ISSN 1347-9156

Governance Decentralization and

Infrastructure Provision in Indonesia

Shamal Chowdhury, Futoshi Yamauchi, Reno Dewina

JBICI

Working Paper

NO. 25

October 2007

JBIC Institute (JBICI)

The JBICI Working Papers are based on the research done by staffs of Japan

Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and published by the JBIC Institute. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of JBIC.

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Governance Decentralization and Infrastructure Provision in Indonesia1

Shyamal Chowdhury2 University of Sydney

Futoshi Yamauchi3

International Food Policy Research Institute

Reno Dewina3 International Food Policy Research Institute

Abstract: This paper examines the recent decentralization of governance in Indonesia and its impact on local infrastructure provision. The decentralization of decision-making power to local authorities in Indonesia has created the dependency of local public infrastructures on local resources. However, due to the difference in initial endowments, this may result in the divergence in local public infrastructures. The divergence may also happen due to differences in preference within communities. Using a village-level survey conducted in 1996, 2000, and 2006, this paper finds that (i) though local public infrastructure depends on local resources and preferences, (ii) decentralization has improved the availability of local public infrastructures, and (iii) communities are converging to a similar level of local public infrastructures. 1 We would like to thank Japan Bank for International Cooperation for financial support and the Indonesian National Statistic Office for discussion on PODES village data. This paper is part of our background research on decentralization, infrastructure and poverty dynamics in Indonesia. Remaining errors are ours. 2 Agricultural and Resource Economics, A04 RD Watt Building, Science Road, University of Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia. Tel: +2-93512786, Email: s.chowdhury@usyd.edu.au 3 International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC, USA.

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1. Introduction Decentralization refers to the devolution of political decision-making power to elected local-level, small-scale entities (Bardhan 2002). With the fall of planned economies and centralized states, the decentralization of governance and the delivery of public services by local authorities have taken the centre stage of policies favored by development agencies and donor communities (World Bank 1999). Like many other countries, Indonesia also has embarked on the path to decentralization in the late 1990s following the economic and financial crisis. Decentralized services can be a way to achieve allocative efficiency since they should reflect the preference of the actual users of the services and the cost of the service should be reflected in the user fee for such services. Decentralization can also reduce information asymmetry that prevails otherwise between the central planner and the actual users of services. Decentralization however also makes local public services dependent on local resource availability leading to the possibility of divergence in the amount of local public good available between rich and poor communities. Since decisions are taken at local level, difference in preference within communities over different public goods may also result in the divergence in the type of public goods available. In this paper, the objective is to answer two questions: first, does decentralization lead to a divergence in the amount of local infrastructure availability between rich and poor communities? Since due to decentralization investment on local public infrastructure depends largely on local resources, differences in local resource endowment across communities may result in the differences in the amount of investment on public infrastructure. Second, does preference heterogeneity within a community lead to the divergence in the type of local infrastructure provision? Since the type of public infrastructure chosen depends on preferences at local level, differences in the preference within a community may result in the difference in the type of local public infrastructure provision. Three distinct characteristics made Indonesia an attractive test-case to answer the two research questions at hand: first, the relative exogeneity of the decentralization experiment; second, large internal variations in the availability of resources among local government jurisdictions; and third, the availability of both pre- and in-decentralization data on infrastructure at local level, which is discussed in more details in Section 4. In Indonesia, the decision to decentralize was exogenous, at least to the local communities, and the implementation of decentralization was relatively quick –as opposed to gradualism a big-bang approach was followed. Starting from the Dutch colonial role, for most of its modern history, Indonesia was governed by a centralized system where the local governments mostly functioned as implementing agencies of policies and programs designed by the central government. The reform agenda formulated by the multilateral donors and development agencies following the Asian financial crisis paved the devolvement of fiscal and political authorities from the central

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to the regional governments. Through the enactment of Law 22/1999 on regional governance, responsibility for much of the government expenditures was decentralized to local (district) governments. The sweeping legislative and administrative changes in local governments introduced in 1999 have brought momentous changes on what local public infrastructures/goods will be financed and how they will be financed. Though all major tax bases, e.g., value added taxes, personal and corporate income tax, are still controlled by the central government, the local governments receive a united transfer over which they have full discretion. Barring five functions – security and defense, law and judiciary, monetary and macroeconomic policies, religious affairs, and foreign relations – local governments are responsible for all other functions including the financing and management of local public infrastructures, health and educational services. In the fiscal year 2002, the local government financed 44.3% of transportation development, 21% of health and social services, and 16% of education development (Eckardt and Shah 2006). Needless to say that transportation infrastructure, health and education constitute the major expenditure outlay for the local governments. Large variations in local resource availability and resource potentials among local government jurisdictions make Indonesia an attractive test case for the current research. In 2000 prior to the implementation of decentralization, the per capita income in the top 20 percent of the districts was three times more than in the bottom 20 percent of the districts. Similarly the poverty rates also differed significantly among local jurisdictions (poverty figures for top and bottom quartiles of the districts in 1999 were 8.53% and 43.07%, respectively).1 These reflect the uneven distribution of economic activities as well as natural resource endowments among local government jurisdictions. Though a conditional intergovernmental transfer program based on the fiscal needs addresses the heterogeneity of local governments, fiscal disparities still persist. Even after equalization transfers, for instance, the richest district has roughly 70 times as much as per capita revenue as the poorest district (Eckardt and Shah 2006). Our work complements the recently developed theoretical literature that focuses on the link between decentralization and welfare (see for instance, Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006, Besley and Coate 2003 and the reference therein). It also complements the cross-country empirical literature on the link between democratization and economic growth (Barro 1996 and the literature that follows it). While the theoretical literature in the past emphasized on the trade-of between the uniformity of service delivery under centralization, and uneconomic scale and cross-regional externalities under decentralization, the recent literature emphasizes on the limited accountability of local government officials and capture by local elites and interest groups. The current debate on the relative responsiveness of centralized versus decentralized delivery of public goods needs to be tested empirically, and the current work is an attempt in this direction.2

1 Authors’ calculation based on BPS data 2 The issue of spatial inequality and externalities in the context of Indonesia are discussed in another paper of ours (Yamauchi, Chowdhury and Dewina, 2007)

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The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 builds a model that links decentralization of decision making to local resources and preferences. The main implications are that without progressive subsidy from the central government, decentralization may increase cross-community inequality in public goods provision, and heterogeneous preferences may increase investment favorable to large groups within a community. Section 3 describes the empirical approach followed in this paper that maps the initial local endowments and preferences to subsequent allocation on local public goods during pre- and in-decentralization periods. The unit of analysis here is village instead of district. This is due the availability of disaggregated data at village level. We, however, control of district fixed effects in the estimation process. The parametric approach followed here should be capable of distinguishing the relative responsiveness of public infrastructures provision during pre- and in-decentralization periods. Section 4 describes the data used to construct the village-level panels for the two periods – pre- and in-decentralization, and gives the summary statistics of the variables used. Section 5 describes the empirical results on the impact of local income and preferences on public goods provision in pre-decentralization and in-decentralization periods. Section 6 concludes the paper with some possible policy implications.

