOR BINDING AND PROTECTING [THE SANCTUARy] *Ii~1!

t;, 39. }i!§iililjlj.:E Invoke the Horse-headed Wisdom King Sky Net (or Vajra Net) t;, 40. ITl2~~ (iiillJq~)

t;, 41. iiillJlJ~ Vajra Fire 42. *':::,*Jfll Great Samaya [Assembly]

* SECTION SEVEN: PROCEDURE FOR MAKING OFFERINGS ~.I!

t;, 43. fMHlJo Offer Pure Water t;, 44. i1l!*~ Offer Lotus Seats

45. JJret,t Offer the [Five Pronged] Vajra and Bell 46. li~~ Five Offerings (powdered incense, garland, burnt

incense, food and drink, light) 47. 1ZEi'~ Eulogy of the Four Wisdoms (accompanied by

clapping) 48. *~~ Eulogy to the Principal Deity

t;, 49. !l*/F~JlifJE~(i!t-~~) Offer the Great Wish-fulfilling Gem (or Univer-sal Offerings)

50. ~{91l Worship the Buddhas' [Names]

SECTION EIGHT: PROCEDURE FOR INVOCATION ~IDliI!

51. A.~~A. Interpenetration of Self [and Deity] 52. *~1JO~(*~':::fil'fJ~~) Empowerment of the Principal Deity 53. lE~~iIi Formal Invocation 54. *#1Jo~ Empowerment of the Principal Deity (as above, 52) 55. ~*iU11if! Syllable Wheel Contemplation 56. *#1Jo~ Empowerment of the Principal Deity (as above, 52) 57. tt~~iIi Dispersed Invocations

90 ROBERT H. SHARF

SECTION NINE: LATTER OFFERINGS f&i#i~

58. lii#i~ Five Offerings (as above, 46) 59. ~{fJn Offer Pure Water (as above, 43) 60. f&Mi Latter Offering of Bell and Vajra (as above, 45) 61. ~ Eulogy (as above, 47) 62. ~i#i~=:tJ Universal Offering with the Verses of the Three

Strengths (as above, 27) 63. ijlJ{jil Worship the Buddhas' [Names] (as above, 50) 64. ~[i;J Dedication of Merits 65. li1jij~'C.,I§[i;J Five Repentances and Vows of a Sincere Mind 66. fW-!JI. Release the Realm, consisting of the following

five segments, in the reverse of their order above: *=:Ili!<J!ll Great Samaya [Assembly] (as above, 42) ;kJ!;t(~!llJ~~) Vajra Fire (as above, 41) i\Ill!JI.()JI&~i\Ill) Sky Net (as above, 40) ,i!llAAIjIj.:E Horse-headed Wisdom King (as above, 39) ~IiiIIJJilj Vajra Wall (as above, 30)

67. l1i!~ Send Off [the Principal Deity and His Assembly] 68. =:1!EIli!<J!ll Three-fold Samaya 69. 1lt1flil~ Don Armor and Protect the Body (as above, 12) 70. ~ijlJ Universal Prostration 71. t±l~~ Leave the Sanctuary


Works Cited

Abbreviations

KDZ Kobo Daishi zenshii 5Ai1:;\;Jili~~. 6 vols. Edited by Sofil senyokai *1I.J!\1L~1r. Tokyo: Rokudai shinposha, 1910.

SZ ShingonshU zensho iA~*~jj:. 44 vols. Edited by Shingonshil zensho kankokai iA~*~~fIHT1r. Koyasan: Koyasan daigaku, 1933-36.

T TaishO daizokyo j(iE;kiXfil!. 100 vols. Edited by Takakusu Junjiro ~:fl¥jNi1~~~ and Watanabe Kaigyoku lJj;j§jfjj:1i!l.. Tokyo: Taish5 issaikyo kankokai, 1924-32. Texts are indicated by the text number ("T.") followed by the volume and (when appropriate) page, register (a, b, or c), and line number(s).

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Achu rulai niansong gongyang fa J"iJ~{lftO*~~#!i~i1. Trans. Amoghavajra. T.921: 19. Bizai shidai fimtE~m. Attr. Kilkai !,gi/ii. KDZ 4.620-663. Dabao guangbo louge shanzhu bimi tuoluoni jing ;k)!f,l;l't\j;flIill~1±itiJl.*~tm!E'.~.

Trans. Amoghavajra. T.1005a: 19. Dapiluzhe'na chengfo jingshu ;kJ!BJJ!J!ltIlB.6Xi?U!J!Ml. Yixing -fl'. T.1796: 39. Issai nyorai daishO kongo shidai ..c'.-IjI]fto*;kM1ii:JiilIJ~m. Attr. Kilkai !,g#if.. KDZ

2.605-610. Fudo myoo nenju shidai /Fl!iIJIJlEE~~ili~m. Attr. Kilkai !,gi/ii. KDZ 2.656-678. Guanzizai pusa ruyilun yuqie ill J3 tE'ifiiifto;i;~lit{bD. Trans. Amoghavajra. T.1086: 20. Guanzizai pusa ruyilun niansong yigui li!iJ31:E'ifiiiftO;i;~~~ili{iiIiJL. Trans. Amoghava-

jra. T.1085: 20. Gumonji shidai ;j{1lf!j\f~m. Attr. Kilkai !,gi/ii. KDZ 4.698-702. Jiho kongo nenju shidai j\f)f~JiilIJ~~i'li~m. Attr. Kilkai !,gi/ii. KDZ 2.556-570. Jingangding lianhuabu xinniansong yigui ii:!illtlmJi~1l1H.'~~ili{iiIiJL. Trans. Amoghava-

jra. T.873: 18. Jingangdingjing dayuqie bimi xindi famen yijue ii:JiilIJm*il!;klit{fJDjj'~*'i:.,:lt!!i1F~{i~.

Amoghavajra. T.1798: 39. Jingangdingjing yuqie shibahui zhigui ii:Jiiltlm~lit{bn-t 7\ 1rlirJ$. Trans. Amoghavajra.

T.869: 18. Juhachi geiin -tl\~~P. Attr. Kilkai !,g#if.. KDZ 2.634-645. Juhachi geiin gishaku shOki -tl\~~*~1o;g. J5jin Ai::i?I1. T.2475: 78. Jlihachido kubi shidai -tl\~!!.li~m. Attr. Kilkai !,gi/ii. KDZ 2.611-612. Juhachido kuketsu -tl',~Dtt<:. Raiyu !fjlit. T.2529: 79. Juhachido nenju shidai -tl\~~~ili~m. Attr. Kilkai !,gi/ii. KDZ 2.616-628. Juhachido sata -tl\~tptt. Kakuban ~m. T.2517: 79. Kongokai dai giki ii:Jiiltl:l'l-;kiiiIiJL. Attr. Kilkai !,gi/ii. KDZ 4.466-496. Kongokai dciihO taijuki ii:/IlJIJ:I'I-;ki1!t~flc. Annen 'ti:t!.\. T.2391: 75. Kongokai kue mikki ~!illtl:l'l-.1L1r*flc. Gengo J[;~. T.2471: 78.

92 ROBERT H. SHARF

Mujin shOgonzo shidai I!\tiilm:mx~;£>zm. Attr. Kiikai ~iIiJ. KDZ 4.497-53l. Ninno hannyakyo nenju shidai f=.:E~m!l!:E;~;£>zm. Attr. Kiikai ~M. KDZ 4.720-752. SahO shidai fti*;£>zm. Attr. Kiikai ~M. KDZ 2.495-508. Sanmitsu shOryoken :=:'ifii'.P'¥'-fI'lil. Kakuch6 1!!m. T.2399: 75. Senju Kannon gyohO shidai =f'FlIJ!i§'fl'i*;£>zm. Attr. Kiikai ~M. KDZ 2.533-554. Shari hO ~'flli*. Attr. Kiikai ~M. KDZ 4.770-773. Sheng huanxitian shifa ~1i!Xg::;RAi*. Trans. Prajfiacakra ~:i\'liJT[,glm~ (Zhihuilun

~Jl*fiD). T.1275: 21. Shiba qiyin -t-i\~f'P. Attr. Huiguo ~~. T.900: 18. (This is a reprint, with minor

changes, of the Juhachi geiin; see above.) Shingon denju sahO ~~~j'ltfti*. Attr. Kiikai ~M. KDZ 4.417-422. Shonyoirin Kanjizai bosatsu nenju shidai ~ftD~*fiDlIJ!Eli'£1"i'iii:E;~ili;£>zm. Geng6 JI;~. Shugokyo nenju shidai 'ij'iUl!:E;~ili;£>zm. Attr. Kiikai ~M. KDZ 4.755-769. Taizo bizai shidai JIiliilXiilii'£;£>zm. Attr. Kiikai ~M. KDZ 4.559-617. Taizo bonji shidai n€liilXJiI::"i";£>zm. Attr. Kiikai ~M. KDZ 2.247-290. Taizokai daihO taijuki n€l~Jf.*i*Jt§t~c. Annen *?:ft. T.2390: 75. Taizokai nenju shidai yoshUki n€l~Jf.:E;~ili;£>zm~*~. G6M ~~. SZ 25.1-519. Taizokai shOki n€l~Jf.1:m;. Kakuch6 ~m. T.2404: 75. Taizokai unji shidai n€l~Jf.Il'j:*;£>zm. Attr. Kiikai ~iIiJ. KDZ 4.665-697. Usuzoshi kuketsu ji1jl:'TIJ#t. Raiyu ili:lm. T.2535: 79. Wuliangshou rulai guanxing gongyang yigui 1!\t:m:~ftD*lIJ!fl'W<jtffiiWL. Trans.

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Veda Reij6 J:E!3m:~ 1986 Shingon mikkyo jiso gaisetsu - shidobu - shin'anryu 0 chU"shin toshite

~a*~:J:1ilmm-IlE~$-tJi'tcli\E:a: '" .c.' C: G"[. Tokyo: D6b6sha. Yamasaki Taik6 1988 Shingon: Japanese Esoteric Buddhism. Trans. Richard and Cynthia Peter

son. Boston: Shambhala.

ON THE NlKAYA AFFILIATION OF THE SRlGHANACARASANGRAHA

AND THE SPHUTARTHA. SRlGHANACARASANGRAHATTIKA

GTIJLIO AGOSTINI

The SrIghanacarasailgraha is a Sanskrit text in verses on the conduct of Buddhist novices. It is extant only in the fonn of quotations found in a commentary on it, the Sphutarilia SrIghanacarasailgrahatIka, written by J ayarak~ita 1. The name of the author of the verses is unknown2•

Jayarak~ita mentions three other commentators3 who worked on the same verses, but their commentaries are not extant. The SrIghanacarasailgraha was therefore an important text for atleast one monastic community.

According to Singh, "the text probably belongs to the Mahasamghika school"4, because of the following passage5 :

1 The text was first edited in 1968 by Sanghasena. In 1983 the same scholar (as Sanghasen Singh) republished the same text (with different pagination), adding a translation and a reconstruction of the original verses. In this paper I always refer to this edition as Singh 1983. In the same year, Derrett published his own translation, based on the 1968 edition and on a microfilm (Derrett 1983: 5, n. 1). The two translations are independent from one another.

2 Derrett (1983: 6) took the term irfghana as the "pen-name" of a "vinaya specialist" who authored the verses. He knew (ib.: 14, n. 3) that according to lexical sources this term may be applied to buddhas (add now examples in Handurukande 2000: 6 and in inscriptions from the eleventh century in Tsukamoto 1996-1998: I 154, 200). Derrett (1983: 14, n. 3) even regarded it "as quite possible that Jayarak~ita really believed a Buddha called Srlghana wrote the verses!" However, the term irfghana is used in the text in the meaning of 'novice' (Singh 1983: 3-4). In 1961 Singh, too (paper re-published in Singh 1983: "Appendix i", p. 241), had taken the term irfghana as the name of the author, but in the same year he pointed out that this term in the text merely refers to novices (paper in PaIi of 1961, published as Singh 1974 and again as Singh 1983: "Appendix ii"). Shimoda (1990: 495) also took irfghana as meaning 'novice'.

3 bhadanta Parahitagho~a, bhadanta Prajiiasirhha, and bhadanta Dharmavalokitamitra (Singh 1983: 57,63, 119 = ff. 19a, 28b, 93b).


98 GIULIO AGOSTINI

yadi kascit agatyagantukaJ:t samavasthiini~aI:u:zam a[bhivadayati], tadanena vaktavyam " . katamas te nikayaJ:t, kati ca tasya nikiiyasya bhedaJ:t '" so 'pi yadi aryamahiisiimghiko bhavati tadiinena vacyam aryamahiisiimghiko 'smi / tasya ced bhediiJ:t

viidinas ciirthasiddhiirthiiJ:t sailadvayaniviisinaJ:t / bhiidrayana haimavataJ:t ~arj.bhedii mulasiimghikiiJ:t / /

If any arriving [ascetic] addresses one settled and seated, then the latter should say io him: " ... Which is your nikiiya? How many divisions are there in your nikiiya? ... " And if he is an Arya-Mahasarilghika, then he should say: "I am an Arya-Mahasamghika". Here are their divisions: 1. Vadins, 2. Mhasiddharthas, 3. 4. Sailadvayanivasins, 5. Bhadrayanas, and 6. Haimavata; the Mi1lasamghikas are divided into six [nikayas].

Derrett, however, made a distinction between the original verses, which constitute the SrlghanacarasaiJ.graha, and the prose commentary by Jayarak~ita. According to Derrett, the passage quoted above is merely evidence that the commentator "Jayarak~ita is evidently interested in the Mahasfu:hgbikas but it has been doubted whether he did appertain to that sect,,6. As for the author of the verses, Derrett's "impression" is that he "worked for all nikdyas, and deliberately eschewed allegiance to any" (ib.). Therefore, I assume, Derrett did not think that the verse quoted above belongs to the mula text, but implied that it is a mnemonic §loka produced by Jayarak~ita himself, and indeed Singh did not use it in his reconstruction of the mi1la verses 7. Derrett also noticed that the author of the verses refers to a sequence of the ten precepts unknown to any other school, including the Mahasfu:hghikas8•

4. Singh 1983: 7. In a later article (id.: 1986), the work is Mahasamghika in the title, but only "probably" so in the text (ib.: 6). Singh (1983: 7) also maintained that "the word 'sanvara' [sic] for the conduct of a 'sramru;tera' " implies Mahayana, but it doesn't. The only Mahayana element is the mention of Mafijusri in the mangalaslokas (ib.: 45).

5 Singh 1983: 119-120. Translation as in Derrett (1983: 80-81; slightly modified). 6 Derrett 1983: 7. He refers to Ejima (1976: 918-919). Following Ejima, Yuyama, in

his survey of Vinaya literature (1979: 39c40), classifies Jayarak~ita's commentary as a Mahasamghika text, but adds a question mark. However, Shimoda (1990: 492, n. 4) notices that Ejima does not give any reason for doubting a Mahasamghika affiliation.

7 According to Derrett (1983: 6, 82), the original verses numbered 102. According to Singh (1983: 219 and 239, n. 128), they numbered 200, although this figure does not need to indicate the exact number (ib.: 286). Both rely on the expression satadvayeneti (Singh 1983: 121). Singh tries to reconstruct exactly two hundred verses in his "Appendix vi" (ib.: 289-313). Shimoda (1990: 495-494) agrees with Singh.

ON THE NlKAYA AFFILIATION OF THE SRlGHANACARASANGRAHA 99

More recently Masahiro Shimoda, disagreeing with Derrett, has sought toprove the Mahasamghika affiliation of the commentator, Jayarak~ita9. By comparing passages from the section on theft (adattadana) in Jayarak~ita's commentary and in the Mahasamghika Vinaya, Shimoda was able to show that both texts agree very much in terms of cOntents, although the agreement "is not word for word"lO. This result, based only on this section, led him to conclude that Jayarak~ita's work must be a summary from the Mahasamghika Vinayall .

Shimoda's arguments are not conclusive. He did not explain why the order of the ten precepts in Jayarak~ita's work is different from the one in the Mahasamghika Vinaya. Also, he only examined one section of the commentary to the Srighanacarasailgraha, a section that does not contain any verbatim quotations from the Vinaya. Therefore, he only showed that Jayar~ita knew a Vinaya which is similar to the Mahasamghika Vinaya. We do not know yet if it was identical to it. For, similarity does not entail identity, as it is known for example that two texts belonging to the Lokottaravadins, the Bhik~ul).l-Vinaya and the Abhisamacarika-Dharma, are similar, but not identical to the corresponding sections of the Mahasamghika Vinaya. Moreover, Shimoda did not disprove Derrett's contention that the author of the verses "worked for all nikayas, and deliberately eschewed allegiance to any". For, Shimoda only worked on Jayarak~ita's commentary, not on the verses12.

8 Derrett 1983: 8, where a comparative table of the ten precepts is given. Jayarak~ita's sequence of the ten precepts is as follows (Singh 1983: 51-52): 1. killing, 2. stealing, 3. sexual intercourse, 4. lying, 5. drinking liquor, 6. high beds and seats, 7. dancing, singing, and playing music, 8. perfumes, garlands, and unguents, 9. eating at the wrong time, lD. taking gold and silver. The greater part of the text is made of ten sections on each of the ten precepts. If one exchanges item 6 with item 8, the result is the sequence of the Mahiisamghikas, of the Dharmaguptakas (who add suicide as the eleventh precept), and of the Abhidharmakosa (see Derrett 1983: 8).

9 Shimada 1990. See also Shimada 1987, where the text is taken to be a Mahiisamghika commentary on the ten precepts.

10 Shimada 1990: 494. 11 Shimada 1990: 495. Prebish (1994: 60-61) seems to follow Shimada and classifies

J ayarak~ita' s work as a Mahiisamghika text. 12 Shimoda 1990: 495.

100 GIULlO AGOSTINI

Here I shall present evidence to deternrine whether both the author of the verses and Jayarak~ita refer to one and the same Vinaya, and to indicate how close this Vinaya was to the Mahasamghika Vinaya, extant in Chinese.

I

J ayarak~ita comments on five items that define homicide and that were mentioned by the author of the verses in the following order: 1. upakrama (taking a weapon, etc.), 2. n[sarhjiiii (the idea that one is a man), 3. nara (there is man), 4. vadhakacetanii (there is the intention of killing), and 5. jlvitasya k!jaya (destruction of life)13. We are not told whether these terms occur in the Vinaya. Jayarak~ita complains that some "stupid" (mandadhiya/:t) fellows misread the verse: they read nare vadhakacetanii instead of the correct naro vadhakacetanii. Since the verse in question is about a list of five items in the nominative case, the wrong reading would yield a list of four items only, and the Vinaya would be "curtailed"14. Therefore, Jayarak~ita has to justify his reading by quoting an analogous list, not exactly the same one, from his Vinaya15 :

e~a hi vinaye nirddalJ / 1. prclIJlca bhavati, 2. prllIJisamjfil ca bhavati, 3. vadhakacittafi ca pratyupasthitam bhavati, 4. upakramafi ca karoti, 5. jlvitl1d vyavaropito bhavati iyatl1 prl1lJlltiplltl bhavati /

For, this is the explanation in the Vinaya: "TIlere is a breathing being. One is conscious that it is a breathing being. A thought of killing is present. One starts to act. One is deprived of life. To this extent is one a killer of a breathing being".

This passage in itself is probably pan-Buddhist. For example, parallel passages occur in Theravada commentaries16. The style, moreover, has the

13 ebhir aizgair manu~yavadho bhtivatfti darsayan params codayann aha / upakrama ityadi / tatra sastradigrahaJ;am upakrama~ / manu~yoyam iti samjfia nrsamjfia / kadacid upakramam karoti nrsamjfia bhavati na tv asau manu~ya ity aha / naTa iti / yady asau manu~yo bhavati / kadacid etani tril}y aizgani sambhavanti, na vadhakacetaneti / ato vadhacetanavacanam / kadacid ... na ttl jfvitad vyaparopayatfti / ata aha / jfvitasya k~ayas ceti (Singh 1983: 59).

14 nare vadhakacetaneti saptamyantam pa?hanti / te~am paficaizgani na siddhyanti nare vadhakacetanety asya padasyaikaizgatvtit / vinayas ca tair vilopito bhavati (Singh 1983: 59).

15 Singh 1983: 59. 16 See references in Saddhatissa 1970: 89, n. 1.

ON THE NlKAYA AFFllJATION OF THE SRIGHANACARASANGRAHA 101

flavor of a later scholastic elaboration 17. Of all extant Vinayas, only the Mahasamghika Vinaya has anything similar. Here, both the section on the third piiriijika (killing human beings) and the section on the sixty-first piitayantika (killing animalS)IS include comparable lists. In the section on the third piiriijika we read19 :

If one fulfills five conditions and kills a man, one commits a piiriijika offence: 1. a man, 2. the idea of a man, 3. starting to find a means [to kill], 4. the thought of killing, 5. cutting off the life [ofa man]. These are called the five conditions.

In the section on the sixty-first piitayantika we read20 :

If a monk is possessed of five dharmas and cuts off the life of an animal, [he is guilty of a] piitayantika offence. What five? [1.] An animal, [2.] the idea of an animal, [3.] the thought of killing, [ 4.] arising of bodily action, [5.] cutting off the faculty of life. These are called the five dharmas.

The Sanskrit list mentioned by author of the verses agrees with the Chinese list from the piiriijika section, but the order is different. It is impossible to know whether the author of the verses took these terms directly from a Vinaya. Jayarak~ita, who is quoting a Vinaya, mentions a list that corresponds to the Chinese one from the piitayantika section, in the same order. For, he uses the word priilJin (lEt, 'animal'), not nr/nara (A, 'man'). Given that Jayarak~ita's context is 'killing human beings', it is strange that he does not quote the passage from the pertinent section, using the same terms that the author of the verses used. Perhaps, Jayarak~ita's Vinaya did not list these five items in the section on killing human beings, and therefore Jayarak~ita quotes an analogous list from the section on killing animals. On the basis of this comparison,

17 So Gombrich (1984: 99), referring to the analogous list in the Pili commentaries. 18 I use the Sanskrit piitayantika instead of any middle Indic form for convenience of

reference with the comparative table of the monastic precepts published by Rosen (1959: 42-49).

19 fr1i~~.!E4I1:.A.JB¥Bi'I.i:'Jl;. 1iiJ~llo -'if .A. 0 = 'if .A.~flo =:'ifJ!!1J{f 0 [Il'if4l1:,L.'o 1l'if1!li frro :&\:;j!;ll~o (T.1425 xxn 257c3-5).

20 :Et~liPl4mtlli'!l!IilEEfrro ¥Bi':&~o fiiI~llo Ii:'!:. Ii:'!::'''\!o 4I1:,L.,. ~:!J~. frr */lilio :&\: ~1l (T.l425 xxn 378a24-25).

102 GIULIO AGOSTINI

Jayarak~ita's Vinaya was similar to the Mahasamghika Vinaya, but perhaps it was not identical to it.

IT

Jayarak~ita refers to his Vinaya also in the context of §ukravisHti, 'emission of semen'. This is an offence, unless it occurs in a dream. Jayarak~ita continues21 :

pafica svapnal; vinaye uktal; / satyasvapno yathii bodhisattvena dutal;, allkasvapno yathii dHtal; tathii na bhavdty allkam mHeti k[tva, acfn:/asvapno yat satatakarm/iyam vastu d[Syate, anantasvapno yal; sakalam ratrim drsyate na paricchidyate, svapnasvapno yal; svapna evanyal; svapno d[Syate /

Five [kinds at] dreams are mentioned in the Vinaya: 1. A truthful dream as seen by a bodhisattva. 2. A false dream. [A real occurrence] is not the same as it is seen [in a

dream], taking 'false' as 'deceitful'. 3. An unfulfilled dream. Something is seen that remains to be done. 4. A ceaseless dream, which is seen during the entire night and is not

interrupted. S. A dream in a dream, i.e. another dream which is seen within the very

same dream.

Only the Mahasamghika Vinaya, in the corresponding section, mentions five types of dreams. Still, there are some differences22 :

~.~E •. M.E.-•••. =.~.~.~.~M7~. ~.~~ ~.E.~eW.~.£.E.M •• ~.m.~* ••• ~.~E.~ ~.~ •. £~.~.~.~ •. fiA~ •• ~ •. £~~ ••. ~M7 ••. ~~.~~ •• ~M.£.~M7 •. ~~~.~~~~~.~. A~ •• £~~~~. ~ew.~ •. Im.J5Jf1'F'~131:ilI!$Jj[~. £~~~~ • ••

21 Singh 1983: 92. My translation is mainly based on Derrett (1983: 56), and less on Singh (1983: 186-187). The Pali Vinaya-atthakatha in the same context mentions four dreams: annatra supinantii ti ettha supino eva supinanto, tam rhapetvii apanetvii ti vuttam hoti. tan ca pana supinam passanto catuhi kiiralJehi passati dhiitukkhobhato vii anubhUtapubbato vii devatopasamht'irato, vii pubbanimittato vii ti (Samantapas1idika III 520 = T.l462 XXN 760a2- ... ).

22 T.1425 XXII 263b8-16.

ON THE NlKAYA AFFILIATION OF THE SRIGHANA.CARASANGRAHA 103

There are five types of dreams. What five 7 1. A truthful dream, 2. an untruthful dream, 3. an unclear dream, 4. a dream in a dream, and S. dreaming later what someop.e has thought of earlier. These are the five. 1. What is a truthful dream? The Tathagata, when he was a bodhisattva, saw

five dreams [which were] not different from the truth. This is called a truthful dream.

2. Untruthful dream: if a man sees a dream and, when he wakes up, it is not true. This is called an untruthful dream. .

3. An unclear dream: if one does not remember the beginning, the end, and the middle part of one's dream.

4. A dream in a dream: if a man sees a dream, and then in [that] dream he tells a dream to [other] men, this is called a dream in a dream.

S. As for dreaming later what one has thought of earlier, if one dreams at night what has been done and thought during the day, this is called 'dreaming later what one has thought of earlier'.

Jayarak~ita's first and second types correspond to the first and the second ones of the Mahasamghika Vinaya. But, Jayarak~ita's fifth type corresponds to the fourth one of the Mahasamghika passage. Jayarak~ita's third and fourth types do not correspond to any type in the Mahasamghika Vinaya. Therefore, from this passage it appears that Jayarak~ita's Vinaya was similar, but not identical to the Mahiisamghika Vinaya.

ill

Jayarak~ita teaches how a junior monk should salute a senior one. In this context, he says23: tasyarh jaflghiiyarh mu~4e[na] sphotarh na dadyat / kim ivety aha / avina yathii, "one [a junior monk] should not make a smacking sound with the shaven head against the lower legs [of a senior monk] ( ... ). Like what? « As by a sheep» "24 The words avina yathii are part of the original verses, as they are introduced by aha. Jayarak~ita goes on to say that bhadanta Avalokitarnitra read ravina yathii (ib.). He is wrong, says Jayarak~lta, because "in the Vinaya only the example of a ram is

23 Singh 1983: 119: 24 Derrett 1983: 80. Skr. spho{a also means 'boil'. Although it is difficult to see how

this meaning could fit into this sentence, boils are part of the context, as it is clear from the passages quoted below.

104 GIULlO AGOSTINI

given", vinaye rnerjhakasyaiva d[.Jtdntaddndt25. Therefore, one should find this example in the Mahasamghika or related Vinayas. .

As Derrett noticed26, this entire section is very close to a passage from a canonical Vinaya text extant in hybrid Sanskrit, the AbhisamacarikaDharma of the Lokottaravadins. The Mahasamghika Vinaya also has a corresponding chapter on rules of deportment (1J!li;1i~), which often runs exactly as the Lokottaravadin chapter. I now present two parallel passages from both Vinayas, where the example of the ram occurs. I divide both passages into four paragraphs. For each paragraph I quote the Chinese of the Mahasamghika Vinaya, my translation of it, and the Sanskrit from the Lokottaravadin Vinaya. I shall then point out any correspondence with the wording of the Vinaya quoted by the author of SrIghanacarasangraha and by Jayarak~ita27.

l. l'f~lim'HI::5 fFl~.$JljH1=t!L "One may not, covering the head, covering the right shoulder, wearing leather shoes, make a salutation". na k$amati I ogulJ.{hitakiiyena na k$amati I ohitahastena na k$amati / upiinahiiruq.hena siimfcfkarentenal

2. l'f~tIJJltlJl1iPtlJlli!o ~mJEtlo "One may not revere the knees, revere the legs, revere the shins. One should revere by touching the feet". na k$amati I jiinukena viijanghiihi vii vanditum I atha khalu piidii vanditavyii I

3. :ll:tl)\l'WtlQ1l52$l'il!o ~;!ilFp~mto "The man who receives the salutation may not keep silent like a dumb sheep. He should reply with polite questions". na diini melJ.q.hena viya iisitavyam piidehi vandayantehi I atha khalu pratisammodayitavyam I [in the original text this paragraph is the fourth one]

4. *ru)\Jl'ilP...t:ff:!fo ~~mjj}!I;o "If the person in front has a boil on the foot, one should take care not to hit it with the head". piidiim vandantena jiinitavyam I yadi kasyaci vralJ.ii bhavati I galJ.q.o vii pi{ako vii na diini sahasii utpfq.itavyam I athii khalu tathii vanditavyam yathii

25 Derrett 1983: 80. For meejhaka cf. Sanskrit melJej~1G(ka) and Piili melJeja. 26 Derrett 1983: 80 nne 4, 5, 9. 27 MahasfuiIghika Vinaya, T.1425 XXII 510b18-21; Lokottaravadin Vinaya,

Abhisamacarika-Dhanna (Abhisamacarika-Dhanna Study Group 1998: 120; I keep the dalJejas, although they do not make much sense).


na dulJkMpiye padehi vandayantehi / [in the original text this paragraph is the third one]

As for the fJist paragraph, efr. Jayarak~ita28:

idanirh tu yadrgvidhavasthavasthitena navakena yatina na vanditavyarh, tatM darsayitum aha / avagulJthitetyadi / avagulJthitarh pidhitarh Sfr-!arh slro yasya yate~ tena .. ./ ... sopanatka~ tena upanaMrutjhenety artha~ /

This passage shows that the author of the verses used the tenn avagulJthitasir~el}a, 'by [a cleric] whose head is covered/veiled'. This tenn is similar, but not identical to the Lokottaravadin tenn ogul}thitakayena, 'by [a cleric] whose body is covered/veiled'. The reading of the author of the verses better corresponds to the Chinese Mahasamghika Vinaya phrase "covering the head". As for the Lokottaravadin tenn upiinahiirurj.hena, "by one who wears sandals", the author of the verses used the synonym sopiinatkena, probably metri causa, but Jayar~ita clearly refers to the original reading. The Chinese phrase "wearing leather shoes" may correspond to both tenns.

As for the second paragraph, efr. Jayarak~ita: jiinu ca jiinu ca jiinunr, tayor jiinuyor yii jaftghii tasyiirh jaftghiiyiirh mUl}rj.e[ na] sphotarh na dadyiit (ib.). This passage shows that the author of the verses used the tenns jiinu and jaftghii, 'knee' and 'shin', found in both the Mahiisarhghika and Lokottaravadin Vinayas.

