JIABS 27-2

JIABS Iournal of the International

Association of Buddhist Studies

Volume 27 Number 2 2004

Katsumi MIMAKI In memoriam, Yuichi Kajiyama (2.1.1925-29.3.2004) ..................... 255

Oliver FREIBERGER The Buddhist Canon and the Canon of Buddhist Studies................ 261

Klaus-Dieter MATHES

Tiiraniitha's "Twenty-One Differences with regard to the Profound Meaning" ........................................................................................... 285

Richard D. McBRIDE, IT Is there really "Esoteric" Buddhism? .............................................. 329

Jerome DUCOR Les sources de la Sukhiivati, autour d'une etude recente de Gerard Fussman .... ... ... ... ..... ................ ...... ............ .... .... .... ....... ....... ... ... ........ 357

David N. GELLNER Himalayan Conundrum? A Puzzling Absence in Ronald M. David-son's Indian Esoteric Buddhism....................................................... 411

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EDITORIAL BOARD

SCHERRER-SCHAUB Cristina A. TILLEMANS Tom J.F. Editors-in-Chief

BUSWELL Robert

COLLINS Steven

Cox Collet GOMEZ Luis O. HARRISON Paul

VON HINOBER Oskar JACKSON Roger

JAINl Padmanabh S.

KATSURA Shoryu KuoLi-ying LOPEZ, JI. Donald S.

MAcDONALD Alexander

SEYFORT RUEGG David

SHARF Robert

STEINKELLNER Ernst

ZORCHER Erik

In memoriam

yurem KAJIYAMA (2.1.1925-29.3.2004)

KATSUMI MIMAKI

Professor Yilichi KAJIYAMA, Emeritus Professor of Buddhist Studies at Kyoto University, died at 6:09 o'clock in the morning, March 29,2004, at the age of 79. Because he had practiced martial arts such as Kend6 and Jildo in his junior high school days, he had always felt confident about his health. But since his heart operation in the summer of 2000, he had begun to be anxious about his health. In fact, in January 2004, while taking a walk, he accidentally fell down and, hitting his face against the ground, broke his teeth. He said to me: "It was a shock for me, who had practiced so well the 'safe ways of falling down' (ukemi) of JUdo, to fall down and hit my face on the ground". The last time I saw him was in a hospital bed two days before he died. I had been asked by our office to find out whether he would be able to attend a ceremony to receive an award on May 12. He answered: "By the time of the ceremony, I will be completely cured and will go by myself to receive the award." Who could have imagined that he would die suddenly two days later? The cause of his death was described in the newspapers as "cardiac insufficiency", but according to the official diagnosis it was in fact "stomach cancer" that deprived him of life.

This is indeed an irrecoverable loss to the Buddhist Studies world. Professor Kajiyama treated several topics in Buddhist studies through a sharp insight and elucidated many unexplored fields through a clear investigation. We could have expected still many many results from him. Here, from the depths of profound grief, I would like to pray for the peace of his soul by presenting a brief survey of his career and academic activities, even if I am not truly competent to do so.

Born in Shizuoka city on Jannary 2, 1925, Professor Kajiyama attended Shizuoka Junior High School and Shizuoka High School. He entered Kyoto

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 27 • Number 2 • 2004

256 KATSUMI MIMAKI

University in October 1944, studying in the department of Philosophy (Buddhist Studies) of the Faculty of Letters until his graduation in March 1948. Then he became a special research fellow of the Graduate School of the same university. He married Hiroko MATSUURA in 1951 and had a daughter Tomoko in 1952. From April 1953 until March 1956 he continued his research, while teaching, under the direction of Professors J. Kashab and Satkari Mookerjee at the Nalanda Pili Institute, in Bihar, India. After his return to Kyoto, he became an Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Letters of Kyoto University in April 1956. Having received a prize from the Japanese Academy for his joint-work Ju yong guan ~,*IJi~~ in May 1959 as well as a prize from the Japanese Association of Buddhist Studies in October of the same year, he was promoted to Associate Professor in March 1961. From July 1961 until August 1962 he studied under the guidance of Professor John Brough as a fellow of the British Council in the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) of London Unversity. From September to December 1962 he continued his research under the guidance of Professor Erich Frauwallner at the Indological Institute of Vienna University. Promoted to Professor of Kyoto University in November 1971 he concentrated on research and education for the sixteen years until his retirement in March 1988, and in April 1988 he was given the title of Emeritus Professor of Kyoto University. From April 1988 until March 1997 he was Professor at Bukkyo University (Faculty of Letters, Department of Buddhist Studies). There in April 1991 he founded the Comprehensive Research Institute, and as its Director he inaugurated its Bulletin. From April 1997 until March 2001 he was Professor at Soka University. There in June 1997 he founded the International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology, and as its Director he inaugurated the Annual Report. It was amazing to see how easily he accomplished the difficult tasks of founding a new Institute and launching a new journal.

The research of Professor Kajiyama was recognized and appreciated not only inside Japan, but also internationally. He had occasions to teach as Visiting Professor at the University of Wisconsin (1967-1968), the University of California, Berkeley (1974; 1981; 1997), Harvard University (1986), Vienna University (1985), and Leiden University (1989).

The formation of his knowledge and his method of guiding his disciples seemed to have been deeply influenced by his own research experi-

YDrcHI KAJIYAMA (2.1.1925-29.3.2004) 257

ence with three foreign teachers, as he often mentioned. The first was Professor MookerJee of the Nalanda Pali Institute, under whose direction he produced a Sanskrit reconstruction of the Vaidalyaprakara1J.a of Nagarjuna. The second was Professor Brough of London University, under whose direction he completed an annotated English translation of the Tarkabhii>!ii of Mok~akaragupta (1l-12th c.). As one of the best introductions to Indian Buddhist epistemology and logic, this work, first published in 1966 in Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters (Kyoto University No. 10; included also below in Bibl. 1), was reprinted in the series of the Institute for Tibetan and Buddhist Studies in Vienna (Bib!. 2; cf. a Japanese translation in Bibl. 8). His third teacher was Professor Frauwallner, under whose guidance he completed a German translation of the first chapter of the Prajfi.iipradfpa of Bha(va)viveka (ca 500-570) (included in Bib!. 1).

There is no doubt that his experience of the so-called person to person method under these three professors deeply influenced his own research as well as his method of guiding his students. When I was student preparing a master's thesis, he read my text with me once a week during the summer vacation. He did not seem to need much preparation, but he corrected my reading and each time gave me very useful comments and suggestions. It was indeed thanks to him that I could read this difficult text through. Needless to say, I was not the only student to receive the benefit of his methodical attention. It was naturally the same not only for other Japanese but also for foreign students. This is the reason why so many of his disciples continue now their academic activities in many places all over the world.

The research field of Professor Kajiyama covers several branches of Indian Mahayana Buddhism. It is almost impossible to present all of his works in this limited space, but we can at least enumerate the following five branches as his main SUbjects: (1) Madhyamaka philosophy, (2) Mahayana sutras, among others the Prajfi.iipiiramitiisittra, (3) Buddhist logic and epistemology, (4) analysis of the doctrinal positions of several Buddhist schools, and (5) Chinese and Japanese Buddhist thought, based on Indian Buddhist philosophy.

As for the first field, we can mention his clear overview of the history of Indian Madhyamaka philosophy (Bib!. 11), and, in particular, as is shown by his above-mentioned German translation of the first chapter of

258 KATSUMI MIMAKI

the Prajfiiipradzpa, which elucidates Bha(va)viveka's philosophy, one of Professor Kajiyama's contributions was to clarify the important role that the Madhyamika played in the history of Indian logic. Another important contribution was that, having critically reexamined various theories and using Bha(va)viveka for important evidence, he established the dates of Sthiramati (510-570) and DharmapaIa (530-561).

In the second field, we have his Japanese translations of the A!ftasiihasrikii-prajfiiipiiramitii-sutra (Bibl. 7) and the Pratyutpanna-buddhasarrtmukhtivasthita-samiidhi-sutra (Bibl. 21). He also treated several interesting topics such as the Bodhisattva, transfer of merit, transmigration, smpa worship, the Buddha-body, the origin of Mahayana Buddhism, Buddhist eschatology, miracles, and supernatural events. In the field of logic and epistemology we have his clear description of Buddhist logic (Bibl. 16). Besides the above-mentioned translation of the Tarkabhii!fii of Mok~akaragupta, the most important contribution in this field is his translation of the Antarvyiiptisamarthana of Ratnakarasanti, in which we can see the final phase in the development of Indian Buddhist logic. This text of Ratnakarasanti had already been twice translated into Japanese by Professor Kajiyama (1959, 1989), but its final form was completed in a new edition of the Sanskrit text, juxtaposed with a collated text of the Tibetan versions, an English translation, and a facsimile edition of the Sanskrit manuscript (Bibl. 3). In his fourth field, of special note is his study of Buddhist conceptions of existence and knowledge (Bibl. 12). Finally, in his fifth field, he studied East Asian Buddhist ideas, including the thought of Shinran (Bibl. 18). Recently Professor Kajiyama had occasions to discuss contemporary ethical problems (brain death, human cloning, nuclear weapons, etc.) from the perspective of Buddhist Studies.

The above is only a partial summary of Professor Kajiyama's academic activities. His works are indeed so numerous and multi-faceted that it is impossible to mention all of them here. The attached bibliography lists his books and only his Western-language articles published after 1989. Let me also mention that a Collected Works of his Japanese publications (an estimated 8 volumes) is planned by the publisher Shunjilsha. His pre-1989 Western-language articles have been published by Rinsen Publishc ers (Bibl. 1). Currently out of print, this collection will be reprinted soon. Rinsen will also undertake the publication of his post-1989 articles in Western languages.

YDIcm KAJIYAMA (2.1.1925-29.3.2004) 259

Books

1) Y. Kajiyama, Studies in Buddhist Philosophy, ed. by Katsumi MiMAKI et al., Rinsen, Kyoto, 1989.

2) An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy, an annotated translation of the Tarkabhii~ii of Mok~akaragupta, Arbeitkreis fUr Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universitiit Wien, Wien, 1998.

3) The Antarvyiiptisamarthana of Ratniikarasiinti, Bibliotheca Philologica et Philosophica Buddhica II, The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology, Soka University, Tokyo, 1999.

4) Kil no Ronri <ChUgan> (The Logic of the Madhyarnaka School), Coauthored with S. UEYAMA, Kadokawa, Tokyo, 1969; Reprint as a pocket-size book,1997.

5) Bukkyo no Shiso (Buddhist Thought), Coauthored with S. UEYAMA, ChiioKoronsha, Tokyo, 1974

6) Ryilju RonshU (Japanese translation of Nagarjuna's works), Daijo Butten 14, Coauthored with R. URYDZU, ChilO-Koronsha, Tokyo, 1974.

7) Hassenju-Hannyakyo, (Japanese translation of the A~tasiihasrikii-Prajniipiiramitii-siltra), 2 Vols. (The second volume is coauthored with T. TANn), Chiio-Koronsha, Tokyo, 1974-5.

8) Ronri no Kotoba (The Language of Logic), A Japanese translation of Mok~akaragupta's Tarkabhii~ii, Chiio-Koronsha, Tokyo, 1975.

9) Seshin Ronshil (Japanese translation of Vasubandhu's works), Daijo Butten 15, Coauthored with N. ARAMAKI and G. M. NAGAO, Chiio-Koronsha, Tokyo, 1976.

10) Hannyakyo - Kil no Sekai (Prajniipiiramitii-siltra - the World of Emptiness), Chiio-Koronsha, Tokyo, 1976.

11) ChUkan Shiso (Madhyarnaka Thought), Koza Daijo Bukkyo 7, Coauthored with R. URYUZU, M. TACHIKAWA, T. EnMA, M. IcmGo, K. MIMAKI, C. TAMURA, and S. HARADA, Shunjiisha, Tokyo, 1982 (first edition), 1995 (new edition).

12) Bukkyo ni okeru Sonzai to Chishiki (Existence and Knowledge in Buddhism), Kinokuniya, Tokyo, 1983.

13) Satori to Eko (Enlightenment and Merit Transfer), KOdansha,Tokyo, 1983. 14) Kil no Shiso-Bukkyo ni okeru Kotoba to Chinmoku (The Idea of Empti

ness - Language and Silence in Buddhism), Jinbun-Shoin, Kyoto, 1983. 15) Bosatsu to iukoto (On Bodhisattvas), Jinbun-Shoin, Kyoto, 1984. 16) Ninshikiron to Ronrigaku (Epistemology and Logic), Koza Daijo Bukkyo 9,

Coauthored with S. KATSURA, H. TOSAKI, A. AKAMATSU, K. MiMAKI, Y. MrYASAKA, S. KAWASAKI, and H. NAGASAKI, Shunjiisha, Tokyo, 1982 (first edition), 1995 (new edition).

17) Budda-charita (Japanese translation of the Buddhacarita), Coauthored with N. KOBAYASm, M. TACHIKAWA and K. MlMAKI, KOdansha ShuppanKenkyiisho, Tokyo, 1985.

18) Shinran (A Study of the founder of the JOdo-Shin school), Chiio-Koronsha, Tokyo, 1987.

260 KATSUMI MIMAKI

19) Rinne no Shiso (The Buddhist Concept of Transmigration), Jinbun-Shoin, Kyoto, 1989.

20) Ku Nyumon (An Introduction to Emptiness), Shunjiisha, Tokyo, 1992. 21) Hanjuzanmai kyo (Pratyutpannabuddha-sarrzmukhiivasthita-samadhi-sutra:

partial translation and interpretation), in JOdo Bukkyo no Shiso (the Idea of Pure Land Buddhism) II, Kodansha, Tokyo, 1992.

22) Satori to Eko - Daijo Bukkyo no Seiritsu (Enlightenment and Merit Transfer - the origin of Mahayana Buddhism), Expanded version of Satori to Eko (1983), Jinbun-Shoin, Kyoto, 1997.

Articles in Western languages, published after his collection, Studies in Buddhist Philosophy (see Bib). 1)

23) "Fundamentals of Buddhist Ethics", Zen Buddhism Today: Annual Report of the Kyoto Zen Symposium (The Kyoto Seminar for Religious Philosophy), 1990, pp. 61-70.

24) "On the Authorship of the Upay~daya", Proceedings of the 2nd International Dharmakfrti Conference, Vienna, 1989, pp. 107-117.

25) "Presuppositions of Amitabha Worship in India", Bericht. JapanischDeutsche Studiengemeinschaft zur Kultur des Buddhismus, Bukkyo-Universitat, Kyoto, 1990, pp. 11-24.

26) "Sthiramati, Uddyotakara, and Arcafa on Vyabhicara", Asiatische Studien XL VI. 1, Etudes bouddhiques offertes a Jacques May, Zeitschrift der Schweizerrischen Asiengeseilschaft, 1992, pp. 212-221.

27) "Prajnaparamita and the Rise of Mahayana", Buddhist Spirituality: Indian, Southeast Asian, Tibetan, and Early Chinese, ed. by Y. TAKEucm in association with Jan Van Bragt, New York, Crossroad Publishing, 1993, pp. 137-154.

28) "Buddhist Eschatology, Miracles, and Power other than Self", A Comprehensive Review of the Pure Land Buddhism of Honen, International Academic Symposium, Bukkyo University-L.A. Extension, 1998, pp. 16-21.

29) "Buddhist Eschatology, Supernatural Events and the Lotus Sutra", The Journal of Oriental Studies, Vol. 8, 1998, pp. 15-37.

30) "Sarp.ghabhadra und Nagarjuna uber die Theorie der zwolfgriedrigen Kausalitat", Horin -Vergleichende Studien zur Japanischen Kultur, No.6, Eko-Haus der japanischen Kultur, Dusseldorf, 1999, pp. 139-149.

31) "AIayavijfiana und Abhangiges Entstehen", Horin, Vergleichende Studien zur japanischen Kultur, No.7, Eko-Haus der japanischen Kultur, Dusseldorf, 2000, pp. 77-92.

32) "TheSaddharmapuQ.9arika and Siinyata Thought" (tr. by Wayne Yokoyama), The Journal of Oriental Studies, Vol. 10, 2000, pp. 73-96.

33) "Buddhist Cosmology as Presented in the Yogacarabhiimi", Wisdom, Compassion, and the Search for Understanding: The Buddhist Studies Legacy of Gadjin M. Nagao, ed. by Jonathan A. Silk, University of Hawai'i Press, 2000, pp. 183-199.

THE BUDDIDST CANON AND THE CANON OF BUDDIDST STUDIES

OLIVER FREIBERGER

In contemporary academia, the concept of a canon is rather unpopular!. The word 'canon'2 reminds us of elites who use their power to suppress opposing views by labeling them as non-canonical and heretic. It reminds us of colonialism and 'Orientalism,' ofthe ways Western scholars 'canonized' the knowledge of 'the East.' And it reminds us of a 'classical' canon in education that conservative instructors and politicians attempt to save from postmodern randomness. In Buddhist Studies, such general reservations about the canon appear to become manifest in two demands: In our research, we must focus on sources other than the Buddhist canon; and in teaching, we must abandon the inherited 'canon' of class readings, which again consists mainly of Buddhist canonical texts, and must teach contemporary Buddhist practice instead.

In this paper, I will reconsider those demands by reflecting upon the Buddhist canon as a subject of research, and upon our own scholarly canonizations, the secondary canon of Buddhist Studies. The first part of the paper examines the role of the Buddhist canon in research and in teaching, the trend towards non-canonical sources, and the current affection for contemporary practice. As a textual scholar who works with canonical texts, I intend to point to some risks that are, in my view, inherent in that general trend. To corroborate my critique and to illustrate what

1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the University of Bayreuth and at the University of Texas at Austin in spring, 2004. I thank the participants of the subsequent discussions for their responses and, in particular, Janice Leoshko for her comments and valuable suggestions.

2 The word 'canon' is derived from Greek kanan, "cane", "ruler", figurative: "rule", "norm", "model". See for the etymology and historical development of the term Gerald T. Sheppard, "Canon," The Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. Mircea Eliade, vol. 3 (New York: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 62-69.


262 OLIVER FREIBERGER

I consider the value of canonical texts for scholarship, I will, in the second part of the paper, examine one exemplary issue: the image of the laity in early Buddhism. I intend to demonstrate that canonical texts are, in contrast to the common view, a rich source for current scholarly interests (such as the issues of religious practice and diversity). I will argue that the image of the canon as being consistent, one-dimensional, and purely normative - an image that underlies the current rejection of canonical texts - is to a large extent the product of a 'canonization' carried out by earlier generations of scholars. Discussing further implications in the third part of the paper, I will argue that by excluding the canon, Buddhist Studies runs the risk of canonizing other sources for research and, at the same time, enhances particularism in teaching. Rather, the opposite approach appears to be useful: a roughly 'canonized' introductory education in Buddhist Studies, spiced with selected data that are suitable for undermining simplification, and an attitude in research that is open for all kinds of sources, including canonical texts.

1. The Buddhist Canon in Research and in Teaching

When scholars of religion apply the term 'canon' to a certain corpus of texts, they usually wish to emphasize two aspects: its normative, authoritative character on the one hand, and its fixed and standardized form on the othez3. The latter feature is the result of a process of canonization. Generally speaking, this process begins when within a tradition certain institutions select a limited number of texts and define them as authoritative,

3 Jonathan Z. Smith defmes a canon broadly as "the arbitrary fixing of a limited number of 'texts' as immutable and authoritative." "Sacred Persistence: Toward a Redescription of Canon," id., Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown (Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 36-52, here: 44. Gerald Sheppard describes those two aspects as follows: "On the one hand, [the term 'canon'] can be used to refer to a rule, standard, ideal, norm, or authoritative office or literature, whether oral or written. On the other hand, it can signify a temporary or perpetual fixation, standardization, enumeration, listing, chronology, register, or catalog of exemplary or normative persons, places, or things. The former dimension emphasizes internal signs of an elevated status. The latter puts stress on the precise boundary, limits, or measure of what, from some preunderstood standard, belongs within or falls outside of a specific 'canon. ", Sheppard, "Canon," p. 64.

THE BUDDIDST CANON AND THE CANON OF BUDDIDST STUDIES 263

that is, 'canonicaI.' Subsequently, those or other institutions will need to protect and defend this canon4•

Following this deftnition, scholars of Buddhism are used to la,beling certain Buddhist text collections 'canonical.' I focus in this paper on the so-called Pili canon of the Theravada school. Although little is known about the fonnation of the texts after the death of the Buddha, scholarship holds that for a couple of centuries, Buddhists transmitted the constantly increasing text collection orally, until, according to the Theravada tradition, it was written down for the fIrst time in Sri Lanka, in the 151 century before the Common EraS. From the 5th century commentaries onwards, at the latest, both canonical features are observable: the Pali canon is regarded as nonnative and authoritative, and its textual contents are deftned and ftxed.

1.1. Leaving the Canon Behind: Alternative Sources for Research

From its very beginning, Westemschoil,lIship has focused on the Pili canonical texts, assuming that historically they were the most reliable source for reconstructing the life of the Buddha, his original teachings, and the new religion's early development. In recent decades, scholars have raised new questions and brought up a number of critical methodological issues: the problem of the alleged objectivity of the scholar; the

4 According to Aleida and Jan Assmann, we can distinguish three tasks these institutions have to fulfill: censoring; maintaining the text; and maintaining its meaning (Zensur, Textpflege, and Sinnpflege). Censoring means delimitating the text from the extraneous and false; maintaining the text means immunization against change, the orthopraxy of language within the tradition; maintaining the meaning of the text means compensating the semantic deficiencies of the orthopraxy of language, a phenomenon which is often manifest in commentaries of canonical texts. Aleida and Jan Assmann, "Kanon und Zensur," Kanon und Zensur: Beitrage zur Archaologie der literarischen Kommunikation II, ed. Aleida and Jan Assmann (Miinchen: Fink, 1987), pp. 7-27. See also the articles in the same volume by Alois Halm, "Kanonisierungsstile," pp. 28-37; and Carsten Colpe, "Sakralisierung von Texten und Filiationen von Kanons," pp. 80-92.

5 Although it is likely that at this point, the Pili canon was more or less fixed, we can be fully sure about its actual contents only from Buddhaghosa's commentary in the 5th century onwards. Cf. K.R. Norman, "Buddhism and Canonicity," id., A Philological Approach to Buddhism: The Bukkyo Dendo Kyokai Lectures 1994 (London: SOAS, 1997); cf. also Gregory Schopen, "Two Problems in the History of Indian Buddhism: The Layman/Monk Distinction and the Doctrines of the Transference of Merit," StlI10 (1985), 9-47, here: 9f.


need for scholarly interpretation and creativity; the issue of evaluative assessment and normativity; the disputed quest for the original intention of a text's author; the significance of politics and power; and, in particular, the role of the written text in general6• A considerable number of scholars have become critical of the traditional, historical-philological paradigm. Emphasizing the obvious multifaceted character of Buddhism and the need for adequate ways to deal with its diversity, they suggest methods other than philological (for example, anthropological, sociological, and art historical methods), and approaches other than historical (such as cross-cultural analysis, feminist criticism; deconstruction, and literary criticism)7. The critique of the traditional historical-philological approach concerns, of course, particularly its focus on canonical texts; scholars tend to look for other meaning-producing forms of sources. In the words of Jose Cabezon: "There is today a call for the increased investigation of alternative semiotic forms - oral and vernacular traditions, epigraphy, ritual, patterns of social and institutional evolution, gender, lay and folk traditions, art, archeology and architecture."8

In the course of this trend, the role of the Pilii canon in Buddhist Studies has been subject to critical examination. Charles Hallisey, for example, has analyzed the way Western Buddhologists used to deal with it. He points to the beginnings of Buddhist Studies and their typical 19th century historicist approach "with its split between older and later sources and its positivistic concerns for origins." This approach led scholars to the attitude that unlike modern Buddhists, only Western scholars, due to their knowledge of Pilii, have access to 'original' Buddhism.9 Instead of

6 Jose Ignacio Cabezon has thoroughly examined these methodological issues in his article "Buddhist Studies as a Discipline and the Role of Theory," JIABS 18 (1995), pp. 231-268. As he convincingly demonstrates, the debate takes place between the two poles of positivist/objectivist and interpretivist/subjectivist/constructionist approaches.

7 Cf. Cabezon, "Buddhist Studies as a Discipline ... ," pp. 238f. and 264f. 8 C[ Cabezon, "Buddhist Studies as a Discipline ... ," pp. 262f. 9 Charles Hallisey, "Roads Taken and Not Taken in the Study of Theraviida Bud

dhism," Curators of the Buddha: The Study of Buddhism under Colonialism, ed. Donald S. Lopez, Jr. (Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 31-61,here: pp. 34-38. Trying to apply a one-sided concept of Orientalism to this issue, however, would be too simple. As Hallisey observes, "there was something like a productive 'elective affinity' between the positivist historiography of European Orientalism and Buddhist styles of self-representation" (p. 43); see also pp. 47-49. This is true also for the common usage of


cOlitinuing a scholarly tradition that focuses on the Pali canon, scholars of Buddhism should examine, according to Hallisey, commentaries, subcommentaries, and in particular, local contexts and works composed in vernacular languages. He sketches an "alternative historical paradigm which will encourage us to expect meaning to be produced in local circumstances rather than in the origins of the tradition."JO In Hallisey's view, this local production of meaning is of crucial interest for Buddhist Studies, because it reveals the interaction between the text and its users and is thus connected to the 'real life' of Buddhists much more closely than the Pali canon is. Although not explicitly abandoning the canonical texts for research, Hallisey discourages from examining them. The Pali canon appears as one among many representations of Buddhism, but as a rather unexciting one.

1.2. Teaching Buddhism without a Canon: The Affection for Contemporary Practice

It comes as no surprise that the focus on the Pilii canon in research caused an identical focus in teaching. Charles Hallisey remarks that "the study of the Theravada became equated with the study of the Pilii canon, ·and it is still common for a student to finish a graduate program in Buddhist Studies without ever having read a Theravadin commentarial text." 11

the commentaries of the Pali canon; emulating Buddhist tradition, scholars of Buddhism have used them merely as a tool for understanding the canonical text but not as a religious expression of its own right that was composed centuries after the canon itself. In addition to that, several other ways of emulating the Buddhist tradition are observable. Luis Gomez examines similarities in the philological and the scholastic approaches, in the doctrinal commitment, and in the notion of history (decay or culmination). Luis Gomez, "Unspoken Paradigms: Meandering through the Metaphors of a Field," JIABS 18 (1995), pp. 183-230. For the dialectics of orientalism, occidentalism, 'auto-oc.cidentalism,' and 'auto-orientalism' in (the study of) Asian religions cf. also the recent volume, Religion im Spiegelkabinett: Asiatische Religionsgeschichte im Spannungsfeld zwischen Orientalismus und Okzidentalismus, ed. Peter Schalk, Max Deeg, Oliver Freiberger, Christoph Kleine, Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis: Historia Religionum 22 (Uppsala: University of Uppsala, 2003); for an outline of this volume see my note, "Religion in mirrors: Orientalism, Occidentalism, and Asian Religions," Journal of Global Buddhism 4 (2003), pp. 9-17 (online: http://www. globalbuddhism.org).

IO Hallisey, "Roads Taken ... ," pp. 50-53. I1 Hallisey, "Roads Taken ... ," p. 44.


The text selections in 'classical' anthologies of Buddhist Studies confinn Hallisey's impression. Concerning Theravada Buddhism, those compilations contain passages taken almost exclusively from the Pilii canon12.

Moreover, their editors seem to agree upon what the 'significant' topics were and, correspondingly, what text passages to select13• Roughly, the topics are: the early life of Siddhattha Gotama, his ascetic years, his awakening, and his death; the 'sermon of Benares', the Four Noble Truths and the Middle Way, the doctrines of dependent origination, anatta, the five khandhas, karma and rebirth, meditation and nibbiina, general ethical principles, and the basic rules of the sangha. These topics reflect the traditional classification of the 'three jewels' (buddha, dhamma, sangha); their selection is, certainly not by chance14, largely in accordance with the later commentarial tradition of the Theravada school. The text passages selected for anthologies correspond to these topics. Although being not entirely identical, the compilations constitute a largely intersecting set of texts. The process of selecting topics and texts can be viewed as a form of canonization.

Taking the anthologies as a means (or an expression) of teaching Buddhism, we may state that the discipline of Buddhist Studies has created its own teaching canon - a secondary canon, as it were, extracted from the primary one. This secondary canon possesses the general features: it is authoritative, and it is, to a certain extent, fixed; the fact that the anthologies contain very similar text collections indicates that the academic community has 'observed and protected' the selection15.

12 To a much lesser extent, they also contain sections from quasi-canonical works such as the Milindapafiha or the Visuddhimagga.

13 Examples are: Buddhism in Translations: Passages Selectedfrom the Budhist Sacred Books and Translated from the Original Pali into English, by Henry Clarke Warren (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1915); The Living Thoughts ofGotama the Buddha, presented by Ananda K. Coomaraswamy and LB. Horner (LondonlEdinburgh: Morrison and Gibb, 1948); Buddhism: A Religion of Infinite Compassion - Selections from Buddhist Literature, ed. Clarence H. Hamilton (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1952); The Teachings of the Compassionate Buddha, ed. E.A. Burtt (New York: Mentor, 1955); Buddhist Texts through the Ages, ed. Edward Conze et aI. (Oxford: Cassirer, 1954); The Wisdom of Buddhism, ed. Christmas Humphreys (New York: Random House, 1961).

14 Cf. above, note 9. 15 Below, I point to canonical texts that were omitted in this canonization process.

While my example concerns the image of the Buddhist laity, another example would be

THE BUDDHIST CANON AND THE CANON OF BUDDHIST STUDIES 267

In recent times, the textual focus in teaching has shifted. One example of a new type of anthology is the voluminous collection Buddhism in Practice, edited by Donald Lopez, published in 199516• All but one of the Theravada texts in this volume are non-canonical, some even written by contemporary Buddhists17• Corresponding to the book's title, all texts concern in one way or the other Buddhist practice; they deal, for example, with the consecration ritual of Buddha images, with meditation, or donation. As an example of anthologies used in teaching, this compilation shows that the criterion for selecting texts is not their canonical status anymore but their significance for Buddhist practice.

A recent collection of essays on "Teaching Buddhism in the West" places strong emphasis on practice, as welll8 • In its first chapter, Frank Reynolds criticizes the usual 'Introduction to Buddhism' course. He describes it as "the kind of survey course that begins with ( ... ) the historicallife and teachings of Gautama Buddha, ( ... ) moves through a rapid-fire treatment of some 2500 years of Buddhist intellectual and social history ( ... ), and finally concludes with an equally rapid-fire survey of contemporary Buddhism in various countries around the world. "19

As examples of an "alternative approach that will be appropriate and effective within a postmodem liberal arts curriculum," he suggests three types of courses on Buddhism, two of which are significant for our

the Vinaya passages that I.B. Homer refused to translate in her translation of the Vinayapi{aka. These passages, which deal with sexual issues, appear, in her words, "unsuitable for incorporation in a translation designed principally for Western readers," because of "the outspokenness and crudeness" they contain. The Book of the Discipline (Vinaya-Pi{aka), trans!. LB. Homer, vo!' 1 (Oxford: Pali Text Society, 1992 [1938]), p. 197. Those passages have been translated recently; see Petra Kieffer-Piilz, "Parajika 1 and Sanghiidisesa 1: Hitherto Untranslated Passages from the Vinayapi{aka of the Theravadins," Traditional South Asian Medicine 6 (2001), pp. 62-84.

16 Buddhism in Practice, ed. Donald S. Lopez, Jr. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995). Cf. also John S. Strong, The Experience of Buddhism: Sources and Interpretations, 2nd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2002).

17 The only canonical text in the book, the Gotamf-apadana, is little known and has been translated into a Western language here for the first time. Buddhism in Practice ... , pp. 113-138.

18 Teaching Buddhism in the West: From the Wheel to the Web, ed. Victor Sagen Hori, Richard P. Hayes, James Mark Shields (London/New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002).

19 Frank E. Reynolds, "Teaching Buddhism in the Postrnodern University: Understanding, Critique, Evaluation," Teaching Buddhism in the West ... , pp. 3-16, here: p. 8.

268 OUYER FREIBERGER

considerations2o• First, he proposes a concept for an introductory undergraduate course that deals not with the foundations of Buddhism and its historical development but with practices of contemporary Buddhists in Asia and North America. The goal of such a course is "to' introduce students to a broadly representative variety of the real worlds of real Buddhists who are involved in real Buddhist practices that generate real Buddhist experiences. "21 Reynolds' second concept of an advanced course comprises a canonical text, but focuses on the "ways in which the text has been received and put to use in the tradition. "22 It is obvious that in this article, Reynolds does not attach great importance to the Pili canon for teaching purposes. His introductory course contains no canonical text whatsoever, and his advanced course focuses not on the content of the selected canonical text, but on its role in practice.

The approach underlying Reynolds' concepts seems to represent a general trend. In the volume on Teaching Buddhism in the West, the authors suggest a number of teaching methods, all of which focus not on canonical texts but on other religious expressions, particularly on religious practice. For their class readings, they select either Buddhist texts that deal with - or are used in - practice, or scholarly articles describing contemporary forms of it23• Canonical texts are of interest only as far as they have a role in practice.

20 The third course deals with the establishment and development of Buddhism in the West and the development of.Buddbist Studies. Reynolds, "Teaching Buddbism ... ," pp. 9-1l. Reynolds describes his vision of postmodem liberal education in detail in his article "Recon

;structing Liberal Education: A Religious Studies Perspective." Beyond the Classics? Essays in Religious Studies and Liberal Education. ed. Frank E. Reynolds. Sheryl L. Burkhalter (Atlanta: Scholars Press. 1990). pp. 3-18.

21 Reynolds. "Teaching Buddhism ...• " pp. 7-9. here: p. 9. One decade ago. Reynolds' brief description of an introductory course had included contemporary practice as merely one among several elements. See his chapter on "Introducing Buddhism" in Teaching the Introductory Course in Religious Studies: A Sourcebook, ed. Mark Juergensmeyer (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1991). pp. 71-77.

22 The introduction of this course includes a "concise consideration of sub-topics" (!) such as textual criticism. the composition and compilation of the text. its canonical status. and its form and content. Reynolds. "Teaching Buddhism .... " p. 10 ..

23 See particularly Todd T. Lewis' article. "Representations of Buddhism in Undergraduate Teaching: The Centrality of Ritual and Story Narratives." Teaching Buddhism in the West .... pp. 39-56.


This current trend covers up for another approach, the integration of practice into teaching. The volume Teaching Buddhism in the West also contains the article "Moving Beyond the 'ism': A Critique of the Objective Approach to Teaching Buddhism" by O'Hyun Park, Professor of Religion at Appalachian State University24. Park criticizes what he calls objective studies of Buddhism, which "are conditioned by occidental or provincial patterns of thought and arbitrarily limited methodologies. It is typical of occidentals as well as of many contemporary Buddhists to wish to teach Buddhism by means of scientific understandings of Buddhist ideas. These objective studies of Buddhism fail to transmit the living essence of Buddhism, and in consequence, those whose approach is purely of this sort may conclude that Buddhism at its best is merely a form of psychology and has little to do with religious life. "25 Park suggests a different method of teaching Buddhism. The teacher, to begin with, must be a seeker him- or herself, and the student must be willing to find a spiritual companion. Then meditation must be included in teaching. Park states: "One must first be still in order to teach and learn Buddhism. In no other way can its essence truly be known or shown. Seen from this point of view, teaching and learning Buddhism, if it is not filtered by meditation, is not worthy of attention. "26 The goal of his method is "to introduce students to the Buddha's world and to help them be engaged in the process of moving in that direction themselves. In the process, the spirit of Buddhism may rub off on them. I personally do not know what in the process of teaching Buddhism has rubbed off on me, but I can only hope that whatever it is can be passed on to my students. "27

When using this way of teaching, Park gets rrrixed responses. He admits: "At times I am informed that my lectures suggest a dogmatic affIrmation." His reaction to this critique reads: "This is only because I have temporarily been carried away by my deeper bias in the area. However, that this discussion of non-duality may lead students to re-examine their own

24 O'Hyun Park, "Moving Beyond the 'ism': A Critique of the Objective Approach to Teaching Buddhism," Teaching Buddhism in the West ... , pp. 57-68.

25 Park, "Moving Beyond the 'ism' ... ," p. 67. 26 Park, "Moving Beyond the 'ism' ... ," p. 59 (italics in the original). 27 Park, "Moving Beyond the 'ism' ... ," p. 68.


approach to their lives and to enlarge their world is for me a sufficient justification for teaching it. A fair number of students have been very appreciative. "28 .

Given this attitude, it is particularly interesting to learn about the texts Park uses for teaching. He writes: "For a text as a proverbial fmger pointing to the moon, I have chosen myown translation of a sixteenth-century Buddhist text written by Xishan, a Korean Zen master. ( ... ) Xishan made a substantial effort not only to grasp the essence of Buddhism, but also in most cases to make it relevant to the breadth of human existential awareness. In my judgement, this text warrants use as an alternative to most current texts that are based upon a widespread unawareness of the central thrust of Buddhist religiosity, a deficiency which may be related to long engrained patterns of dualistic thought. "29 Park selects this text because in his view, it is suitable for grasping "the essence" of Buddhism. He rejects the canonical texts not because of their normativity and their distance from current Buddhist practice, nor because they fail to represent religious diversity, but because for him, they are less suitable for revealing Buddhism's "central thrust."

It is obvious that this is not an academic or historical, but a religious criterion. Park's teaching method is thus a form not of academic education but of religious instruction. This example points to the important fact that many Western scholars of Buddhism are committed Buddhists themselves, so-called 'scholar-practitioners.'3o Although this is a well-known fact, there is still too little reflection about its implications for research and for teaching. In recent years, some scholars came up with ideas for a new sub-discipline of Buddhist Studies, called "Buddhist Theology." This discipline, modeled after modem academic Christian Theology, would be a home for Buddhist scholars who stand normatively in their tradition and who, by using Western scholarly methods, critically reflect upon this

28 Park, "Moving Beyond the 'ism' ... ," p. 62. 29 Park, "Moving Beyond the 'ism' ... ," p. 63. 30 Cf. Charles S. Prebish, "Buddhist Studies in the Academy: History and Analysis",

Teaching Buddhism in the West ... , pp. 17-36, here: pp. 21-27; Cabezon, "Buddhist Studies as a Discipline ... ;" Gomez, "Unspoken Paradigms ... ;" Malcolm David Eckel, "The Ghost at the Table: On the Study of Buddhism and the Study of Religion," JAAR 62 (1994), pp.1085-1110.


tradition31• This interesting development can be a topic for research in itself, including the question whether it will be possible to retain the distinction between the "theological" reflections of this new discipline and the. empirical approach of Buddhist Studies as part of the academic study of religion. Victor Hori supposes that we may encounter a separation into two disciplines, the "theological" and the academic study of Buddhism32• This would equal the separation of Christian theology and the academic study of religion (Religionswissenschaft). As the discussions are structurally similar (including well-known arguments, for example against alleged neutral scholarship), this new development may benefit from the long-lasting and ongoing debate between Christian theology and the study of religion33•

O'Hyun Park's approach, however, can hardly be considered an example of Buddhist Theology in the sense of critical, academic reflection. He uses postmodem and postorientalist arguments as a justification for propagating what he considers the "essence" of Buddhism, which is based upon his own translation of a sixteenth-century Zen text from Korea.

2. Reconsidering the Value of Canonical Texts

Given this trend of dissociating from the idea of a canon, what is the future perspective of Buddhist Studies? Should researchers abandon the

31 Cf. the essays in Buddhist Theology: Critical Reflections by Contemporary Buddhist Scholars, ed. Roger R. Jackson, John J. Malcransky (Richmond: Curzon, 2000), particularly the contributions by John Malcransky, "Contemporary Academic Buddhist Theology: Its Emergence and Rationale," pp. 14-21, and Jose Ignacio Cabezon, "Buddhist Theology in the Academy," pp, 25-52.

32 Victor Sogen Hori, "Introduction," Teaching Buddhism in the West ... , pp. ix-xxv. Malcolm David Eckel views such a distinction critically; cf. his "The Ghost at the Table ... "

33 I am aware of the fact that differences between academic disciplines are discemable in normative and programmatic concepts rather than in actual practice. While the individual scholar could have more in common with one from another 'discipline' than with many of her or his own profession, it is programmatic concepts prescribing how scholars of a discipline should work that construct this discipline. Such concepts describe the boundaries of the subject matter, the theory, and the methods; within one discipline, they tend to be controversial and to compete with other concepts. Nevertheless, the continuous debate on a discipline's identity is necessary for self-reflection; inter-, cross-, or transdisciplinarity is possible only if there are boundaries one can cross. Cf. my "1st Wertung Theologie? Beobachtungen zur Unterscheidung von Religionswissenschaft und Theologie," Die Identitiit der Religionswissenschaft: Beitrage zum Verstandnis einer unbekannten Disziplin, ed. Gebhard Lobi' (Frankfurt/M. et al.: Peter Lang, 2000), pp. 97-121.


primary canon of ancient, normative, and standardized texts, and focus on the local/present productions .of meaning instead? Should instructors abandon the secondary canon, and focus on the contemporary practice or the 'central thrust' of Buddhism? Or is working with canonical texts and using a secondary canon for teaching still justifiable? I think it is. In the following sections of the paper, I intend to illustrate what I consider the significance of canonical texts for research and teaching. I start off by presenting one example: the image of the laity in early Buddhism.

According to the accounts given in 'classical' anthologies and in most textbooks, early Buddhist laymen and laywomen can be described as follows. Together with Buddhist monks and nuns (bhikkhus and bhikkhunfs), male and female laypeople (upiisakas and upiisikiis) form the fourfold Buddhist community. They provide the former with clothes, food, lodging, and medicine, and they lead a moral life according to the paficasflii, that is, they refrain from harming living creatures, from stealing, from sexual misconduct, from false speech, and from consuming intoxicants. Unlike members of the sangha, lay people are per se incapable of higher spiritual accomplishment. Therefore, they do not strive for liberation from the cycle of rebirth and will not attain this state. Their (inferior) goal is rebirth in a heavenly world, and thus they do not engage in meditative practices but focus on morality and generosity. Particularly by donating gifts to the "unsurpassable field of merit," that is the Buddhist sangha, they can accumulate merit that will cause a better rebirth.

As mentioned before, this roughly sketched image of the laity is prevalent in 'classical' textbooks and anthologies. Denying the fact that this image is common also in many sections of the Pali canon would be absurd. But claiming that it is the only view traceabl~ in the texts would be equally incorrect. When examining not only the 'secondary canon' preserved in modem anthologies but the entire doctrinal section of the Pali canon, the Suttapitaka, one discovers a number of passages in which the authors create an image of laypeople that differs immensely from the one sketched above.34 Here, the laity appears as a group not only serving the sangha

34 For the following, see my Der Orden in der Lehre: Zur religiOsen Deutung des SaJigha imfriihen Buddhismus (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2000), pp. 140-212; an English


but also observiil~ and controlling the behavior of monks and nuns. Those accounts portray laypeople as self-confident persons who have the ability to assess the ethical and 'spiritual' status of the recipient of thei,r gifts. They do not trust the promise that the best recipient is, by way of ordination, the Buddhist monk or nun; they reject the concept of the sangha as a field of merit that is, by definition, unsurpassable. Instead they individually select worthy recipients who lead a moral life and who are 'spiritually' advanced, because they believe that for gaining religious merit, the individual 'spiritual' status of the recipient weighs more than the person's status of being an ordained member of the sangha. How to accumulate merit is a serious issue for them, because it may cause rebirth in a heavenly world. In fact, a close look reveals that in the canonical texts, rebirth in heaven appears as a Buddhist soteriological goal independent from nibbiina (Skt. nirviilJa). The two goals rarely appear in the same context; only a few theological passages link them and declare nibbiina the superior one. Reportedly, members of the sangha strive for rebirth in heaven, to035• On the other hand, there are many accounts of laypersons receiving instructions into the most complex issues of Buddhist doctrine and attaining certain trance states. Some laypersons, the texts state, have even gained liberating insight and nibbiina.

Considering these accounts, we must put the clear division between members of the sangha and laypeople into perspective; members of both groups strive for - and attain - both goals, rebirth in heaven and nibbiina. The clear division of the groups appears as an idea belonging to an institutionalistic concept of the Buddhist sangha. A close view demonstrates that a different, rather individualistic, concept is just as common in the canonical texts. Due to the specific scope of earlier generations of

summary of major arguments in Oliver Freiberger, "Profiling tbe Sangha: Institutional and Non-Institutional Tendencies in Early Buddhist Teachings," Marburg Journal of Religion 5 (2000) (online: http://www.uni-marburg.de/religionswissenschaft/journallmjr/ freiberger.html). Cf. also Jeffrey Samuels, "Views of Householders and Lay Disciples in the Sutta Pitaka: A Reconsideration of tbe Lay/Monastic Opposition," Religion 29 (1999), pp.231-24l.

35 Cf. for this issue Oliver Freiberger, "Salvation fortbe Laity? Soteriological Concepts in Early and Modern Theravada Buddhism", Stvdia Asiatica 2 (2001), pp. 29-38; id., "'Ein Vinaya fur Hausbewohner'? Norm und Praxis der Laienanhanger im friihen Buddhismus," forthcoming.


scholars, Buddhist textbooks - and scholarship at large - rarely take notice of this latter concept with regard to the laity.

For the considerations about the canon in Buddhist Studie~, we can draw three major conclusions from this example. The first is that the Pali canon is not homogeneous. A canon's general feature of being authoritative and normative does not presuppose homogeneity of its contents. On the contrary, it seems that oftentimes, heterogeneity of the canon contributes much to the success of a religion; the more views and practices can be legitimized by passages from the canon, the more worldviews are represented, and the more people can feel at home in that religious tradition. It becomes apparent that the secondary canon Buddhist scholars have created is not representative. Already in the early canonical Pali texts, we discover a broad spectrum of attitudes, beliefs, and practices. Thus the reference to diversity in Buddhism, a point Frank Reynolds emphasizes when focusing on contemporary Buddhist contexts, can hardly be an argument for dismissing the canonical texts.

The second conclusion we can draw is that although canonical texts are generally normative, they do not only contain theoretical reflections of elite, ivory-tower theologians but also religious practice. Certainly, trying to entirely reconstruct social reality in Ancient India would be hopeless, but to a certain extent, detecting religious practices in normative texts is possible36• Although far from what ethnographic fieldwork could achieve, such fmdings show that 'practice' appears frequently in the canonical texts. Therefore, the distinction between norm and practice does not necessarily correspond to the distinction between historicalphilological method and socio-ethnographic method, let alone to the distinction between past and present. Actually, the often-felt rift between

36 One issue of our example was the question whether the laypeople trust in the meritpromising institution of the sangha and thus act accordingly, or whether they select 'worthy' recipients and, furthermore, strive for their personal spiritual development and liberation. Examining the respective passages more closely, we could detect a number of concrete practices of Buddhist laypeople. For this issue, cf. Oliver Freiberger, "'Ein Vinaya fiir Hausbewohner'? .. " Jan Nattier develops methods for extracting historical data from a normative Buddhist source in her recent book, A Few Good Men: The Bodhisattva Path according to The Inquiry of Ugra (Ugraparipfcchii) (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003), pp. 63-69; see also Christoph Kleine, "Der Kampf der Normen und die Suche nach dem Referenten," forthcoming.

THE BUDDHIST CANON AND THE CANON OF BUDDIDST STUDIES 275

the canon and practice seems to be due largely to our own one-dimensional construction of 'canonical Buddhism. '37 Thus, a focus on practice in Buddhist Studies need not lead to the abandonment of canonical texts.

A third conclusion we can draw from the example is that although Western scholars have been examining the canon for more than a century, there is still a lot to discover. We must not believe that the great scholars of our field have said everything there is to say about the Pili canon38• Rather, with their 'protestant' view on Buddhism, some played down the rather 'catholic' practice of accumulating merit39• Re-reading the same old texts can lead us to new and surprising insights, which broaden our horizons and, at the same time, highlight the specific scope of earlier generations of scholars40•

The example shows that canonical texts are heterogeneous and diverse, that they contain both norms and practices, and that re-reading them helps us understand our own inherited presuppositions. With this conclusion, I do not intend to revive the outdated view that the Pilli canon is a source sufficient for all interests and questions of modern Buddhist Studies. But it is apparent that there is more to gain from the canon than some Buddhist scholars, who focus on contemporary practice, might expect41.

37 Cf. Martin Southwold, Buddhism in Life: The Anthropological Study of Religion and the Sinhalese Practice of Buddhism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983), esp. pp. 202-212.

38 Certainly, this point, just as other arguments in the present paper, refers not only to canonical texts but to historical sources in general; a discussion of the general value of the historical approach, however, would go beyond the scope of a paper that focuses on the canon.

39 Cf. Gregory Schopen, "Archeology and Protestant Presuppositions in the Study of Indian Buddhism," History of Religions 31 (1991), pp. 1-23; see also Oliver Freiberger, "Werke, GuteI: Religionsgeschichtlich," Theologische Realenzyklopiidie, vol. 35 (Berlin/ New York: de Gruyter, 2003), pp. 623-625.

40 Gregory Schopen, who is otherwise well-known for challenging the traditional view of Buddhologists by referring to other sources, such as inscriptions and archaeological accounts, has also convincingly shown how we can come to new conclusions by reading the Pilii canonical texts with a fresh and critical question. Cf. Gregory Schopen, "Monks and the Relic Cult in the Mahiiparinibbiinasutta: An Old Misunderstanding in Regard to Monastic Buddhism", From Beijing to Benares: Essays on Buddhism and Chinese Religion in Honour of Prof Jan Yiin-Hua, ed. Koichi Shinohara and Gregory Schopen (Oakville: Mosaic Press, 1991), pp. 187-201.

41 Cf. also the considerations in Jonathan S. Walters, "Suttas as History: Four Approaches to the Sermon on the Noble Quest (Ariyapariyesanasutta)", History of Religions 38 (1998), pp. 247-284.


3. Implications for Research and Teaching

3.1. The Fundamental Equality of Sources for Research

The discussion about 'Orientalism' has helped Buddhist scholars develop a greater sensitivity of the fact that some ancestors in the field had certain presuppositions and motives that were determined by colonial interests, by the 'protestant' view on Buddhism, by their personal religious commitments and cultural biases, and so forth. Donald Lopez, Charles Hallisey, Luis Gomez, Gregory Schopen, Janice Leoshko, and others have provided substantial analyses of this issue42• Some scholars of earlier generations believed that the only appropriate way of examining Buddhism is to turn to its most ancient texts while neglecting later, alleged degenerate developments. Modern scholarship rightly opposes this implicit canonization. Presumably, most oftoday's scholars would agree that there should be no restriction whatsoever as to what texts or religious expressions to select for research - so long as one is able to explain why the respective source lies within the scope of Buddhist Studies. If we thus agree that as a matter of principle, all sources have, as religious expressions, the same value for research, then a fixed secondary canon must not exist. What follows is that a canonical text, as one particular type of religious expression, has - on principle - no lesser value for research than contemporary ritual practice has. As a modern ritual handbook in a local context has its particular significance and meaning within a religious tradition, ancient canonical texts have theirs, too.