2. Model 2.1. Basic Setting This section sets up the environment in which the community decides on public good investment and allocation. Assume for simplicity that there is one public good. Also assume that the community allocates its resource into consumption and investment on public good, and receives returns (services) from such public good investment. For simplicity, assume that there is no subsidy from the central government. The community taxes the residents to raise funds for building the public good. The tax rate is assumed to be unique within the community. Therefore, community residents have to decide the rate following some mechanism. Before discussing the mechanism, let us describe individual decision problem.

Assume a degenerate income distribution in the community. Income iy is given to individual i . With tax rate t , the per-capita public good q is formed through ( )q tE y= if q q≥ − (or ( )

qE yt −≥ ) where ( )E y is the average community income, which is

exogenous to each individual in the community, and q− is the minimum sufficient level of the public good. Assume that 0q = if ( )tE y < q− . Meanwhile, we assume that this condition holds.

We write the utility for household as ( ) ((1 ) ) ( )i iV t y u t y f qβ; = − +

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where ( )u . and ( )f . are utility functions for the consumption and public good service respectively, and β is the discount factor ( (0 1)β ∈ , ). Assume that both utility functions are strictly increasing and concave. Since the problem is single-peaked, the first order condition for agent i , ( ) ( ) ( )i iu c y E y f qβ′ ′= provides the most preferred tax rate for i . In other words, the most-preferred tax rate is determined by

( ) ( )( )

( )i

ii

u c E yMRS yf q yβ

′

′= = .

The relative income position affects the individually most-preferred tax rate.

Let ( )it y denote the tax rate, i.e., ( ) argmax ( )i it y V t y≡ ; . Given the non-degenerate income distribution, we also have a non-degenerate distribution of the most preferred tax rate. The community uses majority voting to decide the community’s tax rate. By median voter theorem, the tax rate t∗ is equal to

( ) argmax ( )m mt y V t y= ;

where my is the median income in the community. In this autarky case, since community income level (median, taking into account the distribution) affects investment in public good. The distribution of the community median income (across communities) will generate the distribution of public good investment. Proposition 1: (i) Investment in public good depends on community income level. (ii) Cross-community income distribution generates the distribution (inequality) of

public good investment across communities. In short, a higher average (median) community income makes it possible to collect higher local tax to build more local public goods. Therefore, without progressive subsidy from the central government, cross-community inequality in public goods may increase through decentralization. 2.2. Two goods, two groups: (1,2) - potential conflict between groups Suppose there are two groups in the community. Let φ denote the fraction of group 1 (so (1 φ− ) is the fraction of group 2). Public goods are 1 2( )q q, Let α denote investment share for the public good 1, given the total investment is q ,

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1

2 (1 )q qq q

α

α

=

= −

The utility from services or next period returns is 1 2( )f q q, Therefore, each individual attempts to maximizes his/her value, as in the previous section 1 2( ) ((1 ) ) ( )i iV t y u t y f q qβ; = − + ,

Here the community can have a potential conflict between the two groups in determining the investment share kα

∗ . Each group tries to equalize marginal products from the two public goods, i.e., 1 2f f=

The most-preferred tax t for individual i with income iy is given by, given α 1 2( ) (1 )i iu c y f fβµ α α′ ⎡ ⎤

⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦= + −

Here we assume α is determined through bargaining between the two groups, influenced by group proportions in the community population. 1 2 1 2(1 )α φα φ α α α∗ ∗ ∗ ∗⎛ ⎞

⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠

= + − ∈ ,

Note that it is single peaked, so we obtain ( )i it y∗ . By median voter theorem, the median income determines tax rate. Then, community composition determines resource allocation. Proposition 2: Greater proportion of one group increases investment share favorable to the group. For example, gender of village head, male/female proportions among voters, and particular occupation or social group may matter in the allocation of public good investments.

3. Empirical Approach We have followed a parametric approach that focuses on the relationship between initial village resource and preference and subsequent stock of local public infrastructures. This

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approach can help to map the changes in stock of local public infrastructures – an increase, no change, and deterioration – with the local resource availability and preferences. The main specification is:

iiiii ZINFINCINF εδϕβα ++•+•+=∆ ',0,0 (1)

The change in infrastructure stock between two period in village i, iINF∆ , is defined as a categorical variable and is our primary variable of interest. Initial measures of local resources, iINC ,0 , is one of the primary explanatory variables, where “0” denotes the initial period resource availability for village i. In addition, village characteristics such as population, existence of port/ and topography are included in iZ as further controls. The first measure of local public infrastructure considered here is the village road – the road that connects a village with the regional road network. As discussed, after the devolution of power, financing and maintenance of this type of roads falls under the purview of local authorities. Intuitively, villages with more resources are likely to invest more and maintain their roads better. However, investment in roads could be endogenously determined since the initial stock of village roads may affect the current income and subsequent investments in roads. This is accounted for by incorporating iINF ,0 that indicates infrastructure stock for village i in period 0. The second measure of local public infrastructure considered here is village streetlight. A specification similar to road is followed here, and intuitively, it should follow the same rationale. The third measure of local public goods considered here is the presence of school (or absence of it) – both primary and junior high school in the village. And the fourth measure of local public goods considered here is the healthcare infrastructure, namely if a village possesses polyclinic and puskesmas. These are the two primary healthcare giving facilities in Indonesia. Four public infrastructures considered here – road, streetlight, health and education – constitute, on average, the major expenditure outlay for the local governments in Indonesia as discussed in Section 1. The changes between pre- and in-decentralization periods should be a benchmark for measuring the relationship between decentralization and local infrastructure provision in Indonesia. In estimating the equation (1), we have some concerns. First, decentralization was implemented at the district level, so that observed and unobserved investment behavior should differ across districts. We compare results with and without district fixed effects to see how district-level unobservables affect public good investment behavior in both periods. Since we think that investment behavior is more homogeneous within a district than across districts, it is reasonable to control district fixed effects. However, we are not sure of possible direction of bias if the fixed effects are not controlled.