As for the third paragraph, efr. Jayar~ita: kim ivety iiha I avinii yathii I avir me~alJ I yathii avinii mel}rj.akena dvayor jiinunor jarhghiiyiirh hanyate, tadvad yatir api v[ddhiintikasya yater jarhghiiyiirh na vandeteti yiivat I ... vinaye merj.hakasyiiiva dutiintadiiniit (ib.). This passage shows that the author of the verses used the word avi, 'sheep', but this tenn according to J ayarak~ita is only a substitute for the Vinaya reading merj.haka, 'ram'. This Vinaya tenn is indeed found in the Lokottaravadin Vinaya, in the fonn mel}rj.ha29• A similar word, if not the same one, was in front of the Chinese translators 30. Therefore, Jayarak~ita's Vinaya seems to be close

28 Singh 1983: 119. 29 Jinananda (1969: 125), however, reads meriitena, which he emends into sra~thena.

Prasad (1984: 134) follows this emendation in his paraphrasis and takes it as meaning 'banker': "The senior monk whose feet are to be greeted is not to sit like a banker".

30 J£QOiil$, 'like a dumb sheep'. According to the Mvy (7684), the similar Chinese phrase Il52J£Q$ translates etjamuka, 'dumb like a sheep' (Tibetan lug ltar lkug pa), which is also

106 GrULlO AGOSTINI

to both the MahasariJ.ghika and Lokottaravadin Vinayas. But, in an important point the Srlghanacarasailgraha and its commentarY differ from both of them. In the Mahasamghika and Lokottaravadin Vinayas, it is the cleric who receives the salutation who should not be "dumb like sheep", i.e. he should not keep silent, but should say some polite words. More awkward is Jayarak~ita's understanding of his own Vinaya, in consonance with the author of the verses: it is the junior cleric who makes the salutation who should not hit with his head - like a sheep or a ram - the shins of the senior cleric. It is difficult to decide whether this understanding is based on a different wording of Jayarak~ita's Vinaya or on a misinterpretation of it. Bhadanta Dharmavalokitamitra, as shown above, read ravi, 'sun', instead of avi, 'sheep', probably because he did not know how to interpret the example of the 'sheep'31. Therefore, the correct understanding of the example of the sheep was indeed a problem. Perhaps an examination of the fourth and last paragraph will shed some light on this.

As for the fourth paragraph, cfr. Jayarak~ita: yadii samavasthiiniflat:llJO yatil:z piidarogel!a gliinal:z syiit ... 32. Jayarak~ita here is not quoting, but only referring to a passage close to the last paragraph from both the MahasariJ.ghika and Lokottaravadin Vinayas, quoted above. This shows that Jayarak~ita's Vinaya had a passage corresponding, in some form, to that paragraph. The order of the last two paragraphs in both Vinayas is the opposite of the one found in Jayarak~ita. In the Lokottaravadin Vinaya the last two paragraphs follow each other as follows:

padarh vandantena janitavyarh / yadi kasyaci vral:za bhavati / gal:Z¢o va pitako va na dani sahasa utpftjitavyarh / atM khalu tatM vanditavyarh yatM na duJ:tkMpiye padehi vandayantehi / [new paragraph] na dani me1}tjhena viya asitavyarh padehi vandayantehi / atha khalu pratisarhmodayitavyarh /

attested in the form erjakamuka and corresponds to PaIi e{amuga. See BHSD s.vv. erjakamuka and edamuka.

31 Acco;ding to Derrett's emendation and translation, Dharmavalokitamitra's explanation is that "Just as the sun is not to be saluted (?) by one wearing shoes [ ... J so an ascetic who has his shoes on should not salute" (Derrett 1983: 80, corresponding to Singh 1983: 119).

32 Singh 1983: 119.

ON THE NlKAYA AFFILIATION OF THE sRIGHA.~ACARASANGRAHA 107

[ ... the feet must be revered]. [The cleric] who reveres the feet must know if some [cleric in front of him] has a boil, or a pimple, or a blister [on a foot]. He must not inconsiderately sqeeze it, but he must revere [the feet] so as not to cause pain while the feet are being revered. [new paragraph] [The cleric who is being revered] must not sit like a ram, while his feet are being revered, but should make a salutation in return.

It is possible that the author of the verses and J ayar~ita had in mind this paragraph order, and that they construed na diini melJ4hena viya with the preceding paragraph: tatM vanditavyarh yathii na du/:lkMpiye piidehi vandayantehi I na diini melJ4hena viya, "the salutation must be made so as not to cause pain while the feet are being revered, not as if [it were made] by a ram". To be sure, the word diini does not allow such a construction, but one does not need to assume that Jayar~ita had the word diini in his mind or in his Vinaya. This construction would explain why the author of the verses and Jayar~ita compare the junior cleric to a ram that hits the shins, as opposed to comparing the senior cleric to a ram that merely keeps silent.

In short, a comparison with these four paragraphs has shown that: 1. the Vinaya quoted or implied by the author of the SrIghanacarasaIigraha and by Jayar~ita was generically similar to both the Mahasamghika and the Lokottaravadin Vinayas; 2. the term avagulJthitasir~e1J.a, used by the author of the verses, is found in the Mahasamghika Vinaya, not in the Lokottaravadin Vinaya; 3. the author of the verses and Jayarak~ita's understanding of the example of the ram/sheep is at variance with both the Mahasamghika and the Lokottaravadin Vinayas, but could be based on the word order of the Lokottaraviidin Vinaya, or of a similar one; 4. the author of the verses and Jayarak~ita had in mind the same Vinaya, contrary to what Derrett thought.

IV

Another passage shows that not only Jayarak~ita, but also the author of the verses depends on the Mahasamghika Vinaya or on a very similar one. It occurs in the section on 'false speech' (m[~iiviida), which corresponds to the fIrst piitayantika in the Vinaya. Jayarak~ita says that one becomes a liar (m[~iiviidin) because of four elements (aflga): 1. there is some matter; 2 there is a man who is aware that [something] is false; 3. his mind is directed toward [lying]; 4. he is aware that it is false speech;

108 GIULIO AGOSTINI

5. he utters words33 • A few lines below, J ayarak~ita adds that the last four, or the last three, or the last two, or even the very last miga are enough to define a liar34• From Jayarak~ita's quotations of the original verses, it appears that the author of the SrighanacarasaIigraha himself referred to the same theory35. Of all extant Vinayas, only the Mahasamghika Vinaya has anything similar, although it might be based on a somewhat different terminology36:

ff1i~PX;mt!<Qllff:lH~o ~~~m:!ljL fPJ~1io .ffff;Wf~AY~;i'll.~ p ~o ... ffll!l~PX;mto ... =~ ... =$ ... -~ ... !<Qllff:'§O§fto ~~m:o

If one, being possessed of five dharmas, consciously lies, one incurs a piitayantika offence. What five? 1. there really is [such and such matter], 2. awareness that there is [such and such matter], 3. one turns his mind [to it], 4. awareness of disobeying [a precept], and 5. one utters words different [from the truth]. ... If one is possessed of four dharmas [i.e. the last four] ... three dharmas ... two dharmas ... one dharma ... and consciously lies, it is a patayantika offence.

The Chinese renderings of some of these five items are not completely clear to me, as my translation shows, but they are clear enough to indicate the similarity with the five items mentioned by the author of the Srlghanacarasailgraha and by Jayarak~ita.

v Jayarak~ita uses the technical term arthotpatti, which can be translated

as 'particular case>37. This term is peculiar to the Bhik~UIfI-Vinaya of the

33 katibhilJ punar angailJ mr~tivtidf sytid ity tiha I vastu eety tidi slokalJl vastu ea bhavati, alfkasmnjiif ea bhavati, vinihitam eittam bhavati, mr~tivtidasamjiif bhavati, vticam ea bhti~ate (Singh 1983: 99).

34 na kevalam paiieabhir angailJ samprajtinamHtivtido bhavati, kin tu hy ekentipfti dadayann tiha I eatustrfty tidi I .,. latra caturbhir angailJ mr~tivtidf bhavati I alfkasamjiif cety tidi / alfkasamjiiitvena vastunalJ parigrahtin na prthan nirdisyate ... (similarly for the other angas; Singh 1983: 100)

35 See the reconstruction of slokas 144-145 in Singh (1983: "Appendix vi", p. 306) and the underlined words in the quotations given in the two preceding notes.

36 T.1425 xxn 325b2-12. 37 See Roth (1970: 109, § 142, n. 1) and Nolot (1991: 376, n. 2). The former translates

arthotpatti as the "arising of a particular case" (ib.), the latter as "cas particuliers" (ib.).

ON THE NlKA.YA AFFILIATION OF THE SRlGHANA.CARASANGRAHA 109

Lokottaravadins: after a story that leads to the promulgation of a precept, other stories follow which represent 'particular cases'. An arthotpatti does not constitUte a separate precept. This term is conspicuously absent in the Mahasamghika Vinaya.

J ayarak~ita has to comment on a verse that forbids a novice to drink water containing living beings and then on other verses that forbid a novice to use. water containing living beings in order, for example, to water plants. An opponent says that the first verse is redundant, because it prohibits what is implicitly prohibited in the other verses38 •

Jayarak~ita defends the author of the verses as follows39 : kin cdrthotpattivasdn na likhitety ado~al;. arthotpattiprabhdvatvdd vinayasyeti krtvd, "furthermore, there is no fault that '[the verse] is not [to be] written because it is a special case' [i.e part of a precept], because the Vinaya is the source for [what should or should not be accepted as] special cases". Even though my translation might need improvement40, it is clear that Jayarak~ita uses the term arthotpatti in the same technical sense as found in the Bhik~uI).I-Vinaya of the Lokottaravadins. His point is that in the Vinaya itself the rule 'not to drink water containing living beings' is not an arthotpatti contained in the section about the precept 'not to use water containing living beings'. He and his readers knew that they are two different precepts41, and therefore one cannot fault the author of the SrlghanacarasaIigraha for devoting verses to both of them.

One does not need to assume that Jayarak~ita's Vinaya contained the term arthotpatti. Even though this term is not represented in the Chinese version of the Mahasamghika Vinaya, it could have been part of Mahasamghika exegetical terminology. Therefore, Jayarak~ita's mention

38 atha kimartham iyam kiirikii prthag vyavasthiipyate? ... yatra hi seka~ prati~idhyate sutariim tatra piinaprati~edha~ (Singh 1983: 62).

39 Singh 1983: 62-63. 40 Derrett (1983: 29; bracketed words are his own) translates: "Moreover there is no

harm if it is written [del. na], so as to bring out the meaning, since the strength of the vinaya is its meaningfulness". Singh (1983: 149) translates: "That is why, there is no fault (here in composing separately) taking into account that the Vinaya has got the effect of meaning some thing". Both miss the technical meaning of arthotpatti.

41 Piitayantika 19 (about using water) and 51 (about drinking water) in the Mahiisarilghika Vinaya.

110 GIULIO AGOSTINI

of the term arthotpatti does not exclude his affiliation to th~ Mahasamghikas and does not prove his affiliation to the Lokottaravadins.

VI

Finally, we should notice the occurrence of term bhik~uvinaya, 'Vinaya of monks'. The commentator J ayarak~ita says that the original verses are merely "an excerpt from the bhik~uvinaya", and maybe the author of the verses himself had already used this term42• It is not a common term because it does not correspond to any section of the Vinayas of most schools43• The usual arrangement is: vibhaitga, divided into bhik~uvibhaitga and bhik~U1J-lvibhaitga, and a section made of various chapters called khandhakas or vastus44• The Vinayas of the Mahasamghikas and of the related Lokottaravadins, however, have a different arrangement: the bhik~uvinaya is made of a bhik~uvibhaitga with its own prakfrl)aka (corresponding to the khandhakas or vastus), and the bhik~ul)fvinaya is made of a bhik~ul)fvibhaitga with its own prakfrl)aka45• The Lokottaravadin bhik~ul)lvinaya is indeed extant in Sanskrit. Therefore the term bhik~uvinaya in Jayarak~ita's commentary most probably refers to the appropriate section of the Mahasamghika Vinaya46 , or of a similar one.

Conclusions

The evidence so far presented clearly shows that the author of the SrIghanacarasaIigraha and its commentator J ayarak~ita knew the same

42 bhik:fuvinayiit samuddh[tam aciiriintaram na tu svamanf:fikayiinyat "rtam iti dadayitum iiha / vinaya iti (Singh 1983: 121). According to Singh's reconstruction, the entire compound bhik:fuvinaya was part of the original verse, although this is not certain (ib., "Appendix", p. 313, kiirikii 199).

43 It occurs in the commentary to the Pali Vinaya, but it refers to 'discipline', not to a . section of the pari Vinaya: vinayaril paccakkhiimf ti na vevacanena paccakkhiinam !

bhikkhuvinayam paccakkhiimi bhikkhunzvinayam ... paccakkhiimf ti evam iidinii vinayavevacanena sikkhiipaccakkhiinam hoti (Samantapasadika I 252).

44 Hirakawa 1982: 14-15. 45 Hirakawa 1982: 16-18. The Sarvastivada Vinaya also has a similar structure (ib.). 46 As already suggested by Singh (1983: 238 n. 127).


Vinaya, but it does not definitely solve the problem of their precise nikiiya affiliation. Their Vinaya appears to have been generally close to the Mahasamghika and Lokottaravadin Vinayas, but in some details it differed from both of them. If one dismisses these differences as unimportant and due to the vagaries of the tradition or the imperfection of the Chinese translation, one will have to be generic on the nikiiya affiliation of both the author of the verses and J ayarak~ita: they belonged either to the Mahasamghikas or to any related nikiiya. If one stresses the importance of these differences, one will have to maintain that both the author of the verses and Jayarak~ita were neither Mahasamghikas nor Lokottaravadins, but belonged to a different nikiiya related to the Mahasamghikas.

I am inclined to give importance to these differences, because - as noted above - both the author of the verses and Jayarak~ita accept a sequence of the ten precepts unknown to any other nikiiya. Derrett suggested that the author of the verses used this "curious order" intentionally, because he wanted to address all nikiiyas47 . However, I have shown that there is no reason to doubt that the author of verses and J ayar~ita referred to one and the same Vinaya, and it is therefore more simple to suggest that also their unique sequence of the ten precepts belonged to one Vinaya school. While the Mahasamghika sequence is known, the sequence adopted by any sub-schools is not;48. Therefore, the available evidence strongly suggests that the author of the SrIghanacarasailgraha and Jayarak~ita were

47 Derrett 1983: 7. 48 In principle, an unknown sequence of the ten precepts can be inferred from a known

sequence of the eight precepts. For, the wording and order of the ten precepts taken by novices is very similar to the wording and order of the eight precepts taken by laypersons during fasting days: two precepts taken by novices - abstention from dancing etc. and abstention from perfumes etc. - correspond to one precept taken by laypersons; novices also abstain from taking gold and silver (see e.g. Gombrich 1991: 78). A short text on lay precepts, the 'll:+1§'fflG~ (unknown nikiiya affiliation), lists the eight precepts of the weekly fast in the following order: -1lf/l'~. =1lf/l'~. ~1lf/l'~. 1l!I1lf/l'~~.3i1lf/l'~iW. t\ 1lf/l'illr.\'iJl\\':;k:,*. -l::;1lf/l'1'FfIHU!Ml:ttltl!~. HH!i\t;;&. )\1lf/l'J®rf'~ (T.1486 XXIV 1023c29-1024a3). If one splits the seventh precept into two and adds the precept about gold and silver, the result is Jayarak~ita's sequence. However, the same text, after the passage just quoted, adds some verses where the eight lay precepts are listed in a different order: /l'~JF/l'~,/l'~/l'~~,miWi!!¥fEw,r.\'i,*J®rf'~ (ib. a5-6). From this order one can derive the list of the ten precepts of the Mahasarnghikas, of the Dharmaguptakas, and of the Abhidharmakosa (see table in Derrett 1983: 8).

112 GIULIO AGOSTINI

not Mahasamgikas, but belonged to a nikiiya that was related to the Mahasamghikas. '

References

Abhisarnacarika-Dhanna Study Group ~tJi~jfHtli}f9i:~. 1998. f:icff!tmlrul.1±li!:tml 'if; . btJi&lZ1~¥tJ :~t:!l:E:i*~fpl'i&Cf.~11 A Guide to the Facsimile Edition of the Abhisamacarika-Dharma of the Mahiisa1?1ghika-Lokottaravadin (Tokyo: The Institute for Comprehensive Study of Buddhism, Taisho University).

BHSD = Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary. Volume II: Dictionary (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953). Reprints, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970 etc.

Derrett, J. Duncan M. 1983. A Textbook for Novices: «layaraksita's Perspicuous Commentary on the Compendium of Conduct by Srlgh"ana » (Torino: Indologica Taurinensia) (Pubblicazioni di Indologica Taurinensia XV).

Ejima, Yasunori ¥I!l'!!;!;~. 1976. "Daishubukei riUen bonpon ni tsuite" :icXRW~1$$1t* (;: -:> c' "( [Some Observations on the Sanskrit Vinaya Texts of the Mahasamghikas], in Okuda lio Sensei Kiju Kinen "Bukkyo Shiso Ronshi"t" ~ EB~1l!5t1:%!'§c.~1ijt~,\!B~fut~ [Studies in Buddhist Thought Dedicated to Professor Iio Okuda in Commemoration of His SeventySeventh Birthday] (Kyoto: Heirakuji Shoten 'f~~'i!tr.5), pp. 911-922.

Gombrich, Richard. 1984. "Notes on the Brahminical Background to Buddhist Ethics", in Gatare Dhammapala, Richard Gombrich, and K.R. Norman, Buddhist Studies in Honour of Hammalava Saddhatissa (Nugegoda, Sri Lanka: University of Sri Jayewardenepura), pp. 91-101.

Gombrich, Richard. 1991. Buddhist Precept and Practice. Traditional Buddhism in the Rural Highlands of Ceylon (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass).

Handurukande, Ratna. 2000. Three Sanskrit Texts on Caitya Worship. In Relation to the Ahoratravrata, an edition and synopses in English (with an introduction) (Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies of the International College for Advanced Buddhist Studies) (Studia Philologica Buddhica. Monograph Series XVI).

Hirakawa, Akira. 1982. Monastic Discipline for the Buddhist Nuns: An English translation of the Chinese text of the Mahiisamghika-Bhik:fulJl-Vinaya (patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute).

Jinananda, B. 1969. Abhisamacarikii {Bhik:fupraklrlJakaJ (Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute) (Tibetan Sanskrit works Series volume IX).

Mvy = Sakaki, R. (ed.). 1916-1925. Mahiivyutpatti, part 1 & 2 (Kyoto) (Kyoto Imperial University Series 3).

Nolot, Edith. 1991. Regles de discipline des nonnes bouddhistes. Le Bhik:fulJlvinaya de l'ecole Mahiisa1?7ghika-Lokottaravadin. Traduction

ON THE NIKAYA AFFllJATION OF THE SRlGHANACARASANGRAHA 113

annotee, commentaire, collation du manuscrit (Paris: Edition-Diffusion de Boccard) (College de France. Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indi-enne. Fascic\.!le 60). .

Prasad, Maulichand. 1984. A Comparative Study of Abhisamiiciirikii. Abhisamiiciirikii-Dharma-Vinaya of the Arya Mahiisiirhghika-Lokottaraviidins and the Pali Vinaya of the Theraviidins (Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute) (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series; No XXVI).

Prebish, Charles S. 1994. A Survey of Vi nay a Literature (Taipei: Jill Luen Publishing House) (The Dharma Lamp Series, Volume 1).

Rosen, Valentina. 1959. Der Vinayavibhanga zum Bhik~upriitimok~a der Sarviistiviidins: Sanskritfragmente nebst einer Analyse der chinesischen Ubersetzung (Berlin: Akademie Verlag) (Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Institut fur Orientforschung. Nr. 27) (Sanskrit Texte aus den Turfanfunden IT).

Roth, Gustav. 1970. Bhik~ulJl-Vinaya. Including Bhik~ulJi-PraklrlJaka and a Summary of the Bhik~u-PrakirlJaka of the Arya-MahiisiiY(lghika-Lokottaraviidin. Edited and annotated for the first time with Introduction and two Indexes (patna: K. P. J ayaswaI Research Institute) (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series. Volume Xll).

Saddhatissa, Hammalawa. 1970. Buddhist Ethics: Essence of Buddhism (New York: George Braziller).

Samantapasadika = J. Takakusu and M. Nagai, Samanta-Piisiidikii: Buddhaghosa's Commentary on the Vinaya Pi[aka, 6 vols. (London: Pali Text Society, 1938-1966).

Sanghasena. 1968. Sphu{iirthii Srlghaniiciirasangrahatikii (patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute) (Tibetan Sanskrit texts series, v. Xl). For a second edition by the same editor see Singh 1983.

Shimoda, Masahiro rB3lE'§L. 1987. "Daishubukei sharnikai no tekisuto ni tsuite" *~ #Il*~/[;-~l# 17) 7" ~ ;r, r to: '? ,. '( [A Note on the Sphutartha SnghanacaraSarilgrahatIka] Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu EpJ3[~1*~J}HiJf9t [Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies] 35, 2: 941(80)-939(82).

Shimoda, Masahiro rB3lE5L.. 1990. "The Sphu{iirthii Srighaniicarasangraha{lkii and the Chinese Mahiisiinghika Vinaya", Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu EPJ3[~f~~",jiJf9t (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies) 39, 1: 495(11)-492(13).

Singh, Sanghasen. 1974. "Sirighana-sadda-vImarilsa", Buddhist Studies The Journal of the Department of Buddhist Studies, University of Delhi 1: 101-103.

Singh, Sanghasen. 1983. A Study of the Sphutiirthii Srlghaniiciirasangraha (patna: Kashi Prasad Jayasawal Research Institute) (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series; No. XXIV). For a previous edition by the same editor see Sanghasena 1968.

Singh, Sanghasen. 1986. "A Study of the Scriptural References and Comments in the Sphutartha SnghanacarasailgrahatIka of the Mahasanghika Sect", Buddhist Studies (The Journal of the Department of Buddhist Studies, University of Delhi) 10: 1-6.

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T. = Takakusu, Junjiro and Kaigyoku Watanabe (eds.), *IE~f~*i'U~ TaishO shinshU Daizokyo, 55 vols. (Tokyo: 1924-1929). .

Tsukamoto, KeishO J:%.:;$:mt$. 1996-1998. Indo bukkyo himei. no kenkyu .; :> ~·1~filili'~ 0) liJf9i: [A comprehensive study of Indian Buddhist Inscriptions]. Part I: Text, note, wayaku [Text, notes and Japanes'ltranslation] (Kyoto: Heirakuji shoten, 1996). II: Sakuin, zuhan [Indices, maps and illustrations] (Kyoto: Heitakuji shoten, 1998).

Yuyama, Akira. 1979. Systematische Ubersicht iiber die buddhistische SanskritLiteratur - A systematic Survey of Buddhist Sanskrit Literature. Erster Teil: Vinaya Te~te (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag).

CAN ALL BEINGS POTENTIALLY ATTAIN AWAKENING? GOTRA-THEORY IN THE MAHAyANASUTRALA¥KARA

MARlO D'AMATO

The Mahayana has sometimes been associated with the doctrine that all sentient beings will attain complete awakening, a doctrine which is often linked to some conception of the "embryo of the Tathagata" (tathiigatagarbha)l. However, according to an alternate Mahayana doctrine, only some sentient beings will attain the complete awakening of a buddha - and some may even be excluded from attaining any form of awakening at all. In this paper, I will examine just such a doctrine, as it is found in ah Indian Yogacara treatise, the Mahiiyiinasutriilaf!lkiira ("Ornament to the Mahayana Siitras"; abbr., MSA), a Sanskrit verse-text, and its prose commentary, the Mahiiyiinasutriilaf!lkiira-bhii:rya (MSABh)2. Particular Tibetan and Chinese sources attribute the composition of the MSA to the bodhisattva Maitreya3,

which gives us some indication of the importance this text was understood to have within certain traditions. Nevertheless, the authorship and date of

1 A concise introduction to this doctrine, and the Mahayana sutras to which it is related, may be found in Williams 1989, Chapter 5.

2 When referring to both the verse-text and the prose commentary together, I will use the abbreviation MSA/Bh. By the term "the text" I mean the MSA and the MSABh taken together, by "the verse-text" I mean the MSA, and by "the commentary" I mean the MSABh. Throughout this paper, for the Sanskrit I will quote from Levi's edition of the MSA/Bh (1907); I have also consulted the editions of Bagchi (1970; based on Levi's edition) and Funahashi (1985; select chapters based on mss. from Nepal). All translations are my own. The Tibetan canon contains the following relevant works: the MSA (verse-text): DT 4020; the MSA/Bh (verse-text along with prose commentary): DT 4026; the MSA VBh (Sthiramati's subcommentary to the text): DT 4034; and the MSAT (Asvabhava's subcommentary to the text): DT 4029. The MSA/Bh also appears in the Chinese canon (Taish6 1604), although with some differences from the Sanskrit version; on this, see Nagao 1961: vi.

3 The colophon of the Derge edition of the MSA states that the verse-text was composed by Maitreya. Bu ston (1290-1364) includes the MSA as one of the five Maitreyatexts; see Obermiller 1987: 53-54. Vi (1928: 221) identifies a Chinese tradition of the "five treatises of Maitreya," which differs from the Tibetan list of texts, but which also includes the MSA. Xuanzang (seventh century CE) writes that Asailga received the MSA and other texts from Maitreya; see Bea11906, voL 1: 226.


116 MARIO D'AMATO

the verse-text and its commentary are not certain; I hypothesize that the MSAlBh may be dated to the fourth century CE (perhaps c. 350 CE)4. It is my hope that an examination of such a source may contribute to the study of the various ways in which the contours of the Mahayana have been drawn from a doctrinal perspective. In the MSAlBh, one way in which the limits of the Mahayana are defIned is through the employment of the gotratheory, a theory which identifIes the soteriological potentialities of individuals through reference to their spiritual "family" or "lineage." So in order to understand this text's discursive construction of the category "Mahayana," we must understand its concept of gotra.

In the context of discussions of Buddhism, the term gotra has been variously translated as "family" (Edgerton 1970, vol. 2: 216), "basis, source, cause, seed" (ibid.), "kind, class, category" (ibid.), "species" (Wayman 1961; 58), or "spiritual lineage" (Ruegg 1968; 303, Griffiths 1990b: 49)5. Again, in the MSAlBh, gotra represents the soteriological category to which a particular sentient being belongs: an individual's gotra is taken to be indicative ofthat individual's soteriological possibilities, i.e., what type of - or even whether - awakening can be attained. So if a particular being is said to belong to the bodhisattva-gotra, then that being has the potentiality for the awakening of a buddha, and if a particular being is classified as "without gotra" (agotraka), this indicates that, at least for the present, that being does not have the "seed" to attain any form of awakening at all.

4 My working hypothesis is that earlier strata of the MSA were compiled, redacted, added to, and commented upon by one person, and I take the result of this process to be the received text of the MSA/Bh. An extended introduction to the MSA/Bh - its editions and translations, structure and contents, authorship, date, and relation to a larger corpus of texts - may be found in Chapter 2 of my PhD dissertation (D' Amato 2000).

5 Ruegg (1976: 354) offers the following meanings of gotra in Buddhist usage: i. "mine, matrix"; ii. "family, clan, lineage"; iii. "germ, seed"; and (iv.) "class, category." He also offers a preliminary discussion of the relation of the term gotra to other possible cognate terms in Iranian languages; his provisional hypothesis is that it might be possible to derive the various meanings of the cognate terms - including the Vedic meaning "cattle-pen" - from a root meaning "origin, source" (ibid., 354-356). In the context of the MSA/Bh, the translation "spiritual lineage" is perhaps most appropriate. "Spiritual lineage," however, should not be confused with the notion of a lineage of transmission or tradition (paramparti). In any case, in this paper when using the term gotra, I will leave it untranslated and unitalicized.

CAN ALL BEINGS POTENTIALLY ATTAIN AWAKENING? 117

Given. that for the MSA/Bh gotra is indicative of a sentient being's soteriological potentiality, an important issue is whether gotra is able to be acquired by every sentient being or whether there are some beings who are excluded from ever acquiring a gotra; and furthermore if some beings are excluded, in what sense they are excluded6. It will be necessary to understand these issues in order to address the question of whether, from the perspective of the MSA/Bh, all sentient beings can potentially attain awakening? And so I will begin by discussing the meanings of the term gotra in the MSA/Bh-including its relations to other important terms and concepts. Then I will tum to a presentation of the various categories or subdivisions of gotra according to the text. Following this, I will consider the text's gotra-theory in relation to some related doctrines in the MSA/Bh. I will then conclude with a response to the question of whether all sentient beings can potentially attain aWakening.

Gotra defined

As I stated above, a number of translations have been offered for the term gotra. The MSA/Bh itself offers an interesting interpretation of the term. In explaining the use of the phrase gUlJottiiralJatii ("having the characteristic of increasing virtues") in 3.4, the commentary states:

guI?ottaraI).arthena gotrarp. veditavyarp. guI?:l uttaranty asmad udbhavantiti lqtv1i/

Gotra should be known as that which increases virtues, since virtues arise and increase because of its.

6 For example, according to the Buddhabhumyupade.sa certain beings are excluded in a predetermined sense: "From the beginningless beginning all sentient beings are divided into five kinds of lineages (gotra) .... the first four of the above will ultimately attain final cessation ... But the fifth lineage ... will never reach a time of final cessation" (Keenan 1980: 494). For other references to gotra as a predetermined category in Buddhist literature, see Lamotte 1976: 304.

7 In my general formulation of this question, I have benefited from Ruegg's work on the gotra-theory, especially 1968, 1969: 73-107, and 1976.

8 Mano (1967: 970) points out that this etymological interpretation (nirukta) is also given by Haribhadra (end of the eighth c. CE) in the Abhisamayiilaf!lkiiriilokii (the Abhisamayiilaf!lkiira [AA] is considered by Bu ston to be another of the five Maitreya-texts), as well as by both Arya-Vimuktisena and Bhadanta-Vimuktisena in their earlier commentaries to the AA.

118 MARIO D'AMATO

From this we may see that for the MSAlBh, acqui:ripg a gotra means acquiring the ability to increase virtues. And this ability is of no small. importance according to the text, because the development of a number of virtues is understood as necessary for the attainment of particular soteriological goals. More specifically, gotra is posited as the cause of differences in inclination towards a particular vehicle (adhimukti) - that is to say, which soteriological vehicle one will be inclined to follow; religious practice (pratipatti); and awakening itself (bodhi) (MSA 3.2). It is said to be the basis of knowledge (jfiiina), purification from the afflictions (kleSa-nairmalya), and the supernormal powers, such as the higher knowledges (abhijiiii) (MSABh ad 3.9). It is said to be the cause of great awakening, great knowledge, concentration (samiidhi), and the maturation of sentient beings (MSA 3.10). Gotra is also identified as one cause for the production of the thought of awakening (cittotpiida) (MSABh ad 4.7), compassion (ad 17.34), the practice of the perfections (ad 16.16), and the specific perfection of patience (ad 8.6). Indeed at MSA 19.61 gotra is identified as the [lIst of the ten aspects of the Mahayana, thus it is understood to be the foundation upon which the practice of the Mahayana is based9. According to the MSA/Bh, then, having a gotra is foundational to attaining any specific Buddhist soteriological goal.