In the "alternative historical paradigm" Charles Hallisey envisages, "Buddhist scholars are encouraged to "expect meaning to be produced in local circumstances rather than in the origins of the tradition" (myemphasis )43. In her response, Jan Nattier rightly remarks that "meaning is also

42 Cf., for example, the volume Curators of the Buddha: The Study of Buddhism under Colonialism, ed. Donald S. Lopez, Jf. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), which includes Hallisey's before-mentioned article, and the review essay by Jan Nattier, "Buddhist Studies in the Post-Colonial Age," JAAR 65 (1997), pp. 469-485; Schopen, "Archeology and Protestant Presuppositions ... ;" Gomez, "Unspoken Paradigms ... ;" Janice Leoshko, Sacred Traces: British Explorations of Buddhism in South Asia (Burlington: Ashgate, 2003); cf. also Eckel, "The Ghost at the Table ... "

43 Hallisey, "Roads Taken ... ," pp. 50-53.


pro'duced at the' ?rigins of the tradition (which, of course, had its own local circumstances), as well as at every other point along the historical continuum. '>44 Hallisey's "alternative paradigm" is not identical with but corresponds to an attitude fairly popular in current studies of culture: the view that local, vernacular, non-canonical, sub-altern, and/or contemporary religious expressions are, as topics of research, of somewhat higher value than canonical texts. It is beyond doubt that these issues had been neglected in the past, and that studying them thoroughly is imperative. But there is a risk of falling into another trap: assuming that now the single appropriate way of examining Buddhism is the analysis of contemporary practice in local contexts. It seems crucial not to create a hierarchy in values that entails an exclusion of canonical texts from research. An implicit canonization of that kind would resemble the way earlier generations excluded non-canonical religious expressions45•

Beside the fundamental insight that a scholarly canonization which excludes the Buddhist canon is methodologically unacceptable, it seems that the Buddhist canon remains, as I hope to have shown by the example of the early Buddhist laity, a rich source for the study of religion46• Today, Buddhist Studies has not only expanded its scope in terms of topics for research, it also approaches its sources (including canonical texts) with questions different from those of the past. Such questions, and nothing else, should determine the criteria for selecting appropriate sources and methods47•

3.2. The Significance of Canonization for Teaching Buddhism

Is this fundamental freedom to select sources equally applicable in the realm of teaching? To begin with, it seems helpful to view introductory

44 Nattier, "Buddhist Studies in the Post-Colonial Age," p, 472. 45 Interestingly, the reservations about scholarly canonization appear to be much less

pronounced when it comes to modem and contemporary texts. Cf. a recent collection of writings of modem Buddhists, the title and subtitle of which are telling: A Modem Buddhist Bible: Essential Readings from East and West, ed. Donald S. Lopez (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002). A "bible" is a canon par excellence, and preserving the "essence" is the most central objective of canonization.

46 Besides, canon and exegesis are interesting topics also for comparative analysis; cf. Smith, "Sacred Persistence ... "

47 Cf. Nattier, "Buddhist Studies in the Post-Colonial Age," pp. 483f.

278 OLIVER FREffiERGER

and advanced courses separately. J'he advanced course deals with specific texts and contexts the inst;ructor is familiar with; in these courses, students begin to specialize in certain areas of Buddhism. For the in4'oductory course, I will consider two concepts: the new one suggested by Frank Reynolds, which deals exclusively with contemporary practice in Asia and North America; and the conventional survey course with its outline of Buddhist history.

The strongest point of Reynolds' concept is its significance for liberal education: undergraduate students, especially those who take only one course in Buddhism, will get an impression of Buddhism as it is practiced in the world they live in. I agree that integrating contemporary practice in the syllabus is of utmost importance. But narrowing the course contents down to current religious practice does not seem to be useful. Luis Gomez has convincingly argued that in Western education, the focus on practice in Buddhism is not accompanied by a parallel focus on practice in Western culture48• He states that "an exaggerated inflation of the 'field' approach to Buddhism that excludes the textual tradition and the canons that guided that tradition may work in support of the exoticization of Buddhism, reinforce its alterity, and reinforce the perception among our students and the public at large that Buddhism is only a curiosjty, and certainly not comparable to the well ordered and well-demonstrated products of our own culture. "49 He continues by saying that "the 'methodological' exclusion of the textual tradition leads to ( ... ) the questionable assumption that textual traditions and textual elites are entities separate from the living traditions and the non-elite groups with which they obvi- . . ously interact. "50

Moreover, the spread of Reynolds' concept would affect the conformity and comparability of undergraduate education in Buddhism. The texts he selects for his introductory course deal with specific practices at certain

48 "The presentation of Buddhism in the classroom as something occurring only in a practice without canonical benchmarks may be more corrosive than one can perceive on first blush - after all, this degree of secularization and devaluation of the book is not accompanied by a parallel secularization and devaluation of the Great Books of our own culture." Gomez, "Unspoken Paradigms ... ," p. 205.

49 GOmez, "Unspoken Paradigms ... ," p. 205. so GOmez, "Unspoken Paradigms ... ," p. 206.


places; for example, image consecration and village rituals in Thailand, the ordination of novices in Korea, or healing rituals in Sri Lanka51 . Obviously, Reynolds does not intend to 'canonize' these specific contexts of practice. In consequence, every instructor of Buddhism will make his or her own selection of contemporary contexts for their classes. Students of different universities will gain close insights into those respective contexts but will lack a common, basic knowledge of Buddhism. Over time, basic agreements will begin to crumble - a process that reinforces fragmentation and an anything-goes attitude that makes it increasingly difficult to assess and judge each other's work.

One, already tangible, product of such an anything-goes attitude is O'Hyun Park's approach. Blaming Western "occidental" scholars for their "dualistic" view, he uses post-orientalist arguments to justify his teaching method and the selection of texts that allegedly reveal the 'essence' of Buddhism best. Defining the 'essence of Buddhism' is, however, a religious act; in Buddhist history, Buddhists have done it in manifold ways. Due to this historical perspective; academic scholarship cannot determine the 'essence' of a religion. Thus, undisturbed by the academic community, Park gives religious instruction in the cloak of academic teaching, and his students may get the impression that Xishan's sixteenth century Zen interpretation is all they should know about Buddhism. The fact that the editors accepted Park's paper for a volume on Teaching Buddhism in the West shows that his approach is considered by some a legitimate option for teaching. Ironically, the current trend of abandoning the idea of a canon, of emphasizing religious practice, and of stressing the "variety of the real worlds of real Buddhists" (Reynolds), gives free rein to approaches that, for their part, reject diversity and reinforce particularism.

Therefore, using a secondary canon in teaching still makes sense. As it is unlikely that we might agree upon a binding selection of contemporary contexts, and considering the objections raised above, we may be inclined to return to our conventional, historical survey course52• It has

51 Reynolds refers to the (very useful) text collection The Life of Buddhism, ed. Frank E. Reynolds, Jason A. Carbine (Berkeley et al.: University of California Press, 2000).

52 It is reasonable to follow the historical developments in their proper historical course, but with caution. G6mez remarks correctly: "The challenge of the future, however, will be to find a way to retain the obvious pedagogical advantages of a chronological matrix

280 OLIVER FREmERGER

the advantage of providing students with a common basic knowledge of the beginnings and the historical development of Buddhism, and it also serves as a basis for further stUdies. This general survey seems to be crucial for liberal education, for otherwise students would face the complexity of Buddhism without any point of reference. But as Reynolds rightly complains, the conventional survey course too has serious weaknesses. With such a course, one could be tempted to neglect contemporary practice, to perpetuate a 19th century scholarly framework, and to cement a secondary canon of texts that has proved to be partial and biased. If we intend to maintain the general concept of the historical survey course, it needs to be modified. '

Modifications should address what I call the horizontal and the vertical complexities of Buddhism. Making students aware of the horizontal complexity means to demonstrate, by way of example, that at every point in history, 'Buddhism' is a complex phenomenon. For instance, to illustrate the complexity of practices and beliefs of early Buddhist laypeople, an instructor could confront the 'classical' readings with other passages from the PaIi canon that undermine the alleged consistent image of the laity. Similarly, in other areas the secondary canon can be confronted with equally undermining data: with passages from non-canonical texts, with inscriptional records, with artistic accounts, and the like.

Demonstrating the vertical complexity means to make students aware of the complex nature of historical developments. To begin with, they must realize that the many forms of contemporary Buddhist practice represent merely a small portion of the multifarious ways in which Budd1psm has taken shape throughout its history. Since the majority of those religious expressions is accessible through textual sources53, discussing

while we replace the implicit universal linear narrative with a narrative that is neither culminationistic nor atomistic." G6mez, "Unspoken Paradigms ... ," p, 203.

53 In Jan Nattier's words: "The intense and ongoing use of written sources thus will always be a central part of Buddhist Studies, stemming from the simple fact that most of the Buddhists who have ever lived are no longer with us today, If we wish to hear their voices, we must do so through the surviving texts - including, as Gregory Schopen has so eloquently argued, not just scriptural texts but also inscriptions, archaeological remains, and artistic data." Nattier, "Buddhist Studies in the Post-Colonial Age," p. 483. For a defense of the historical-philological method in Buddhist Studies, cf. also Tom J.F. Tillemans, "Remarks on Philology," JIABS 18 (1995), pp. 269-277.


the 'conditional nature of texts is crucial. Students must understand that canonical texts, fbr example, are not a given divine manifestation but a product of complex historical controversies, which also include power relations54. .

For demonstrating vertical complexity, it is also important to examine 110W history has shaped the present. By way of example, I again draw on the Buddhist laity. Modem Western Buddhism is largely a lay movement, but Western converts are not very interested in accumulating merit and rebirth in heaven; they prefer meditation and insight55• This preference is determined by, among other factors, the scope of earlier generations of scholars and their particular way of presenting Buddhism to Western readers; had they focused on rebirth in heaven, or had they merely presented the two goals side by side, Buddhism would probably have gained less attention among seekers in the Wesp6. The observation that the canonical texts contain various soteriological goals thus reveals the biased perspective of our scholarly ancestors; and at the same time, it helps us understand how that biased perspective has again shaped contemporary Western Buddhism. On the other hand, realizing that even the ancient texts advocate the goal of rebirth in heaven may prevent students from subscribing to the arrogant view that the accumulation of merit, manifested in daily practices among contemporary Buddhists in Asia and among immigrant groups in the West, represented a degenerate and diluted version of Buddhism57• If we integrate, which we should, a glance at contemporary practice in our modified survey course, being aware of the

54 For this, general reflections upon the term 'canon' and comparisons with processes of canonization in other religions can be useful; cf. Smith, "Sacred Persistence ... " Another aspect worth mentioning are the circumstances under which canonical texts have first been made accessible to the Western world and the ways early scholars dealt with them.

55 Cf., for example, the interview with Jack Kornfield, a well-known American teacher of Theraviida meditation, in: Jack Kornfield, Living Dharma: Teachings of Twelve Buddhist Masters (Boston/London: Shambala, 1996), pp. 287-301. For other references, see my "The Meeting of Traditions: Inter-Buddhist and Inter-Religious Relations in the West," Journal of Global Buddhism 2 (2001), pp. 59-71 (online: http://www.globalbuddhism.org).

56 This Western interest in Buddhism has, of course, its own historical background, namely a critical stance towards the Christian churches and their alleged authoritarian and dogmatic claims, and the longing for a rational and individualistic religion that does not require blind faith, an attitude connected with both Romanticism and Enlightenment.

57 Cf. Southwold, Buddhism in Life ... , pp. 202-212.


vertical complexity, of the complex historical circIffitstances that have shaped today's Buddhism, is imperative.

Conclusion

This paper has addressed four issues: the role of the Buddhist canon and the canonization taking place within Buddhist Studies, both for research and in teaching. Some scholars tend to discourage from studying the Buddhist canon and aim at eliminating its role in teaching. I hope to have shown that studying the Buddhist canon remains worthwhile in itself and even more, helps understand better our own presuppositions in the field. In addition, I have argued that although integrating contemporary practice in the introductory course is necessary, the historical survey course, which includes readings from the canonical texts, remains the best option for providing a basis for further studies as well as for liberal education in general.

Earlier generations of scholars were interested in the origins of Buddhism and thus focused on the earliest, that is the canonical, texts. Moreover, in textbooks and anthologies they presented only a certain selection of text passages and religious concepts, while excluding others. They selected texts according to their interests which were determined by their own culturally and personally, often 'protestant' backgrounds. In such a way, they again 'canmiized' the sources which for them represented original or authentic Buddhism. For overcoming this - still influential....,... canonization, Buddhist scholars have turned to other expressions of Budghist religiosity, particularly to contemporary religious practice. I have argued that following this trend, Buddhist Studies runs the risk to further a new process of canonization which now excludes the Buddhist canon. The fact that the issues argued for (diversity and practice) are present in canonical texts too, is largely ignored, in part due to the inherited ('canonized') image of the canon.

The exclusion of the Buddhist canon is notably conspicuous in recent discussions about teaching. The old, canonized sources for teaching (anthologies and textbooks) that comprise Buddhist Studies' secondary canon are abandoned, in favor of accounts of contemporary religious practice. This trend of rejecting canonization for teaching entails an


anything-goes attitude which encourages the abandonment of common standards and allows particularistic religious instruction into the classroom. I have argued that in contrast to research, undergraduate education, particularly on the introductory level, needs a secondary canon. A common basis of knowledge gives students some certainty in orientation, a first frame of reference (which they may criticize and deconstruct at a later point), and the capability of communicating with, and assessing the work of other students and scholars in Buddhist Studies. But in addition to that, I suggest that during the course, every now and then the 'classical' readings should be supplemented and confronted with other, undermining data. Thereby demonstrating the diversity and the historically conditioned nature of the sources, an introductory course can make students aware of the horizontal and the vertical complexity of Buddhism without withholding from them a common basis of knowledge.

TARANATHA'S "TWENTY-ONE DIFFERENCES WITH REGARD TO THE PROFOUND MEANING" -

COMPARING THE VIEWS OF THE TWO aZAN STaN MASTERS DOL PO PA AND SA.K.YA MCHOG LDANl

KLAUS-DIETER MATHES (UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG)

1. IDstorical Background

. The distinguishing feature of gzan stan Madhyamaka in the Jonangpa , school, to which Taraniitha (1575-1634) belongs, is the fact that itnorrnally

restricts the validity of the common Madhyamaka assertion "all phenomena are empty of an own-being" to phenomena on the level of apparent truth. The ultimate, which is inseparably endowed with innumerable Buddha-qualities, is considered to be not "empty of an own-being" (ran itan) but "empty of other" (gzan stan), namely accidental stains and so forth2• it was the famous Jonangpa Dol po pa Ses rabrgyal mtshan (1292-1361) who is said to have gained such an insight during a Kiilacakra retreat3• From the Ri chas nes dan rgya mtsha, which is one of the first works in which Dol po· pa expressed his new gzan stan understanding, it becomes clear that the latter's full-fledged gzan stan theory requires including even an ultimate sambhagakiiya and nirmii1}£lkiiya within an ultimate realm of truth, which is equated with dharmatii, or the unchangeable perfect nature. This, we are told, is in line with extraordinary Mantrayana4•

1 The present article is an enlarged version of a paper read at the Eighth Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies in Bloomington (USA) in July 1998. Thanks to a scholarship from the Gennan Research Council (DFG) I have been able to continue my research on tathtigatagarbha during the last three years and can now rest my original study of Tliranatha's comparison on a much broader basis. Improvements to my English by Philip H. Pierce (Nepal Research Centre, Kathmandu) are gratefully acknowledged.

2 Mathes 2000: 195-6. 3 Dol po pa's disciple Lha'i rgyal mtshan (1319-1401) infonns us that his master's real

ization was counected with the Ktilacakratantra (see Stearns 1995: 829-31). 4 Dol po pa: Ri chos iles don rgya mtsho, 343, 11. 19-21 & 344, 11. 8-9: "As to the

two aspects of the fonn-ktiyas, they are here the commonly known sambhogaka)ia and nirmtilJaktiya of the apparent [truth]. As to the ultimate sambhogakiiya and nirmtilJaka)ia,


286 KLAUS-DIETER MATHES

But as a commentator of non-Tantric texts, such as the Ratnagotravibhaga, Dol po pa explains that the sambhogakaya and nirmalJakaya are brought forth by a fortified potential which arises from virtuous deeds being newly adopted with effort5, and it is only in texts such as the Ri ch;s nes don rgya mtsho that we are informed that the created kayas are merely the ones pertaining to apparent truth. In view of this hermeneutic strategy6, the differences between the Ri chos nes don rgya mtsho and the Ratnagotravibhaga commentary appear to be so fundamental that Rookham wonders if the latter is by Dol po pa at all and not rather by the Third Karmapa Rail byuil rdo rje (1284-1339)1.

Still, Dol po pa to some extent reads his originally KaJacakrabased gzan ston into the Siltras and such non-Tantric treatises as the

they are completely [contained] in the dharmatii, perfect [nature] and suchness. [.0.] Therefore the ultimate sambhogakitya and nirmiiIJakiiya are known by way of the extraordinary Mantra[yana]." (de la gzugs sku rnam pa gfiis ni kun rdzob kyi Ions spyod rdzogs pa dan sprul pa'i sku ste thun man du rab tu grags pa'o / / don dam pa'i Ions spyod rdzogs pa dan sprul pa'i sku ni chos fiid yons grub de bZin fiid la tshan ste / [ ... J des na don dam gyi Ions spyod rdzogs pa dan sprul pa'i sku ni thun man ma yin pa snags kyi tshulla grags pa'o I).

5 Dol po pa: "Ni ma'i 'od zer", 986, 1. 6-987,1. 3: "For example, in the same way as the inexhaustible treasure underground is naturally present, not newly brought about by effort, while the tree with its fruits gradually grows in a garden by bringing about [the necessary conditions] with effort, the Buddha-potential, which has the ability to bring forth the three kiiyas, should be known to be twofold as well. It is both the natural potential, [namely] the pure dharmadhiitu (which latter is intimately present as the nature of [one's] mind throughout beginningless time), and the fortified potential [which is] supreme in terms of virtues (which are conducive to liberation). [The latter potential] arises from [virtuous deeds] being newly adopted with effort, [namely by] something being done, such as focusing on [the naturally present potential] and studying." (dper na 'bad rtsol gyis gsar du ma bsgrubs sin Ions spyod zad mi ses pa dan ldan pa'i gter chen sa'i 'og na ran Min gyis gnas pa dan 'bad rtsol gyis bsgrubs pas 'bras bu dan bcas pa'i sin ljon sa skyed mos tshal du rim gyis skye baji Ita ba biin du sku gsum 'byun du run ba'i sans rgyas kyi rigs de yan rnam pa gfiis su ses par bya ste / thog ma med pa 'i dus nas sems kyi ran biin du fie bar gnas pa'i chos kyi dbyins mam par dag pa ran biin gyi rigs dan / de la dmigs te thos pa la sogs pa byas pas 'bad rtsol gyis gsar du yag dag par blans pa las byun ba'i dge ba thar pa'i cha dan mthun pas mchog tu gyur pa rgyas 'gyur gyi rigs fiid do).

6 The possibility that Dol po pa wrote his Ratnagotravibhiiga commentary before achieving his insight into gian stan can be ruled out, for he also refers to ultimate qualities in his "Ni ma'i 'od zer" (911, 11. 3-4).

7 She reinforces her view with the assertion that the text was copied by KOIi sprul BIo gros mtha' yas nearly verbatim (Hookham 1991: 173-4). But such an assumption is unlikely, since the text is signed by "One Endowed with the Four Reliances" (rton pa bii ldan), which was the most common pseudonym used by Dol po pa in his works (Steams 1999:201).

TARANATHA'S "TWENTY-ONE DIFFERENCES" 287

Tathagatagarbhasiltras and the Maitreya works. The hermeneutic principIes according to which he interprets the Buddhist teachings are laid out in his "bKa' bsdu bii pa" (i.e., his own "fourth council"S), in which the whole of Buddhist doctrine is "reckoned" by dividing the teaching into four epochs. Alongside the four epochs of varying quality which make up a cosmic age, Dol po pa uses a lesser set of four epochs to refer to the qualitatively different periods of the teaching. He thus allocates philosophical doctrines to epochs (yuga) according to purely dogmatic criteria9•

The teachings transmitted by Siikyamuni and also the Maitreya works, for example, belong to the Krtayuga of doctrine, while other works, such as the ones by Arya Vimuktisena and Haribhadra, represent the teachings of the inferior Tretayuga. The common interpretation of the Y ogacara works of Maitreya, Asailga and Vasubandhu as mere cittamatra itself reflects for Dol po pa the historical degeneration of the Dharma. The Maitreya works are only "Krtayuga" Dharma when they are explained as "Great Madhyamaka" (dbu ma chen pO)lO.

The theories of tathiigatagarbha ("Buddha-nature") and trisvabhiiva ("three natures", i.e., the imagined, dependent and perfect natures) in the Maitreya works offer good canonical support for a distinction between ran ston and gzan ston, and it is thus no surprise that an interpretation which supports such a distinction is a major concern for the Jonangpas. Dol po pa takes the ultimate to be absolutely unconditioned, and it is the Ratnagotravibhiiga among the Maitreya works which is adduced as the best support for this stance. Thus Dol po pa comments RGV I.5a in his Ri chos nes don rgya mtsho in the following way:

Even though [the verse RGV I.5a]: "[Buddhahood] is unconditioned and spontaneously present"l!, and other [passages] teach that the ultimate Buddha is not conditioned, the underlying intention is that he is [also] free from momentsl2.

8 Virtually the entire Buddhist tradition accepts only three great councils in India held for the purpose of consolidating the teaching after the Buddha's nirviiJ;za.

9 Kapstein 2000: 115-6. IO Kapstein 1992:24-5. 1J Cf. ROVV 7, 11. 14-5: asmhsk[tarn anabhogarn aparapratyayoditarn I buddhatvam

jiianakarUl:zyasaktyupetam dvayarthavat II. 11 Dol po pa: Ri chos nes don rgya rntsho, 97,11. 15-7: 'dus rna byas sin lhun gyis

grub Ices pa la sags pas rnthar thug gi sans rgyas 'dus rna byas su gsuns pa yan skad cig . dan bral ba la dgons pa yin no /.


For Dol po pa's disciple Sa bzail Mati PaI! chen (1294-1376) the ultimate or Buddhahood is thus permanent in the sense of being beyond the three times (i.e., past, present and future), as becomes clear in Mati PaI! chen's Ratnagotravibhaga commentary on RGV I.6cd:

Buddhahood is unconditioned, since in the beginning, middle and end it has the nature of being free from conditioned phenonema which arise, abide and pass out of existence, as has been said in the [MahiiparilnirviilJasutra: "A phenomenon that abides in permanence does not belong to the three times. Likewise, the Tathagata does not belong to the three times, and is therefore permanent. "13

It is obvious that in this case the perfect nature of the Y ogacar-a must be restricted, as Tar-anatha has done in his final summary of the trisvabhiiva theoryl4, to its unchangeable aspect (nirvikara), since in an absolutely permanent and atemporal Buddhahood or Buddha-nature (both are ontologically the same for the Jonangpas) there is no room for an unmistaken (aviparyiisa) wisdom cultivated on the path, namely -according to MA V III. I led - the perfect in terms of being unmistaken.

Already at the time of Dol po pa, the Third Karmapa Rail byun rdo rje (1284-1339) was propounding a different "gian ston position", or rather a position that was eventually called gian ston by a few later KagyupastS such as Karma Phrin las pa (1456-1539)16. Rail byun rdo rje bases his distinction between the true nature of mind or Buddha-nature and that from which it is free on Mahayanasamgraha 1.45-9, in which an impure aZayavijfiiina is strictly distinguished from a "transmudane rnind,,17. In this context Rail byun rdo rje stresses the need to distinguish

13 Sa bzail Mati pal,! chen: "Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos kyi mam par bsad pa iles don rab gsal snail ba", 55, 11. 2-3: sans rgyas fiid thog ma dan dbus dan mtha' mar 'dus byas kyi chos skye ba dan gnas pa dan 'jig pa rnams med pa'i ran Min can yin pa'i phyir 'dus rna byas pa ste I my a nan las 'das pa'i mdo las I rtag tu gnas pa'i chos ni dus gsum la (text: las) ma gtogs te I de biin gsegs pa yan de dan 'dra bar dus gsum la ma gtogs pa de bas na rtag pa' 0 ies gsuns pa Itar roo

14 See Mathes 2000:219-220. 15 It should be noted that the term gian ston is found nowhere in the works of Rail byuil

rdo rje. 16 Karma 'Phrin las pa: "Dris Ian yid kyi mun sel ies bya ba lcags mo'i dri Ian Mugs

so" 91,11. 1-4. 17 This is clear from Rail byuil fdo rje's autocommentary on the Zab mo nan gi don

(9b4-10bl) and commentary on the Dharmadhtitustotra (l2bl-13b6).


"ground-consciousness" (Skt. iilayavijfiiina, Tib. kun gii rnarn ses) from "ground" (kun gii) in terms of suchness18. Referring to this passage, Koit sprul Bla gras mtha' yas (1813-1899) proceeds in his commentary on the Zab rno nan gi don to use the gian ston term kun gii ye ses for the transmundane mind of the Mahiiyiinasamgraha19• Koit sprul' s use of the term kun gii ye ses 20 does not imply, though, that he took Rail byuit rdo rje's position to be the same as Dol po pa's. It rather suggests that Koit sprul himself maintains a gian ston whose "basis of emptiness" (ston gii) is defined in accordance with Rait byuit rdo rje's Zab don ran 'grel, which in this crucial point follows not the Ratnagotravibhiiga but the Mahiiyiinasamgraha. Rail byuit rdo rje is a gian ston pa for Koit sprul, but one who explains that which remains in emptiness in a way different from Dol po pa. And indeed, in the ninth chapter of his Zab rno nan gi don Rail byuit rda rje takes the stainless Buddha-nature (which is liberated from everything else (Tib. gian grol) - i.e., the basis of emptiness) as being endowed with the two truths21 . From the autocommentary it is clear, however, that it is not the normal apparent truth which is included in Buddha-nature here, but only a pure aspect of the latter, namely the "nonexistence of the stains [or] delusions in the eight consciousnesses"22.

18 Ran bymi. rdo rje: Zab mo nan gi don gsaZ bar byed pa'i 'gre! pa, fol. 8a6-7: "In this regard, if 'ground' (kun gii) is not mentioned [together with] the word 'consciousness', 'ground' may refer to suchness. Therefore, consciousness is mentioned [together with it]." Cdi la kun gii zes bya ba rnam par ses pa'i sgra ma smos na de Min fiid la yan kun gii brjod du run ba 'i phyir rnam par ses pa smos so !.)

19 Kmi sprul Blo gros mtha' yas: Zab mo nan gi don gyi 'greZ pa, 17b4-6. 20 A term thought to be newly coined by Dol po pa. 21 Ran bymi. rdo rje: Zab mo nan gi don, 22b6: "The [Buddha]-element in sentient

beings, the stainless Buddha-nature, is endowed with the two truths." (/ sems can khams ni sans rgyas kyi / / sfiin po dri med bden gfiis ldan I).

22 Rail bymi. rdo rje: Ran 'grel, 62a7-62b2: "What exists ultimately? It is the mind beyond every net of thought, the naturally pure element of sentient beings, [and] the Buddha-nature (sans rgyas kyi sfiin po). Because these two exist, they have been expressed by way of these [terms]. Therefore it is stated: "as for the element of sentient beings, the stainless Buddha-nature is endowed with the two truths." In this regard, the Buddha-nature is simply the non-existence of stains [or] delusion in the above-mentioned eight accumulations [of consciousness]." (don dam par gaJi zig yod na / rtog pa'i drva ba thams cad las 'das pa'i sems ran biin gyis dag pa'i sems can gyi khams sans rgyas kyi sfiin po dag ni yod pas de'i tshul brjod pas / sems can khams ni sans rgyas kyi / sfiin po dri med bden giiis ldan ies smos so / / de la sans rgyas kyi sfiin po ni snar smos pa'i tshogs brgyad kyi 'khrul pa dri ma med pa kho na yin mod kyi .. . ).


What this latter term exactly refers to is explained a little further down in the Zab don ran 'grel, where the use of the word "truth" in the term "apparent truth" is justified on the grounds that one cannot deny mere appearance as such, even though its interpretation as a perceived object and perceiving subject is not true:

What has been imagined as the duality of a perceived and a perceiver does not exist at all, given the pronouncement [in MA V I.3] by the Venerable Maitreya: "A consciousness arises which has the appearances of objects, sentient beings, a self and perceptions. It does not have a [corresponding outer] object, and since [such] an object does not exist, it (i.e., a perceiving subject) does not exist either. "23 Thus it has been said that no perceived [objects] or perceiving [subjects] of the imagined [nature] exist at all. Well then, how can it be presented as a truth? [The answer is:] Even though it does not exist, [something] appears. This is what is called apparent truth, for it has the nature (ran gi no bo Rid) of not being deceptive24•

In response to the objection that these mere appearances would then be the ultimate truth, since the latter is defined as not being deceptive in the treatises on logic, Rail byuil rdo rje further clarifies his understanding of the ultimate truth as follows:

These [mere appearances] are presented as the expressible ultimate (paryiiyaparamartha), while the ultimate truth [here] is that which25 is related to the reasoning of dharmata, [namely] the natural emptiness previously mentioned during the presentation of the eighteen [types of] great emptiness26.

In other words, the Buddha-nature or the pure mind includes "mere appearances" in the form of the expressible ultimate truth, and it is only

23 MA VBh, 18,11.21-2: arthasattvatmavijfiaptipratibhiisam prajayate Ivijfianam nasti casyarthas tadabhiivat tad apy asat. My additions in brackets are accordings to Vasubandhu's bhii0'a.

24 Rail bymi. rdo rje: Ran 'grel, 63a3-5: I gzun ba dan 'dzin pa gfiis su kun btags (text: brtags) pa ni mampa thams cad du med pa dag yin te I 'phags pa byams pa'i tal sna nas kyanl [MA V 1.3]1 ces kun btags (text: brtags) pa'i gzun ba dan 'dzin pa thams cad mam pa thams cad du med pa fiid du gsuns so II '0 na bden pa ji ltar Mag ce na I med btin du yan snan ba tsam de ni kun rdzob kyi bden pa zes bya ste I bslu ba med pa'i ran gi no bo fiid yin pa 'i phyir ro !.

25 The use of the plural particle dag should be noted here. It indicates that there is more than one truth related to dharmatayukti.

26 Ibid., 63a5-6: 'di yan mam grans kyi don dam par bzag pa yod mod kyi I chos fiid kyi rigs pa'i rjes su 'breI pa dag ni stan pa fiid chen po beo brgyad kyi mampar b§ad pa'i ran Min stan pa fiid snar smos pa de fiid don dam pa'i bden pa yin no!.


the iatter which is taken as apparent truth here. That it is different from what is ordinarily 'included in apparent truth is clear from Ran byun rdo rje's Dharmadhiitustotra commentary, where the two aspects (nirvikiira and aviparyiisa) of the perfect nature in MA V IIUl cd are explained in the following way:

The two [aspects of the perfect], the unchangeable and unmistaken, are taken [respectively] as the defIning characteristics of the two truths. Acceptance by common consent (lokaprasiddha) and by reason (yuktiprasiddha) are varieties of the apparent truth27.

In other words, the unchangeable perfect is taken as the ultimate, and the perfect in terms of being unmistaken as a restricted form of apparent truth, which does not include acceptance by common consent and the like.

It should have become clear by now that Ran byun rdo rje, in contrast to the Jonangpas, fully accepts the Yogacara theory of trisvabhiiva,

. that is, two aspects of the perfect nature. This entails that the latter possesses moments, in the Zab rno nan gi don the true nature of mind which is free from everything else (gzan grol) being consequently equated with dependent arising28• In this context, it is of interest that Kon sprul BIo gros mtha' yas, who otherwise strictly follows Dol po pa's Ratnagotravibhiiga commentary, deviates from the latter's gzan ston understanding of the term "unconditioned" (asarhs!q:ta) in his commentary on RGV 1.6. Referring to Ron ston Ses bya kun rig's (1367-1449) explanation of four ways of understanding "unconditioned", Kon sprul states that the dharmakiiya only shares this quality of being unconditioned to a certain extent, inasmuch as it does not appear to disciples. If one claimed that it is completely

27 Rail bymi rdo rje: dBu ma chos dbyins bstod pa'i rnam par Mad pa, 7b1-2: bden pa gfiis kyi rali gi mtshan fiid kyis 'gyur ba med pa dan phyin ci ma log pa gfiis so / 'jig rten pa dan rigs pa'i grags pa ni / kun rdzob bden pa'i bye brag ste !.

28 Rail byuil rdo rje: Ran 'grel, IOb3-4: "As to the 'beginningless [mind-essence]" since a beginning and end of time is a [mere] conceptual superimposition, [the cause of everything] is here [taken as] the true nature (ran gi no bo) of both the stainless [mind] and the [mind] mingled with stains - it is precisely this dependent origination; and it is completely liberated (i.e., free) from [all] else. Since there is no other beginning than it, one speaks of beginningless time." (thog med la ies bya ba ni / dus kyi thog ma dan tha ma ni rtog pas sgro btags pa yin pas 'dir ni dri ma med pa dan dri ma dan bcas pa'i ran gi no bo ni rten cin 'brei bar 'byun ba de fiid dan gian las rnam par grol ba ste / de las thog ma gzan med pa'i phyir thog ma med pa'i dus ies bya ste I),


unconditioned, tbis would contradict the fact that it possesses knowledge, compassion and power.29

To sum up, whether one wants to call RaiL bymi rdo rje's "free from other" (gzan las grol ba) "empty of other" (gzan ston) or not, there is an alternative way of defining how the pure mind or Buddha-nature is free from or empty of other (i.e., adventitious stains), and some Kagyupas decided to call tbis gzan ston, too. It should be noted that with an ultimate that still possesses moments a distinction founded on gzan grol (or gzan ston) can be better brought into line with mahiimudrd teachings30, and tills is exactly what RaiL byun rdo rje did31 . It is thus no longer so puzzling how Situ paJ). chen ehos kyi byun gnas (1699/1700-1774) "blended the seemingly irreconcilable gzan ston and mahdmudrd positions"32.

Another famous scholar whose gzan ston differs from the Jonang position is gSer mdog paJ). chen Sakya mchog ldan (1428-1507). Georges Dreyfus (1997:29) has observed that Sakya mchog ldan fully endorses a gzan ston view only in works written after his first meeting with the Seventh Karmapa (1454-1506) in 1484, and it is thus interesting that Sakya mchog ldan's gzan ston differs from the Jonang position in a way similar to Ran byun rdo rje's gzan grol (or gzan ston). Kon sprul Blo gros mtha' yas notices in bis Encyclopedia of Knowledge (Ses bya kun khyab mdzod) that Sakya mchog Idan has bis own views on what is exactly empty of what, or, to use the technical terms, how the negandum (Tib. dgag bya), the basis of negation (Tib. dgag gzi) and the mode of being empty (Tib. ston tshul) are defined.

Kon sprul says that gzan ston pas take the perfect nature as the basis of negation, the imagined and the dependent natures as the negandum, and the mode of being empty as the absence of these two neganda in the basis of negation33. He adds, however, that Sakya mchog Idan holds a view

29 Kon sprul BIo gros mtha' yas: rGyud bla ma'i b§ad sral, fol. 12bl-5; see also Tsultrim Gyamtsho & Fuchs 2000: 103-4. .

30 A dharmakaya that possesses moments it not entirely transcendent and can be expe-rienced as the true nature of thoughts and the like.

31 For further information on this topic I refer to my forthcoming habilitation thesis. 32 Smith 1970:34. 33 In the subchapter on ascertaining the view (7.3.), Kon sprul (Ses bya kun khyab

mdzad, vol. 3, 61, ll. 19-24) defmes the tradition of the gzan stan Madhyamaka as follows: "The basis of negation is the perfect, the sphere (dhatu), suchness, what is beyond [any]

TARANATHA'S "TWENTY-ONE DiFFERENCES" 293

different from this, and illustrates this by quoting from Sakya mchog ldan's '~Zab ii spras bral gyi Mad pa":

As to the basis which is empty, it is the dependent, the entire "mind" (§es pa), which takes on various forms of a perceived object and perceiving subject. The negandum is the imagined. Given its division into perceived and perceiver, it [consists of] two. [ ... J34 As to in what sense it is empty, the basis of negation is empty of the negandum by virtue of being "empty of other", not by virtue of being "empty of self", for the following reason: The negandum, namely the duality of a perceived and a perceiver, is an "other-being" with regard to the basis of negation, [namely] the mind" (§es pa), which appears as two, [duality] not being taken as its own-being. What is then the own-being of this mind which appears as two? It is non-dual wisdom, namely mere awareness and luminosity that experience knowable objects35.

Kon sprul continues his presentation of gzan ston along this (namely Sakya mchog ldan's) line of thought, elaborating it on the basis of the sixteen fonns of emptiness in the Madhyantavibhiiga. Kon sprul's position on gzan ston still needs further clarification, but it is at least noteworthy that while in the sixth chapter of his Ses bya !run khyab mdzod he quotes nearly the entire dbu ma chen po paragraph of Tiiranatha's gian

mentally fabricated object. The negandum is the two defining characteristics of the imagined and the dependent. The mode of being empty is: 'empty of these two neganda in the basis of negation' Only the perfect, therefore, is empty of other. Thus says the Y ogacara, the proponents holding the tradition of gzan ston." (dgag gzi yons grub dbyins de Min fiid spros pa'i yullas 'das pa / dgag bya kun btags (text: brtags) dan gian dban gi mtshan fiid gfiis / ston tshul dgag bya de gfiis kyis dgag gzi la ston pas yons grub fiid gzan gyis ston pa yin ces mal 'byor spyod pa ste gzan ston gi srol 'dzin pa rnams smra'o I).

34 Kon sprul: ibid., vol. 3, 62, 11. 1-3: gan ston pa'i gzi ni gzan dban ste gzun 'dzin gfiis snan can gyi ses pa mtha' dag go / dgag bya ni kun btags (text: brtags) pa ste gzun ba dan 'dzin pa'i dbye bas gfiis yin la /. This is a literal quote from Sakya mchog ldan's work "Zab ii spros bral gyi Mad pa ston fiid bdud rtsi'i lam po che", 114, 11. 3-4.

35 Kon sprul, op. cit., vol. 3, 62, 11. 4-10: ji ltar ston pa'i tshul ni / dgag bya des dgag gzi de gzan ston gi tshul gyis ston pa yin gyi / ran ston gi tshul gyis ni ma yin te / dgag bya 'kun btags (text: brtags) kyi' gzun 'dzin gfiis po de ni' dgag gii gfiis snan gi ses pa gfiis po de la ltos pa'i gzan gyi no bo yin gyi / de'i ran gi no bor mi 'jog pa'i phyir / gfiis snan gi ses pa de'i ran gi no bo gan ie na / gfiis med kyi ye ses sesb bya myon ba rig cin gsal tsam de fiid do. (= "Zab ii spros bral gyi biad pa", 114,1. 7 -115,1. 2).

, Added by Kon sprul. b The edition of the collected works of Sakya mchog Idan reads zes, the editors prob

ably having thought that zes had changed into ses according to an old sandhi rule.


ston sfiin po, he skips the last part, where - against the purport of the Y ogacara works - the trisvabhava theory is brought into line with that of tathagatagarbha by restricting the perfect nature to its unchangeable aspect36• .

To sum up, from the time of Dol po pa it is possible to trace, parallel to the Jonang position, another "gian grol" or gian ston which distinguishes the basis of negation from the negandum in a different way. Whereas for the Jonangpas the basis of negation is a perfect nature which is restricted to its unchangeable aspect and thus transcendent and doctrinally mainly based on the tathagatagarbha theory, Sakya mchog Idan, Rail bymi rdo rje and some other Kagyupas adhere to a distinction based on Y ogacara, that is, mainly the Mahayanasamgraha and the Madhyantavibhiiga.

2. Taranatha's Twenty-One Differences with regard to the Profound Meaning37

For a short but brilliant analysis of the positions of Dol po pa and Sakya mchog ldan we are very much indebted to the Jonang master Taranatha, who is considered to be a follower and proponent of Dol po pa's doctrine. In each of the Twenty-one Differences with regard to the Profound M eaning a fictive initial statement of Sakya mchog ldan is followed by a similarly fictive reply of Dol po pa, Taranatha being, of course, well aware of the fact that this is all ahistorical38. To be sure, it is not possible to establish Sakya mchog ldan's or Dol po pa's views on the basis of this short text alone, but it does sharpen our awareness of the subtle aspects of gian ston when studying the bulky and often not very systematic works of these masters. Furthermore, critically evaluating these doctrinal differences against the background of pertinent Indian texts in such traditions as the Madhyamaka, Y ogacara and Tathagatagarbha promises to be a second interesting task. Both are, however, beyond the scope of this paper. Such an evaluation will, however, be undertaken with regard to the different presentations of trisvabhava as an example of how one might proceed.

36 See Kon sprul: ibid., vol. 2, 546-9. 37 Tib. zab don khyad par fier gcig pa, which is the title according to the colophon

(Taranatha: "Zab don fier gcig pa", 795, 1. 5. 38 Taranatha: "Zab don fier gcig pa", 792, 1. 4.

TARANATHA'S ''TWENTY-ONE DIFFERENCES" 295

-Taranatha begins his somewhat delicate task of comparing the two masters Dol po pa and Sakya mchog ldan in a conciliating manner, by explaining that both supposedly see what is profound reality and hence should not have different thoughts about it. It is only in order to accommodate the different needs of their disciples that they enunciate variant views. Evert though the essential gzan ston view and meditation practices of both masters are the same, there are a lot of minor differences regarding tenets (grub mtha ') that arise when formulating the view on the level <if apparent truth39•

- -The first four of the twenty-one points address differences in the exegesis of the Madhyamaka and Maitreya texts which are considered to be 20mmentaries on the Buddha's intention underlying the second and third tUrnings of the "Wheel of the Dharma" (dharmacakra)40. Points 5-8 e~body Sakya mchog Idan's and Dol po pa's different understanding of non-dual wisdom. In points 9-16, their views on the trisvabhiiva theory lite distinguished. In a related topic, Taranatha also elaborates the different understandings of self-awareness (point 11), entities and non-entities, and conditioned and unconditioned phenonema (all in point 13). Next, oUr attention is -drawn to different ways of relating the four noble truths

. With the apparent and ultimate (point 17). The last four points deal with the two masters' views on the Buddha-nature.

2.1. Translation: The Twenty-One Differences

Difference No.1

Sakya mchog Idan41 : All the views of the Prasailgika- and Svatantrika[Madhyamaka] are logically correct [and accurately represent] the Buddha's

39 These remarks should not be taken too seriously, though. 'Ba' ra ba rOyal mtshan dpal bzail (1310.1391) launches into his "Chos rje mam gfiis kyi dgOIis bsad iii ma'i 'od zer" (496-8) by stating, in a similar way, that Dol po pa and Bu ston (sic) are both omniscient and must see the same reality, but teach it in various ways with hidden intentions.

40 The Indo-Tibetan exegetical traditions summarize the teachings of the Buddha in three circles or "[turnings of the] Wheel of the Dharma" (dharmacakra). See Mathes 1996:155.

41 Lit. "The one named Sakya claims that .... " Here and in the following sentences simply the proponent's name is given in bold letters.


intention in the middle turning and the corpus of analytical works42. The explicit teaching of the middle [turning], in addition, [has to] be taken

_ literally, and the corpus of analytical works is not in accordance with the explicit teaching of the last turning.43 .

Dol po pa44 : Even though [the ran stan pas] are proud that these Prasailgika and Svatantrika views [represent] the intention of the middle turning and the corpus of analytical works, [their interpretation of this] intention is not free from mistakes. Although the explicit teaching of the analytical works generally appears to be consistent, it is not so in a great number of cases. Since many passages45 of the treatises of the middle turning clearly teach gian stan, the explicit teaching of the middle turning and the analytical works [should] not be [taken] literally. The explicit teaching of most passages of the middle turning and the analytical works contradicts neither the Prasailgika and Svatantrika nor the gian stan. Nevertheless, for those appealing to the extraordinary tenet known as ran stan, it has become a cause of confusion. On the other hand, given that [these texts] do not teach different tenets, that they contradict other traditions, and that there are [in fact] many extraordinary passages which only teach gian stan, even the middle turning and the analytical works [can be said to] teach gian stan Madhyamaka. From these texts [of the middle turning], however, the extraordinary points of gian stan - namely [those reached by] following only the lines of commentary on the intention of the last turning - have not clearly or extensively emerged. They are the extraordinary tenets of the Prasailgika and Svatantrika. What is nowadays known as the ran stan view was not taught [in the middle turning]; nevertheless, this ran stan [interpretation of] the intention of the Buddha and his sons is taught in detail [nowadays]46.

42 E.g., the analytical works of Nagarjuna, such as the Millamadhyamakakarika. 43 Taranatha: "Zab don fier gcig pa", 782, 11. 3-5: de la sakya'i mtshan can ni I thai

ran gi Ita ba 'di kun 'khar la bar pa dan I rig tshags kyi dgans dan 'thad Idan yin cin I bar pa'i dnas bstan sgra ji Min pa yan yin I rig tshags dan 'khar la tha ma'i dnas bstan mi mthun par bied la I.

44 Lit. "the great omniscient one from Jonang". 45 Lit. "words". 46 Taranatha: ap. cit., 782, 1. 5 - 783, 1. 6: kun mkhyen ja nan pa chen pa ni I thai ran

gi Ita ba 'di 'khar la bar pa dan rig tshags kyi dgans par rlam pa yin kyan I dgans pa rma med pa ma yin la / rig tshags dnas bstan gyi tshig phal cher la 'byar ba Itar snan yan /

TARANATHA'S ''TWENTY-ONE DIFFERENCES" 297

Difference No.2

Sakya mchog Idan47 : With regard to the fact that the Abhisamayiilarhkiira teaches both the tenets of ran ston and gzan ston, [Maitreya] considered the necessity of gzan ston in tenns of a meditation practice, and that of Prasiuigika and Svatantrika, [which are at the same time] the ran ston of the subsequent three works48, when it comes to cutting through mental fabrications with the help of the view. The remaining four Maitreya works49 teach only gzan ston50• With regard to these [latter four] there are two types: In the Ratnagotravibhiiga ultimately only one single path is taught and the possibility of a cut-off potential refuted. In the other three [Maitreya] works (i.e., Mahiiyiinasutriilarhkiira, Madhyiintavibhiiga and Dharmadharmatiivibhiiga) ultimately three paths and a cut-offpotential51

.are explained52•

Dol po pa: There are no different tenets in the five Maitreya works at all. The tenet of the so-called ran ston is not explained even in the

mi 'byor ba yan man du yod la / 'khar 10 bar pa 'i giun tshig man pos gian ston gsal bar ston pas 'khor 10 bar pa dan rig tshogs kyi dnos bstan sgra ji biin pa rna yin no / de la 'khor 10 bar pa dan rig tshogs kyi tshig phal cher gyi dnos bstan ni thaI ran dan gian ston giiis ka la mi 'gal yan / ran ston par grags pa'i thun mon ma yin pa'i grub mtha'i khuns la 'dren pa mams ni / de mams iiid la 'khrul gii byun ba yin gyi / grub mtha' de dan de mi ston cin / de las gian de'i lugs dan 'gal iin / gian ston kho na ston pa thun mons rna yin pa'i tshig kyan du ma yod pas / bar pa dan rig tshogs kyis kyan gian ston dbu rna iiid ston no / 'on kyan de dag nas / 'khor 10 tha ma dgons 'grel dan bcas pa tsam du gian ston thun mons ma yin pa mams gsal iin rgyas par 'byun ba min la / thaI ran gi thun mons rna yin pa 'i grub mtha '/ den san ran ston gi Ita bar grags pa de mi ston kyan / rgyal ba sras bcas kyi dgons pa'i ran ston de rgyas par bstan te / ces gsun so!.

47 From here on, Sakya mchog ldan and Dol po pa are referred to as "the former" and "the latter".

48 le., the Mahayanasutralamkara, Madhyantavibhliga, Dharmadharmatavibhliga. 49 le., the Mahayanasutralamkara, Madhyantavibhliga, Dharmadharmatavibhliga, and

Ratnagotravibhliga. 50 This does not obviously exclude recourse to a Prasatigika view when cutting through

mental fabrications in the Mahayanasutralamkara etc. 51 Usually a cut-off potential and the potentials for entering on the paths of the Sravakas

and Pratyekabuddhas and on the Mahayana are distinguished. 52 Taranatha: op. cit., 783, 1. 6 -784, 1. 3: mnon rtogs rgyan gyis / ran ston gian ston

gi grub mtha' gnis ka ston pa ni / Ita bas spros pa gcod pa la thaI ran giun phyi gsum gyi ran ston dan / sgom pas nams len gian ston dgos pa la dgons la / byams chos Ihag ma biis gian ston kho na ston mod / de la' an rigs giiis te / rgyud blar mthar thug theg gcig bsad / rigs chad bkag giun gian gsum du mthar thug theg gsum dan / rigs chad bsad gsun !.


Abhisamayiilarhkiira. A real cut-off potential and three ultimate paths are not explained in the [Mahiiyiinalsutriilarhkiira and so forth53.

Difference No.3

Sakya mchog ldan: Ran ston is considered to be more profound when j it comes to cutting through mental fabrications with the help of the view. When it comes to the practice of meditation, however, it is said that gian ston is more profound. The ran ston54 of the latter in turn, namely Prasangika and Svatantrika, is acknowledged in the tradition of the subsequent three works (Le., the Mahiiyiinasutriilarhkiira etc.)55.

Dol po pa: The view of ran ston as taught by the Buddha and his sons is superior in cutting through mental fabrications. Nevertheless, it is contained in gian ston, and therefore view and practice are not opposed to each other56• To maintain that the ran ston, [namely,] the Prasangika and Svatantrika - as it is known nowadays - is the view of the subsequent three works, [thinking that according to the latter] nothing exists ultimately, is wrong. [Such a ran ston] is therefore not better in cutting through mental fabrications with the help of the view, for this would be a false denial57.

Difference No.4

Sakya mchog ldan: Even though gian ston goes beyond Cittamatra and is thus acceptable to Madhyamaka, ran ston is superior to it with regard

53 Ibid., 784, 11. 3-4: byams chas sde Ina la grub mtha' so so ba ye med / ran stan par -grags pa'i grub mtha'mnon [rtags] rgyan nas /cyan ma bsad/mda [sde] rgyan sags nas /cyan / gtan nas rigs chad pa dan mthar thug theg gsum ma Mad / zes gsun no /.

54 The gzan stan view includes a ran stan that refers to the negandum, but not to what is left over in emptiness.

55 Tiiranatha: ap. cit., 784,11.4-5: Ita bas spros pa gcad pa la ran stan zab / sgam pas fiams su len pa la gzan stan zab ces te / de'i ran stan yan thai ran gzun phyi gsum gyi lugs Ia nos 'dzin (text: 'dzi).