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Second, we are also aware of possible correlation between the initial conditions and fixed factors, and unobserved shocks. For instance, well-endowed villages are likely to have good infrastructure to start with, and such villages also have high propensity to invest more on infrastructure or improve infrastructures further. This positive correlation may create upward bias in the estimated effect of initial infrastructure condition on the infrastructure investment (or improvement). Third, resource constraint and demand for services may differ across different types of infrastructure and villages. These factors change parameters of our interest. For example, demand for roads depends on economic activities in the village, which is correlated with the initial income level (and also road conditions). This makes it difficult to identify resource constraint against demand heterogeneity. However, if economic conditions are stable between pre-and in-decentralization periods, the comparison of parameters between the periods enables us to identify the role of resource constraint. For the preference heterogeneity within a village (PRE), the gender of the village head, his/her education, age and duration are considered. The rationale is similar to Chattopadhyay, Duflo (2004) where they found the evidence of gender differentiated preference for infrastructures. This gives us the following specification:

iiiiii ZINFINCPREINF εδϕβγα ++•+•+•+=∆ ',0,0,0 (1′)

While the first specification (1) should allow us to see the impact of local resource availability on local public goods, the second specification (1′) should allow for the preference heterogeneity within a local area controlling for resource constraints. We examine the roles of village head characteristics (age, gender, education and tenure) and, in some year, gender composition of voters in the village. The latter measure could be correlated with economic activities in the village, since migration opportunities change the composition. In the equation (1’), controlling the initial income and infrastructure condition also mitigates this potential bias. Besides the points we discussed above, we are concerned with exogeneity of village preference measure since it can be correlated with unobserved component of infrastructure condition. However, this possibility is mitigated in the above equation as we examine changes in infrastructure over time, not at a given point in time. One issue not discussed so far is the macro shock of the economic crisis that had taken place during the first period of our analysis. Being a major shock, it had affected all villages and districts irrespective of rich or poor. It is not unrealistic to assume that the effects of the shock were randomly distributed and there is no reason to believe a priori that there was any systematic relation between the shock and the resource availability between the rich and the poor villages. As a result, we do not need to control for the shock. Even if the shock had different effects on different districts, it should not matter for our estimation as long as it is not systematically correlated with the initial infrastructure conditions of the centralized regime. Besides, the impact of financial crisis

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on infrastructure investment can be assumed homogeneous across districts in the centralized regime.

4. Data The data for this study has come from the Village Potential Statistics (PODES) community (desa) survey conducted periodically by Indonesia’s Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS). The PODES survey contains detailed information on the stock of public infrastructures at village in addition to the characteristics of villages, their geography and topography, the natural disaster that they faced in the past years. We have used three round of PODES survey – 1996, 2000, and 2006, and were able to match (part of the) communities across survey rounds for the PODES for the pre- and in- decentralization periods. Since the decentralization started in 2001, we have used the first two rounds, 1996 and 2000, for the pre-decentralization period, and compared 2000 with 2006 to examine changes due to decentralization (before and after analysis). We have matched the 1996 and 2000 rounds by village (i) recovering province, district and sub-district from codes that have changed from round to round and (ii) constructing unique codes for these administrative units, taking into account their mergers and splits. In this process, we have kept (recorded) village names to match the data, so some observations were missed if they changed village names (along with their splits). In this process, nearly 84 percent of the 1996 villages were matched between 1996 and 2000. It is about 81 percent of the 2000 villages between 2000 and 2006. Public infrastructures that are available and chosen for the current study are village road, village streetlight, schools and health care facilities. Among them, the first two, village road and streetlight, are non-excludable as well as non-rival, and externalities are limited within a village. The PODES survey includes information on the type of village road (soil, hardened, paved etc), and state of street lighting [Table 1]. Since we were comparing two periods (1996 and 2000, and 2000 and 2006), for road there could be 16 different states, and for street lighting there could be four different states. In stead of all these combinations, we have used three states for both road and lighting – improvement, no change, and deterioration [Table 2]. In addition, for school and health infrastructures, the presence (or absence of it) of primary school and junior high school, and polyclinic and puskesmas are considered, respectively. For the estimation purpose, for the local road and streetlight, three states – deterioration (e.g., from hardened road to soil road or from having streetlight to no light), no change, and improvement (e.g., from soil road to paved road) are constructed as a categorical variable (1, 2, 3, respectively). Similarly changes in education3 and health infrastructures

3 Note that there was a large decline in the number of schools (Table 1), both primary and junior high schools, between 1996 and 2000. Though there might be underreporting by villagers, this may not explain the total decline. Though it remains to be explored, most appropriately by using school census data, most

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between two periods are categorized as one and three depending on if the changes were positive or negative, and no change is categorized as two. This is conditioned on the initial state at (t-1) period, which appears as a lagged dependent categorical variable. For schools, in addition, the mean distance of schools in district in initial period is also interacted with the initial village condition. For the estimation purpose both ordinary least squares (OLS) as well as ordered probit are used. Turning to the explanatory variables, for the availability of local resource at village level, the proportion of households that live in poverty (pre-prosperous households and prosperous households level I4) are taken as the indicator of income assuming that the higher the proportion of households in poverty, the lower the availability of resources for public goods. Though transfer from the central government via districts may reduce it, the cross-community differences in resource availability still prevails and it does not necessarily eliminate the resource constraint as discussed in Section 1. Note that due to the possible endogeniety between income and public goods, the income taken is a one period lag or income at the beginning of the period. The second explanatory variable of interest is the preference. Here a set of characteristics of the head of the village such as gender, age, education and duration, and the gender composition of the voters are considered. Note that the proportion of villages with female heads is very small though the total number is not due to the large sample size of PODES data. Table 2 provide summary statistics of all the above and other variables utilized in the estimation.

5. Empirical Results

Local income and changes in local public goods Table 3 to Table 6 show the estimation results where the availability of local public goods –roads, streetlight, schools, and health facilities - is regressed on local income controlling for other factors described in equation (1) including the initial stock of public goods. For all tables, a negative coefficient for village income indicator shows the dependence of local public goods on local income. Estimated coefficients are derived from ordinary least square (OLS), OLS with district fixed effects (FE), and ordered probit with district fixed effects (FE). Results are shown for both pre- (1996-2000) and in-

plausible causes are: many privately-run schools might have been shutdown, and many community-run schools might have become unsustainable. 4 The Family Planning Coordinating Board (BKKBN) of Indonesia classifies all households into five welfare status: (i) Pre-Prosperous Households (Keluarga Pra Sejahtera or KPS), (ii) Prosperous Households Level I (Keluarga Sejahtera I or KS I), (iii) KS II, (iv) KS III, and (v) KS III+. Poor households are often equated as the KPS households, and they are often defined to include the KPS and KS I households. See BKKBN (1994) for further details.

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decentralization (2000-2006) periods. To ensure comparability between these two periods, parameters for the later period have been adjusted so that they now reflect the equal length of time (4 years). As can be seen in the table, the results show a significant dependence of public goods – both public infrastructures and public schools and health care facilities – on local income/resource. For the local roads, villages with more poor households have experienced either deterioration or less improvement in road condition compared to villages that have few poor households. Note that the reverse causality of road/public goods to income has been controlled for in the estimation by taking the income at the beginning of the period. It is therefore the local income, in addition to other factors, that determines the local public goods here. Results similar to the local roads are found for all public goods considered here. Local government authorities in Indonesia are not financially self-sufficient and their revenue-raising capabilities vary widely depending on local economic activities and resources. This inequality among local jurisdictions prevails even after financial transfers from the national government, and for the poor jurisdictions, local revenues fall well short of their expenditure responsibilities forcing them to have less public goods. This is true for all the public goods discussed here. Though one should expect such dependency of local public goods on local income not to exist in pre-decentralization period, the empirical findings show otherwise. How the decentralization has changed this dependence? A comparison between the estimated coefficients ( β ) of income between the two periods – pre- and in- decentralization suggests that the dependency of local public infrastructures on local income has substantially declined following the decentralization. While it should rather increase in in-decentralization period compared to pre-decentralization period, to our surprise, it has in fact decreased. This finding remains equally valid across public goods and across estimation methods. Though the addition of district fixed effects reduces the size of the income coefficient, it does not change the pre- and in-decentralization differences. This finding is counter-intuitive and goes against our initial prediction. It seems that the decentralization has eased the local resource constraints. Among the plausible explanations, competition among local government jurisdictions may have enhanced efficiency of local governments (Tiebout 1956, Oates 1972). Alternatively, this may have happened due to linking of local benefits with local costs, and local governments may now tailor the public goods and services to local circumstances (Musgrave 1959). Decentralization might have changed the priority among competing public goods that are locally financed, and the local public goods considered here might get more priority of local citizens compared to other alternative use of resources available to the local government jurisdictions. This issue of priority/preference is discussed further in the next section.