Having considered the MSA/Bh's explanation of the term gotra, we now tum to terms that are used as equivalent to it in the text. One such equivalent term used by the text is dhiitu. In fact, there are two places in the text in which gotra and dhiitu are used interchangeably 10. The [lIst is at 11.8, where the verse-text uses the term tridhiituka. Here the commentary states:

tatra dhatu-niyato yaJ:t sravakadi-gotra-niyataJ:t1

There [in the previous line of the text] a defInite dhiitu is a definite gotra, such as sravaka.

Although the term dhiitu has a number of meanings in this and other texts, in this instance, "stage" or "level of attainment" seems to be the

9 Chapter 19 of the MSA;Bh is specifically devoted to the topic of the gU(las; furthermore, at MSA;Bh 19.59-61, all of the virtues referred to in this paragraph are either explicitly mentioned or implicitly contained in the lists that occur there.

10 Furthermore, as Ruegg (1969: 85) points out, in a number of places the Tibetan text of the MSA;Bh has rigs (normally gotra) for khams (normally dhiitu).

'CAN ALL BEINGS POTENTIALLY ATTAIN AWAKENING? 119

most appropriate. In another context (at 11.43) the verse-text uses the term arya-gotra, the "noble gotra," which the commentary glosses with anasrava-dhatu, the "undefiled realm" - i.e., the realm or level of attainment in which there is no longer the influx of afflictions which bind one to smp.sara. Here, then, we may infer that gotra is understood in terms of a spiritual stage or level of attainmentll .

The term gotra is also used twice in the commentary as a gloss for praJerti, or "nature." The commentary to 8.5 glosses svaprakrtya - "by one's nature" or "according to one's nature" - with gotrel}a - an instrumental form of the term meaning "by gotra" or "according to gotra." Also, the commentary to 18.19-21 glosses the term prakrtya with gotrata/:t, an ablative form of the term meaning "due to one's gotra." So here the term gotra refers to one's "nature."12

While the term gotra has been equated with spiritual stage or level of attainment (dhiitu) and nature (prakrti)13, it is so far unclear whether this stage or nature represents something predetermined or something acquired. That is to say, if the development of certain capacities or virtues is due to one's nature - or due to one's gotra - then does gotra represent a predetermined and predetermining category, or does it represent an acquirable and alterable category of spiritual potentiality? And if it is acquirable, is it acquirable by all? These are questions that I will return to below. In any case, belonging to a certain gotra means having the potentiality for reaching specific soteriological goals. The next step in understanding gotra, then, is understanding the different categories or subdivisions of gotra according to the text.

Categories of gotra

. In Indian Buddhist literature, a list of the following five gotras may be found: sravaka-gotra, pratyekabuddha-gotra, bodhisattva-gotra, indefinite

11 In this connection, according to Ruegg (1974: 204), the Visuddhimagga equates ariya-gotta with ariya-bhilmi, which Ruegg translates as "spiritual stage of the saint."

12 However, note that at neither of these locations does the text posit that one's nature (prakrti) is to be understood as beginningless or unalterable.

13 These synonyms for gotra are also found in the Bodhisattvabhiimi (Sanskrit edition, Dutt 1966: 2); a third synonym given in that text is bfja, "seed."

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gotra (aniyata-gotra), and without gotra (agotraka)14. Spmetimes this list of five is shortened to just the fIrst three members15, which the MSA/Bh then aligns with the three. vehicles: those of the sravaka-gotra go by the sravakayana, etc. But such a shortening of the list need not reflect any serious philosophical differences. Only the first three gotras result in particular Buddhist soteriological goals, since only the fIrst three gotras correspond to particular Buddhist soteriological vehicles. Furthermore, being classified under the category of indefinite gotra may be understood as a liminal state: when one's gotra becomes definite, it will be in terms of one of the three standard gotras of sravaka, pratyekabuddha, or bodhisattva. And the category "without gotra," after ali, is not properly an element of the list of categories of gotra. Therefore, the lists of five and three gotras may be seen as having different conceptual emphases, rather than different theoretical bases.

While the MSA/Bh offers no specific list of gotras that corresponds to those given above, each member of the list of five is either explicitly mentioned or implicitly referred to16. Furthermore, it is clear that the

14 For example, the Mahiivyutpatti contains the following fivefold list of gotras (1261-1265): sriivaka-yiiniibhisamaya-gotraJ:t, pratyekabuddha-yiiniibhisamaya-gotraJ:t, tathiigata-yiiniibhisamaya-gotraJ:t (gotra for the realization of the vehicle of sravakas, pratyekabuddhas, and tathagatas, respectively), aniyata-gotraJ:t (indefinite gotra), agotrakaJ:t (without gotra); see Sakaki 1926. The Mahiivyutpatti is a compilation of lists of Sanskrit Buddhist terms, along with their Tibetan translations, that dates to the early ninth century CE, centuries after the time of the MSA/Bh. Nevertheless, when a particular list is found in the Mahiivyutpatti, this suggests that the list was important to Indian Buddhist thought at the time. The fivefold list of gotras is also significant for our purposes since Sthiramati offers the same one in his subcommentary to the MSA/Bh (DT sems tsam MI 48a3-4).

15 The three gotras are referred to in the Sa7[ldhinirmocana-sutra (SNS); Lamotte 1935: 73-74 and 198-199 offers the Tibetan text and French translation, respectively; cf. Powers 1995: 110-115. The SNS is considered to be one of the earliest Yogacara siitras (along with the Mahiiyiiniibhidharma-sutra, which is no longer extant). Although the MSABh does not explicitly refer to or quote the SNS, Schmithausen (1976: 240, note 2) makes the convincing point that MSA 19.44ab presupposes SNS 8.20.2 in its discussion of the seven types of thusness (tathatii). The Abhidharmakosa-bhii$ya ad 6.23cd also identifies the three gotras (Sanskrit edition, Pradhan 1967: 348). Other lists of gotras appear in Indian Buddhist literature. For example, the Mahiivibhii$iiSiistra mentions six different gotras; but even in this case the principal gotras of the Vaibha~ikas are the standard three identified here; see Davidson 1985: 94-95.

16 The bodhisattva-gotra is mentioned in various places, e.g., MSABh ad 3.5, 3.7, 3.8, etc.; the verse-text refers to it as the "foremost-gotra" (MSA 3.13: agra-gotra) or "noblegotra" (MSA 11.43: iirya-gotra). The sravaka-gotra is mentioned at MSABh ad 11.8,

TAN ALL BEINGS POTENTIALLY ATTAIN AWAKENING? 121

MSA/Bh posits the superiority of the bodhisattva-gotra: in linking gotra to the roots of virtue (kusala-mula), the commentary to 3.3 states that the roots of virtue of the bodhisattva-gotra are far superior to those of the sravaka-gotra - those of the sravaka-gotra, for example, lack the special powers of a buddha. And in 11.43 the commentary states that the noble gotra of buddhas - i.e., the bodhisattva-gotral7 - is distinct from those of the sravaka and pratyekabuddha for five reasons: (1) it is purified from the impregnating afflictions (sawisana-kleSa), (2) it purifies a buddhafield, and (3-5) it attains the three buddha-bodies.

The MSA/Bh explicitly aligns each of the first three gotras with one of the soteriological vehicles (yanas). The commentary to 3.2 states that there is a difference in gotra with respect to the three vehicles - the three vehicles here being the sravakayana, pratyekabuddhayana, and bodhisattvayanal8 .

The commentary also goes on to distinguish three types of awakening (inferior, middling, or superior), stating that each corresponds to a particular gotra in the way that a fruit corresponds to its seed19• And at 5.4-5 the commentary states that there are three gotras: again, inferior, middling, or superior. Thus the MSA/Bh posits the following threefold structure:

spiritual category sravaka-gotra pratyekabuddha-gotra bodhisattva-gotra

soteriological vehicle sravakayana pratyekabuddhayana bodhisattvayana

form of awakening inferior middling superior

It is clear, then, that the category of gotra is of importance to the MSA/Bh's soteriological scheme because different gotras lead to different

11.53, etc. The pratyekabuddha-gotra is implicitly referred to in the phrase sravakadigotra, "the gotra of sravakas, etc." [i.e., pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas] at MSABh ad 11.8. The indefinite gotra is mentioned at MSA 3.6, etc., and the category "without gotra" is mentioned at MSA 1.14, etc. Again, Sthiramati's subcornrnentary does offer the specific list of five gotras; see note 14.

17 It is quite clear that buddha-gotra is another term for bodhisattva-gotra, and not a separate category. MSABh ad 3.2 states there are three forms of awakening, and that each form corresponds to a gotra as a fruit corresponds to its seed: thus the awakening of a buddha corresponds to the bodhisattva-gotra. Then MSABh ad 3.4 states that gotra does not exist along with its fruit; so when the awakening of a buddha is attained, no gotra exists.

18 While the first two vehicles are specifically mentioned in the text (see, e.g., MSABh ad 19.44), the third is not; the term mahayana is used rather than bodhisattvayana.

19 Here we see gotra understood in terms of a seed, as in definition iii. offered by Ruegg; see note 5.

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soteriological goals. To trace this out a bit further, we ~ay mention the following points: (1) the first two gotras belong to the lITnayana, while the third gotra belongs to the Mahayana20; (2) the Hfuayana is said to bring about the termination of the afflictive obstructions (kldavaral}a), while the Mahayana is said to bring about the termination of both the atflictive and the cognitive obstructions (jfieyavaral}a)21; (3) the lITnayana leads to lesser forms of awakening, and ultimately to nirvfu:1a without residual conditioning (nirupadhi§e~a-nirval}a) - which the text interprets as a form of extinction22; (4) the Mahayana leads to a superior form of awakening - the complete awakening of a buddha, an awareness of all objects of knowledge and all modes of appearance (sarva-jfieya-sarvakara-jnana), viz., omniscience - which is a state of being coextensive with reality (thusness, tathata) itself, since the text posits that ultimately there is no distinction between subject and object23; furthermore, the Mahayana does not lead to the extinction of nirvaI;la without residual conditioning, but rather to non-abiding nirvaI;la (aprati~thita-nirval}a) - an attainment which allows for continued manifestations in the world in order to aid sentient beings24. So the MSA/Bh's gotra-theory is of central importance to the text's soteriological theory, since the first two gotras lead to lesser forms of awakening which ultimately terminate in extinction (nonexistence), while the third gotra leads to complete awakening which is nothing less than omniscience (coextension with reality itself).

While the preceding gives us a sense of the MSA/Bh's presentation of the gotras of sravaka, pratyekabuddha, and bodhisattva, in order to understand

20 MSA 15.4 refers to the "twofold Hlnayana" (nihfnayiina-dvividha), viz., the sriivakayiina and pratyekabuddha-yiina. There is further textual evidence for identifying the sriivaka- andpratyekabuddhayiinas with the hfnayiina; on this, see D'Amato 2000: 177-178.

21 See, e.g., MSABh ad 17.4-5 and MSA/Bh 20-21.44. 22 See MSABh ad 3.3, 16.50, etc. In every place where the term nirupadhise~a- or

anupadhise~a-nirviil}a is used in the text, some form of the term k~aya ("loss, destruction, end, termination") is also used.

23 While this is by no means the standard account of omniscience offered in Buddhist traditions, it is the one that I believe is most defensible as a reading of the MSA/Bh; see MSA/Bh 20-21.58, Griffiths 1990a: 106-108, and D'Amato 2000: 130-131, 141-146, and 152-154.

24 See MSA/Bh 17.32, 19.61-62, etc. On both forms of nirvfu.1a in the text, see D' Amato 2000, Chapter 5.

CAN ALL BEINGS POTENTIALLY ATTAlN AWAKENING? 123

the text's gotra-theory more fully, we must also consider the latter two gotras in our initial fivefold list: indefinite gotra and without gotra. Regarding the indefinite-gotra, we may begin with a consideration of MSA 3.6, where the verse-text introduces a fourfold classification of gotras:

niyatamyatarp. gotram aharyarp. haryam eva cal pratyayair gotra-bhedo 'yarp. samasena catur-vidhalJII

Gotra can be definite or indefInite, incapable of being lost or able to be lost. In sum, according to conditions, the distinctions of gotra are fourfold.

While the verse seems to set up a fourfold classification system (definite-incapable of being lost, definite-able to be lost, etc.), the commentary reduces this to a twofold system: "definite" corresponding only to "incapable of being lost," and "indefinite" corresponding only to "able to be lost. "25 The commentary's move here is supported by the fact that while the term "indefinite" (aniyata) is again used by the text in connection with the term gotra (at MSA/Bh 11.54), neither term of the pair "incapable of being lost/able to be lost" (ahiirya/hiirya) is again linked to it. Furthermore, Sthiramati's subcommentary agrees with the MSABh in specifying that "definite" corresponds to "incapable of being lost" and "indefinite" corresponds to "able to be lost. "26

Regarding the classification definite/indefinite, it is significant that for the MSA/Bh indefinite gotra does not represent a fourth gotra alongside the three standard gotras. Rather, any sentient being belonging to one of the three specific gotras may be further classified according to whether that specific gotra is definite or indefinite. If the gotra is definite that means it is fixed and will not be lost, but if the gotra is indefinite that means it is not fixed and there is the possibility that it can be lost or changed after it has been acquired.

The text further discusses the indefinite gotra in a section devoted to the analysis of the ekayana (a doctrine which the MSA/Bh does not

25 MSABh ad 3.6: samasena caturvidharp. gotrarp. niyataruyatarp. tad eva yatha-kramarp. pratyayair ahiiryarp. hiiryarp. ceti/.

26 MSA VBh ad 3.6 (DT sems tsam MI 45b4-5): de bas na rigs nes pa mams ni rkyen gyis mi 'phrogs pa :les bya ste/ ... rigs rna nes pa roams ni rkyen gyis 'phrog pa :les bya ste/.

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consider to be definitive, but rather in need of interpretation). At 11.54, the verse-text states:

akar~alJ.arthameke~am anya-sarpdh1iraIJ.aya cal desitaniyataniiIp. hi sarpbuddhair ekayanatall

For the purpose of attracting some, and for supporting others, the fully awakened ones taught the fact of one vehicle for those who are indefInite.

The commentary goes on to specify that those who are attracted are those with an indefinite sravaka-gotra and those who are supported are those with an indefinite bodhisattva-gotra. Also, in discussing the function of buddhahood as a refuge, the commentary to 9.8 states:

hInayana-paritr~atvam aniyata-gotr~iiIp. mahayanaikayaru-karaIJ.at/

[Buddhahood] protects those of an indefInite gotra from the Hfuayana by constructing the uniform path of the Mahayana.

Although this comment refers to the indefinite gotra without linking it to one of the three specific gotras, it seems reasonable to read it in terms of 11.54: buddhas teach the unity of vehicles in order to lure those of an indefinite sravaka-gotra away from the Hinayana, and in order to keep those of an indefinite bodhisattva-gotra from entering the Hlnayana. Furthermore, in discussing the ten types of sentient beings towards whom bodhisattvas are compassionate (MSA/Bh 17.29-30), the verse-text refers to one type as those who have gone astray, which the commentary specifies as those who are indefinite in adhering to the Hinayana - a reference to the indefinite sravaka- and pratyekabuddha-gotras27•

In the commentary to verse 11.53 the MSABh mentions the indefinite sravaka-gotra, stating that those of this gotra may attain final liberation through the Mahayana28 • Thus there is the possibility for one of an indefinite sravaka-gotra to acquire the bodhisattva-gotra. Furthermore, if as

27 MSABh ad 17.29-30: utpatha-prasthita hInayana-prayukta aniyatlQI/. Again, hfnayiina refers to the sriivakayiina and pratyekabuddhayiina. While the indefinite pratyekabuddhagotra is not specifically mentioned in the MSA/Bh, it is mentioned in Sthiramati's subcommentary. In fact, Sthiramati specifies that each of the three specific gotras may be definite or indefmite; see MSAVBh ad 3.6 (DT sems tsam MI 45a6-7).

28 MSABh ad 11.53: aniyata-sravaka-gotrfu,lfup. mahayanena niryfu,lad yanti tena yanam iti lqtva/.


11.54 states some bodhisattvas are in need of support, this implies that one of an indefinite bodhisattva-gotra has the possibility of losing that gotra. So for one of an indefinite gotra there is the possibility of losing one's gotra and transferring to another29•

The final classification to consider is that of being without gotra; a category that is the topic of MSA/Bh 3.11. Here, the verse-text and commentary state:

aikantiko duscarite 'sti kascit kascit samudghatita-sukla-dharma/ amok~a-bhaglya-subho 'sti kascin nihIna-suklo 'sty api hetu-hlnal}/'po

aparinirvaI).a-dharmaka etasminn agotrastho 'bhipretal}/ sa ca samasato dvividhal}l tat-kalaparinirvaI).a-dharma atyantarp. cal tat-kalaparinirviiI).adharma caturvidhaJ:!/ ... atyantaparinirviiI).a-dharma tu hetu-hlno yasya parinirviiI).a-gotram eva nasti/

Some have solely ill conduct, some have pure qualities that have been destroyed, some have purity that is not associated with liberation, or an inferior purity, and some also lack the cause.

This [verse] refers to those who are without gotra, those who lack the qualities associated with parinirviiI).a. And this is concisely in two ways: lacking the qualities associated with parinirviiI).a at the present time and for ever (or "absolutely"; atyantam). Lacking the qualities associated with parinirviiI).a at the present time can be in four ways .... But those who for ever (or "absolutely"; atyanta) lack the qualities associated with parinirvaI).a - those who lack the cause - simply do not have the parinirviiI).a gotra.

So according to the text, being without gotra means lacking the qualities associated with parinirvfu).a (aparinirviilJa-dharmaka)31. And there are two ways in which this might occur: lacking the qualities associated with parinirvaJ:?a at the present time (tat-kala) and lacking them for ever or absolutely (atyantam). The first option -lacking the qualities at the present time (tat-kiila) - is explained with reference to the

29 For a discussion of this issue in the Buddhabhumyupadda, see Keenan 1980: 678-684; briefly, those of an indefinite gotra may attain nirvfu.la either through the Mahayana or through one of the other vehicles.

30 Following the commentary, I do not interpret this verse in terms of the standard four padas; I read the last pada as identifying two elements in a list, rather than one.

31 The term aparinirvaIJa-dharmaIJal; is used at MSABh ad 17.29-30: it refers to those do not have the qualities associated with parinirvfu.la because they have never put an end to sarpsara (sarrzsara-vartmatyantanupacchedat). The context here is a discussion of the types of beings towards whom a bodhisattva should be compassionate.

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first four reasons stated in the verse: having solely ill conduct, having cut-off roots of virtue (samucchinna-kusala-mula)3Z; having roots of virtue unrelated to liberation (amok~a-bhaglya-kusala-mula), and having inferior roots of virtue (hlna-kusala-mula). So sentient beings belonging to this category are without gotra because of some deficiency in roots of virtue. However, they are understood to be without gotra only for the present, with the implication that they can acquire a gotra at some point in time through accumulating an adequate store of the appropriate roots of virtue.

The second option - lacking the qualities associated with parinirval).a for ever or absolutely (atyantam) - makes reference to the fifth reason stated in the verse: lacking the cause, which ostensibly means lacking any roots of virtue whatsoever. So here we see that there is a certain category of sentient beings who are excluded from acquiring a gotra. But there is some difficulty in determining in precisely what sense they are excluded, a difficulty which hinges on the way in which the term atyantam is translated in this context, a term which has a semantic range which includes both "for ever" and "absolutely."33

Translators have dealt with the term atyantam in different ways in this context. While Ruegg (1969: 80ff.) translates it as absolument, Levi (1911: 30) suggests indefiniment (although this is not included as one of the meanings ofthe term in the standard dictionaries). The Tibetan translation (DT sems tsam PHl, 138b3) gives gtan [du], which Das's dictionary defines as "always, continually, for ever." The Chinese translation (Taish6 vol. 31, no. 1604, p. 595a25) renders it as bijing, which according to the Digital Dictionary of Buddhism has the basic meaning of "absolute[ly]," but also has the senses of "finally, in the long run.,,34 Hence there has not been a consensus on the meaning of atyantam in this

32 See Davidson 1985: 98-99 regarding samucchinna-kusala-mUla in the Vaibhfuiika tradition.

33 The standard Sanskrit-English dictionaries include both of these senses of the term atyantam. Monier-Williams has "in perpetuity" and "absolutely, completely"; Apte lists "for ever" and "absolutely"; and the Poona dictionary (edited by Ghatage) also gives "for ever" and "absolutely."

34 My thanks to Peter Gregory for providing me with the reference to the Chinese translation of the MSAlBh. The term bijing, according to Muller's Digital Dictionary of Buddhism, also includes the senses of "positively, decidedly" and "necessarily."

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context. However, since the term is used in MSABh ad 3.11 in opposition to tat-kala (lit., "that time"; "immediately, the present time"), I think there is some reason to understand atyantam here in a temporal sense (viz., as "for ever"). Furthermore, there is evidence that the term atyantam is used in its temporal sense in other locations in the text. For example, at 8.22 the verse-text states that the bodhisattva instructs beings for as long as the world exists, which the commentary explains as follows:

yavallokasya bhavas tat-samanaya gatya atyantam ity arthaJ:!/

For as long as the world exists - with that same duration - means "for ever" (atyantam).

And the commentary to 18.44 states that the practice of bodhisattvas goes on "for ever" (atyantam) because it does not end in nirvfu).a without residual conditioning (nirupadhise.ya-nirvalJe 'pi tad-ak,yayat). Furthermore, in the commentary to the Madhyantavibhiiga (a text referred to in the MSABh), the term atyanta is used to gloss sada ("always")35. Thus it can be seen that the term atyantam does mean "for ever" in certain contexts. In any case, it is clear that sentient beings belonging to this category - those.who are atyantaparinirvalJa-dharma - are without roots of virtue, without gotra, and hence excluded from attaining any form of awakening.

It should be emphasized that according to 3.11 roots of virtue (kusalamula) are understood to be the cause of gotra: gotra is acquired through amassing an adequate store of the appropriate roots of virtue. This is not so unusual a claim for the MSAlBh to make, since obtaining roots of virtue has traditionally been understood as a necessary aspect of the path to awakening36. Furthermore, Sthiramati's subcommentary to the Madhyantavibhiiga states that one standard definition of gotra is "roots of

~5 MA V 1.18b states: sada sattva-hitaya cal "And for the benefit of sentient beings always." MA VBh ad 1.18b then glosses with: atyanta-sattva-hitarthaJPI "For the sake of the benefit of sentient beings for ever (atyanta)." See Sanskrit ed., Nagao 1964: 25.

36 On the importance of the kusala-mula to Buddhist conceptions of the path, see Buswell 1992; he identifies one basic classification of the kusala-mula as nongreed (alobha), nonhatred (adveSa), and nonignorance (amoha). The MSA/Bh is not the only text that links the roots of virtue to gotra; for a discussion of the relation between these two in the context of the Mahiivibhii~iisiistra and the Abhidharmakosa, see Davidson 1985: 92-100.

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virtue. "37 But the MSAlBh also posits that when the bodhisattva-gotra is acquired, it in turn becomes a source of further roots of virtue. At 3.3 the verse-text states that the pre-eminence of the [bodhisattva-]gotra is indicated by the vastness, totality, greatness of purpose, and imperishability of its purity (subha) - and here the commentary identifies purity with the roots of virtue. And in 3.9, when the verse-text compares gotra to a mine of gold38, the commentary states that the bodhisattva-gotra is like a source of abundant gold since it is the basis of unlimited roots of virtue. So for the MSAlBh, acquiring roots of virtue is a necessary condition for acquiring a gotra (3.11), but when the bodhisattva-gotra is acquired, it becomes a source of unlimited roots of virtue (3.9).

To conclude this section, it is necessary to consider one further char-acterization of gotra in the text. At 3.4, the verse-text states:

pralqtya paripu~taI!l ca asrayas casritarp. ca tatl sad asac caiva vijiieyarp. gUl.J.0ttaraI).atiirthataI:!/ I

By nature, nourished, support and supported, existing and not existing, it should truly be known as that which increases virtues.

First we should note that this verse does not offer an addition to the fivefold list of gotras discussed above; rather, it is introduced by the commentary as a verse onthe characteristics (lak:;ar:tas) of gotras in general. The commentary identifies the following four characteristics of gotra: (1) gotra is natural (prkrtistha) insofar as it has the nature (svabhiiva) of a support, (2) it is attained (samudiinUa, a gloss for paripu:;taY[l - "nourished" - in the verse) insofar as it has the nature of being supported, (3) it exists along with its cause (hem), (4) but it does not exist along with its fruit. From this we can see that gotra can be attained - at least by some sentient beings - and that it has a cause. And again, according to MSAlBh 3.11, the cause of gotra - the condition for its acquisition - is the roots of virtue: gotra is acquired when adequate roots of virtue of the appropriate kind are accumulated. But we must also remember that, according to MSA/Bh 3.9, when the bodhisattva-gotra is

37 Sanskrit ed., Yamaguchi 1934: 188. 38 As stated in note 5, one of the meanings of the tenn gotra is "mine" (as in "a mine

of gems or ores"; see Edgerton 1970, vol. 2: 216, def. 2), thus here the MSA/Bh is playing off that defmition of the tenn.


acquired, it serves as a basis for further roots of virtue. It is in this sense that we should read characteristic (1) according to the verse above: gotra is natural'insofar as it is a support or basis for further roots of virtue39•

From all that has been said above, we may summarize the MSA/Bh's gotra-theory as follows: (1) having a gotra is a prerequisite for attaining any form of awakening; (2) there are three specific gotras: the sravaka, pratyekabuddha-, and bodhisattva-gotras; (3) the first two gotras lead to lesser forms of awakening, and ultimately to the HJnayana goal of nirvfu).a without residual conditioning - understood as extinction - while the bodhisattva-gotra leads to complete awakening, the Mahayana goal of buddhahood - understood as omniscience; (4) some sentient beings are of an indefinite gotra: they are able to lose their gotra and acquire a different one; (5) some beings are presently without gotra, but can acquire one through amassing roots of virtue; and (6) some beings are excluded from acquiring any gotra. Considering these points we are now in a better position to attempt to address the question of whether all sentient beings can potentially attain awakening.

39 The Bodhisattvabhiimi ([BBh] the fifteenth section of the first division of the Yogiicarabhiimi, which contains in parts some of the oldest Yogaciira materials [Schmithausen 1969]) also makes use of the classification of prakrtistha-gotra and samudiinfta-gotra. Yamabe (1997: 195ff.) offers a discussion of the BBh's interpretation of these categories; according to that text, the prakrtistha-gotra is beginningless (aniidikiilika), while the samudiinfta-gotra is acquired through the accumulation of roots of virtue. While the MSA/Bh is closely related to the BBh in the selection and order of topics that it addresses, the two texts do not always address those topics in the same way. For example, the MSA/Bh does not defme gotra in terms of the ifaeJiiyatana-viseifa (" distinct state of the six sense bases"). Furthermore, the MSA/Bh does not use the term aniidikiilika ("beginningless") in connection with the topic of gotra at all. Thus the two texts differ in their treatments of gotra. For the BBh, a gotra is prakrtistha if it is beginningless (viz., predetermined in some way), whereas for the MSA/Bh a gotra is prakrtistha only in the sense that it serves as a causal basis for the further accumulation of roots of virtue. [Here note that one meaning of the termprkrti is "cause," so prkrtistha may be interpreted as "existing/operating as a cause."] The MSA/Bh's interpretation of prkrtistha may also be seen at 3.12, where the text states that the bodhisattva-gotra possesses virtues both naturally (prakrtyii) and by nourishment (paripuiftasya); thus a bodhisattva-gotra is in one sense natural (or causal), and in another sense attained (or caused). Finally, both Ruegg (1969: 476-477) and Davidson (1985: 100) state that the prakrtistha/samudiinfta distinction seems to be strikingly similar to two types of roots of virtue in the Vaibh~ika tradition - those that are congenital (upapattiliibhika) and those due to application (priiyogika).

130 MARIO D'AMATO

Can all beings potentially attain awakening?

Before responding to this question, we must fIrst consider a few relevant doctrines in the MSA/Bh that have not been addressed thus far. The fIrst, and most significant for our purposes, is that of the tathagatagarbha, the "embryo of the Tathagata. " The MSA contains one reference to the tathagatagarbha, which is found at 9.37. This verse and its commentary state:

sarve~am avisi~tapi tathata suddhirrl agata/ tathagatatvarp. tasmac ca tad-garbhaI). sarva-dehinaI:t11

sarve~arp nirvisi~ta tathata tad-visuddhi-svabhavas ca tathagataI:t1 atal;t sarve sattvas tathagata-garbha ity ucyatel

Although thusness is in all [living beings] without distinction, when it is pure it is the nature of the Tathagata; thus all living beings have its embryo.

Thusness is in all [living beings] without distinction, and the Tathagata has the nature of the purity of that. Hence it is said that all sentient beings have the embryo of the Tathagata.

This verse states that all sentient beings have the embryo of the Tathagata (tathagatagarbha) since all sentient beings have the nature of thusness (tathata). It should be noted that it is possible to interpret this verse as stating that all beings "are" the embryo of the Tathagata, rather than all beings "have" the embry040. The former would imply, however, that all sentient beings will attain buddhahood, a claim that the MSA/Bh does not seem inclined to make. In fact, as we have already seen in the material on gotra, the text states quite clearly that different beings belong to different gotras and that different gotras lead to different forms of awakening41; thus not all sentient beings attain buddhahood. Nevertheless, the text does here claim that all sentient beings have the potentiality for attaining buddhahood, even if this potentiality is not actually realized.

The claim that all sentient beings have the potentiality for attaining buddhahood is not such a strange one for the MSA/Bh to make given its

40 For more on this see Griffiths 1990b: 62-63. Here I am following Griffiths' translation.

41 Compare this to Haribhadra's theory of gotra as found in the AbhisamayaiaJ?1kara/okii, where from the ultimate point of view gotra is seen as non-distinct in all sentient beings; see Ruegg 1968, especially: 316-317, and Mana 1967.

· CAN ALL BEINGS POTENTIALLY ATTAIN AWAKENING? 131

affirmation of mind as fundamentally pure in nature. The first half of 13..19 states:

matarp. ca chtarp. pralqti-prabhiisvararp. sada tad agantuka-do~a-dii~itarp./

Mind should properly be thought of as always luminous by nature; it is impure due to adventitious defilements.