56 As would be the case if the former were strictly ran stan and the latter strictly gzan stan.

57 Tiiranatha, ap. cit., 784, 11. 5-7: rgyal ba sras bcas bzed pa'i ran stan gi Ita ba de spros pa gcad byed mchag yin /cyan / gzan stan du 'dus pas Ita grub logs logs pa min Ia / den san grags pa'i ran stan thaI ran gzun phyi gsum gyi Ita ba don dam bden med du 'dod pa ni nor ba yin pas / Ita bas spros pa gcad pa la bzan ba min te / skur 'debs su 'gyur ba'i phyir yin zes gsun /.

TARANA.THA'S "TWENTY-ONE DIFFERENCES" 299

. to the view. Still, the former (i.e., gian stan) is not wrong, for it accords with the experiential object of meditation58•

Dol po pa: Ran stan, too, goes beyond Cittamlitra, and thus falls. under Madhyamaka within the system of the four tenets. It is not the pure ultimate, however, the highest view being gian ston alone59•

Difference No.5

Sakya mchog Idan: For this reason non-dual wisdom is not analyzed when following the Maitreya works. When critically analyzing it, after having excluded [its] opposite, [wisdom] cannot withstand such analysis. Therefore, since it cannot withstand a critical analysis [aimed at] ascertaining the ultiplate, ran stan is more profound in terms of the view. Even though it does' not withstand analysis, this wisdom is experienced uninterruptedly. Therefore it abides like the experiential object of meditation, namely gian ston60•

Dol po pa: Non-dual wisdom does withstand critical analysis61. Therefore, this very analysis itself is self-delusion62•

Difference No.6

Siikya mchog Idan: Non-dual wisdom is momentary awareness (rig pa), not permanent, and has no chance to abide63•

58 Ibid., 784, 1. 7 -785,1. I: gian stan sems tsam las 'das pas dbu ma go chad po yin kyan / Ita ba'i nos nas de bas kyan ran stan mtho / 'on kyan sna ma de nor bar (text: par) ni mi 'gyur te / sgom don dan mthun pas so gsun /.

59 Ibid., 785, 11. 1-2: ran stan yan sems tsam las 'das pas / grub mtha' bii'i dbu mar bsdu ba tsam yin kyan / TTlam dag mthar thug min la / Ita ba'i mtho sos gian stan kho na yin no gsun.

60 Ibid., 785, 11. 2-4: de'i rgyu mtshan du / byams chos rjes 'bran dan bcas par / gfiis med kyi ye ses la dpyad pa mi byed pa yin la / spyi Idog nas de yan rig pas dpyad na dpyad mi bzod pas / don dam gcod byed kyi rig pas dpyad bzod mi srid pas Ita ba ran stan zab / dpyad ma bzod kyafl ye ses de iiams myon rgyun mi 'chad pas / sgom don gian stan Itar gnas gsun /.

61 For it is beyond one and many. Moreover, wisdom is omnipresent, in that the Buddhas embrace with their non-dual wisdom the all-pervading suchness of all phenomena (cf. 2.2. below).

62 Taranatha: op. cit., 785, 1. 4: gfiis med ye ses rigs pas dpyad bzod yin pas / de la dpyod pa de ran gi 'khrul gsun.

63 Ibid., 785, 1. 5: giiis med ye ses de rig pa skad cig ma yin / rtag pa min / gnas pa'i go skabs med pa cig yin gsun.


Dol po pa: This [wisdom] is not momentary, but pe~anent and stable, in that it is beyond the three times (i.e., past, present and future)64.

Difference No.7

Sakya mchog ldan: Likewise, given that it is knowledge (ses pa), wisdom [can be] taken to be an entity/existent (dftos pO)65.

Dol po pa: And it [can be] taken to be beyond both [the state of] an entity/existence and a non-entity/non-existi.mce66•

Difference No.8

Sakya mchog ldan: Likewise it [can be] taken to be conditioned67•

Dol po pa: It [ can be] taken to be unconditioned, to068 •

Difference No.9

Sakya mchog ldan: If one isolates its specific aspects (raft Zdog), all knowledge is - as generally accepted in Tibet - only clarity and awareness, and here an entity of the dependent [nature]. The isolation of the specific aspects of mere dualistic appearances which arise in this [clarity and awareness] results in the imagined nature. When viewed under its aspect of being accompanied by these dualistic appearances, clarity and awareness constitute the dependent nature. From the perspective, however, that it is unstained by these dualistic phenomena throughout beginningless time, this clarity and awareness constitute the perfect nature. Based on that, dependent entities as such are by nature the same as the perfect nature, even though they are different as isolates (ldog cha) and different in terms of their respective defining characteristics69.

64 Ibid., 785, 11. 5-6: de skad Gig ma ma yin / dus gsum las grol bas rtag pa brtan pa yin gsun.

65 Ibid., 785, 1. 6: de biin du ses pa yin pa'i phyir dnos por bied pa dan! 66 Ibid., 785, 1. 6: dnos po dnos med giiis ka las grol bar bied pa ste! 67 Ibid., 785, 11. 6-7: de biin du 'dus byas su bied pa dan! 68 Ibid., 785, 1. 7: 'dus ma byas su bied pa yan ste! 69 Ibid., 785, 1. 7 -786,1. 3: bod spyi dan mthun run du ses pa thams cad kyi ran ldog

gsal rig {sam 'di ka gian dban gi dnos po yin la / de iiid la sar ba'i giiis snan kho na'i


Dol po pa: The imagined aspect, which is imputed by the mind's multitude of thoughts; and its appearances in the form of external objects, is the perceived. The isolation of its specific aspects is the imagined nature. The isolation of the specific aspects of the mind and mental factors results in the dependent nature, namely knowledge constituted by knowledge or consciousness of apparent truth. Clarity and awareness, by nature free from mental fabrication, is the perfect nature. Thus the imagined and the dependent are substantially the same; their defining characteristics are very different, however. Not only are the perfect and the dependent different as isolates and in terms of their defining characteristics, but they are also not the same by nature (flO bo gcig pa)70. The previous presentations of this [trisvabhava-theory] were mainly in line with Cittamatra, but [Dol po pal thinks that the tradition of Madhyamaka is only this [trisvabMva]71.

Difference No. 10

Sakya mchog ldan: The imagined nature fully pertains to what is not true, the perfect to what is true, and the dependent to both72.

ran ldog nas kun btags (text: brtags) yin no I gsal rig gfiis snan de dan bcas pa'i cha nas gzan dban dan I gsal rig de la gfiis chos gdod nas ma gos pa 'i cha nas yons grub yin pas I gzan dban yons grub ldog cha nas tha dad cin I mtshan fiid kyi cha nas tha dad kyan gzan dban gi dnos po de fiid dan I yons grub no bo gcig par bzed do !.

70 This negation of identity h!ls been often misunderstood and misleadingly represented. (Cf. Newland, who writes that for Dol po pa the two truths are different entities (no bo tha dad pa). Instead of referring directly to the Jonang material, however, he quotes Seyfort Ruegg, Hopkins and Thurman (Newland 1992: 30 & 260). In fact, Dol po pa negates not only identity but also difference. In his "bDen gfiis gsal ba'i iii rna", 23, 11. 2-3) he explains that "the two truths should be called neither identical (de fiid) in terms of their nature nor different (gzan) [in terms of their nature].' Cf. also Mathes 1998:465-6.

, For Tib. de fiid dan gian, Skt. tattviinyatva, see MA VBh, 23, L 10. 7l Taranatha: op. cit., 786, 11. 3-6: blo rnam rtog sna tshogs pas brtags pa'i btags cha

dan I phyi don du snan ba'i snan cha ste I gzun ba'i ran ldog kun btags (text: brtags) dan I sems sems byun ses pa'i ran ldog kun rdzob pa'i ses pa'am rnam ses kyis bsdus pa'i ses pa gian dban dan I spros pa dan bral ba'j ran biin.gsal rig yons grub ste I des na kun btags (text: brtags) ni gzan dban las rdzas tha dad du med kyan I mtshan fiid kyi sga nas ni sin tu tha dad do I yans grub dan gian dban ni I [dog cha dan mtshan fiid tha dad par ma zadl no bo gcig pa yan ma yin no I sna ma'j rnam gzag ni sems tsam dan mthun sas che la I dbu ma'i lugs ni 'di kho na'o ies dgans so!.

72 Ibid., 786, 11. 6-7: kun btags (text: brtags) la bden med kyis khyab lyons grub la bden yod kyis khyab I gian dban la cha gfiis mdzad !.


Dol po pa: The imagined and the dependent both fully pertain - that is to say, through and through - to what is not true73•

Difference No. 11

Sakya mchog ldan: All self-awareness - understood as the isolation of its specific aspects - [belongs] exclusively to the ultimate [truth]14.

Dol po pa: Given that the self-awareness75 of consciousness [belongs] exclusively to the apparent [truth], self-awareness, too, has both an apparent and an ultimate aspect16•

Difference No. 12

Sakya mchog ldan: The perfect [nature] is emptiness. The imagined [nature] is not emptiness, even though it is purely empty77. Emptiness fully pertains to the ultimate [truth]18.

Dol po pa: Everything, phenomena and their true nature, can only be called emptiness. Emptiness does not pertain to (lit. "is not pervaded by") the ultimate truth. It is not counted unambiguously among the synonyms [of the ultimate] : [emptiness] is related to [the ultimate only] in a general sense79•

Difference No. 13

Sakya mchog ldan: The works on valid cognition, the Abhidharma etc. are mostly [written] in accordance with general Dharma terminology.

73 Ibid., 786, 1. 7: kun btags (text: brtags) gian dban giiis ka la mtha' gcig tu bden med kyis khyab par mdzad do /.

74 Ibid., 786, 1. 7 -787, 1. 1: ran rig thams cad ran rig gi ran ldog nas don dam kho na yin gsun la /.

75 The Tibetan uses the plural: "moments of self-awareness". 76 Ibid., 787, II. 1-2: kun rdzob roam ses kyi ran rig roams kun rdzob kho na yin pas

/ ran rig yan kun rdzob don dam giiis yod par bied do /. 77 I.e., it is the negandum and nothing more. 78 Ibid., 787, 1. 2: yoils grub ston pa iiid yin / kun btags (text: brtags) ston pa tsam yin

kyan ston pa iiid min / ston pa iiid la don dam gyis khyab par bied /. 79 Ibid., 787, II. 2-3: chos dan chos iiid thams cad la ston iiid tsam du brjod dgos / ston

iiid la don dam gyis ma khyab / min gi roam grans la khyab mtha'i rna rtsi / gtso bo'i don du sbyor gsun /.

TiillANATHA'S "TWENTY-ONE DIFFERENCES" 303

This being the case, the attainment of pacification fully pertains to both categories, those' of entities/existence and non-entities/non-existence8o ;

knowledge (§es pa)81 [only] to that of entities82• The ultimate is not an entity. Since it is not conditioned, it is a non-entity, [like] the sky and so forth. There are different aspects of the unconditioned - suchness not being conditioned by causal defilements, or mere clarity and awareness not being newly produced, etc. Therefore, when one enumerates categories, these are designated as unconditioned. They are, however, not the [real] unconditioned as opposed to the conditioned ('du byed) and the defining characteristics (mtshan ilid); therefore, they are unconditioned only in a metaphorical sense83 •

Dol po pa: Explanations along the lines of Pramal),a or Abhidharma belong to traditions that mainly ascertain the apparent truth. With regard here to definitive meaning, when it is mainly the ultimate truth that is being ascertained, entities and non-entities fully pertain to the apparent [truth] and vice versa84• The ultimate truth is neither an entity nor a nonentity; therefore, the attainment of pacification85 certainly does not pertain to the ultimate. [If it did,] wisdom would not be an entity, while being knowledge at the same time. Therefore, knowledge would not pertain to [the category of] entities, while to maintain that the ultimate truth

80 Pacification, or cessation, falls under this latter category by virtue of being unconditioned.

81 In the context of the Abhidharma: usually the "knowledge of the destruction [of passions etc.]" (Skt. k~ayajiiiina, Tib. zad pa ses pa) and the "knowledge of no further occurrence [of passions etc.]" (Skt. anutpiidajiiiina, Tib. mi skye ba ses pa).

82 In the following Tib. dizos po is rendered as "entity", even though the Sanskrit equivalent bhava also means "existence".

83 Taranatha: op. cit., 787, II. 3-6: tshad ma'i giuiz dan mizon pa sogs spyi skad daiz phaL cher mthun par / / ii grub pa La dizos po dnos med gaiz ruiz gis khyab / ses pa La dnos pas khyab / don dam dnas pa min /' dus rna byas (text om. byas) pas ni dizas med nam mkha' sags yin/ de biin iiid La las iion gyi 'dus rna byas daiz/ gsaL rig tsam gsardu 'dus rna byas sags / 'dus rna byas pa'i cha re yod pas / mam grans kyi sga nas 'dus rna byas su btags pa yin gyi / 'dubyed daTi mtshan iiid 'gal ba'i 'dus rna byas rna yin te / des na 'dus rna byas btags pa ba yin gsuiz !.

84 This means that the totality of entities and non-entities is exactly identical with the apparent truth.

85 Dol po pa restricts the ultimate truth to the actual cessation, which exists throughout beginuingless time. The actual pacification attained thus still forms, together with suffering, a dualistic concept yet to be transcended.


is a non-entity would be improper Dharrna86 . To maintain that the ultimate is an entity [is in accordance with] the tradition of maintaining the . [ultimate existence of] entities. All non-entities like the sky etc. which the Abhidharrnikas take to be unconditioned, are there considered to be conditioned, and for this reason, both entities and non-entities fully pertain to the conditioned. The ultimate is the real unconditioned. The sky etc. are thus unconditioned [entities] only in a metaphorical sense87•

Difference No. 14

Sakya mchog ldan: The "very face" (ran no) of the dependent, being empty of the imagined, that is, the negandum, is the basis of emptiness. It may be taken as the ultimate being empty of the apparent88•

Dol po pa: The perfect is the basis of emptiness. It is empty of the two neganda, the dependent and the imagined, in that the ultimate is empty of the apparent. [The explanation of] the dependent as being empty of the imagined applies only when ascertaining mere apparent truth89•

Difference No. 15

Sakya mchog ldan: Even though the "pure dependent" is widely known in Tibet, it is in reality not the dependent but rather what is "perfect in

86 This reductio ad absurdum presupposes the inclusion of wisdom under the ultimate truth.

87 Taranatha: op. cit., 787, L 6 -788, L 3: tshad mnon sags su bSad pa de I kun rdzob gtso bar gtan la 'bebs pa'i lugs yin I don dam gtso bar gtan la 'bebs pa'i nes don gyi skabs 'dir I kun rdzob fa dnos po dan dnos med kyis khyab cin I dnos po dnos med la'an kun rdzob kyis khyab I don dam dnos po yan min I dnos med (text: mod) kyan min pas ii (text: gii) grub fa nes ma khyab lye ses dnos po ma yin La ses pa yin pas I ses pa fa dnos pas ma khyab dnos med don dam du 'dod pa chos mi rigs lal don dam dnos par 'dodpa dlios smra ba'i lugs so I mnon pa ba rnams 'dus ma byas su 'dod pa'i nam mkha' sags I dnos med thams cad kyan skabs 'dir 'dus byas yin pas I dlios po dnos med la 'dus byas kyis khyab I don dam 'dus ma byas dnos yin I nam mkha' sags 'dus ma byas btags pa ba yin gsun!.

88 Ibid., 788, L 4: stan gii gian dbmi gi ran no de dgag bya kun btags kyis stan pa ste I de fiid kun rdzob kyis stan pa'i don dam du mdzad do!.

89 Ibid., 788, 11. 4-6: stan gii yons grub I dgag bya gian dban kun btags (text: brtags) gfiis kyis ston pa I don dam kun rdzob kyis stan pa 'i don yin fa I gian dbali kun btags (text: brtags) kyis stan pa ni I kun rdzob bden pa kho na gtan la 'bebs pa'i skabs kho na yin par bied do I.


termS of being unmistaken." The latter is the actual perfect nature. Since the origin and usage of the conventional [term] "pure dependent" is not clear, it is not good to use it90•

Dol po pa: Even though the usage of the conventional [term] "pure dependent" is not clear - the term is not found in the treatises - its meaning is fully established [in them], and therefore it is proper to use it. This follows from the fact that the Buddha's teaching is based on meaning [rather than words proper], and that in olden times in Tibet all agreed on such a convention. Therefore, it is appropriate not to find any fault in the transmitted pith-instructions deriving from Maitreya. Even though some [parts of the] wisdom of the noble [path of] learning are [called] "perfect in terms of being unmistaken" in [certain] passages of the [Maitreya works], the presentation of its conventional [term] (i.e., the term "pure dependent") is good. This is because of [instances] where some [phrases] such as "for those who have attained the [Bodhisattva]levels the ground appears as gold" are also [taken as denoting] "perfect In terms of being unmistaken"91.

Difference No. 16

Sakya mchog Idan: The perfect in terms of being unmistaken fully pertains to the actual perfect nature92•

Dol po pa: This [being unmistaken] is only taught as being the expressible perfect, in the same way as the twelve limbs of the Buddha's speech

90 Ibid., 788, n. 6-7: dag pa gzan dban ies bod spyi la grags kyan / don la gian dban min cin phyin ci ma log pa'i yons grub yin la/ phyin ci ma log pa'i yons grub kyan yons grub mtshan Hid pa yin cin / dag pa gian dban gi tha sHad pa'an khuns gsal med pas / de'i brda 'chan byed pa mi legs par dgOlis so I.

91 Ibid" 788, L 7 -789,1. 3: dag pa gzan dban zes pa'i tha sHad gzun las gsal po ma byun yan / don tshan bas tha sHad byar run ste / sans rgyas kyi bstan pa don la brtan pa yin pa dan / bod sna ma thams cad tha sHad de Ita bu mthun par byed pas / byams pa nas brgyud pa'i man ilag ma nor ba yin du run bas so / de'i nan tshan 'phags pa slob pa'i ye ses 'ga' zig phyin ci ma log pa'i yoils grub yinkyan / sa thob pa mams la sa gii gser du snail ba sags 'ga' iig phyin ci ma log pa'i yoils grub yin pa'an yod pas / de'i tha sHad rnam giag legs par dgoils so I.

92 Ibid" 789, L 4: phyin ci ma log pa'i yans grub la/yons grub mtshan Hid pas khyab parbzedl.


have been also said to be the perfect [in terms of being unmistaken]. Thus the latter, incontrast to the unchangeable perfect nature, is in reality something that belongs to the pure dependent and is the perfect only in a metaphorical sense. The unmistaken perfect which is the same as the unchangeable [perfect] is called the "ultimate perfect in terms of being unmistaken." It is purely unchangeable93• Therefore, when one ascertains the true state of being, it is only this "[ultimate] perfect". When one explains in detail [its] synonyms, both types [of the perfect] (i.e. the unchangeable and the perfect in terms of being unmistaken) are presented94.

Difference No. 17

Sakya mchog Idan: The [noble] truth of the path also [belongs to] the ultimate truth95.

Dol po pa: Among the four noble truths the truth of cessation is the ultimate, and the other three are the apparent truth. To be more precise, only the actual cessation, which exists throughout beginningless time, [is called] ultimate [truth]. The other three [noble] truths and the analytical cessation fully pertain, in reality, to the apparent truth. Hence the actual [noble] truth of the path fully pertains to the apparent [truth], and the actual truth of cessation to the ultimate [truth]. This follows from the fact that the [noble] truth of the path in its ultimate aspect is one with the beginningless

93 The distinction between "perfect in terms of being unmistaken" and "ultimate perfect in terms of being unmistaken" reflects the Jonangpas' view that wisdom; like all other Buddha-qualities, mainly pertains to the unchangeable ultimate truth and only to limited extent to the apparent truth.

'In the Yogacara, "the perfect in terms of being unmistaken" usually refers to non-conceptual wisdom cultivated on the path.

94 Taranatha: op. cit., 789, 11. 4-7: de ni mam grails kyi yoils grub tu bstan pa tsam ste / gsuil rab yan lag bcu gfiis kyail yoils grub tu gsuils pa dail 'dra'o / des na / 'gyur med yoils grub kyi zlas drails pa 'i phyin ci rna log pa de ni gian dbail dag pa pa yin ciil / yoils grub btags pa ba yin / 'gyur med fiid dail gcig pa 'i yoils grub phyin ci ma log pa de la / don dam pa 'i phyin ci ma log pa'i yoils su grub pa ies bya ste / 'gyur med kho na' 0/ des na / gnas tshul gtan la 'bebs pa'i skabs su yoils grub de fiid kho na yin la / mam grails rgyas par bsad pa 'i skabs su gfiis kyi mam giag byed do gsuil /.

95 Ibid., 789,1. 7 - 790, 1. 1: lam bden yail don dam par mdzad la /.


[ultimate truth]. Because it is [in reality] the [noble] truth of cessation, [this ultimate aspect] is the [noble] truth of the path [only] in a metaphorical sense96•

Difference No. 18

Sakya mchog ldan: There is no Buddha-nature in the mind-stream of sentient beings. The natural luminosity of the mind of sentient beings is JIlerely the cause of the Buddha-nature and [its] "basic element" (khams). Therefore, there is a Buddha-nature or basic element as a cause in all

. ordinary sentient beings, but it is not like the actual [Buddha-nature], which is rather the [same as] Buddha-wisdom97•

Dol po pa: The actual Buddha-nature is nothing else than [the Buddhanature] of the mind-stream of sentient beings, and if it is the actual [Buddha-nature] of a Buddha, then it is established that sentient beings possess it, precisely because it is the dharmata of sentient beings. This is proven, in particular, by a number of canonical passages. The explanation [of the Buddha-nature] as the basic element and cause [refers to] a cause different from the sphere/element (dbyihs)98, given that the latter is neither an efficient cause nor an efficient sphere99•

96 Ibid., 790, n. 1-3: bden pa biir phye ba'i 'gog bden don dam dan / bden pa gian gsum kun rdzob tu bied / iib mor na / 'gog bden mtshan fiid pa gdod ma'i 'gog bden la don dam kho na dan / gian bden pa gsum dan / so sor brtags 'gog la kun rdzob kyis khyab par don la gnas pas / lam bden mtshan fiid pa la kun rdzob kyis khyab / 'gog bden mtshan iiid pa la don dam gyis khyab / don dam pa'i lam bden ni gdod ma dan gcig pa 'i phyir / 'gog bden iiid yin pas / lam bden btags pa ba yin gsun!

97 Ibid. 790, II. 3-5: sems can kyi rgyud la bde gsegs siiili po med sems can kyi sems ran biin 'od gsal de / bde gsegs siiin po'i rgyu dan khams tsam yin pas / rgyu bde gsegs siiin po 'am khams bde gsegs siiin po sems can thams cad la yod kyan / de ni de 'dra mtshan iiid pa min / sans rgyas kyi ye ses bde gsegs siiin po' 0 !

98 The Buddha-nature with all its qualities is already present in one's mind-stream and thus does not need to be generated. Here, Buddha-nature as cause means that focusing on the true nature of mind, which is the Buddha-nature, causes the removal of all defIlements.

99 Tliranatha: op. cit., 790, II. 5-7: sems can gyi rgyud kyi de ka bde gsegs siiin po mtshan iiid pa yin te / sans rgyas de kyi mtshan iiid pa yin na / de iiid ka sems can gyi chos iiid yin pas / sems can bde gsegs siiin po can du grub la / khyad par lun mtha' yas pas grub bo / khams dan rgyur Mad pa yan / skyed rgyu dan skyed khams min par dbyins dan bral rgyu la dgons pa' 0 gsun !


Difference No. 19

Sakya mchog ldan: [Passages which] state that the Buddha-nature is endowed with essentially inseparable qualities refer only to the fruit [of the path]. On the level of the cause, the qualities still have to be developed. Having this capability, the Buddha-nature exists only as seeds [in ordinary sentient beings]loo.

Dol po pa: The essentially inseparable qualities are naturally present. They exist even in the Buddha-nature of the basis, since [firstly] something that arises, [in the sense of being] newly [acquired], may possibly be not naturally present; [secondly], the division of basis, path and fruit applies only to the level of "phenomena" (dharmin)lOl [or] apparent truth; and [thirdly], there is, [in terms of] the nature [ of phenomena], only one Buddha-nature. It must henceforth be the Buddha-nature, adorned with all the qualities of the ultimate102•

Difference No. 20

Sakya mchog ldan: The major and minor marks and the like [of a Buddha] do not belong to the qualities of the dharmakaya103•104

100 Ibid., 790, 1. 7 - 791, 1. 1: sfiin po la yon tan no bo dbyer med ran biin fiid ldan du gsuns ba 'bras bu kho na'i skabs yin la I rgyu'i skabs su yon tan 'byun run gi nus pa sa bon tsam yod par bied !.

101 In the context of phenomena (dharma) and their true being (dharmatii) , dharmin refers to the dharmas which possess dharma{tii} (see Mathes 1996: 185).

102 Ibid., 791, ll. 1-4: yon tan no bo dbyer med I ran biin fiid ldan de gii bde gsegs sfiin po la yan yod de I gsardu byun bas ran biin gyis ldan par mi 'gro ba 'i phyir dan I gii lam 'bras bu gsum kun rdzob chos can gyis phye ba ma gtogs I ran biin bde gsegs sfiin po gcig kho na yin pa'i phyir I bde gsegs sfiin po yin phyin chad don dam pa'i yon tan thams cad kyis brgyan pa yin dgos par bied do I.

103 The Y ogacaras use the term dharmakiiya in an exclusive as well as in an inclusive sense. In its exclusive sense, the term dharmakiiya is defined as the transformation of the basis which results in the non-conceptual wisdom of the purity of suchness. In its inclusive sense, it refers to the totality of Buddhahood including all kttyas. The interpretation of the dharmakiiya as a distinct kiiya, which does not include the sambhogakiiya, is also found in the particular four-kiiya theory of Haribhadra's commentary on the Abhisamayiilamkiira. Haribhadra qualifies the dharmakiiya for the first time with the compound jfiiiniitmaka "the dharmakiiya consisting of wisdom", and understands it as conditioned jfiiinas on the level of apparent truth. It is only the sviibhiivikakiiya which encompasses suchness, or the ultimate emptiness of all phenomena. Contrary to this, Arya Vimuktisena


Doi pO pa: With regard to all types of Buddha-qualities, there is an aspect of them that pertains to the ultimate qualities of the dharmakiiya, and appears only to the Buddha himself, and another aspect that pertains to the apparent qualities of the form-kiiyas, and appears to others, namely the disciples [of the Buddha]. As for the explicit teaching of the Ratnadiirikiisiitra105 and the Uttaratantra [Ratnagotravibhiigaj, in general it is necessary to explain them in terns of the qualities of the two kiiyas106.

On the whole, with respect to the major and minor [marks of a Buddha], [Dol po pal only makes analogies in accordance with what is generally accepted. When taken as taught in other Siitras, and the Tantras, both [the dharmakiiya and the form-kiiyas] share aspects common to all oftheml07. What is different [from the Ratnagotravibhiiga] when Mantra[yana is'taught] with regard to gian ston is precisely this [inclusion of all qualities in the

. ultimate F08. 109

Difference No. 21

Sakya mchog ldan: Only the seeds of the fruit are inherently present in the form of the natural luminosity of mind. [Their] improvement is achieved by meditating on the path, until the fruit is finally actualized 110.

takes dharmakaya as a synonym of svabhiivikakaya, and as such the totality of Buddhahood comprising all kayas (see Makransky 1997:9-13 & 39-41).

104 Taranatha: op. cit., 791, I. 4: chos sku'i yon tan la mtshan dpe sogs mi bied /. 105 The explanation of the sixty-four qualities in the third chapter of the Ratnagotra

vibhaga is based on the Ratnadarikasiltra (see Takasaki 1966: 14). 106 I.e., the thirty-two qualities of the dharmakaya and the thirty-two qualities of the

form-kayas. 107 Which means that the dharmakaya possesses aspects of the major and minor marks,

and the form-kayas aspects of the thirty-two qualities of the dharmakaya. 108 This sentence is the beginning of the following paragraph, but refers to the previous

one. 109 Taranatha: op. cit., 791, 11. 4-7: sans rgyas kyi yon tan gyi rigs thams cad la / chos

sku'i yon tan don dam pa sans rgyas ran snan re dan / gzugs sku'i yon tan kun rdzob pa gdul bya gian snan gi cha re thams cad de yod pa yin la / bu mo rin chen gyis ius pa'i mdo dan / rgyud bla ma'i dnos bstan ni spyir sku giiis ka 'i yon tan' chad dgos pa la gtso che chun gi dban las / grags pa spyi dan mthun pa dper brjod tsam du mdzad la / mdo gian rnams dan rgyud sde sogs las gsuns pa [tar na / giiis ka la thams cad kyi char yod pa yin no gsun / [ ... J de ni snags kyi skabs su gian ston la mi 'dra ba ni 'di yin te /.

110 Ibid. 791,1. 7 -792,1. 1: sems ran biin 'od gsalla 'bras bu'i sa bon tsam ran chas su yod pa / lam bsgoms pas gon 'phel thob / mthar 'bras bu mnon gyur du 'byun bar bied /.

310 KLAUS-DIETER lViATHEs

Dol po pa: Throughout beginningless time wisdom is effortlessly perfect in the form of the ultimate malJq.aia. On the path, stains are removed by meditating on it, and [this ever-present wisdom] is actualizedlll.

2.2. Tiiraniitha's Conclusion

Having elaborated Siikya mchog ldan's and Dol po pa's twenty-one differences with regard to the profound meaning, Taranatha' concludes by pointing out one fundamental difference, to which all the other ones basically refer:

PIlI). chen Sakya mchog ldan takes non-dual wisdom to be non-abiding and impermanent in every moment, in that it is not something single but multiple. [For the] omniscient Jonangpa (i.e., Dol po pa) it is in reality neither one nor many; provisionally he accepts it as reasonable when [wisdom] is presented as being single, and takes it as being permanent, impartible, allpervading, free from mental fabrication and ineffable. In view of this, the [main] difference is, in short, that [the former] takes [wisdom] as being impermanent, and [the latter] takes it as being permanentI12•

We are further informed that Dol po pa infers from the omnipresence of non-dual wisdom that all qualities of a Buddha are already present in ordinary beings. For the same reason, non-dual wisdom cannot be impaired by reasoning, such as that it is neither one nor many, and hence withstands analysis. On these grounds the tenets of the Prasailgika and Svatantrika, which assert the destruction of non-dual wisdom by analysis, is wrong, and hence these Prasailgika and Svatantrika views are

. impure. One comes to know this by way of analysis which makes use of reasoning without distorting the original intention of the middle turning. Dol po pa and Siikya mchog ldan agree, however, that ultimately the Buddha-nature is beyond words and'thoughts, and the unmistaken object of

III Ibid., 792, 11. 1-2: gdod rna nas ye ses don dam pa'i dkyil 'khor du lhun grub tu rdzogs pa de lam bsgoms dri rna bsal te milon du gyur pa yin par bied do I.

112 Ibid., 792, 11. 5-6: palJ chen sakya'i mtshan· can ni I gfiis med kyi ye ses de gcig pu ma yin pa du ma'i tshul can I skad cig gis mi gnas pa mi rtag par bied pa dan I kun mkhyen jo nan pa ni I de dnos gnas la gcig min du ma yan min par nes mod I gnas skabs su gcig pu'i (text: bu'iJ mam gzag 'thad ldan du mdzad cin I de rtag pa I cha med kun khyab I spros bral brjod bral yin par bied pa 'i dban las te I mdor na mi rtag pa dan rtag par bied pa'i khyad par ro I.


non~conceptual wisdom. Taranatha concludes by explaining at length that Dol po pa's "perinanent" is not the ordinary opposite of impermanent:

This ["pennanent"] is free from mental fabrications. It is the unchangeable sphere which is free from both the impennanence of an established entity and the pennanence of a negated non-entity. It is free from the characteristic signs of pennanence1l3.

3. Taranatha's Presentation of Dol po pa's and Sakya mchog ldan's Positions

A comparison of Taranatha's summary of Dol po pa's position with what we fmd in the latter's pertinent works, such as the Ri chos ftes don rgya mtsho, shows that the subject matter is correctly presented. Of particular interest are Taranatha's elaborations on difference no. 20, where he confirms my own observation that Dol po pa explains the Buddha-nature more in line with general Mahayana when commenting the Ratnagotravibhiiga114. Also, the presentation of the trisvabhiiva theory is in accordance with the Ri chos ftes don rgya mtsho, in which Dol po pa explains:

The basis which is empty of the imagined is the dependent, and the basis which is empty of even the dependent is the true nature of phenomena, the perfect1l5.

A little further down Dol po pa further explains:

It has been taught that phenomena which [belong to] the imagined [and] the dependent do not really exist, and that the true nature of phenomena, [namely] the perfect really does. The meaning of ran ston and gzan ston is taught in these two statements1l6.

113 Ibid., 794, 11. 6-7: 'di ni spros bral te I dnos po sgrub pa mi rtag pa dan I dnos med dgag pa rtag pa giiis ka las grol ba'i dbyins 'gyur med de yin I rtag pa'i mtshan ma las grol iin /.

1I4 See my introductory remarks on Dol po pa in the fIrst paragraph of this paper. liS Dol po pa: Ri chos nes don rgya mtsho, 148,11. 3-4: ... kun btags (text: brtags) kyis

ston pa'i gii ni gian dban no I I gian dban gis kyan ston pa'i gii ni chos iiid yons grub bo (text: po) /.

1I6 Ibid., 149, 11. 8-10: ... kun btags (text: brtags) gian dban gi chos rnams ni yan dag par med pa dan I chos iiid yons grub ni yan dag tu yod par bstan te 'di dag gis kyan ran ston dan gzan ston gi don bstan pa yin no /.


These two quotes clearly show that it is only the perfect which really exists as the basis which is empty of the dependent (and thus also the imagined). Moreover, the following passage from the Ri chos nes don rgya mtsho confirms Taranatha's observation in difference no. 14 that "[the explanation of] the dependent as being empty of the imagined applies only when ascertaining mere apparent truth":

As to the lack of an own-being in the imagined, the [imagined] does not exist in terms of its own defining characteristics. Being established 'as the mere apparent, [or rather as] the mere mistaken apparent, it is established neither as apparent truth nor as the correct apparent. As to the lack of an own-being in the dependent, even though [the dependent] exists on the level of apparent [truth] as an own-being which arises from something else, it does not exist as an own-being which arises from itself, and is not in the least established in reality. In this way, the two lack an own-being, because they are ran stan. As to the true nature of phenomena, the perfect, or the basis of the non-existence of these two (i.e., the imagined and dependent), even though it is not the case that it lacks an own-being, it is the basis for the lack of an own-being in the phenomena of apparent [truth], which are different from [this basis]. Therefore it is the own-being of the ultimate truth, or the "body belonging to the own-being" (sviibhiivikakaya)ll7.

That the ultimate basis of emptiness is restricted to the unchangeable perfect becomes clear in the following passage where the perfect in terms of being unmistaken is equated with the form-kayas of the apparent truth:

Thus the ultimate Buddha is the kiiya of the five self-arisen wisdoms. He abides permanently in the form of [these] five wisdoms, which are suchness and the unchangeable perfect. The form-kiiyas of the apparent [truth] possess correct wisdom, namely the perfect in terms of being unmistaken, and [thus] the wisdom of the Mahayana[ -path] of no more learning which is not beyond moments ll8.

Il7 Ibid., 319,11. 16-24: lam btags no bo med pa ni ran gi mtshan iiid kyis med pa ste kun rdzob tsam mam log pa'i kun rdzob tu grub pa tsam las kun rdzob bden pa'am yan dag kun rdzob tu yan ma grub bo / gian dba/i no bo fiid med pa ni kun rdzob tu gian las skye ba'i no bar yod kyan ran las skye ba'i no bar med cin yan dag par na cir yan ma grub pa ste de ltar de gfiis ni ran stan yin pa 'i phyir ran gi no bo med pa' 0 / / de gfiis med pa'i gii chos fiid yons grub ni ran gi no bo med pa ma yin yan de las gian pa kun rdzob kyi chos rnams kyi no bo fiid med pa 'i gii yin pa 'i phyir don dam bden pa'i no bo ste no bo iiid kyi sku ....

118 Ibid., 356, L 22-357, L 2: de [tar don dam pa'i Sa/is rgyas ni ran byun ye ses lna'i sku yin la / de yan de Min fiid dan 'gyur med yons grub fiid ye ses lnar rtag tu biugs pa'o


For Dol po pa, the ultimate is beyond moments and the three times (i.e., the past, present and future). The permanence of the ultimate wisdom is thus not an ordinary permanence as opposed to impermanence, but one that is, as Taranatha puts it, beyond these latter two categories. To be sure, for Dol po pa all kayas have an ultimate aspect that is beyond the three times:

That the permanent Buddha and the liberation of the Buddha are form, that even space is the form of the Buddha, and so forth - the meaning of such statements must be understood in the context of forms etc. being explained [on the level] of suchness or as forms etc. which are beyond the three times and the threefold world1!9.

Such an extreme form of transcendence explains Dol po pa's sharp distinction between the ultimate and apparent truths - which he defines with the phrase: "a difference in terms of a negation of an identity" (gcig pa bkag pa'i tha dad pa). From this it does not follow, though, that the two truths are different entities 120 , but simply that the ultimate exists and the apparent does not (negation of identity). To be sure, since there is only one essence for Dol po pa, namely that of the ultimate, it does not make sense to speak of an essential difference, since this would require the existence of another essence from which it differs. This also means that Dol po pa's distinction between ultimate and apparent kiiyas does not entail the absurd ontological view that there really are two different sets of kiiyas 121• It is rather that only the ultimate kiiyas exist ontologically. The kiiyas of apparent truth, which are equated with the perfect in terms of being unmistaken, do not really exist, any more than the apparent world does. Still, on the level of apparent truth they are produced to the same extent as the accidental stains of the apparent truth are removed (which

/ / kun rdzob gzugs kyi sku ni yan dag ye ses phyin ci ma log pa'i yons grub dan ldan pa ste theg chen mi slob pa'i ye ses skad cig las ma 'das pa dan [dan pa'o /.

119 Ibid., 142,11. 17-9: sans rgyas rtag pa dan sans rgyas kyi thar pa gzugs yin pa dan nam mkha' yan sans rgyas kyi gzugs yin / zes pa la sogs pa'i don ni f. .. J de biin fiid kyi gzugs sogs dan/ khams gsum dan dus gsum las 'das pa'i gzugs sogs ies pa la sogs pa 'chad par 'gyur pa'i skabs su rig par bya ....

120 See Dol po pa: "bDen gills gsal ba'i iii rna", 23, 11. 2-3: bden pa gfiis ni no bo de fiid dan gian du brjod du med pa gcig pa bkag pa 'i tha dad pa yin te I.

121 See also Broido (1989:88), who has made the same observation with regard to two sets of skandhas in the Ri chos nes don rgya mtsho.


enables the ultimate to manifest on the level of apparent truth), and in this sense there are accumulations of merit and wisdom. Taranatha's restriction of the perfect to its unchangeable aspect is thus perfectly in line with the position of Dol po pa. .

Things become a bit more complicated in the case of Sakya mchog ldan. Even later Tibetan thinkers had difficulties in pinning down his positionl22. To give an example, in his short presentation of the Buddhanature which was written in 1474123, Sakya mchog ldan endorses Bu ston Rin chen grub's (1290-1364) and Sa skya paIJQ.ita's (1182-1251) Madhyamaka hermeneutics124 of ascribing a provisional meaning (neyiirtha) to the tathiigatagarbha theory. But in difference no. 21 Sakya mchog ldan is said to hold that the seeds of the fruit (Buddhahood) are naturally present in the form of the natural luminosity of mind. This is strikingly similar to the position of 'Gos Lo tsa ba gZon nu dpal (1392-1481), who speaks of "subtle qualities" or "seeds of qualities" in the mind-stream of sentient beings. By explaining a natural growth of qualities, gZon nu dpal is able to read the Ratnagotravibhiiga as a teaching with definitive meaning (nftiirtha), without being forced to accept the ontological consequences of the tathiigatagarbha theoryl25. It is likely that Sakya mchog ldan later adopted such a stance, Taranatha being right in this point, but only a careful study of Sakya mchog ldan'sworks written after 1484 will tell.

The notion in points 1-4 that ran ston is more profound when mental fabrications are cut through with the help of the view finds support in Sakya mchog ldan's Dharmadharmatiivibhiiga commentary, in which the commentator shows that the teaching of a transformation of the basis (iisrayapariv[tti) does not contradict the Svatantrika and PrasaIigika views 126.

122 For a short description of Sakya mchog ldan' s position see also Tillemans & Tomabechi (1995: 891-6).

123 Slikya mchog ldan: "Saris rgyas gyi sifui. po'i mam bsad mdo rgyud kyi sifui. po", 136, 1. 3.

124 See Seyfort Ruegg 1973:29-33. 125 See Mathes 2002:88-9. In his Ratnagotravibhiiga commentary, gZon nu dpal refers

to these qualities in sentient beings as "seeds" (see Mathes 2003: 121, 11. 6-7). 126 Slikya mchog Idan: "Byams chos ma'i lam gyi rim pa", 154,11. 1-7. See also Mathes

1996:176.


A comparison with the "Zab ii spros bral gyi Mad pa"127 shows that Taranatha also got the main points of Siikya mchog Idan's definition of the basis of emptiness and the negandum right. Tiiranatha's difference no. 14, though, which has Siikya mchog ldan equating the emptiness of the dependent from the imagined with the ultimate which is empty of the apparent, is problematic. In fact, Siikya mchog ldan takes the dependent to exist ultimately only when describing Cittamatra. Thus he says in his "Sill rta srol gfiis mam dbye"128: , ~

Outside objects and what is explained as general characteristics are the imagined, and empty of an own-being. What appears as [the imagined] through mental imprints is the dependent and truly established. Emptiness which [is taken as] the basis of negation (the dependent), empty of the negandum (the imagined), is the perfect. Therefore it is the ultimate truth129•

The Yogacaras, on the other hand, who according to Siikya mchog Idan130 belong to the Madhyamaka, are not said to claim the ultimate existence of the dependent nature. Ultimate truth is equated rather with the unchangeable perfect nature:

The Yogaciiras explain: "The imagined is empty of an own-being, and the dependent empty of an other-being. The remainder left over as something which does not lack an own-being is precisely the nature of the dependent. or the so-called perfect. [ ... ] When both Madhyamikas (i.e., the Yogaciiras and the Asvabhavavadins) postulate what must be meditated upon or experienced in the meditative equipoise of the Noble Ones, their perception is in mutual accordance: both explain it as the wisdom of dharmadhiitu. When labelling it after rising from meditative equipoise, they differ: The Yogaciiras label it [the experiential] wisdom of dharmadhiitu or non-dual wisdom, which goes by the name "unchangeable perfect" - the actual ultimate truth,

127 I.e., the two passage (114, 11.3-4 & 114,1. 7 -115,1) quoted above in the first paragraph of this paper.

12' According to Dreyfus (1997:29) this work was written in 1489. 129 Sakya mchog ldan: "Sill rta srol gfiis mam dbye", 476, II. 3-5: [sems tsam pa'i

mnam biag gi ltaba ni ... des drans pa'i rjes thob kyi grub mtha' niJ phyi Tal gyi don dan spyi mtshan du b§ad pa rnamsni kun btags dan ran gi no bas stan pa'a II bags chags kyis der snan ba ni gian dban dan bden par grub pa' a II dgag gii gian dban de dgag bya kun btags kyis stan pa'i stan pa nid ni yans grub dan I des na don dam pa'i bden pa'a I.

130 The Y ogaciira treatises on the Maitreya works, for example, are taken to go beyond Cittamatra and thus to be in accordance with the intention of the Madhyamaka. See Sakya mchog ldan: "Byams chos ma'i nes don rab tu gsa! ba", 6, 11.3-7; and Mathes 1996:174.


the supreme self, the permanent, stable, quiescent, steady and truly established.l3l

In other words, Sakya mchog ldan restricts the ultimate truth in the same way as the Jonangpas to the unchangeable perfect nature, which is also equated with wisdom. Against the background of this passage, the quintessence of Taranatha's comparison of Dol po pa with Siikya mchog ldan, namely that they take wisdom to be resepectively per:manent and impermanent, appears questionable. The main difference is rather that Sakya mchog ldan does not define gzan stan as the ultimate being empty of the apparent, but includes the dependent nature within the basis of negation. This is also clear in the following passage from the "Zab ii spros bral gyi Mad pa", where Sakya mchog ldan disagrees with a popular gzan stan position:

The apparent [truth], [comprising] all conditioned entities, is empty of an own-being (raft stOli), while the ultimate, everything!32 unconditioned, is empty of other (gian stoft). This explanation is the assertion of the great Madhyamika Vasubandhu, for this is how it is explained in the Brhartfhi. Such an explanation does not hold true, since it is not in accordance with the basic Maitreya works, and contradicts the clear gian stoft teachings of the indisputable works of Asanga and his brother as well as the text tradition of Dignaga and his disciple133.

131 Sakya mchog ldan: "Sill rta sro! gfiis mam dbye", 483, 1. 7 -484,1. 4: mal 'byor spyod pa pas ni / kun btags ran gi no bas stan pa dan / gzan dban gzan gyi no bas stan pa dan / de 'i suI du ran gi no bas mi stan par Ius pa ni / gzan dban gi no bo' am yons grub ces bya ba de iiid do lZes 'chad f. .. ] dbu rna pa de giiis ka yan 'phags pa'i mfiam gzag gis bsgom bya'am mfiam su myon bya zig khas len pa'i tshe nos 'dzin tshul ni mthun pa yin te / gfiis kas kyan chos kyi dbyins kyi ye ses la 'chad pas so / mfiam gzag de las lans pa'i rjes thob tu tha sfiad 'dogs tshul ni mi mthun pa yin te / mal 'byor spyod pa pas ni 'gyur ba med pa 'i yons grub ces bya ba'i min can / chos dbyins ye ses sam gfiis su med pa'i ye ses de fiid don dam pa'i bden pa dnos dan / bdag dam pa dan / rtag brtan zi ba g.yun drun dan / bden par grub pa iiid du tha sfiad 'dogs par byed la!.

132 The plura! particle shows that there is more than one unconditioned element. 133 Sakya mchog ldan: "Zab ii spros bra! gyi biad pa", 117,11.1-3: kun rdzob 'dus

byas kyi dnos po thams cad ran ston dan / don dam 'dus rna byas mams gzan ston du 'chad pa ., di ni dbu rna pa chen po dbyig gfien gyi bied pa yin te / yum gyi gnod 'jams las de ltar Mad pa'i phyir / zes 'chad pa ni rigs pa rna yin te / / rje btsun gyi gzun rtsa ba dan mi mthun zin / thogs med sku mched kyi gzun rtsod med mams dan / phyogs glan yab sras kyi gzun lugs las gian ston gi 'chad tshul gsal par gsuns pa mams dan' gal ba 'i phyir ro !.

TARANATHA'S "TWENTY-ONE DlFFERENCES" 317

Sakya mchog ldan continues by presenting his own definition of gian stan based on the Madhyantavibhiiga, namely that the dependent is empty of the imagined, and explains:

Just as in the lines: "False imagining [equated with the dependent nature] exists. Duality is not found in it"134 the dependent is "phenomena" (dharmin), or the basis of emptiness, and both [aspects of the] imagined, the perceived object and the perceiving subject, are the neganda, or that of which [the dependent] is empty. There is an e~planation of the wisdom beyond the duality of a perceived object and the perceiving subject as an entity which is empty, but [the latter] is not taken as the subject, or the basis of emptiness 135.

It should be noted that for Sakya mchog ldan the dependent nature, or false imagining, exists in terms of its own-being, specific marks and its own nature, but not truly, on the level of ultimate truth, or in reality. It is like an illusion136• This presentation is based on the reasonable interpretation of the Y ogacara works as implying that the dependent nature only exists on the level of apparent truth. Sakya mchog ldan is, of course, well aware that in the Ratnagotravibhiiga and the B[ha{tfka the perfect

.. nature is taken to be empty of the imagined 137.

134 MA VBh, 17, L 16 (MA V Dab): abhiltaparikalpa 'sti dvayan tatra na vidyate i. 135 Sakya mchog Idan: "Zab ii spros bral gyi biad pa", 117, L 5: ji skad du / yan dag

ma yin kun rtag yad / / de la gnis po yad ma yin / ies 'byun ba ltar / gian dban stan gii'i chas can dan / gzun 'dzin kun btags (text: brtags) gnis po gan gis stan pa'i dgag bya dan / gzun 'dzin gnis med kyi ye ses la stan pa'i dnas par Mad pa ies bya ba zig yad pa yin gyi / stan gzi'i chas can du 'jog pa ma yin te I.

136 Ibid., 115, L 3: de ltar na gian dban yan dag pa ma yin pa'i kun tu rtag pa zes bya ba ran biin kyis yad pa dan / ran gi mtshan nid kyis dan / ran gi no bas yad pa ni yin la / bden pa dan / don dam par dan / de kha na nid du yad pa ni ma yin te sgrub byed go rim Min du / dgag bya dag gnis kyis stan pa'i phyir dan / don dam pa'i bden pa ma yin pa'i phyir dan / de kha na nid ma yin pa'i phyir dan / sgyu ma biin no I.

137 Sakya mchog Idan: "Sin rta chen po'i srol gfiis mam dbye", 520, 11. 2-3: rgyud bla ma dan yum gyi gnad 'jams su chos nid yans grub dgag bya kun btags kyis ston par Mad pa' o. In other words, here again the dependent nature is not included in the negandum. The Brha{flkii (Karmapa Tanjur (T6hoku no. 3808), ses phyin, pha, 572, 1. 5) supports the Jonangpas, however, in that the ultimate, or the perfect nature, is defined as "that which is free from these names (roughly referring to the imagined nature in the Brhattlkti) and the forms of mistaken appearances (i.e., the dependent nature)," and that which is ineffable and the form of signlessness." (gan min dan / phyin ci log tu snan ba 'j mam pa de dan bral ba brjod du med pa / mtshan ma med pa 'i mam pa gan yin pa de ni don dam pa yans su grub pa'i no bo nid de I).

a The expression "forms of mistaken appearances" defInes the dependent nature: "The forms, which, under the sway of ignorance and so forth, appear to the consciousness in a


From what has been said till now, it is clear that the way Taranatha summarizes Sakya mchog ldan's view on trisvabhava is not strictly accurate. Even though the dependent nature is undoubtedly taken to be the basis of negation, Siikya mchog ldan describes it as existing ultimat~ly only in the Cittamatra, but not in the Y ogacara. And it is the presentation of the trisvabhava in the Yogacara which reflects his own gzan stan view. It is also questionable whether wisdom is really only a conditioned entity for him; as we have seen above, Siikya mchog ldan explains the unchangeable (!) perfect nature as being non-dual wisdom.

4. The Theory of trisvabhiiva in the Madhyiintavibhiiga and Its Commentaries

The trisvabhava theory of the Madhyantavibhaga plays an important role not only for those gzan stan pas who define the basis of emptiness in line with Yogacara, but also the Jonangpas, whose main doctrinal support otherwise is the tathagatagarbha theory. How is it possible, though, that such different positions on emptiness can be doctrinally supported by one and the same text?