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It seems that decentralization has led to an improvement in the local public goods availability. While the divergence in local public goods still exists to a large extent, the dependency on local income, which was initially thought to be the main impediment against convergence in in-decentralization period, seems not to exist. Horizontal inequalities among local jurisdictions are not uncommon in other countries and vertical transfers may not be sufficient to ensure equality. Nonetheless local jurisdictions provide public goods according to local demand and capabilities including fiscal and financial capabilities. The Indonesian experience also supports to this direction.

Local preference and changes in local public goods As discussed in the previous section, the preference of different groups within a village may vary between alternative public goods and the possibility of rank ordering of these alternatives may enable them to choose one public good over others. Table 7 to Table 10 present the estimation results for the impact of local preference on changes in local public goods availability over time where the availability of local public goods –roads, streetlight, schools, and health facilities - is regressed on a set of preference indicators controlling for other factors described in equation (1′) including the initial stock of public goods and local resource availability. Estimated coefficients are derived from the ordinary least square (OLS), OLS with district fixed effects (FE), and ordered probit with district fixed effects (FE). Results are shown for both pre- (1996-2000) and in-decentralization (2000-2006) periods. Two explanatory variables that are of most interest for the preference proxies are gender of the head of the village, and voter composition of the village. For the local road, gender of the village head does not have any significant impact. While voter composition does not have any significant impact in pre-decentralization period, it has become significant in in-decentralization period implying that more women voters results in better local roads. One plausible explanation is that the benefits of local roads are widely shared and known to the voters, and the road ranks very high at the preference list of women voters. This is not surprising given the findings of other studies (Jacoby 2000, Gibson and Rozelle 2003) on the benefits of rural roads for all households, particularly to the poorer ones, and women headed households (Chowdhury et al 2005). Unlike roads, the streetlight is significantly affected by the gender of the village head being the case that female village heads prefer streetlight more compared to male village heads. In addition, years of schooling of village head have a positive impact while the village head’s duration has a negative impact. Note that the size of the effect of female heads has in fact increased during the decentralized period when the devolution of power to local authority has made it possible to reflect their preferences. Similarly, higher the percentage of women voters in a village, higher is the likelihood of having streetlight in the village. This finding of gender-differentiated preference in public good allocation is similar to that found in Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004). One plausible reason for this is the security and mobility of women at nighttime that may improve with village streetlight.

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In the case of educational infrastructure, female village head has a positive impact on the supply of junior high school. However, effect becomes insignificant once controlled for district fixed effects. Similarly years of schooling have a positive impact but becomes insignificant once controlled for district fixed effects. Note that Indonesia has a quite diverse educational system with general education, technical education, religious education, public and private institutions - all co-existing together. Therefore allocating public funds at local government jurisdictions could be quite complex and not all of them are considered here. In the case of health infrastructure, the impact of gender differentiated preference indicators is either mixed or insignificant during in-decentralization period. Two plausible explanations are: first, unlike road and streetlight, the health (and educational) infrastructures are more complex to build and require resources beyond building physical structures such as doctors and nurses (teachers). Attracting and retaining such resources require policies and plans not considered here. Second, the typical free-riding and coordination problem of public goods due to externalities may arise that go beyond local resources and preferences. While externalities for local roads and road lights are easy to capture within a local community, health (and education) infrastructures are not easily excludable5. Why duration of elected local government officials is related negatively with local public goods provision? One plausible explanation is that elected representatives in Indonesia have a short time horizon that discounts the long-term prospects in favor of more immediate payoffs. If reelection prospect diminishes with duration in the office, the goal of public officials might systematically diverge from maximizing citizen welfare, especially in their second terms (Brennan and Buchanan 1980). Since the introduction of decentralization, Indonesian local government selection process, in addition, has also experienced some experimentation, which may have created some uncertainty about the future on public officials.

6. Conclusions In this paper, we have examined the impact of recent decentralization of governance in Indonesia on local infrastructure provision where unobserved heterogeneity and initial conditions are appropriately accounted for. The decentralization of decision-making power to local authorities in Indonesia has created the dependency of local public infrastructures on local government jurisdictions. Horizontal inequality that pre-exists among local government jurisdictions allows the possible divergence in local public good provision. The decentralization, in addition, has also allowed local preferences to be accounted for. If, for instance, women as a group prefer a particular public good to other alternatives, it may get financed in in-decentralization period.

5 Of course mechanisms, such as discriminatory pricings, can be designed for the out of community beneficiaries.

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To model the dynamics of public good provision, we have introduced state dependence of public goods by conditioning the supply of public good in period t on the lagged public good stock in period (t-1). The availability of pre- and in-decentralization period data at the level of local government jurisdictions has facilitated this empirical exercise. In addition, the information on income indicators at village level, village administration and voters’ composition has allowed us to account for local level resources and preferences. The empirical findings of this paper support the notion that the decentralization has linked local public goods to local government endowments; the local public goods such as local road, streetlight, schools, and health facilities at village level depend on local resources. Despite the transfer of resources from the central government to the district government following the decentralization, the local public goods still depend on local resource availability, and poorer communities have less public goods than richer communities. This finding remains valid even after controlling for district fixed effects. However, contrary to our predictions, decentralization in Indonesia that has linked local public goods provision to local resources has also improved the availability of local public goods across communities. Though cross-community difference exists, they are converging to a situation with similar access to local public goods. This may happen due to the inter-jurisdictional competition and efficiency gain that economists have long been argued in decentralized states. Given the resource availability, the supply of some of the public goods considered here also depends on local preferences. It is found that women village heads and women voters have a strong preference for local roads improvement and village streetlight. However, for educational and health infrastructures, preferences are not explained well, and there might be coordination and free-riding problems due to externalities that are not well accounted here. Based on Indonesian experiences, the current decentralization and democratization trend observed in developing countries deserves cautious optimism. The devolution of decision-making power to local government jurisdictions in developing countries and the delivery of local public goods by them can enhance efficiency and reflect local preferences better than a centralized system. However, for some public goods, such as education and health, local authorities might not have the sufficient capacity, or may require inter-jurisdictional coordination to capture the externalities, that currently lacks.

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Chattopadhyay, R., and E. Duflo. 2004. Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India. Econometrica, 72 (5): 1409-1443.