The commentary further states that mind is like space, or like water that is pure in itself but made impure by pollutants; and like water, mind can be purified through removing the defIlements. Thus from the perspective of the text, insofar as sentient beings have (or just are) minds, they may attain the state of fundamental purity through the removal of adventitious defIlements42•

The theme of purity is also discussed at 11.13-14, although here it is the nature of reality that is fundamentally pure. MSA 11.13 states:

tattvarp. yat satatarp. dvayena rahita:qJ. bhriintes ca sa:qJ.nisraya}:t sakya:qJ. naiva ca sarvathabhilapitu:qJ. yac caprapaiicatmaka:qJ./ jfieya:qJ. heyam atho visodhyam amala:qJ. yac ca pralqiya matarp. yasyakasa-suvan;ta-vari-sadrsI klesad visuddhir matal/

Reality - which is always without duality, is the basis of error, and is entirely inexpressible - does not have the nature of discursivity. It is to be known, abandoned, and purified. It should properly be thought of as naturally immaculate, since it is purified from defilements, as are space, gold, and water.

As in the commentary to 13.19, the nature of reality - like the nature of mind - is said to be similar to that of space and water: they are naturally pure and defIled only adventitiously. The next verse goes on to state that there is nothing else in the world besides this fundamentally pure reality. Thus at an ontological level the MSA/Bh posits that, even though it serves as the basis of error, reality is fundamentally pure.

This brief excursus into the domain of the MSA/Bh' s ontological discourse is to be understood in relation to our original question. The moves towards understanding the MSA/Bh's position on the tathrigatagarbhatheory and the MSA/Bh's doctrine of the fundamental purity of mind and reality were, I think, necessary in order to more fully consider a response

42 The theme of the fundamental purity of mind and the adventitious nature of defilements may also be found in certain passages in the nikayasjagamas; see Keenan (1980: 21-22) on passages from the Anguttara-niktiya and Majjhima-nikaya that posit the fundamental purity of mind.

132 MARIO D'AMATO

to the question of whether all sentient beings can potentially attain awakening. According to the passages discussed here we see that

(1) All sentient beingshave the potentiality for attaining complete awakening (i.e., all beings have the embryo of the Tathagata; MSA/Bh 9.37), and all beings have the potentiality for purifying their minds, smce mind - like reality itself - is fundamentally pure by nature (MSA/Bh 13.19 and 11.13).

However, we must also consider this claim in relation to the MSA/Bh's discourse on gotra, according to which

(2) Having a gotra is a prerequisite for attaining any form of awakening, but some beings are excluded from acquiring a gotra (MSA/Bh 3.11).

Considering these claims together, we may note a degree of tension between (1) and (2). More specifically, according to (1) all sentient beings have the potentiality for complete awakening, while the implication of (2) is that some beings are excluded from the attainment of any form of awakening at all, in that they are excluded from acquiring the "seed" (gotra) necessary for awakening. The issue here is in what sense we should understand the state of being excluded - and, more specifically, in what sense we should understand the term atyantam in the commentary to 3.11. Are sentient beings of this category - those who are atyantiiparinirviilJa-dharmii - excluded "absolutely"? "For ever"? Does anything hinge on deciding one way or the other?

I would argue that something does indeed hinge on such a decision, that it is not philosophically insignificant whether atyantam is translated as "absolutely" or "for ever" in this context. To say that some beings are "absolutely" without the qualities associated with parinirvaJ).a -absolutely without gotra - implies that some beings are "unconditionally" in this state43 : it implies that these sentient beings unconditionally lack gotra - hence they simply do not attain any form of awakening, without reference to any other conditions or qualifications. This would pose a problem in interpreting the text consistently, in that we have already seen that gotra is not unconditional: the condition for its acquisition is the

43 The O:iford English Dictionary offers one defInition of "absolutely" as "without conditiou or limitation; unconditionally."


roots of virtue. Furthermore, understanding atyantam here as "absolutely" intensifies the tension between (1) and (2): it would imply the problematic conclusion that although all beings have the potentiality for complete awakening, some beings are absolutely unable to attain any form of awakening at all. On the other hand, saying that some beings are "for ever" without the qualities associated with parinirvfu;a - for ever without gotra - does not imply that any beings are unconditionally in this category. Rather, it implies that some beings simply always remain in this category due to a conditional lack in roots of virtue. And translating atyantam here as "for ever" would significantly reduce the tension between (1) and (2): it would allow that while all beings have the potentiality for complete awakening, some beings simply never actualize this potentiality. In fact, according to the text there is always a surplus or remainder of sentient beings who have not been ripened to awakening, since the world is infinite44•

I would propose that a more perspicuous means of clarifying and addressing the tension between (1) and (2) - between a doctrine of universal potentiality for buddhahood and the exclusion of certain sentient beings from attaining awakening - may be found through introducing the modal concepts of necessity, possibility, and contingency. It should first be noted that the MSA/Bh does not employ these concepts in this or any other context; in fact, to my knowledge, the concepts of modal logic are not fully articulated anywhere in the history of Indian Buddhist thought. What I propose then is of the nature of a rational reconstruction. Briefly, Haack specifies the distinction between necessary and contingent truths as follows: "a necessary truth is one which could not be otherwise, a contingent truth one which could; or, the negation of a necessary truth is impossible or contradictory, the negation of a contingent truth possible or consistent; or, a necessary truth is true in all possible worlds, a contingent truth is true in the actual but not in all possible worlds" (1978: 170). To this we may add that a possible truth is one whose negation is not necessary. I would argue that a reconstruction of (1) and (2) employing modal concepts allows for a clarification of the claims at MSA/Bh 9.37 and 3.11, and the elimination of the tension between them. Through introducing the

44 MSABh ad 9.49: na ca nil)se~aip. lokasyanantatvat/.

134 MARIO D'AMATO

concepts of possibility and contingency, we might restate propositions (1) and (2) in the following terms: '

(1') For all x such that x is a sentient being, it is possible that x will attain complete awakening,

(2') For some x such that x is a sentient being, it is contingent that x is without gotra, and hence without any form of awakening.

These two propositions are consistent with one another, since there is no contradiction in stating that awakening is possible for all beings even though some beings do not in fact attain it. Note, however, that if we were to translate atyantam as "absolutely" at MSABh ad 3.11, then (2') would be restated as follows:

(2") For some x such that x is a sentient being, it is necessary that x is without gotra, and hence without any form of awakening.

Such a proposition would be inconsistent with (1 '), since it is contradictory to state that it is possible for all beings to attain awakening but necessary that some do not. Thus my reconstruction of (2) entails interpreting atyantam as a term implying contingency rather than necessity45. And so I propose that the claims at MSA/Bh 9.37 and 3.11 be read in terms of propositions (1 ') and (2'), respectively.

The tension which I raise between (1) and (2) is one which has been noticed by Tibetan and Indian Buddhist traditions. In his study of the theories of tathiigatagarbha and gotra, Ruegg (1969: 82) states that the apparent contradiction between MSAJBh 9.37 and 3.11 has divided Tibetan commentators, and that certain Tibetan commentators have argued that the tathiigatagarbha-verse (9.37) is to be understood as having a sens intentionnel in this context - that its claim is not definitive for the MSA/Bh. Also notable is the fact that in the subcommentary to the Madhyiintavibhiiga (again, a text cited in the MSABh), Sthiramati offers two rather conflicting interpretations of gotra46 : according to the first interpretation, different gotras are "inherent" (sviibhiivikam) and "beginningless" (aniidikiilikam) in different individuals - for example, some have the sravaka-gotra and

45 My thanks to Jay Garlield for suggesting this way of stating the point to me in conversation.

46 See Sanskrit ed., Yamaguchi 1934: 55-56.


others the buddha-gotra - a view that implies a theory of predetermined and distinct "seeds" of aWakening. According to the second interpretation, however, all beihgs have the tathagata-gotra - a view that implies a theory of universal potentiality for buddhahood. And Sthiramati does not indicate which interpretation is to be understood as definitive. Thus we can see that even in the Indian context there was some debate over whether all beings have the tathiigatagarbha or whether different beings just have different gotras, with some beings excluded from the attainment of complete awakening, and others - those who are inherently without gotra -excluded from the attainment of any form of awakening at all. We might speculate that had the modal concepts of necessity, possibility, and contingency been developed in a rigorous fashion and employed in the context of a controversy between the theories of tathiigatagarbha and gotra, any inconsistency between the two theories - at least as they occur in the MSAlBh - could have been resolved. Again, the reconstruction which I propose involves the two steps of interpreting atyantam at MSABh ad 3.11 as "for ever" - a step supported by both internal and external evidence - and interpreting (1) as a statement of possibility and (2) as a statement of contingency.

To conclude, in response to our initial question of whether all sentient beings can potentially attain awakening, we may state the following: in the terms of the MSAlBh itself, while all beings have the embryo of the Tathagata, some beings are simply for ever without the "seed" (gotra) of awakening. And in the terms of my proposed reconstruction: while all sentient beings can potentially attaining awakening, it is contingently the case that some beings will never actually do S047.

Abbreviations

AA: BBh: DT: MAV:

AbhisamaytilaJ?1.kara BodhisattvabhUmi Derge Tanjur (Sde dge bstan 'gyur) Madhyantavibhiiga

47 It may be interesting to consider this interpretation in relation to Anguttara-nikiiya V: 193-195, where, after a discussion of the fourteen restricted points, the Buddha remains silent in response to the question of whether the whole world will attain deliverance.

136 MARIO D'AMATO

MA VBh: Madhyantavibhiiga-bhii~ya

MSA: Mahiiyanasatralal[lkiira (verse-text) MSABh: Mahiiyanasatralal[lkara-bha~ya (commentary) MSA/Bh: Mahiiyanasatrala"r[zkara and Mahiiyanasatralal[lkiira-bhii~a MSAT: Mahiiyanasatriilal[lkiira-tfka (Asvabhava's subcommentary) MSA VBh: Mahiiyanasatralal[lkiira-vrtti-bhii~a (Sthiramati's subcommentary) SNS: Sal[ldhinirmocana-satra

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Beal, Samuel, trans. 1906. Si-Yu-Ki: Buddhist Records of the Western World, 2 vols. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Triibner and Co.

Buswell, Robert E., Jf. 1992. "The path to perdition: the wholesome roots and their eradication." Paths to Liberation: The Marga and Its Transformations in Buddhist Thought. Edited by Robert E. Buswell, Jr. and Robert M. Gimello. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press: 107-134.

D'Amato, Mario. 2000. "The Mahayana-ffinayana Distinction in the Mahiiyanasatriilal[lkara: A Terminological Analysis." PhD diss., University of Chicago.

Davidson, Ronald M. 1985. "Buddhist Systems of Transformation: Asrayaparivrttii-paravrtti among the Yogacara." PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley.

Dutt, Nalinaksha, ed. 1966. Bodhisattvabhiimi. Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute.

Edgerton, Franklin. 1970. Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary, 2 vols. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Originally published in 1953.

Funahashi Naoya, ed. 1985. Mahayanasatralarpkiira (Chapters I, II, III, IX, X): Revised on the Basis of Nepalese Manuscripts. Tokyo: Kokushokankokai, Ltd.

Griffiths, Paul J. 1990a. "Omniscience in the Mahayanasutralailkara and its commentaries." Indo-Iranian Journal vol. 33.2: 85-120.

Griffiths, Paul J. 1990b. "Painting space with colors: Tathagatagarbha in the Mahayana-satralaJikiira-corpus IX.22-37." Buddha Nature: A F estschrijt for Minoru Kiyota. Edited by Paul J. Griffiths and John P. Keenan. Reno: Buddhist Books Int.: 41-63.

Haack, Susan. 1978. Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Nagao Gadjin. 1958-1961. Index to the Mahiiytina-Siltrtilarp.ktira, 2 vols. Tokyo: Nippon Gakujutsu Shinko-kai.

Nagao Gadjin, ed. 1964. Madhytintavibhiiga-bhii~ya. Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation.

Obermiller, E., trans. 1987. The Jewelry of Scripture by Bu ston. Delhi: Sri Satguru. Originally published in 1931.

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Ruegg, David Seyfort. 1968. "Arya and Bhadanta Vimuktisena on the gotra-theory of the Prajfiaparamita." Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sud- und Ostasiens vol. 12-13: 303-317.

Ruegg, David Seyfort. 1969. La Theorie du Tathiigatagarbha et du Gotra. Paris: Ecole Fran<;aise d'Extreme-Orient.

Ruegg, David Seyfort. 1974. "Pali gotta/gotra and the term gotrabhil in Pali and Buddhist Sanskrit." Buddhist Studies in Honour of I. B. Horner. Edited by L. Cousins, A. Kunst, and K. R. Norman. Dordrecht: D. Reidel: 199-210.

Ruegg, David Seyfort. 1976. "The meanings of the term gotra and the textual history of the Ratnagotravibhiiga." Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies vol. 39: 341-363.

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Schule." ZeitschriJt der Deutschen Morgenliindischen Gesellschaft supplementa I: 811-823.

Schrnithausen, Lambert. 1976. "On the problem of the relation between spiritual practice and philosophical theory in Buddhism." German Scholars on India, vol. 2. Edited by the Cultural Department of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass: 235-250.

Ui Hakuju. 1928. "On the author of the Mahayana-sutralarp.kara." ZeitschriJt flir Indologie und Iranistik vol. 6: 215-225.

Wayman, Alex. 1961. Analysis of the Srtivakabhilmi Manuscript. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Williams, Paul. 1989. Mahiiytina Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations. London: Routledge.

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Yamabe Nobuyoshi. 1997. "The idea of dhiitu-vada in Yogac~a and Tathiigatagarbha texts." Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism. Edited by Jamie Hubbard and Paul L. Swanson. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press: 193-204, 208-219.

Yamaguchi Susumu, ed. 1934. MadhyantavibhiigatJkii. Nagoya: Librairie Hajinkaku.

I would like to thank the members of the Five College Buddhist Studies Seminar (Jay Garfield, Peter Gregory, Jamie Hubbard, Marylin M. Rhie, Young H. Rhie, Andrew Rotman, and Taitetsu Unno) for reading an earlier draft of this paper and participating in a helpful discussion on it. While I have greatly benefited from their comments, I alone am responsible for any errors or deficiencies that remain.

CANDRAKiRTI ON DIGNAGA ON SV ALAKSAijAS

DAN ARNOLD

l. Introduction

Since the publication of Th. Stcherbatsky's Buddhist Logic in 1932, many scholars have followed the great Russian Buddhologist's lead in looking to the works of DharmakIrti for help in understanding the works of Dignaga. Among other things, this has meant taking Dignaga to have understood svalak~ar;as in terms of what Stcherbatsky characterized as "point-instants," a translation which perhaps plausibly conveys a sense of DharmakIrti's understanding of this concept.

It is not surprising that scholars should thus have relied on DharmakIrti in interpreting Dignaga, since understanding Dignaga's works is a task that presents significant interpretive difficulties. Unlike the case of DharmakIrti (several of whose works survive in the original Sanskrit), Dignaga's works come down to us only in Tibetan translation!. Moreover, in the case of the Pramar;asamuccaya, what we have are in fact two often quite divergent Tibetan translations, a state of affairs that reflects Richard Hayes's contention that the available translations "show signs of having been done by translators who were themselves not certain of the meanings of many passages in the original texts ... "2. The available texts of Dignaga's works are thus more than usually underdetermined. Even more than is typically the case with respect to the characteristically elliptical works of Indian philosophers, then, a full understanding of Dignaga requires recourse to his commentators. In this regard, it is not surprising that a great many modem scholars have tread in Stcherbatsky's footsteps

1 Randle (1926) has compiled such Sanskrit fragments of Dignaga as can be gleaned from the quotations of him in other extant works of Indian philosophy.

2 Hayes (1988). p.6. Note that Hattori's edition and translation of the first chapter of the PramiilJasamuccaya (1968) gives editions of both Tibetan translations (i.e., the one supervised by the Indian palJrjita Vasudhararak~ita, and the one supervised by Kanakavarman). Both Hayes and Hattori take the translation of Kanakavarman as their basic text.


140 . DAN ARNOLD

and read Dignaga primarily through the lens of DharmakIrti, who is, after all, traditionally taken to have been Dignaga's grand-disciple, and whose Prarnii1J.aviirttika represents itself as what would thus be the earliest surviving "commentary" on Dignaga's magnum opus.

In recent decades, however, several scholars have urged that Dharmaldrti is a commentator in name only, and that his works in fact represent innovative departures from Dignaga's works. Indeed, Radhika Herzberger has gone so far as to urge that "Diimaga's thought is not encompassed by the greater depth of Dharmaklrti' s, rather it is washed away by it"3. The question of Dignaga's understanding of svalak~a1J.as is one of the chief issues with respect to which recent scholars have particularly questioned the value of Dharmaklrti. Thus, for example, Hayes (1988, p.15) says that among the views erroneously "imputed" to Dignaga by Stcherbatsky is " ... the view of particulars as point-instants, which amounts to a commitment to a doctrine of radical momentariness (k~a1J.ikaviida)." Similarly, Shoryu Katsura (1991, p.l44) has urged that "[Dharmaklrti's view ot] reality is characterized by momentariness, an idea which has no place in Dignaga."

While such cautions may be appropriate, it nevertheless remains difficult to be sure exactly what Dignaga does understand svalak~a1J.as to be like, since about the only thing he ever says about them is that they are "ineffable," "unspecifiable," or "indefmable" - with all of these being plausible renderings of avyapadeSya (Tib., bstan par bya ba rna yin pa), the word that Dignaga uses. Thus, there is still light to be shed on the issue. I propose, then, to weigh in on the question of how Dignaga ought to be understood with regard to svalak~a1J.as. I propose to do so, however, not by recourse to any of Dignaga' s commentators4, but by looking at an

3 Herzberger (1986), p.241; quoted by Hayes (1988), p.30. Hayes concurs with Herzberger's assessment, adding that Dharmaldrti "also washed away much of the accomplishment of the Buddha as well." (p.310) Among other things, this reflects a significant tendentiousness in Hayes's lucid presentation of Dignaga, but that is a subject for another day.

4 Hayes has urged that Iinendrabuddhi's VisalamalavatinamapramaIJasamuccayaflka represents a more helpful commentary on the Pramti7JaSamuccaya than DharmakIrti's PramaIJavarttika, despite the latter's being much earlier. However, not only is it the case that Iinendrabuddhi's commentary (like Dignaga's text) survives only in Tibetan translation (as the Yans-pa dan dri-ma med-pa ldan-pa ses-bya-ba tshad-ma kun-las-btus-pa'i 'grel-bsad, Tohoku 4268); moreover, Iinendrabuddhi (800-850) significantly post-dates Dharmaldrti, and Iinendrabuddhi himself thus tends to read Dignaga through the lens of

CANDRAKlRTI ON DIGNAGA ON SVALAKSA0'AS 141

early critic of him: specifically, Candrakirti, the first chapter of whose Pfasannapadii comprises a highly under-appreciated engagement with an unnamed interlocutor whose thought looks very much like that of Dignaga. In the standard edition of the Prasannapadii, this section spans some twenty pages5. Typical of the neglect of this section is the fact that, while it thus constitutes more than a fifth of Candrakirti's opening chapter, Cesare Rizzi's 36-page summary of the chapter devotes a scant two pages to this "controversy with the Buddhist Logicians"6. This neglect perhaps owes something to the fact that some influential Tibetan discussions of at least parts of this section take Candraldrti to have been continuing his attack on Bhiivaviveka, so that what is almost certainly an engagement with Dignaga's epistemology gets subsumed in the sviitantrika-priisangika discussion that has instead preoccupied most scholars.?

DharmakIrti. Cf., Hayes (1988), pp.224-6, for comments on Jinendrabuddhi's nevertheless being preferable to DharmakIrti as a commentator on Dignaga.

5 The standard edition is that of Louis de La Vallee :poussin (1903-1913), which was printed as volume IV in the Bibliotheca Buddhica. Based on additional manuscripts from Nepal, J. W. de Jong (1978) suggested extensive revisions to this edition. All translations in the present essay are my own, and are from the edition of La Vallee Poussin as revised by de Jong (with de long'S changes noted). (The edition ofVaidya [1960], which provides the pagination from the Biliotheca Buddhica edition, can be used, but is effectively just a reprinting of La Vallee Poussin's edition without La Vallee Poussin's extraordinarily erudite and helpful footnotes. Vaidya can, though, occasionally prove useful for his judgments regarding which of La Vallee Poussin' s variants to adopt.) In La Vallee Poussin' s edition, the engagement with Dignaga runs from 55.1l to 75.13 (with references thus being to page and line numbers), with the entire first chapter spanning 91 pages.

6 Rizzi (1987). The bulk of Rizzi's short book (pp.23-59) consists in what is usually a detailed paraphrase of the first chapter of the Prasannapadt'i; Rizzi's account of the section in question (i.e., that spanning pages 55.1l to 75.13 of La Vallee Poussin's edition) occupies a page and a half at pp.47-49.

7 For the view that CandrakIrti is still occupied with Bhavaviveka in at least part of the section I will consider, d., Thurman (1991), pp.292-295 (and especially p.293, n.13); this translates a section of Tsoil-kha-pa' s Legs bsad snyiiz po that addresses (and quotes extensively from) a discussion occurring at pp.66.1-68.4 of the Prasannapadt'i. Cf., also, Eckel (1978), who similarly follows Tsoil-kha-pa's lead in taking this section to be addressed to Bhavaviveka. Stcherbatsky (1927) understood this whole section of the Pras(mnapadt'i (i.e., pp.55.11-75.13) to have been addressing Dignaga, introducing his translation of it (p.142) as a "Controversy about the Validity of Logic," and characterizing CandrakIrti's pilrvapak~in as "The Logician." (Stcherbatsky's translation of this section is at pp.142-174.) Hattori (1968) also understands CandrakIrti to have been addressing Dignaga, and his annotations to his translation from Dignaga's Pramt'il}asamuccaya frequently provide useful cross-references to CandrakIrti. The only other significant treatments of this section that

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Whatever the reason, this neglect is regrettable, and not least because, in my view, an understanding of Candraldrti's engagement particularly with Dignaga affords us an unusually good opportunity for appreciating the logically distinct character of Candraldrti's Madhyamaka8• For the present, however, I am chiefly interested in what CandrakIrti can tell us about how to understand Dignaga - and specifically, how to understand Dignaga's concept of svalak~Wla. I would like to show this by following Candraldrti in elaborating, in effect, on what seems to me an apt observation from Shoryu Katsura (which will be noted in due course). As we will see, Candraldrti elaborates a similar insight in such a way as to make clear precisely how Dignaga had (on Candraldrti's reading, anyway) transformed the A.bhidharmika notion of svalak~alJ-a - specifically, how Dignaga had used a word which A.bhidharmikas understood to denote a species of universal to refer instead to what can plausibly be characterized as bare particulars. We can, then, flesh out Dignaga's spare account of svalak~alJ-as by appreciating what Candraldrti thought Dignaga would find to be an unwanted consequence of his own view.

II. Svalak~aI).a in the Abhidharmika context

Insofar as it is characteristically A.bhidharmika usage that Candraldrti will press against Dignaga, our account should begin with the discourse

I have been able to fmd are those of Mookerjee (1957, pp.42-58; this is basically a paraphrase of Candraldrti's text) and Siderits (1981), who also takes Candraldrti's target here to be Dignaga.

Recently, an interesting bit of evidence regarding Candraldrti's purvapakein has come to light: Yoshiyasu Yonezawa (1999, 2001) has been preparing a critical edition of the * Lakea/}atfka, from a Sanskrit manuscript in Tibetan dbu-med script, recovered at Zha lu monastery by Rahula Sai1lq1:yayana (1937, p.35). This very brief commentary on the Prasannapada was, Y onezawa speculates, written under the supervision of Abhayakaragupta (2001, p.27), which would place it roughly in the 12th century. Among the things which this concise commentary does is identify the various unnamed interlocutors, and with regard to the section that will concern us, the anonymous author of this commentary specifically identifies Dignaga; cf., n.43, below. (I would like to thank Prof. Yonezawa for sharing this information with me.) Be that as it may, I would argue (and indeed, have done so in Arnold, 2002) that Candraldrti has good reasons for fmding the epistemological project of Dignaga in principle problematic, and that Candraldrti's unnamed interlocuto"r throughout this section is in fact Dignaga.

8 I have argued this at length elsewhere; see Arnold 2002.

CANDRAKlRTI ON DIGNA.GA ON SVAlAKSAijAS 143

of Abhidharma. According to standard Abhidharmika accounts of the Buddhist reductionist project, dharmas are the really (though fleetingly) existent elements that survive characteristically Buddhist reductionist analysis; dharmas are, in other words, the elements to which existents (and paradigmatic ally, of course, persons) can be reduced, and a great deal of Abhidharmika literature is devoted to the enumeration of the" dharmas" which should thus be permitted into a final ontology (where "ontology" thus has something like its standard meaning of a catalogue of ontologically primitive categories). A standard such enumeration, for example, lists 75 dharmas that constitute the ontological primitives upon which all other, derivative existents are supervenient9• Note, though, that the idea of there being 75 dharmas is not the idea that there exist only 75 unique particulars in the world; rather, these clearly delineate 75 ontologically primitive categories - types of which there can be, presumably, innumerable tokens. The Abhidharmika notion of dharmas is closely related to what are, in this literature, the conceptually cognate notions of svalak~al}a (in this context, "defining characteristic") and svabhiiva ("essence" or "intrinsic nature"). Thus, for example, Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosabhii~yam explains that dharmas (literally, "bearers") are so called "because they bear (...Jdhr) svalak~al}as."l0 That is, what distinguishes something as exemplifying one of the 75 categories of ontological primitives (one of the dharmas) is the fact of its sharing the same defining characteristic that is common to all instantiations of that dharma. Thus, to bear such a "defining characteristic" or "essence" is, in effect, to qualify for inclusion in this final ontology.

Among the significant points about this understanding of svalak~m:zas is that each of these amounts to a sort of property belonging to a

9 Cf., Cox (1995), p.12; Chaudhuri (1976), p.14(a). The language of "supervenience" is borrowed from Kapstein (1987), pp.90, ff.

10 Pradhan (1975), p.2.1O: svalak~alJadharm:uid dharrna~. On the connection between svalak~alJa (as "defining characteristic") and svabhava (as "essence"), cf., inter alia, Cox (1995), p.12, as well as Abhidharrnakosabha~yarn ad 6.14cd (Pradhan 1975, p.341.11-12): KayafTl svasarnanyalak(!alJabhyafTl parfk~ate. VedanafTl cittafTl dharrnas ca. Svabhava evai~afTl svalak~alJarn: "The body is investigated in terms of its defining and general characteristics. Feeling and thought are dharmas; the essence of these is their defining characteristic. "

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dharma. That is, this discourse speaks of dharmas as, the irreducible remainder of reductionist analysis, and speaks of these, in turn, as individuated or characterized by the defIning properties that belong to them - as, for example, perceptual awareness (vijfulna) is definitively characterized in terms of some "conception regarding an object" (vi~"ayaprativijfiapti), or as earth (Prthivf) is definitively characterized by "hardness" or "resistance" (khara or kiithtnya)Y There is thus an important sense in which the svalak~ar;as in virtue of which dharmas qualify as such are, in fact, universals or abstractions; for, say, a "conception regarding an object" is something that belongs to (and definitively characterizes) every instance of perceptual awareness - characterizes each, that is, as a token of the type of thing that belongs in a final ontology. The abstract nature of such "defining characteristics" figures particularly prominently in Sarvastivadin arguments for the existential status of past and future moments of time. Thus, as Collett Cox explains,

The tenn "intrinsic nature" [svaZak,l'a('la] does not indicate a factor's [i.e., dharma's] temporal status, but rather refers to its atemporal underlying and defining nature. Intrinsic nature thus determines the atemporal, existential status of a factor as a real entity (dravya). Nevertheless, it is precisely in this sense of intrinsic nature that factors can be said to exist at all times (svabhiivaly. sarvadil cast!); intrinsic nature, as the particular inherent characteristic, pertains to or defmes a factor in the past, present, and future, regardless of its temporal status. (1995, p.139)

But even for Sautrantikas who, following Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosabhii~yam, reject this specifIcally temporal application of the point, it is nevertheless the case that the svalak~ar;as that individuate existents as belonging to one or another dharmic category are fundamentally abstract. This is, I will suggest, among the salient points that will be transformed by Dignaga's use of the term, and it will be rendered clear by CandrakIrti's urging of .Abhidharmika usage against Dignaga.

11 The adducing of vi~ayaprativijnapti as the svalak~alJ.a of vijniina occurs at Abhidharmakosa 1.16a (Pradhan, p.ll), and khara as that of prthivi at Abhidharmakosa 1.12 (Pradhan, p.8). For kiifhinya as synonymous with khara, cf., Pradhan, pp.24.3, 78.7-8. These are the examples of svalak~alJ.a which, as we will see, CandrakIrti adduces contra Dignaga; cf.,nA8, below.

CANDRAK!RTI ON DIGNAGA ON SV ALAKSAlYAS 145

While macro-objects such as (paradigmatically) persons can thus be reduced to their basic parts, such reductionist analysis is thought by Abhidharmikas to be capable of reaching bedrock, in the form of the dharmas that are individuated by uniquely defining characteristics. In Abhidharmika literature, this intuition that reductionist analysis can yield ontological primitives is also advanced in terms of a debate regarding what is dravyasat and what is prajfiaptisat - that is, regarding, respectively, what "exists as a substance," and "what exists as a prajfiapti"12. Paul Williams, borrowing from Brentano, aptly renders these as (respectively) primary and secondary existence13, and emphasizes that what is at stake here is not so much what exists, as how it exists. Thus, things that exist as prajfiapti (prajfiaptitab) are invariably reducible to things that exist as ontological primitives (dravysat); the latter, in turn, exist irreducibly. In Vasubandhu's massive Abhidharmakosa and his bhd~ya thereon, the most prominently recurrent debate concerns the question of precisely which things are to be admitted as being dravyasat. Thus, if we follow the traditional doxographic view (according to which Vasubandhu's commentary reflects a Sautrantika critique of the Vaibha~ika perspective reflected in the kiirikiis), we might characterize the Vaibha~ikas as ontologically promiscuous, and the Sautrantikas as ontologically parsimonious; for throughout the course of Vasubandhu' s massive work, various Buddhist categories are introduced and considered, with the Vaibha~ikas characteristically asserting that they exist dravyatas ("substantially"), and the Sautrantikas invariably rejoining that, in fact, they only exist prajfiaptitas ("derivatively" or "superveniently," we might say).14

12 I leave prajfiapti untranslated since I am dissatisfied with the customary rendering of this as "concept" (cf., e.g., Warder 1971). In the Madhyamika context, much depends on the rendering, since the notion of upadaya prajfiapti is pivotal for Nagarjuna and CandrakIrti. I have argued elsewhere (Arnold 2002) that, particularly as deployed by Burton (1999), the translation of this as "concept" is highly misleading.

13 Williams (1981). This is one of the best discussions of the conceptual motivation behind Abhidharmika discussions of dravyasat and prajfiaptisat. See also the discussion by Kapstein (1987), pp.90, ff.