The main focus for the proponents of both "Yogacara gzan stan" and "Tathagatagarbha gzan stan" lies on the initial two stanzas of the first chapter of the Madhyantavibhaga, in which the Middle Path is defined by three philosophical propositions: (a) false imagining exists; (b) subject-object duality, though created by false imagining, is not found in the latter itself; (c) false imagining is found in relation to emptiness in

. the sense that emptiness is found in false imagining as its true nature138•

mistaken way as phenomena, are the dependent nature." (rna rig pa la sags pa'i dban gis mam par ses pa la chos mams su phyin ci log tu snan ba'i mam pa gan yin pa de ni gian dban gi no bo fiid do I, ibid. 572, ll. 4-5).

138 While (a) and (b) are the padas MA V 1.1a and I.lb, proposition (c) reflects the double locative relationship between false imagining and emptiness in the second part of MA V 1.1 (But emptiness is found there (i.e., in false imagining) and [false imagining] is found in relation to it (i.e., emptiness) as we/I). If the second locative (tasyam, i.e., siinyatayam) is taken literally in the sense that x is found in y, and y in x, x would be y. Total identity, however, of false imagining and emptiness can be excluded on the grounds that the fIrst is considered to be conditioned and the latter not (cf. MA VBh on I.2). I therefore suggest the preliminary translation "in relation to" for the two locatives.


One has to bear in mind that the root text, which does not make much use of trisvabhiiva 'terms in the initial stanzas, equates the perceived object with the imagined nature, false imagining with the dependent nature, and the absence of duality, or emptiness, with the perfect nature in MA V I.S.

As I have already noted in my paper on Taranatha's "gZan ston sfiiIi po" 139, the relationship between false imagining and emptiness can be variously defined along the lines of two different trisvabhiiva models, in

. the Madhyiintavibhiiga and its Indian commentaries. The central focus of the fIrst model, which is mainly based on the first section of the first chapter (MAV I.l-11), lies on a false imagining or dependent nature which at times is taken to exist ultimately, though not by Maitreya and Vasubandhu. Duality and emptiness are just two different aspects of false imagining, namely the way it appears and the way it really is. In the second section (MA V 1.12-22) a positively understood emptiness (comparable to suchness or the Buddha-element in the RGV) replaces false imagining at the centre of the old equation. It is now emptiness, defined as natural luminosity, which can appear in two modes, either as being

. accompanied by adventitious stains (under which false imagining is included) or free from these stains (see below). This results in two trisvabhiiva models which come close to what Sponberg (1981 :99) calls the pivotal and progressive exegetical model of trisvabhiiva. The first model is centred on the dependent nature as a bearer of the perfect, which latter is understood as something abstract, like the state of suffering or impermanence. In the progressive model the focus lies more on an emptiness which pervades or transcends all phenomena of the dependent nature. This all-pervading emptiness possesses positive qualities and can exist, contrary to the fIrst model, in its own right. The three natures represent three levels, each revealing a progressively deeper degree of reality140,

This leads to the question whether the Madhyiintavibhiiga takes the dependent nature as existing on the level of ultimate truth 141, One might

139 Mathes 2000: 195-223. 140 See Mathes 2000:204-14. 141 This is what TSOIi kha pa (1357-1419), for example, claims on the basis ofMA VT I.1,

where the verse abhiltaparikalpo 'sti is glossed as svabhavatal:z. A little further down Sthiramati does not object to an opponent's claim of its ultimate existence: "[Opp.:] If thus duality was entirely non-existent, like a hare's horn, and false imagining existed ultimately


argue that the Y ogacara does not distinguish existence on two levels of truths, its trisvabhava theory being rather an alternative to the apparent and ultimate truths of the Madhyamaka142• Many passages in the Madhyantavibhiiga support this. This becomes particularly evident in the third chapter (on reality), where older concepts relating to truth/reality, such as the four noble truths of early Buddhism or the apparent and ultimate truth of the Madhyamaka, are explained in terms of the new trisvabhava. Even the noble truth of cessation is subsumed under the scheme of the imagined, dependent and perfect natures. A continuity between mainstream Buddhist thought and Y ogacara is thereby established. It is noteworthy, however, that in the case of the ultimate truth of the Madhyamaka only the perfect nature is accepted as a fit candidate for it, the dependent nature, or false imagining, being dismissed as something to be ultimately given up. If one applies this to the definition of the madhyama pratipat in MA V 1.1-2, it would be safe to say that the propositions "the existence of false imagining" (MA V l.la) and "the non-existence of duality" (MA V I.1b) refer to the level of apparent truth, while "the mutual existence of false imagining and emptiness" (MA V LIed) defInes the relation between apparent and ultimate truth. Resorting to two levels of truth not only explains the initial stanzas in a meaningful way, but also resolves some of the tensions between the two parallel trisvabhiiva models mentioned above. And this is exactly what Santarak~ita did when he explained the theory of trisvabhava in terms of his favoured Yogacara-Svatantrika-Madhyamaka143•

The first chapter of the Madhyantavibhaga is divided into two sections, one on false imagining and the other on emptiness. While the latter is in perfect harmony with the Ratnagotravibhaga, the former seems to draw on older strands of more conservative Y ogacara material. Vasubandhu (and to some extent also the author of the root text) nevertheless managed to harmonize the originally unbalanced strands. In MA V l.1 false imagining and emptiness are said to mutually exist in each other, and based on this Vasubandhu defines emptiness in his bha~a as

in its own right. ... " (Sanskrit in brackets reconstructed: [yadi evam dva jyam sasavi~a1Javat sarvathii nasti / abhUtaparikalpas ca paramarthata~ svabhiivato 'sty ... , MA Vr, 10,11. 17-9). See Thurman 1989:226-8.

142 See Boquist 1993: 17-22. 143 See Lindtner 1997: 193.

TARANA.THA'S "TWENTY-ONE DIFFERENCES" 321

"the state of this false imagining being free from the relation of a perceived object and perceiving subject"l44.

Whereas emptiness is simply taken here as a property of the dominant "false imagining", the latter hardly matters in the definition of emptiness in the second part of the first chapter, where emptiness is not only the absence of something in false imagining, but something more positive, the own-being of non-duality, which is associated with positive attributes such as the natural luminosity of the mind. In fact, in MA V 1.22 emptiness is defined in the same way as in the Ratnagotravibhaga:

[Emptiness is] neither defiled nor undefiled, neither pure nor impure. (MA V I.22ab) How is it that it is neither defiled nor impure? It is because of the natural luminosity of mind (MA V I.22c). How is it that it is neither undefiled nor pure? It is because of the adventitious nature of defilements (MA V I.22d)145.

It is obvious that the natural luminosity of the mind has taken the place offalse imagining here146• That the latter cannot truly partake of the luminous nature is clear from a passage in the Siigaramatiparip[ccha quoted in RGVV 1.68, in which the example of an ever-pure vai¢urya stone drawn out from mud is taken to illustrate the relation between the luminous mind and accidental stains:

In the same way, 0 Sagaramati, the Bodhisattva knows the naturalluminosity of the mind of sentient beings. He also perceives that it is defiled by adventitious defilements. Then the Bodhisattva thinks as follows: These defilements would never penetrate into the natural luminosity of the mind of sentient beings. These adventitious defilements have sprung from false imagining147.

144 MAVBh, 18, II. 2-3: sunyatii tasyiibhutaparikalpasya griihyagriihakabhiivena virahitii.

145 MAVBh, 27, 11. 5-9: na klilf!ii niipi viiklilf!ii suddhii 'suddhii na caiva sii I katham na klilftii niipi casuddhii I prak[tyaiva I prabhiisvaratviic cittasya I katham niiklilffii na suddhii I kleiasyiigantukatvatalJ I.

146 What is defmed as all defilements (samklda) in MA V 1.10-1 can here only be the adventitious defilements.

147 RGVV, 49, 11. 9-12: evam eva sagaramate bodhisattvalJ sattviiniim prak[tiprabhiisvaratiim cittasya prajiinati I tiim punar iigantukopakleSopaklilf!iim pasyati I tatra bodhisattvasyaivam bhavati I naite kldiif:z sattviiniim cittaprak[tiprabhiisvaratiiyiim pravilftiif:z I iigantuka ete kldii abhiltaparikalpasamutthitiif:z /.


It is now luminosity which is centred on and occurs in two modes, one of which is being stainless and thus even free from the false iinagining which causes these adventitious stains. That the natural luminosity of the mind refers to an originally pure nature of the mind in the Madhyantavibhaga, too, becomes clear in stanza I.16, on the differentiation of emptiness:

How should the differentiation of emptiness be known? As being defiled as well as pure (MA V I.16a). Thus is its differentiation. In which state is it defiled and in which is it pure? It is accompanied as well as not accompanied by stains. (MA V I.16b) When it occurs together with stains it is defiled, and when its stains are abandoned it is pure. If, after being accompanied by stains it becomes stainless, how is it then not impermanent, given that it has the property of change? This is because its purity is considered to be like the one of water, gold and space. (MA V I.16cd) [A change is admitted] in view of the removal of adventitious stains, but there is no change in terms of its own-beingI48 •

It should be noted how the terms "defiled" and "pure" of the first section are explicitly equated with the iinported terminology "accompanied by stains" and "stainless". The latter doubtlessly stem from the Ratnagotravibhaga, where the Buddha-nature is defined as suchness accompanied by stains (samala tathata) and the transformation of the basis as stainless suchness (nirmala tathata).

To sum up, the Madhyantavibhiiga combines the traditional Y ogacara formula "the perfect is the dependent empty of the imagined" with strands from the tathiigatagarbha theory, according to which an unconditioned149

Buddha-element is empty of adventitious stains, but not of the inseparable Buddha-qualities 150.

148 MA VBh 24, 11. 4-13: katham siinyataya/:t prabhedo jiieya/:t I samklilitii ca visuddhii ca / ity asyii/:t prabheda/:t / kasyam avasthiiyam samklilita kasyam visuddhii I samalii nirmalii ca sii / yada saha malena varttate tada samkli~ta / yada prah17:zamala tada visuddhii I yadi samala bhiitva nirmala bhavati katham vikaradharmilJftvad anitya na bhavati / yasmad asya/:t abdhiitukanakiikiisasuddhivac chuddir iliyate II agantukamalapagaman na tu tasya/:t svabhiivanyatvam bhavati /.

149 See ROY 1.5-6, where Buddhahood is taken to be without beginning or end and thus unconditioned (ROVV, 7, 1. 14-8,1. 1: "Buddhahood is unconditioned. [ ... ] As having neither beginning, middle nor end by nature, it is unconditioned." asamsk[tam [. .. J buddhatvam £ ... J 1/ anadimadhyanidhanaprak[tiatvad asamsk[tam I).

a Johnston reads -prak[ta-. 150 ROVV, 76, 11. 3-4 (ROY I.155): "The [Buddha]-element is empty of adventitious

[stains], which have the defining characteristic of being separable; but it is not empty of


-Ilowever one wishes to combine these two formulas, a consistent reading of the MadhYiintavibhiiga requires, as I already pointed out in my paper on Taranatha's "gZan s~oi:J. sfiiIi po", operating with the Ma!ihyamaka distinction of two truths, and following MA V III. I 0 in accepting

. only the perfect nature as the ultimate truth. In doing so, one should not overlook the fact of two models of trisvabhiiva which reflect varied, hot yet completely harmonized strands of thought. In this respect, the Madhyiintavibhiiga does not differ from other texts of the early Yogacara school in not only drawing on early Mahayana thought but also featuring a rich background of Abhidharma analysis. Sthiramati's uncertainty about 'the ontological status of false imagining may thus reflect the Abhidharmic background of this early Yogacara material. Thus, it is generally asserted in the HInayana schools that conditioned, dependently arising entities really exist151• On the other hand, such a stance would of course be incomilatible with a Madhyamaka understanding of the Yogacara, which is at least attempted in some passages.

is. Conclusion'

Both Sakya mchog ldan and Dol po pa profit from the tensions between . different trisvabhiiva models in the pertinent passages of the Madhyiintavibhiiga and its commentaries, and follow the exegetical solution by restricting the ontological status of false imagining to the level of apparent truth. But from this point onwards the two masters depart from each other. Sakya mchog ldan remains more faithful to the Yogacara, in taking the dependent nature as being empty of the imagined. What remains in emptiness is thus not only an unchangeable perfect nature, but also the perfect in terms of being unmistaken. This is similar to Rail byuIi rdo

unsurpassable qualities, which have the defining characteristic of not being separable." (siinya iigantukair dhiituly. savinirbhiigalak~a/Jaily. / a§unyo 'nuttarail; dharmair avinirbhiigalak~tllJaily. /1).

151 See v. Rospatt (1995:69ff.), who observes that in the early Yogaciira the contradiction between Abhidhanna and Mahayana ontology was solved by more or less incorporating the doctrine of the existence of momentary caused entities into the description of the dependent nature. The Mahayana stance that the momentariness of the dharmas means nothing other than their mere non-existence could then be comfortably brought into line with the imagined nature of the trisvabhiiva doctrine.


rje's "mere appearance", which corresponds to the apparent truth included in the Buddha-nature. Following the Y ogacara definition of emptiness in such a way, the Ratnagotravibhiiga must be interpreted in term~ of a Buddha-nature which is inside time and thus consists of moments. This allows for a theory of seeds which naturally grow into the qualities of a Buddha. For Sakya mchog ldan, the basis of emptiness is thus not the ultimate truth alone. In other words, his Yogacara-based gian ston is not defined along the lines of an ultimate being empty of the apparent. .

Dol po pa, on the other hand, follows more the Ratnagotravibhiiga when defining his gian ston: an unconditioned Buddha-element interpreted as being completely transcendent (beyond the world and time)lS2 is taken to be empty of adventitious stains. Such a tathiigatagarbha-based gian ston requires reinterpreting the trisvabhiiva theory by taking a perfect nature restricted to its unchangeable aspect as the basis of negation. Given the Ratnagotravibhiiga elements in the Madhyiintavibhiiga, such an interpretation is not completely out of question. One could argue in support of Dol po pa, that Sakya mchog ldan's gian ston interpretation of the first part of the first chapter in the Madhyiintavibhiiga which is centered on false imagining or the dependent nature defInes in a first step the emptiness of the correct apparent from the false apparent. From that one still has to go one step further, though, and explain the emptiness of the ultimate from the correct (and false) apparent in line with the Ratnagotravibhiiga.

Bibliography

INDIAN TEXTS

B[hatrika (Tibetan translation) Quoted from the Kannapa Tanjur (= Tohoku no. 3808). Rumtek/Delhi 198? (no date).

MA V: MadhyantavibhCiga. See MadhyantavibhCigabhCi.rya MA VBh: MadhyantavibhCigabhCi.rya

Ed. by Gadjin M. Nagao. Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964.

152 It is not the case though, that all parts of the Ratnagotravibhiiga explain Buddhanature or Buddha-hood in such a way. Thus the explanations of the three kayas in the second chapter rather suggest that the latter constantly remain in samsiira - and thus in time -as long as sentient beings need help (see Takasaki 1966: 331-5).

TARANATHA'S "TWENTY-ONE DIFFERENCES"

MA VT: Madhy{mtavibhiiga{lkii Ed. by S. Yamaguchi. Nagoya: Librairie Hajinkaku, 1934. See also NGMPP reel no. A 38/10.

RGV: Ratnagotravibhiiga Mahayiinottaratantrasiistra

325

Ed. by Edward H. Johnston. Patna: The Bihar Research Society, 1950. (fucludes the Ratnagotravibhiigavyiikhyii)

RGVV: Ratnagotravibhiigavyiikhyii. See Ratnagotravibhiiga

TIBETAN TEXTS

Karma 'Phrin las pa "Dris Ian yid kyi mUll sel ies bya ba Icags mo'i dris Ian biugs so". The Songs of Esoteric Practice (mGur) and Replies to Doctrinal Questions (Dris Ian) of Karma 'Phrin las pa, 88-92. Reproduced from prints of the 1539 Rin chen ri bo blocks. New Delhi: Ngawang Topgay 1975.

Karma pa Ran byun rdo rje (the Third Karmapa) dBu ma chos dbyins bstod pa'i mam par bsad pa biugs so. 52 fols., dbu med, unpublished. Zab mo nan gi don ies bya ba'i giun biugs so (block print). Published together with the rNam ses ye ses 'byed pa and the bDe bar bsegs pa'i siiin po bstan pa. Rumtek Monastery: 1970. Ran 'grel: Zab mo nan gi don gsal bar byed pa'i 'grel pa biugs so (block print). No place, no date. (The work itself was composed at the 0 rgyan kyi mkhan po padma 'byuil gnas kyi sgrub gnas in 1325 (fo1. 92b6)).

Kon sprul BIo gros mtha' yas: rGyud bla ma'i bsad srol: Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'j bstan bcos siiin po'i don mnon sum lam gyi Mad srol dan sbyar ba'i mampar 'grel paphyir mi ldog pa sen ge'i na ro ies bya ba biugs so. Rumtek Monastery: no date. Zab mo nan gi don gyi 'grel pa: rNal 'byor bia na med pa'i rgyud sde rgya mtsho siiin po bsdus pa zab mo nan gi don iiun nu'i tshig gis mam par 'grel ba zab don snan byed. Rumtek Monastery: 1970. Ses bya kun khyab mdzod. Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khan, 1982.

'Gos Lo tsa ba gZon nu dpal Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos kyi 'grei Mad de kho na iiid rab tu gsal ba'i me Ion. Ed. by Klaus-Dieter Mathes (Nepal Research Centre Publications 24). Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2003.

Taranatha: . "gZan ston sfiiil po", rJe btsun tiiraniitha'i gsun 'bum biugs so, vol. 4, 491-514. Collected Works. Leh: Namgyal and Tsewang Tarn, 1982-5.

~ "Zab don fier gcig pa bZugs so", op. cit., vol. 4, 781-95 Dol po pa Ses rab rgyal mtshan:

"bKa bsdu bii pa'i don gtan tshigs chen po", Kun mkhyen dol po'i gsun 'bum, . Vol. ka, 363-418. Delhi: Jamyang Khyentse, 1984. Jo nan ri chos nes don rgya mtsho. Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khan, 1998.

326 . KLAUS-DIETER MATHES

[Ni ma'i 'od zer:] "Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos legs Mad iii ma'i 'od zer". The 'Dzam-thang Edition of the Collected Works of Kunmkhyen Dol-po-pa Shes-rab rgyal-mtshan, vol. 4 (rna), 883-1161. Delhi: Shedrup Books, 1992. "bDen giiis gsal ba'i iii ma", Kun mkhyen dol po pa'i gsun 'bum, 1-45. Published by Jamyang Khyentse. Kathmandu: Shechen Publications, no date.

'Ba' ra ba rGyal mtshan dpal bzail "Chos rje mam gills kyi dgons Mad iii ma'i 'od zer". A TIbetan Encyclopedia of Buddhist Scholasticism. The Collected Writings of 'Ba' ra bq rgyal mtshan dpal bzan, vol. 11,496-557. Dehra Dun: Ngawang Gyaltsen and Ngawang Lungtok, 1970.

Sa bzang Mati paIJ. chen 'Jam dbyangs Blo gros rgyal mtshan "Theg pa chen po'i rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos kyi mam par Mad pa nes don rab gsal snail ba". Sa skyapa'i mkhas pa rnams kyi gsun skor, vol. 4,1-520. Kathmandu: Khenpo Abbey, 1999.

gSer mdog paIJ. chen Sakya mchog ldan "Byams chos ma'i nes don rab tu gsal ba ies bya ba'i bstan bcos biugs so", gSer mdog pan chen siikya mchog ldan gyi gsun 'bum legs bsad gser gyi bdud rtsi glegs bam, vol. 11, 1-38. Collected Works. Thimphu: Kunzang Topgey, 1975. "Byams chos ma'i lam gyi rim pa gsal bar byed pa'i bstan bcos rin chen sgron gyi sgo 'byed ces bya ba bzugs so", op. cit., vol. 11,39-155 "Zab ii spros bral gyi biad pa ston fiid bdud rtsi'i lam po che zes bya ba biugs so", op. cit., vol. 4, 107-207 . "SiD. rta chen po'i srol giiis kyi mam par dbye ba Mad nas nes don gdg tu sgrub pa'i bstan bcos kyi rgyas 'grel biugs so", op. cit., vol. 2, 471-619. "Sails rgyas gyi sfiiiJ. po'i mam Mad mdo rgyud kyi sfiiiJ. po", op. cit., vol. 13, 124-136.

OTHER WORKS

Boquist, Me (1993). Trisvabhiiva: A Study of the Three-nature-theory in Yogiiciira Buddhism. Studies in African and Asian Religions 8. Lund: Department of History of Religion, University of Lund. .

Broido, Michael M. (1989). "The Jo-nang-pas on Madhyamaka: A Sketch". TIbet Joumal14, no. 1,86-91.

Dreyfus, Georges B.J. (1997). Recognizing Reality (SUNY Series in Buddhist Studies). New York: SUNY

Hookham, Susan K. (1991). The Buddha Within (SUNY Series in Buddhist Studies). New York: SUNY.

Kapstein, Matthew T; (1992). "Introduction", in The 'Dzam-thang Edition of the Collected Works of Kun-mkhyen Dol-po-pa Shes-rab rgyal-mtshan. Delhi: Shedrup Books.

TARAN.ATHA'S "TWENTY-ONE DIFFERENCES" 327

.~. (2000). The Tibetan Assimilation of Buddhism: Conversion, Contestation and Memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lindtner, Christian (1997). "Cittamatra in Indian Mahayana until KamalasIla", WZKS 41, 159-206.

Makransky, John J. (1997). Buddhahood Embodied. New York: SUNY. Mathes, Klaus-Dieter (1996). Unterscheidung der Gegebenheiten von ihrem

wahren Wesen (Dharmadharmatavibhtiga) (Indica et Tibetica 26). SwisttalOdendorf: Indica et Tibetica Verlag .

...,-. (1998). "Vordergriindige und hochste Wahrheit im gZan ston-Madhyamaka". Anniiherung an das Fremde. XXVI. Deutscher Orientalistentag vom 25. bis 29.9. in Leipzig. Ed. by H. Preissler and H. Stein. Zeitschrijt der Deutschen Morgenliindischen Gesellschaft 11, 457-468.

_. (2000). "Taranatha's Presentation of trisvabhtiva in the gZan ston sfiin po". JIABS 23, no. 2, 195-223.

-. (2002). "'Gos Lo tsa ba gZon nu dpal' s Extensive Commentary on and Study of the Ratnagotravibhtigavyakhya". Religion and Secular Culture in Tibet, 79-96. Tibetan Studies n. Proceedings of the International Association of Tibetan Studies 2000, vol. 2/2, 79-96. Ed. by H. Blezer with the assistance of A. Zadoks. Brill's Tibetan Studies Library. Leiden: Brill.

-. (2003). See 'Gos Lo tsa ba gZon nu dpal: Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos kyi 'grel Mad de kho na fiid rab tu gsal ba'i me Ion.

Newland, Guy (1992). The Two Truths in the Mtidhyamika Philosophy of the Geluk-ba Order of Tibetan Buddhism. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications.

v. Rospatt, Alexander (1995). The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness. Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 47. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.

Seyfort Ruegg, David (1973). Le Traite du Tathtigatagarbha de Bu ston rin chen grub (Publications de I'Ecole fran~aise d'Extreme-Orient 88). Paris: Ecole fran~aise d 'Extreme-Orient.

Smith, E. Gene (1970). "Introduction", in Kongtrul's Encyclopaedia of IndoTibetan Culture, vol. 1, 1-28. Ed. by Lokesh Chandra (Sata-Pitaka-Series 80). New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture.

Sponberg, Alan (1981). "The Trisvabhava Doctrine in India & China: A Study of Three Exegetical Models", Bukkyo bunka kenkyujo kiyo 21 (1981),97-119.

Steams, Cyrus (1995). "Dol-po-pa Ses-rab rgyal-mtshan and the Genesis of the gian ston Position in Tibet". Asiatische Studien 49, no. 4, 829-852.

-. (1999). The Buddha from Dolpo: A Study of the Life and Thought of the Tibetan Master Dolpopa Sherab Gyaltsen (SUNY series in Buddhist Studies). New York: SUNY.

Takasaki, Jikido (1966). A Study on the Ratnagotravibhtiga (Uttaratantra) Being a Treatise on the Tathtigatagarbha Theory of Mahayana Buddhism (Rome Oriental Series 33). Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente.

Thurman, Robert, A.F. (1989). The Speech of Gold: Reason and Enlightenment in the Tibetan Buddhism. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.


Tillemans T. and Tomabechi T. (1995). "Le dbu ma'i byuli tshut de Sakya mchog ldan", Asiatische Studien 49, no. 4, 891-918.

Tsultrim Gyamtsho Rinpoche & Fuchs, Rosemarie (2000). Buddha Nature: The Mahayana Uttaratantra Shastra with Commentary. Ithaca, N.Y. : Snow Lion Publications.

Zhang, Yfsiln (1985). Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo: Zing-Han Dacfdian. 3 vols. Published by Zhang Yfsiln. Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khaIi..

IS THERE REALLY "ESOTERIC" BUDDHISM?

RICHARD D. MCBRIDE, II

In his seminal book The Order of Things, Michel Foucault makes an important observation on a methodological problem associated with classification:

Historians want to write histories of biology in the eighteenth century; but they do not realize that biology did not exist then, and that the pattern of knowledge that has been familiar to us for a hundred and fIfty years is not valid for a previous period. And that, if biology was unknown, there was a very simple reason for it: that life itself did not exist. All that existed was living beings, which were viewed through a grid of knowledge constituted by natural history.!

In contemporary Western scholarship, the concept of "Esoteric Buddhism" has become part of a three-fold grid of knowledge deployed to describe the history of Buddhism. For instance, The Encyclopedia of Religion presents three general essays titled: "Hfnayana," "Mahayana," and "Esoteric Buddhism."2 In this case the classification "Esoteric Buddhism" is clearly a euphemism and replacement term for "Buddhist Tantrism" or "Tantric Buddhism," a problematic classification repeatedly shown by scholars in recent years to be largely a product of nineteenth-century Western Orientalist imagination.3 For this reason, perhaps, many scholars now favor the category of "Esoteric Buddhism." It also may be because

1 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences [A translation of Les mots et les choses] (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970; rpt. New York: Vantage Books, 1994), 127-128.

2 See the book Buddhism and Asian History, ed. Joseph M. Kitagawa and Mark D. Cummings (New York: Macmillan, 1989), 195-256, which is comprised of selections from The Encyclopedia of Religion, Mircea Eliade, editor in chief, 15 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1987).

3 See, for instance, Hugh B. Urban, "The Extreme Orient: The Construction of 'Tantrism' as a Category in the Orientalist Imagination," Religion 29 (1999): 123-146; and Donald S. Lopez, Jr., Elaborations on Emptiness: Uses of the Heart Satra (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 78-104.


330 RICHARD D. MCBRIDE, II

the classification suggests a relationship with the Sanskrit word guhya (secret, esoteric) and implies that this form of Buddhism was taught secretly and is for and understoo,d by the initiated only. Many scholars in Asia and the West are confident that there was a separate "Esoteric Buddhism" that was known by various names in East Asia and that it is related directly to the teachings of three masters: SubhakarasiIpha (Shanwuwei ~~~, 637-735), Vajrabodhi (Jin'gangzhi ii:~U'W, 671-741), and Amoghavajra (Bukong /f~, 705-774).4 However, this classification is equally problematic because the interpretation of the category or classification "Esoteric Buddhism" (Jap. mikkyi5 *t3l:) may in reality be a product of Japanese sectarian Buddhism, the influence of which on Western scholarship on Buddhism cannot be understated.

My purpose here, however, is not another Foucaultian deconstruction of a problematic scholarly category. Bob Sharf's essay "On Esoteric Buddhism in China" accomplishes this purpose nicely,S My aim here is to explore, in a more nuanced way, how Buddhists in the Sinitic cultural sphere from the fifth to the eighth centuries C.E. and beyond, including some figures whom historians want to categorize as the earliest "Esoteric" or

4 The classic example is Omura Seigai :k#irn'L:!!, Mikkyo hattatsushi !$!ffi:~@;5I: (History of the Development of Esoteric Buddhism) (Tokyo: 19l8;!pt. Tokyo: Daito Shuppansha, 1972). For a discussion of Omura's work and other Japanese scholarship on Esoteric Buddhism see Robert H. Sharf, "On Esoteric Buddhism," in Coming to Terms with Chinese Buddhism: A Reading of the Treasure Store Treatise (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), 263-266. See also Taganoo Shoun 1l'Jm!;t'f~, Himitsu Bukkyoshi ~!$j?~~5I: (History of Esoteric Buddhism) (1933; Rpt. Tokyo: Ryfibunkan, 1981); Chou Yi-liang, "Tantrism in China," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 8 (1945): 241-332; Lti Jianfu §M!Wrll, Zhongguo Mijiaoshi cpOO1f~~ (History of Esoteric Buddhism in China) (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1995); Abe Ryfiichi, The Weaving of Mantra: Kilkai and the Construction of Esoteric Buddhist Discourse (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); Charles D. Orzech, "Seeing Chen-yen Buddhism: Traditional Scholarship and the Vajrayana in China," History of Religions 29/2 (1989): 87-114; "MaI,1qalas on the Move: Reflections from Chinese Esoteric Buddhism Circa 800 C.E." Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 19/2 (1997): 209-244; or his Politics and Transcendent Wisdom: The Scripture of Humane Kings in the Creation of Chinese Buddhism (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998),135-136 n. 1; and Michel Strickmann, Mantras et Mandarins: Ie bouddhisme tantrique en Chine (paris: Editions Gallimard, 1996) and Chinese Magical Medicine (Staoford: Staoford University Press, 2002).

5 See Robert H. Sharf, Coming to Terms with Chinese Buddhism (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002), 263-278.

IS THERE REALLY "ESOTERIC" BUDDIDSM? 331

"Tantric" Buddhists in China, deployed the ideas of "esoteric teaching" (mijiao 'i'f;~) and its mate "exoteric teaching" (xianjiao !.m~) and related concepts to describe and classify Buddhist teachings.

The grid of knowledge established by intellectual Buddhist mollks in medieval China was openly biased toward the Mahayana. Based on the rhetoric of Mahayana scriptures, such as the Lotus Sutra, they understood the teachings of Buddhism as being comprised of three vehicles: 1) the Sravakayana (shengwensheng ~M*), the vehicle of the disciples; 2) the Pratyekabuddhayana (bizhijosheng .!l¥:SZ:fll!l*), the vehicle of the solitary buddha; and 3) the Bodhisattvayana (pusasheng ifill*), the vehicle of the bodhisattvas. The first two vehicles (ersheng =*) were conceptualized as inferior; hence, they were labeled with the pejorative title Hinayana, the Lesser Vehicle (xiaosheng IJ\*). The vehicle of the bodhisattvas was conceived of as superior; hence it enjoyed the designation Mahayana, the Greater Vehicle (dasheng **).6 This polemical dualism presents an interesting irony since the prevailing mode of doctrinal discourse projects a view of reality that is ultimately non-dual or indivisible. Although the

. duality is ultimately transcended, it is still fundamentally polemic. The idea of ultimate non-duality is projected onto these differentiated Buddhist teachings through the concept of the One Vehicle (yisheng -*, Skt. Ekayana) or the Buddha-vehicle (josheng fll!l*, Skt. Buddhayana), which, though not really different than the bodhisattva vehicle mentioned above portrays the Mahayana as subsuming, comprehending, and transcending the Hinayana. The most famous explication of this approach to the Buddhist teachings is the famous "Parable of the Burning House" in the Lotus Sutra'? Furthermore, other Mahiiyana sutras proclaimed the superiority of the Mahayana in ways that influenced Sinitic Buddhist exegetes' conceptualizations of the development of the Buddhist doctrines. The Sa1[ldhinirmocana Sutra, for instance, explains that the Buddha "turned the wheel of the dharma" (zhuan falun ,,~$;~~) three times: the first being the Hinayana teaching of the Four Noble Truths in Deer Park, the second being

6 See, for instance, Miaofa lianhuajing ~j>$Jlg'ii¥*!l! 1, T 262, 9.8a, fasc. 2, T 262, 9.18b; cf. Leon Hurvitz, trans., Scripture on the Lotus Blossom of the Fine Dharma (The Lotus Sutra) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976),34,95.

7 See, for instance, Miaofa lianhuajing 2, T 262, 9.13c; cf. Hurvitz, trans., Scripture on the Lotus Blossom of the Fine Dharma (The Lotus Sutra), 63-64.


the early Mahayana teaching of "emptiness" (kong @, Skt. sunyatd) of the Prajfiaparamita sfitras, and the third and final teaching being the advanced Mahayana teaching that "all dharmas lack substantial marks (tixiang 1l1if'§, svabhava-lak~a1Ja), are neither produced nor destroyed but are in quiescence and that their self-nature is nirvliI).a."8

The concepts of "esoteric" and "exoteric" must be understood as functioning within this polemical context. They refer not only to the ideas of being secret, hidden, or concealed versus being explicit, evident, or manifest, but also implicitly to the inherent superiority of the Mahayana teachings to the Hfuayana. However, in the second sense, esoteric also refers to a fundamentally transcendent kind of knowledge that represents the bodhisattva's comprehension of ultimate reality, the emptiness of all dharmas, their fundamental lack of self-nature and marks and their original quiescence - "the acquiescence to the non-production of dharmas" (wushengfa ren ~1:.1t;;>g, Skt. anutpattika-dhanna-k~anti)9 - but also that the Buddha employed skillful means (updya) to lead aspirants to understand the esoteric teaching. In other words, esoteric teachings are, by definition, advanced Mahayana teachings suited to bodhisattvas.

Northern and Southern Dynasties Period (317-589)

The most explicit examples that employ the polemical rhetoric that the Mahayana is esoteric and the Hfuayana is exoteric are found in the single most important document for understanding Buddhism in medieval China: The Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom (Dazhidu lun *'&.§tffilll, T 1509).10 There is nothing in Indian Mahayana literature that

8 Shenmi jietuo jing i5f['£~RJlil;*~ 2, T 675, 16.673c; cf. John Powers, trans., Wisdom of Buddha: The Sarrzdhinirmocana Mahayana Sutra (Berkeley: Dharma Publishing, 1995), 138-141. See also Paul Williams, Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition (London: Routledge, 2000), 153-154.

9 Obtaining the "acquiescence to the non-production of dharmas" (wushengfa Ten i!\li§:.$;'2.) is the phrase commonly used in the Mahayana teachings to reflect an adherent's awakening to the ultimate truth of reality, the way things really are; see Weimoji suoshuo jing MI!}ljl:UipJim,f~ 1, T 475, 14.539a, 540c; fasc 2, 14.546a.

10 See Etienne Lamotte, trans., Le traite de la grande vertu de sagesse de Nagarjuna (Mahiiprajfiaparamitasastra), 5 vols. (Louvain: Institut orientaliste, Universite de Louvain, 1944-1981). On many different names by which this text was known in medieval China

IS THERE REALLY "ESOTERIC" BUDDHISM? 333

remotely approaches the authority this work enjoyed in medieval Sinitic Buddhism. It is a' large compendium of Mahayana views and practices attributed to the monk-scholar Nagarjuna (Longshu i~W, ca. 150-200).u It was translated into Chinese between 402 and 406 by Kumarajlva (Jiumoluoshi N,W;J**i1t, 344-413), the famous Central Asian translator and explicator of Buddhism to the Chinese and founder of Madhyamaka philosophy in China. 12 The recent dissertation of Chou Po-kan presents a strong case for a "partly Chinese" authorship of the work, since the hand of Kumarajlva's editor and scribe Sengrui 11f1J:Z (352-436) can be seen in the translation and because some subjects treated by Kumarajlva appear to be responses to questions by Sengrui and the project's sponsor Yao Xing ~t$ (365-416), sovereign of the Later Qin 1&~ dynasty.13 Nagarjuna's views on the ideas of esoteric and exoteric teachings provide the original context for the discussion of this issue in medieval Sinitic Buddhist exegesis:

and on the attribution of the text to Nagarjuna see Paul Demieville review of the second volume of Lamotte's translation (originally published in 1950), in Choix d'etudes bouddiques (1929-1970) (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), 470, n. 1,475-476.

11 There is a great debate as to whether Nagilljuna actually existed or whether he is a literary creation concocted by Mahayana writers. This is unimportant to our discussion because he existed to the Chinese. In India Nagarjuna is referred to variously as the author of one or another particular essay. However, in China, when a Buddhist exegete says "Nagarjuna" he is alluding almost invariably to the Dazhidu lun. For the problem of Nagarjuna's existence and dating in Indian literature see Joseph Walser, "Nagarjuna and the Ratnavalf: New Ways to Date an Old Philosopher," Journal of the 1ntemationalAssodation of Buddhist Studies 25/1-2 (2002): 209-262.

12 For the biography of Kumara]1va see Gaoseng zhuan jljij{jf-f,\!): 2, T 2059, 50.330a-333a; see also Kenneth Ch'en, Buddhism in China: A Historical Survey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964),81-83.

13 Some of the most notable evidence provided by Chou is that the Dazhidu [un's commentary on the Mahiiprajfiaparamita Satra follows Chinese word order rather than Indian and that the whole of the commentary is in the form of a dialogue. Dialogue was not only commonly employed in Sarvastivadin commentarialliterature, with which Kumarajlva was familiar, but also in contemporary Chinese "Neo-Daoism." (This is a misleading translation of xuanxue Z"0l'l, "dark learning" or "learning of the arcane/mysterious," which is to be preferred.) Questions appear to be written into the text and answered as the text proceeds. Furthermore, Sengrui appears to have written down everything that Kumarajlva said and perhaps, due to other involvements, did not edit out old translations of technical terms; hence, both old and new Buddhist terms remain in the Dazhidu lun. Thus, the Dazhidu [un seems to reflect the work-in-progress nature of this translation. See Chou Pokan, "The Translation of the Dazhidulun: Buddhist Evolution in China in the Early Fifth Century" (ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 2000), 62, 68,74-77,78,80,81-84. I would like to thank James Benn for referring me to this recent dissertation.


There are two ldnds of Buddhadharrna (fofa {~$): 1) esoteric (mimi W~'&;) and 2) exoteric (xianshi :ij/,7f-;). In the exoteric [form], the Buddha, pratyekabuddha, and arhat are' all fields of merit since their defilements have been exhausted without residue. In the esoteric [form], it is explained that bodhisattvas obtain the acquiescence to the non-production of dharmas, the absolute cessation of defIlements, and all of the six spiritual penetrations (liu shentong 1\jfr$ill[, Skt. $arj-abhijiiiilJ)14 to benefit sentient beings. According to the exoteric dharma (xianshi fa fJ!7f-;$), the arhats are mentioned first [in the sutra] and the bodhisattvas are mentioned after.15

To Nagarjuna/Kumarajlva, the "exoteric dharma" is simply the teaching of the Two Vehicles, the Sravakayana, the goal of which is becoming an arhat, and the Pratyekabuddhayana. The "esoteric dharma" is the totality of the Mahayana approach to the "three teachings" of Buddhism: morality, meditation, and wisdom. The wisdom aspect as explained as the bodhisattva's enlightened comprehension of the non-production of dharmas, the emptiness of all conceptualizations and the non-dual nature of reality; the morality aspect corresponds to the complete cessation of defilements; and the meditation aspect matches up with the acquisition of the six spiritual penetrations, which are thaumaturgic powers putatively acquired as a by-product of the cultivation of meditative absorption (samadhi).

In some editions of the text the compound xianshi is written using the character we are more familiar with in later discourse. The two characters, both pronounced xian fJl./~, mean the same thing and are often used

14 The six spiritual penetrations (Ch.liu shentong t::mIfIJ1!!; Skt. earj-abhijfiiif:z) are 1) psychic power (rddhi-vidhi-jfiiina, shenzu tong m$~J1!!), magical power; 2) heavenly ear (divyasrotra-jfiiina, tianer tong ~!fJ1!!), supernormal hearing; 3) cognition of others' thoughts (para-citta-jfiiina, taxin tong ftj:J"L.,J1!!), the ability to read minds; 4) recollection of past lives (pilrva-nirviisiinusmrti-jfiiina, suming tong m~J1!!), 5) heavenly eye (divya-cakeus-jfiiina, tianyan tong ~1lNJ1!!), the ability to discern the previous lives of others; and 6) cognition of the extinction of outflows (iisrava-keaya-jfiiina, loujin tong im~jj), a state in which one is no longer plagued by any fonn of defilement. See Apidamo da piposha lun 102, T 1545, 27.530a18-b1O; and Dazhidu lun 28, T 1509, 25.264a-266b; cf. Etienne Lamotte, trans., Le traite de la grande vertu de sagesse de Niigiirjuna (Mahaprajiiiipiiramitiisiistra), 5 vols. (Louvain: Institutorientaliste, Universite de Louvain, 1944-1981),4: 1809-1838. By means of the spiritual penetrations a bodhisattva purifies his buddhakeetra; see Mohe zhiguan )lj!:~iiJll:w. 2a, T 1911, 46.14a-b.

15 Dazhidu lun 4, T 1509, 25.84c-85a; cf. Lamotte, Le traite de la grande vertu de sagesse de Niigiirjuna, 1:235.


interchangeably. The writer employs the idea of the "esoteric dharma" a '. few more times iater in his translation and, due to the foregoing explanation, we can understand that he is referring generally to advanced. teachings of the Mahayana.16 At the end of this long exegesis the writer attempts to be more explicit with respect to what about the Mahayana is and is not "esoteric." However, the odd construction of the passage leaves room for much interpretation. The passage is as follows: "The Prajiiiipiiramitii is not an esoteric dharma (mirrLifa), and yet all the sfitras, such as the Lotus Siltra, explain to the arhats that they will become buddhas."17 Based on i:his statement, some later exegetes understood this passage to mean that the Lotus Satra is "esoteric" but that the Perfection of Wisdom literature was ~'exoteric. "

The idea of an esoteric dharma or esoteric teaching referring to Mahayana teachings and techniques was employed in several seminal translations of Buddhist scriptures in the first quarter of the fifth century. Faxian 1:!~ (d. after 423), the famous Chinese Buddhist pilgrim who traveled to India during the years 399A14,18 in his translation of the Mahiiparinirviil}a Satra (Daban nihuan jing *~YJEl7§*~, T 376, completed ca. 417-418) consistently utilizes the idea of an "esoteric teaching"

.. (mijiao W;~) to refer to the central teaching of the Mahayana sutras, including the Buddha's stratagems or "skillful means" (Skt. upiiya; Ch. fangbian 1J1J!). In several places the translation refers to the Mahayana

. variously as "the esoteric teaching of the Tathagata's skillful means" (rulaifangbian mijiao tlD*1J1J!W~), "the Buddha's esoteric teaching" (fa mijiao ~W~), "the esoteric teaching of the Vaipulya [scriptures]"

. (fangdeng mijiao 1J~W~), and "the esoteric teaching of the Vaipulya Mahayana [scriptures]" (fangdeng dasheng mijiao 1J~**W~).19

16 See Dazhidu lun 76, T 1509, 25.597b16, for the usage "the Buddha's esoteric dhanna" (fo mimifa {9Ilff,zWl!).

17 Dazhidu lun 100, T 1509, 25.754b20-21. 18 For the biography of Faxian see Gaoseng zhuan 3, T 2059, 50.337b-338b; see also,

James Legge, trans. A Record of Buddhistic Kingdoms (Oxford: Clarendon, 1886; rpt. New York: Dover, 1965), 1-8; and Ch'en, Buddhism in China, 89-91.

19 Dahan nihuanjing 1, T 376, 12.853b, 853c; fasc. 2, T 376, 12.867c-868a, 868b; fasc. 3, T 376, 12.870a, 872a; fase. 4, T 376, 12.879c; fasc. 5, T 376, 12.884a-b, 886a, 887a, 890a; fasc. 6, T 376, 12.894b, 898c, 899a.

336 RICHARD D. MCBRIDE, IT

A few good examples of the way "esoteric teaching" is used in this text to refer to the various skillful means learned by the bodhisattva according to the Mahayana are as follows:

Since the Tathiigata entices sentient beings to make [spiritual] progress, for the sake of sentient beings he explains all dharmas and cultivates practices of no-self. When one cultivates no-self one eradicates and forsakes views of the self. Having eradicated views of the self one enters nirv3J;J.a. Forsaking the worldly self, for this reason, is not my esoterio teaching of skillful means (fangbian mijiaa). Nevertheless, I have explained that the nature of the Tathagata is called "the self of the truth of leaving behind the world."20

In other words, here, the NirviilJa Sutra says that although all of the Buddha's teachings are skillful means, the ones that entice people to leave the mundane world and forsake the self are not esoteric teachings. This being said, teachings that inspire people to seek the bodhisattva path are the "esoteric teaching" because these expedients lead them to understand the true nature of reality, the emptiness of all dharmas. The scripture is more explicit in another passage:

The Buddha told [me] Kasyapa that the fIrst thing that I [the Buddha] preached was namely the esoteric teaching of the Tathagata' s skillful means (rulaifangbian mijiaa). He said that all the sravakas did not obtain nirv3J;J.a. For this reason you should know all [things] by means of this Mahiiparinirviil,la Sutra and that "parinirv3J;J.a'.' is merely a Buddha-sphere (fa jingjie {~~.w).21

This second passage from the scripture supports an important issue for ;Sinitic Buddhist exegetes, particularly those associated with formulating doctrinal classification taxonomies (panjiao 1U~): that immediately after the Buddha became enlightened he taught the Mahayana initially and only later taught the Sravakayana because his disciples could not understand his superior teaching. Since the greater path of skillful means employed by the bodhisattva was not understood by the sravakas it was called the esoteric teaching because it was comprehended by bodhisattvas only.

20 Dahan nihuanjing 5, T 376, 12.883c. 21 Dahan nihuanjing 6, T 376, 12.895b.

IS THERE REAlLY "ESOTERIC" BUDDIDSM? 337

. Dharmak~ema's (Tanwuchen ~1Wi~, 385-433)22 translation of the Mahiiparinirvar;a'Satra (Dahan niepanjing *~tW*~, T 374, completed 414-421), though better known for its support of Daosheng's ~ (ca. 360-434) views about all beings possessing Buddha-nature,23 also uses ."esoteric teaching" in the same manner as Faxian's translation but employs a few new compounds such as "the fine esoteric teaching of the Vaipu-

. lya Mahayana [scriptures]" (fangdeng dasheng weimi zhi jiao ::1J~**~ lfzii&), "the Buddhas and Tathagatas' fme esoteric teaching" (fo rulai

.' weimi zhi jiao f~tlD*~lfzii&), and "the esoteric teaching of the Mahayana Vaipulya [scriptures]" (dasheng fangdeng mijiao **U~~).24

Furthertnore, Buddhabhadra's (Fotuobatuoluo f~.~jij(WEm, 359-429)25 translation of the Buddhiivatarrzsaka Satra (Dafangguang fo huayan jing

. *1J.f~.D*~, T 278, completed 418-422) uses "esoteric teaching" to refer to its presentation of the advanced Mahayana teachings. In this scripture we find such constructions as "the Tathagata's deep and broad esoteric teaching" (rulai shenguang mijiao tlD*~.~~), "the Buddha's fine esoteric teaching" (fo weimi jiao f~~~ii&), a.nd "the dharma of the Buddha's esoteric teaching" (fo mimijiao fa ffl;f~lf~$).26 The Buddhiivatarrzsaka, which claims to be the sutra taught ftrst by the Buddha after . his enlightenment and which was not understood by the srav'akas, was considered to be an "esoteric teaching" along with the Lotus and Nirvar;a Satras. Buddhist sutras and treatises contain more examples of the ideas of ."esoteric" and "exoteric" deployed as polemical interpretive devices. They often appear in lists.27

22 For the biography of Dhann~ema see Gaoseng zhuan 2, T 2059, 50.335c-337b; see also Ch'en, Buddhism in China, 88, 114.

23 See, for instance, Young-ho Kim, Tao-sheng's Commentary on the Lotus Sutra (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 17-18,24,34-38,61,65-66; Whalen Lai, "Tao-sheng's Theory of Sudden Enlightenment Re-exantined" in Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought, edited by Peter Gregory (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1987), 169-200.

24 Daban niepanjing 1, T 374, 12.366a-b, 368c; fasc. 8, T 374, 12.415c; fasc. 9, T 374, 12.417a; fasc. 10, T 374, 12.427a; fasc. 11, T 374, 12.431a.

25 For the biography of Buddhabhadra see Gaoseng zhuan 2, T 2059, 50.334b-335c; see also Ch'en, Buddhism in China, 107, 109.

26 Dafangguangfo huayanjing 1, T278, 9.395b; fasc. 4, T 278, 9.419b; fasc. 6, T 278, 9.434a; fasc. 14, T 278, 9,621a; fasc. 51, T 278, 9.720a; fasc, 58, T 278, 9.773c, 774b,

27 Dhann~ema's translation of the Bodhisattva-bhUmi (completed between 414421, or 426) briefly employs an "hidden esoteric explanation" (yinmi zhi shuo Jlil1f;;tim) and an


Although few Chinese scholastic works from the Northern and Southern dynasties period remain, there is evidence to demonstrate that monastic intellectuals made use of "esoteric teaching" to refer to Mahayana ideas. A natural place to begin is the Collected Exegesis on the Mahaparinirviil}a Siitra (Dahan niepan jing jijie *~~!E~*~~m, T 1763) compiled by the monk Baoliang JfTc; (444-509) and others early in the Liang ~ period (502-557). At this stage in the development of Chinese Buddhist scholarship, monks understood the "esoteric teachmg" to refer to things that can only be understood if one grasps the Mahayana perspective. For instance, in one passage that explains "the esoteric teaching of the Tathagata's skillful means," the monk Sengzong fflffi (438-496) explains: "[The Buddha] manifests the Three Vehicles by skillful means; the One Vehicle (yisheng -*, Skt. Ekayana) is the practice of reality (shixing .11'). The sixteen-foot [body of the Buddha] is for sarp.sara (youwei 1"f~); the Dharmakaya is for nirvfu).a (wuwei ~~). "28 Although complicated by its use of "matched meaning" (geyi t~~) terminology, a problematic system of translation drawing upon concepts from native Chinese Daoists and scholars of Dark Learning (xuanxue 1r~) in an attempt to make Buddhist ideas more intelligible to a Chinese audience, Sengzong understands "esoteric teaching" to refer to what is ultimate and real behind what is manifest to ordinary beings. What is "esoteric" is the fact that the skillful means employed by the Buddha to get his message across to sentient beings is merely a shadow of underlying reality. In other words, although the Buddha taught the Three Vehicles (Sravakayana, Pratyekabuddhayana, and Bodhisattvayana), there is only really the One Vehicle of the Buddhayana. This same understanding of

exoteric "lucid explanation" (ming shuo sJ.l~); see Pusa dichijing i'l'iii:l1flM'ffill 3, T 1581, 30.905a. In a list of 27 upaya for teaching the Buddhadharrna in his translation of the Yogiiciira-bhUmi (completed between 646-648) Xuanzang 1r!!R (ca. 600-664) refers to an esoteric method (yinmi shuo fa ~i'i'i~$) and an exoteric method (xianliao shuo fa !l\I!T~$) as numbers 15 and 16; see Yuqie shidi [un m1JJll+ttll~ 37, T 1579, 30.497a. Prajiia's (Bore i!l1:;Ei, fl. late 8th century) forty-fascicle version of the BuddhiivataYf1saka Siitra (presented to the Tang emperor in 798) includes a list of various comparative and opposing terms in which an exoteric "lucid explanation" (mingliao shuo SJ.lT~) and "esoteric explanation" (yinmi shuo ~i'i'i~) are two, see Dafangguang fo huayan jing 5, T 293, 1O.683c. There are certainly other examples of this kind of usage; the foregoing are the most representative examples.