Chowdhury, S., M. Torero, Ali, A M M S., Rana, M., Garrett, J., Jahan, I., Islam, M. Sherman, T.2005. Urban-Rural Linkages in Bangladesh: Impact of infrastructure and the food value chain on the livelihoods and migration of landless households, women and girls in the Northwestern Region. Manuscript. IFPRI.

Eckardt, S., and A. Shah. 2006. “Local Government Organization and Finance: Indonesia.” In Local Governance in Developing Countries, ed. A. Shah, 233-274. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Gibson, John and Scott Rozelle. 2003. Poverty and Access to Roads in Papua New Guinea. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 52(1) October 2003, 159-185.

Jacoby, Hanan. 2000. Access to Markets and the Benefits of Rural Roads. Economic Journal, 110 (465) July: 713-737.

Musgrave, Richard. 1959. Public Finance. New York: McGraw Hill. Oates, Wallace. 1972. Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Tiebout, Charles. 1956. A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures. Journal of Political

Economy, 64: 416-24. World Bank. 1999. World Development Report: Entering the 21st Century. Oxford

University Press. Yamauchi, Futoshi, Shyamal Chowdhury, and Reno Dewina, 2007, “Spatial Coordination,

Decentralization and Public Good Allocation: Nonparametric Evidence from Indonesia,” Manuscript, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington D.C.

16

Tables and Figures Table 1: Road, Road Lightening, Schools and Health Facilities, and their Changes: 1996 – 2000, and 2000 – 2006

1996 2000 2006 1996-2000 2000-2006

Road (in %)Paved 57.51 55.42 58.03 - -Hardened 25.02 28.88 25.77 - -Soil 17.12 15.26 15.77 - -Other 0.35 0.45 0.54 - -Improved - - - 13.73 19.57No change - - - 74.07 68.66Deteriorated - - - 12.2 11.77

Village Road Lightening (in %)Yes 42.9 40.55 57.24No 57.1 59.55 42.76Improved - - - 12.39 23.23No change - - - 73.88 72.75Deteriorated - - - 13.73 4.02

Schools (in %)Primary school (yes-1) 92.42 73.98 91.3Improved 0.59 18.28No change 83.95 80.76Deteriorated 15.47 0.96

Junior high school (yes-1) 41.46 24.93 44.42Improved 2.87 21.64No change 78.93 76.22Deteriorated 18.2 2.14

Health Facilities (in %)Puskesmas (yes-1) 4.3 5.6 12.1

Improved 2.34 7.66No change 95.98 89.98Deteriorated 1.68 2.36

Polyclinic (yes-1) 10.9 11.6 10.7Improved 3.13 2.33No change 95.08 95.91Deteriorated 1.79 1.76

17

Tab

le 2

: Sum

mar

y St

atis

tics

Var

iabl

e N

ame

Var

iabl

e D

escr

iptio

n19

96-2

000

2000

-200

6

Mea

nS

td. D

ev.

Mea

nS

td. D

ev.

Roa

d_C

hang

eC

hang

e in

villa

ge ro

ad b

etw

een

(t-1)

and

t pe

riods

. Thr

ee p

ossi

ble

stat

es a

re: d

eter

iora

tion-

1, n

o ch

ange

-2, a

nd im

prov

emen

t-3.

2.01

40.

509

2.06

70.

562

Roa

d_ha

rdIf

type

of v

illage

road

was

har

dene

d in

(t-1

) per

iod

equa

ls 1

, els

e 0

0.25

00.

433

0.28

90.

453

Roa

d_pa

ved

If ty

pe o

f villa

ge ro

ad w

as p

aved

in (t

-1) p

erio

d eq

uals

1, e

lse

00.

575

0.49

40.

554

0.49

7Li

ght_

Cha

nge

Cha

nge

in v

illage

ligh

teni

ng b

etw

een

(t-1)

and

t pe

riods

. Thr

ee p

ossi

ble

stat

es a

re: d

eter

iora

tion-

1, n

o ch

ange

-2, a

nd im

prov

emen

t-3.

1.98

60.

448

2.18

10.

484

Ligh

t(t-1

)If

villa

ge h

ad ro

ad li

ghte

ning

in (t

-1) e

qual

s 1,

els

e 0

0.42

90.

495

0.40

40.

491

Prim

ary

scho

ol c

hang

eC

hang

e in

prim

ary

scho

ol b

etw

een

(t-1)

and

t pe

riods

. Thr

ee p

ossi

ble

stat

es a

re: d

eter

iora

tion-

1, n

o ch

ange

-2, a

nd im

prov

emen

t-3.

1.85

10.

372

2.17

30.

403

Prim

ary

scho

ol (t

-1)

If vi

llage

had

prim

ary

scho

ol in

(t-1

) per

iod

equa

ls 1

, els

e 0

0.92

40.

265

0.74

00.

439

Mea

n di

stan

ce p

rimar

y (t-

1)A

vera

ge d

ista

nce

of p

rimar

y sc

hool

s in

dis

trict

(in

Km

) in

(t-1)

per

iod

0.44

99.

849

1.28

032

.540

Juni

or h

igh

scho

ol c

hang

eC

hang

e in

juni

or h

igh

scho

ol b

etw

een

(t-1)

and

t pe

riods

. Thr

ee p

ossi

ble

stat

es a

re: d

eter

iora

tion-

1,

no c

hang

e-2,

and

impr

ovem

ent-3

.1.

847

0.43

32.

195

0.44

7Ju

nior

hig

h sc

hool

(t-1

)If

villa

ge h

ad ju

nior

hig

h sc

hool

in (t

-1) p

erio

d eq

uals

1, e

lse

00.

415

0.49

30.

249

0.43

3M

ean

dist

ance

juni

or (t

-1)

Ave

rage

dis

tanc

e of

juni

or h

igh

scho

ol in

dis

trict

(in

Km) i

n (t-

1) p

erio

d7.

084

33.1

227.

930

36.5

70P

olyc

linic

_Cha

nge

Cha

nge

in p

olyc

linic

bet

wee

n (t-

1) a

nd t

perio

ds. T

hree

pos

sibl

e st

ates

are

: det

erio

ratio

n-1,

no

chan

ge-

2, a

nd im

prov

emen

t-3.

2.01

30.

221

2.05

30.

312

Pol

yclin

ic(t-

1)If

villa

ge h

ad a

pol

yclin

ic in

(t-1

) equ

als

1, e

lse

00.

042

0.20

00.

055

0.22

7P

uske

sma_

Cha

nge

Cha

nge

in p

uske

smas

bet

wee

n (t-

1) a

nd t

perio

ds. T

hree

pos

sibl

e st

ates

are

: det

erio

ratio

n-1,

no

chan

ge-2

, and

impr

ovem

ent-3

.2.

007

0.20

12.

006

0.20

2

Pus

kesm

as(t-

1)If

villa

ge h

ad a

pus

kesm

as in

(t-1

) equ

als

1, e

lse

00.

106

0.30

80.

111

0.31

4

Inco

me(

t-1)

The

avai

labi

lity

of lo

cal r

esou

rce

at v

illage

leve

l in

the

(t-1)

per

iod.