14 So, for example, the famous debate, in the fifth chapter of the Abhidharmakosa, regarding the existential status of past, present, and future moments. The characteristically Vaibha~ika claim is that all three "really" exist, and that this reflects the proper interpretation of the Buddhist scriptural passage (sarvam asti, "everything exists") that gives adherents of this school the name "Sarvastivarla" (the '''everything exists'-affmners").

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The reason it matters so much how these terms are ,allocated is that, given the intuitions that motivate the Abhidharmika project, what is dravyasat ("substantially" or "primarily existent") is, ipso jacto, admitted as being paramarthasat ("ultimately existent," "real," or "true"). On this view, in other words, the characteristically Buddhist contention that there are two levels of "truth" (" conventional truth," saY(lvrtisatya, and "ultimate truth," paramiirthasatya) has a specifically ontological correlate: what is conventionally true is what is reducible, by way of critical analysis, to what is "ultimately real"; the latter category, in tum, thus consists in an enumerable set of ontological primitives. In an often-cited passage, V asubandhu' s Abhidharmakosa makes this point explicitly:

There are also two truths, conventional truth and ultimate truth. What are the characteristics of these two? ... The conventionally true is that with respect to which the concept does not arise when it is broken into parts, as for example a jar; for with respect to that, when it is broken into pieces (kapalaso bhinne), the idea of a jar does not arise. And that with respect to which, having excluded other dharmas by way of the intellect, the idea does not arise - that, too, should be known as conventionally true, as for example water; for with respect to that, having excluded, through the intellect, other dharmas such as form, the idea of water does not arise. Everything else is ultimately true; with respect to this, even when broken, the idea still arises, even when other dharmas are excluded by way of the intellect - that is ultimately true, as for example, form. IS

Vasubandhu the Sautrantika rejoins that he does not deny that these exist; he simply rejects the Vaibha~ika claim regarding how they exist. Thus, "We, too, say the past exists; but the past is what existed previously, and the future will exist with respect to [presently] existent causes. And in this sense they exist, but not substantially." (Pradhan [1975], p.299.1ff: vayam api briimo 'sty atftanagatam iti; atftaT(l tu yad bhiitapiirvam, anagataT(l yat sati hetau bhavi~yati. EvaT(l ca krtva-astzty ucyate na tu punar dravyatal:z.) On this whole debate, see Williams (1981) and Cox (1995, passim), who both provide very illuminating discussions.

15 Pradhan (1975), pp.333-4: dve api satye saT(lvrtisatyaT(l parmarthasatyaT(l ca. Tayol:z kiT(llak~al}am? ... Yasminn avayavaso bhinne na tad buddhir bhavati tat saT(lvrtisat, tadyatka ghatal:z; tatra hi kapaiaso bhinne ghatabuddhir na bhavati. Taira ca-anyan apohya dharman buddhya tad buddhir na bhavati taccapi saT!lvrtisad veditavyam, tadyatka-ambu; tatra hi buddhya riipadfn dharman apohya-ambubuddhir na bhavati .... Atonyatha paramarthasatyam; talra bhinne 'pi tad buddhir bhavaty eva; anyadharmapohe 'pi buddhya tat paramarthasat, tadyatha riipam.

CANDRAKlRTI ON DIGNA.GA ON SV AL1KSAlYAS 147

Collett Cox explains: "If the notion ofa particular entity disappears when that entity is broken (e.g., a pot) or can be resolved by cognition into its components (e.g., water), that entity exists only conventionally. Entities that are not subject either to this further material or mentalanalysis exist absolutely. Thus, actual existence as a real entity (dravyasat) is attributed only to the ultimate constituent factors, which are not subject to further analysis"16. As an example of the latter, Vasubandhu has here adduced the case of "form" (rupa) - presumably in the sense of the first of the five skandhas17•

III. Digniiga and the culmination of Abhidharmika commitments

That the foregoing represents the basic set of intuitions inherited by Dignag a is perhaps most clear in his Alambanaparzk$ii ("examination of intentional objects"). This very short text - which consists in only eight kiirikiis together with a brief auto-commentary - represents Dignaga's attempt to argue that awareness can satisfactorily be explained provided only that we posit some mental phenomena as the "objects" intended by awareness; and indeed, that we cannot coherently posit any non-mental, external objects as what is directly intended by awareness. The latter is true insofar as any account of external objects necessarily presupposes some version of minimal part atomism, which, Dignaga argues, cannot coherently be adduced to explain our awareness of macro-objects. Clearly,

16 Cox (1995), pp.138-9. Cf., Williams (1981), p.237: "Saq1ghabhadra [i.e., the Vaibha~ika whose Nyayanusara - now extant only in Chinese translation - is traditionally held to represent a rejoinder to Vasubandhu' s Sautrantika criticisms 1 adds that the distinction between primary and secondary existence corresponds to that between ultimate and conventional truth (paramartha and saT[lvrtisatya). This point is extremely important for it shows that in the Sarvastivada the distinction between satyas was not soteriological but primarily philosophical, in this case ontological."

17 With the Vaibha~ikas represented as admitting the skandhas to be dravyasat. The Sautrantikas, in contrast, deny that the five skandhas exist as dravyasat, instead favoring the view that what is dravyasat are the 75 dharmas into which, inter alia, the skandhas can be reduced. Thus, for Sautrantikas the category of rupa-skandha exists only secondarily (prajfiaptisat) insofar as it comprises the first 11 dharmas in the standard list of 75 (specifically, the five bodily senses, together with their respective objects, plus the category of avijfiaptirupa).

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Dignaga's argument here owes something to Vasubandhu's Vi1!lsatikti18 •

As with the latter work, there is some scholarly disagreement about whether Dignaga is best understood as arguing here for an idealist metaphysics, or simply for something like a representationalist epistemology involving sense-data (which allows the possibility of remaining neutral with respect to what might finally exist in the world).19

Be that as it may, what is of greatest interest to me here is Dignaga's clear allusion to the passage from Vasubandhu (considered above) on the "two truths." Thus, arguing that there is an unbridgeable gap between atoms as the putative cause of awareness, and medium-sized dry goods as the content thereof, Dignaga says: "Things like jars are [merely] conventionally existent, because if the atoms are removed, the awareness that appears with respect to them is destroyed [k.5c-d]. In the case of what is substantially existent, such as color, even when one has taken away what is connected with it, there is no removal of the awareness of the color itself"2o. Like Vasubandhu, Dignaga thus suggests that what qualifies medium-sized dry goods (of which jars are a stock Indian example) as merely "conventionally existent" (kun rdzob tu yod pa; Skt., sa1!lvrtisat) is the fact of their being reducible, while the constituent parts to which they can be reduced (such as "color," kha dog, which is shorthand for n1pa and the other skandhas) in tum exist "substantially" (rdzas su, dravyataJ:t).

18 On Vasubandhu's arguments against atomism in the Vil]lsatika, see, inter alia, Kapstein (1988).

19 Hayes (1988), for one, opts for the latter characterization (with respect both to Dignaga and to Vasubandhu), and calls the view "phenomenalism"; see pp.96-104 (on Vasubandhu) and pp.173-178 (on the Alambanaparfk~a).

20 As with Dignaga's other works, the Alambanaparfk~a survives only in its Tibetan translation. I have used the edition of Tola and Dragonetti (1982), which gives: bum pa la sogs pa ni kun rdzob tu yod pa Hid do I urdul phran yons su bsal na ni I der snan ses pa nyams 'gyur phyir II" rdzas su yod pa rnams la ni 'brei pa can bsal du zin !cyan kha dog la sogs pa biin du ran gi blo 'dor pa med do. (The part italicized in the text represents kariM. 5c-d, which is, in the edition of Tala and Dragonetti, marked off with quotation marks. I will follow the convention of italicizing portions from the kiirikas in all subsequent citations from the PramiiIJasamuccaya, as well.) Note that Hayes (1988, p.I77) translates, "In the case of what is rigorously real ... " (my emphasis) - which suggests that the text reads paramartha;at, for which Hayes has adopted the translation equivalent "rigorously real." But the text in fact reads rdzas su yod, which suggests instead dravyasat - though as I have been arguing, the two terms are, in the Abhidharmika context which presently concerns us, conceptually co-extensive.

CANDRAK:lRTI ON DIGNA.GA ON SVALAKSAJYAS 149

In the PramalJasamuccaya, Dignaga alludes to the same discussion, this time explicitly putting the issue in terms of what is "ultimately existent" (paramarthasat). Thus, arguing that a cognition cannot properly be named after the object that produces it, Dignaga says: "These individual [atoms], when aggregated, are the cause [of cognition], but it is not the aggregate [itself that is causally efficacious], since this exists only conventionally .... if [a cognition be produced] from an object, that [object] must be [a real entity, and what is real is] ultimately unnamable ... "21,

Clearly, then, Dignaga's understanding of the reductionist project (and correspondingly, his understanding of the two truths as consisting in the enumerable sets of those existents that are reducible and those that are not) is substantially the same as Vasubandhu's, and we can safely say that Dignaga's notion of svalak$alJa thus represents one of several significantly correlated terms: svabhava, svalak$alJa, dharma, dravyasat, paramarthasat. That is, Dignaga's notion of svalak$alJa represents the culmination of the .Abhidharrnika intuition that there exist basic (dravyasat) and irreducible entities - ontological primitives which are the sole remainder of critical analysis, and which are defined vis-a-vis svalak$ar;as; and that the "ultimately real" or "ultimately true" (paramarthasat) consists in an enumerable set of such things22, The same point is particularly clearly put by DharrnakIrti, who thus elaborates Dignaga's ideas vis-a-vis the category of pragmatic efficacy (arthakriya): "Whatever has the capacity for pragmatic efficacy is said in this context to be ultimately true;

21 PramiilJasarnuccayavrtti ad 1.15: de dag bsags pa na yan so so ba rgyu yin gyi de bsags pa ni rna yin te tha sfiad du yod pa'i phyir ro .... "gan las de ni don dam par / de fa tha sfiad du rna byas /" [1.15c-d]. The Tibetan (per the translation of Kanakavarrnan) is at Hattori (1968), p.189, with Hattori's translation at pp.34-5. I have followed Hattori's translation partiCUlarly of the kiirikii, retaining his insertions; cf., Hattori's nn.2.24-25 (p.120) for an elaboration, together with relevant Sanskrit fragments. .

22 In this regard, the thumb-nail doxographical sketch provided by the 18th-century dGe-lugs-pa dKon-mchog 'jigs-med dbaIi.-po is interesting, and quite accurately states what I have here taken to be the most significant aspect of this approach: "A phenomenon that is established as bearing critical analysis with regard to its own way of being, independent of the imputation of terms or conceptions: that is the definition of ultimate truth. 'Existent,' 'ultimate truth,' 'svalak:falJa,' 'impermanent,' 'constructed,' and 'truly established' are synonyms." (Mimaki, p.84: sgra dan rtog pas btags pa la rna [tos par ran gi sdod lugs kyi nos nas rigs pas dpyad bzod du grub pa'i chos de don dam bden pa'i rntshan fiid / dnos po dan / don dam bden pa dan / ran mtshan dan / mi rtag pa dan / 'dus byas dan / bden grub rnarns don gcig/ )

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everything else is conventionally true. These two [sets consist, respectively, in] unique particulars (svalak!fwta) and abstractions (siimiinyalak!fa1}a). "23

In what sense, though, does Dignaga's understanding of svalak!fa1}a represent, as I have put it, the "culmination" of A.bhidharrnika intuitions? That is, just what are the svalak!fa1}as which, for Dignaga, thus constitute the set of really existent things? It seems to me that it is in his conception of this notion that Dignaga perhaps most significantly parts company from Vasubandhu24• I have indicated that a salient point about the A.bhidharrnika usage of svalak!fa1}a is that it denotes some property - specifically, the "defining characteristics" of which dharmas are the "bearers." Indeed, Vasubandhu's etymology of the word dharma (svalak!fa1}adhiiralJiid dharma, "it is a 'bearer' because of 'bearing' a defining characteristic") turns on precisely this notion. I have also suggested that the svalak!falJas ("defining characteristics") thus "borne" by dharmas are abstract or universal, in that any instance of some dharma qualifies as such by virtue of its sharing with every other instance of that dharma the property which defines it as belonging in a [mal ontology.25

We can highlight the contrast with this A.bhidharmika usage by noting that Dharmakfrti understands svalak!falJas as unique, objective particulars of some sort - specifically, as the kind of vanishingly small bare particulars that fit with Dhannaklrti's metaphysics of "momentariness"

23 PrarnalJavarttika 2.3 (Miyasaka [1971/72], pA2): arthakriyasarnarthal'Jl yat tad atra pararnarthasat / anyat sal?lvrtisat proktal'J1 te svasarnalJyalak:jalJe 1/. It is important to note (as Hayes and Katsura have) that the notion of "pragmatic efficacy" (arthakriya) as the criterion of the ultimately real is among Dha=akIrti's innovations.

24 Katsura (1991, p.l36) agrees, saying with respect to svalak/ialJas that "Dignaga accepted the Abhidharrnika's concepts of them at least in general. Nonetheless, he appears to have attached to them new significances." In characterizing this as Dignaga's most significant departure, I am only speaking, of course, in te=s of the issues relevant to the present discussion. A more comprehensive account of Dignaga' s innovations would of course have to assess the significance of his apoha doctrine, and of his fo=ulation of rules for valid inferences.

25 Again, cf. Katsura (1991, p.l37): " .. .it is clear that svalak/ialJas of Abhidharrna, viz. dharrnas which are actually named as rupa, vedana, etc., should be regarded by Dignaga not as svalak:jal}as but as sarnanyalak:jalJas. Consequently, Dignaga's sarnanyalak/ia(w corresponds to both sva- and sarnanyalak/ialJa of the Abhidharrna, which cannot be regarded as real in Dignaga' s system."

CANDRAKIRTI ON DIGNAGA ON SVALAKSAl:IAS 151

(k~m:likatva). Thus, for example, John DUIDle has urged that, on Dharmaklrti's understanding, it must be the case that svalak~alJ-as have no spatial extension.26 At least in Dharmaklrti's thought, then, the Abhidharmika tradition reaches its culmination in the insight that the irreducible. ontological prinlitives in the system Camlot be said themselves to have any properties; for if they did, they would be reducible (i.e., into dharma and dharmin, "property" and "property-possessor"). Thus, it is no longer the case that svalak~alJ-as are the "defining characteristics" possessed by dharmas; rather, svalak~a7J.as just are the ontological primitives on this view, and they are simply "self-characterizing." Dunne (1995: 195) nicely expresses the upshot: "This is best illustrated by a genitive construction such as, 'The nature of the infinitesimal particle.' Dharmaldrti maintains that in such expressions the dharma is actually identical to the dharmin itself. The apparent separation of the dharma from the dharmin is simply part of the exclusion process, and is hence conceptual." This reflects an extension or "culmination" of the Abhidharmika project, then, insofar as the idea of irreducibility has here been taken to its logical extreme, such that what is irreducible cannot be said even to have aI!-y properties -here, in other words, we have the idea that for ontological prinlitives even to be simply logically reducible is to compromise the basic idea.

As I have noted, though, several scholars have recently challenged the idea that Dignaga understood svalak~alJ-as in the way that Dharmaklrti thus understood them. That may be the case. In fact, though, it seems to me that it is not altogether clear what Dignaga means by svalak~alJ-a, since he never formally defines the concept. Indeed, about the only thing Dignaga says about svalak~alJ-as is that they are "indefinable" or "unspecifiable" (avyapaddya; "ineffable" is a frequently met translation for this). Thus, Dignaga begins his Pramii7J.asamuccaya by arguing:

Perception and inference are reliable warrants. There are only two, since there are [only] two [kinds of] warrantable objects; there is nothing warrantable other than svalak,ymJas and abstractions. It is perception that has svalak,ymJas as its objects, and inference that has abstractions as its objects27.

26 Cf., Dunne (1999), p.13l. 27 Pramiil:zasamuccayavrtti ad 1.2: .. mnon sum dan ni rjes su dpag / tshad ma dag niH

gfiis kho na ste, gan gi phyir .. mtshan fiid gfiis / gial byaH ran dan spyi'i mtshan fiid dag

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As for the "sphere of operation" (gocara) of the perceptual senses (indriya): it is the "indefinable (anirde§ya) form which is to be known in itself. "28 Later on, in. contesting the Naiyayika account of perception (which has it that perceptual awareness is "ineffable"),29 Dignaga urges that this qualification is unnecessary, because re·dundant. He explains: "It is not possible that a definable (bstan par bya ba) object be the object of a sense-cognition (dbail po 'j blo, =Skt. indriyabuddhi) , since what is definable is [always] the object of inference. [Therefore,] there is no [possibility of a sense-cognition's] variance in regard to indefinability. "30

Just what does it mean, though, for svalak$WLas thus to be "indefinable"? Here again, Dignaga's own account is frustratingly underdetermined. What nevertheless seems clear, though, is that this idea has something to do with Dignaga's taking them to be the objects (Tib., yul, Skt., vi$aya) of perception - and, in tum, with his characteristic insistence on the fact that perception (pratyak$a) is definitively characterized by its being "free of conceptual elaboration" (kalpanapocJha). Apropos of this, Dignaga says: "Perception is free from conceptual elaboration; that awareness which is without conceptual elaboration is perception. And what is this which is called 'conceptual elaboration'? Association with name, genus, etc"31. The basic idea here is that a bare perceptual event is constitutively non-linguistic, with the subsequent addition of linguistic interpretation representing, among other things, the point at which

las gian pa'i gial bar bya ba med do. ran gi mtshan Rid kyi yut can ni milon sum yin la spyi' mtshan Rid kyi yul can ni rjes su dpag pa'o .... Tibetan per Hattori (1968), p.l77.

28 Pram{lI;asamuccaya 1.5c-d: svasaf!lvedyam anirdesyaf!l rupam indriyagocaraJ:t (Sanskrit fragment in Hattori 1968, p.91, n.1.43, which also provides some useful elaboration; among other things, Hattori reports an alternative reading from another source: svalaksanam anirdeSyam .... ).

29 Cf., Nyiiyasutra 1.1.4, given by Hattori (1968) at p.121, n.3.1. 30 PramiiIJasamuccayavrtti ad 1.17: dbail po'i blo la bstan par bya ba'i yul Rid srid

pa rna yin te, bstan par bya ba ni rjes su dpag pa'i yul yin pa'i phyir yo. bstan par bya ba rna yin pa Rid la yan 'khrul ba yod pa rna yin te .... (Hattori, p.191) Cf., also, PramiiIJasamuccya 2.2a: ran gi mtshan Rid bstan bya min ("the svalak$alJa is indefinable").

31 PramiiIJasamuccaya 1.3, with vrtti: "mnon sum rtog pa dan bral ba." ses pa gan la rtog pa med pa de ni mnon sum mo. rtog pa ses bya ba 'di ji Ita bu sig ce na, "min dan rigs sogs bsres pa'o."

CANDRAKIRTI ON DIGNA.GA ON SVALAKSAlYAS 153

cognitive error can creep in. To be sure, it is not necessarily the case that any subsequent linguistic elaboration introduces error, as some such is necessary merely to yield the kind of propositional knowledge which alone could make the initial perception useful. Thus, for example, Dignaga exemplifies the steps of the cognitive process by saying: "One [initially] apprehends the non-conventional [i.e., because ultimately real] svalak~alJas (rail. .. rntshan fiid dag tha sfiad du bya ba rna yin; Skt., *avyavahiirtavyasvalak~alJani) and the abstraction 'being colored.' Then, by means of the operation of the mind, one relates [being colored] to [the universal] impermanence, and expresses [the resulting cognition in the judgment] 'colored things and so forth are impermanent. "'32

While discursive elaboration in terms of universals is thus held to be indispensable to the development of propositional knowledge, it is nevertheless the case that a part of Buddhism's "deep grammar," as it were, is the idea that our cognitive and soteriological defIlements are adventitious to our basic epistemic faculties, such that the removal of these defIlements would leave untrammeled perception free to register things as they really are. If discursive elaboration of our basic percepts is thus necessary to yield propositional knowledge, then, it is nevertheless the case that such, in one form or another, is also precisely the problem to be overcome by Buddhist practice. That intuitions such as these are in play is made more clear by DharmakIrti, who revises Dignaga's account by adding that perception is not only "free of conceptual elaboration," but also "non-mistaken."33 In this way, "conceptual elaboration" (kalpana)

32 PrarniilJasarnuccayavrtti ad 1.2c-d (Hattori 1968, p.177): rail dail spyi'i rntshan iiid dag tha siiad du bya ba rna yin pa dan kha dog iiid dag las kha dog la sogs pa bzuil nas, kha dog la sogs pa rni rtag go ses rni rtag pa iiid fa sogs par yid kyis rab tu sbyor bar byed do. Here, I have basically followed Hattori's translation (p.24), with some adjustments; cf., Hattori's n.1.19, p.81, for extensive Sanskrit fragments from commentaries on DharmakIrti. In these, avyapade§ya is again the word used to characterize svalaklfalJas. For the Sanskrit underlying the Tibetan translation of Dignaga' s tha siiad du bya ba rna yin, I have taken avyavahiirtavya from Chandra (1959-1961, p.lOlO), whose usage is from the Nyiiyabindu of DharmakIrti.

33 Nyiiyabindu 1.4 (Shastri 1985, p.20): tatra pratyaklfaJ?! kalpaniiporjharn abhriintarn; cf., PrarniilJaviirttika 2.123, ff. (Miyasaka 1971n2, pp.56, ff.). While the introduction of this as a definitive feature perhaps represents an innovation by Dharmaklrti, cf., PrarniilJasarnuccayavrtti ad 1.17: Having said that the Nyaya definition of perception involves a redundant reference to avyapade§yatva (cf., n.29, above), Dignaga adds: "Nor is

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is implicated as the point in the cognitive process at 'Yhich error comes in. Moreover, DharmakIrti also expands Dignaga's contention that conceptualization involves '~association with name, genus, etc.," with the significant adjustment that conceptualization involves simply any idea that is suitable for association with discourse34• With this emphasis, DharmakIrti means to allow that conceptual activity is the sort of thing which may be (and is in fact) found even in such pre- or non-linguistic creatures as infants and animals - which must be the case if one is to avoid the unwanted consequence that the main soteriological defilement does not exist for infants or animals35•

Clearly, then, the idea of the "indefinability" of svalak~wtas can serve important intuitions about the non-linguistic character of perception - intuitions according to which perception is thought to yield access to uniquely uninterpreted data, which, being "knowable in themselves" (svasarrzvedyam), amount to something that is simply "given" to awareness as the uniquely certain foundation for all other knOWledge. Such has been the contention of Tom Tillemans, who aptly appeals to Wilfred Sellars's characterization of the "myth of the given" :

One of the forms taken by the Myth of the Given is the idea that there is, indeed must be, a structure of particular matter of fact such that (a) each fact can not only be noninferentially known to be the case, but presupposes no other knowledge either of particular matter of fact, or general truths; and (b) such that the noninferential knowledge of facts belonging to this structure constitutes the ultimate court of appeals for all factual claims - particular and general- about the world. (Sellars 1963, p.164)

there a possibility of [perception's] having an erroneous object, since an erroneous cognition has as its object an illusion produced by the mind" (Tibetan at Hattori, p.193: 'khrul ba'i yul nyid kymi srid pa rna yin te, 'khrul ba ni yid kyi 'khrul ba'i yul Rid yin pa'i phyir TO; cf., Hattori's n.3.7, p.122).

34 Nyayabindu 1.5 (Shastri 1985, p.25): abhilapasarrzsargayogyapratibhasapratftil; kalpana ("Kalpana is a conception which has an appearance suitable for association with discourse").

35 It is thus important to note just how much is excluded, by DharrnakIrti, with the characterization of perception as "kalpanapof/,ha"; for to the extent that contemporary scholars hope to explicate DharmakIrti's thought vis-a.-vis developments in contemporary philosophy, it becomes quite significant that DharmakIrti' s idea of what it would mean for perceptual cognitions to be (in one contemporary idiom) uninterpreted is thus meant to include instances (to retain the idiom) of "interpretation" even on the part of infants and animals. The kind of "conceptualization" thus ruled out must be very general indeed.

CANDRAKlRTI ON DIGNA.GA ON SVALAKSAijAS 155

Following this lead, Tillemans explains that svalak~alJas, for the Buddhist Epistemologists, represent "the purely particular, known without prior reliance on concepts or any general truths," such that "particulars (svalak~alJas), be they accepted as external or as only mental, are the sort of thing naturally suited to be present to non-inferential awareness, and hence can be considered as a type of given - this is what is involved in Buddhists saying that particulars are the exclusive objects of perception"36.

While the A.bhidharmika usage had it that svalak~alJas were "defining characteristics," it thus seems clear that Dignaga's characterization of svalak~alJas as avyapaddya is part of a project in which these are now understood as unique particulars of some sort. Surely, then, the avyapadefyatva of svalak~alJas thus goes hand in hand with the idea of perception as definitively free of conceptual elaboration, and as having svalak~alJas as its object. In attempting to understand just what kind of "unique particulars" we are talking about, though, I would like to consider the possibility that Dignaga' s characterization of svalak~alJas as "indefinable" is meant to advance a stronger claim - one such that Dignaga's version of svalak~alJas might resemble Dharmaldrti's, after all (or at least, such that it is not clearly incompatible with Dharmaldrti's). In this connection, it is interesting to start by noting Masaaki Hattori's translation of part of PramiilJasamuccaya 1.2 and the vrtti thereon - specifically, the passage that reads [tshad ma] dag ni gfiis kho na ste, gail gi phyir mtshan fiid gfiis / gzal bya .. 37. Hattori translates: "They [i.e.,pramiilJas] are only two, because the object to be cognized has [only] two aspects," reading (with my emphasis) as though mtshan fiid gfiis (*lak~alJadvayam) were a bahuvrzhi compound standing for gzal bya (*prameya)38. Against such a reading, Shoryu Katsura makes what seems to me exactly the right point about Hattori's translation: viz., that it "may suggest that the object to be cognized is a possessor of the two lak~alJas and [is] something different from them .... [But] I do not think that Dignaga admitted any bearer of the two lak~alJas"39. And it is at this point, finally, that rwould like

36 Tillemans (2003), p. 98. See also Tillemans (1990), pp.41, ff. 37 Cf., n.27, above. Hattori's translation (1968) is at p.24. 38 Cf., the Sanskrit reconstrnction given in Katsura (1991), p.136, n.29: .,' pratyak$am

anumanarrz ca prama[le dve eva, yasmad lak$a[ladvayarrz prameyarJ1. 39 Ibid,

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to introduce Candraldrti; for one reason I am inclined to opt for Katsura's more straightforward reading (according to which the compound is not a bahuvrfhi, and prameyam is more literally gerundive) is that Candrakfrti has seized on precisely the same conceptual issue that Katsura here notes. Let us, then, see how Candraldrti develops this point.

Iv. Candrakfrti on Digniiga on svalalqaIfas

Having devoted a considerable part of the first chapter of the Prasannapadii to refuting Bhavaviveka, Candraldrti turns to address the objection of an epistemologist, who wants to know what pramiil}as warrant the claims made in MUlamadhyamakakiirikii 1.1. Specifically, Candraldrti's interlocutor here wants to know whether Candrakirti's "certainty" or "conviction" (niscaya) is or is not produced by an accredited pramiil}a ("reliable warrant")40. Candraldrti's initial rejoinder is reminiscent of Nagarjuna's well-known disavowal, in the Vigrahavyiivartanf, of any "thesis" (pratijfzii), with Candraldrti here disavowing any claim to the conceptually cognate category of "certainty" (niscaya)41.

After ringing the changes on this theme, CandrakIrti turns to consider commitments such as are specific to Dignaga. He sets up this consideration by anticipating the claim that Dignaga is merely thematizing our conventional epistemic practices, and so cannot be charged with striving for the sort of ultimacy that is only the purview of a fully realized Buddha42. Thus:

[Objection:] Or perhaps [the Epistemologist will suggest:] "It is [simply] worldly convention (vyavahara) regarding warrants and warrantable objects which has been explained by us through [our system's] treatise."

40 Prasannapada 55.11-15: Atra kedt paricadayanti: Anutpanna bhava iti kim ayaTJ1 prama[laja niscaya uta-aprama[laja~? Tatra, yadi prama[laja i:jyate, tada-idaTJ1 vaktavyaTJ1: kati prama[lani, kiTJ1lak:ja[lani, kiTJ1vi:jaya[li, kiTJ1 svata utpannani, kiTJ1 parata ubhayata 'hetuta va-iti? Atha-aprama[laja~ sa na yukta~, prama[ladhfnatvat prameyadhigamasya. Anadhigata hy artha na vina prama[lair adhigantuTJ1 sakyata iti, prama[labhiivad arthiidhigamabhiive sati, kuta 'yam samyagniscaya iti?

41 56.4-5: Ucyate: Yadi kascinniscaya nama-asmakaTJ1 syat, sa prama[laja va syad aprama[laja va. Na tv asti.

42 For Candraldrti had urged that the demand for putatively probative arguments (upapatti) makes no sense insofar as "ultimate truth is a matter of venerable silence" (57.7-8: KiTJ1 khalv arya[lam upapattir na-asti? Kena-etad uktam asti va nasti va-iti? Paramartha hy aryas tasnfbhiiva~ [per de Jong]).

CANDRAK1RTI ON DIGNAGA ON SV ALAKSA1YAS 157

[Response:] Then it should be stated what the fruit of [your] explanation of . this [i.e., of worldly usage] is. . [The Epistemologist continues:] It [i.e., worldly usage] has been destroyed by bad logicians (kutiJrkikaif:z), through their predication (abhidhiJna) of false characteristics. Its correct characteristics have been explained by us. [Reply:] If [this is said, we rejoin:] This doesn't make sense, either. For if, based on the composition of a false definition by bad logicians, everyone made a mistake regarding what's under definition (krtal'(!lak.tyavaiparftyal'(! lokasya syiJt), [then] the point of this [i.e., of your proposed alternative to Nyaya epistemology] would be one whose effort was fruitful. But it's not so, and this effort is pointless.43

It is significant that CandrakIrti thus introduces his consideration of commitments such as are specific to Dignaga with this exchange about whether or not Dignaga can credibly claim to be offering an account of conventional epistemic practices; for from this point on, CandrakIrti's governing concern will simply be that of rejecting this claim. CandrakIrti has, in other words, introduced his survey of commitments specific to Dignaga by setting it up in such a way that he will only need to show that Dignaga's categories are not only not used conventionally, but cannot even account for conventional usage. To show this, on CandrakIrti's view, is to show that, notwithstanding his likely protests to the contrary, Dignaga is really trying to explain conventions by getting behind them to something that is more "real" than they are (specifically, really existent

43 58.14-59.3: Atha syad qa eva pramaIJaprameyavyavahiiro laukiko 'smabhi1.1 sastreIJanuvarIJita iti. TadanuvarIJasya tarhi phalal]l vacyal]1. KutarkikaiJ:t sa nasito viparftalak~aIJabhidhiinena. Tasya asmabhiJ:t samyaglakijalJam uktam iti cet. Etad apy ayuktal]1. Yadi hi kutarkikair viparftalak~alJapralJayanal]1 [Tib., praIJayanat ... ; adopted by Vaidya] lq-tal]1 lak~yavaiparftyal]1lokasya syat. Tadarthal]1 prayatnasaphalyal]1 syat. Na ca etad evam iti vyartha evayal]1 prayatna iti. It is with respect to this passage that the anonymous author of the *Lak~aIJarfka (cf.,n.7, above) specifically identifies Dignaga as Candraldrti's interlocutor: "He says that on this view, it makes sense only [to speak of] the worldly convention regarding warrants and warrantable objects, not [what is] ultimate[ly the case]. [This is what is said in the passage] beginning 'Atha ... .' ['Its correct characteristics have been explained] by us' means by Dignaga, et al. It's the master [i.e., Candraldrti] who says, at this point, 'the fruit of this intention should be explained,' and it's Dignaga who rejoins, '[It has been destroyed] by bad logicians.' 'It' [here] means convention." (Lak~aIJarfkii 2b4: laukika eva pramaIJaprameyavyavahiiro yukto na paramarthika ity asmin pakije aha / athetyadi / asmabhkr> DignagadibhiJ:t / tadanubandhanasya «pha»lal]1 vacyam ityatraryaJ:t, kutarkkikair iti DignagaJ:t, sa iti vyavahiiraf:t). Thanks to Y oshiyasu Y onezawa for sharing this fragment with me.