28 Daban niepanjing jijie 2, T 1763, 37.386b29-c3.

IS THERE REALLY ''ES01ERIC'' BUDDIDSM? 339

"esoteric teachilig" is deployed elsewhere in this text to explain why the Buddha gave the appearance of being sick although it is known from the Mahayana point of view that the Buddha is permanently free from :UIness and that the Buddha seemed to die although it is known that it is impossible for the Buddha to die.29

Sui and Early Tang Period (589-712)

, In the late sixth century the great Mahayana scholiast Jingying Huiyuan .~~~j& (523-592?O inherited his understanding of "exoteric teaching" and "esoteric teaching" directly from the Treatise on the Great Perfection o/Wisdom and used it often in his works on seminal Mahayana scriptures. Although the words "esoteric teaching" are not found in the Vimala-

· kirtinirdda Satra (Weimoji suoshuo jing *ft*ID!ip1T~*'!lL T 475), many · exegetes beginning with Huiyuan found the polemical categories to be a useful heuristic device they could employ to explain why crucial Mahayana teachings were taught to sravakas and to evaluate the respective

· merit of the competing systems of Buddhism. In his Record on the Mean-· ing of the Vimalakirtinirdda Satra (Weimo yiji *iE*~~a, T 1776) Huiyuan . grapples with the issue of why sravakas are listed before the bodhisattvas· in the scripture:

Summarizing differences in merit is also called summarizing differences in teachings. As Niigiirjuna explained there are two kinds of teachings: 1) the exoteric teaching (xianshijiao .~), which displays marks and conceals reality, and 2) the esoteric teaching (mimijiao iflS~¥5I:), which rejects marks and manifests reality. ill the exoteric teaching, it is proclaimed that arhats and pratyekabuddhas, like the Buddha, have exhausted [all their] outflows. It proclaims that a bodhisattva manifests .[karmic] actions, that his defilements have not been cut off and that they all bear fruit. With respect to this [esoteric] teaching, if one hears of bodhisattvas they are superior people with reference to the arhats and many are astonishing and extraordinary. For this reason [the scriptures] first list the sriivakas and afterward list the bodhisattvas. If one relies on this extremely deep teaching that manifests reality, the virtuous honor of the bodhisattva, in principle, should come first

29 Daban niepanjing jijie 8, T 1763. 37.4l1c, and fasc. 26, T 1763, 38.476c. 30 For the biography of Jingying Huiyuan see Xu gaoseng zhuan G{!f~ 8, T 2060,

50.489c-492b.


and the inferior practices of the sravaka should come afterward just as in the Buddhavatarrzsaka Sutra. 31

Instead of saying that the reason arhats are listed before bodhisattvas in the scripture is mere literary convention, as many modem scholars would suggest, Huiyuan uses this as an opportunity to differentiate between the Mahayana and the llinayana. From an exoteric llinayana point of view, he says that the adherents of the Two Vehicles (arhats [disciples] and pratyekabuddhas) are listed first because they are presumed to be more advanced than bodhisattvas. However, from the esoteric Mahayana point of view in which bodhisattvas are superior to the Two-Vehicle adherents, they are listed afterwards because they are of higher and more extraordinary quality. It is merely the case of listing teachings in the order of increasing significance. The important issue for us is that the "esoteric teaching" is clearly associated with the path of the bodhisattva. However, this does not mean that Chinese Buddhist exegetes did not invert or play with these categories from time to time in formulating their arguments for the superiority of the Mahayana path. Notice how the ideas of exoteric and esoteric are first affirmed than then reversed in the following passage from Huiyuan's Mahayana Compendium (Dasheng yizhang

**~~, T 1851): Some say that the HInayana is intelligible and that the Mahayana is unintelligible. The HInayana is rough and exoteric (cuxian l1!g~) so it is said to be intelligible. The Mahayana is secret and esoteric (mimi if~'&;) so it is said to be unintelligible. Some say that the Mahayana is intelligible and that the HInayana is unintelligible. [Since] the Mahayana manifests (xian ~) reality it is said to be intelligible. [Since] the HInayana obscures (ju fi) reality it is said to be unintelligible.32

From the enlightened perspective of the advanced Mahayana teachings, the bodhisattva comprehends reality the way it really is - this is the great secret of Buddhism.

Tiantai Zhiyi ~iJ'~IiJi (538-597),33 in his Literary Passages of the Lotus Sutra (Miaofa lianhua jing wenju frj>1*ji.*~:X ~, T 1718), says that the

31 Weimo yiji ME~li!~a lA, T 1776, 38.426a. 32 Dasheng yizhang 11, T 1851, 44.679b. 33 For the biography of Zhiyi see Xu gaoseng zhuan 17, T 2059, 50.564a-568a; see also

Leon Hurvitz, Chih-i I''AA (538-597); An Introduction to the Life and Ideas of a Chinese

IS THERE REALLY ''ESOTERIC'' BUDDHISM? 341

Two Vehicles taught before the Lotus Sutra are an "exoteric explanation" (xianshuo mi~) of the Buddhadharma and that what was taught to the

. 'aSsembly in the Lotus Sutra was an "esoteric explanation" (mishuo ~~).34 .As is well known, Zhiyi employed the concept of a "secret" or "esoteric . teaching" (mimijiao ff~W~) in his multi-tiered doctrinal classification system.35 In his Arcane Commentary on the Vimalakirtinirdda Sutra (Weimojing xuanshu m.*~~tit, T 1777) he outlines the four teachings but gives a different order than is usually presented in scholarship: 1) sudden teaching, 2) gradual teaching, 3) indeterminate teaching, and 4) esoteric teaching.36 Zhiyi's explanation of "esoteric teaching" portrays an attempt on his part to express the meaning of "esoteric teaching" in its transcendent sense. It is the cuhnination of his classification of the four teachings:

4) The esoteric teaching. The Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom says that [when] the Buddha first achieved enlightenment he turned the wheel of the Dhanna of the Four Noble Truths in Deer Park.37 In the teaching he presented on the road he clarified [the understanding] of the 5 people who saw the Truth and obtained the fruit of the srota-tipanna [stream-winner] and 80,000 people obtained the Purity of the Dhanna-Eye.38 [As for] the esoteric teaching, immeasurable bodhisattvas heard him explain the Mahiiyana and obtained the acquiescence to the non-production [of dhannas]. After

Buddhist Monk, Melanges chinios et bouddhiques (Bruxelles: l'Institut BeIge des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, 1962), and Ch'en, Buddhism in China, 303-313.

34 Miaofa lianhuajing wengou 4A, T 1718, 34.48a. 35 Due to the evidence that follows, I am confused by Bob Sharf's statement that "the

place of a 'secret teaching' within the T'ien-t'ai tenet-classification is a matter of some complexity and debate." See Sharf, Coming to Terms with Chinese Buddhism, 340, n. 21.

36 Weimojing xuanshu 6, T 1777, 38.561c29-562a1. The traditional order is: 1) sudden teaching, 2) gradual teaching, 3) secret teaching, and 4) indeterminate teaching. See Hurvitz, Chih-i W~ (538-597), 247; Ch'en, Buddhism in China, 308.

37 Cf. Dazhidu lun 2, T 1509, 25.62a; fasc. 7, T 1509, 25.109b-c, fasc. 22, T 1509, 25.225c; cf. Lamotte, Le traite de la grande vertu de sagesse de Niigiirjuna, 1:49-51, 1:415-421,3:1405-1406.

38 The Purity of the Dhanna-Eye (fayanjing l:&m~, Skt. anutpattika-dharma-k~iintz) has different connotations in the non-Mahayana and Mahayana traditions. In the nonMahayana or Sriivakayana tradition it refers to attaining the first of the four attainments of the sravaka, the fruit of the srota-iipanna, or the stage of the stream-winner; see Za ahan jing ~i!i!f~M!! 15, T 99, 2.104c. In the Mahayana it refers, as the quote above, to obtaining the acquiescerice to the non-production of dhannas(wushengfa ren ~~1:&;g), see Weimoji suoshuo jing 1, T 475, 14.539a, 540c fasc. 2, 14.546a.


that, from his frrst moment of enlightenment until his nirvfu:1a he constantly explained the Prajfiii [lit~rature] at night, [but only] some were able [to comprehend] its meaning. This scripture (VimalakirtinirdeSa Sutra) says: "The Buddha preaches the Dharma by means of one sound / Sentient beings, according to their class, are each able to obtain liberation. "39 This is also a mark of the esoteric teaching. If there is a time in which all the masses are unable to hear or see [understand the Buddha's teaching], then this is an esoteric teaching.40

Zhiyi's explanation of "esoteric teaching" is inextricably tied to his understanding of the chronological classification of siitras, and yet it . still refers directly to the advanced teachings of the Mahayana. It is an esoteric teaching because even though people may hear it they cannot understand unless they have the spiritual capaCity of a bodhisattva. Although not stated explicitly, the "exoteric teaching" is what is heard by people of limited spiritual capacity and refers to the Four Noble Truths. An adherent of the Two Vehicles can attain the stage of a stream-winner, a benefit of the exoteric meaning of the teaching, This is contrasted to the bodhisattva who is able to comprehend the esoteric meaning of the teaching that causes the acquiescence to the non-production of dharmas, the defining characteristic of an advanced bodhisattva's wisdom on the Mahayana path.

Jizang alii (549-623),41 the famous scholar-monk of the Chinese Madhyamaka tradition (Sanlun =m~j), also wrestles with the concept of "esoteric teaching" in many works and, like his colleagues, draws inspiration from the seminal exegesis attributed to Nagarjuna. To him, an esoteric teaching was a dharma entrusted to bodhisattvas only. In his Commentary on ihe Vimalakfrtinirde.sa Sutra (Weimojing yishu *fE**~~jIjjL T 1781) he problematizes the matter in the form of a dialogue:

Question: The Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom says that the Lotus Sutra was the first esoteric dharma (mifa W~) because it was entrusted to bodhisattvas. The Prajfiii (bore ?1l!l:E') [literature] is not an esoteric dharma because is was entrusted to sravakas.42 If this scripture was not yet clear to

39 Weimoji suoshuo jing 1, T 475, 14.538a. 40 Weimojing xuanshu 6, T 1777, 38.562a. 41 For the biography of Iizang see Xu gaoseng zhuan 11, T 2059, 50.513c-515a; see

also Ch'en, Buddhism in China, 132-134. 42 Cf. Dazhidu [un 100, T 1509, 25.754b20-21.


sravakas when they received prophesies of [their future] attainment of Buddhahood then it is not an esoteric dhanna (mimifa Wt'i'B'l$;). Why was it entrusted to bodhisattvas?

Answer: There are two types ofPrajna [literature]: 1) [that preached to the people] of the Three Vehicles together and 2) that explained to the bodhisattvas only. Having searched through the Large [Prajiiiipiiramitii Siara] (dapin 7cd"o), [1 found that] it is taught to the people of the Three Vehicles together because it was entrusted to sravakas. Even though this scripture (Vimalakfrtinirde.sa Sidra) is not esoteric it is only understood by bodhisattvas as an inconceivable approach to the Dhanna. It is not what can be known [by people] of inferior ranking [viz. spiritual capacity]. How can the [teachings] of the Two Vehicles be fathomed? - because they are entrusted to bodhisattvas; they do not bother with sravakas.43

In the foregoing passage we can see that Jizang attempts to refine the definition of the concept of an "esoteric teaching" to include teachings in the Prajfia literature understood only by bodhisattvas. Jizang understands that not all Mahayana scriptures are subsumed in the "esoteric teaching" because many scriptures contain both Mahayana and rion~ Mahayana teachings, but more importantly because, according to his understanding, the Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom suggests that the Prajfia literature is not esoteric and that the Lotus Siitra is. This should not be surprising because intellectual concern with doctrinal classification systems reached its zenith during the seventh century in China. We have seen how previously Zhiyi incorporated "esoteric teaching" into his doctrinal classification system. According to Jizang's defInition, since the Vimalakfrtinirdda SLitra was entrusted to both bodhisattvas and sravakas it is not an "esoteric teaching." However, he says that since the principles taught in the scripture are fundamentally "inconceivable" to sravakas it should be viewed as in the same general class as the Lotus Sidra, which he takes to be a prototypical "esoteric teaching" entrusted to and understood only by bodhisattvas.

Elsewhere in his writings, however, Jizang attempts to explain the esoteric teaching in causative terms as what transforms sravakas into bodhisattvas. For instance, in his Commentary on the Lotus SLitra (Fahua yishu l$;~~W1E, T 1721), Jizang says: "[To] Sravakas [who rely on the]

43 Weimojing yishu 6, T 1781, 38.990c.


esoteric teaching (mijiao shengwen W~§1~), the Buddha, as a Dharma King, appears as a self-transfonning bodhisattva and now he causes the Hfuayana to enlarge into the great path (dadao *~),transfonning them into bodhisattvas. '># Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, in his Arcane Discourse on the Lotus Satra (Fahua xuan lun 1:t.1r~, T 1720) Jizang labors to demonstrate that both the Lotus Sutra and Perfection of Wisdom literature have exoteric and esoteric components. It should not be a surprise that he would attempt to portray the "exoteric teaching" of the Prajiia literature as just as important as the "esoteric teaching" since it serves as the scriptural basis for the Chinese Madhyamaka tradition. He understands the ideas of exoteric and esoteric polemically since the "esoteric teachings" of the Lotus and Nirviif}a Sutras were taught "exoterically" - explicitly, openly - to bodhisattvas.45 Also in his Commentary on the Lotus Sutra, Jizang uses "esoteric teaching" to explain the superiority of the Mahayana to the Hfuayana, which he calls the "Vehicle of Men and Gods" (rentiansheng A7(*). The "esoteric teaching" fits nicely into this heuristic role representing the Mahayana in the "ten teachings in five pairs" (wushuang shijiao 1i~+~): sudden [Buddhiivata1'{tSaka Sutra] and gradual [Vehicle of Men and Gods up to the Lotus Sutra] (dunjian ~~); mundane [Vehicle of Men and Gods] and supra-mundane [Lotus Sutra] (shi-chushi t!:!:1±It!:!:); great and small (da-xiao */N; exoteric and esoteric (xian-mi ~W); and self and others (zi-ta EHif!).46

In the second half-of the seventh century, Kuiji ~£ (632-682),47 a close disciple of Xuanzang 1r~ (ca. 600-664) and the founder of the Ci'en "Mf,Jf!J or Faxiang 1:t;f:§ (Dharma Characteristics) school of Chinese Yoga-

:~ara, also elucidated his views on the dual ideas of esoteric and exoteric dharmas. In his commentary, Hidden Praise of the Heart Sutra (Bore poluomiduo xinjing youzan ~:6~«W1~1IL,\*~~., T 1710) he makes the following observation:

Only those hastening in the Mahayana tum the wheel of the hidden and secret [esoteric dhanna] (zhuan yinmi [un ".W~), which explains that all

44 Fahua yishu 7, T 1721, 34.552a. 45 Fahua xuan [un 3, T 1720, 34.383b. 46 Fahua yishu 7, T 1721, 34.552b-c. 47 For the biography of Kuiji see Song gaoseng zhuan *iiii{!Jj$ 4, T 2061, 50.725b-726c;

see also Ch'en, Buddhism in China, 320-321.


'dharmas, each and every one, is devoid of self nature, is neither produced nor destroyed, 'and is originally nirvfu}.a. Even though [dharmas] are still curious and miraculous, they are as if their meaning is not intelligible. Also, all [dharmas] have been demonstrated as existing in a state of complete tranquility. Now, those propounding all vehicles (yiqie cheng -t7J*) [tum] the wheel of the exoteric [dharma] (xianliao fun !.'l!i7fffil), which is unexcelled and featureless, and in its surpassing meaning it is the teaching that meaning is truly intelligible (zhenliaoyi jiao ~ 7 ~il&). [In this teaching] not all [dharmas] are explained as existing in a state of complete tranquility.48

Kuiji's definition of these ideas also suggests that what makes a particular teaching esoteric or exoteric depends on the way that it views dharmas. If the view of dharmas coincides with the advanced Mahayana doctrine that they lack self nature, then it is an esoteric teaching because the great secret is that all dharmas are originally in a state of quiescence. This is the transcendent approach of the One Vehicle, the BUddhayana. When viewed from the perspective of the teachings of all the various vehicles, however, if dharmas are explained as existing and as being intelligible, then it is an exoteric teaching - no matter how profound.

The influential Buddhist scholiast W5nhyo JGIlji (617-686),49 from the Korean state of Silla ~H, deploys the polemical concepts of esoteric and exoteric as a: heuristic device to indicate superior and inferior approaches to the Buddhadharma. In his Thematic Essentials of the Sukhiivatfvyuha Sutra (Muryangsu-gyong chongyo ~J;3iiij,*~*~, T 1747), he uses the polemical ideas to explicate the passage in the Sukhiivatfvyuha Sutra that encourages the practice of buddhiinusmrti (yombul, Ch. nianfo ~{*), the "ten recollections" (simnyom, Ch. shinian +~).50 He explains that there is both an "esoteric meaning" (iinmil iii, Ch. yinmi yi ~WR) and an "exoteric meaning" (hyoZZyo iii, Ch. xianliao yi mi7R) to this practice.51

To describe the esoteric meaning of the ten recollections W5nhyo gives a list of ten practices drawn from a now-lost text titled the Scripture O'n

48 Bore poluomi duo xin jing youzan ill!:;sUW~{"ff,!llliIllW 1, T 1710, 33.523b, 49 For the biography ofWonhyo see Song gaoseng zhuan 4, T 2061, 50.730a-c; Samguk

yusa .:::mi!~ 4, T 2039, 49.l006a-c; see also Robert E. Buswell, Jr., The Formation of Ch'an Ideology in China and Korea: The Vajrasamadhi-Siitra, A Buddhist Apocryphon (princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989),41-73.

50 Wuliangshoujing ~liK'*~ 1, T 360, 12.268a. 51 Muryangsu-gyong chongyo, T 1747, 37.129a.

346 RlCHARD D. MCBRlDE, II

Questions asked by Maitreya (Mile fawen jing sm1¥j]~rp~~~).52 Being concerned with compassion toward other beings, not slandering the teachings and practices of others, and cultivating the thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta), there is nothing "secret" about any of the ten practices. 53

Wonhyo explains that they are descriptive of bodhisattvas above the first stage (bhitmi). The point is that Wonhyo calls them "esoteric" because they are superior and are practices of the bodhisattva. The exoteric meaning of the "ten recollections" refers to the practice of chanting the name of the Buddha Amitayus ten times or for ten thought-moments, paying homage to the Buddha, as explained in the Book on the Visualization of the Buddha Amitayus (Guan Wuliangshou jing i5!1!\tm.~~~, T 365),54

52 The Mile fawen jing has a complicated genealogy that discussed briefly by Matsubayashi Koshi t-,,;f!:'lL.::Z:, "Chosen Jodokyo no kenkyii: Miroku somon no jiinen 0 meguru gimon" iWl/.(lf~±!f<O)liJf:re : l!ll4'iJJmr"~O)+z;r@') <' 0~r"~ (Study of Korean Pure Land: Focusing on the issue of the ten recollections of the Mile sowen). Ryukoku Daigaku Bukkya bunka kenkyu kiyo ~OOj;:~ljf,~:x:ltliJl~*c* 6 (1967): 82-85; Matsubayashi had published similar findings earlier as "Shiragi JOdokyo no ikkosatsu: Gangyo no jodokyo shiso 0

megutte" ~,t.rHjl±!f<O)-~*: jG~O)~±,\!!,~r@')<'-:>, (An inquiry into the Pure Land teachings of Silla: With an emphasis on Wonhyo's Pure Land teachings and thought), IBK 15/1 (December, 1966): 196-198. Later scholarship on Wonhyo's ten recollections derives from Matsubayashi's work: for instance, see Chong Hakkwon ~~fft "Gangyo Taishi no jiinengi ni tsuite" 5C1I!Iij;:iliJjO)~ilH;: '?"l (On Master Wonhyo's view of the ten recollections), IBK25/l (December, 1976): 269-271; and Kakehashi Nobuaki t>IliBlI!Ii, "Shiragi JOdokyo no hatten (1): jiinen-ron ni chakuganshite" ~mw±~O)~~ (-) : ~fnli (The development of Silla Pure Land teachings (1): Looking at the theory of the ten recollections), IBK 42/2 (March, 1994): 650-653.

53 Muryangsu-gyong chongyo, T 1747, 37. 129a-b. The ten recollections according to the Mile fawen jing are as follows: "1) Constantly arouse thoughts of compassion toward all beings. Do not slander the practice of all beings, for if you do slander their practice, you will never be reborn in the Pure Land. 2) Deeply arouse thoughts of sympathy toward all beings. Forsake remaining hannful intentions. 3) Arouse the thought of protecting the dharma without begrudging your body or your life. Do not slander any of the dharmas. 4) Produce a mind of assurance with regard to everything you are enduring. 5) With your mind profoundly pure, do not covet profit and gain. 6) Arouse a mind of omniscient wisdom. Constantly reflect (yom) on these day after day without faltering. 7) Arouse thoughts of honor and respect toward all beings. Forsake all sentiments of self-conceit and be humble when you speak. 8) Do not take pleasure in worldly gossip. 9) Stay close to the thought of enlightenment and deeply arouse all the conditions of wholesome faculties. Stay far away from thoughts that are trOUbled, tumultuous, scattered, and chaotic. 10) Visualize the Buddha with the correct recollection (yom) and forsake all doubts." The Yu simallak to l!!i'{/~(~l1l: (Traveling the Path to Mental Peace and Bliss), a later text attributed to Wonhyo, which is based on the Muryangsu-gyong chongyo, contains this same passage; see T 1965, 47.114c.

54 Guan Wuliangshoujing 1, T 365, 12.346aI2-22.

IS THERE REALLY "ESOTERIC" BUDDIllSM? 347

which, from the context, Wonhyo considers an inferior practice to becoming a bodhisattva:

In his Thematic Essentials of the Nirviil}a Siitra (Yolban chongyo ¥!E.jll\Hi~~, T 1769), Wonhyo deploys these concepts heuristically to discuss the meaning of nirvfu;la:

The concept "nirvfu}.a," verily, contains two meanings: that which we may call an "esoteric expression" (mira, Ch. miyu W~) and an "exoteric expression" (hyallyoa, Ch. xianliaoyu i.1J[7~). Relying on the exoteric expression, it is the straight translation "liberation [through the] extinction [of outflows]" (myalto, Ch. miedu j,l~t~) .... If we rely on the esoteric expression, it contains many instructions.55

Wonhyo then proceeds to discuss a few aspects of the meaning of nirvaIJa. For instance, he treats nirvfu;la's association with the concept of death (samyol, Ch. simie JE~) as an "exoteric expression" and as belonging to the "esoteric expression" of nirv1iIJa he includes the idea of "a lack of suffering" (mugo, Ch. wuku ~:~n.56 In this case, esoteric and exoteric do not refer to the polemical distinction between the Mahayana and the Hinayana, but instead suggest the literal distinctions between "hidden" and "apparent." Although not used frequently in this manner, there is ample evidence of "esoteric" and "exoteric" being used this way in Buddhist scriptures.57 Also, Jiacai 3tm::t (fl. 645), for instance, employs the compound yinxian ~~ to refer to hidden and manifest interpretations in his Pure Land Treatise (Jingtu lun ~±§Rl!, T 1963).58

55 Yolban chongyo, T 1769, 38.240c-241a. 56 Yolban chongyo, T 1769, 38.241a. 57 Dhannak~ema's translation of the Bodhisattva-bhumi (completed between 414-421,

or 426) briefly employs an "hidden esoteric explanation" (yinmi zhi shuo p';wzm) and an exoteric "lucid explanation" (ming shuoa)lm); see Pusa dichijing 3, T 1581, 30.905a. In a list of 27 upiiya for teaching the Buddhadhanna in his translation of the Yogiiciirabhumi (completed between 646-648) Xuanzang ~9!§ (ca. 600-664) refers to an esoteric method (yinmi shuo fa p.;wml*) and an exoteric method (xianliao shuo fa !!Il:7ml*) as numbers 15 and 16; see Yuqie shidi lun ftl:iih1l+ftllg,jff 37, T 1579, 30.497a. PrajfHi.'s (Bore i!9:!i, fl. late 8th century) forty-fascicle version of the BuddhiivataT(lSaka Sutra (presented to the Tang emperor in 798) includes a list of various comparative and opposing terms in which an exoteric "lucid explanation" (mingliao shuo a)l7m) and "esoteric explanation" (yinmi shuo I\iWm) are two, see Dafangguang fa huayanjing 5, T 293, IO.683c. There are certainly other examples of this kind of usage; the foregoing are the most representative examples.

58 Jingtu lun 2, T 1963, 47.90b.


The concepts of "esoteric" and "exoteric" were understood as polemical terms by medieval Sinitic Buddhist exegetes. While they were deployed most commonly to explain the supreme Mahayana teaching on the true nature of dharmas as being empty of self-nature, they were also used to promote the superiority of the bodhisattva. Thus, for three hundred years the polemical heuristic device known as the esoteric teaching or esoteric dharma had been employed regularly by Buddhist exegetes to promote the superiority of the advanced Mahayana teaching of the emptiness of all dharmas and the acquiescence to the non-production of dharmas, the transcendent knowledge acquired through skillful means cultivated by adherents to the bodhisattva path. Furthermore, the Buddhavataf(lsaka, Lotus, and NirvalJa Sutras were held to embody the esoteric teaching.

High Tang through the Late Tang (712-907) and Beyond

The putative first true "Esoteric" master, SUbhakarasiIpha (Shanwuwei %f~~, 637-735)59 arrived at the Tang capital early in the reign of the Tang Emperor Xuanzong 1r* (r. 712-756), probably around the year 716, and, with the help of the brilliant Buddhist polymath Yixing -ff (673-727),60 translated the Sutra on Mahavairocana 's Attaining Buddhahood (Da Piluzhena chengfo jing *mL\!Jl[JJ~JrZ{~M~, Skt. *Mahiivairocanaabhisaf(lbodhi Siitra, T 848), which they completed in 725. Before Yixing's death in 727, and probably in the process of translating the siltra, they composed the first "Esoteric" Buddhist exegesis: the Commentary to the Scripture on Mahavairocana's Attaining Buddhahood (Da Piluzhena chengfo jing shu *mmtJl[JJBJrZ{?M~iffit:, T 1795).

The siltra describes rituals and practices for the use of mantra (zhenyan ~ l'ij) in a new role as helping generate the three esoterica (sanmi =.W, Skt. *tri-guhya) or three mysteries: the body, speech, and mind of the Buddha.61

59 For the biography of SubhakarasiIpha see Song gaoseng zhuan 2, T 2061, 50.714b-716a; see also Chou Yi-liang, "Tantrism in China," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 8 (March, 1945): 251-272.

60 For a study on Yixing see Jinhua Chen, "The Birth of a Polymath: The Genealogical Background of the Tang Monk-Scientist Yixing (673-727)," Tang Studies 18/19 (2000-2001): 1-39.

61 The sUtra introduces the term "mantra vehicle" (zhenyansheng J!j;~*, Skt. mantrayiina) to describe this approach to the Dharma; see Da Piluzhena chengfo jing 1, T 848,


These are new developments that the commentators develop further in the exegesis.62 However, in each of the six times "esoteric teaching" is used in the commentary it is deployed in a way not fundamentally different than the preexisting tradition as representing advanced Mahayana teachings.63

For certain, the idea of secrecy is emphasized, but they do not claim that the point of the secrecy is somehow different than obtaining the acquiescence to the non-production of dharmas.

For example, after providing a list of code words, some gendered and some not, in which the concept of "female" or "woman" (nuren -J7:.A) is explained as meaning "prajiia, the mother of the buddhas" (bore fomu Jl'it;g:{~a), the commentators say: "This esoteric teaching cannot be proclaimed directly since there is much secret language (yinyu ~~tf). Scholars presently consider it to be coarse. "64 In this passage, since other" esoteric teachings" of the Mahayana have been proclaimed directly previously, only because this new esoteric teaching contains gendered language offensive to contemporary Buddhist scholars is it taught secretly. The way the category of "esoteric teaching" is used resembles that of the earlier intellectual tradition. Note the following example:

You should dwell in non-profligacy (bufangyi /fmz~) and you will inherit and take up the previously [ -mentioned] text (in other words, you will be entrusted with the sutra), this esoteric teaching of the Mahayana (ci dasheng mijiao Jl:t;*~W~.x), and you will be an inheritor of the mark of the Dharma (jaxiang cheng i*i'i3J¥i:).65

I8.5c; fasc. 7, T 848, I8.51b (uses dasheng zhenyansheng **;l!l;~*, "mantra vehicle of the Mahaylina"), and 54c. For the "approach of the three esoterica" (sanmi men =WF~) see Da Piluzhena chengfo jing 7, T 848, 18.51c, 52b.

62 For example, the concept of the "three esoterica" is discussed 19 times, beginning with Da Piluzhena chengfo jing shu 1, T 1796, 39.579b-c. It is also interesting to note that the term "mantra vehicle" (or mantrayana) is deployed three times; see Da Piluzhena chengfojing shu 4, T 1796, 39.625c25, c27 (here dasheng zhenyansheng), and fasc. 9, T 1796, 39.671aI2; "mantra teaching" is used four times (usually zhenyanjiaoJa ;l!l;~>¥j(i:!, zhenyanjiao ;l!l;~l1: once); see Da Piluzhena chengfo jing shu 7, T 1796, 39.651a5, b26; fasc. 10, T 1796, 39.688a25; and fasc. 14, T 1796, 39.724a17 (here zhenyanjiao); and "vajra vehicle" (jin'gangsheng <!E~U*; Skt. vajrayana) is found once; see Da Piluzhena chengfo jing shu 5, T 1796, 39.629al1.

63 Da Piluzhena chengfo jing shu 1, T 1796, 39.579c29; fasc. 3, T 1796, 39.614aI9; fasc. 4, T 1796, 39.616c27; fasc. 5, T 1796, 39.627a26; and fasc 20, T 1796, 39.787alO, 13.

64 Da Piluzhena chengfo ling shu 1, T 1796, 39.579c-580a. 65 Da Piluzhena chengfo jing shu 20, T 1976, 39.787a9-I2.


There is no attempt on the part of SubhakarasiIpha or Yixing to differentiate their "esoteric teaching" from the advanced Mahayana teachings; rather, they emphasize that it is an "esoteric teaching of the Mahayana." Nevertheless, it is difficult to transmit and they are clear that to receive and observe their esoteric teaching requires special spiritual capacities. Aspirants and adherents are sternly warned not to give in to profligacy and lust because the ritual practices introduced in the scripture use the senses to overcome the senses. Seen from this perspective, dne can see how to many Chinese Buddhists, the esoteric teachings of the SiUra on Mahdvairocana's Attaining Buddhahood, which emphasize recreating the body, speech, and mind of the Buddha directly as the "esoteric teaching," are no more esoteric than the teachings of the Buddhavataf[lsaka Sutra or the Lotus Sutra, because one could easily understand that acquiescence to the non-production of dharmas means fundamentally the same thing as acquiring or reproducing the body, speech, and mind of the Buddha.

Amoghavajra (Bukong ::f~, 705-774),66 the third of the three "Esoteric" masters, deployed the concepts of esoteric and exoteric teaching in a short essay he composed on the meaning of dharaI)I titled Encomia on a General Interpretation of the Meaning of DharalJl (Zongshi tuoluoni yizan *~flW8*im~~, T 902), which was probably written sometime between 762 and 774. At the beginning of the exegesis, after listing four types of dharaI)I he says: "Relying mostly on the exoteric teaching (xianjiao) they are explained in the Mahayana teaching (dashengjiao **~)." At the end of this short piece, after detailing four kinds of Buddhist vocative devices: dharar:n (tuoluoni W8*im), true words (zhenyan J1:l.: § ), esoteric words (miyan W § ) - both are Chinese translations of the word "mantra" - and vidya (ming 8)3), he says that they are all based on words in the Indian language and that they "have been explained repeatedly in the siitras of the exoteric teaching (xianjiao)." He then goes on to say that "true words" have been "explained in the esoteric teaching (mijiao)" using the above four designations and that they resonate with the "approach of the three esoterica" (sanmi men '=:WF5).67 At fIrst glance

66 For the biography of Amoghavajra see Song gaoseng zhuan 1, T 2061, 50.712a-714a; see also Chou, "Tantrism in China," 284-307.

67 Zongshi tuoluoni yizan, T 902, 18.898a-b.


Amoghavajra's statements seem to support the idea of a separate esoteric teaching, but since he does not explain what he means by either esoteric teaching or exoteric teaching we are left to conclude that his deployment of these terms follows the standard intellectual interpretation. He r~cognizes that dhar3l)I and several other related terms for spells and codes are found commonly in Buddhist literature; probably a tacit reference to their deployment in Prajfiapatamita literature, which was held by many to be an

, exoteric teaching. "True words" occupy a special place in his "esoteric teaching" but it is not conceptualized as anything more than an advanced Mahayana teaching, resonating with the approach of the three esoterica, the same as with the commentary by SubhakarasiIpha and Yixing mentioned previously.

Although scholars have become accustomed to describing Sinitic Buddhism around the time of the An Lushan 3i:ffrU<lli rebellion (ca. 755-763) as generally dominated by "Tantric" or "Esoteric" Buddhism in the capital and Chan ff~ (Zen) in the outlying areas, we must remember that Buddhist exegetes throughout the Sinitic cultural sphere continued to digest Xuanzang's translations and retranslations of Yogacara materials and that the Yogacara and Huayan *D intellectual traditions were still influential. In the Yogacara literature, the concept of "esoteric" was, as before, connected to the understanding of the true nature of reality. For example, the writings of Tullyun ~11li (a.k.a. Toryun ~11li, d.u.), a Yogacara monk 'in the Korean kingdom of Silla who lived during the eighth century, suggest that "esoteric teaching" continued to refer to the Mahayana doctrine that dharmas lack self-nature. In his Record of the Yogiiciira-bhUmi (Yuga-ron ki :ff,j1tJJfoiB~c, T 1828) Tullyun says: "The esoteric meaning (mirui, Ch. miyi W~) is explained summarily that all dharmas, each and everyone, has no self-nature and is neither produced nor destroyed, etc. [Hence,] they are called scriptures of unintelligible meaning. "68

Later, during the ninth century, Pei Xiu ~1* (797-870), the famous Buddhist layman and Chan advocate explains the term xian-mi IIW, literally "exoteric-esoteric," in his "Preface to the Annotated Commentary to the Book of Perfect Enlightenment" (Dafangguang yuanjue xiuduoluo liaoyi jing lueshu zhu shu *1JJJ:liI:1;{~~HffJ~*~III!~ttff, T 1795),

68 fuga-ron ki 20B, T 1828, 42.776a.


which was composed by his friend Zongmi *W (780-841), the wellknown Huayan and Hezei1ITw Chan patriarch.69 Pei Xiu, however, defines this concept in a straight-forward Mahayana way: "exoterically explained and esoterically preached" (mi shuo er xian yan W~ffiH!JjiJI).70

Bob Sharf has demonstrated that it was not until the late tenth century, during the Song * period (960-1279), that Chinese Buddhist exegetes first began to group together particular ritual practices and the monks who promoted those practices - which is somewhat close to preserit-day academia's "Esoteric Buddhism." The earliest evidence is from Zanning's .$ (919-1001) Lives of Eminent Monks compiled in the Song (Song gaoseng zhuan *~ffl1$, T 2061), which was commissioned in 983 and completed in 988, and further reedited. In a brief editorial comment following the hagiography of the three "Esoteric" masters he classifies them as among those who promulgated the "Wheel of Instruction and Command" (jiaoling lun ~5!:4J~Ali), which Sharf identifies as "one of the earliest known expressions used to characterize the teachings and practices of these prelates." Perhaps more importantly, Zanning also says that they "claim to teach the great doctrine of Yoga" (yuqie dajiao ffj;r(J]ojdtz).7! Perhaps this explains why Buddhist thaumaturges, usually thought to be "Esoteric Buddhists," are often referred to as "Yoga monks" (yuqie seng filrJ11Jo11W) in Buddhist literature compiled during the Song and succeeding periods.72 The fact that Zanning coins a new classification and does not employ the idea of "esoteric teaching" is circumstantial evidence that "esoteric teaching" still simply referred to the advanced teachings of the Mahayana.

The earliest conceptualization of "esoteric teaching" in exegetical materials that seems to support the ideas commonly-held by scholars today regarding "Esoteric Buddhism" is found in a work titled Anthology on the Essentials of the Heart of Attaining Buddhahood and the Peifect Inter-

69 For more on Zongmi and Pei Xiu see PeterN. Gregory, Tsung-mi and the Sinification of Buddhism (princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991),27-90.

70 Dafangguang yuanjue xiuduoluoliaoyijing lueshu zhu shu, T 1795, 39.523b28-c2. 71 Sharf, "On Esoteric Buddhism in China," 269-270; Song gaoseng zhuan 1, T 2061,

50.714aI5-18. 72 See Lii lianfu, Zhongguo mijiaoshi, 432-513. For an example in Korean Buddhist

hagiographicalliterature compiled about 1285 by !ryan -!f& (1206-1289), see Samguk yusa 2, T 2039, 49.972b.


penetration of the Exoteric and Esoteric (Xianmi yuantong chengfo xinyao ji ~WlililiIJ$G{~{,\~~, T 1955). This text was also treated briefly by Sharf.13 It was compiled by a Liao ~ monk named something like Daoe m:Jii~ (a.k.a. DaozhenlDaochen ~IR~, fl. 1085-1096), who lived at Jinhesi ~1PT~ on Mt. Wutai E:::' in Shaanxi ~g§" Province in North China.74

Since his name is so uncommon he may have been non-Chinese, but since he resided at this famous pilgrimage site he probably knew Indian and Tibetan Buddhists, and he may have been somewhat familiar with tantras. Nevertheless, Daoe's work is full of allusions to the writings of Fazang $~ (643-712), referred to here as "Xianshou" .Ii§[ (Worthy Head), and especially to Huayan doctrine. After discussing the "mantra teaching" (zhenyanjiao ~§W:), explaining it in Huayan terms, Daoe says:

As for the essentials of the heart of the second esoteric teaching (er mijiao xinyao zhe =~~{,,~:g-), they are said to be the commentarial documents on spiritual transformations 75 and the commentarial documents on m3I.J.qala, both of which demarcate the teaching of dharaJ.1I, which is [the tradition of] esoteric perfection (miyuan ~III). The previous perfect tradition of the exoteric teaching (xianjiao yuanzong ~~III*, viz. Huayan) necessarily precedes awakening in the dharma-sphere of Vairocana. Thereafter, depending on his awakening [the practitioner] cultivates the whole ocean of practices of Samantabhadra,76 is able to abandon [the cycle of] rebirth and death, give

73 Sharf, "On Esoteric Buddhism in China," 273-275. 74 For more on Daoe see Lii Jianfu, Zhongguo mijiaoshi, 472, 485-489; and Nogami

Shunj6 !IlH{~Ii\,>, Ryo Kin no Bukkyo iftl':&0){~~~ (Kyoto: Heirakuji Shoten, 1953),42-45, 70, 108, 165, 166, 169. The TaishO and Japanese secondary sources use the character ~t but Lii, probably following the Xinxiu gaoseng zhuan (compiled in 1884) uses another rare character IRt which suggests his name may be pronounced either Daozhen or Daochen. See Yu Qian Ui!ii~ (aka Yu Mei'an ui!ii$l<Jl;l;), Xinxu gaoseng zhuan siji ~;\i~ii!Hl!j[!j~ (Taibei: Liuli jingfang, 1967),4: 19a-b (modem edition in four volumes; Daoe's biography is found in 1: 237-238).

75 Spiritual transformations (shenNan iiilji~) refer to miraculous powers displayed by the Buddha in teaching and converting sentient beings. It is often interchangeable with "spiritual penetrations" (shentong /iiljijffi), the six supernormal powers obtained by Buddhist adepts as a by-product of meditation (samadhi). See Apidamo jushe lun Il"fEE.U{J'!*IDfu 27, T 1558, 29.l43c-144a; and Miaofa lianhuajing ~j)i:t<jlUH~ 7, T 262, 9.60a.

76 The practices of Samantabhadra (Puxian xing llff~f'f) commonly refer to all the expedient means cultivated by the bodhisattva in the 52 stages of the Huayan conceptualization of the bodhisattva path. See Dafangguang fo huayan jing *1J~{~.mH~ 33, T 278, 9.607a-611a; Dafangguangfo huayanjing 49, T 279, 1O.257c-262a; cf. Thomas Clearly, trans. The Flower Ornament Scripture, one-volume ed. (Boston: Shambhala, 1993),952-970.


evidence to the completion of the ten bodies,?7 and [acquire] the unhindered fruit of buddhahood.78

Although this description of "esoteric teaching" begins to approach what academics conceptualize as "Esoteric Buddhism," it is in a late work and one not held to be of particular significance in the academy's imagined "Esoteric" tradition because it is so thoroughly mingled with Huayan doctrine. But what is more interesting is that Daoe separates !he practice of zhenyan mantras and dharaJ)l into two different types of "esoteric teachings," the essentials of both he explains using Huayan doctrine. Certainly, monks in the Sinitic cultural sphere did not conceive of "Esoteric Buddhism" the same way that scholars of the present-day do.

Some Concluding Remarks

In medieval Sinitic Buddhist exegesis "esoteric teaching" is not a descriptive term or titular designation of what academics presently call "Esoteric Buddhism." The polemical concepts of "esoteric" and "exoteric" are hermeneutical devices employed generally to laud the merits of the Mahayana over the so-called Hfuayana. Although there is not complete uniformity in the explanations of "esoteric teaching" and "exoteric teaching" in the writings of the Sinitic Buddhist exegetes from the fifth through the eighth centuries C.E. there is a definite congruity of meaning to the point that we can state confidently that through the eighth century the object of the interpretation of such terms as "esoteric teaching" or "esoteric dharma" was the advanced Mahayana teachings and that "exoteric teaching" or "exoteric dharma" referred to the non-Mahayana tradition and usually also to the Perfection of Wisdom literature. The evidence also suggests that despite some scholars attempts to refine the defInition

77 The ten bodies (shishen +!l) are 1) the sentient being body (zhongsheng shen *1:!l), 2) the [Buddha-]land body (guotu shen ~±!l), 3) the karma-reward body (yebao shen *¥&!l), 4) the sravaka body (shengwen shen §flIJ!l), 5) the pratyekabuddha body (bizhiJo shen !l'F:3'z:i9ll!l, dujue shen JmI~!l), 6) the bodhisattva body (pusa shen i§'i\I!l), 7) the tathagata body (rulai shen ~D*!l), 8) the wisdom body (zhishen ~,§t), 9) the dharma body (jashen lti:!l),'and 10) the emptiness body (xukong shen ~~!l). See Dafangguang fo huayan jing 26, T 278, 9.565b; Dafangguang fo huayan jing 38, T 279, 1O.200a.

78 Xianmi yuantong chengfo xinyao ji !.lIi:mlillHir&i9ll'[/~~~ 1, T 1955, 46.993c.


of "esoteric teaching" it remained basically synonymous with "advanced Mahayana teaching" throughout the medieval period.

An even more significant point is that the so-called "Esoteric" masters did not attempt to redefine the terms "esoteric teaching" and "exoteric teaching." The esoteric teaching they advocated, conceptualized as the body, speech, and mind of the Buddha, though not readily accepted or understood by contemporary scholars and most individuals, was on all counts harmonious with the general message of the Mahayana. This suggests that they used "esoteric teaching" in the same way it was deployed in earlier Mahayana literature and Sinitic Buddhist exegesis: that "esoteric" means "the best," that it refers to advanced Mahayana teachings, that it is only intelligible to individuals with the spiritual capacity of bodhisattvas, and that it employs updya (skillful means) as a means of causing the practitioner to obtain "the acquiescence to the non-production of dharmas" - which seems to be the great secret of the Mahayana. Thus, the three "Esoteric" masters did not presume to establish a new teaching that was fundamentally different than the advanced Mahayana, they merely claimed a privileged place within the expansive Mahayana teaching for their ritualized approach to overcoming duality and desire to achieve buddhahood. That this was conceptualized as "esoteric" along with other advanced Mahayana teachings is axiomatic and the polemics of the Mahayana demanded it. This may be a reason why there is no clear documentary evidence for a separate or distinct "Esoteric School" in the Sinitic cultural sphere during the Tang.

The grid of knowledge deployed by Buddhists in medieval China and Korea always conceptualized the idea of "esoteric teaching" as referring generally to the advanced teachings of the Mahayana, particularly to the way the bodhisattva understands the nature of reality. Furthermore, Buddhists in the Sinitic cultural sphere did not begin to develop a tentative classification for "Esoteric Buddhism" (not to mention the classification "Tantric Buddhism") until at least the tenth century and they never deployed a classification comparable to that which developed in either Japan or Tibet. We scholars need to be careful about either applying or projecting models developed from Indian, Tibetan, or Japanese sectarian developments backward onto Buddhist history in China and Korea.


So, in conclusion: Is there really "Esoteric" Buddhism? There are two possible answers: 1) Yes., it is the advanced teachings of Mahayana Buddhism, and 2) No, it just means the advanced teachings of Mahayana Buddhism. Observed from this perspective, "Esoteric Buddhism" may not be any better than "Tantric Buddhism" as a category. In medieval times it never really meant what sectarian scholars impute to it but was instead employed as a polemical device to claim that what it represented - the advanced teachings of the Mahayana - was the best or most superior form of Buddhism. All of the Buddhist exegetes who used the term imputed an esoteric quality to the teachings they held to be superior in their analyses. While classifications are indispensable tools to facilitate understanding, they may often cause us to overlook the complex relationship between dynamism and continuity that is a defining characteristic of medieval Sinitic Buddhism.

mROME DUCOR*

LES SOURCES DE LA SUKHAVATi',

AUTOUR D'UNE ETUDE RECENIE DE G. FUSSMAN

Le quart de siecle ecouIe a vu un renouvellement important de l' etude des sources indiennes relatives a la Bienheureuse (Sukhavatf), ce champ de buddha (buddhak~etra) du Buddha Arnitiibha/Amitayus, dont Ie culte se developpera ulterieurement dans la tradition sino-japonaise de la Terre Pure. Ce renouveau est d'autant plus significatif que Ie sujet a longtemps ete considere comme relevant d'un bouddhisme de seconde zone par les indianistes occidentaux. Certes, on n'en est plus aux invectives de F.M. Mi.iller!, mais Ie temps n'est pas loin ou Andre Bareau pouvait encore ecrire a propos du culte d'Arnitiibha: "A une religion construite pour des surhommes, heros doubles d'ascetes et de penseurs, se substitue une religion destinee a la masse des gens depourvus d'energie, de moralite et d'intelligence"2.

Cependant, ce regain d'interet temoigne aussi de la difficulte pour bien des specialistes a maitriser des sources aussi diverses que l' epigraphie et la litterature canonique indiennes, les traductions chinoises avec leurs reperes chronologiques ou les etudes de leurs collegues orientaux. En temoigne, notamment, Ie long article publie par Gerard Fussman sur "La place des Sukhiivati-vyuha dans Ie bouddhisme indien" (JA 1999). Celui-ci souleve plusieurs points litigieux, tant sur les sources que sur leur interpretation, et on trouvera ici quelques observations a leur sujet. Sans pretendre a l'exhaustivite, elles rassemblent des informations souvent difficiles d'acces.

* Ma vive gratitude s'adresse a Mme Helen Loveday (Universite de Geneve) et a M. Jacques May (Universite de Lausanne) pour leurs precieux conseils, ainsi qu'a M. Paul Harrison (University of Canterbury) pour la communication de ses analyses recentes.

1 V. Miiller 1881, p. 29-30. 2 Bareau 1966, p. 177. La Vallee Poussin n'etait guere plus tendre: "Le nom de Grand

Vehicule devrait etre reserve a des speCUlations mystiques d'un interet beaucoup plus grand" (LVP, Dogme, p. 71). Aucun texte lie ala SukhavatI n'apparalt dans Le bouddhisme, belle anthologie publiee par Lilian Silbum (1977) et reeditee sous Ie titre de Aux sources du bouddhisme (1997).


358 mROME DUCOR

I. Sources epigrapbiques

Les donnees epigraphiques sont particulierement maigres, puisqu'elles ne comprennent que deux documents tres courts: l'inscription de Govindnagar et celie de Sanc!, qui datent respectivement du IIe siecle et de la fin du VIIe siecle.

(A.l) L'inscription de Govindnagar se trouve sur Ie socle d'une statue cassee d'un buddha debout, decouvert en 1977 a Govindnagar et conserve au Mathura Museum (n° 77.30). Forme de quatre lignes en ecriture brahmI, Ie texte dit3 :

"Le 26 du 2" mois de l'an 26 du Maharaja Huve~ka. En ce jour, Nagarak~ita, pere du marchand Sacika (?), petit-fils du marchand Balakatta, Ie fils de Buddhapila (?), a etabli une image du Bienheureux Buddha Arnitabha (bhagavato buddhasya amitiibhasya) en offrande a tous les buddha. Puisse cette racine de merite faire obtenir a taus les etres la connaissance insurpassable d'un buddha!"

Si l'on accepte comme hypothese de travailla date de 78 ap. I.-C. pour la 1 ere annee de Huve~ka/K~ka4, cette inscription remonterait aI' an 104 de notre ere. Tant la mention du nom du buddha que la derriiere phrase du texte en font la plus ancienne reference datee non seulement a Amitabha mais, aussi bien, au Grand Vehicule, voire a un "proto-Mahayana"5.

(A.2) L'inscription de Sanc! figure sur un fragment de stele provenant du monastere 43 de Sanc! et conservee au Sanc! Museum (nO C 833). Mais elle est d'une importance bien moindre que l'inscription de Govindnagar, puisqu'il s'agit d'un hymne en sanskrit a Lokanatha/Avalokites

;vara ou Amitabha n' est que mentionne comme figurant dans la coiffe de ce bodhisattva ("yo=mitiibhan=ca dhatte")6.

3 Editions et traductions: Schop. 1987, p. 101-111 (cf. id. 1985, p. 39); Fus. 1999, p. 541-542. Reproduction: Schop. 1987, p. 135-137. Cf. Huntington 1988, p. 86ab et PI. 9.1. Shanmi 1984, p. 231-232, n. 169, et fig. 151; id. 1989, p. 313b-314b; id. 1995, p. 214-215, fig. 146 .

. Autres references in Fujita 1996b, p. 9, n. 10, id. 1996c, p. 43-44, n. 25; id. 2001, p. 119-120, n. 7.

4 Resume de cette bouteille a encre dans Ie bel et utile ouvrage de Pierre Guenee, p. 187. 5 Schop. 1985, p. 39-40. 6 N.G. Majumdar, in The Monuments of sand, Vol. I, p. 394-395, inscription no. 842;

Vol. ill, PI. CXXXIX, 64, 1. 2. Cf. Schop. 1987, p. 99, 117.