If a

villa

ge h

ad 5

0% o

r mor

e fa

milie

s in

wel

fare

equ

als

1, e

lse

0.0.

606

0.48

90.

495

0.50

0

Hea

d’s

Gen

der

Gen

der o

f villa

ge h

ead

(mal

e –1

, fem

ale-

0)0.

980

0.13

90.

977

0.14

9A

ge o

f villa

ge h

ead

Age

of v

illage

hea

d in

yea

rs44

.655

8.68

344

.424

8.92

6E

duca

tion

of v

illage

hea

dN

ot c

ompl

eted

–1,

els

e 0

0.02

60.

160

0.04

00.

197

Edu

catio

n of

villa

ge h

ead

Prim

ary

scho

ol –

1, e

lse

00.

259

0.43

80.

171

0.37

7E

duca

tion

of v

illage

hea

dJu

nior

hig

h sc

hool

–1,

els

e 0

0.27

60.

447

0.28

10.

449

Edu

catio

n of

villa

ge h

ead

Hig

h sc

hool

–1,

els

e 0

0.35

00.

477

0.39

20.

488

Edu

catio

n of

villa

ge h

ead

Aca

dem

y –1

, els

e 0

0.03

90.

193

0.03

50.

184

Edu

catio

n of

villa

ge h

ead

Uni

vers

ity –

1, e

lse

00.

046

0.21

00.

075

0.26

4D

urat

ion

of v

illage

hea

dD

urat

ion

of v

illage

hea

d in

yea

rs5.

692

5.05

44.

637

5.11

3%

of w

omen

vot

ers

% o

f wom

en v

oter

s in

villa

ge a

mon

g to

tal v

oter

s49

.067

8.86

950

.169

4.45

3

Pop

ulat

ion(

t-1)

The

size

of v

illage

pop

ulat

ion

in (t

-1) p

erio

d29

85.0

0085

74.0

0028

71.0

0037

62.0

00S

tatio

n_P

ort(t

-1)

If th

e vi

llage

had

any

sta

tion/

term

inal

/airp

ort/s

eapo

rt in

per

iod

(t-1)

per

iods

equ

als

1, e

lse

00.

057

0.23

10.

068

0.25

2D

isas

ter(

t-1)

Any

dis

aste

r in

the

last

thre

e ye

ars:

yes

1, n

o-2

0.53

40.

499

0.39

40.

489

Topo

grap

hyV

illage

topo

grap

hy0.

715

0.45

10.

715

0.45

1

18

Tabl

e 3:

Loc

al In

com

e an

d C

hang

e in

Loc

al P

ublic

Goo

ds -

Villa

ge R

oad

Dep

ende

nt V

aria

ble-

Cha

nge

in v

illag

e ro

ad: d

eter

iora

tion-

1, n

o ch

ange

-2, i

mpr

ovem

ent -

3

1996

-200

020

00-2

006

OLS

OLS

Ord

ered

Pro

bit

OLS

OLS

Ord

ered

Pro

bit

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

Vill

ages

with

50%

or m

ore

fam

ilies

in p

re-w

elfa

re a

nd w

elfa

re 1

in

(t-1)

per

iod:

yes

-1, n

o-0

-0.0

835

-0.0

645

-0.1

949

-0.0

347

-0.0

347

-0.0

950

(0.0

105)

***

(0.0

070)

***

(0.0

212)

***

(0.0

086)

***

(0.0

062)

***

(0.0

170)

***

Roa

d_ha

rden

ded

in (t

-1) p

erio

d eq

uals

1, e

lse

0-0

.287

6-0

.303

6-0

.887

8-0

.145

4-0

.224

9-0

.633

1(0

.022

3)**

*(0

.021

4)**

*(0

.055

5)**

*(0

.018

4)**

*(0

.014

5)**

*(0

.035

9)**

*

Roa

d_pa

ved

in (t

-1) p

erio

d eq

uals

1, e

lse

0-0

.667

9-0

.743

7-2

.328

-0.4

825

-0.5

951

-1.6

632

(0.0

217)

***

(0.0

215)

***

(0.0

676)

***

(0.0

167)

***

(0.0

145)

***

(0.0

471)

***

Pop

ulat

ion

of v

illag

e in

(t-1

) per

iodX

10^4

0.01

330.

0075

10.

0234

0.08

070.

0330

0.10

00(0

.004

9)**

*(0

.003

5)**

*(0

.012

)***

(0.0

113)

***

(0.0

067)

***

(0.0

193)

***

If th

e vi

llage

had

any

term

inal

/sta

tion/

port

in (t

-1) p

erio

d: y

es-1

, no-

00.

0566

0.06

490.

2059

0.03

180.

0488

0.13

79(0

.009

9)**

*(0

.009

5)**

*(0

.029

8)**

*(0

.007

9)**

*(0

.006

2)**

*(0

.017

3)**

*

Vill

age

topo

grap

hy (h

ill a

rea

-0, f

latla

nd-1

)0.

0503

0.05

640.

1702

0.05

110.

0501

0.13

75(0

.010

9)**

*(0

.010

1)**

*(0

.029

8)**

*(0

.009

5)**

*(0

.007

1)**

*(0

.018

8)**

*

Any

dis

aste

r in

last

thre

e ye

ars:

y-1

, no-

2-0

.014

8-0

.032

5-0

.102

6-0

.023

9-0

.007

9-0

.023

1(0

.010

8)(0

.010

3)**

*(0

.030

3)**

*(0

.007

5)**

*(0

.006

1)(0

.016

7)C

onst

ant

2.49

972.

7056

1.65

401.

9084

(0.0

253)

***

(0.0

244)

***

(0.0

195)

***

(0.0

128)

***

Obs

erva

tions

4916

849

168

4916

851

995

5199

551

995

R-s

quar

ed0.

230.

270.

250.

34

Rob

ust s

tand

ard

erro

rs in

par

enth

eses

* si

gnifi

cant

at 1

0%; *

* si

gnifi

cant

at 5

%; *

** s

igni

fican

t at 1

%D

istrc

it sp

ecifi

c co

nsta

nts

are

not r

epor

ted

in th

e ta

ble

19

Tabl

e 4:

Loc

al In

com

e an

d C

hang

e in

Loc

al P

ublic

Goo

ds -

Roa

dlig

htD

ep. V

aria

ble:

Cha

nge

in v

ill ro

adlig

ht: d

eter

iorta

tion-

1, n

ocha

nge-

2, im

prov

ed-3

1996

-200

020

00-2

006

OLS

OLS

with

Ord

ered

pro

bit

OLS

OLS

with

Ord

ered

pro

bit

Dis

trict

FE

with

dis

trict

FE

Dis

trict

FE

with

dis

trict

FE

Vill

ages

with

50%

or m

ore

fam

ilies

in p

re-w

elfa

re a

nd w

elfa

re 1

in

(t-1

) per

iod:

yes

-1, n

o-0

-0.0

856

-0.0

751

-0.3

076

-0.0

115

-0.0

305

-0.1

352

(0.0

115)

***

(0.0

074)

***

(0.0

009)

***

(0.0

090)

(0.0

041)

***

(0.0

006)

***

Vill

age

road

ligh

teni

ng in

(t-1

) per

iod:

yes

-1, n

o-0

-0.4

654

-0.6

373

-12.