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svalak~alJas). And having shown only this much, CandrakIrti will have reduced Dignaga's project to absurdity, insofar as CaridrakIrti's project, as contra Dignaga's, consists (as Jay Garfield aptly says of Nagarjuna) in "taking conventions as the foundation of ontology, hence rejecting the very enterprise of a philosophical search for the ontological foundations of convention"44.

With this set-up in place, then, CandrakIrti devotes the remainder of his lengthy engagement with this interlocutor to showing that the categories of svalak~alJa and pratyak~a - specifically as they are understood and correlated by Buddhist philosophers like Dignaga - cannot accommodate familiar examples of what are, after all, perfectly ordinary words in the Indian context. Our concern here, of course, is particularly with CandrakIrti's reading of Dignaga' s notion of svalak~alJa. CandrakIrti begins:

Moreover, if you say there are [only] two reliable warrants, corresponding respectively to the two [kinds of warrantable objects, Le.,] unique particulars45 and abstractions, [then we are entitled to ask,] does the subject (lak.rya) which has these two characteristics exist?46 Or does it not exist? !fit exists, then there is an additional warrantable object; how, then, are there [only] two reliable warrants? Or perhaps [you will say] the subject [which is characterized by these characteristics] does not exist. In that case, even the characteristic, being without a locus, doesn't exist, [and] how, [in that case,] are there [as many as] two reliable warrants? As [Nagarjuna] will say: "When a characteristic is not in play, a subject to be characterized doesn't stand to reason; and given the unreasonableness of a subject to be characterized, there is no possibility of a characteristic, either." Or this could be said [by Dignaga]: It is not that' lak:jafla' means "that by which [something] is characterized." Rather, [following Pal!ini's rule at IIL3.113, Le.,] "krtyalyuto bahulam" ["the gerundive affix is variously applicable"], taking the affix in the sense of an object (karmm)i), 'lak:jar;a' means "what is characterized."

44 Garfield (1995), p.l22. 45 This is how I render svalak:ralJa when it is Dignaga's usage that is in play; one of

the difficulties in this whole section of the Prasannapadii is that of keeping clear on whose usage is in play, with CandrakIrti urging that the word conventionally means "defIning characteristic. "

46 Alternatively: " ... is that which has these two characteristics a 1ak:rya, or not?"; or, to take lak:rya more literally as a gerundive, "is that which has these to be characterized, or not?"

CANDRAKIRTI ON DIGNAGA ON SV ALAK~AJ:IAS 159

[Reply:] Even so, this same fault [still obtains], since that instrument by . which something [i.e., some object] is characterized has the quality of being a thing other $an an object (yena tal lak.yyate tasya karmJasya karmmJo 'rthiintaratviit), owing to the impossibility of something's being characterized by itself (tenaiva tasya lak.yyamiilJatviisarrtbhaviid). 47

In this way, Candraldrti's opening salvo trades on the notion that the idea of a "characteristic" (lak~alJa) is by definition the idea of a relationship - specifically, a relationship between a "characteristic" (lak~alJa) and the "thing characterized" thereby (lak~ya). Thus, CandrakIrti urges that Dignaga's sva- and siimiilJya-Iak~alJas, precisely insofar as they are (etymologically) types of "characteristics," must be instantiated in some subject of characterization (lak~ya) - which Dignaga cannot admit without compromising his commitment to the view that there are only two types of existents, since the subject in which these were instantiated would seem to represent an additional existent. On the other hand, it is incoherent to suppose that these are not the "characteristics" of anything, since the conventional understanding of the term definitionally involves the characteristic / characterized relationship.

What is particularly interesting for our present purposes is that CandrakIrti presses this point - viz., that the idea of a "characteristic" definitively includes the idea of a "subject of characterization" - as an unwanted consequence for Dignaga. That he does so clearly reflects his having read Dignaga as wanting to claim, to the contrary, that svalak~alJas are irreducible, being neither the characteristics of nor characterized by anything else. Thus, on Candraldrti's reading (as on Katsura's), Dignaga did not wish to admit any separate "bearer" (dharma!) of his svalak~alJas, which is precisely why CandrakIrti can (as he does) urge that Dignaga must think of svalak~alJas as simply "self-characterizing" - against

47 59.7-60.3: Ki1?1 ca yadi svasamanyalak$a1Jadvayanurodhena pramal}£ldvayam ukta1?1, yasya tallak$a1Jadvaya1?1 ki1?1 tallak$yam[per de Jong; so, too, Vaidya] asti? Atha nasti? Yadyasti, tada tadapara1?1 prameyam astfti, katha1?1 pramaradvaya1?1? Atha nasti lak$ya1?1, tada lak$aram api nirasraya1?1 niistfti katha1?1 pramiiradvaya1?1? Vak$yati hi: " lak$ariisa1?1pravrttau ca na lak$yam upapadyate, lak$yasya anupapattau ca lak$arasyapy asa1?1bhaval;," iti. (This quotes MMK 5.4.) Atha syiin na lak$yate 'neneti lak$ara1?1. Ki1?1 tarhi "krtyalyuro bahulam" iti karmari lyufa1?1 krtvii lak$yate tad iti lak$ara1?1. Evam api tenaiva tasva [per de Jong]lak$yamiiratvasa1?1bhavad - vena tallaksvate [per de Jong] tasya kararasya karmaro 'rthiintaratviit - sa eva dO$al;.

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which view, CandrakIrti here exploits standard grammatical analyses of the "characterizing" relationship as necessarily involvIng both a characteristic (lak~m:la) and a thing characterized (lak~ya).

To complete CandraIdrti's basic characterization of Dignaga's position, we need only attend to the passage that immediately follows what we have just seen. Having thus charged that his interlocutor's account incoherently posits something essentially self-characterizing, CandrakIrti now anticipates moves intended to salvage the possibility of such a thing. Ultimately, this will lead to a consideration of Dignaga's account of svasarrzvitti (reflexive awareness), which will be adduced as the unique example of something that is at the same time both an object and an instrument. We can, however, appreciate CandrakIrti's basic point without entering that thicket; for the main point in what follows is CandrakIrti's clarification of the sense in which Dignaga's understanding of svalak~alJa differs from what CandrakIrti takes to be the conventional sense. Thus:

[The Epistemologist rejoins:] Well, perhaps this could be said: Because awareness (jfllina) is an instrument, and because this [i.e.,jiiiina] is included in [our concept of] the unique particular, there is not the fault [with which you charge us]. [Reply:] Here [in the world], that which is the nature (svariipa) of existents, [i.e.,] their own, not shared with anything else, that is their defining characteristic (svalak~alJa). For example, the earth's [defining characteristic] is resistance, [the defining characteristic] offeeling is experience, [and the defining characteristic] of awareness is a conception regarding any object; for [in each of these cases,] by that [quality the thing in question] is characterized. By one who, disregarding (avadhaya) the usage which follows the familiar sense based on this (iti krtvii), [instead] accepts the definition [of svala~alJa] as an object, and positing [at the same time] the instrumental nature of perceptual awareness, it is said [in effect] that one unique particular has the quality of being an object, and another unique particular has the quality of being an instrument. In this case, if the unique particular which is perceptual awareness is an instrument, then it must have a separate object (tasya vyatiriktena karmalJii bhavitavyam). This is the fault [in your position].48

48 60.4-61.2: Atha syiit: Jniinasya karaIJatviit, tasya ca svalak:falJiintarbhiiviid, ayam ado:fa iti. Ucyate: Iha bhiiviiniim anyiisiidhiiraIJam iitmfya/?1 yat svariipal'{l, tat svalaqalJal'{l. Tadyathii prthivyiif:t kii!inyal'{l, vedaniiyii anubhavo [per de Jong, Tibetan], vijniinasya vi:fayaprativijnaptif:t. Tena hi tal lak:fyata iti /qtvii, prasiddhyanugatiim [per de Jong, Tibetan] ca vyutpattim avadhiiya karmasiidhanam abhyupagacchati. Vijniinasya ca

CANDRAKlRTI ONDIGNAGA ON SVALAK$AijAS 161

In this particular case, the examples of the conventional usage - which, we note, are taken from the Abhidharmakosabhiiryam49 - are particularly contrasted with a"usage which takes the word svalak~m:la as "denoting an object" (karmasadhanam)50. It is not only with reference to Candraldrti's chosen examples, then, but also with this contrast in mind that I render svalak~alJa, when CandrakIrti uses the word as he thinks it is conventionally used, as "defining characteristic"; and what seems to characterize the relationship between, say, earth and its "defining characteristic" (viz., "hardness" or "resistance") is the fact of their being inseparable, such that "hardness" is not an object that could be perceived apart from

karaJ}abhavafJ1 pratipadyamanena-idam uktafJ1 [per de Jong, Tibetan] bhavati, svalak$Gf}asyaiva karmatii, svalak$alJantarasya karaIJabhavasceti. Tatra yadi vijRanasvalak$alJafJ1 karaIJafJ1, tasya vyatiriktena karmaIJii bhavitavyam iti sa eva dO$a~"

Though conceptually fairly straightforward, particularly the latter part of this section is grammatically tricky, and I have found it helpful to consult the Tibetan here, with particularly those passages underlined in the following having proved useful: ci ste ses pa byed ba yin pa'i phyir la I de yan ran gi mtshan Rid kyi khons su 'du ba'i phyir Res pa 'di med do sRam na Mad par bya ste I re iig 'dir ji Itar des de mtshon par byed 'di sa'i sra ba dan I tshor ba'i myons ba dan I rnam par ses pa'i yul so sor rnam par rig pa Itar bdag Rid kyi ran gi flO bo gian dan thun mon ma yin pa gan yin pa de ni ran gi mtshan Rid yin na I rab tu grags pa dan ries su 'brei pa'i bye brag tu Mad pa bor nas I las su sgrub pa khas len iin rnam par ses pa byed pa'i no bor rtogs pas ni I ran gi mtshan Rid kho na las Rid yin iin ran gi mtshan Rid gian ni byed pa'i no bo yin no ies bya ba 'di smras par 'gyur ro I.

49 Cf., n.ll, above. Cf., also, Madhyamakavatara 6.202-3 (La Vallee Poussin's edition, p.316), where CandrakIrti trots out a similarly Abhidharmika list of "defming characteristics" (svalak$alJas) of all" of the skandhas: "Form has the defining property (svalak$alJa) of color and shape; vedanii has the nature of experience; safJ1jfzii grasps characteristics; safJ1skaras fashion [things]; the defining property of perceptual awareness is a conception regarding any object" (gzugs ni gzugs run [sic; read ran] mtshan Rid can I tshor ba myon ba'i bdag fzid can I 'du ses mtshan mar 'dzin pa ste I 'du byed mnon par 'du byed pa'o II yulla so sor rnam rig pa I rnam ses ran gi mtshan Rid do I). Cf., inter alia (and in addition to n.10, above), Abhidharmakosa 1.14 (Pradhan, p.lO: vedanii-anubhava~ safJ1jfzii nimittodgrahalJiitmika), which gives some more of the defming characteristics repeated here by CandrakIrti.

50 As is evident in nA8, above, the Tibetan translation renders this as las su sgrub pa, "established as an object." For the sense of -sadhana as "denoting" or "expressive of," I follow Apte, p.1666, meaning #4. On the compound karmasiidhana, see also Renou (1942), p.125, who gives: "qui a l'objet-transitif (i.e. une notion passive) pour mode de realisation." We could easily follow this lead and transpose this discussion into the key of grammatical terms (hence, e.g., "denoting an accusative"), with little change in significance.

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"earth." That is, when one encounters an instance of "earth," one just is encountering an instance of "hardness"; indeed, this is Just what it means for the latter to be a defining characteristic of the former. Moreover, as I have suggested, this understanding of svalak~m:za qualifies it as what Dignaga would consider to be a universal; for a "defining charaCteristic" is what is common to any and all instances of the thing defined thereby. Thus, to be sure, we can separate a thing and its defining characteristic analytically, as we do when we specify which is the thing being defined ("earth," the lak~a), and which is the thing adduced as its definition ("hardness," its svalak~a1Ja). What we cannot do, though, is encounter these separately as ontologically "given" entities. And this is precisely what is required, according to CandrakIrti, on Dignaga's usage of the term, which is such that we can render svalak~a1Ja as "unique particular" when it is Dignaga who is using the tenn. For Dignaga, svalak~a1Jas are the unique objects of the cognitive act which is perception, they are what (following Tillemans) perception encounters as "naturally suited to be present to non-inferential awareness."

Taken together, the two passages we have considered from CandrakIrti provide a clear sense of how he considers Dignaga' s doctrine of svalak~a1Jas to differ from the examples of the A.bhidharmika usage of the tenn adduced by CandrakIrti. Thus, CandrakIrti rightly understands the A.bhidharmika usage as not denoting any kind of object; rather, it denotes the sort of "defining characteristics" which are, in fact, abstractions. Candraldrti would concur, then, with Shoryu Katsura, who notes that "svalak~a1Jas of Abhidharma ... [must] be regarded by Dignaga not as svalak~a1Jas but as samanyalak~a1Ja"51. This point is underscored by CandrakIrti's characterization of Dignaga's usage as karmasadhanam, "denoting an object." Moreover, as CandrakIrti stresses in the first of the two passages we have just considered, "defining characteristics" are the kinds of abstractions that are definitively inextricable from the existents they define - they are not only not objects, but it makes no sense to think of encountering them in the way we encounter objects, since they are definitively relational abstractions. Among other things, this means they are necessarily instantiated in some lak~ya, some "bearer" of the defining

51 Cf. n. 25, above.

CANDRAK!RTI ON DIGNA.GA ON SVALAKSA/fAS 163

property in question - and on Candraldrti's reading, Dignaga cannot coherently concede this, since his position requires that there be no additional kind of eXIstent to which svalak~ar;as could belong.

V. Are Digniiga' s svalalqaI).as "bare particulars" ?

As I have suggested, what is most significant for Candraldrti is that Dignaga's usage cannot accommodate what Candraldrti takes to be attested usage, with demonstration of such failure of adequacy to conventions being sufficient for Candraldrti's purposes. It is interesting, though, that Candraldrti reduces this failure to absurdity particularly by way of an argument to the effect that any attempt by Dignaga to accommodate conventional usage will issue in infinite regress. This fact makes clear how Candraldrti reads Dignaga's doctrine of svalak~ar;as; for all of the foregoing centrally has to do with CandrakIrti's basic rejection of svalak~ar;as understood as self-characterizing. Candraldrti's argument here can plausibly be characterized, I think, as fundamentally similar to some contemporary arguments against the sort of "bare particulars" presupposed by "substratum theories" similar to the Abhidharmika version of reductionism. Thus, the view that medium-sized dry goods are reducible to more fundamental constituents is often expressed in terms of a "bare substratum" in which various properties are instantiated, but which is itself without any properties. Such an account is intended to bring the exercise of reductionism to rest, explaining the numerical diversity of ontological primitives without presupposing that the reducible properties are themselves such primitives. It has been persuasively argued, however, that the idea of bare particulars as the "ultimate" (i.e., because themselves irreducible) exemplifiers of the properties of a whole is incoherent, insofar as putatively bare particulars can always be essentially characterized - that is, characterized by such "essential" properties as being a substratum or a human being. Michael Loux succinctly summarizes this line of argument:

The difficulty is that once we concede this fact, we fmd that the very problem substrata were introduced to resolve arises in their case. Substrata tum out to be complexes or wholes themselves, complexes or wholes constituted by the attributes essential to them. Unfortunately, the attributes essential to

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anyone substratum seem to be precisely those esseptial to any other. They are all essentially subjects for attributes, all essentially diversifiers, all essentially different from the number seven, all essentially colored if green, all essentially red or nbt red. But, then, while being numerically different from each other, they begin to look like qualitatively indiscernible entities. And so we need an account of their numerical diversity; and the only account that will do is one that posits a lower-level substratum in each of our original substrata, a lower-level substratum that makes each of our original substrata different from each other. But since nothing can be bare, the same problem arises for these new, lower-level substrata; and we seem once again to be off on an infInite regress52•

We can express Loux's argument more perspicuously simply by pointing out that any particular must at least have the "property" of being a unique particular - with the latter being an abstract state of affairs that can be said to be a universal or abstraction (i.e., since the property "being a unique particular" is one that is shared by all unique particulars! )53. But in that case, the basic problem of how particulars are characterized (which is essentially the problem of how particulars are related to their defining properties) is not avoided by claiming that particulars are defined as such simply by their having only themselves as "characteristics"; for this move opens an infinite regress insofar as there remains a sense in which this characterization itself necessarily involves a relationship between characteristic and thing characterized (lak:;alJa and lak:;ya). I suggest that Candraklrti's opening argument against Dignaga's svalak:;alJas trades on a fundamentally similar point. Thus, the point that Candraklrti makes in terms of the "characterizing" relationship is that it is incoherent to think that anything without characteristics (any "bare particular") could in the end be all that really exists, insofar as any object (karman) we encounter as possessing characteristics must be in relation to what

52 Loux (1998), pp.116-17. Among the thinkers whom Loux here follows is Sellars; cf., Sellars (1963), pp.282-3n.

53 Thus to suggest that "bare particulars" must at least be capable of being "essentially" characterized is, it seems to me, basically to make David Armstrong's point that a truly bare particular "would have no nature, be of no kind or sort" (Armstrong 1989, p.94); and the argument is that this is self-referentially incoherent insofar as saying something is a "bare particular" just is to say that it is of some kind or sort. As Armstrong puts it: "Perhaps a particular need not have any relations to any other particular - perhaps it could be quite isolated. But it must instantiate at least one property." (Ibid.)

CANDRAKlRTI ON DIGNAGA ON SVAL1KSAlYAS 165

characterizes it (karal}a) - with the force of necessity here coming from the unavoidability of talk about what Loux has called "essential characteristics"54. And just as with the line of argument summarized by Loux, the logic of Candraldrti's argument against Dignaga similarly trades on the charge that Dignaga's account involves an infinite regress - with such an argument gaining its power insofar as it is precisely the point of Dignaga's project to bring the reductionist project to rest in something not further reducible.

It can of course be questioned, though, whether abstract properties (like the property being a unique particular) should be admitted as in any sense "real." Indeed, to the extent that Dignaga's whole project centrally involves the denial even of first-order property-universals, it might be thought that the adducing of what Loux has called "essential characteristics" (which are basically second-order properties: the property of being something with such-and-such properties) will have little purchase against Dignaga55. But there is a non-trivial point at stake here, and we would do well to take seriously the problem raised by these cases. Thus, Candraldrti has argued that svalak:fal}a (in the sense of "defining characteristic") necessarily involves a relationship between two things; and I have proposed reconstructing this as an argument to the effect that even an irreducibly unique particular necessarily has (hence, stands in relation to) the property of "being a unique particular." Such a reconstruction helps to make

54 It is particularly this part of my exegesis of CandrakIrti that involves an effort at rational reconstruction; for CandrakIrti, of course, argues simply on the basis of standard Sanskritic grammatical analyses of the various parts of speech necessarily involved in any

. instance of lak~aT:za ("characterization"). (That CandrakIrti's procedure here is standard in Sanskritic philosophical discourse is suggested, I think, by the perceptive remarks of Ingalls 1954.) What I have suggested is that the necessarily relational quality of any instance of "characterization" can be argued by appeal to the unavoidability of saying at least that particulars can be "essentially characterized."

55 Note, though, that these seemingly second-order constructions ("being X or Y") in fact neatly reflect one of the main ways of discussing universals in Indian philosophy. Thus, one of the points at issue between apohaviidins such as Dignaga and, say, MIrnfupsakas, is whether or not a word such as go ("cow") gains its usefulness by referring to some universal abstraction (gotva) that is common to all cows. In much of the secondary literature on such debates, words like gotva are often rendered as "cow-ness." But in fact, the traditional commentarial gloss on the -tva suffix involves bhiiva ("being"), and we are probably better off thinking of gotva as expressing the property" being a cow."

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clear how CandrakIrti can plausibly argue that on Dignaga's account of svalak:fm:za (i.e., as neither being nor having any characteristic), it becomes impossible to say of any svalak:falJ.a even that it is one!

And indeed, might not this radical reading make sense of Dignaga's own claim that svalak:falJ.as are characterized only by their unspecifiability (their avyapadeiyatva)? But here we are on the verge of a very dense thicket, and any full accounting of what Dignaga may have been up to would surely require significant attention to his anyiipoha theory of meaning (which CandrakIrti seems not to have engaged). For I have tried to give CandrakIrti's argument against Dignaga greater purchase by introducing the case of "essential characteristics"; but I have also indicated that thus adducing a problem involving universals would count for little in Dignaga's view, insofar as his whole project centrally involves denying the reality of universals. And in the context of that project, it is the anyiipoha ("exclusion") theory of meaning that is meant to explain how language is possible - how, e.g., it is possible to predicate of some particular a certain characteristic (such as "being a unique particular") -without reference to any really existent universals. The apoha doctrine, then, is meant precisely to explain how one can do away with really existent universals (how one can deny, that is, that an abstraction like being a unique particular should be allowed to count as a really existent state of affairs), while yet retaining the ability at least usefully to say that a unique particular is "of a certain kind or sort." Perhaps, then, an answer to the difficulties with bare particulars that Loux and Armstrong have identified would be forthcoming from an attempt to link this discussion with Dignaga's account of apoha. If the attribution to Dignaga of a theory "bare particulars" (in abstraction, at least, from other crucial parts of his program) does not, then, finally turn out to represent the most hermeneutically charitable reading of Dignaga's project, it is nevertheless a plausible reading of his contention that svalak:falJ.as are "characterized" only by their avyapadeSyatva; and it is, I am suggesting, the reading that is recommended by CandrakIrti's engagement with Dignaga.

It is clear, in any case, that CandrakIrti (like Katsura) read Dignaga as wanting to affirm that svalak:falJ.as do not themselves have any characteristics (and that they are not, in turn, the characteristics of anything else) - which is precisely why Candraldrti can (as he does) take it as an

CANDRAKiRTI ONDIGNA.GA ON SVAlAKSAIYAS 167

unwanted consequence for Dignaga that svalak~m:Las must be the characteristics of something else. With this in mind, we might put the difference between the Abhidharmika usage of svalak~al}a (which is what CandrakIrti favors) and Dignaga's Sanskritically, in terms of two different analyses of the compound sva-Iak~al}a: on the Abhidharmika usage, the compound is a karmadhiiraya, such that a svalak~al}a denotes simply whatever "property" or "characteristic" (lak~al}a) is defInitively "proper" or "specific" (sva-) to something (i.e., something's "own characteristic"); Dignaga, on the other hand, can be said to read the compound as a bahuvrzhi, such that svalak~al}a denotes what "has itself (sva) as [its only] characteristic." But recall Dunne's characterization of DharmakIrti's notion of svalak~al}a: the irreducibility of svalak~al}as "is best illustrated by a genitive construction such as, 'The nature of the infinitesimal particle.' DharmakIrti maintains that in such expressions the dharma is actually identical to the dharmin itself. The apparent separation of the dharma from the dharmin is simply part of the exclusion process, and is hence conceptual." If CandrakIrti and Katsura are right, it seems to me that Dignaga is after essentially the same idea: in order to be consistent, the Abhidharmika version of Buddhist reductionism cannot come to rest with the idea of dharmas, if such are thought to "have" some defining characteristic; rather, it must be pressed to the point where the only ontological primitives in the system are not even logically resolvable even into "properties" and "property-possessors." Svalak~al}as, on such a view, thus become not only unique, objective particulars, but bare particulars.

Such a reading has the advantage, at least, that it might tell us something about what Dignaga meant in characterizing svalak~al}as as "indefinable." That is, perhaps Dignaga's point is that svalak~al}as cannot be "defined" or "specified" (vyapadisyate) specifically as having any properties; rather, the only irreducible svalak~afJas worth the name must be "indefinable" in that they admit of no logical reduction into dharma and dharmin, "property" and "property-possessor. "56 It is no longer the case,

56 Cf., Dignaga's recurrent point that the distinguishing of separate vise.ra and vise.rya ("characteristic" and "thing characterized") is a constitutively conceptual operation - in which case, perception can never itself register such a distinction. Thus, e.g., PramiilJ.asamuccaya 1.23, where Dignaga adduces the case of perception's perceiving such a distinction as a counterfactual entailing problematic consequences: "If it were admitted

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that is, that svalak:;Gl;as are the "defining characteristics" possessed by dharmas; rather, svalak:;Gl;as just are the ontological primitives on this view, and they are. simply self-characterizing. Having followed Candraldrti, then, we see that the upshot of Katsura's apt point regarding Hattori's translation is thus to emphasize that, on Dignag;i's view, svalak:;Gl;as are no longer "borne" by anything; they are simply themselves the direct objects of perception, and that only insofar as perception is uniquely devoid of the sort of conceptual activity that is concerned with discerning distinguishing properties.

VI. Conclusion

This stronger claim about what it takes for something to qualify as irreducible seems to me to cut against several of those interpretations of Dignaga's svalak:;ar,tas that emphasize his differences from Dharmaldrti. Consider, for example, the interpretation of Dignaga put forward by Jonardon Ganeri, according to whose trope-theoretical reconstruction, Dignaga's svalak:;ar,ta seems to denote simply any "object" of perception - i.e., such as the garden variety macro-objects we typically take ourselves to perceive5? Thus, Ganeri would seem to agree with CandrakIrti that Dignaga takes svalak:;ar,ta as "denoting an object" (karmasadhanam)58, but

that both [viseea(la and vise.)'ya] were objects of the same [sense,] unaccepted consequences would follow" (Tibetan at Hattori, p.207: yul mtshuns fiid du 'dod ce na / mi 'dod pa yan thai bar 'gyur /I).

57 This reading would seem to be recommended by, inter alia, dKon-mchog 'jigs-med dbang-po, who adduces a pot as an example (Ita bu) of a svalak.)'a(la as the "Sautrantikas" understand the latter. See Mimaki (1977: 85): don dam par don byed nus pa'i chos de / ran mtshan gyi mtshan iiid / mtshan gii ni / bum pa Zta bu .... (Of course, dKon-mchog has DharrnakIrti in mind here.) While it is not my task here to elaborate a complete interpretation of Dignaga (much less of DharrnakIrti) in relation to later Tibetan interpretation, it seems worth at least noting that this reading of svalakealJ.as (i.e., as exemplified by macro-objects like pots) could in principle be reconciled with Dunne's contention that, for DharrnakIrti, svalak.)'a(las have no spatial extension (n.26, above); for the latter claim could have chiefly to do with a representationalist epistemology, according to which dKonmchog 'jigs-med dbang-po's "pot" could simply be understood as a sense-datum.

58 Which would, to be sure, be sufficient to distinguish Dignaga' s usage from that of the Abhidharrnikas. In making this point, Ganeri follows Katsura (1991, p.138), who says: "I would like to assume that in Diirnaga's system svaZak.)'a(la is the object itself which is to be grasped directly by perception, which is neither expressible nor identifiable at that moment.. .. "

CANDRAKlRTI ON DIGNAGA ON SV ALAKSAiYAS 169

would disagree with the further claim that it denotes something like "bare particulars." On Ganeri's reading, then, the "indefinability" (avyapade.§yatva) of these consists simply in their being unavailable to any comprehensive intuition. As Ganeri says,

Properties are conceptual constructs. They are potential contents of conception because it is possible, in principle, to know everything about them .... Objects, on the other hand, are not potential constructs of conception because it is not possible, even in principle, to know everything about them. Again, on the trope-theoretic analysis, what this means is that one cannot know every member of a class of concurrent tropes - all the trope-constituents of this vase, for example59.

On this reading, the point is that "objects" (svalak~alJ.as) are indefinable simply as given to perceptual awareness, and that insofar as perceptual awareness can never comprehensively apprehend all facets of an object.

Note, though, that Ganeri's interpretation seems to be licensed by a reading particularly of Hattori's translation of Dignaga - and specifically, of PramiilJ.asamuccaya 1.5a-b, which Hattori renders: "a thing possessing many properties cannot be cognized in all its aspects by the sense"60. Richard Hayes (1988, p.138; my emphasis) instead translates: "no knowledge at all of a possessor of properties that has many characteristics is derived from a sense faculty." Explaining the difference from Hattori, he ventures an interesting point:

Please note that the Tibetan translation construes the modifier 'sarvatha' as governing the negative 'na' and so renders the core of the sentence modally: 'rtogs srid rna yin' or 'knowledge is impossible.' The point is that knowledge of a multi-propertied whole is impossible through the senses. Hattori's translation ... implies [the] weaker claim ... that while sensation can capture some of the aspects of a multi-propertied whole, it cannot know the whole exhaustively. But I think the point is clearly that the whole cannot be known

59 Ganeri (2001), p.106. On "trope" theories, cf., Armstrong 1989: 113-133. 60 Hattori (1968), p.2?; my emphasis. Ganeri (2001, p.lOl) follows Hattori, modify

ing slightly: "A thing possessing many forms (rupa) cannot be cognised in all its aspects by a sense-faculty." Kanakavannan's Tibetan is at p.181: du rna'i no bo'i chos can ni / dban po las rtogs srid rna yin. Hattori (p.91, n.1.43) gives the Sanskrit as quoted by Prajiiakaragupta: dharrnil:.zo 'nekarupasya nendriyat sarvatha gatib. Cf., n.28, above, for PrarnalJasarnuccaya l.5c-d.

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at all by the senses, because the notion of a whole is superimposed upon a multiplicity of discrete data of sense61 • •

Thus, while Hayes is (as I have noted) critical of those who follow Stcherbatsky in seeing Dignaga's svalak~alJ.as as the "point-instants" of DhannakIrti, he nevertheless reads Dignaga's point about the "indefinability" of svalak~alJ.as as a strong claim that they are radically different from what is present to propositional awareness; and, in keeping with his emphasis on Dignaga's as a "phenomenalist" epistemology62, he nevertheless reads Dignaga's svalak~alJ.as not as (macro-) objects themselves, but as the component sense-data out of which such are constructed: " ... individuals, which are the referents of singular terms, are regarded by Diimaga to be the synthesis of a multiplicity of cognitions and hence are treated as classes rather than as particulars"63.