LES SOURCES DE LA SUKHAYATI 359

Les deux temoignages mentionnes ci-dessus constituent les seules sources epigraphiques certaines concernant Amitabha. Mais certains specialistes se sont efforces de l' identifier dans plusieurs autres sculptures. Trois d'entre el1es ont plus particulierement inspire leur sagadte.

(B.l) La premiere est la celebre stele de Mohammed Nari conservee au Central Museum de Lahore (n° 1135/G. 155), qu' Alfred Foucher tenait pour une illustration des miracles de Sakyamuni a SravastI7. L'interpretation qui voit en elle une representation de la SukhavatI ne s'est developpee qu'a partir de la tMorie publiee en 1980 par John C. Huntington8,

qui a sus cite depuis bien des reactions contradictoires. Si cette hypothese a notamment ete reprise par Mario Bussagli9, Gregory Schopen a cependant montre que la sculpture pourrait tout aussi bien - sinon rnieux -representer Abhirati, Ie champ de buddha d'Ak~obhyalO. Plus recemment, Jacques Gies et Monique Cohen ont aussi estime qu'elle etait "loin d'illustrer la Terre Heureuse de 1'Ouest, telle qU'elle se dessine dans les deux Sukhiivatfvyuha-sutra"; ils y voient plutat la manifestation d'un Sakyamuni mahayaruste, "peut-etre" Ie Vairocana de l'AvataJ?1saka ll , mais non pas Ie Sakyamuni du "Sutra du Lotus" comme Ie pensent les specialistes japonais12.

Par contre Fussman juge toujours que notre stele constitue "une representation pas trop maladroite de la SukhavatI", ce qu' i1 fait en se r€ferant notarnment a la "remarquable mise au point" d'Anna Maria Quagliotti13•

Cette derniere conclut en effet son etude de 1996 par une identification avec Ie "SukhavatI Paradise" (p. 287-288). Mais son interpretation est des plus douteuses, au moins sur trois points. Quagliotti se fonde principalement sur la scene figurant a l' extreme droite du 2e registre en partant du

7 Foucher 1917, p. 171-175, PL XXVIll, 1; JA 1909-1, p. 5-78. Cf. lngholt, n° 255; Kurita 1, n° 395. Photo couleur: Bussagli 1984, p. 140; id. 1996, p. 245.

8 Y. aussi Huntington 1988, p. 86a; l'auteur annonce la prochaine publication de "Studies in Sukhavatf Art and Literature" (ibid., n. 5).

9 Bussagli 1984 et 1996, loc.cit. Pour Paul Harrison aussi, notre stele represente bien Amitabha en SukhavatI (communication personnelle).

10 Schop. 1987, p. 117, n. 50 (p. 130-131). 11 Serinde, Terre de Bouddha, p. 341-343; la stele y est attribuee au IVe_ye siecle. Pour

Fussman (1999, p. 550), sa date n'est "pas determinable a trois siecles pres (ly_ye)", tandis que Tissot la situe au "lye s. ap. I.-C. au plus t6t" (1987, p. 99).

12 Cf. Quagliotti 1996, p. 281(-282), n. 7. 13 Fus. 1999, p. 550 et 548; cf. Fus. 1987, p. 73b et 74b.

360 JEROME DUCOR

haut de la stele14 : elle l'identifie comme la visite rendue par Indra - i.e. Sakra15 - a Sakyamuni meditant dans une grotte (Indrasailaguhii) et elle juge que cette image est "highly relevant for interpretation of the stele" (p. 276). Neanmoins, on re1evera, tout d'abord, qu'il est par trop artificiel de vouloir se fonder quasiment sur cette seuIe scene pour interpreter une stele qui en compte tant d'autres. Ensuite, rien ne prouve qu'il s'agisse de la visite d'Indra a Sakyamuni, bien au contraire. En effet, toutes les representations bien attestees du meme theme montrent, en toute logique, Ie Buddha faisant Ie geste de la meditation, d'une part, et abrite sous une grotte, d'autre part16• Or, dans la scene excipee par Quagliotti, Ie Buddha a la main droite levee. En outre, il y est figure non pas dans une grotte mais sous un arbre. Quagliotti elle-meme devance cette derniere objection en affirmant que "the point is relatively unimportant smce the Buddha is in fact shown seated on a rock" (p. 284). Mais cet argument, bien leger en un point si crucial de la demonstration, ne convaincra que son auteur. Enfin, et surtout, on ne voit vraiment pas Ie rapport entre la Sukhavatl et la visite d'Indra. Quagliotti imagine que cette demiere aurait ici une dimension symbolique renvoyant a un enseignement d'ordre superieur: Sakyamuni en nirmal}akdya guiderait vers une contemplation d' Amitabha en safTlbhogakaya qui serait reservee a des inities; et Ie moine agenouille au pied de Sakyamuni representerait symboliquement ces inities recevant l'enseignement ultime du Buddha, qu'il s'agisse de l'Ananda du "Grand Sukhavatlvyuha", ou du Sariputra du "Petit Sukhiivatfvyuha"17 (p. 284-285,287). Or, non seulement il reste a prouver que la doctrine du trikdya ait ete maitrisee par l'auteur de la stele, mais, surtout, on doit relever que rien dans Ie texte des deux sutra n'autorise une telle hypothese a tendance esoterique. Au contraire, la manifestation du champ de buddha d'Amitabha telle qu'elle est decrite dans Ie "Grand Sutra" n'est pas reservee au seul auditoire du Buddha sur Ie Mont Grdhrakil!a: elle est vue par tous les

14 Photo: Huntington 1980, PI. ill, fig. 4; reproduite in Quagliotti 1999, PI. ill, fig. 4. 15 Cf. Lamotte, "VajrapiiI).i en Inde", p. 116, 118. 16 Voir les exemples in Ingholt nOI28-134; Kuirta 1, nO 330-340,629-630. 17 Les deux Sukhtivativyuha-sutra seront mentionnes ci-apres comme Ie "Grand Siitra"

et Ie "Petit Siitra". Le "Grand Siitra" sera cite selon les pages et les lignes de I 'ed. Ashikaga (Ash.), accompagnes de la division commode en 155 paragraphes de la traduction libre de G6mez (p. 61-111). Pour Ie "Petit Siitra", on suivra la division habituel1e en 20 paragraphes (Ducor 1998, p. 141-149; p. 100, n. 345); cf. son edition H!Cente in Fujita 2001, p. 79-88.

LES SOURCES DE LA SUKHAVATI 361

religieux, nonnes et hucs des deux sexes du champ de buddha de Sakyamuni tout entier, sans parler de ses dieux,niiga et autres divinites18.

Plus recemment encore, Ie meme detail de la stele a ete repris par Chhaya Haesner qui, suivant l'hypothese de Huntington, l'identifie non pas avec la visite d'Indra, mais avec cette manifestation de la SukhavatI que nous venons d'evoquer19. Cependant, meme si nous adoptions cette hypothese, rien n'attesterait que la stele tout entiere constitue une illustration du theme de la SukhavatI avec Amitabha en son centre. Deux . details au moins prouvent meme Ie contraire. En effet, Ie buddha central est assis sur un lotus flanque par un homme et une femme, chacun debout· sur un lotus s' enracinant dans les memes eaux que Ie lotus du buddha. Haesner les identifie comme des "reborn souls in SukhavatI,,20. Or, ce dernier point est impossible, puisque Ie 35e vreu d' Amitabha dans Ie "Grand Sutra" assure que les femmes ne naissent pas en son champ de buddha sous une forme feminine. Et il en va de meme des poissons nageant dans les eaux d' ou poussent les lotus21 : leur presence en SukhavatI serait tout aussi incongrue, puisque Ie 1 er vreu affirme que les trois mauvaises destinees - dont celie des animaux - sont absentes du champ de buddha d' Amitabha. En resume, rien dans cette stele de Mohammed Nari ne permet d'y reconnaitre positivement une representation de la SukhavatI.

(B.2) La deuxieme sculpture a avoir ete identifiee a notre theme est la Triade Buddhamitra, conservee au John and Mable Ringling Museum of Art, a Sarasota (n° MF94.8.5). Ce fragment montre un buddha avec un bodhisattva sur son cote gauche, tandis qu 'un autre bodhisattva devait figurer en pendant sur sa droite dans Ie morceau manquant. Les specialistes datent cette piece avec des ecarts considerables, allant des environs de 78-178 au tournant des rne_IVe siecles, voire meme des ye_ YIe siecles22. Sur Ie socle se trouve une ligne d'inscription gandhan redigee en

18 Ash. 55:20-56:3, §125. 19 Haesner, p. 432-433 et fig. 2a Cf. Huntington 1980, p. 658-659. 20 Haesner, p. 435 et fig. 5-5a; photo: Huntington 1980, PI. VI, fig. 7-8. Suivant Hun

tington (iti., p. 660, 680), Quagliotti y voit des figures de donateurs (1996, p. 275). 21 Haesner, p. 436, et p. 450, fig. 12; photo: Huntington 1980, PI. XV, fig. 23, et PI. XVI,

fig. 24. 22 Respectivement Fus. 1999, p. 543; Salomon & Schopen, p. 4; GvM, p. 229b. Brough

disait "probably of the second century" (1982, p. 70).

362 .JEROME DUCOR

kharo~thI. Fondee sur une photo mediocre, I' edition Brough, reprise par Fussman, pouvait etre rendue it peu pres en ces termes:

"De Buddhamitra: Avalokitesvara (oloispare), en don. De Buddhamitra: AmWibha (amridaha) ... "23.

A partir de cette identification epigraphique, la triade a ete reconnue par Brough comme une representation d' Amitabha et de ses deux bodhisattva assistants, tels qu'ils sont mentionnes dans Ie "Grand Slitra": Ie bodhisattva conserve serait donc A valokitesvara, tandis que son pendant disparu aurait ete Mahasthamaprapta24. Pour Fussman, la Triade Buddhamitra constituerait ainsi "Ie seul temoin sUr de la devotion it Amitabha au Gandhara"25.

Cependant, il semble bien qu'il n'en soit rien. En effet, Richard Salomon et Gregory Schopen ont recemment publie cette inscription sur nouveaux frais et sont arrives it une lecture qui peut se rendre ainsi:

"Don de Dhamitra [sic] (Dha<*rma>mitra7), a (au lieu-dit) Oloispara [7], pour l'immortalite (amridae > amrtaya) [i.e. nirva(1a] de Buddhamitra ... "26.

Les auteurs livrent cette interpretation avec plusieurs reserves, notamment sur Ie terme "oloispare"; en outre, ils n'abordent pas la question iconographique et ne proposent pas d'identification de la piece. Neanmoins, leur analyse me parait suffisamment solide pour que I'on souscrive it leur conclusion categorique: l'inscription "definitely contains no reference to

_ 23 Brough 1982, p. 66-67; Fus. 1987, p. 73a, et fig. 4; Fus. 1999, p. 543-544, n. 49. A propos de "amridaha", Fussman s'est demande "si Amitabha n'est pas une fausse sanskritisation d'un terme moyen-indien correspondant it sanskrit Amrtiibha" (Fus. 1994, p. 37; cf. id. 1999, p. 543-544; cf. Brough 1982, p. 67-68; GvM, p. 228b). Ogiwara Unrai (1867-1937) avait aussi avance l'hypothese qu'Amida venait d'Amrta, mais celle-ci a ete refutee par Fujita (p. 287-306). Ce dernier refute aussi l' opinion d 'Ogiwara selon qui "Amita" aurait precede Ie doublet Amitabha/Amitayus (v. Nakamura, p. 201, 202; cf. Mbdj. 1, p. 72a). V. Yamada Isshi, I, p. 189-196; Machida, p. 3-8.

24 Brough, p. 66. Cf. Ash. 49:9-10, §102; Hobi5girin 7, p. 999b-1000a. 25 Fus. 1999, p. 550 (cf. id. 1987, p. 73b-74a; 1994, p. 36-37). Quagliotti estirne aussi

que, "in the lack of decisive confutation", Ie Buddha peut etre identifie comme Arnitabha (1996, p. 282, en note).

26 Salomon & Schopen, notarnment p. 9-18, 27 (cf. p. 5, et n. 3). Les crochets sont des auteurs, tandis que j'ajoute les parentheses en fonction de leurs commentaires. Sur l'equialence amrta = nirviiIJa, v. Lamotte, Vimalakfrti, p. 430.


Amitabha"27. D'ailleurs, ce constat se confirme sur Ie plan iconographique. En effet, Brough (p. 65-66) etayait son interpretation notamment par la presomption de la presence d'une representation d'Amitabha dans Ie turban du suppose A valokitesvara. Or, les photographies recentes ·montrent qu'il ne s'agit pas d'un buddha mais d'un simple element conique28. Tant est si bien que rien n'interdit d'identifier Ie bodhisattva subsistant avec, par exemple, Maitreya, comme Ie faisait LeRoy Davidson29.

(B.3) Enfin, Ie troisieme des plus celebres candidats it une hypotMtique sukhavatIsation est Ie fameux "Buddha de Bruxelles", sculpture qu'il serait plus juste d'intituler "Pentade Buddhananda", du nom de son donateur30. Publiee pour la premiere fois en 197331 , elle porte une inscription qui, la meme annee, fit l'objet de communications de James C. Harle et de Fussman32. Entree dans la collection Claude de Marteau (Bruxelles), cette piece a - elle aussi - suscite des commentaires tres contradictoires, tant sur sa datation que sur son identification, et meme des doue tes sur son authenticite33•

La sculpture represente un buddha assis sous un arbre et flanque de deux bodhisattva debout, avec deux dieux sur l'arriere. Le bodhisattva sur la gauche du buddha porte dans sa coiffe un buddha assis en meditation, ce qui l'identifie facilement it Avalokitesvara; tandis que l'autre bodhisattva ne presente aucun signe distinctif. Lesoc1e porte une inscription, qui fait entrer cette piece dans Ie cerc1e tres ferme des sculptures du Gandhara qui

27 Salomon & Schopen, p. 28. Cf. aussi les doutes de Fujita 2001, p. 120, et n. 8, qui mentionne les etudes japonaises recentes.

28 L'absence de tout buddha etait deja mentionnee par Lee, p. 315, n. 25. Cf. LeRoy Davidson, p. 23, fig. 23 (photo reprise in GvM, p. 229, fig. 4); Salomon & Schopen, fig. l.

29 LeRoy Davidson (loc.cit.). Selon Mitterwallner, cependant, les personnages subsistants sont bien Amitabha et AvalokiteSvara, tandis que c' est Ie pendant de ce dernier qui aurait ete Maitreya (GvM, p. 228b, 239a).

30 Lecture "Buddhananda" selon Harle (p. 128), Czuma (p. 198) et Schopen (1985, p. 35; 1997, p. 62); mais "Buddhananda" selon Quagliotti (1977, p. 137), et "Buddhanada" selon Fussman (1974, p. 54; 1999, p. 547).

31 "Oriental Art", N. S., Vol. XIX, no. 1 (1973), p. 24. Cf. Harle, pI. 71; Fus. 1974, pI. XXXI, fig. 27; Quagliotti 1977, Tavola 1. Photo couleur: Czuma, p. 199; Bussagli 1984, p. 107; id. 1996, p. 188; Kurita 1, P3-VIII.

32 Cf. Harle (2nd South Asian Archeology Conference, Amsterdam 1973), et Fus. 1974 (XXIXe Congres des Orientalistes, Paris 1973).

33 Cf. Guenee, p. 198, qui renvoie a Tanabe Katsurni (1988).

364 JEROME DUCOR

soient datees34, ou plutot, dans Ie cas present, quasi datees. Redigee en kharo~thI, "exceptionally well-written and legible"35, elle est en prakrit "fortement sanskritise"36, mais sans teneur mahayana contrairement ace qu' avait cm Fussman37 :

"Le 5 du mois de Phalguna de I'an 5, don de Buddhananda verse-dans-IeTripitaka (trepirJakasa), en offrande pour feu son pere et sa mere".

En l'absence d'un nom d'ere ou de souverain, cette "date". en dit trop ou pas assez, au point qu' on a pu la traduire par des datations extremement divergentes. Partisan convaincu de la datation la plus longue, Fussman adopte l'ere de Kani~ka debutant en 78 et il en condut que la sculpture remonte a l'an 83 de notre ere, ou, "au plus tard, 130 de n.e."38. Avec la date de 83, la Pentade Buddhananda et son inscription cumuleraient les superlatifs. Ce chef-d'~uvre du Gandhara constituerait en effet Ie plus ancien temoignage du Grand VehicuIe, puis que precedant d 'une vingtaine d'annees l'inscription de Govindnagar; ce serait aussi Ie plus ancien exemple d'un buddha a I'epaule droite denudee, d'une part, et faisant Ie geste de l'enseignement, d'autre part39• En outre, son inscription serait Ie plus ancien texte date en sanskrit mixte bouddhique et eIle serait, a 2-3 ans pres, run des plus anciens temoignages du terme "Tripitaka"40.

A l'autre extreme, Gritli von Mitterwallner attribue l'inscription a l'ere de Khirigila, ce qui donnerait une date suivant de peu ran 453 ap. J._C.41 •

Son hypothese s'appuie sur de nombreux details, tant stylistiques qu'iconographiques, Ie plus frappant etant la presence de l'image d'Amitabha dans la coiffe d'Avalokitesvara~ caracteristique qui n'apparaitrait qu'a partir de la seconde moitie du IIIe siede42. On relevera cependant que

34 Harle, p. 131; Czuma, p. 198, n. 5. 35 Harle, p. 128, qui en donne I'edition et la traduction etablies par John Brough. 36 Fus. 1974, p. 54-55, qui en donne sa propre edition ayec sa traduction; cf. Fus. 1999,

p.546-547. 37 Schop. 1985, p. 35-38. Cf. Fus. 1974, p. 56; et id. 1999, p. 547, n. 56. 38 Fus. 1999, p. 547, n. 56. Cf. id. 1974, p. 54, n. 2; id. 1987, p. 72b. 39 GyM, p. 217b-219b. Cf. Tissot 1985, p. 73, n. 34, et p. 202-203. 40 Elle ne serait precedee que par I'inscription de I'image de KausambI offerte en

I'an 2 de Kani~ka par la nonne Buddhamitra, ainsi que par I'inscription de Samath datant de ran 3 (Quagliotti 1977, p. 137, n. 4; Schop. 1985, p. 24, n. 6; id. 1997, p. 243, 247).

• 41 GyM, p. 213b, 222b, 239b. 42 GyM, p. 215b-216a. Cf. Kurita 2, n° 171.


Marie-Therese de Mallmann avait signale une tete de ce bodhisattva omee de la figurine d'un buddha assis, au Field Museum de Chicago, tout en avan<;:ant la date de la seconde moitie du lIe siecle de notre ere; en outre, R.C. Sharma a aussi presente une tete similaire d' A valokitesvara au Mathura Museum (n° 2336), qu'il attribue a la fin du lIe siecle43•

A vancee des la premiere publication de cette sculpture, l'identification avec Ie Miracle de SravastI fut reprise sans autre par les differents commentateurs, dont Fussman et Harle. Pour ce demier, Ie bodhisattva sur la gauche du buddha est evidemment A valokitesvara, tandis que son pendant est Maitreya, identifie "almost certainly" par la forme de sa chevelure44• Cependant, la publication par Brough de la Triade Buddharnitra amena ensuite Fussman a reconnaitre la Pentade Buddhananda comme constituant, elle aussi, une representation de la Sukhavatl, en rempla~ant l'identification de Maitreya par celle de Mahasthamaprapta45 • Plus nuance, Fussman estime prudemment aujourd'hui que cette pentade "est Ie possible temoin de l'existence d'un culte rendu a Amitabha", son buddha central etant "probablement identifiable a Amitabha,,46.

Mais Mitterwallner, tout en excluant que notre sculpture puisse figurer Ie Miracle de Sravastl, se refuse a y voir une representation d'Amitabha en raison de la presence des deux dieux Brahma et Indra, representes derriere Ie buddha, respectivement sur sa droite et sur sa gauche47• On objectera pourtant que les dieux ne sont jamais tres loin d'un buddha, y compris d' Amitabha: c' est ainsi que Ie 4 e va:u du "Grand Sutra" atteste que les dieux, aussi bien que les hommes, peuvent mitre dans son champ de buddha48 • D' autre part, Mitterwallner continue a identifier les deux bodhisattva comme etant A valokitesvara et Maitreya, tout en affirmant que ce demier temit une cruche dans sa main gauche aujourd'hui

43 Respectivement: Malhnann, p. 120-121, pI. I-a et XXI-a; et Shanna 1984, p. 232, fig. 155 (Huntington 1988, PI. 9, II). Cf. Kurita 2, nO 168-169. Pour des fragments de buddha assis en meditation qui ont pu se trouyer dans la coiffe de statues d' AvalokiteSvara, y. Ingolt n° 242; Kurita 2, n° 173-174, 884.

44 Harle, p. 132-133; cf. Guenee, p. 206. 45 Fus. 1987, p. 73b-74a; id. 1994, p. 38. 46 Fus. 1999, p. 546 et p. 547, n. 56 (c'est moi qui souligue). Cf. Kurita 2, p. 311a. 47 GyM, p. 239ab. La position des deux dieux est classique: Lamotte, "Vajrapfu)i", p. 124,

130. 48 Ash. 11:9-10. Cf. Dantinne, p. 264-265.

366 JER6ME DUCOR

disparue49. En resume, la Pentade Buddhananda representerait, selon elle, Sakyamuni entoure d' Avalokitesvara et Maitreya, ainsi que de Brahma et Indra50. .

Or, ce programme iconographique correspond a celui d'une autre pentade, qui est conservee au Museum of Art and Archeology (MAA) de I'University of Missouri-Columbia. Fussman y reconnait les memes personnages que ceux identifies par MitterwaIlner dans la Pentade Buddhananda51 et il evoque Ie "Sutra du Lotus" en guise d'identification52. Mais quel est donc l'indice lui permettant de differencier ainsi ces deux pentades quasi identiques? Pour lui, tout ne tient qu'a un seul detail: l'Amitabha de Buddhananda se trouverait sous une voute de fleurs, tandis que Ie Sakyamuni du MAA serait assis sous un arbre pipal53. On en conviendra, l'argument est mince, d'autant que la dendrologie de la Pentade Buddhananda n'est pas sure: il pourrait s'agir aussi bien d'un manguier en fleurs que d'une simple stylisation elaboree, si ce n'est meme d'un "jewel-tree"54.

Mais puis que nous en sommes au domaine des hypotheses, la Pentade du MAA pourrait tout aussi bien illustrer la predication du "Grand Sutra" par Sakyamuni. En effet, Maitreya/Ajita et Avalokitesvara sont aussi les interlocuteurs du Buddha dans ce sutra55 ; et si Brahma et Indra n'apparaissent pas nommement dans Ie prologue de sa version sanskrite,

49 GvM, p. 215b-216a; meme supposition deja in Harle, p. 133. La cruche peut etre un accessoire cornmun aux bodhisattva Maitreya, Mahasthamaprapta et A valokitesvara; cf. Hob6girin 3, p. 267a; et 7, p. 1013a; Tissot 1985, p. 231-232.

50 Mitterwallner ne propose pas d'interpretation globale de la scene et se contente d'avancer que la presence de Braluna et Indra serait Jiee a I'episode ou les dieux, apres I'eveil du Buddha, l'invitent a precher (GvM, p. 215a, 238a-239b). Czuma adopte la meme identification des personnages et date Ie relief de 182 ap. J.-c. (p. 35 et 198). Bussagli, qui opte pour 149 ap. J.-c., ne reconnait qu'Avalokitesvara (1984, p. 137, 159; 1996, p. 188-190, cf. p. 223).

51 Avec une hesitation pour Brahma. Sans buddha dans sa coiffure, Avalokitesvara est identifie, sur la gauche du buddha, par Ie lotus et Ie rosaire qu'il tiendrait en mains (Fus. 1987, p. 75ab, fig. 5). Cf. GvM, p. 216b, 239a.

52 Fus. 1987, p. 75a; cf. Fus. 1999, p. 545, n. 51. Mais on s'attendrait a voir Ie "Siltra du Lotus" plutot illustre par les deux Tathagata Sakyamuni et Prabhiltaratna; cf. l'identification suggeree par Jacques Gies pour la stele de Loriyan Tangai a I'Indian Museum de Calcutta (n° 5090): Serinde, Terre de Bouddha, p. 352-353, fig. 257; Kurita 1, n° 398.

53 Fus. 1987, loc.cit.; cf. Fus 1999, p. 546. 54 Harle, p. 133, et n. 13; GvM, p. 214a, 239a. Pour Bussagli, il s'agit de "l'arbre de

la bodhi" (1984, p. 106; 1996, p. 189). 55 Respectivement: Ash. 2:12, §4 et 56:17, §129; Ash. 46:3, §96-13. Cf. Hob6girin 7,

p. 1000a.


la presence des dieux est bien attestee par la conclusion du meme texte56•

Cette identification pourrait egalement s'appliquer a la Pentade Buddhananda, car rien ne permet d'affirmer que Ie bodhisattva sur la droite du buddha ne serait pas Maitreya. D'ailleurs, Ie Peshawar Museum conserve deux autres pentades extremement semblables a celIe de Buddhananda, jusque dans Ie decor de l'arbre abritant Ie buddha. Or, l'une d'elles (n° 158) se distingue par la coiffe du bodhisattva sur la droite du buddha, qui porte un element ressemblant au smpa symbole de Maitreya57 ; dans la seconde pentade (nO 1527), Ie bodhisattva situe a la meme place a la tete cassee et ne peut etre identifie, mais celui sur la gauche du buddha tient une cruche pouvant l'identifier, lui aussi, a Maitreya58• Et, a tout prendre, on pourrait meme adopter un raisonnement similaire pour la Triade Buddhamitra - quoi qu' il en soit de son inscription - et pour bien d' autres triades encore59• En tout cas, notre tres hypothetique identification d'un Sakyamuni exposant Ie "Grand Sutra" aurait au moins l'avantage de marquer une transition entre les representations purement consacrees a Sakya~ muni dans Ie monde indien et celles reprenant exclusivement Ie theme de la Sukh1lvatl telles qu'elles apparaitront en Asie Centrale.

En conclusion de ce survol des sources epigraphiques, force est de constate{ non seulement leur rarete, mais aussi leurs faiblesses: a l'exception notable de l'inscription de Govindnagar, leur interpretation est si aleatoire qu'aucune d'elles ne peut servir de temoignage probant sur Ies origines et Ie developpement de la tradition de la Sukh1lvatI. Ce cons-

56 Ash. 66:25, §155. Les dieux des differents paradis, dont ceux de Brahma et Indra, sont bel et bien detailles dans Ie prologue de l'une des traductions chinoises archaIques du sutra (T. 12,361, k. 1, p. 279b). Quant au prologue de la traduction du "Petit Sutra" par Kumarajlva, elIe ne cite nommement qu'Indra (cf. Fus. 1999, p. 530, n. 11, qui mentionne Ducor 1998, tout en attribuant, par erreur, cette traduction du chinois a J. May).

57 Reproduite in Ingholt n° 254; et Fisher, qui la date du Ill-IVe s. (p. 48, fig. 35); Kurita 1, n° 403.

58 Fus. 1974, p. 58, n. 3. V.les reproductions in Ingholt, n° 253; Harle, plate 74; Quagliotti 1977, p. 139, n. 11, et Tavola Ill; Czuma, p. 35, fig. 15; Tissot 1987, p. 97, fig. 96; Kurita 1, nO 404 (cf. nO 405-407, 409-413, 632).

59 Cette identification pourrait ainsi etre attribuee a une triade du Lahore Museum: dans ce cas, c'est Ie bodhisattva sur la gauche du buddha qui manque, tandis que son pendant conserve tient une cruche; cf. Fus. 1987, p. 75b-76a (fig. 7). Fussman reproduit aussi (ibid. fig. 6) une piece similaire, au Musee d'ethnographie de Geneve (nO 38665); sur cette derniere, v. Erac1e 1987, p. 54-55. Cf. aussi Kurita 1, nO 406.

368 JEROME DUCOR

tat s'applique tout particulierement a la Pentade Buddhananda, que Fussman, malgre les incertitudes de sa datation et de son identification, considere neanmoins comme uri "terminus ante quem pour l'existence du culte d' Amitabha", jugeant meme inutiles les reperes chronologiques ~ pourtant bien plus significatifs - fournis par les traductions chinoises60• Ce demier sujet merite par ailleurs quel'on s'y attarde, parce qu'il traduit bien Ie danger de references repetitives qui tarderaient a se renouveler.

II. Sources Iitteraires

1. Sources chinoises

Face a la nebulosite de la chronologie indienne, les indianistes se sont en effet rabattus depuis longtemps sur les sources chinoises pour essayer de donner un terminus ante quem a la version sanskrite du "Grand Sutra" et de cemer ainsi la date de I' origine du culte d' Amitabha61• De Mallmann, notamment, recourut a cette methode; elle Ie fit en prenant la precaution de faire reviser ses dates par Paul Pelliot, ce qui n'etait pas rien62•

Mais si cette methode reste toujours valable et meme necessaire, malgre ses limites63 , ses criteres ont entre temps evolue avec Ie developpement de l'etude de la chronologie du bouddhisme chinois. C'est ainsi que Huntington se fourvoie en recourant au Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripitaka publie en 1883 par Nanjo Bun'yU, qui est "tout a fait perime"64. C'est pourtant sur Huntington que se fonde encore Haesner, apres tant d'autres65•

v' 60 Fus. 1999, p. 548, n. 57 .. Neanmoins, notre auteur indique plus loin (p. 577) que la Pentade Buddhananda est "d'interpretation plus douteuse" que l'inscription de Govindnagar et la triade B uddhamitra.

61 Le "Petit Siitra" n'entre pas en ligne de compte, puisqu'il n'a ete traduit pour la premiere fois qu'en 402, par Kumarajiva (T. 366; cf. Ducor 1998). A signaler que sa seconde traduction, attribuee a Xuanzang (T. 367), pourrait en fait etre imputable a un scribe de ce demier, Dasheng Xun *~SiJ (Fujita 1998, p. 3-4, 21-23).

62 Pour les td. de Lok~ema, Zhi Qian et S3Ip.ghavarman, Mallmann (p. 21 et n. 1) donne respectivement les dates de 147-186, 223-279 et 252 ap. J.-C. Demieville ales memes dates, sauf pour la traduction de Zhi Qian: 223-253 (Pensee unique, p. 233-235).

63 Cf. Lamotte, Concentration, p. 43-44; Demieville, YogiiciirabhUmi, p. 358; Harrison 1998b, p. 556, n. 15.

64 T. Rep., p. 4-5. Cf. Huntington 1980, p. 654-655; id. 1996, p. 45, n. 6. 65 Haesner, p. 427. Cf. notamment Fus. 1987, p. 74a, n. 34; id., 1999, p. 532, n. 17 et

p. 547(-548), n. 57.


Cependant, si·les donnees chinoises sont complexes66, il est acquis depuis un certain· temps deja qu'An Shigao ("Shigao-l'Arsacide") n'a jarnais traduit Ie "Grand Siitra"67. ·En effet, la mention de cette paternite n'apparait pour la premiere fois que dans Ie catalogue de Fei Changfang, datant de 597, dont Demieville a vigoureusement denonce les defauts68 ; en outre, aucune des reuvres valablement identifiees d' An Shigao ne traite de th~mes relevant du Grand Vehicule69.

D'autre part, il est generalement adrnis que Zhi Loujiachen ("*Lokak.~ema-Ie-Yuezhi") n'est pas Ie traducteur de T. 361: cette traduction n'apparut ni dans ses biographies, ni dans les catalogues les plus anciens, et Ie vocabulaire ne correspond pas a celui de ses ouvrages reconnus70. Par contre, des sources chinoises anciennes identifient T. 361 cornrne un texte de Zhu Fahu ("*Dhannar~a-l'Jndien"), datant de 308, que 1'on croyaitperdu71• D'autres sources, enfin, 1'ont reconnu plutot cornrne l'reuvre de Bo Yan72, en 258: c'est cette derniere attribution qui semblait prevaloir jusqu'il y a peu73.

66 Sur les attributions et les datations des td. conservees ou pretenduement perdues, v. essentiellement Fujita, p. 23-96; id. 1985, p. 59-61. Cf. Blum, p. 148-149; Adachi, p. 21-22; Kao Kuan-ju, EOB, 1-3, s.v. Amitabha-vyUha, p. 464a-465b; Mochizuki, p. 241-245; Erac1e 1984, p. 12-17; id.1988, p. 80b-85a; Nattier 2003. Concordance entre les cinq td. conservees in Inagaki 1978, p. viii-ix.

67 Fujita, p. 24-25. Premier traducteur arrive en Chine, An Shigao passe pour avoir ete un prince d'origine parthe, qui arriva a Luoyang en 148 (T. Rep., p. 236a). Cf. Bagchi, p. 8-37; Dantinne, p. 12; Demievilie, YogacarabhUmi, p. 343-347, et LCI. § 2070; Shih, p. 4-12; Tsukamoto, p. 78 ss; Ziircher 1959, p. 32-34. V. Forte 1968.

68 V. Ducor 1998, p. 184, en note. Cf. T. 49, 2034, k. 4, p. 50b. 69 Dantinne, p. 12; Demieville, YogacarabhUmi, p. 353, n. 1; I.CI. § 2070, infine; Ziir

cher 1959, p. 33. 70 Fujita, p. 35-37; Harrison 1998b, p. 556, n. 16. Zhi Loujiachen (abr. Zhi Chen) arriva

a Luoyang en 167 (T. Rep., p. 277b); i1 est souvent presente comme l'introducteur du Mahayana en Chine. Cf. Bagchi, p. 37-44; Dantinne, p. 11-16; LCI. § 2071; Lamotte, Concentration, p. 66-72; Tsukamoto, p. 98 ss; Shih, p. 13-17; Zurcher 1959, p. 35-36. Sur les Yuezhi, v. Lamotte, Histoire, p. 495-497; id., Traitt! 3, p. IX et 1584, n. 2; Dantinne, p. 11, n. 40.

71 Cf. Fujita, p. 37-41; Blum, p. 148, n. 4 (3). Cetteattribution est soutenue par Mochizuki (p.245; cf. LCI. §2073), Tsukamoto (p. 193 ss) et Hirakawa (p. 32-33). Zhu Fahu etait d'une famille d'origine Yuezhi etablie a Dunhuang (T. Rep., p. 259a). Cf. Bagchi, p. 83-114; Demieville, YogacarabhUmi, p. 348; LCI. § 2074; Lamotte, Concentration, p. 81-85; Shih, p. 33-37; Ziircher 1959, p. 65-70.

72 "Bo" designe la dynastie royale de Kuca, a laquelle Bo Yan aurait ete affilie. Mais i1 y a deux Bo Yan: Ie premier, qui passe pour avoir vecu sous les Wei (220-265) (T. Rep., p. 253a; Bagchi, p. 79-81; Shih, p. 19),n'a peut-etre jamais exist6; Ie second vecut SOllS les Liang anterieurs (320-376); cf. Lamotte, Concentration, p. 79-81, 98-99; Ziircher 1959, p. 76-77.

73 Cette attribution etait admise dans la tradition bouddhique japonaise ancienne, notam-

370 rnR6ME DUCOR

A defaut des traductions d' An Shigao et de Zhi Loujiachen, c'est donc celIe du disciple de ce del)1ier, Zhi Qian ("Qian-Ie-Yuezhi")14, qui s'est imposee comme la plus imcienne (T. 362): les catalogues la datent de rere Huangwu de Da Di, soit 222-229 ap. l_C.7S. Mais depuis quelques decennies, certains specialistes, notamment japonais, considerent que T. 362 pourrait etre la traduction originelle de Zhi Loujiachen, tandis que T. 361 serait sa revision par Zhi Qian76. Cette hypothes.e a ete reprise recemment par Paul Harrison 77. De fait, les deux traductions sont tres proches et renvoient sans doute a une recension archa'ique distincte de la tradition constituee par les autres traductions chinoises, ainsi que par la version sanskrite nepalaise et la traduction tibetaine78.

ment par Shinran, Gyonen et Zonkaku (Blum, p. 148, n. 4 (1)). Elle l'etait encore par des specialistes n:cents, dont Fujita qui penchait pour Ie Bo Yan des Wei en 258 (Fujita, p. 41-51; Hob6girin 7, p. 997b). Cependant, celui-ci n'ayant peut-etre jamais existe, il faudrait examiner la possibilite d'accorder l'attribution a son homonyme des Liang anterieurs (De Jong, p. 354-356). .

74 Zhi Qian etait un laIc descendant a la 2· generation d'une famille immigree (T. Rep., p. 275b-276a); cf. Dantinne, p. 17; I.Cl. §2073; Lamotte, Concentration, p. 74-79; Shih, p. 21-23; Tsukamoto, p. 193 ss; Ziircher 1959, p. 47-51.

75 T. 55, 2146, k. 1, p. 119b, etc. Cette anteriorite est soutenue par Ziircher (1959, p.50; 1984, p. 190b), Lamotte (Traite 3, p. xxxiv-xxxv), Mochizuki (p. 243), Hubert Durt (Hobogirin 7, p. 997b), et G6mez, p. 126, n. 3, et p. 130.

76 Cf. Fujita p. 55-61; id., 1985, p. 60; id., 1994, p. 14. La parente de T. 361 et 362 avait deja ete signalee par Ie Pere Wieger (p. 12), qui counaissait son chinois; v. aussi Demieville, "Pensee unique", p. 235.

77 Harrison 1998b, p. 556-557; et HHM, p. 179-181, 183, qui mentioune une etude complete en preparation par Harrison. Cf. Fus. 1999, p. 532, n. 17; Nattier, p. 76, n. 13. La question n'est pas abordee in Harrison 1993.

78 T. 361 et 362 sont ainsi reunis sous l'appellation de "Grand Siitra ant6rieur" (shokiMuryojukyo fJJWl1!Ui.~if, "Early L.Sukh" ou "Early Recension"), les autres td. chinoises ainsi que la version sanskrite nepalaise et la td. tibetaine etant c1assees comme "Gd Siitra post6rieur" (koki-Muryojukyo r&Wl~:I;:~*if, "Later L.Sukh" ou "Later Recension") (Fujita p. 167; id. 1980, p. 118; HHM, p. 179). n y a parente non seulement entre la version sanskrite nepalaise (in! p. 365, n. 83-85) et la traduction tibetaine du IX" s. par Jinamitra, DiinaSila et Ye-ses-de (Tib. Trip. XXlI, 760-5), mais aussi avec la td. chinoise r6alisee par Ie second Bodhiruci (572-727) et inc1use par lui dans Ie Ratnakiita aux environs de 706-713, Ie Wuliangshou Rulai hui ~:Ii~tlD*~ (T. 310-5), qui appartient donc a l'ere des td. nouvelles (xinyi m~); cf. Adachi, p. 22; HHM, p. 182-183. V. aussi la table de concOI:dance entre Ie skr. et Ie tib. in Inagaki 1978, p. viii-ix.


Pour autant, ce ne sont pas ces traductionsarchaYques (guyi iI~) du "Grand Siitra,,79 qui fournissent Ie plus ancien repere chronologique chinois de l' existence du .culte d' Amitabha, comme nous Ie verrons plus loin.

2. Sources sanskrit

Les principales sources de la Sukhavafi dans la litterature bouddhique indienne sont ces deux monographies que constituent Ie "Grand" et Ie "Petit" Sukhiivatfvyuha-sutra; s'y ajoutent diverses mentions dans vingtneuf autres textes sanskrits80, sans parler des traductions conservees en tib6tain ou en chinoiS81. Le "Petit Siitra" n'est accessible qu'a travers ses editions japonaises en siddham du xvrne S82., tandis que trente-huit manuscrits nepalais du "Grand Siitra" sont conserves de par Ie monde83. La plupart de ces derniers sont sur papier et datent du XIXe S84., mais deux d'entre eux sont sur olles et remontent au XIIe s. Parmi ceux-ci, Ie meilleur est Ie ms. Sakaki, aussi dit "Ashikaga" ou "Ryiikoku", qui date des environs de 1147-1167 ap. J._C.85.

79 On n'y inclura pas T. 360: son attribution a Kang Senkai ("*Saip.ghavannan-le-Sogdien"), avec la date de 252 (Bagchi, p. 77), est aujourd'hui abandonnee au profit de Buddhabhadra (359-429) et son disciple Baoyun (376~449), en 421, ce qui Ie rejette dans les td. anciennes (jiuyi fi~). Cf. Fujita, p. 69-97 (id. 1994, p. 13; 1996b, p. 7; 1996c, p. 37), repris par Durt (H8bfJgirin 7, p. 999ab), Inagaki (1994, p. 56, n. 71) et Nattier (2000, p. 76, n, 13; 2003, p. 189); v. aussi G6mez (p. 126), Harrison (1998b, p. 557, n. 22) et Blum (p. 147, n. 2).

80 Ceux-ci sont repertories in Fujita, p. 161-164; une douzaine d'entre eux sont utilises in Schop. 1977.

81 Soit 290 textes chinois dans Ie Canon de TaishO (T.), repertories avec leurs equivalents tiMtains in Fujita, p. 141-161. Cf. Yamada Isshi, I, p. 175-196; Blum, p. 162-164. L'Amida-butsu setsurin acheve en 1770 par Ie Japonais ZenshO Keijo n'est pas une liste de titres sanskrits (Fus. 1999, p. 537), mais une compilation de tous les extraits pertinents tires de plus de 200 td. chinoises (Shinshu zensho, 7, p. 59-178; cf. Mbdj. 1, p. 73b-75a); c'est la restitution de leurs titres en sanskrit qui est fournie par Kanaoka ShiiyU in EOB 1-3, p. 425b-429a.

82 Ducor 1998, p. 99-105. 83 V. Fujita 1992, p. vii-xi; id. 1996a, p. v (cf. Fus. 1999, p. 531, n. 14). TIs ont ete edi

tes par Fujita (1992, 1993, 1996a); v. aussi l'etude synoptique de Kagawa 1984. Aucun ms. du "Grand Siitra" n'a ete trouve au Japon, contrairement II. ce qu'indique Huntington (1980, p. 655; 1996, p. 44).

84 L'edition de Muller (1883, p. 1-78), aussi dite "edition d'Oxford", et sa traduction (1894) se fondent sur cinq de ces ms. sur papier. .

85 Amene au Japon en 1923 par Sakaki Ryozaburo (1872-1946), il fut offert en 1958

372 rER6ME DUCOR

Cependant, l'bistoire de la tradition manuscrite du "Grand Sutra" a ete revisitee tout recemment par Paul Harrison, Jens-Uwe Hartmann et Matsuda Kazunobu, qui ont ieuni et publie vingt-six fragments de trois folios d'un manuscrit sanskrit de la Collection Martin Sch!Zlyen (SC 2382). Cette nouvelle source apparalt d'une importance considerable: non seulement elle remonterait aux environs des VIe_ VIIe siec1es, mais, en outre, son contenu differe suffisamment de la tradition nepalo-tiMtaine et de la recension chinoise archaique pour temoigner d'une troisieme tradition; de plus, comme ces fragments proviendraient d' Afghanistan, peut-etre meme de la region de Bamiyan, ils constitueraient aussi un jalon geograpbique significatif, alors que Ie berceau meme de la tradition de la Sukhavatl demeure inconnu86.

A defaut de pouvoir se lancer ici dans l'analyse du delicat probleme de la datation du "Grand Sutra" , I' on se contentera de mentionner encore les points suivants. Selon Lamotte, "l'original indien circulait deja ala fin du Ier siecle de notre ere, et au plus tard au IIe", Schopen evoquant aussi une periode anterieure au IIe siec1e, tandis que Harrison parle du milieu du IIe siec1e ou plus t6t87. Quant a Fussman, qui la compare avec Ie "Sutra du Lotus", l'actuelle version du "Grand Sutra" daterait "probablement du IVe siec1e et des interpolations posterieures sont probables", mais son noyau ancien, en sanskrit hybride, remonterait "aux environs du Ier siec1e de n.e."88. Enfin, au terme d'une analyse serree des deux sutra de la Sukhavatl, Fujita conc1ut sur une fourchette allant du Ier au TIe s. pour leur version la plus developpee, tout en remontant a une periode situee entre Ie Ier s. avo J.-C. et Ie Ier s. ap. J.-C. pour leur noyau ancien89. Quant

par la veuve de ce dernier au patriarche du Hompa-Honganji, qui Ie fit deposer 11 l'Universite Ryiikoku (KyOto); son edition par Ashikaga Atsuuji (Ash.) a ere revisee dans la synopse de Fujita. Le second ms. sur olles, conserve aux Archives Nationales de Katmlindu, est date de 1152-1153 mais il est incomplet. Reproduction: Inokuchi 1986.

86 HHM, p. 181; Yamada 2002, p. 111-114. Cf. De Iong, p. 363-364. 87 Lamotte, Concentration, p. 57; Schop. 1977, p. 204; Harrison 1988b, p. 557. Cf. Dan

tinne, p. 42. 88 Fus. 1999, respectivement p. 538-539, et p. 535. L'influence du "Grand Siitra" sur

Ie "Lotus" a ete relevee par Fujita (1980) et Huntington (1996, p. 95-99); elle parait "au moins" douteuse 11 Fussman (1999, p. 527, n. 5).

89 Fujita, p. 231-235 (cf. id. 1996b, p. 9-10). D'autres font remonter les noyaux scripturaires les plus archaYques jusqu'au milieu du ne s. avo I.-C., ou au ille s. av., voire jusqu'aux IYe_ille s .. av. (respectivement Huntington 1988, p. 87b; id. 1996, p. 96-99; Inagaki 1998a, p~ 37-47).

LES SOURCES DE LA sUKHA VATl 373

a l'eventuelle anteriorite de l'un de nos deux sutra sur l'autre, il ne semble pas possible de trancher9o•

ll. Interpretation

Les indianistes occidentaux a s'etre pencMs sur Ie contenu de ces sources litteraires canoniques sont encore relativement rares. C'est ce qui donne un interet tout particulier a l'artic1e publie par Fussman en 1999, dont on relevera ici quelques elements.

En guise d'introduction, ce dernier denonce, notamment, un contre-sens qu'il juge enorme et caricatural, soit "la traduction anglaise generalement acceptee de Sukhavatl par 'Pure Land' ou 'Land of Bliss»" (p. 528). En fait, ces deux expressions renvoient a deux notions differentes91 . Dans la terminologie elaboree par Ie traducteur Kumarajlva (344-413), l'expression chinoise "terre pure" (jingtu ~ ±) designe un buddhak~etra purifie, par opposition a un buddhak~etra qui ne l'est pas, i.e. une "terre souillee" (huitu ~±)92. En outre, l'expression "Terre Pure" en vint rapidement a designer Ie champ de buddha purifie par excellence, i.e. celui d'Amitabha93 • D'abord reproduit en transcription phonetique94, son nom de "SukhavatI" fut traduit en chinois par "Beatitude" (Anyang 3'i:l€) et "Bonheur-Paisible" (Anle *~)au debut du IIIe S.; puis, Kumarajlva Ie rendit par "Bonheur-Supreme" (lile f.ili3~), usage enterine par Xuanzang (602-664). On ne voit pas ce que Ies expressions "Pure Land" ou "Land of Bliss" auraient de «sectaire» ou d' «ethere», pour reprendre les termes

90 V. Fujita, 1980, p. 118. Cf. Nattier 2000, p. 76, n. 13, et p. 92, n. 64; Fus. 1999, p. 535, n.23.

91 Le glossaire de Gomez porte aussi it confusion puisqu'il donne sukhavatl comme equivalent de jingtu ("pure land", p. 318). L'entree "Land of Bliss" (p. 306) est plus claire; de meme l'introduction (p. 9, n. 15).

92 Lamotte, Vimalaklrti, p. 397 ss.; H6b6girin 3, p. 199b-201b. L'expression "terre pure" n'apparait pas encore dans la td. du "Petit Siitra" achevee par Kumarajlva en 402 (T. 366), mais el1e figure dans sa td. du "Siitra du Lotus" datant de 406 CT. 9, 262, k. 6, ch. 16, p. 43c12; Robert, p. 288).

93 Fujita 1996b, p. 20-21; id. 1996c, p. 33-37. 94 Soit: "Xuhemati" @ilfiiJ lou ~'Tl Jll'i~, qui renverrait it la gandhiirl "Suhamadi" (Fujita,

p. 432-433; De Jong, p. 361; cf. Harrison 1990, p. 31, n. 2). Plusieurs specialistes estiment ainsi que ce prakrit du Nord-Ouest de I'Inde serait la source des traductions chinoises archa'iques du "Grand Siitra" (Fujita, p. 239-247; Dantinne, p. 1-2; De Jong, p, 363; Nakamura, p. 205). Fussman est d'un avis oppose (Fus. 1999, p. 540, n. 41).

374 JEROME DUCOR

de Fussman (loc.cit.), qui traduit lui-meme "SukhavatI" par "terre de bonheur" (p. 525). On relevera par ailleurs que, selon les sources sanskrites, Ie champ de buddha d'Amitabha n'est pas tant une "terre"qu'un univers (Sukhtivati lokadhtitu)95.

1. Le titre du "Grand SukhavatIvyiiha"

Abordant la question du titre du "Grand Sutra", Fussman (p. 575-577) attire notamment I' attention sur les appellations figurant dans la conclusion du texte:

"Fin du chapitre Agencement (vyuha)96 de la SukhavatI d'Amitabha, [constituant] la celebration des qualites du Bienheureux Amitabha [et presentant] l'entree des bodhisattva dans Ie stade irreversible"97.

Fussman en conclut que ce sutra "est donc un chapitre (parivartaM extrait d'un ouvrage plus long aujourd'hui perdu, dont nous ignorons Ie titre" (p. 576). Cependant, l'expression "chapitre" ne doit pas etre

95 "Grand Siitra", Ash. 30:9, § 53, passim; cf. "Petit Siitra", § 2. L'adjectif substantive Sukhiivati est feminin, tandis que lokadhiitu est ferninin ou masculin: on peut donc traduire par "la Bienheureuse" ou par "l'univers Bienheureux". Burnouf a "la terre fortunee" (Intro., p. 89, n. 1); LVP: "Ie bienheureux univers"(Dogme, p. 70; cf. Bouddhisme, p. 415, ad p. 215) ou "the happy world" (HERE, s.v. Cosmogony, p. 137, n. 6); Filliozat: "1' element du monde (lokadhiitu) appele Sukhavatl, I"Heureuse'" (lCI. § 2331). Lamotte ne traduit presque jamais, mais lorsqu'ille fait c'est par "univers Fortune" (<<Maiijusri», p. 18), ce qui l'amene a confondre sukha et bhadra (cf. Vimalakirti, p. 385 et 399). Enfin Dantinne, citant Ie "Petit Siitra" (§ 2), a "cet univers est appele 'Felicite'" (p. 120, n. 192), ce qui traduit sukha mais non pas avatf (cf. Fujita 1996c, p. 37-38). BHSD, p. 464a, 597a. CO 96 Filliozat traduit ce terme complexe par Burnouf traduit ce terme complexe par "constitution" (Intro., p. 88) ou "enumeration" (Lotus, p. 133), Filliozat par "developpement" ou "manifestation" (ICI. § 2003, 2011), et Dernieville par "omementation" (id. §2113). Lamotte Ie rend par "deploiement", "splendeur", "manifestation", voire "merveilles" (Vimalakirti, p. 100, 120; Somme, p. 320; Concentration, p. 225); Dantinne a "splendeur" ou "omementation" (p. 124). Fussman traduit par "merveilles" (p. 576). Cf. Schop. 1977, p. 196; Gomez, p. 3, n. 1; BHSD, s.v. 2, p. 520a. V. aussi l'hypothese de Nattier 2000, p. 73(-74), n. 6.