3672

-0.3

711

-0.5

409

-12.

0419

(0.0

143)

***

(0.0

117)

***

(0.0

052)

***

(0.0

113)

***

(0.0

079)

***

(0.0

051)

***

Pop

ulat

ion

of v

illag

e in

(t-1

) per

iod

X 1

0^4

0.02

630.

0263

0.04

390.

1152

0.06

790.

6860

(0.0

089)

***

(0.0

089)

***

(0.0

0037

)***

(0.0

186)

***

(0.0

100)

***

(0.0

023)

***

If th

e vi

llage

had

any

term

inal

/sta

tion/

port

in (t

-1) p

erio

d: y

es-1

, no

-00.

0525

0.09

80.

4305

-0.0

174

0.04

870.

2196

(0.0

125)

***

(0.0

097)

***

(0.0

017)

***

(0.0

082)

**(0

.005

9)**

*(0

.001

5)**

*

Vill

age

topo

grap

hy (h

ill a

rea

-0, f

latla

nd-1

)0.

0997

0.09

890.

408

0.06

380.

0496

0.22

20(0

.012

2)**

*(0

.009

2)**

*(0

.001

3)**

*(0

.012

5)**

*(0

.006

0)**

*(0

.001

0)**

*

Any

dis

aste

r in

last

thre

e ye

ars:

y-1

, no-

2-0

.044

9-0

.001

9-0

.004

1-0

.006

40.

0106

0.04

25(0

.013

1)**

*(0

.008

7)(0

.000

8)**

*(0

.007

9)(0

.004

1)**

*(0

.000

7)**

*

Con

stan

t2.

1898

2.32

271.

5438

1.41

57(0

.015

8)**

*(0

.010

8)**

*(0

.015

1)**

*(0

.006

9)**

*

Obs

erva

tions

5212

752

127

5212

755

129

5512

955

129

R-s

quar

ed0.

230.

350.

280.

5R

obus

t sta

ndar

d er

rors

in p

aren

thes

es*

sign

ifica

nt a

t 10%

; **

sign

ifica

nt a

t 5%

; ***

sig

nific

ant a

t 1%

Dis

trcit

spec

ific

cons

tant

s ar

e no

t rep

orte

d in

the

tabl

e

20

Tabl

e 5a

: Loc

al In

com

e an

d C

hang

e in

Loc

al P

ublic

Goo

ds -

Prim

ary

Scho

ols

Dep

. Var

iabl

e: C

hang

e in

the

avai

labi

lity

of p

rimar

y sc

hool

s in

vill

age

1996

-200

020

00-2

006

OLS

OLS

Ord

ered

Pro

bit

OLS

OLS

Ord

ered

Pro

bit

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

Vill

ages

with

50%

or m

ore

fam

ilies

in p

re-w

elfa

re a

nd w

elfa

re 1

in (t

-1)

perio

d: y

es -1

, no-

0-0

.004

1-0

.003

3-0

.048

50.

0040

0.00

010.

0335

(0.0

016)

**(0

.001

5)**

(0.0

400)

(0.0

018)

**(0

.001

3)(0

.024

7)If

the

villa

ge h

ad a

prim

ary

scho

ol in

(t-1

) per

iod:

yes

-1, n

o -0

-0.1

028

-0.1

507

-3.1

620

-0.1

283

-0.1

913

-1.6

525

(0.0

108)

***

(0.0

120)

***

(0.0

780)

***

(0.0

120)

****

(0.0

131)

***

(0.0

440)

***

Mea

n di

stan

ce in

dis

trict

in (t

-1) p

erio

d X

intit

ial c

ondi

tionX

10^4

14.2

300

14.3

600

59.6

000

0.04

000.

1667

2.05

31(5

.750

0)**

(6.1

600)

**(2

1.00

00)

***

(0.2

066)

(0.2

533)

(0.9

999)

**

Pop

ulat

ion

of v

illag

e in

(t-1

) per

iod

X10

^40.

0027

0.00

101.

4000

0.01

880.

0095

1.20

65(0

.001

0)**

*(0

.000

4)**

*(0

.370

0)**

*(0

.003

5)**

*(0

.001

9)**

*(0

.166

7)**

*

If th

e vi

llage

had

any

term

inal

/sta

tion/

port

in (t

-1) p

erio

d: y

es-1

, no-

00.

0027

-0.0

004

-0.1

220

0.00

13-0

.002

3-0

.062

3(0

.002

2)(0

.002

0)(0

.095

0)(0

.001

9)(0

.002

0)(0

.050

7)V

illag

e to

pogr

aphy

(hill

are

a -0

, fla

tland

-1)

-0.0

016

-0.0

005

-0.0

467

-0.0

026

0.00

060.

0023

(0.0

021)

(0.0

014)

(0.0

460)

(0.0

026)

(0.0

015)

(0.0

267)

Any

dis

aste

r in

last

thre

e ye

ars:

y-1

, no-

2-0

.000

9-0

.001

7-0

.066

6-0

.007

20.

0014

0.03

19(0

.001

8)(0

.001

6)(0

.052

0)(0

.003

4)**

(0.0

009)

(0.0

180)

*

Con

stan

t2.

0970

2.11

561.

4472

1.50

44(0

.011

3)**

*(0

.008

3)**

*(0

.012

9)**

*(0

.010

2)**

*

Obs

erva

tions

5212

752

127

5512

955

129

5512

9R

-squ

ared

0.05

0.08

0.1

0.17

Rob

ust s

tand

ard

erro

rs in

par

enth

eses

* si

gnifi

cant

at 1

0%; *

* si

gnifi

cant

at 5

%; *

** s

igni

fican

t at 1

%D

istrc

it sp

ecifi

c co

nsta

nts

are

not r

epor

ted

in th

e ta

ble

21

Tabl

e 5b

: Loc

al In

com

e an

d C

hang

e in

Loc

al P

ublic

Goo

ds -

Juni

or H

ight

Sch

ools

Dep

. Var

iabl

e: C

hang

e in

the

avai

labi

lity

of ju

nior

hig

h sc

hool

s in

vill

age

1996

-200

020

00-2

006

OLS

OLS

Ord

ered

Pro

bit

OLS

OLS

Ord

ered

Pro

bit

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

Vill

ages

with

50%

or m

ore

fam

ilies

in p

re-w

elfa

re a

nd w

elfa

re 1

in (t

-1)

perio

d: y

es -1

, no-

0-0

.015

6-0

.014

0-0

.110

3-0

.000

6-0

.003

3-0

.015

5(0

.003

4)**

*(0

.002

9)**

*(0

.000

6)**

*(0

.002

3)(0

.002

0)*

(0.0

120)

If th

e vi

llage

had

a ju

nior

hig

h sc

hool

in (t

-1) p

erio

d: y

es-1

, no

-0-0

.156

6-0

.170

0-1

0.73

98-0

.149

7-0

.157

3-1

.650

2(0

.004

6)**

*(0

.005

1)**

*(0

.006

6)**

*(0

.004

3)**

*(0

.004

7)**

*(0

.022

9)**

*

Mea

n di

stan

ce in

dis

trict

in (t

-1) p

erio

d m

ultip

lied

by in

titia

l con

ditio

n X

10

^4-0

.010

00.