Hayes's point seems to me to be generally correct, and not obviously incompatible with the reading I have developed following DhannakIrti. As I indicated in beginning this essay, though, it is hard to be sure precisely what Dignaga means by his use of the term svalak~alJ.a, since he says so little explicitly about it, and that in texts that come down to us mainly in divergent Tibetan translations. What is nonetheless clear, in any event, is that Dignaga has transformed the Abhidharmika sense of the word, and that CandrakIrti can help us to understand the nature of this transformation. For the present, I am not concerned with whether or not CandrakIrti's arguments against Dignaga's notion of svalak~alJ.a have any purchase (though such is, of course, an interesting question). Rather, I wish only to have suggested that CandrakIrti's engagement with Dignaga represents, inter alia, one traditional reading of what Dignaga claimed regarding svalak~alJ.as - a reading that, having been developed perhaps only a generation or two removed from Dignaga, might well be helpful to our understanding of what is, in the texts of Dignaga, a frustratingly underdetermined concept.

And what CandrakIrti clearly tells us is that Dignaga's notion of svalak~alJ.a represents a transformation of the Abhidharmika notion.

61 Hayes (1988), p.l70, n.20. 62 Cf., n.19, above. 63 Hayes (1988), p.189.

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The latter notion is that of uniquely defIning "properties" or "characteristics" borne by dharmas, with Vasubandhu having invoked the latter's "bearing" (....Jdhr) of these to explain their name (dharma, "bearer"). Clearly, on the spartan epistemology espoused by Dignaga, such "defining characteristics" would not be the sort of thing that could be encountered in perception, and would instead have to be counted as among the things Dignaga considers to be "abstractions" (samanyalak:ja1}as). On Dignaga's usage, in contrast, svalak:ja1}as are the unique particulars encountered by perception, and are "characterized" only by their "indefmability" (avyapadeSyatva) - which is, perhaps, simply to emphasize the irreducible uniqueness of particulars, as opposed to the eminently categoreal notion at play in the idea of dharmas. Whether or not we understand the latter point as intended to delimit the kinds of vanishingly small "point-instants" that DharmakIrti will have in mind, it is clear that this characterization advances the intuition that our epistemic faculties yield some sort of access to a simply given, uninterpreted sort of data. And whether or not Dignaga can rightly be thought to have upheld a Dharmaldrtian doctrine of momentariness, it is at least not obviously the case that his doctrine of svalak:ja1}as is incompatible with one. In any case, what is clear is that, at least as Candrakmi reads him, Dignaga has eschewed the conventional usage and clearly posited something very much like bare particulars.

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Ganeri, Jonardon, Philosophy in Classical India: The Proper Work of Reason. London: Routledge, 200l.

Garfield, Jay, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Niigiirjuna's Millamadhyamakakarika. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Hattori Masaaki, Digniiga, On Perception, being the Pratyak~apariccheda of Digniiga's Pramfu).asamuccayafrom the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.

Hayes, Richard P., Digniiga on the Interpretation of Signs. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988. Herzberger, Radhika, Bhartrhari and the Buddhists: An Essay in the Develop

ment of Fifth and Sixth Century Indian Thought. Studies in Classical India, 8. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1986.

Ingalls, Daniel H. H., "The Comparison of Indian and Western Philosophy," lournal of Oriental Research, Madras 22 (1954): 1-11.

Kapstein, Matthew, "Self and Personal Identity in Indian Buddhist Scholasticism: A Philosophical Investigation." Ph.D. dissertation, Brown University, 1987.

Kapstein, Matthew, "Mereological Considerations in Vasubandhu's Proof ofldealism," Idealistic Studies 18 (1988): 32-54.

Katsura Shoryu, "Dignaga and Dharrnaldrti on apoha," in Ernst Steinkellner, ed., Studies in the Buddhist Epist.emological Tradition: Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakfrti Conference, Vienna, lunell-16, 1989, pp.129-146. Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, PhilosophischHistorische Klasse Denkschriften, 222. Band. Wien: Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1991.

La Vallee Poussin, Louis de, ed., Mulamadhyamakakiirikiis (Miidhyamikasutras) de Niigiirjuna, avec la Prasannapadii Commentaire de Candrakfrti. Bibliotheca Buddhica, Vol. IV. Osnabrock: Biblio Verlag, 1970. (Reprint; originally St.-Petersbourg: Academie Imperiale des Sciences, 1903-1913.)

La Vallee Poussin, Louis de, ed., Madhyamakiivatiira par Candrakfrti: Traduction tibhaine. Bibliotheca Buddhica, Vol. IX. Osnabrock: Biblio Verlag, 1970. (Reprint; originally St.-Petersbourg: Academie Imperiale des Sciences, 1907-1912.)

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Loux, Michael J., Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. London: Routledge, 1998.

Mimaki Katsumi, ed" "Le Grub mtha' rnam bZag rin chen phren ba de dKon mchog 'jigs med dbaiJ. po (1728-1791): Texte tiMtain edite, avec une introduction," Zinbun: Memoirs of the Research Institute for Humanistic Stud-ies, Kyoto University 14 (1977): 55-112. .

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Mookerjee, Satkari, "The Absolutist's Standpoint in Logic," in Satkari Mookerjee, ed., The Nava-Nalanda-Mahavihara Research Publication (Patna), vol. 1 (1957): 3-175. (Mookerjee's summary of CandrakIrti's critique of the Buddhist Epistemologists is at pp.42-58.)

Pradhan, Prahlad, ed., Abhidharmakosabha~yam of Vasubandhu. Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975.

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Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 23/1 (1937): 11-57. Sellars, Wilfrid, Science, Perception and Reality. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1963. Shastri, Swami Dwarikadas, ed., Nyiiyabindu of Acharya Dharmakirtti [sic], with

the commentaries by Arya Vinitadeva and Dharmottara. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1985.

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-, The Conception of Buddhist NirviilJa. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1989. (Reprint; originally published in Leningrad by the Publishing Office of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1927.

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Tillemans, Tom J. F., Materials for the Study of Aryadeva, Dharmapiila and Candraklrti: The CatuJ:zsataka of Aryadeva, Chapters XII and XIII, with the Commentaries of Dharmapiila and Candraklrti: Introduction, Translation, Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese Texts, Notes. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, Heft 24, 1-2. Wien: Arbeitskreis fUr tibetische und buddhistische Studien, 1990.

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Tillemans, Tom J. F., "Metaphysics for Madhyamikas," in G. Dreyfus and S. McClintock eds. The Svatantrika-PrasaJigika Distinction. What Difference does a Difference make? Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2Q03: 93-123.

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-, et aI, "Introduction to the Facsimile Edition of a Collection of Sanskrit Palmleaf Manuscripts in Tibetan dBu med Script." TaishO University: The Institute for Comprehensive Studies of Buddhism (Study Group of Sanskrit Manuscripts in Tibetan dBu med Script), 2001.

STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE BSAM GTAN MIG SGRON: A COMPARISON OF THE FOURFOLD CORRECT PRACTICE

IN THE ARyAVIKALPAPRAVESANAMADHARAlfI AND· THE CONTENTS OF THE FOUR MAIN CHAPTERS OF

THE BSAM GTAN MIG SGRONI

CARMEN MEINERT

1. Object of research

The 9th century treatise bSam gtan mig sgron [Torch of the Eye of Meditation], composed by gNub chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, is the only known work which discusses in detail the four Buddhist approaches prevalent during the early spread of Buddhism in Tibet, namely the discussion of (1) the gradual path, known as Rim gyis pa, (2) the sudden approach of Chinese Meditation Buddhism known as Cig car ba, (3) the Mahayoga tradition, and (4) the rDzogs chen teachings2. The author aims at distinguishing these four schools in the four main chapters of the bSam gtan mig sgron

1 An earlier Chinese draft of this paper was fIrst presented at the Conference of Tibetan Studies held by the Centre for Tibetan Studies in Beijing in the summer of 2001 (that Chinese draft is to be published in the proceedings of the conference). The idea of this paper results from discussions with Master Tam Shek-wing (a disciple of Dudjom Rinpoche) and Henry C. H. Shiu in the summer 2000 in Toronto on the bSam gtan mig sgron and the Arylivikalpaprave§anlimadhliralJl. I am thankful to Mr. Tam's pointing out the connection in structure and in content between these two texts. Moreover, I would like to express my thanks to Prof. Schmithausen for recent inspiring comments on the present version of this paper during a colloquium in Hamburg in winter 2002.

2 gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, gNubs chen sangs rgyas ye she rin po ches mdzad pa'i sgom gyi gnang gsal bar phye ba bsam gtan mig sgron [Torch of the Eye of Meditation Elucidating the Very Heart of Meditation, Composed by gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes Rin po che], short title: bSam gtan mig sgron [Torch of the Eye of Meditation], reproduced from a manuscript made presumably from an Eastern Tibetan print by 'Khor gdon gter sprul 'Chi med rig dzin, Leh: Smarts is shesrig spendzod, Vol. 74, 1974 (hereafter in the footnotes abbreviated as SM). According to different historical data the dates of gNubs range from 772 as the earliest date of his birth (cf the sources listed in: Herbert V. Guenther, '''Meditation' Trends in Early Tibet", in: Lewis Lancaster/Whalen Lai (ed.), Early Ch'an in China and Tibet, Berkeley: Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series, 1983,352) up to the late 10th century (cf the discussion in: Samten Gyaltsen Karmay, The Great Peifection

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 26 • Number I • 2003

176 CARMEN MEINERT

in order to clarify the misunderstandings about some of their apparent similarities3• His analysis is undertaken in the light of th~ soteriological idea of "non-conceptuality" (rnam par mi rtog pa). Therefore, gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes quotes extensively from canonical scriptures and also from texts which are now only preserved in Dunhuang manuscripts in order to exemplify "non-conceptuality" according to the understanding of each particular school.

The Japanese scholar Ueyama Daishun already pointed out that in the eighth and ninth centuries in the Sino-Tibetan border regions, e.g. in Dunhuang as one geographical junction in the encounter between Chinese and Tibetan Buddhism, the AryavikalpapraveSaniimadharalJl [The Supreme dharalJl of Entering into Non-Conceptuality] has been widely known and was of particular regional importance in the spread of Buddhism from Central Asia to Tibet4. This short siUra is a teaching attributed to the historical Buddha on how to give up clinging to discursive thoughts in order to enter into the "non-conceptual sphere" (rnam par mi rtog pa'i dbyings).

The AryiivikalpapraveSaniimadhiiralJl and gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes likewise emphasise the importance of the understanding of "non-conceptuality". In this initial approach the present paper shall open a window to develop our insight into the important but difficult bSam gtan mig sgron through a structural analysis which, however, does neither claim to be fmal nor complete. Thus, in order to analyse the structure of its' four main chapters as a possible soteriological path in itself, that is from Rim gyis pa to Cig car ba, Mahayoga, and finally to rDzogs chen5, this paper

(rDzogs chen). A Philosophical and Meditative Teaching in Tibetan Buddhism, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988,101t). If we follow the argumentation of H. Guenther (1983: 352), that is placing the birth of gNubs in the late eighth century, gNubs presumably composed the bSam gtan mig sgron in an old age in the late 9th century.

3 The four main chapters that the SM covers: chapter four on Rim gyis pa SM: 65-118, chapter five on Cig car ba SM: 118-186, chapter six on Mahayoga SM: 186-290 and chapter seven on rDzogs chen SM: 290-494.

4 Ueyama, Daishun/Kenneth W. Eastman/Ieffrey L. Broughton, "The AvikalpapravdadhiiralJz: The Dharani of Entering Non-Discrimination", in: BBK (1983), 35.

5 In his unusual doxographical description ranging from Rim gyis pa to rDzogs chen gNubs seems to omit Anuyoga as a link between Mahayoga and rDzogs chen intentionally even though he briefly distinguishes the essence of Anuyoga in regard to the other traditions in his concluding remarks (cf. SM: 490.6-491.3,492.4-6,493.5-6).

STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE BSAM GTAN MIG SGRON 177

proposes to understand it through the fourfold correct practice as it is also taught in the AryavikalpapravesanamadhiiralJl. There, this fourfold practice is described in terms of: (1) "perception" (dmigs pa), (2) "nonperception" (mi dmigs pa), (3) "non-perception of perception" (dmigs pa mi dmigs pa) and (4) "perception of non-perception" (mf dri1igs pa dmigs pa). Even though the Aryavikalpaprave§anamadhiiralJl is not the first and only place where a fourfold correct practice is discussed6, this paper claims that gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes was familiar with such a fourfold structure in arranging his treatise. Therefore, in the present paper the fourfold correct practice as it is also exemplified in the AryavikalpapravesanamadharalJl is used as such an example of that practice and as a bridge to demonstrate how to enter into the "non-conceptual sphere". Having analysed the insight into "non-conceptuality" according to this fourfold practice, we shall compare it to the understanding of "non-conceptuality" in the four different schools as described in the bSam gtan mig sgron. This structural analysis of the bSam gtan mig sgron may shed new light on distinguishing the traditions of Rim gyis pa, Cig car ba, Mahayoga and rDzogs chen as distinct approaches on the Buddhist path. It will furthermore highlight some philosophical differences between the apparently similar foundations of Chinese Meditation Buddhism (Cig car ba) and Tibetan rDzogs chen.

2. The Aryavikalpapravesanamadhara¢

2.1 Dunhuang manuscripts and canonical versions

The AryavikalpapravesanamadhiiralJl played an important role in the spread of Buddhism from Central Asia to Tibet. D. Ueyama even argues

6 -A detailed and comprehensive analysis of the fourfold correct practice in the Buddhist literature awaits further research. Yael Bentor is the fIrst to have investigated different fourfold meditation systems in Tibet and proposes in her closing remarks of her article even a kind of prototype for most of the systems she discussed (cf. Yeal Bentor, "Fourfold Mediation: Outer, Inner, Secret, and Suchness", in: Religion and Secular Culture in Tibet. Tibetan Studies II, Leiden: Brill, PIATS 2000, vol. 2, 41-58). On this topic cf. also Tam Shek-wing ~~~;1, (ed./transl.), Sianfa fax:ing lun. Shiqin shi lun l!IitiHtOi • t!!:IU~ [Dharmadharmatavibhtiga. The Commentary of Vasubandhu] , Hongkong: Vajrayana Buddhism Association Limited, 1999, 159-160.

178 CARMEN MEINERT

that the knowledge of Sanskrit originals and the philosophical discussions on how to enter into a "non-conceptual" state may have even motivated further translations of the text in the Sino-Tibetan border regions such as in Dunhuang7 . WithIn the corpus of Duriliuang manuscripts we find one Chinese and two Tibetan translations8• The Dunhuang Chinese translation is entitled the Ru wu fenbie zongchi jing A ~ 'TJ' 3u *~ t~ *1 [The dharal}l of Entering into Non-Conceptuality] (jiang :Ii: 23) preserved in the Beijing National Library, and S. tib. 51 and S. tib. 52 preserved in the British Library in London9• Moreover, the AryavikalpapraveSanamadharal}l was translated around the same time, that is the 9th century, into Tibetan by the prominent translators Jinamitra, Danaslla, and dKa' ba dpal brtsegs. Their translation 'Phags pa rnam par mi rtog par 'jug pa zhes bya ba'i gzungs was then included in the tripitakalO. In Central China, however, the AryavikalpapraveSanamadharal}1 did not have the same lasting impact. The text was only translated in the eleventh century by Danapala (nt!!~, active in Kaifeng from 982 to roughly 1017) under the title F oshuo ru wu fenbie famen jing f?f) ~ A ~ 'if 3u it; ~~ *~ [The sutra of Entering into the Dharma Gate of Non-Conceptuality taught by the

7 Ueyama/Eastman/Broughton 1983: 35. 8 Kazunobu Matsuda t.llB3;j!]j" has also published two Sanskrit fragments of the

AryiivikalpapraveSaniimadhiirQ/JI, one found among the Gilgit manuscripts (cf "Nirvikalpapravesa-dharrup: ni tsuite [On the Nirvikalpa-pravda-dharal)I]", in: Buddhist Seminar 34 (1981, 40-49) and one in the St. Petersburg manuscript collection of the Institute of Oriental Studies at the Academy of Sciences of Russia (cf "Nirvikalpapravesadharrup:. Sanskrit Text and Japanese Translation", reprint from Bulletin of the Research Institute of Bukkyo University (3/1996), 89-113).

9 Ueyama/Eastman/Broughton 1983: 32-33. D. Ueyama (loc. cit.: 38-40) first published jiang 23; I am preparing an English translation of jiang 23 and a structural analysis of the text. The Catalogue of the Tibetan Manuscripts from Tun-Huang in the India Office Library by Louis de la Vallee Poussin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962, 24-25) gives for the Tibetan versions S. tib 51 and 52 the title rNam par mi rtog pa 'jug pa zhes bya ba'i gzungs. D. Ueyama noted that he did not yet identify S. tib. 52. I was not able to look at the Tibetan originals myself so far.

10 "'Phags pa mam par mi rtog par 'jug pa zhes bya ba'i gzungs [The Supreme dhiiral}l of Entering into Non-Conceptuality]", translated by Jinamitra, DiinasUa and dKa' ba dpal brtsegs, in: IT. 32, no. 810, la-6b. Furthermore, the ninth century catalogue !Dan dkar rna lists under no. 196 also the title 'Phags pa rnam par mi rtog par 'jug pa'i gzungs [The Supreme dhiiral}! of Entering into Non-Conceptuality] (cf Yoshimura, Shyuki, The Denkar rna. An Oldest Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons with Introductory Notes, Kyoto: Ryiikoku University, 1950).


Buddha]l1. Apparently, the Buddhist traditions in Central China were not aware of the regional importance of this text in the Sino-Tibetan border areas and Tibet. Furthermore, the Chinese translation in the Dunhuang manuscript jiang 23 is very close to the Tibetan canonical version, whereas in the later Chinese translation Danapala either provided a rather free translation or used a different Sanskrit original. In our discussion we shall therefore pay attention to jiang 23 and the Tibetan canonical version likewise.

2.2 Influence of the Text in Tibet

In the literary history of Buddhism in Tibet the contents of the Aryavikaipaprave§anamadharmy,Z is a reoccurring theme. Shortly after the translation of the text into Tibetan, none other than the Indian scholar Kamalasila wrote a commentary to the Aryavikalpaprave§anamadhiirm}l, namely the 'Phags pa rnam par mi rtog par 'jug pa zhes bya ba'i gzungs kyi rgya cher 'grel pa [Extensive Commentary to The Supreme dhiirar;z of Entering into Non-ConceptualityF2. Kamalasila is said to have been the advocate of a gradual path towards awakening in the great debate of bSam yas that apparently took place in the late eighth century13. Unlike his

II "Foshuo ru wu fenbie famen jing f9ll:otAM.9-ZIJit:;r5~ [The siltra of Entering into the Dharma Gate of Non-Conceptuality taught by the Buddha]", translated by Danapala M!i~, in: T. 15, no. 654, 805-806.

12 "'Phags pa mam par mi rtog par 'jug pa zhes bya ba'i gzungs kyi rgya cher 'grel pa [Extensive Commentary to The Supreme dhiirGl}1 o/Entering into Non-Conceptuality]", by Kamalasna, in: IT. 105, no. 5501, f. 146b.6-174b.1.

13 A lot of recent research has been done concerning the reliability of historical material about the great debate of bSam yas and thus concerning the question whether the debate can be regarded as an actual historical event at all. D. Seyfort Ruegg also provides a comprehensive bibliography in this field in his footnotes (cf Buddha-nature, Mind and the Problem o/Gradualism in a Comparative Perspective, London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1989). For earlier research concerning the debate cf also Paul Demieville, Le concile de Lhasa, reprint, 1st edition 1952, Paris: College de France Institnt des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, 1987; Giuseppe Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts II, Rome: Is. M. E. 0., 1958; Ueyama, Daishun, "The Study of Tibetan Ch'an Manuscripts Recovered from Tunhuang: A Review of the Field and its Prospects", in: L. Lancaster/W. Lai (ed.), Early Ch'an in China and Tibet, Berkeley: Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series, 1983, 327-350 and L. Gomez, "The Direct and Gradual Approaches of Zen Master Mahayana: Fragments of the Teachings of Mo-ho-yen", in: M. Gimello/p. N. Gregory (ed.), Studies in Ch'an and Hua-yen, Studies in East Asian Buddhism No. 1, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,1983[a], 69-168. Despite the uncertainties surrounding the question of whether the

180 CARMEN MEINERT

opponents in the Chinese School of Meditation Buddhisll). who are said to have quoted the text to emphasise their subitist outlook14, KamalasIla interpreted the text to support his view of a gradual path.

Apart from this immediate historical connection, the contents of the Aryiivikalpaprave.saniimadhiirm;l is a central theme in a scholastic treatise of the yogaciira school, namely in the Dharmadharmatiivibhiiga [Discrimination of dharma and dharmatii] 15. A later commentary of Mi pham Rin po che to this yogaciira text explicitly states that the passage in the Dharmadharmatiivibhiiga on "non-conceptual wisdom" (rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes) summarises systematically the essence of the Aryiivikalpaprave.saniimadhiiraf}116. The Dharmadharmatiivibhiiga as a scholastic work

debate ever actually took place, a symbolic meaning was attached to it in the course of Tibetan history that gave rise to discussions up to the present. Concerning the arguments of Heshang Moheyan and of Kama1asila cf. Dunwu dacheng zhenglijue «1lf:kJlHl:i!!lili [Ratification of the True Principle of the Mahayana Teachings of Sudden Awakening], P. chin. 4646 (copy edited by Rao Zongyi (Jao Tsung-I) 1!iii*1!li in: "Wangxi Dunwu dacheng zhengli jue xushuo bing jiaoji ~~1!li1l'f7'Jl<iB(l,!i!;;ffm*mC [Preface and Notes to Wang Xi's Dunwu dacheng zhenglijue (J?atification of the True principle of the Mahayana Teachings ofSudden Awakening)]", in Chongji xuebao iJii'MHifl Chung Chi Journal] 9/2 (1970), 127-148) and "sGom pa'i rim pa [Stages of Meditation (Third Bhiivanakrama)]", by Karnalasila, translated by Prajfiavarrna and Ye shes sde, in: IT. 102, no; 5312; 60b.8-74bA.

14 Cf e.g. the Tibetan manuscript on Chinese Meditation Buddhism P. tib. 116: VIa, 153.2-3 and Vimalarnitra's Cig car 'jug pa rnam par mi rtog pa'i bsgom don [The Meaning of 'Non-Conceptual' Meditation in the School of Simultaneous Entry] (in: IT. 102, no. 5306, llb.3).

15 "Chos dang chos nyid mam par 'byed pa'i gzhung [Discrimination of dharma and dharmata]", attributed to Maitreya, in: IT. 108, no. 5523, f. 48b.1-51b.6. Cf also Henry C. H. Shiu llIIUiUi£, Bianfafaxing lu. Bubai shi lun !IOliiiilfffff' 1'lIHHif [Dharmadharmatavibhiiga. The Commentary of Mi pham Rin po che], ed. by Tarn Shek-wing I!li~zk, Hongkong: Vajrayana Buddhism Association Limited, 2000, 67-77 and preface by Tarn Shek-wing, 1-10.

16 Cf. Klaus-Dieter Mathes, Unterscheidung der Gegebenheiten von ihrem wahren Wesen (Dharmadharmatavibhiiga), Swisttal-Odendorf: Indica et Tibetica Verlag, 1996, 215. The commentary of Mi pham Rin po che consulted by K. Mathes was prepared on the basis of the block prints from Kathmandu and Rumtek. K. Mathes provides the facsimile in the annex. For the passage in question compare this facsimile: "Chos dang chos nyid marns par 'byed pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa'i 'grel pa ye shes snang ba mam 'byed [Commentary to the Verses of the Discrimination of dharma and dharmata. Discrimination of Primordial Wisdom and Appearances]", by Mi pham Rin po che (1846-1912), in: Mathes 1996, annex, f. l6a.1. Moreover, K. Mathes (1996: 83-84 and 138-139) also provides a transliteration and translation of Vasubandhu's commentary to the Dharmadharmatavibhaga that in some cases even uses the same vocabulary on the two main topics of the AryavikalpapraveSanamadhiiraJJI, that is on "abandoning marks" (mtshan rna spong ba)


is more systematic and also offers a more affording vocabulary than the sutric text. Therefore, we shall also pay attention to the relevant passages of the Dharmadharmatiivibhiiga in our discussion of the fourfold correct practice as it is taught in the AryiivikalpapraveSaniimadhiiralY-z.

2.3 Fourfold correct practice

In demonstrating how to enter into the "non-conceptual sphere," the AryiivikalpapraveSaniimadhiira'!l focuses on two corresponding methods, namely the method of "abandoning marks" (mtshan ma yongs su spong ba) of the conceptual framework and the method of "correct practice" (yangdag par sbyor ba)17. The approach of "abandoning marks" is described in a fourfold way, namely as the abandoning of marks of (1) "own nature" (rang bzhin), (2) "antidotes" (gnyen po), (3) "thusness" (de kho na nyid), and (4) of "realisation" (thob pa)18. However, in the context of the present research we shall only focus on the method of "correct

and on "correct practice" (yang dag pa'i sbyor ba). These equivalents will also be proved in my English translation of the Tibetan text of the AryiivikalpapraveSaniimadht'iral;l. It will soon be published together with my translations of KamalaSlla's commentary and Vimalamitra's Cig car 'jug pa mam par mi rtog pa'i bsgom don in the anthology Studies on the AryiivikalpapraveSaniimadht'iral!! in the Sino-Tibetan Series of Wisdom Publications in cooperation with Tam Chek-wing, Henry Shiu and Shen Weirong.

I7 For the Tibetan cf "'Phags pa mam par mi rtog par 'jug pa zhes bya ba'i gzungs", in: IT. 32, f. 2b.3-3b.l (abandoning marks) and f. 5a.3-6b.2 (correct practice); for the Chinese cf Jiang 23, I. 17-25 (abandoning marks) and I. 83-125 (correct practice) (hereafter the Tibetan version is referred to as IT. 32, p. x and the Chinese version is referred to as jiang 23. I. x). In Kamalaslla's commentary to the AryiivikalpapraveSaniimadhiiraf}! the discussion on "abandoning marks" and on "correct practice" (mtshan ma yongs su spong bar yang dag par sbyor ba) is the most relevant (Luis O. Gomez, "Indian Materials on the Doctrine of Sudden Enlightenment", in: Lewis Lancaster/Whalen Lai (ed.), Early Ch 'an in China and Tibet, Berkeley: Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series, 1983[b], 408). Cf "'Phags pa mam par mi rtog par 'jug pa zhes bya ba'i gzungs kyi rgya cher 'grel pa", in: IT. 105, f. 156a.5-l63b.8. My above mentioned translation of the Tibetan text will also provide a structural analysis of the AryiivikalpapraveSaniimadht'iraf}l.

18 The abandoning of these four marks in the Aryiivikalpaprave§aniimadhiiraf}! corresponds to a similar passage in the Dharmadharmatiivibhiiga on abandoning the marks of (1) "non-conducive" (mi thun pa'i phyogs) , (2) "antidote" (gnyen po), (3) "suchness" (de bzhin nyid), and (4) "realisation" (rtogs pa). Cf "Chos dang chos nyid mam par 'byed pa'i gzhung", in: IT. 108, f. 49b. Thanks to Henry C. H. Shiu for the discussions on this point.

182 CARMEN MEINERT

practice". If we apply the vocabulary of the Dharmadha1:matavibhiiga it is described as the following fourfold practice: (1) "perception" (dmigs pa), (2) "non-perception" (mi dmigs pa), (3) "non-perception ofperception" (dmigs pa mi dmigs pa), and (4) "perception of non-perception" (mi dmigs pa dmigs pa)19. The Aryiivikalpapravesaniimadhiira/Jl appli~s such a fourfold correct practice to the practice about form and to the practice about omniscience, which respectively pertain to the "marks of own nature" in the case of form and to the "marks of realisation" in the case of omniscience20. In order to demonstrate this gradual path of cognition we shall, however, merely look at the practice about form as one example of this structural process.

Generally speaking, conceptual thinking - which is itself cause for the appearance of duality - arises when thusness is not cognised. Thus, the manifestations of cause and effect appear, yet they are not inherently existent. Only when those manifestations do not appear anymore as seemly inherently existent then the nature of all dharmas comes to light and "non-conceptual wisdom" may be cognised. Concerning the abovementioned fourfold correct practice, the four steps in this process of entering into the "non-conceptual sphere" are described as follows:

(1) In the first step of "perception" one cognises all dharmas as the manifestation of "mere cognition" (rig pa tsam), that is, all dharmas are an expression of one's own mind. Even though conceptual thinking still arises, one does not mistake it for existent, but rather takes it as "mere cognition"21. The Aryiivikalpaprave§aniimadhiira/Jl

19 Cf "Chos dang chos nyid mam par 'byed pa'i gzhung", in: IT. 108, f. 50a.6. The equivalent passages in the Tibetan and Chinese version of the Aryiivikalpaprave§aniimadhiiraJ;zi are in IT. 32, f. 5a.3-6b.2 and injiang 23,1. 83-125. However, in these translations the Aryiivikalpaprave§aniimadhiiraJ;zi does not use those pithy designations of the fourfold practice, as the Aryiivikalpaprave§aniimadhiiraJ;ti itself is of rather denotative character and instead gives lengthy explanations of how to give up different kinds of concepts - which, nonetheless, correspond to the essence of the four correct practices.

20 Cf IT. 32, f 5a.3-Sb.4 (practice about form) and f. 5b.6-6b.2 (practice about omniscience) andjiang 23, 1. 83-101 (practice about form) and 1. 106-121 (practice about omniscience).

21 Cf IT. 32, f. 5a.3-5 and jiang 23, 1. 83-88. For the term "practice of perception" (dmigs pa'i sbyor ba) in the Dharmadharmatiivibhiiga cf. "Chos dang chos nyid mam par 'byed pa'i gzhung", f. 50a.6.


describes this first step as follows: If one takes form as existent, then . one is still practising in the conceptual sphere22.