97 Skr. bhagavato 'mitiibhasya gU1Japarikfrtana/'fl bodhisattviiniim avaivarttikabhiImipravdalJ. Amitiibhasya Sukhiivatf-vyuha-parivartalJ. samiiptalJ. (Ash. 67 :2-4). Supprirner Ie point apres pravesaQ. dans Ash. 67:3, la negligence du sa/'fldhi etant l'une des caracteristiques des mss nepalais (cf. Ash. v:25-vi:3). Le titreproprement dit est donc Amitiibhasya Sukhiivati-vyuhao, precede des deux "sous-titres" bhagavato 'mitiibhasya gU1Japarikfrtana/'fl et bodhisattviiniim avaivarttikabhitmipravdalJ..


prise ici au sens strict du tenne - soit une subdivision d'un ouvrage plus grand - mais au sens large de "texte". Lamotte a montre que des mots comme sutra, nirdesa, dhannaparyiiya, dhannamukha ou parivarta. peuvent constituer autant d'equivalents98 • Le VimalakirtinirdeSa, comme bien d'autres siltra du Mahayana, se voit ainsi attribuer plusieurs titres dans sa conclusion, dont celui de "Chapitre de la liberation inconcevable" (Acintyavimok~a-parivarta)99, qui ne pretend pas renvoyer a un autre texte: l'expression constitue simplement un sous-titre paraphrasant de maniere condensee la doctrine essentielle du siltra. Que si l' on tenait malgre tout a conserver la signification "chapitre" stricto sensu pour Ie "Grand Siltra", on pourrait bien etre tente d'y voir une allusion au Ratnakuta; comme Ie fait Hirakawa Akira100. Cet ensemble canonique, conserve en chinois et en tibetain, est en effet constitue de quarante-neuf siltra, dont Ie cinquieme n'est autre que notre "Grand Siltra". Cependant, si la version tibetaine du Ratnakuta classe bien ces differents siltra en "chapitres"(le'u), elle donne de notre texte Ie titre sanskrit Arya-Amitiibha-vyuha-niima-mahiiyiinasutra; tandis que sa traduction chinoise les intitule "assemblees" (hui it, pari~ad)IOI.

2. La nature de la Sukhiivatf

Fussman (p. 574-575) signale aussi 1'importance du deuxieme de ces sous-titres du "Grand Siltra", soit: "entree des bodhisattva dans Ie stade irreversible" (bodhisattviiniim avaivarttika-bhami-pravesa); et il affirme que ce sous-titre correspond "expressement" au 21 e vceu du futur Amitiibha. Or, ce vceu ne mentionne pas Ie stade irreversible, mais bien 1'ultime etape ou Ie bodhisattva n'est plus separe de la manifestation du parfait eveil que par une seule naissance (ekajiitibaddha)102: il s'agit donc d'un

98 Lamotte, Virnalakirti, p. 64-65, qui renvoie a Filliozat, LCI. § 2003, ou parivarta est rendu par "tour d'horizon, tour autour d'une question"; cf. BHSD, s.v. 2, p. 329ab.

99 Selon Ie tibetain, ou parivarta est traduit par le'u; tandis que Xuanzang afarnen ¥t:~~, soit "exposition de la Loi" (dharrnaparyaya). V. Lamotte, Virnalakirti, p. 392-393 et n. 42.

100 Hirakawa, p. 33-34. 101 Cf. sup. p. 370, n. 78. L'histoire du RatnakU{a, compile par Bodhiruci de 706 a 713,

est mal connue: v. ICI. § 2011,2037,2113; Lamotte, Traite 4, p. 1884-1887; id., Virnalakirti, p. 64; Eracle 1988, p. 77-79; Dantinne, p. 28-34; Pagel, p. 53-78.

102 Ash. 14:14; (Schop. 1977, p. 201); cf. Ash. 46:25 (§96-18) et 48:23-24 (§100; Dantinne, p. 171). Sur ekajatifpratilbaddha, v. Ducor 1998, p. 74, n. 230. Contrairement

376 JEROME DUCOR

stade distinct et posterieur 11 l'irreversible103 • C'est Ie 46e vreu qui assure l'irreversible (avaivarttika, Ash. 21 :5), tandis que Ie 11 e vreu y fait allusion, en promettant que les etres nes en Sukhavati ne sont pas sans etre "fixes" (niyata )104 dans la suite de leur parcours jusqu' 11 l' atteinte du nirvfu.1a, raison pour laquelle Ie stade irreversible est aussi nomme niyata bhiimilO5. En outre, les vreux 511 9 garantissent l'obtention des cinq sciences sublimes (abhijfia, Ash. 11: 14-12: 11), dont la plenitude est precisement propre 11 ce stade106. Le 47e vreu precise egalement que l'atteinte de l'irreversible en Sukhavat! est due 11 l'acquisition, en celle-ci, des trois degres de l'endurance envers la non-naissance des choses (anutpattikadharma-k~anti)I07. Enfin, Ie 16e vreu assure que les etres en Sukhavati ignorent jusqu ' au nom du mal (akusalasya namadheya, Ash. 13: 15): cette particularite nous confirme que ce champ de buddha est parfaitement purifie (parisuddhabuddhak~etra)108 et que ses habitants demeurent au moins au 8e stade, parce qu'ils ont coupe toutes les passions (sarvaklesasamucchinna)I09, ainsi que l'atteste la doctrine c1assique de l'''Exegese sur la Perfection de sagesse" (Prajfiaparamitopadesa)llO.

a ce que laisse entendre Fusman (p. 599, n. 80), Ie 21e vceu ne traite pas non plus de la mesure de la vie (iiyu~pramiina) des etres nes en SukhavatI, ce qui incombe au 14e vreu (Dantinne, p. 153-154).

103 Ducor 1998, p. 34-36. 104 Ash. 12:17 (et §85; Ash. 40:19). Surla notion d'etre "fixe", v. Ducor 1998, p. 73

et n. 226. 105 Lamotte, Concentration, p. 157, alinea 4c. Sur Ie parcours des bodhisattva, v. Ducor

1998, p. 30, n. 39. 106 Cf. Ash. 46:14-17; §96. Lamotte, Traitt! 4, p. 1855-1860; Schop. 1977. p. 190-191,

n; 20. 107 Au cours de la carriere du bodhisattva. cette endurance passe par trois stades: adhe

sion purement verbale, conviction preparatoire intense et acquisition defmitive; c'est cette derniere qui donne acces a l'irreversible. V. Lamotte, Vimalakfrti, p. 411-412; Traitt! 4, p. 1788, n. 1; et Concentration, p. 160-162, en note.

108 Lamotte, Traitt! 5, p. 2344. 109 Cf. Schop. 1977, p. 189-191, qui cite Ie Samiidhiriija-sutra. 110 Lamotte, Traitt! 5, p. 2343-2345. Premier traite a evoquer Amitabha et la SukhavatI,

I' Upadda attribue a Nagarjuna fut edite en chinois par Kumarajlva de 404 a 406 (Dazhidulun, T. 1509); son auteur se situerait au debut du IVe siec1e, dans Ie nord-ouest de l'Inde (Lamotte, id. 3, p. viii ss.; 4, p. xv). Fussman (1999, p. 539) n'y trouve que trois mentions de la doctrine de la SukhavatI, soit: Lamotte, Traitt!, p. 2228, 2230 et 2308. On y ajoutera: p. 300,465,556,601, 1361, 1927,2335 et 2432. Encore Lamotte ne traduit-il "que" Ie premier tiers des cent volumes de l' ouvrage, et d' autres references se trouvent dans Ie texte chinois: T. 25, p. 342ab, 343a, 529c, 708c (td. in Lamotte, Vimalakfrti, p. 401), et


Bref, au vu du2l e vreu, d'une part, et des neuf autres vreux mentionnes ici, d'autre part, on constate que la Sukh1ivatl englobe deux des uItimes etapes de la carriere des bodhisattva, que ce soit les deux demieres des quatre etapes selon les Prajfiaparamita, ou la 8e et la loe bhumi du Dasabhumikasutralll . C'est ce que Ie "Petit Sutra" (§ 10) resume en affirmant que les etres nes en ce champ de buddha sont de "purs bodhisattva (Suddhii bodhisattvalJ), irreversibles (avinivartanfya), lies par une seule naissance (ekajatipratibaddha)"l12.

Mais il y a plus. A partir du stade irreversible, la carriere du bodhisattva se deroule sans que celui-ci n'ai plus a fournir aucun effort (anabhoga), de maniere quasi automatique1l3 . Tant et si bien que la ge bhumi est, elle aussi, comprise dans la Sukh1ivatl. Les vreux ne la citent pas nommement, puisqu'elle est necessairement incluse entre Ie 8e et Ie lOe stade. Mais Ie 2ge vreu mentionne bien que les etres en Sukh1ivatl seront pourvus des quatre pleins savoirs (pratisaT[lvid), qui font Ie bon predicateur. Or ceux-ci sont precisement acquis dans la ge bhumi, stade ou Ie bodhisattva se cons acre specialement a enseigner aux etres114, cette activite etant d'ailleurs assuree par Ie 24e vreu. Tel que l'evoquent les deux Sukhiivatlvyuha, Ie champ de buddha d'Amit1ibha constitue donc, pour ses habitants, un univers qui n'est autre que la sphere d'activite dans laquelle se deroule automatiquement Ie parcours irreversible des bodhisattva (avinivartanacarya)ll5, ultirne tranche de leur carriere, entre Ie moment ou ils atteignent l'irreversible et celui ou ils deviendront effectivement buddha. Cette interpretation de la Sukh1ivatl est d'ailleurs bien connue, puisqu'elle n'est autre que celIe qui allait se transmettre en Chine, notamment dans

712a; cf. id, Traite, 3, p. xxxv; Fujita, p. 143. Concernant les omissions mentionnees par Fussman (loc.cit.), l'absence d'Amitayus en Traite 2336 n'a pas de quoi etonner puisque ce passage ne concerne que les buddha de l'univers Saha; tandis que Traite 403-406, 442-456 et 2352-2364 constituent un traitement general, ou aucun champ de buddha n'est cite nomement. En revanche, Fussman aurait ete justifie de mentionner l' omission flagrante en Traite 594-595 (cf. plus bas, p. 391).

III Lamotte, Traite 5, p. 2374, 2376. 112 Cf. Dantinne, p. 172. 113 References in Ducor 1998, p. 30, n. 42. 111 Lamotte, Traite 3, p. 1614 ss; id., Concentration, p. 157"158; id., Somme, p. 202,

293-294; Rahula, p. 159, n. 11 et p. 166; Dayal, p. 259-267, 291. 115 Lamotte, "Maiijusn", p. 12; Dantinne, p. 125, n. f.

378 mROME DUCOR

la tradition dite de ShandaoJl6. Ainsi, panni ses premiers representants, Tanluan (476-542) expliquera comment les etres nes en Sukhavat! n'ont pas a y passer par chaque bhiimi successivement, conformement au principe canonique du parcours par saut (vyutknintaka)ll7 rendu possible a partir de la 8e bhiimiJl8 .

Comme on peut Ie cons tater, la naissance en SukhavatI constitue plus qu'un simple "enjoyment of its sensual and spiritual pleasures, so lavishly described throughout the sutra"Jl9. Certes, la description des ornements (alal'{lkiira) de ce champ de buddha a de quoi fasciner par sa richesse, mais elle reste relativement banale si on la compare a d'autres descriptions, comme celle, notarnment, de l'Uttarakurul20 . Et, de fait, ce n'est pas Ie "monde-receptacle" (bhiijanaloka) de la Sukhavat! avec son decor qui se trouve au creur des vreux. Car ce sont bien ces derniers qui constituent la part originale, la substantifique moelle, du "Grand Sutra". Or, seuls trois VlEUX sont cons acres aces ornements 121, tandis que leur tres grande majorite, soit trente-neuf VlEUX sur quarante-sept, concerne les etres a delivrer: vingt-sept vreux sont ainsi lies aux etres nes en Sukhavat!, tandis. que les douze autres s'appliquent aux etres vivants dans les autres champs de buddha. En outre, il n'est pas besoin de recourir a une inter-

116 Sur la tradition de Shandao, v. Ducor 1999, p. 145. Il7 Chin. chaoyue I@.~ (Tanluan: T.40, 1819, k. 2, p. 840c2; Inagaki 1998a, p. 253-257). 118 Cf. Demieville, Yogiiciirabhumi, p. 429-430; et Jacques May, art. chOjo, chOgyo

et chOotsu-shO du HobOgirin 4-5, p. 353a-360a, 346b, 360b-371a. n faut attendre Shinran (1173-1263), fondateur du IOdo-Shinshii, pour voir Ie stade irreversible considere comme atteignable en cette vie-ci par la foi seule, et la naissance en Sukhavat! interpretee comme la realisation immediate du parfait eveil au moment de la mort (cf. Fujita 1996c, p. 50; Ducor 1998, p. 36-37). Incidemment, on se demande pourquoi Fussman rend ShinshU Ii.* par "Nouvelle Secte <de la Terre Pure>" (p. 527, n. 6); idem chez Magnin, qui a "Nouveau courant de la Terre pure" (p. 398).

119 Harrison 1978, p. 52. Cet article est deja ancien, et l'interpretation de Paul Harrison a evolue: "I now believe that Sukhavat! is the forest hermitage or monastery writ large, a perfect environment for strenuous religious practice, not for pleasurable enjoyment" (communication personnelle).

120 Tucci, p. 217-218. Idem pour l'Abhirati d'Ak~obhya: Kwan, p. 109-113; Nattier, p. 75. Cf. Fujita, p. 491-494.

121 Vceux 30-32: (Iuminosite de la SukhavatI), 31" vceu (vases de parfums pour les offrandes aux buddha et bodhisattva), et 32· vceu (ondees de fleurs avec nuages de musique); Ie 28" vceu mentionne indirectement l'arbre de l'eveil (bodhivrkea). On nuancera donc Ie propos de Nattier declarant (2000, p. 96-97): "the majority of his [Dharmakara'sl vows are devoted to a description of the precise qualities of the Buddha-field he intends to create".

LES SOURCES DE LASUKHAVATI 379

pretation symbolique pour comprendre la fonction de ces ornements 122, puisque les sutra parlent d'eux-memes. Ainsi des fameux oiseaux crees artificiellement par Amitabha, qui sont mentionnes dans Ie "Grand Sutra" (§ 67), et dont Ie "Petit Sutra" (§ 6) precise qu'ils chantent les trente-sept auxiliaires de l'eveil, de concert avec la musique celeste, pour amener les etres a commemorer les Trois Joyaux. De meme des diverses rivieres qui repercutent Ie son de nombreuses rubriques de la Loi, dont les moindres ne sont pas piiramitii, bhumi, silnyatii, et anutpattikadharma-k$iinti123 . Plus significatif encore, les etres, conformement au 28e vreu, peuvent voir l'arbre de 1'eveil (bodhivrk$a) d'Arnitabha, meme s'ils n'ont que peu de racines de bien (parlttakusalamilla)124; et des qu'ils Ie voient, ils obtiennent les trois degres d'endurance tout en devenant irreversibles125. Bref, Ie commentaire de l' Upadesa a propos de l'arbre de l'eveil peut s'appliquer a tous les autres ornements de la SukhavatI: ils ne sont 13. que "pour faciliter aux etres 1'audition de la Loi"!26.

Mais si ces ornements font ainsi "reuvre de buddha" (buddhakiirya)127, cette fonction revient evidemment en premier lieu a Amitabha luimeme128, lui qui est "en pleine possession des perfections de son champ de buddha"129. Conformement ala formule consacree, "il y demeure, s'y tient, y subsiste et preche la Loi"!3O. C'est ce dernier point qui donne la vraie dimension de la Sukhavati, comme l'a bien vu Ie regrette Bernard Frank en la qualifiant de "Terre de predication" d'Amitabha!3!. Le sutra precise encore que les etres "ne sont plus jamais separes de la vision du buddha ni de l'audition de la Loi, mais sont exempts de rechute jusqu'a leur accession a l'eveil"132. Comme l'assure Ie 45e vreu, ils peuvent ainsi

122 Comme Ie fera l'Upadda; cf. L~motte, Traite 4, p. 1971. 123 Ash. 36:8, 10 et 13; v. §65 et 68. Cf. Dantinne, p. 216-217. 124 Ash. 16: 19. Cf. Dantinne, p. 216. 125 Ash. 48:15, §99 (v. plus haut, p. 376, n. 107). Cf.I'Upadda cite in Lamotte, Vimala-

kfrti, p. 401. 126 T. 25, 1509, k. 93, p. 712a15. 127 Cf. Lamotte, Vimalakfrti, p. 341, n. 7; et p. 364, n. 10. 128 Cf. Ducor 1998, p. 84, n. 278. 129 Skr. buddhak:jetrasal'{lpada samanvagataJ:z (Ash. 26: 18-19). 130 Ash. 26: 11, §40. V. "Petit Sfitra", § 2. Cf. Lamotte, Vimalakfrti, p. 247, n. 8; Dan

tinne, p. 78 et 80. 131 Frank, p. 38. 132 Skr. sarva te 'virahita buddhadharsanena dharmasrava!:zenavinipatadharmalJ.o

380 JER6ME DUCOR

entendre la Loi a volonte, du Buddha en personne. Des lors, leurs pensees sont, notamment, pour la pratique de la perfection de sagesse (praj

iiaparamita, Ash. 51: 17, § 111), et ils obtiennent les cinq yeu~, y compris celui de buddha133• Tant et si bien qu'ils peuvent a leur tour precher

, la Loi avec omniscience (sarvajiiata, Ash. 51 :5, § 109), conformement au 24e vreu.

En resume, l'on peut considerer que la Sukhiivatl fonctionne comme une caisse de resonance du Dharma, et1'on retiendra ce juge'ment pertinent du Pere de Lubac: "Cette «Terre Heureuse» n'offre pas de plaisirs oil I' on s' enlise. Elle est avant tout comme une vaste ecole, OU I' on se rejouit essentiellement des progres qu'on y accomplit dans l'intelligence de la Loi"134. Cependant, cet equipement en connaissance (jnanasGJ?7.bhara)

serait insuffisant sans son equivalent en merites (pu1JyasaTflbhara). Les habitants de la Sukhiivatl obtiennent ce dernier principalement en allant rendre hommage aux myriades de buddha de toutes les directions 135,

conformement au 22e vreu, tant il est vrai que les buddha constituent Ie supreme champ de merites (paramapu1Jyak~etra)136. Et, comme l'affinne Ie sutra, cela est rendu possible parce que les etres ont ete "embrasses (parigrahe1Ja) par Ie secours (adhi~thana) des vreux primordiaux (pilrvapra1Jidhana) du Tathiigata AmitiiYUS"137.

Aucune de nos sources epigraphiques ou litteraires - qui seules nous occupent ici - ne presente la Sukhiivatl comme un "paradis" (svarga),

yavadbodhiparyantalfl (Ash. 49: 18-19, § 104; cf. Lamotte, Concentration, p. 211, en note; cf. p. 164). Sur Ie bienfait de ne plus etre separe du Buddha, v. id., Traite 4, p. 1924-

;:-1927. Sur Ie Buddha enseignant en son champ, v. Rowell, E. B. VI-4, p. 381-385. 133 Ash. 51:22, §112. Sur les cinq yeux, v. Ducor 1998, p. 83, n. 277. 134 De Lubac, p. 52; cf. p. 262. Selon La Vallee Poussin aussi, la Sukhavatl "is not an

everlasting paradise" mais "a blissful purgatory and a school, not only a place of retribution" (HERE, s.v. "Blest, Abode of the", p. 688b).

135 Ash. 47:2-5, 50:2-51:3; §96:20-21, §105-108. V. "Petit Siitra", §5 (Dantinne, p. 114, n. 165). Cf. Lamotte, Traite 5, p. 2431-2433; Rowell, E.B. VI-4, p. 402.

136 Cf. Lamotte, Concentration, p. 231, n. 266; Traite 1, p. 524; ibid.'4, p. 1970; H6b6-girin 3, p. 200ab; Rowell, op.cit., p. 402-405.

137 Ash. 51: 1, §108 (cf. id., 48: 19, §99). Fussman traduit: "parce qu'ils ont ere englobes autrefois dans Ie vreu solennel et I'hero'ique resolution du tathligata Amitayus" (p. 569, 574). Burnouf rend adhi-rthiina par "benediction" "Lotus" p. 363; cf. L VP, Kosa, ch. 3, p. 31, n. 2), comme Lamotte (Concentration, p. 269), qui a aussi "intervention 8urnaturelle" (Vimalakirti, p. 321). Demi6ville Ie rend par "gr§ce efficiente" (YogacarabhUmi, p. 386), et Girard par "force de soutien" (p. 209). Cf. Rowell, E.B. Vll-2, p. 154 S8.; BHSD, S.V. 3, p. 16a.


quoi qu'en dise Fussman (p. 558-559), car ce terme ne s'applique qu'aux divers sejours des dieux (deva) au sein du saf{lsara. Certes, Ie 38e vreu garantit que les etres nes dans Ie champ de buddha d'Amitabha gofitent, pour dire Ie moins, Ie comble du bonheur concevable dans Ie cycle des naissances et des morts: ce sommet est celui du moine arhat entre dans Ie 3e dhyana, qui fait naltre dans Ie paradis des dieux SUbha1qtsna138.

Cependant, il y a mieux que ce bonheur divin (divyasukha) , pourtant superieur au bonheur humain (manu$yasukha): Ie 33e vreu assure Ie bonheur qui depasse celui des dieux et des hommes (devamanu$yasamatikranta-sukha, Ash. 17: 23). De fait, les sources canoniques anciennes s' accordent a dire que Ie bonheur des dieux est lui-meme depasse par Ie bonheur du nirvaI.1a (nirvalJ-asukha) 139. Et celui-ci est bien Ie bonheur constitutif du champ de buddha d' Amitabha tel que Ie definissent les antiques stances du "Grand Sutra", soit "Ie bonheur du plan du nirvaI.1a" (nirvalJ-adhiitusaukhya, § 19_8)140. En definitive, la raison d'etre de la Bienheureuse, comme l'affirme une autre de ces stances, n'est autre que de procurer ce bonheur (sukha) aux etres confrontes ala souffrance (dulJkha) qui constitue la premiere des quatre Nobles Verites141 • Et l'on ne s'etonnera donc pas que Ie mot dulJkha n'existe meme pas en Sukhavati142, conformement au 16e vreu.

En outre, la naissance en Sukhavati n'est pas une fin en soi. Certes, Ie 21 e vreu promet que les etres qui y sont nes ne sont plus lies qu' a une seule naissance (ekajatibaddha) avant de devenir buddha (plus haut, p. 375); mais il assure aussi que ses habitants, fixes dans la pratique d'ExcellenceUniverselle (samantabhadra-carya-niyata)143, peuvent continuer Ie parcours des bodhisattva (bodhisattvacarya) pour se consacrer au nirvaI.1a complet (parinirvalJ-a) de tous les autres etres, comme Ie confimie Ie

138 Cf. Dantinne, p. 196, n. 67. References in Ducor 1998, p. 62, n. 165; ajouter Inagaki 1998a, p. 279.

139 Lamotte, Traite 3, p. 1710; pour 1es sources palies: HobOgirin 7, p. 935ab. 140 Seion la lecture de Fujita 1996c, p. 47 et n. 32. Ash. 8: 10 a nirviilJalokad1uitusaukhya. 141 Ash. 21:22, §29-2; cf. "Petit Siitra" , § 2. On s'etonne que Fussman traduise ici dUQkha

par "malheur" (1999, p. 533, n. 20), comme Gomez qui a "misfortune" (p. 76). La td. Miil-1er est viciee par des mss defectueux (1894a, p. 23).

142 Ash. 36:20, §69; Dantinne, p. 139-140. Cf. Fus. 1999, p. 558, n. 78. 143 Cf. Schop. 1977, p. 201. Sur Ies textes lies au Bodhisattva Samantabhadra, v. ibid.,

p. 183-184; Girard, p. 23-24.

382 JEROME DUCOR

sutra144. Ce faisant, iis accomplis sent l'ideal du Grand Vehicule et peuvent achever leur propre champ de buddha, en prenant exemple sur celui d'Amitabha (Ash. 44:24,46:27; § 96-6, 96_19)145.

En conclusion, la doctrine de la Sukhavati montre que l'eveil d'Amitabha regnant dans son champ de buddha est solidaire du progres spirituel de ses habitants: celui-Ia se doit d'y poursuivre son ceuvre de buddha (buddhakarya) en prechant a ceux-ci, tandis que ces derniers peuvent y achever Ie parcours irreversible (avinivartanacarya) des trois derniers stades des bodhisattva146.

3. Les habitants de la Sukhavatf

Puisque Ie champ de buddha d'Amitabha constitue Ie cadre privilegie ou accomplir Ie parcours irreversible des bodhisattva apres la mort, on ne sera pas etonne que Ia doctrine de la Sukhavati fut, des ses origines, recuperee par les adeptes du Mahayana en general. En effet, elle offrait proprement un raccourci a ceux d'entre eux qui en auraient deja franchi les premieres bhrtmi en ce monde-ci, leur permettant d'economiser ainsi une centaine de periodes cosmiques, au moins, sur Ie parcours vers l'eveil147•

Cette recuperation de la Sukhavati a ete abordee par Gregory Schopen148. Mais, outrepassant les conclusions de ce dernier, Fussman estime que l'acces meme a ce champ de buddha serait exclusivement reserve aux plus hauts bodhisattva. C'est ainsi qu'il declare que "la renaissance dans la Sukhavati est reservee a des bodhisattva dont c'est la derniere naissance" (p. 550, n. 62). Ce faisant, Fussman confond la naissance en Sukhavati avec la derniere naissance mentionnee par Ie 21 e vceu (ekajati-

144 Ash. 48:22-49:2, §100; Dantinne, p. 171. 145 A noter que c'est dans la 8e bhilmi que Ie bodhisattva obtient la souverainete sur la

purete de son futur champ de buddha. Cf. Lamotte, Vimalakfrti, p. 403-404; id., Concentration, p. 157, et 164, n. 122; Rowell, ibid., p. 387-389.

146 La Vallee Poussin notait deja: "La doctrine de la carriere du futur Bouddha se concilie cependant avec la doctrine de la Terre [Bienheureuse]" (L VP, Morale, p. 248, n. 1).

147 Ce ne sont donc pas les siitra de la Sukhiivatl qui constituent un "gauchissement" du systeme des bhilmi, comme Ie croit Fussman (Annuaire du College de France 1998-1999, p. 707-708; cf. Fus. 1999, p. 577-578). Sur la longue duree de la carriere des bodhisattva, v. Lamotte, Traite 1, p. 246-249; id., Histoire, p. 693-695.

148 Schop. 1977, notamment p. 189-193, qui se rerere au Samiidhirajii-satra et au Bhadracariprw:zidhiina-siltra.

LESSOURCESDELASUKHAvKrt 383

baddha)I49, alors 'que notre auteur affmne plus loin - non sans raisonque "la Sukhavau'sera l'etape precMant immediatement ['existence ou ils obtiendront [la bodhz]" (p. 575, n. 109). .

Et Fussman de s'interroger sur deux passages du "Petit Sutra" mentionnant la presence, en Sukhavau, d'hommes (manu:fya), d'une part, et d'auditeurs du Petit Vehicule (sriivaka), d'autre partI50• Au sujet des premiers, il cite (p. 565-566) l'extrait du sutra concernant l'infinite de la vie d'Amitayus et de ces "hommes" (§ 8), tout en prenant Ie parti des traducteurs tibetains, qui ont omis cette derniere expression lSI. Mais les "hommes" sont deja mentionnes dans un passage anterieur du meme sutra, y compris dans sa traduction tibetaine: il y est question des hommes (manu:fyiilJiif!l, tib. mi de dag) qui entendent les sons delicieux resonnant dans la Sukhavau (§ 7; Bzwe. 346: 11)152. Quant au "Grand Sfitra" , il suffit de rappeler ici que les hommes et les dieux sont expressement mentionnes par Ie 4e vreu.

Concernant les sriivaka, Fussman (p. 566-567) se rerere a un autre pas- . sage du "Petit Sutra" (§ 9), lequel indique qu' Amitabha est pourvu d'une communaute d'auditeurs (sriivakasangha). Et Fussman d'estimer que cette indication constitue une "inadvertance", parce qu' elle serait contredite par la suite du texte (§ 10). Comme nous l'avons vu plus haut (p. 377), ce dernier affmne, en effet, que les etres nes en Sukhavau sont de "purs bodhisattva, irreversibles et lies par une seule naissance"; de sriivaka, i1 n' est donc pas question. Le sutra poursuit en declarant que I' on doit faire

149 Meme confusion chez Gomez: selon lui, la derniere naissance a laquelle sont lies les etres "is clearly birth in Sukhavati": "only this one birth remains for them", de sorte qu'ils y realiseraient Ie parfait eveil "right there" (§ 96-18, § 100, p. 97, n. 79; cf. Ash. 46:25 et48:23-24); idem chez Miiller 1894, p. 51, n. 1; cf. Ash. 48:23-24). Or, Ie 21· vreu mentionne sans equivoque les "etres qui sont nes" (sattvii upapanniil;) dans ce champ de buddha (v. aussi Ash. 46:22-25, § 96-18); idem pour Ie "Petit Siitra" (§ 10; cf. plus haut, p. 377). Leur realisation du parfait eveil en Sukhavati serait d'autant plus impossible que plusieurs buddha ne peuvent coexister dans un meme champ de buddha (cf. Ducor, p. 1998, p. 35, n. 63; ajouter Nattier 2000, p. 89).

150 La presence des sriivaka en Sukhavati etait deja signalee par La Vallee Poussin (HERE, s.v. "Avalokitesvara", p. 258b, note ~). Selon Huntington, il s'agit Ia de l'une des "ambiguities" du "Petit Siitra" (1996, p. 71-72).

151 Cf. Ducor 1998, p. 145, n. 532. Dans Ie 14· vreu, Ie passage correspondant dit simplement "etres" (sattviiniil]'!, Ash. 13:7); cf. Dantinne, p. 153-154.

152 Les "hommes" (man~ii1J.iil]'!) apparaissent aussi au § 6, mais Ie tibetain a "les etres qui y sont nes" (Bzwe. 346:2).

384 JER6ME DUCOR

un vceu vis-a-vis de ce champ de buddha, c'est-a-dire, y souhaiter naitre. n en explique la raison par Ie fait que l'on s'y trouvera reuni avec des "heros excellents de cette espece"153, ceux-ci n'etant autres que les bodhisattva residant deja en SukhavatI, comme indique plus haut par Ie sutra; ici non plus, il n'est pas question de sriivaka. Pourtant, la presence des sriivaka en SukhavatI est bien attestee par nos deux sutra Car tous les buddha obtiennent un entourage (pariviira), qu'il comprenne exclusivement des sriivaka ou des bodhisattva, ou qu'il soit melange154. La definition de l'entourage d'un buddha fait donc partie des listes classiques des qualites propres a son champ155. Ainsi, tandis que l'entourage du Buddha SugandhakUta ne compte que des bodhisattva156, celui de Sakyamuni est melange!57, car sa predication du Mahayana profite aussi aux adeptes du Petit Vehicule158. n en va de meme pour Ie Buddha Ak~obhya en son propre champ de buddha, Abhirati159. Et Arnitabha ne fait pas exception: il dispose, lui aussi, d'un entourage melange, dont son 12e vceu se fait l'ech0160. A son entourage appartiennent egalement les Bodhisattva Avalo-

153 La traduction de Fussman (p. 566) fait probleme: "Parce qu'on s'y trouve avec des etres purs (satpuru~a) semblables <3. soi?>." (tathiirilpai/:t satpuru~ai/:t saha samavadhiinaf!! bhavati; tib. 'di ltar skyes bu darn pa de Eta bu dag dang phrad par 'gyur ba'i phyir TO, Bzwe. 348:2-3); idem chez Gomez (p. 19): "Because they will meet persons like themselves, who practice the good". A noter que Ie terme satpuru~a designe notamment des bodhisattva laIcs (Harrison 1978, p. 57; id. 1990, p. 6, n. 7; Hobi5girin 7, 793a); KumarajIva Ie rend par "hommes de bien superieurs" (shangshan-ren J:~A), et Xuanzang par "grands heros" (dashi *±): l'expression s'applique particulierement aux bodhisattva irreversibles (HobOgirin 6, 675ab).

154 Lamotte, TraUe 5, p. 2237-2240; id., "Vajrapfu.li", p. 145 ss . •• }55 References in Ducor 1998, p. 31, n. 48. Ajouter: Kagawa 1985, p. 162-165; Inagaki

1998a, p. 56-58. 156 Lamotte, Vimalakfrti, p. 320. 157 Selon Ie prologue du "Grand Sutra", Siikyamuni etait entoure d'une "communaute

de 32.000 moines" (bhikijusangha) comprenant de grands auditeurs (mahiisriivaka) (Ash. 1: 13-14, § 2), ainsi que de nombreux bodhisattva-mahiisattva, parmi lesquels seul Maitreya est nomme (Ash. 2: 12-13, § 4), bien qu' AvalokiteSvara intervienne aussi dans Ie sutra (cf. plus haut, p. 366). Le "Petit Sutra" (§ 1) mentionne egalement une "communaute de 1.250 moines" (bhikijusangha) comprenant des rnahiisriivaka, ainsi que des bodhisattva-rnahiisattva: quatre d'entre eux sont nommes - Ie premier etant MafijusrI suivi d'Ajita/ Maitreya - mais non pas Avalokitesvara.

158 Lamotte, Traite 1, p. 238-240; id., Vimalakfrti, p. 124, n. 87. 159 Dantinne, p. 231, et .p. 254-255, qui se rMere aux deux Sukhavatfvyilha; Nattier

2000, p. 83-84, 92-93. 160 Selon ce dernier, les sriivaka de l'entourage d'Arnita:bha seront innombrables (v. aussi


kitesvara et Mahasth1i.maprapta: si Ie "Grand Siltra" est Ie seul ales nommer, il explique aussi que leur eclat depasse ce1ui des autres bodhisattva de la Sukhavatl et, afortiori, de ses sriivaka161 • Bref, les auditeurs d'Amitabha n'apparaissent pas comme etant nes en tant que tels en SukhavatI, mais plutat comme faisant partie des retributions de ce buddha, ces "qualites de champ de buddha dont s'ome ce champ de buddha", comme Ie rappelle d'ailleurs Ie "Petit Siltra", aussitat apres sa mention des sriivaka (§ 9, in fine). Enfin, la suite de ce texte (§ 10) indique aussi que la communaute des auditeurs (sriivakasangha) fait partie du cortege d' Amitabha apparaissant aux mourants 162. Au passage, on notera que la presence simultanee en SukhavatI des sriivaka et des bodhisattva n'est pas sans evoquer Ie topique des stades communs aux deux Vehicules (siidhiiralJabhumi) 163 .

4. La methode du "Petit Sukhavatlvyilha"

Pour demontrer que seuls des bodhisattva deja tres avances peuvent entrer en SukhavatI, Fussman (p. 567-568) renvoie a un passage anterieur du meme § 10 du "Petit Siltra". Comme nous l' avons vu, Ie siltra y exhorte les etres a produire Ie vceu de naitre en SukhavatI parce qu'ils s'y trouveront reunis avec ces heros excellents que sont les bodhisattva. Cependant, il ne peut s'agir d'un simple vceu pieux, et Ie siltra de donner cet avertissement avant de livrer sa methode:

"Ce n'est pas par une maigre racine de bien seulement, Sanputra, que les etres naissent dans Ie champ de buddha du Tathagata ArnitaYUS"164.

Ash. 28: 11, § 46). Pour autant, l' Upadda indique que "dans Ie champ du buddha Amita, Ie sangha des bodhisattva est nombreux, et celui des sriivaka peu nombreux" (cf. Lamotte, Traite 5, p. 2335).

161 Ash. 49:3-4, 9-10; §101-l02. Cf. Lamotte, Traite 5, p. 2308, n. 2. 162 Passage d'ailleurs mentionne par Fussman: p. 550, n. 62. Huntington (1996, p. 71,

n. 24) releve que Ie texte chinois ne mentionne que les "Holy ones" (i.e. les saintes foules, zhu sheng zhong ~~~; T. 12,366, p. 347b13). C'est vrai de la traduction de Kumarajlva, mais celIe attribuee a Xuanzang mentionne bien "la foule des disciples auditeurs et des bodhisattva" (T. 12,367, p. 350aI2); idem pour Ie tibetain (Bzwe. 348:9).

163 Sur ce sujet complexe, v. Lamotte, Traite 5, p. 2377 ss; id., Concentration, p. 246-251; id.,Histoire, p. 696-697.

164 Skr. niivaramiitrakera Siiriputra kusalami1leniimitiiyu~as tathiigatasya buddhak~etre sattvii upapadyante; cf. Thomas, p. 84; Dantinne, p. 101, n. 115. Miiller traduisait: "Les etres

386 JEROME DUCOR

De cette litote, Fussman d~duit que, retrospectivement, Ies candidats a Ia naissance en SukhavatI. "doivent d'abord avoir fait Ie vreu soiennel d'atteindre Ia bodhi et avoir accumule d'innombrables racines de bien" (p. 567). Pour toute justification de cette interpretation litigieuse du texte sanskrit, Fussman (p. 568) se contente de deux renvois a des sources chinoises. Le premier se re:fere au passage correspondant du sutra dans Ie texte de Kumarajlva mais selan Ia traduction libre de Gomez (1996, p. 148), qui ne nous retiendra pas. Quant au second renvoi, Fussman tie fait que mentionner l'UpadeSa dans Ia traduction de Lamotte (Traite 5, p. 2363, §5.1), qui merite cependant d'etre cite ici plus litteralement:

"il y a des etres, aux merites mms et aux entraves tenues, qui doivent obtenir l'eveil dans Ie futur (ying dang de dao ~'&1~i!!); mais s'ils entendent Ie nom des buddha, ils obtiennent l'eveil a l'instant meme (ji shi de dao ~pa~1~i!!)"165.

Cela etant, on ne voit pas en quoi I' UpadeSa infirmerait ici Ia methode offerte par Ie "Petit Sutra", puisque celui-ci ne parle pas d'obtenir l'eveil a I'instant meme de l'audition du nom166. Par contre, l'interpretation de Fussman est contredite par Ie "Grand Sutra", 28e vreu et §93 (Ash. 16: 19, 42:23).

Certes, Ia Iitote du "Pet,it Sutra" peut surprendre, et c'est la, sans doute sa fonction: attirer I'attention sur Ia methode qui suit immediatement dans Ie texte, et qui pourrait paraitre anodine sans cette figure de rhetorique, Iaquelle n'a d'ailleurs rien d'exceptionneF67. Or, cette methode ne fait

ne naissent pas dans ce Pays de Buddha du Tathagata Amitiiyus en recompense et par suite dis bonnes actions accomplies dans Ia vie actuelle" (cf. Ducor 1998, p. 145, n. 537); cette lecture a ete suivie par Sakaki Ryozaburo (Kaisetsu bongogaku, p. 259), Filliozat (l.CI. §2331, p. 570), Huntington (1996, p. 71), et, tout recemment, par Paul Magnin (p. 462, n. 3).

165 T. 25, k. 34, p. 313c27-28. Cette citation est d'ailleurs a completer par Ia suite du meme passage, qui lui donne un sens tout particulier: "De plus, c'est par Ie pouvoir magnifique des buddha qu'ils l'entendent et obtiennent aussiti'it la delivrance (ji de du ~P1~lt)" (ibid., p. 313c28-29).

166 Lamotte porte a confusion lorsqu'il affmne que, selon les Sukhiivativyuha, "Ie seul fait d'entendre Ie nom du buddha Amitabha ( ... ) assure ipso facto une renaissance en Sukhiivatf" (Traite 5, p. viii).

167 Par ex. dans Ie "Sutra du Lotus" (ch. XXIV): "TIs ne possederont pas une maigre racine de bien, 0 Bienheureux, Ies etres qui entendront cette histoire du Bodhisattva-Mahasattva Avalokitesvara" (na te Bhagavan sattvii avarakelJa kusalamUlena samanviigatii bhavi$Yanti; SP 374:2-3; Burnouf, "Lotus", p. 268; Watters, p. 238a; cf. Robert, p. 371). V. aussi dans I'Ak~obhya-vyuha: Dantinne, p. 101.


absolument pas allusion aux merites anterieurs ni a la production de la pensee d'eveil (bodhicitta), comme Ie prouve Ie texte du sutra lui-meme:

"Sariputra, tout fils de famille ou fille de famille qui entendra Ie nom de ce Bienheureux Tathagata AmiUiyus, qui, l'ayant entendu, y portera attention (manasikarifYati) de une a sept nuits, y portera attention d'une pensee sans distraction (avik#ptacitto manasikarifYati)168, lorsque ce fils de famille ou cette fille de famille mourra, ce Tathagata Amitiiyus, entoure de sa comrnunaute d'auditeurs, escorte d'une foule de bodhisattva, se tiendra face a lui (purataJ:t sthasyati) au moment de sa mort, et il mourra avec une pensee sans meprise (aviparyastacittaJ:t); mort, il naitra dans l'univers Sukhavatl, champ de buddha de ce Tathagata Amitayus."

Si ron s'en tient au texte du sutra, sa methode se decompose donc selon Ie processus suivant:

audition du nom> attention> absence de distraction> presence du Buddha> absence de meprises > mort> naissance en SukhavatI.

Ces elements meritent d'etre detailles. Tout d'abord, les etres doivent entendre Ie nom du Buddha Amitayus169. C'est dire 1'irnportance de l'audition du nom (niimadheyasravalJ-a): en fait, c'est elle qui constitue la clef de notre litote. II apparait en effet que si la methode detaillee dans Ie "Petit Sutra" ne constitue pas une "maigre racine de bien", c'est bien parce qu' elle s' amorce dans les "racines de bien produites par l' audition du nom" (niimadheyal'{l srutvii tac-chravalJ-asahagatena kusalamulena)170. Or, ace stade du sutra (§ 10), ce nom a d'ores et deja ete "entendu", tant par l'auditoire de Sakyamuni que par Ie lecteur ulterieur du texte: l'appellation d'Amit:lyus a, en effet, ete devoilee des Ie debut du sutra (§ 2), tandis que la signification du double nom Amitayus/Amitabha a suivi un peu plus loin (§ 8-9). II n'y a donc plus a s'interroger sur la quantite des merites accumules pour obtenir d'entendre ce nom; et pas d'avantage, d'ailleurs, sur les merites qui, de toute evidence, ont permis l' obtention d 'une existence

168 Pour Ie tenne technique aviklfiptacitto, Fussman traduit: "sans penser 11 autre chose" (p. 567); idem (p. 574) dans un passage du "Sutra du Lotus" qui a aviklfiptena manasikiirelJa (ch. XXVI, SP 388:6; Burnouf, id., p. 279).

169 La diffusion du nom est assuree par Ies autres buddha, selon Ie "Grand Sutra": 17e vreu et §29-3, 89 et 95 (Ash. 21 :24-22:2,41 :25-42:4,4314-17). V. Adachi, p. 23 ss. Cf. Harrison 1978, p. 54 et n. 21; Lamotte, Traite, 5, p. 2364.

170 Pour reprendre l'expression des vreux 34, 42 et 43 (Ash. 18:5-6,20:1-2,7-8).

388 JEROME DUCOR

humaine ainsi que la rencontre avec ce sutra. En soulignant l'importance de l'audition du nom du Buddha, Ie "Petit Sutra" - tout comme Ie "Grand Sutra"l7l - s'inscrit dans un courant typique du Grand VehicuIe, ainsi que I'attestent, notamment, les commentaires que lui cons acre l'Upadesa:

"II y a des buddha dont la commemoration suffit pour que les etres obtiennent l'eveil. ( ... ) II Y a des buddha dont l'audition du nom suffit pour que les etres obtiennent l'eveil"172.

Bref, a l'audition du nom, Ie pratiquant est done amene a y porter attention (manasiktira), ce qui consiste a tenir son esprit sur Ie nom du Buddha pris pour objet173; et c'est bien ce qU'a compris Kumarajiva en traduisant manasiktira par "garder Ie nom" (zhichi minghao tIt~~ ~). Pour autant, cette attention ne doit pas etre excessive au point qU'elle aboutirait, paradoxalement, a une distraction (manasikiira vik~epa), Iaquelle serait une dispersion provenant du doute174• C'est dire aussi que Ia foi (sraddhii) n'est pas absente de cet acte d'attention: elle d'ailleurs explicitee dans Ies exhortations de Sakyamuni, vers Ia fin du sutra (§ 17). En resume, nous avons donc affaire, deprime abord, a une pratique purement mentale175, certes encore bien eloignee du nembutsu jaculatoire qui s'im-

171 Cf. §147 (Ash. 62:18-20); ainsi que les vreux 18, 19,34,35,36,41,42,43,44,46 et 47. V. aussi l'etude d'Adachi.

172 T. 25,1509, k. 34, p. 313c 9-10,12-13; cf. Lamotte, Traite 5, p. 2359, §7 et 9; v. ibid. p. 2355-2364.

173 Selon la definition d'Asanga (Rahula, p. 7, qui restitue en citta-dhiiraIJa). Cf. LVP, Kosa 2, p. 154; Burnouf, "Lotus", p. 413; Ducor 1999, p. 108, n. 60; BHSD, p. 418a.

174 Selon la definition d'Asanga (Rahula, p. 13-14), qui distingue six sortes de distractions: c' est la sixieme qui est la distraction provenant de l' attention. Fussman (p. 567, n. 93) releve que la distraction constitue 1'une des six pensees mauvaises que Ie bodhisattva doit repousser. Pour etre plus precis, elle constitue l'un des six contraires (vipakifa) des six perfections (paramita) qui doivent etre ecartes par la perfection de sagesse (prajfia): la distraction est Ie contraire de la perfection de la meditation (dhyana) (Lamotte, Traite 5, p. 2244-2245, n. 2). On soulignera cependant que Ie "Petit Sutra" ne fait pas une seule fois allusion a la culture des six paramita.

175 Ainsi, Demieville rend "garde du nom" par "Ie retenir en son esprit" ("Pensee unique", p. 235). La traduction attribuee a Xuanzang dit que les etres qui ont entendu Ie nom doivent "y reflechir" (siwei ,\~klt) (T. 12,367, p. 350a9). Contrairement a ce qu'indique Dantinne (p. 42), les Sukhiivatzvyuha ne parlent pas de "la seule invocation du nom d' Amitabha au moment du trepas", principe qui sera soutenu par Ie fameux Sutra des contemplations de Vie-Infinie (Wuliangshou-guan-jing, T. 12,365, p. 345c, 346a; Yamada 1984, p. 101, 109; cf. Ducor 1999, p. 116-117, 120).

LESSOURCESDELASUKHAVATI 389

posera dans la tradition sino-japonaise. n n'empeche que manasikiira peut aussi equivaloir a "commemoration" (anusmrti)176, une pratique dont De Jong a montre qu'elle peut bien avoir ete une invocation en Inde deja177.

De meme, Fujita a signale des exemples tires de stitra ou I'expression chinoise "garde du nom" equivaut bel et bien ala prononciation de ce dernier178.

Quoi qu'il en soit, I'acte d'attention sur Ie nom du Buddha a pour consequence qu'au moment de Ia mort, Ie Buddha se tient face au pratiquant; et cette presence permet a ce dernier de trepasser sans entretenir l'une des meprises (viparyiisa) qui Ie retiendraient dans Ie cycle des naissances et des morts179• En vertu de quoi, il na1:t finalement en SukhavatI180•

Neanmoins, Fussman comprend curieusement que Ie mourant decede non pas libre de meprises, mais "sans avoir change d'etat d'esprit", c'est-adire "sans renoncer a son vreu d'atteindre Ia bodhi" (p. 567 et n. 93). Or, non seulement une telle interpretation ne tient pas compte de Ia specificite du vocabulaire bouddhique, mais, surtout, elle fait violence au texte, puisque Fussman restitue aviparyastacittaJ;. par Ie neologisme "avipa-

176 Comme l'atteste notre sutra: cf. § 6 (buddhamanasikiira) et § 7 (buddhiinusmrti); v. Fujita 2001, p. 131-134; Watters, p. 234b. Cf. aussi "Grand Sutra", Ash. 43:6 et 10 (§ 94). L'equivalence est aussi admise par Lamotte (Traite 5, p. 2350). Enfin, Filliozat rend manasikiira par "mise en esprit" ou "memoration, mentalisation", et smrti par "presence d'esprit" (I.Cl. § 2253).

177 De Jong, p. 365-366. Lamotte remarque aussi: "L'audition du nom des Buddha entrame naturellement a sa suite une reflexion (manasikiira) plus ou moins prolongee sur ces memes Buddha, et cette reflexion se traduit souvent par une invocation orale (akranda) " \ (Traite 5, p. 2350; cf. p. 2355, n. 2). Cf. Yamabe, p. 128, 143-144.

178 Fujita 2001, p. 133-134, qui renvoie aT. 9, 263, k. 10, p. 129b, et aT. 9,278, k. 49, p. 708a. V. aussi plus bas, p. 304, n. 207. C'est cette equivalence entre "garde du nom" et "prononciation du nom" qui sera reprise par Ie Chinois Shandao (613-681) pour justifier la pratique du nembutsu jaculatoire (cf. Ducor 1999, p. 108).

179 Ce sont les quatre meprises: prendre 1 'impermanent pour etemel, la souffrance pour bonheur, l'absence d'lime (aniitman) pour lime, et, enfin, l'impur pour pur. Cf. Ducor 1998, p. 82; ajouter: Scherrer-Schaub, p. 142, n. 116; Lamotte, Vimalakfrti, p. 289, n. 14; id., Traite 3, p. 1150; Rahu1a, p. 120, n. 1; Dayal, p. 90-91; Vievard, p. 97-98.

180 La traduction de Kumiirajlva precise qu'il va y naitre "aussitot" (ji de wangsheng ftP1~tt1:). Ce subitisme sera l'objet de refutations, dont on trouve les premices dans l' UpadeSa (Lamotte, Traite 5, p. 2362-2363). Elles seront pleinement elaborees par l'ecole Y ogacara, notamment dans la "Somme du Grand Vehicu1e" (Mahayiinaslllf1graha) d' Asailga, avec son interpretation diachronique (kiiliintariibhipriiya), dont les effets se feront sentir jusque dans la Chine du VITe siecle (references in Ducor 1999, p. 133, n. 147).

390 JEROME DUCOR

ryasta<bodhi>citta/:L"181. Sa conclusion n'est pas moins absurde puisqu'il pretend que Ie mourant, "au moins a cet instant", est fixe dans l'irreversible (avinivartanfya): il y a Ia un double contre-sens, car l'irreversible est consecutif a la naissance en Sukhavati182, et, par definition, il ne peut etre ni ponctuel ni provisoire.