(2) In the second step one cognises the "non-perception" of objects, to which the ordinary apprehension generally adheres. External dharmas are non-existent because in the first step of "perception" the "mere cognition" already emerged as an object. Therefore, to speak with the A.ryavikalpaprave§anamadharGl}f, form is also non-existent. And if one takes non-form for true, one is again practising in the conceptual sphere23•

(3) In the following step of "non-perception of perception" one trains oneself in the non-perception of the perception that "mere cognition" is non-existent. Since cognition is not possible without an object, cognition itself is also impossible24. In the A.ryavikalpaprave§anamadharGl}fit is explained: If the bodhisattva engages in the notion that form is mere-cognition, he engages in conceptualization. If he just as he engages in the non-existence of form similarly engages in the non-existence of cognition manifesting in from, he engages in conceptualization25•

(4) In the final step of "perception of non-perception" one perceives neither an apprehending subject nor an apprehensible object. As subject and object are not of separate natures, non-duality may be realised26• This is said to be non-dual thusness, the nature of reality beyond any designations. Again, in the A.ryavikalpaprave§anamadharGl}f this final step in this perceptual process is expressed as follows: In regard to not perceiving any dharma apart from cognition, the bodhisattva neither completely sees the absence of phenomena in

22 Cf. IT. 32, f. 5a.3-4 andjiang 23, I. 85-86. 23 Cf. IT. 32, f. 5a.5-6 and Jiang 23, I. 88. For the term "practice of non-perception"

(mi dmigs pa'i sbyor ba) in the Dharmadharmatavibhaga cf. "Chos dang chos nyid mam par 'byed pa'i gzhung", f. 50a.6.

24 For the term "practice of non-perception of perception" (dmigs pa mi dmigs pa'i sbyor ba) in the Dharmadharmatavibhiiga cf. "Chos dang chos nyid mam par 'byed pa'i gzhung", f. 50a.6.

25 Cf. IT. 32, f. 5a.6-7 andjiang 23,1. 91-92. 26 For the term "practice of perception of non-perception" (mi dmigs pa dmigs pa'i

sbyor ba) in the Dharmadharmatavibhiiga cf. "Chos dang chos nyid mam par 'byed pa'i gzhung", f. 50a.6.

184 CARMEN MEINERT

regard to that cognition nor apart from cognition. In regard to the nonexistence of cognition manifesting in form and to that cognition he neither completely sees them as same nor as different27• Just this very non-perception of an apprehending subject and an apprehensible object, or of mere cognition and form, is "non-conceptual wisdom".

In this fourfold investigative practice phenomena are simply a feature of this very perceptual process itself. And to summarise again, this process to non-conceptual wisdom leads through the fourfold cognition that (1) all dharmas are manifestation of one's own mind, (2) that the external world is inherently non-existent, (3) that "mere cognition" is non-existent and (4) that cognisable objects and cognition are non-dual. Now, we shall look at the understanding of "non-conceptuality" according to the system of Rim gyis pa, Cig car ba, Mahayoga and rDzogs chen in the four main chapters of the bSam gtan mig sgron in order to compare it to the four steps of entering into the "non-conceptual sphere" as they were just described according to the Aryiivikalpaprave§aniimadhiira1J,1.

3. The bSam gtan mig sgron

3.1 The Topic of 'Non-conceptuality'

The composition of the bSam gtan mig sgron by gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes is to be understood in the broader historical context of the eighth and ninth centuries. The debate of bSam yas that is said to have taken place in the late eighth century between KamalasTIa, the Indian advocate of a gradual path, and Heshang Moheyan, a Chinese Meditation master rather favouring the subitist approach, is according to the historical data one of the major events giving evidence for the development of Chinese Meditation Buddhism in Tibet during those early times28• Moreover, from other Dunhuang manuscripts we also know about the spread of the Mahayoga tradition29• gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes' treatise

27 Cf jiang 23, 1. 96-97 and IT. 32, f. 5b.1-2. 28 Cf footnote 13 above and the two text Dunwu dacheng zhenglijue and sGom pa'i

rimpa. 29 Cf K. W. Eastman, "Mahayoga Texts at Tun-huang", in: Bulletin of Institute of

Buddhist Cultural Studies 22, Kyoto: Ryiikoku University, 1983,42-60.


bSam gtan mig sgron is the only known work which discusses in detail the differences between the four prevalent traditions in the eighth and ninth centuries, namely Rim gyis pa, Cig car ba, Mahayoga and his own tradition of rDzogs chen. He clearly saw the potential that the teachings of these different schools may be intermingled, and thus states:

In [writing] the bSam gtan mig sgron, I gave a detailed description [of the Cig car ba tradition], because I fear that one mistakes [the meaning of the] Cig car ba to be similar to rDzogs chen30•

Furthermore, he may have had an actual syncretistic movement in mind which fused elements of both traditions alike, namely those of Cig car ba and rDzogs chen31 . In the bSam gtan mig sgron, he clearly refers to contemporaries who neither understood the meaning of Cig car ba nor of rDzogs chen, yet simply mistook their own erroneous view to be rDzogs chen32• Therefore, gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes was concerned to distinguish the doctrirIal differences of the four above-mentioned schools. He undertook his analysis in the light of the soteriological idea of "nonconceptuality" (rnam par mi rtog pa) and said:

[ ... ] in regard to the benefit of myself and others to thoroughly comprehend the authoritative scriptures about 'non-conceptuality' in each vehicle (of Rim gyis pa, Cig car ba, Mahayoga and Atiyoga) [ ... ]33

However, how does gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes analyse the view of "non-conceptuality" according to each of the four schools? The title of this treatise, Torch of the Eye of Meditation (bSam gtan mig sgron),

30 SM: 186.1-3: Irnal 'byor mig gi bsam gtan gyi skabs 'dirl ston mun dang rdzogs chen cha 'dra bas gol du dogs pa'i phyir rgyas par bkod dol. Cf Samten Gyaltsen Kannay, The Great Peifection (rDzogs chen). A Philosophical and Meditative Teaching in Tibetan Buddhism, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988, 105.

31 For a discussion of such a syncretistic outlook in P. tib. 699, a commentary to a manuscript on Chinese Meditation Buddhism (S. tib 689) cf my article: "Chinese Chan and Tibetan Rdzogs Chen: Prelinlinary Remarks on Two Tibetan Dunhuang Manuscripts", in: Religion and Secular Culture in Tibet. Tibetan Studies II, Leiden: Brill, PIATS 2000, vol. 2, 2002, 289-307 and my revised and extended article on this topic "Conjunction of Chinese Chan and Tibetan rDzogs chen Thought: Reflections on the Tibetan Dunhuang Manuscripts S. tib. 689-1 and P. tib. 699", forthcoming, in: SCEAR.

32 SM: 311.1-6 and my article (2002: 304). Cf also Ka=ay 1988: 112. 33 SM: 12.5-6: I de nas bdag gzhan gyi don du gnas der las brtsam pa 'ang theg pa so

so'i mi rtog pa'i gzhung gzhi [= bzhiJ legs par khong du chud pasl [ ... ]. A later interpolation (SM: 12.1-2) lists the four vehicles (theg pa bzhi) as [s]tonl tsenl mahiil a ni [= ti].

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may give a hint as it is also understood in the broader c~ntext of "nonconceptuality." At the very beginning of the book, gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes makes reference to this title as follows:

Even though nature did not vacillate from the condition Of primordial spontaneous presence, If it is not seen, nature manifests [as if] dual; I pay homage to what has become this very condition [of primordial spontaneous presence].

Thence, this meditation called the "eye of the yogi", and which is the king of direct transmission making one definitively understand the spontaneously Great Perfection (rdzogs chen), [namely] the ground-of-all, the awakened mind34.

The "eye" (mig) of the "yogi" (mal 'byor pa) who practices "meditation" (bsam gtan) recognizes the direct transmission of rDzogs chen. Its very essence is the "condition of primordial spontaneous presence" (gdod nas lhun gyis grub pa'i ngang). This condition is twofold: it is empty in nature, nonetheless it is also luminous in nature and is the ground of all which has the potential to allow phenomenal world arise effortlessly. Therefore, within this process of cognition "meditation" (bsam gtan) is of primary importance. However, bsam gtan is here not to be misunderstood in its ordinary meaning of being a specific meditation about something, but rather is to be understood in a much broader sense: bsam gtan is here - as Herbert Guenther has already put it - part of the process of "spiritual maturity". In this process, the human being is cured of the feeling of being separated from the world - a feeling that originates in believing in the "conceptual aspect" (rtog pa) of experience35• Therefore, in this process of convalescence the understanding of the "conceptual aspect" is especially important as it leads to the under-

. standing of "non-conceptuality" (mi rtog pa). Moreover, H. Guenther also brought attention to the term bsam gtan

in a similar context dealing with rDzogs chen teachings and gave the following definition:

34 SM: 2.1-3: I gdod nas lhun gyis grub pa'i ngangl rang bzhin ngang las ma g.yos kyangl ma mthong rang bzhin gnyis su snangl de nyid ngang gyur bdag phyag 'tshall de fa kun gzhi byang chub kyi sems lhun gyis rdzogs pa chen po gtan la dbab pa'i man ngag gi rgyaf pol rnal 'byor pa'i mig zhes bya ba'i bsam gtan 'di [ ... J.

35 Cf Guenther 1983: 353.


The tenn bsam-gtan applies to this 'setting' of an as yet preconscious intending, which gradually becomes frozen into the customary subject-object division, on any.level where the noetic-noematic ['mind' (sems)] correlation is in its fonnation. [ ... ]

To be more precise, bsam-gtan characterizes the moment of transition when the latent discriminating determinations, that become an explicating and concentrating attention, begin stirring and are going to move freely in the context of explicit themes such as subject and object, whereby they harden into 'mind' (sems). This particular transitional moment within experience is tenned the 'spontaneous' [lhun grub] or 'self-present' [rang snang] or 'natural' [rang bzhin] setting36.

According to this definition, bsam gtan is the crucial moment when the "conceptual aspect" of reality arises and thus can also be cut through. This "conceptual aspect" of experience already means a limitation of the openness of being. In regard to perception, this openness means "intrinsic awareness" (rig pa) and is identical with the aspect of "non-conceptuality". Thus in "meditation" (bsam gtan) one is able to see through the limiting factor of perception of reality. Or in the words of the bSam gtan mig sgron itself: in meditation "the condition of primordial spontaneous presence" is illuminated. Finally, gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes distinguishes this meaning of "nonconceptuality" in rDzogs chen meditation in comparing it to the understanding of "non-conceptuality" according to the other three schools. We shall now look at the contents of the four main chapters of the bSam gtan mig sgron.

3.2 "Non-Conceptuality" According To The Four Schools

The four main chapters of the bSam gtan mig sgron, that is chapter four to seven, demonstrate in great detail the respective understanding of "nonconceptuality" of the four above-mentioned schools. In the context of the present research, however, which is merely interested in the fundamental differences and not in particular details, we shall look at the summary in the third chapter of the bSam gtan mig sgron which provides a general

36 Herbert Guenther, Kindly Bent to Ease Us, Emeryville: Dharma Publishing, vol. 2, 1976,4.

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idea of the basic differences in the understanding of "non,-conceptuality" of these schools37•

gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes states that there are different degrees of insight into "non-conceptuality." He makes the following comparison:

The differences [of insight into non-conceptuality] are like the steps of a ladder. Just as there are high and low steps of the ladder, there are differences [according to] these four [schools of Rim gyis pa, Cig car ba, Mahayoga, and rDzogs chen in regard to their respective understanding of] non-conceptuality38.

Then, how does gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes grade these different steps of the ladder? We shall look at his explanations one by one.

(1) Concerning Rim gyis pa, it is said that "self-nature" (rang bzhin) is recognized in a step by step meditation. The four kinds of conceptual thinking, namely about signs of "own nature", "antidotes", "thusness" and "realisation" are abandoned successively. Therefore, it is said to be a gradual meditation on the "three gates of liberation," namely on those of "emptiness" (stong pa nyid), "marklessness" (mtshan ma med pa), and "aspirationlessness" (smon pa med pa?9.

(2) The Cig car ba teaches from the very beginning "instantaneously" (Gig car) the "unborn absolute" (don dam pa ma sykes pa) - beyond any expectation and striving. This means that one shall learn from the beginning that all phenomena are "without a fixed frame of reference" (dmigs su med pa)40.

(3) gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes describes the insight gained through the method of Mahayoga as "non-dual non-conceptuality" (gnyis su med pa'i mi rtog pa)41. According to Mahayoga texts, "non-dual thusness" (gnyis su med pa'i de bzhin nyid) means that "sphere" (dbyings) and "primordial wisdom" (ye shes) are non-dual. Therefore,

37 H. Guenther already translated this important passage of the SM into English. Cf Guenther 1983: 351-366.

38 SM: 60.6-61.1: Ide dag gi khyad par skad [= skasl kyi gdang bu bzhin tel dper na skad [= skasl gdang la mtho dman yod par dang 'dra ste/ mi rtog pa 'di bzhi yang khyad par yodl. Cf Guenther 1983: 360.

39 SM: 55.6-56.1,56.6-57.1. Cf Guenther 1983: 354-355. 40 SM: 57.1-4. Cf Guenther 1983: 357. 41 SM: 55.5. Cf for a translation of this passage cf also Guenther 1983: 355.


"primordial wisdom" does not even take "sphere" as a "referential object" (dmigs par mi byed pa)42.

(4) Finally, the result of rDzogs chen meditation is described as "spontaneously present supreme non-conceptuality" (lhun gyis grub pa'i mi rtog pa chen pO)43. In "spontaneously present thusness" the whole phenomenal world is inherently and, perfectly from primordial times, naturally luminous in the completely pure expanse of "intrinsic primordial wisdom" (rang byung gi ye shes). It is the "supreme primordial non-conceptuality" (ye mi rtog pa chen po) in which manifestations are not blocked44• Therefore, we may label it as the insight into 'dynamic emptiness,' which is in its empty aspect "nonexistence" (med pa) beyond duality and at the same time in its luminous aspect "intrinsic awareness" (rang rig pa) allowing the kaleidoscope of manifestations arise. Therefore, in rDzogs chen meditation the real issue is not simply a non-referential (mi dmigs pa) situation, but innate and luminous awareness itself.

4. Comparison of the Four Practices in the Aryavikalpapravesanamadhararp: and the Contents of the Four Main Chapters in the bSam gtan mig sgron

In the fourfold perceptual process, as it is described above according to the AryavikalpapraveSanamadharal}l, insight into "non-conceptuality" is gained gradually through the steps of (1) "perception," (2) "nonperception," (3) "non-perception of perception'," and (4) "perception of non-perception." In order to apply these four stages of understanding of "non-conceptuality" to the above illustrated account of four schools Rim gyis pa, Cig car ba, Mahayoga and rDzogs chen and to clearly demonstrate how they correspond to each other, we shall look again at gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes' analysis.

gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes criticises each single school respectively from one step above on the ladder, that is, he disapprove Rim gyis pa from the perspective of Cig car ba, disapprove Cig car ba from the view of

42 SM: 59.4,6. Cf Guenther 1983: 359. 43 SM: 55.6. Cf Guenther 1983: 355. 44 SM: 60.2-3,5. For a translation of this passage cf also Guenther 1983: 360.

190 CARMEN l'vlEINERT

Mahayoga, and fmally disapprove Mahayoga from the angle of rDzogs chen. Accordingly, (1) the fault of Rim gyis pa is that it is merely occupied with "perception" (dmigspa) in order to let the expelience of "non-perception" (ma dmigs pa) arise45• (2) Cig car ba seeks for the unborn absolute, yet it simply corrupts mind46 as it still has a concept of the unborn. As already mentioned above, the Cig car ba adept learns from the beginning the "nonperception" (dmigs su med pa) in regard to all phenomena47• (3) Even though Mahayoga talks about "non-duality" (gyis su med pa), it does not realise "spontaneously present supreme non-conceptuality" of rDzogs chen. This is so because Mahayoga gets accustomed to thusness by virtue of "examining reality" (dngos po gzhal ba) and "different means" (thabs mang po). Therefore, even though Mahayoga comes close to the rDzogs chen realisation of "spontaneous presence", it still takes it as an "object of perception" (dmigs pa yod pa )48 and thus regards it as something supreme orreal. (4) According to gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes, the supreme realisation of nonduality is only accomplished in rDzogs chen meditation. It refers to the supreme equality of all manifestations of both sarrzsara and nirval}a. At the end of his treatise he summarises it again as follows:

Since the Great Perfection (rdzogs chen) is spontaneously perfected and ultimate thusness, supreme non-duality is without divisions; thus [the Great Perfection] is the stage of unexcelled primordial wisdom. [ ... ]49

Now, we shall investigate step by step how gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes' classification corresponds to the fourfold correct practice of the Aryavikalpapravesanamadhiiral}l. (1) Regarding Rim gyis pa, gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes himself describes it in terms of "perception" (dmigs

45 SM: 61.2: tsen man rim gyis 'jug pa nil sngar bshad pa ltar dmigs pa la sha thang bar 'bad nas rna dmigs pa skye ba dang! [ ... J.

46 SM: 61.3. Cf Guenther 1983: 358. 47 SM: 57.3-4: yang de nyid las! las dang po pas sems dang po bskyed pa nas nye bar

brtams tel chos thams cad dmigs su med pa la! bslab par bya' 01. Cf Guenther 1983: 357. 48 SM: 63.2-4; 64.4-5: mal 'byor chen po nang pas mtshan ma'i ting nge 'dzin las Sit

rung nas rtags than yang! lhun grub la dmigs pa yod pa'i phyir! rna mthong ba nil dper na nyi ma'i snying po bltas na! slar mi mthong gi mig ljir 'gyur ba bzhin no!.

49 SM: 491.4-5: !rdzogs chen ni lhun rdzogs de bzhin nyid mthar thug nyid pasl !gnyis med chen po dbye ba med pasl lye shes bla ma'i sa yin pas [ ... ]1.


pa). This corresponds to the first stage of insight as it is explained in the Aryavikalpaprave.sanamadhiiralJI. (2) For Cig car ba gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes demonstrates that this tradition is occupied with the "unborn absolute," the inconceivable or - to speak in terms of the AryavikalpapraveSanamadharalJl - with "non-perception" (mi dmigs pa). It IS the realisation of the non-existence of the external world. (3) According to the bSam gtan mig sgron, Mahayoga talks about "spontaneous presence" (lhun grub), the supreme realisation of "non-conceptuality" in rDzogs chen, however, still takes it as an "object of perception" (dmigs pa yod pa). It comes close to the realm of "spontaneous presence", and thus frees from the attachment to the subject-object dichotomy. However, it still regards it as real or supreme. In terms of the AryavikalpapraveSanamadharalJl this would match the third step of "non-perception of perception," that is a non-perception of the perception of the SUbject-object dichotomy. (4) Finally, gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes argues that only in rDzogs chen "spontaneous presence" is perfected which is "supreme nonconceptuality." It is the realisation of the empty but luminous nature, or in other words the union of "intrinsic awareness and emptiness" (rig stong). It refers to the equality of all manifestations of both saf(lsara and nirvalJa - not regarding anything as supreme. In regard to the AryavikalpapraveSanamadharalJl this kind of insight is explained as "perception of non-perception," non-duality of cognisable objects and cognition. Only in realising this final stage one is able to enter into "non-conceptual sphere." When Mahayoga talks about "spontaneous presence", it is the coming into contact of such a realm, whereas rDzogs chen is the realization of such.

By analysing the contents of the four main chapters of the bSam gtan mig sgron - that is the understanding of "non-conceptuality" in Rim gyis pa, Cig car ba, Mahayoga and rDzogs chen - in the light of the fourfold correct practice as it is explained in the AryavikalpapravesanamadharalJl, the structure of the bSam gtan mig sgron becomes transparent. In the eyes of gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes these four traditions clearly describe a soteriological path in itself, that is a path on which one gradually increases insight into "non -conceptuality." In this kind of interpretation the four traditions may be seen as separate parts of a broader picture, or to use the analogy of gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes: they are different steps of one ladder.

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5. Critique of Cig car ba according to the bSam gtan mig sgron

In conclusion, we shall summarise again gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes' view of the differences between Cig car ba (i.e., Chinese Meditation Buddhism) and rDzogs chen as gNubs chen Sangs rgyas. ye shes himself explained in the beginning that one reason for writing the bSam gtan mig sgron was the apparent similarity of both traditions. In this own concluding remarks he says:

Regarding the Cig car ba [tradition] its terminology is similar to rDzogs chen. Although it teaches non-activity and non-practice, it speaks of ultimate truth as the ground which is unborn and empty - having in mind the ground which is not arising and is the perfect reality. However, if one investigates this [view], there is [still] effort getting accustomed to the condition of emptiness; it [has the notion of dealing with the two] truths alternately5o. [The Cig car bas] never practically engage in the non-duality of [the two] truths. Veiled by the own [erroneous] view, the [Cig car bas] need yet to have to enter into non-duality51.

According to this criticism Cig car ba does not understand the absolute truth, thusness, but perceives it as the object "empty nature." gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes therefore classifies it as the understanding of the absolute according to "three essential categories" (ngo bo nyid gsum) in the Yogadira school as "perfect reality" (yongs su grub pa, parini;;panna). In an earlier classification of the different understanding of "non-conceptuality" according to the various philosophical schools he described that "non-conceptuality which manifests as empty nature is the meditation on the perfect [reality] of the Yogacara school"s2. It is not clear how gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes comes to the conclusion to bring the understanding of the absolute in the Cig car ba tradition together with

50 I am not sure about my translation of this sentence. s. Karmay (1988: 105) choose the following translation which seems to avoid the problem ( ... bden pa re mos pa ... ): "[ ... ] If we examine this view, it still hankers after the "truth" and works on becoming accustomed to the state of voidness. [ ... ]".

51 SM: 490.3-5: I ston mun ni rdzogs chen dang skad mthunl bya ba med bsgrub pa med par ston yangl Igzhi mi 'byung ba yongs su grub pa la dgongs nasI don dam pa'i bden pa rna skyes stong pa'i gzhi la smra stel de la ni brtags na da dung bden pa re mos pa dangl stong pa'i ngang la 'dris par byed pa dangl rtsol ba yod del bden pa gnyis med pa la spyod kyang rna myong stel rang gi Ita bas bsgribs te gnyis med la bzod 'jug dgos sol. ej. also Karrnay 1988: 105.

52 SM: 55.3-4: Istong pa'i ngo bor snang la mi rtog pa nil rnal 'byor spyod pa'i yongs su grub pa bsgom pa'ol. Cf. Karmay 1988: 105.


Yogacara philosophy. He does not give further evidence to confirm his view. However, as we have seen in the above structural analysis of the contents of the four main chapters of the bSam gtan mig sgron, it makes perfect sense to place Cig car ba within the broader picture of Buddhist soteriology. Yet, in my view, an assertion like the final one of gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes about Cig car ba would call for a more elaborate verification.

Abbreviations

BBK Bukkyo bunka kenkyilsho kiyo I1U.kxftli'fj\;*i!~ [Bulletin of the Research in Buddhist Culture],

SCEAR= SM

Studies in Central and East Asian Religion bSam gtan mig sgron; cf. gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes

T.

TT.

TaishO shinshO daizokyo t:lEfliiU:1U1 [[Chinese] Buddhist Canon from the Taisho Era], Taibei Reprint Tibetan Tripitaka

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"Chos dang chos nyid mams par 'byed pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa'i 'grel pa ye shes snang ba mam 'byed [Commentary to the verses of the Discrimination of dharma and dharmatii. Discrimination of Primordial Wisdom and Appearances]", by Mi pham Rin po che (1846-1912), in: Mathes 1996, annex.

Demieville, Paul, Le concile de Lhasa, reprint, 1't edition 1952, Paris: College de France Institut des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, 1987.

"Foshuo ru wu fenbie famen jing lj!;~A.~5}3IJi2<r~~ [sutra of Entering into the Dharma Gate of 'Non-Conceptuality' Taught by the Buddha]", translated by Danaprua :Iitliiii, in: T. 15, no. 654, 8D5-806.

Gomez, Luis 0., "The Direct and Gradual Approaches of Zen Master Mahayana: Fragments of the Teachings of Mo-ho-yen", in: M. Gimello/p. N. Gregory (ed.), Studies in Ch'an and Hua-yen, Studies in East Asian Buddhism No.1, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,1983[a], 69-168.

-, "Indian Materials on the Doctrine of Sudden Enlightenment", in: Lewis Lancaster/Whalen Lai (ed.), Early Ch'an in China and Tibet, Berkeley: Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series, 1983[b], 393-434.

194 CARMEN MEINERT

Guenther, Herbert, Kindly Bent to Ease Us, Emeryville: Dharma Publishing, vol. 2, 1976. '

-, '''Meditation' Trends in Early Tibet", in: Lewis Lancaster/Whalen Lai (ed.), Early Ch'an in China and Tibet, Berkeley: Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series, 1983,351-366. .

Karmay, Samten Gyaltsen, The Great Pelfection (rDzogs chen). A Philosophical and Meditative Teaching in Tibetan Buddhism, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988.

Kazunobu Matsuda :t0Hl;fQ1~, "Nirvikalpa-pravesa-dharaI)I ni tsuite [On the Nirvikalpa-pravesa-dharar.n]", in: Buddhist Seminar 34 (1981), 40-49.

-, "Nirvikalpapravesadharar.n. Sanskrit Text and Japanese Translation", reprint from: Bulletin of the Research Institute ofBukkyo University (3/1996),89-113.

Mathes, Klaus-Dieter, Unterscheidung der Gegebenheiten von ihrem wahren Wesen (Dharmadharmatavibhiiga), Swisttal-Odendorf: Jndica et Tibetica Verlag, 1996.

Meinert, Carmen, "Chinese Chan and Tibetan Rdzogs Chen: Preliminary Remarks on Two Tibetan Dunhuang Manuscripts", in: Religion and Secular Culture in Tibet. Tibetan Studies II, Leiden: Brill, PIATS 2000, voL 2, 289-307.

-, "Conjunction of Chinese Chan and Tibetan rDzogs chen Thought: Reflections on the Tibetan Dunhuang Manuscripts S. tib. 689-1 and P. tib. 699", forthcoming, in: SCEAR.

gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes (9th century), gNubs chen sangs rgyas ye she rin po ches mdzad pa 'i sgom gyi gnang gsal bar phye ba bsam gtan mig sgron [Torch of the Eye of Meditation Elucidating the Very Heart of Meditation, Composed by gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes Rin po che], reproduced from a manuscript made presumably from an Eastern Tibetan print by 'Khor gdon gter sprul 'Chi med rig dzin, Leh: Smartsis shesrig spendzod, Vol. 74, 1974.

"'Phags pa rnam par rill rtog par 'jug pa zhes bya ba'i gzungs [The Supreme dharalJ! of Entering into Non-Conceptuality]", translated by Jinamitra, DanasTIa, and dKa' ba dpal brtsegs, in: IT. 32, no. 810, la-6b.

"'Phags pa rnam par rill rtog par 'jug pa zhes bya ba'i gzungs kyi rgya cher 'grel pa [Extensive Commentary to The Supreme dharalJI of Entering into NonConceptuality]", by KamalasTIa, in: IT. 105, no. 5501, f. 146b.6-174b.1.

Rao Zongyi (Jao Tsung-I) ~7jHll!, "Wangxi Dunwu dacheng zhengli jue xushuo bing jiaoji J:~~1'R**i~J!l:!I:f¥IDI:1t:f3(~G [preface and Notes to W angXi' s Dunwu dacheng zhengli jue (Ratification of the True Principle of the Mahayana Teachings of Sudden Awakening)]", in: Chongji xuebao iMti!iOi'¥!l [The Chung Chi Journal] 9/2 (1970), 127-148.

Ru wu fenbie zongchi jing Jd!!! 5t ~Hl! M' ~ [The dharal}-l of Entering into N on-Conceptuality], Jiang it 23, preserved in the Beijing National Library.

Seyfort Ruegg, D., Buddha-nature, Mind and the Problem of Gradualism in a Comparative Perspective, London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1989.

Shiu, Henry C. H. ?lIlUjIllf, Bianfafaxing lun Bubai shi lun mi!i!tl:~ 0 :fJ&~iifi [Dharmadharmatavibhiiga. The Commentary of Mi pham Rin po che], ed. by Tam Shek-wing ~~ii', Hongkong: Vajrayana Buddhism Association Limited, 2000.


Tam Shek-wing ~~7.l< (ed./transl.), Bianfa faxing lun. Shiqin shi lun I!Htdtd1~ 0

ftfJlfHit [Dharmadharmatavibhiiga. The Commentary of Vasubandhu], Hongkong: Vajrayana Buddhism Association Limited, 1999.

TaishO shinshO daizokyo ;kiEllifiJl;kilW [[Chinese] Buddhist Canon from the TaishOEra], 85 vols., ed. by Dazang jing kanxing hui, Taibei reprint of the edition of 1927/28, Taibei, Xinwenfeng chubanshe, 1973.

Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking edition of the Kanjur and Tanjur, Tokyo reprint, ed. by Daisetz T. Suzuki, Tokyo/K yoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, 168 vols., 1957.

Tucci Guiseppe, Minor Buddhist Texts II, Rome: Is. M. E. 0., 1958. Ueyama, Daishun, "The Study of Tibetan Ch'an Manuscripts Recovered from

Tun-huang: A Review of the Field and its Prospects", in: L. Lancaster/ W. Lai (ed.), Early Ch'an in China and Tibet, Berkeley: Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series,1983, 327-350.

Ueyama, Daishun/Kenneth W. Eastman/Jeffrey L. Broughton, "The AvikalpapraveSa-dhiiralJi: The Dharani of Entering Non-Discrimination", in: BBK (1983), 32-42.

de la Vallee Poussin, Louis, Catalogue of the Tibetan Manuscripts from TunHuang in the India Office Library, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962.

Yoshimura, Shyuki, The Denkar mao An Oldest Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons with Introductory Notes, Kyoto: Ryilkoku University, 1950.

NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS

Giulio AGOSTINI earned his PhD in Buddhist Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, with a thesis on the Buddhist laity in ancient India. He is currently working as an independent scholar on Abhidhanna and Vinaya materials concerning lay people.

Dan ARNOLD did his doctorate at the University of Chicago. He is presently Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Religious Studies at the University of McGill in Montreal.

Colette CAILLAT, professor emeritus at the University of Paris ill, is a member of the Academie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres de l'Institut de France. She has focused on Indo-Aryan grammar and linguistics, collaborating on the Critical Piili Dictionary II, and has done extensive research on Jainism, especially on the canonical texts of monastic discipline.

Mario D'AMATO is currently visiting Assistant Professor in Asian Religions and the Philosophy of Religion at Hampshire College in Amherst, Massachu- . setts.

Paul HARRISON is Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, where has he taught Buddhism and Asian Religions in the Religious Studies program since 1983. His main research interests lie in the fields of Mahayana Buddhist history and literature, the history of the Tibetan canon, and Buddhist manuscripts.

Cannen MEINERT currently works as a research fellow at the Institute for the History and Culture of India and Tibet, Tibetan section, at Hamburg University, Germany. Her research in progress is dealing with the issue of violence in Tantric Buddhism, considering Tibetan and Chinese materials alike. She obtained here PhD from Bonn University in 2001 with a comparative study on Chinese Chan Buddhism and Tibetan rDzogs chen. Her research mainly focuses on Buddhism between Tibet and China.

Robert SHARF recently took a position as Professor of Buddhist Studies in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of California, Berkeley, after having taught at McMaster University and the University of


Michigan. He is author of Coming to Terms with Chinese Buddhism: A Reading a/the Treasure Store Treatise (Hawai'i, 2002) and coeditor of Living Images: Japanese Buddhist Icons in Context (Stanford, 2001).

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