La conclusion du §1O du sutra estdetoumee d'une maniere similaire lorsque Fussman affrnne que les etres sont exhortes a naitre en Sukhavan en faisant Ie "vreu solenne1 <dit bodhi>citta"183. Car Ie texte dit seulement que les etres doivent aspirer a Sukh1lvati en faisant un "vreu en leur pensee" (cittapralJidhiinam). De bodhicitta, il n'est toujours pas question. Par contre, si l'on replace ce vreu dans Ie deroulement de la methode du "Petit Sutra", on constate qu'il ne peut qu'etre concomitant a l'acte d'attention (manasikiira) suivant l'audition du nom: en precisant que ce vreu doit etre fait" en pensee"; Ie sutra indique donc clairement que cette aspiration a la naissance en Sukhavati doit proceder d'un acte d'attention fonde sur Ia reflexion (cintiimaya), et non pas seulement sur l'audition (srutamaya), meme si cette demiere s'appuie sur un sermon du Buddha184•

Mais revenons ala pensee denuee de meprises (aviparyastacitta), consequence directe de I'apparition du Buddha185 . Le sutra montre qu'elle constitue l'ultime experience mentale du pratiquant au moment meme de mourir; elle n'est donc rien d'autre que la pensee du moment de Ia mort (maralJacitta), dont l'importanceest capitale dans les textes les plus anciens du bouddhisme: car la demiere pensee d'une vie qui s'acheve est "la cause suffisante et immediate" induisant la naissance suivante186 •

.. , Or, une telle absence de meprise as simile soudainement Ie mourant ni

181 L'altemative mentionnee par Fussman, selou qui aviparyastacittalJ pourrait etre un synonyme de avik~iptacittalJ, ne tient pas non plus.

182 Plus haut, p. 376; et Schop. 1977, 190-19l. 183 Fus. 1999, p. 567 et n. 94. Meme chose dans Ie traitement du §17 du sutra, passage

que Fussman qualifie curieusement de "sectaire" Cp. 569). 184 Cf. L VP, Kosa, ch. 2, p. 328; ch. 4, p. 223. Sur les regles de l'herrneneutique boud

dhique, v. les references in Ducor 1999, p. 126, n. 126. 185 La traduction attribuee 11 Xuanzang se signale en precisant: "Le secours de la bien

veillance et de la compassion [du Buddha] fait que la pensee [du mourant] n'a pas de meprises" CT. 12,367, p. 350aI3). Sur Ie mot "secours" (jiayou :!JOt'/), adhi~{hiina), v. plus haut, p. 380, n. 137.

186 LVP, Morale, p. 180; references in Ducor 1998, p. 82, n. 268.

LES SOURCES DE LA sUKHA VATI 391

plus ni moins qu'au 7e des dix stades des bodhisattval87,avant qu'il n'accede au 8e stade une fois ne en SukhivatI. La chose est d'autant plus remarquable que Ie "Petit slUra" s'adresse soit aux "etres" (sattva) en general, soit aux "fIls ou [Illes de farnille" (kulaputra,kuladuhitr), exp~ession designant notamment des Ialcs. Sans doute est-ce Hi la doctrine la plus originale de notre sutra: celui-ci temoigne d'une tendance du Grand Vehicule visant a. ouvrir au commun des mortels la voie ardue des bodhisattva. Ce principe est confrrme par Ie fait que cette pensee denuee de meprises suit l'apparition du Buddha face au mourant; mais, au contraire de la pratique ordinaire des visualisations, ce dernier n'a pas besoin d'acquerir prealablement 1'reil divin (divyacab;us) necessitant des meditations (dhyiina) reservees aux saints et aux bodhisattva liberes du desirl88 . Et c'est vraisemblablement pourquoi Ie "Petit Sutra" ne parle jamais de visionl89 .

Cette absence de 1'reil divin nous impose un rapprochement significatif, qui nous aidera a mieux situer la place des deux Sukhavatfvyuha dans Ie bouddhisme indien, alors que l'article de Fussman nous laisse sur notre faim malgre son titre. En effet, Ie "Sutra du recueillement du face-a.-face avec les buddha du present" (Pratyutpanna-buddha-saf!lmukhiivasthita-samiidhi-sutra )190

preconise une pratique qui s' adresse aussi bien aux religieux qu' aux hucs et qui, comme dans Ie "Petit Sutra", pennet l'apparition d'un buddha face a eux en ce monde-ci, sans recourir a ['ceil divinl91 ; en outre, elle consiste aussi a. porter attention, d'un jour a une semaine, sans distraction, sur un buddha dupresent, Ie Pratyutpanna dormant specifiquementAmitiiyus en exemplel92 ;

[87 Cf. Dayal, p. 276-277, 290. 188 Sur l'ceil divin, l'une des sciences sublimes (abhijiia), v. Ducor 1999, p. 137, n. 161. [89 Au contraire, Ie "Grand Siitra" offre, entre autres, une methode pour proprement

voir Amitabha (Ash. 42:9-21, § 91-92 Dantinne, p. 224; Conze 1954, p. 206). Eile necessite non seulement un acte d'attention, mais aussi la production de la pensee d'eveil, une haute resolution, l'accumulation des merites et leur transfer!, toutes choses qui n'apparaissent pas dans Ie "Petit Siitra".

190 Tib. Trip. XXXII, 801; T. 13,418. Cf. Ducor 1999, p. 135-136, n. 155; ajouter I.C!. §2071, et Harrison 1990.

191 Cf. Ducor 1999, p. 138 et n. 164; ajouter: Lamotte, TraUt! 5, p. 2274, n. 2. 192 Cf. la td. du tib. par Harrison, qui a: "with undistracted thought [avik~iptacittena]

he concentrates [manasi-kr-] 'on the Tathagata <Amitiiyus>" (1978, p. 42-43; cf. 1990, p. 31-32). Dans les traductions chinoises, Ie nom du Buddha est donne comme "Amituo" ~iiJlmwt, tandis que la pratique consiste a Ie "commemorer" (nian ~). Cf.la version en 3 vols (T. 13,418, k. 1, p. 905ab): Lamotte, Traitt! 5, p. 2274, n. 3; Harrison 1998a, p. 17-19;

392 ffiR6ME DUCOR

enfm, cette methode resulte egalement dans l'acquisition de l'irreversible193.

Neanmoins, Ie Pratyutpanna se distingue du "Petit Sutra" sur pl~sieurs points importants. Tout d'abord, i1 requiert non seulement Ie respect complet des preceptes (SUa), mais aussi seize conditions prealables, dont les moindres ne sont pas de se priver de sommeil, et de pratiquer en marchant durant trois mois194• En outre, la pratique de ce samiidhi implique une visualisation complete du buddha avec toutes ses marques. De plus, il doit etre accompli sans aucun attachement: en fait, il doit proprement s'allier ala sagesse (prajfiii) percevant la vacuite (siinyatii)195. Enfin, I'apparition du buddha procuree par ce samiidhi survient hic et nunc, sans qu'il soit necessaire d' attendre Ie moment de Ia mort196•

Les deux sutra se retrouvent cependant dans leur finalite. En effet, ce samiidhi n'est pas non plus une fin en soi: comme la naissance en Sukhiivatl, Ie but de l'apparition qu'il procure est de pouvoir entendre directement l'enseignement d'un buddha en personne197• Mais queUe est donc la question que Ie pratiquant va enfin pouvoir poser a cet eveille? Le Pratyutpanna est clair: la question du pratiquant conceme la methode pour naitre dans Ie champ de ce buddha Et Ia reponse du buddha interroge ne nous etonnera pas outre mesure: cette methode n'est autre que la commemoration du buddha (buddhiinu.smrtl), laqueUe fait obtenir Ie recueillement de la vacuite (siinyatii-samiidhi)198.

En resume, si Ie Pratyutpanna fait bien Ie pont entre Ia doctrine des Prajfiiipiiramitii et celIe des Sukhiivatzvyiiha199, il se distingue en ce que la realisation de la vacuite y est concomitante a la pratique du samiidhi

Tsukamoto 2, p. 850-851. Et l'abrege en 1 voL (T. 13,417, p. 899ab): Inagaki 1989, p. 58-60. V. aussi Fujita 2001, p. 135.

193 T. 13, 418, k. 1, p. 903b4-5; Harrison 1998a, p. 9; id. 1990, p. 18. Cf. Lamotte, Traite 4, p. 1789.

194 Harrison 1990, p. 45-46; id. 1998a, p. 23-24. 195 Lamotte, Traite 4, p. 1927-1928; id. 5, p. 2268-2269; Harrison 1978, p. 45-46 et .

48-51; id. 1992, p. 221-223. 196 Harrison 1990, p. 33; id. 1998a, p. 18. Cf. Lamotte, Concentration, p. 163, n. 121;

id., Traite 4, p. 1930; ibid. 5, p. 2273, n. 2. 197 Cf. Harrison 1978, p. 52-54; 1990, p. 32-33; 1998a, p. 18. 198 T.B, 418, k. 1, p. 905b8-19; Harrison 1998a, p. 19; id. 1990, p. 36-38 (cf. 1978,

p. 52); id. 1992, p. 220-221.Tsukamoto 2, p. 857. ~99 Harrison 1978, p. 40; Kajiyama, p. 16-17.


en cette vie, tandis qU'elie est une consequence de la naissance en Sukhavan apres la mort. Cette nuance importante induit une derniere difference entre Ie Pratyutpanna et Ie "Petit Siitra": celie du degre de difficulte de leurs methodes respectives. De toute evidence, Ie pratyutpanna-samiidhi implique un parcours plus difficile (du~karacaryii), et sa pratique necessite plus d'effort (prayogika). Ce principe est confmne non seulement par l' Upade.sa200, mais aussi par un autre commentaire, egalement attribue a Nagiirjuna: Ie "Traite sur l'analyse des dix stades" (Dasabhilmikavibhii~iisiistra)20l. Or, si ce dernier texte accorde une place importante au pratyutpcLnna-samiidhz"202, il offre aussi - non sans reticences - une alternative au pratiquant manquant d'energie (vi"rya) sur ce parcours difficile. Ce succedane est celui du moyen habile de la foi (xin-fangbian {~jJfl), qui constitue un parcours facile (yixing JMt) pour atteindre l'irreversible203. n consiste a "garder et prononcer les noms" (zhichi cheng minghao tDl.~m~ ~) des buddha des differentes directions, d 'une maniere assez similaire aux n!commandations apparaissant vers la fin du "Petit Siitra" (§ 11-16)204, mais selon une liste apparentee a celie du "Grand Siitra,,205.

La recommandation de la garde des noms des buddha qui clot I'expose de la methode du "Petit Siitra" montre les buddha des six directions exhortant a la foi en ce texte par cette injonction:

200 T. 25, 1509, k. 21, p. 221b6-7; Lamotte, Traite 3, p. 1361. 201 Inagaki 1998b, p. 137. Ce traite est conserve seulement dans la td. chinoise de Kuma

rajiva (Shizhu-piposha-lun; T. 1521), vers 408-409 ap. I.-C. L'identite de son auteui;,.li;St' debattue; v. Kagawa 1985, p. 152-155; Fujita 1996b, p. 33; Lamotte, Traite 3, p. XLIV,'ii"qi Harrison 1990, p. xxv, n. 25; Tanaka, p. 10, n. 47; Girard, p. 217; cf. Kuo Li-ying, p:!oS'2:. Outre les dix bhibni, Ie titre chinois evoque leur equivalent anterieur que sont les dix stations (vihiira): cf. Demieville, Yogiiciirabhumi, p. 430, et 434, n. 8; Girard, p. 208-209.

202 Cf. Inagaki 1998b, p. 10, 20, 66, 82-83. 203 T.26, 1521, k. 5, p. 41b. Inagaki 1998b, p. 139-140; Dantinne, p. 128; Hob6girin

1, p. 27b; Eracle 1981, p. 6. 204 La liste des noms des buddha dans Ie "Petit Siitra" a, depuis longtemps, ete mise

en parallele avec Ie "Siitra des noms des buddha" (Foming-jing, T. 14,440) (cf. Ducor 1998, p. 84, n. 280; ajouter Fujita 2001, p. 71-79). Mais 1es fragments decouverts dans la Collection Sch¢yen permettent aussi d' evoquer un lien entre ce deruier texte et Ie "Grand Siitra"; cf. IffiM, p. 181 et 206.

205 Selon Inagaki (1998b, p. 11), la version du "Grand Siitra" utilisee par ce traite etait proche de T. 360; cf. ibid., p. 147 ss., 163, n. 24; et les tableaux comparatifs des p. 201-208. V. aussi Kagawa 1985, p. 169.

394 JEROME DUCOR

"Acceptez cette celebration des qualites inconcevables206, cet expose de Ia Loi intitule «embrassement par tous Ies buddha» (sarvabuddhaparigraha)" (§ 11-16).

Cette demiere fonnule est ensuite expliquee par Sakyarnuni de la maniere suivante:

"Tous Ies fils ou fiUes de farnille qui entendront Ie nom de cet expose de Ia Loi et qui retiendront Ie nom (nt1madheyaf!! dharayi~yanti)207 de ces bienheureux buddha seront tous embrasses par Ies buddha (buddhaparigrhftt1) et seront irreversibies quant a I'eveil correct, complet et insurpassabIe" (§ 17).

Fussman consacre de longs developpements (p. 568-574) aux deux expressions sarvabuddhaparigraha et buddhaparigrhftii208. En particulier, il considere que la premiere est Ie VIai titre du "Petit Sutra" (p. 568,571). Or, ce tenne ne constitue pas un titre a proprement parler209• Ala maniere des sous-titres apparaissant a la fin du "Grand Siitra" (plus haut, p. 374, il fait partie d'une serie d'appellations louangeuses appliquees a bon nombre de sutra21O• Le "Sutra du Lotus", pour ne prendre que cet exempIe, l'applique au sennon que Sakyarnuni venait d'achever juste avant de commencer son expose2l1; et Ie meme sutra se l' applique aussi a lui-meme, sans y accorder non plus la valeur d'un titre stricto sensu, ainsi que nous Ie montre d'ailleurs cette citation foumie par Fussman (p. 571-572): "Ie texte de la loi dont Ie nom est SP [Saddharmapu"(uJarfka],

206 L' expression "celebration des qualites" (gul}aparikfrtanam) apparait aussi dans les ,'!!!lus-titres du "Grand Sutra" (cf. plus haut, p. 374). ;£ .2P7 Expression equivalente a "prononcer Ie nom". Cf. Fujita 2001, p. 272ab; Harrison 1~92,p. 225, n. 45.

208 Cf. Gomez, p. 19, n. 8; Watters, p. 239b; BHSD, p. 321b. 209 Le titre de 1a traduction attribuee a Xuanzang, Chengzan jingtu fo sheshou jing

fjii:~i¥±#llJilli~*& (Sutra des louanges de la Terre Pure et de l'embrassement par les buddha, T. 367), renvoie bien aux expressions parikfrtana et sarvabuddhaparigraha du texte du sutra, mais il s'agit d'une initiative du traducteur chinois (Fujita 2001, p. 42).

210 Cette expression apparait ainsi comme un equivalent de celles utilisees pour qualifier Ie "Grand Sutra" lors de sa transmission a Maitreya (Ash. 63:20-21, § 150): "loue par tous les buddha" (sarvabuddhasa1]'!varl}ita), "celebre par tous les buddha" (sarvabuddhaprasasta) et "approuve par tous les buddha" (sarvabuddhiinujiiiita).

211 Burnouf ("Lotus", p. 3) rend sarvabuddhaparigraha par "qui a ete possede par tous les Buddhas" (SP 4:4; Watters, p. 239b; cf. Robert, p. 49). D'une maniere generale, les sutra precMs par Ie Buddha sont, entre autres, loues comme etant "adoptes par tous les etres nobles" (sarviiryajanaparigrhftii); cf. Lamotte, Vimalakfrti, p. 379.

LES SOURCES DE LA suKHA VATI 395

un sutra developpe [mahavaipulya], instruction des bodhisattva [bodhisattvavavada], possession de tous les buddha [sarvabuddhaparigraha]"212. Quant a l'expression buddhaparigrhfta, elle s'explique, notamment, par Ie 25" vreu.

Pour en revenir au Pratyutpanna, on relevera aussi que c' est bien ce sutra qui foumit un rep ere historique capital dans la chronologie du courant de la Sukhavatl. En effet, sa traduction par Zhi Loujiachen (T. 418) est particulierement bien datee et authentifiee213, et son anciennete en fait Ie plus vieux document historique chinois lie au Buddha Amitabha/Amitayus, puisqu' elle remonte a l' an 179 de notre ere. Enfin, tandis que la methode preconisee par ce texte est presentee comme applicable a tOilS les buddha du present dans les dix directions, celui de la SukhavatI est Ie seul aetre nommement mentionne dans Ie texte; on peut donc en conc1ure que I' epoque, forcement anterieure, OU la version indienne de ce sutra fut composee connaissait deja un "well-developed and widespread· cult of Amitabha~'214. On l'admettra, cet argument est autrement plus significatif que celui de la Pentade Buddhananda .

. 5. La place des Sukhavatlvyliha

Nous avons releve dans les deux sutra de la Sukhavatl un certain nombre d'elements relevant en propre de la doctrine du Grand Vehicule. Certes, ceux-ci sont "mostly undevelopped" et necessiteraient une analyse plus fouillee215, mais leur manque meme de systematisation atteste de 1'anciennete des origines de la doctrine du champ de buddha d' Amitabha. Et c'est ainsi que nos deux sutra font bien partie de ces "textes qui representent un Mahayana en fonnation" , au m.eme titre que les sutra de I' A~tasahasrika Prajfiaparamita, du Pratyutpanna, du SuraT{tgama et celui de Vimalakirtz"216.

212 Ch. VII, SP 161:26-28; cf. Burnouf, id., p. 111. 213 Lamotte, Concentration, p. 66-69; ZUrcher 1959, p. 35, n. 93, 95; Harrison 1990,

p. 255-267; Mochizuki, p. 241-242. 214 Harrison 1978, p. 43-44; id. 1990, p. 31, n. 1. Cf. Fujita 1996b, p. 10; Kajiyama,

p. 13, 17. 215 Schopen 1977, p. 191. 216 Lamotte, Concentration, p. 44, 49.

396 JEROME DUCOR

Mis en perspective avec Ie Pratyutpanna, les deux Sukhiivatfvyiiha temoignent pareillement d'un double souci: d'une part, permettre l'audition du Dharma preche directement par un buddha en personne, malgre la disparition de Sakyamuni; et, d'autre part, elargir a un plus grand nombre l'acces a l'irreversible. Cependant, avec son accent sur la doctrine de la siinyatii, Ie Pratyutpanna apparait aussi comme une tentative de recuperation du courant de la Sukhavatl au profit de celui des Prajfi.iipiiramitii217 :

celles-ci avaient en effet superbement ignore Amitabha et son champ de buddha, alors meme que leurs redacteurs ne pouvaient pas ne pas en avoir connaissance218, tout comme ils connaissaient bien Ak~obhya et son AbhiratF19. Neanmoins, cette tentative du Pratyutpanna sera elle-meme critiquee par les tenants de l'ecole Madhyamika, dans Ie cadre d'une controverse entre "mystiques" et "rationalistes" qui se serait developpee au Cachemire, au debut du Ne s., ainsi qu'en temoigne l'Upadda220. Pour ce dernier, Ie pratyutpanna-samiidhi est non seulement plus difficile que la vision du Buddha obtenue par I' ceil divin, mais, en outre, il "peut seulement rassemblerla pensee distraite (vik~iptacitta) "221. Et I' Upadda d' insister encore d'avantage sur l'importance d'unir la sagesse (prajfi.ii) a la commemoration du buddha, a tel point que cette derniere y est elle-meme presentee comme un "recueillement" (buddhiinusmrti-samiidhi)222 - alors

217 Kajiyama parle de "demythologisation" du culte d' Amitabha au moyen de la philosophie de la vacuite (p. 18-19).

218 Lamotte, Concentration, p. 56. La possibilite pour les laYcs de voir les buddha sans recourir 11 1'tEil divin apparaitra dans la Paficavif!1satisahasrikii PP; cf. Lamotte, Traite 5, p. 2265-2266.

AP9 «Lamotte, Vimalakfrti, p. 361-362, en note; HobOgirin 1, p. 25b, 40a; Kwan, p. 133 S8.; Schop. 1987, p. 117, n. 50 (p. 131).

220 Cf. Lamotte, Traite 5, p. VI-VII. Cette controverse resurgit un siecle plus tard en Chine, ou elle opposa KumarajIva, fondateur historique du Madhyamika chinois, et Huiyuan du Mont Lu (334-417); cf. Traite 5, p. VI-VII, 2268-2272; Demieville, Yogacarabhumi, p. 357(-358), n. 8; Zurcher 1959, p. 219 ss.; Tsukamoto 2, p. 851 ss; Mochizuki, p. 254-256. Sur l'Upadda et Ie Pratyutpanna, v. Harrison 1990, p. xxiv, n. 24.

221 T. 25, k. 33, p. 306a; k. 34, p. 314a23-24 (Lamotte, Traite 5, p. 2274, 2369). On relevera la similitude de cette fonction avec celle de l' attention portee au nom du Buddha dans Ie "Petit Siitra" (sup. p. 388).

222 Cf. la paraphrase du Pratyutpanna (T. 13,418, k. 1, p. 905b8-14; Harrison 1998a, p. 19) dans 1'Upadda (T. 25, k. 29, p. 276a18-22; Lamotte, Traite 4, p. 1927 - de preference 11 id. 3, p. 1361, n. 2). L' Upadda fait la difference entre Ie buddhiinusmrti-samiidhi, obtenu par "1'tEil de la pensee" (cittacak~us), et la buddhanusmrti, simple invocation orale du buddha (Lamotte, Traite 1, p. 409, 414).


que cette qualification etait inconnue tant du Pratyutpanna que de la quasitotalite des sources' sanskrites conservees223. Pour autant, Ie but vise reste des plus classiques, puis que cette methode permet au pratiquant de neplus etre separe des buddha: ainsi, "il peut faire a volonte des offrandes aux buddha de son vivant et les rencontrer derechef au moment de la mort,,224. Enfin, Ie Madhyamika s' accorde avec Ie Pratyutpanna au su jet de la nature de la vision du buddha obtenue: conformement a la doctrine des Prajiiaparamita, il ne peut s'agir que d'irnagination subjective (sa1'[lkalpa) du pratiquant225, car "c' est Ie mental qui fabrique Ie buddha, c' est Ie mental qui est Ie buddha" (xin zuo fo, xin ski fo JL\fF1~, IL\~1~)226.

Tout au contraire, selon la remarque judicieuse de Demieville, Ie champ de buddha d' Amitabha considere comme but de la prochaine naissance constitue un "«ailleurs» [tafeng {ill)]] transcendant [ ... ] hors du triple monde": de fait, il se situe au-deIa de myriades de koti de champs de buddha ("Petit Sutra", § 2; "Grand Sutra", § 40), tout en n'etant accessible qu ' apres la mort227.

Cependant, cette distance inconcevabIe, expression de Ia dimension supra-mondaniste (lokottara) d'Amitabha, l'exposait directement a la concurrence du culte du Bodhisattva Maitreya. Ce dernier presentait en effet un double avantage: d'une part, sa tradition etait anterieure au Grand Vehicule, et, d' autre part, sa residence dans Ie paradis de Tu~ita, indus au sein de notre univers Saha, Ie rendait plus accessible, y compris en la vie presente228. La transcendance de la SukhavatI, combinee avec les cri-

223 La Satasiihasrikii P P fournit une rarissime occurrence de l' expression sanskrite buddhiinusmrti-samiidhi (Gho~a 6.1 Yamabe, p. 157-158). Cf. la Paiicavirrzsatisiihasrikii PP (Dntt 5.3; Lamotte, Traite 1, p. 403), dont la td. par Kumarajlva (T. 8,223, k. 1, p. 217a26) est citee par 1'Upadda (T. 25, 1509, k. 7, p. 108c21; Lamotte, id., p. 409).

224 T. 25, 1509, k. 30, p. 276b14-18; cf. Lamotte, Traite 4, p. 1930. 225 Cf. Lamotte, qui parle d'" autosuggestion": Traite 5, p. 2272, 2274 et n. 1; ibid. 4,

p. 1927(-1928), n. 1. 226 Cf. Upadesa: T. 25, k. 29, p. 276blO-12 (Lamotte, Traite 4, p. 1930); et Pratyut

panna: T. 418, k. 1, p. 905c-906a (Harrison 1992, p. 225-226; id. 1998a, p. 21). Meme chose dans Ie Sutra des contemplations de Vie-Infinie (T. 12,365, p. 343a19-22); a noter que selon ce demier, Ie pratyutpanna-samiidhi peut etre obtenu apres la naissance en Sukhiivat! (ibid., p. 346b3); cf. Yamada 1984, p. 51 et 11l.

227 Demieville, Yogiiciirabhumi, p. 395, n. 3, et sa glose sur ta/eng fill:;!]. Fujita souligne que cet "ailleurs" ("world of another dimension", j. tahO-sekai fill:;!]iltW) ne doit pas etre confondu avec l'au-dela ("other world",j. takai {illW): 1996c, p. 44-47; 2001, p. 112.

228 Cf.le temoignage de Xuanzang (602-664): Demieville, Yogiiciirabhilmi, p. 389-390

398 ffiROME DUCOR

tiques du Madhyamika229, explique vraisemblablement pourquoi Ie culte d'Amitabha n'a guere laisse de traces specifiques en Inde23o• Car l'image de son champ de buddha y fut rapidement recuperee par un Mahayana moins radical, qui la banalisa comme un archetype de buddhak~etra, voire une simple comparaison litteraire c1assique: ce phenomene, qui se Mveloppa, approxirnativement, des rer_IIe s. jusqu'aux Ne_ve s. de notre ere231, cuIminera par la rehabilitation de Sakyamuni dans Ie KarU/JijpU/J-fjarfka232•

D'ailleurs, si l'Upadesa considere Ie Pratyutpanna comme digne de critique, il n'est que dedain pour l'iMal de la SukhavatI proprement dite, puisqu'il ne la juge meme pas comparable avec l'univers PadmavatI du Buddha Samantakusuma, ou Mafijusrl, parangon de la prajiiil, reside notamment. Le pretexte invoque par Ie traite est pourtant des plus gratuits: lorsque Ie futur Amitabha contemplait les univers de buddha pour preparer sa propre SukhavatI, Ie pouvoir de ses merites aurait ete trop mediocre pour lui permettre de voir les univers les plus purs, tant et si bien que son propre champ de buddha ne pouvait que leur etre inferieur233 . Mais l'au" dace de cette these, etayee par rien, ne fait que confirmer l'insucces de la SukhavatI dans Ie Madhyamika indien. Des lors, on ne sera pas etonne que l' Upade.sa ne la cite meme pas en exemple lorsqu'il mentionne les univers situes a l'ouest, lui preferant un champ de buddha bien moins connu: l'Upasanta de Ratnarcis234•

5. Les origines de la SukhavatI

Quai qu'il en soit, plusieurs specialistes occidentaux allaient juger Ie culte d' Amitabha suffisamment incongru avec l' enseignement Ie plus

(T. 53, 2122, k. 16, p. 406a3-7; T. 54, 2123, k. 1, p. 6c26-7a3). V. Lamotte, Histoire, p. 785-787; de Lubac, p. 82-85.

229 Bient6t rejoint par l'eco1e Yogacara (cf. plus haut, p. 389, n. 180). 230 Le seul temoignage positif de pelerin chinois serait celui de Huiri (ou Cimin, 680-

748), qui voyagea en Inde et au Gandhara de 702 11 719; cependant sa relation dans la Biographie des religieux eminents des Song lui est posterieure de deux siec1es (T. 50, 2061, k. 29, p. 890b9-20); cf. H6bi5girin 1, p. 25a; Fujita, p. 239; Tanaka, p. 3.

231 Schopen 1977, p. 194-199 et 201-204. 232 Yamada 1sshi, I, p. 164-166. 233 T. 25, 1509, k. 10, p. 134b5-1O; Lamotte, TraUe 1, p. 601. Cf. Hirakawa, p. 9. 234 T. ibid, p. 133b5-6; Lamotte id., p. 594-595.


ancien du bouddhisme pour se demander s'il ne resultait pas d'influences exterieures a celui-ci, ou meme a 1 , Inde. Des la fin du XIXe siecle fut evoquee Ia possibilite que Ies concepts lies a Ia divinite VaruI:la et sa .cite Sukha aient pu influencer l'apparition de l'enseignement sur Ia SukhavatI d'Amitabha, d'autant que Ie nom de ce dernier apparait comme un nom generique dans Ie Vi.glupUral}a235 • Cherchant plus loin, on a imagine des rapports avec 1 'Iran zoroastrien, ou meme avec Ie christianisme nestorien ou chaldeen. Revenant a 1 , Inde, on a enfin evoque Ie courant indien de devotion (bhakti) represente par Ia Bhagavadgfta236•

Voila une cinquantaine d'annees, Ie tableau de ces diverses hypotheses a ete brosse par Ie Pere de Lubac237, qui arrivait deja a ceUe conclusion: "Ie Mahayana, auquel appartient l'amidisme, est en continuite profonde avec Ie bouddhisme primitif"238. Fondees sur des etudes recentes, Ies conclusions de Fussman ne disent pas autre chose: "L'eclat infini d'Amitabha, son infmie duree de vie sont Ia consequence Iogique de la complete transformation du buddha en «super-dieu». Point n'est besoin d'invoquer l'influence de l'Iran pour cela" (p. 557). Bien plus, Ies sources etudiees par Fussman lui permettent de conclure qu'aux deux premiers siecles de l'ere chretienne, Ie culte d' Amitabha "n'etait en rien contradictoire avec un mahayana «orthodoxe»" (p. 523)239. On ne s'explique donc pas cette autre assertion du meme auteur: "ll n'y a que Ies sectateurs de la Terre Pure pour penser que Ia croyance a Amitabha et l' aspiration a renaitre dans Ia SukhavatI sont I'aboutissement logique et naturel d'idees-forces du bouddhisme" (p. 552).

235 Cf. respectivement Muller 1894, p. xxii (mentjonne par Filliozat, I.Cl. §2~31), et Renou: I.Cl. § 1018; etc.

236 Notarnment L VP, Dogme, p. 70-71; Tucci, p. 196; Conze 1971, p. 165 ss. Cf. Amstutz (1998) et Beyer (1977); v. Dantinne, p. 42, n. 208; Fujita, p. 562-565; id. 1996b, p. 9; Harrison 1992, p. 223.

237 De Lubac, Amida, ch. X, qui donne 1es references. V. aussi Fujita, p. 262-278,464-474; Machida 1988.

238 De Lubac, op.cit., p. 248. De Lubac utilise 1es quatre arguments suivants: 1. "la rigoureuse doctrine du karman, malgre 1es apparences, reste intacte" (p. 257-260); 2. Amida "n'est pas dieu en un sens quelconque" (p. 260-261); 3. Ia Terre Pure "n'est pas encore 1a Delivrance" (p. 261-264); 4. Amida "ne conserve provisoirement l'aspect d'un sauveur personnel que pour Ie vulgaire etn'est en realite ( ... ) qu'une manifestation relative de l'Absolu" (p. 264-268).

239 Deja Fus. 1994, p. 38, infine. Cf. Nattier 2000, p. 90-91.

400 JER6IvIE DUCOR

Reglee la question des influences exterieures, il reste a preciser d'avanc

tage la jonction entre la doctrine des deux Sukhiivatlvyi1ha et les elements anterieurs connus, notamment a travers la stratigraphie des traductions chinoises archalques du "Grande Sutra" et de sa version sanskrite, l'evolution de la cosmologie bouddhique240 ainsi que l'interpretation supra-mondaniste (lokottara) de la bouddhologie de Sakyamuni, depuis la longevite infinie attribuee aux buddha dans Ie courant Mahasaqtghika241 jusqu'a la "quasi-infinitude" du Sakyamuni duo "SiUra du Lotus "242, sans oublier Ie developpement des grandes figures soteriologiques, comme Maitreya, A valokitesvara ou Ak~obhya243. Dne telle analyse necessite la reunion des ressources pluridisciplinaires des indianistes et des sinologues, tant orientaux qU'occidentaux. Gageons que l'ampleur de l'entreprise impliquera aussi un travail d'equipe, a l'exempIe de la remarquable contribution de Harrison, Hartmann et Matsuda (HHM 2002).

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Abstract

During the past few decades the Western Indianists have published an increasing number of studies on Amitabha/Amitayus and his Sukhavatl. One of them is Gerard Fussman's long and interesting article in Journal Asiatique 1999, p. 523-586. Unfortunately, however, some rather basic mistakes seriously detract from this study, as when it confuses the 21 st and 46th Vows (p. 574-575) or when it asserts that the very birth in SukhavatI is the ekajiitibaddha's birth itself (p. 550, n. 62). Due to some confusions about Buddhist terms, Fussman seems to have misunderstood the original method of the Smaller Sukhiivatf (§ 10) and concludes that birth in this buddha-field necessitates bodhicitta and countless roots of merit as prerequisites (p. 567). This unlikely interpretation was supposely justified by a quite baffling transformation of aviparyastacittam into «aviparyasta <bodhi>cittam», that is «without renouncing his [i.e. bodhisattva's] vow to reach the bodhi».

In the present article I try to gather the scattered information concerning Amitabha's epigraphy and representations: apart from the early Govindnagar and the late SancI inscriptions, there is no conclusive evidence in any sculpture, even in the Buddhamitra Triad or the Mohammed Nari Stele. Neither is there any evidence in the Buddhananda (<<Bruxel1es») Group that Fussman defines as the terminus ante quem for Amitabha's cult (p. 548, n. 57), despite the uncertainty over both its identification and its dating.

The comparison between the various su.tras' s methods finally leads me to the hypothesis that the Pratyutpanna-samiidhi-sutra could be an attempt to incorporate the concept of SukhavatI into the Prajfiiipiiramitii tradition, this attempt being in tum criticized by the Madhyamika as it appears in the Upade.sa.

HIMALAYAN CONUNDRUM? A PUZZLING ABSENCE IN RONALD M. DAVIDSON'S INDIAN ESOTERIC BUDDHISM

DAVID N. GELLNER

Ronald M. Davidson's Indian Esoteric Buddhism: A Social History of the Tantric Movement (2002, New York: Columbia University Press) is, in many ways, a masterpiece. It synthesizes an enormous mass of material, fearlessly crosses conventional disciplinary boundaries, and makes a qualitative leap forward in the understanding and interpretation of early Buddhist Tantrism. Davidson has marshalled internal textual evidence in great quantity, and related it to epigraphical and other historical evidence, in satisfying and original way. For once, the eulogistic citations on the book's back cover (in this case by David F. Germano, Matthew Kapstein, and Phyllis Granoff) do not exaggerate.

Early scholars of Buddhism found Tantricism to be so offensive that they could not bring themselves to study it dispassionately - and as Davidson emphasizes, it is offensive, no matter how apologists, whether inside or outside the tradition, have tried to explain its antinomianism away. This early attitude was to a considerable extent shared by David Snellgrove; that and the intellectual rationalism of his approach (and his concomitant lack of interest in the details of political arrangements) meant that his mature synthesis Indo-Tibetan Buddhism: Indian Buddhists and their Tibetan Successors does not represent anything like as important an achievement from the point of view of historical sociology. Geoffrey Samuel's Civilized Shamans: Buddhism in Tibetan Societies is a similar highly laudable attempt at synthesis and overview, but covers a later period and deals only briefly with the Indian background.

Davidson's thesis is that the new, politically more insecure conditions in India after the Gupta period generated a new kind of feudalism, which, following BDChattopadhyaya, he calls samanta feudalism (p. 137). Power was more decentralized than it had been in the preceding period, longdistance trade (which had been strongly supportive of Buddhism) was in


412 DAVID N. GELLNER

decline, militant Shaivism was increasing in importance, regional art traditions and languages were flourishing, and popUlations were dispersing from old to new centres. In this context, Buddhism had to adapt and one way it did so was to take on the language and ritual of political imperialism. Davidson demonstrates in fine detail how the terminology of the initiation of Tantrics parallels exactly that of the feudal ruler. He concludes:

Buddhists derived their mandala forms and functions, not so much from the theoretical treatises of Indian polity as from their immediate observation at the disposition and execution of realpolitik in their environment ... by observing the actual relationships of the overlords and their peripheral states ... Indeed, the Buddhist mandala is a classic analysis of the system of samanta feudalism in early medieval India, all sufficiently sanctified for the monastic community. (p. l39)

It was not that the founders of Buddhist Tantrism were

sycophantic actors imitating the domain of mere politics ... [Rather t]hey attempted to transform power and hierarchy into community and congregation. Swimming in the sea of samanta feudalism, they tried to see it as an ocean of gnosis and to engage it in the creation of merit for all beings. (p. 161)

In doing so they went far beyond any previous Mahayanist adaptions in the name of 'skilful means'. As Davidson points out, esoteric Buddhism spread through royal patronage outside India, and it would have been strange if the same were not true inside India as well (p. 115). In spite of the use of tribal imagery in Tantrism, everything points to its being the creation of urban intellectual elite (p. 238).

Davidson emphasizes that the Tantric Buddhist corpus was produced and systematized within a remarkably short time: "in a matter of a few decades, not over the centuries sometimes proposed" (p. 338). One would have expected him therefore to welcome Alexis Sanderson's demonstrations that numerous passages of the Buddhist Y ogini Tantras were lifted directly from Shaiva originals (Sanderson 1994,2001). But Davidson is concerned rather to insist (p. 203ff) that Buddhist Tantras took their materials from other sources as well, and not just from the Shaiva Kapalikas. Be that as it may, Davidson has certainly produced the most sophisticated account yet of what he calls "the esoteric conundrum": how it could be that a religion based on renunciation, moderation, and non-

HIMALAYAN CONUNDRUM? 413

violence could adopt rituals of sex, violence, and the infraction of all social rules, and introduce symbolic forms fully reflective of this dramatic antinomianism.

The aim of this communication, however, is not just to praise Davidson, but also to point out a surprising and mysterious lacuna in his book, namely Nepal, and more particularly the Buddhist culture of the Kathmandu Valley (which in the period he is dealing with, and indeed well into the twentieth century, went by the narne 'Nepal').

It is not that Davidson is hostile to anthropological or ethnographic evidence as such. In his introduction, he writes:

Since the time of Herodotus' description of the Skythians in his Histories, however, participant-observation data have proved of extraordinary value in assessing foreign cultures, whether accrued by the historian, by anthropologists, or both, as in the case of this book. We cannot underestimate [sic] the value to the historian of learning the colloquial languages of these cultures, living in villages, or (in our case) in Buddhist monasteries. Indeed, many Indologists would affirm that they did not truly understand much of this complex society until they had lived and worked there among the descendants of those very people under investigation. (p. 21)

Surely, then, he must deal somewhere with the Newars who are the last remaining Mahayana South Asian Buddhists, as a long line of scholars have recognized - from Sylvain Levi, to David Snellgrove, Siegfried Lienhard, Dhanavajra Vajracharya, Hemraj Sakya, John Locke, Mary Slusser, Michael Allen, Niels Gutschow, Bernhard KOlver, Gautam Vajra Vajracharya, Kashinath Tarnot, Ian Alsop, Karunakar Vaidya, Min Bahadur Sakya, Todd T. Lewis, Kimiaki Tanaka, K. Yoshizaki, Bruce Owens, Gregory Sharkey, Alexander von Rospatt, Will Tuladhar-Douglas, John Huntington, Dina Bangdel, and myself!. Surely Davidson will at least mention the one South Asian society where the Namasangiti is still recited in Sanskrit as part of the daily liturgy and where each complex Buddhist ritual begins with a samkalpa that locates the action as taking place in the mandala of Sri Samvara in the northern Pancala country of Bharatavarsa? But no, Davidson proceeds to claim, in the one statement of the book

I See references for main publications. One should also consult Levy (1990) and Toffin (1993) on Hindu (Shaiva) Tantrism in the Kathmandu Valley.


which I feel wholly competent to say is a fundamental, and very unfortunate, error of fact and interpretation, " ... there are no continuously surviving Indian Buddhist institUtions ... " (p. 24).

This is very strange. Nepal does not figure in the index of Indian Esoteric Buddhism, but there are in fact a number of mentions, as well as at least one to Newars, and two to Newari, and he implies that he has been to Nepal2• Davidson is not averse to citing anthropological authors on India. Thus Jonathan Parry and Lynn Teskey Denton are quoted oIl. ascetics in Banaras (p. 95), Gross is cited on modern Indian sadhus (p. 207, 238), Elvin, Gell, Vitebsky, and Boal are invoked on the Murias and their tribal neighbours (p. 321). Davidson also mentions his own field visits to some Indian sacred sites (e.g. p. 309 to Brahrnaur in Himachal Pradesh), but not his visit to Kathmandu. He castigates other scholars for ignoring tribal ethnography (p. 321) and for labelling phenomena as Tibetan when they are actually Indian (p. 374 n. 97). So what can possibly explain the fact that he ignores Nepal and the Nepali descendants of the Buddhists he is discussing in this way?

Nepal was only recognized by the British as a separate kingdom, that is to say, as different in statUs from the princely states of India, in 1923. Had history been a little different, had Nehru not been such a gentleman, Nepal could easily have ended up inside the Indian union. Even today the border is open and the citizens of both countries are free to travel to and work in the other country without the need for any documentation. At any period before the nineteenth centUry what is now called Nepal was just another region of the subcontinent. Surely Davidson cannot have fallen for t~e fallacy, which he would (and does) castigate in other scholars, of reading back into history the contingent political arrangements of the present day?

2 Davidson notes, "My experience with Buddhist scholars in India, Nepal, and Tibet has been exclusively textual, with little interest displayed towards epigraphy, archaeology, or other sources" (p. 352 n. 52). I cannot speak for India or Tibet, but several Buddhist scholars in Nepal have indeed paid considerable attention to epigraphy, notably Hemraj Sakya in his numerous historical works (see Sakya 1977 for his magnum opus on the history of the sacred complex of Svayambhu). For various reasons to do with Buddhist identity and Nepali nationalism, several Nepali scholars have also been very concerned with the epigraphy and archaeology of Lumbini.


Not being personally acquainted with Davidson, and not being able to fmd one in the book itself, I have no answer to this question. As someone who has written at length on Newar Buddhism - precisely in the framework of Sylvain Levi (whom Davidson would surely honour as a great Sanskritist, Tibetologist, Sinologist, and Buddhologist) that Nepal is "India in the making" (Levi 1905 I: 28) and that Newar Buddhists are indeed the last South Asian Mahayana Buddhists - such neglect is both galling and puzzling. Had Davidson deigned to look at the history of the Medieval Malla kingdoms of the Kathmandu Valley, he would have found ample evidence to illustrate how Tantric Buddhism there evolved a close and symbiotic relationship with royal power, and with Shaivism, as indeed he argues was the case for medieval India. Had he looked at the traditional and still current practice of Buddhism among the Newars he would have found as a clear case as he could have wished of Vajrayana' s efficacy at "transform[ing] power and hierarchy into community and congregation".

I shall close by quoting the words of another prominent historian of Buddhism in India, Greg Schopen:

It is a curious fact that scholars interested in Mahayana Buddhism in India have paid so little attention to Nepal - indeed it may actually be perverse. It was Nepal, after all, that first revealed, and continued to supply, most of the Mahayana literature that we have in Sanskrit. .. Ironically, while some students of the Mahayana have understood this [the importance of studying ethnographic accounts of actually practised Buddhism], they have generally not looked in the most obvious places ... where, one wonders, are the names of those who are working in an actual South Asian Mahayana culture - John Locke, David Gellner, and Todd Lewis? There is something rather strange here and it is time - indeed long overdue - that Newar Buddhism assume its rightful place in Buddhist studies. (Schopen 2000: ix-xi)

References

Allen, M. 2000. Ritual, Power, and Gender: Explorations in the Ethnography of Vanuatu, Nepal, and Ireland. Delhi: Manohar.

Bangdel, D. 1999. 'Manifesting the Mandala: A Study of the Core Iconographic Program of Newar.Buddhist Monasteries in Nepal'. PhD, Ohio State University. UMl AAT 9941281.

Douglas-Tuladhar, W. 2002. 'The Fifteenth-Century Reinvention of Nepalese Buddhism'. DPhil, University of Oxford.


Gellner, D.N. 1992. Monk, Householder, and Tantric Priest: Newar Buddhism and Its Hierarchy of Ritual. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gellner, D.N. 2001. The Anthropology of Buddhism and Hinduism: Weberian Themes. Delhi: OUP.

Gellner, D.N. & D. Quigley (eds) 1995. Contested Hierarchies: A Collaborative Ethnography of Caste among the Newars of the Kathmandu Valley, Nepal. Oxford: Clarendon.

Gutschow, N. 1997. The Nepalese Caitya: 1500 Years of Buddhist Votive Architecture in the Kathmandu Valley. Stuttgart: Edition Axel Menges. .

Huntington, I.e. & D. Bangdel 2003. Circle of Bliss: Buddhist Meditational Art. Serindia.

KOlver, B. & H. Sakya 1985. Documentsfrom the Rudravanya-Mahtivihiira. Sankt Augustin: VGH Wissenschaftsverlag.

Levi, S. 1905. Le Nepal: etude historique d'un royaume hindou (3 vo1s). Paris: Leroux. (Reissued 1991, Delhi: Asian Educational Services.)

Levy, R. 1990. Mesocosm: Hinduism and the Organization of a Traditional Hindu City in Nepal. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lewis, T.T. 1984. 'The Tuladhars of Kathmandu: A Study of Buddhist Tradition in a Newar Mercant Community'. PhD, Columbia University (UMl8506008).

Lewis, T.T. 2000. Popular Buddhist Texts from Nepal: Narratives and Rituals of Newar Buddhism. Albany: SUNY Press.

Lienhard, S. 1984. 'Nepal: The Survival of Indian Buddhism in a Himalayan Kingdom' in H. Bechert & R. Gombrich (eds) The World of Buddhism. London: Thames and Hudson.

Locke, I.K. 1980. Karunamaya: The Cult of Avalokitesvara-Matsyendranath in the Valley of Nepal. Kathmandu: Sahayogi.

Locke, I.K. 1985. Buddhist Monasteries of Nepal: A Survey of the Biihiis and BahlS of the Kathmandu Valley. Kathmandu: Sahayogi.

Owens, B .M. 1989. 'The Politics of Divinity in the Kathmandu Valley: The Fes-tival of Bungadya/Rato Matsyendranath'. PhD, Columbia University.

Pal, P.:1974. The Art of Licchavi Nepal. Bombay: Marg Publications. Pal, P. 1974. Arts of Nepal. Leiden: E.I. Brill. Petech, L. 1984. Mediaeval History of Nepal (c. 750-1492) (Serie Orientale Roma

44, 2nd ed.). Rome: ISMEO. Regmi, D.R. 1985. Inscriptions of Ancient Nepal. Delhi: Abhinav. Riccardi, Theodore, Ir. 1980. 'Buddhism in Ancient and Early Medieval Nepal'

in A.K. Narain (ed.) Studies in the History of Buddhism, pp. 265-81. New Delhi: BK Publishing.

Sakya, H. 1977 (1098 NS). SrI SvayambhU Mahiicaitya. Kathmandu: Svayambhu Vikas MandaI.

Sakya, M.B. See <www.nagarjunainstitute.com> Samuel, G. 1993. Civilized Shamans: Buddhism in Tibetan Societies. Washington:

Smithsonian Press.


Sanderson, A. 1994. 'Vajrayana: Origin and Function' in Dhammakaya ed. Buddhism into the year 2000, pp. 87-102. Bangkok and LA: Dhammakaya Foundation.

Sanderson, A. 2001. 'History through Textual Criticism in the study of Saivism, the Paiicaratra, and the Buddhist YoginItantras' in F. Grimal (ed.) Les sources et le temps, pp. 1-47. Pondicherry: Ecole fran~aise d'Extreme Orient.

Schopen, G. 2000. 'Foreward' in Lewis (2000). Sharkey, G. 2003. Buddhist Daily Ritual: The Nitya Puja in Kathmandu Valley

Shrines. Bangkok: Orchid. Slusser, M. 1982. Nepal Mandala: A Cultural Study of the Kathmandu Valley

(2 vols). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Snellgrove, D. 1957. Buddhist Himalaya. Oxford: Bruno Cassirer. Snellgrove, D. 1987. Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. Boulder: Shambala Press. Tanaka, K. & K. Yoshizaki 1998. Nepiiru Bukky6. Tokyo: Shunjiisha. Toffm, G. 1993. Le palais et le temple: Lafonction royale dans la vallee du Nepal.

Paris: CNRS. Vaidya, Karunakar 1986. Buddhist Traditions and Culture of the Kathmandu Val

ley (Nepal). Kathmandu: Sajha. Vajracharya, D.V. 1973. Licchavikiilkii Abhilekh. Kathmandu: INAS. Vajracharya, G.V. 1987. 'An Interpretation of Two Similar Nepalese Paintings

in the Light of Nepalese Cultural History' in N. Gutschow & A. Michaels (eds) Heritage of the Kathmandu Valley (Nepalica 4), pp. 29-42. Sankt Augustin: VGH Wissenschaftsverlag.

von Rospatt, A. 2000. 'The Periodic Renovations of the Thrice Blessed Svayambhiicaitya of Kathmandu'. Habilitation thesis, Hamburg University.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Oliver FREIBERGER is Assistant Professor of Classical Indian Buddhism at the University of Texas at Austin. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Gtittingen/Germany in 1999. He is the author of Der Orden in der Lehre: Zur religiosen Deutung des Sangha imfriihen Buddhismus, a study of concepts of the sangha in Pali canonical texts, and has published several articles on early Buddhism and on methodological issues in the study of religion.

Klaus-Dieter MATHES works as a research fellow at the Institute for the History and Culture of India and Tibet at the University of Hamburg. His research in progress is dealing with the Indian origins of Tibetan mahamudrii traditions. He obtained a PhD from Marburg University with a study of the Dharmadharmatiivibhaga and recently completed his Habilitation at the University of Hamburg with a work on 'Gos Lo tsa ba gZhon nu dpal's mahamudrii interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhaga. At the moment he is a visiting professor at the University of Vienna.

Richard D. MCBRIDE, IT is presently a post-doctoral fellow in Korean Studies and Buddhist Studies at Washington University in St. Louis. Another related article, "Dharal).I and Spells in Medieval Sinitic Buddhism," will appear in JIABS, vol. 28. He is currently revising his Ph.D. dissertation "Buddhist Cults in Silla Korea in their Northeast Asian Context"(UCLA, 2001) for publication.

David N. GELLNER is Lecturer in the Anthropology of South Asia, University of Oxford. He is the author of Monk, Householder, and Tantric Priest: Newar Buddhism and its Hierarchy of Ritual (CUP, 1992) and The Anthropology of Buddhism and Hinduism: Weberian Themes (OUP, 2001). He has edited several other books, including (with Declan Quigley) Contested Hierarchies: A Collaborative Ethnography of Caste among the Newars of the Kathmandu Valley, Nepal (OUP, 1995) and Resistance and the State: Nepalese Experiences (Social Science Press, 2003). Rebuilding Buddhism: The Theravada Movement in Twentieth-Century Nepal (Harvard University Press), a monograph co-authored with Sarah LeVine, is due out in 2005.


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