0900

0.55

00-0

.033

30.

0133

0.10

13(0

.040

0)(0

.050

0)(0

.030

0)**

*(0

.026

7)(0

.033

3)(0

.261

3)P

opul

atio

n of

vill

age

in (t

-1) p

erio

d X

10^

40.

0126

0.00

630.

0362

0.06

000.

0533

0.54

73(0

.004

4)**

*(0

.002

5)**

(0.0

160)

**(0

.006

7)**

*(0

.006

7)**

*(0

.057

3)**

*

If th

e vi

llage

had

any

term

inal

/sta

tion/

port

in (t

-1) p

erio

d: y

es-1

, no-

00.

0273

0.02

560.

1897

0.02

280.

0153

0.08

00(0

.005

3)**

*(0

.005

0)**

*(0

.001

9)**

*(0

.004

0)**

*(0

.003

8)**

*(0

.022

7)**

*

Vill

age

topo

grap

hy (h

ill a

rea

-0, f

latla

nd-1

)-0

.000

40.

0002

0.00

230.

0006

0.00

280.

0100

(0.0

035)

(0.0

032)

(0.0

011)

**(0

.003

0)(0

.002

5)(0

.015

3)A

ny d

isas

ter i

n la

st th

ree

year

s: y

-1, n

o-2

-0.0

077

0.00

030.

0067

0.00

190.

0046

0.02

79(0

.003

2)**

(0.0

030)

(0.0

008)

***

(0.0

026)

(0.0

019)

**(0

.011

3)**

Con

stan

t2.

0708

1.37

971.

4428

(0.0

052)

***

(0.0

041)

***

(0.0

036)

***

Obs

erva

tions

5212

755

129

5512

955

129

R-s

quar

ed0.

070.

10.

12R

obus

t sta

ndar

d er

rors

in p

aren

thes

es*

sign

ifica

nt a

t 10%

; **

sign

ifica

nt a

t 5%

; ***

sig

nific

ant a

t 1%

Dis

trcit

spec

ific

cons

tant

s ar

e no

t rep

orte

d in

the

tabl

e

22

Tabl

e 6a

: Loc

al In

com

e an

d C

hang

e in

Loc

al P

ublic

Goo

ds -

Hea

lthca

re in

fras

truc

ture

Dep

. Var

iabl

e: C

hang

e in

the

avai

labi

lity

of p

olyc

linic

in v

illag

e

1996

-200

020

00-2

006

OLS

OLS

Ord

ered

OLS

OLS

Ord

ered

Pro

bit

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

Vill

ages

with

50%

or m

ore

fam

ilies

in p

re-w

elfa

re a

nd w

elfa

re 1

in (t

-1) p

erio

d:

yes

-1, n

o-0

-0.0

298

-0.0

243

-0.3

411

-0.0

167

-0.0

151

-0.1

335

(0.0

039)

***

(0.0

032)

***

(0.0

011)

***

(0.0

039)

***

(0.0

023)

***

(0.0

005)

***

If th

e vi

llage

had

a p

olyc

linic

in (t

-1) p

erio

d: y

es-1

, no

-0-0

.509

2-0

.589

7-1

3.83

08-0

.454

9-0

.480

9-9

.316

2(0

.023

0)**

*(0

.022

5)**

*(0

.015

1)**

*(0

.013

3)**

*(0

.010

9)**

*(0

.009

3)**

*

If th

e vi

llage

had

a p

ushk

esm

as in

(t-1

) per

iod:

yes

-1, n

o-0

0.08

280.

073

0.61

320.

0341

0.03

960.

2372

(0.0

074)

***

(0.0

057)

***

(0.0

022)

***

(0.0

051)

***

(0.0

044)

***

(0.0

022)

***

Pop

ulat

ion

of v

illag

e in

(t-1

) per

iod

X10

^40.

0227

0.01

10.

0478

0.14

190.

1012

0.45

62(0

.007

7)**

*(0

.004

1)**

*(0

.000

43)*

**(0

.010

7)**

*(0

.011

3)**

*(0

.001

7)**

*

If th

e vi

llage

had

any

term

inal

/sta

tion/

port

in (t

-1) p

erio

d: y

es-1

, no-

00.

0536

0.05

40.

4112

0.02

520.

0324

0.18

66(0

.007

2)**

*(0

.006

8)**

*(0

.002

7)**

*(0

.006

3)**

*(0

.004

9)**

*(0

.002

3)**

*

Vill

age

topo

grap

hy (h

ill a

rea

-0, f

latla

nd-1

)0.

0119

0.01

010.

1801

0.00

830.

0137

0.12

09(0

.002

9)**

*(0

.002

6)**

*(0

.001

6)**

*(0

.004

3)*

(0.0

030)

***

(0.0

011)

***

Any

dis

aste

r in

last

thre

e ye

ars:

y-1

, no-

2-0

.004

0.00

290.

04-0

.001

60.

0000

0.00

49(0

.003

4)(0

.002

7)(0

.001

1)**

*(0

.002

8)(0

.002

2)(0

.000

9)**

*

Con

stan

t2.

0264

2.00

821.

3465

1.31

39(0

.004

8)**

*(0

.003

4)**

*(0

.005

1)**

*(0

.003

7)**

*

Obs

erva

tions

5212

752

127

5212

755

129

5512

955

129

R-s

quar

ed0.

200.

250.

220.

28

Rob

ust s

tand

ard

erro

rs in

par

enth

eses

* si

gnifi

cant

at 1

0%; *

* si

gnifi

cant

at 5

%; *

** s

igni

fican

t at 1

%D

istrc

it sp

ecifi

c co

nsta

nts

are

not r

epor

ted

in th

e ta

ble

23

Tabl

e 6b

: Loc

al In

com

e an

d C

hang

e in

Loc

al P

ublic

Goo

ds -

Hea

lthca

re in

fras

truc

ture

Dep

. Var

iabl

e: C

hang

e in

the

avai

labi

lity

of p

uske

smas

in v

illag

e19

96-2

000

2000

-200

6O

LSO

LSO

rder

ed P

robi

tO

LSO

LSO

rder

ed P

robi

tw

ith D

istri

ct F

Ew

ith D

istri

ct F

Ew

ith D

istri

ct F

Ew

ith D

istri

ct F

EV

illag

es w

ith 5

0% o

r mor

e fa

mili

es in

pre

-wel

fare

and

wel

fare

1 in

(t-1

) per

iod:

ye

s -1

, no-

0-0

.009

9-0

.011

-0.1

427

-0.0

033

-0.0

025

-0.0

404

(0.0

021)

***

(0.0

022)

***

(0.0

008)

***

(0.0

013)

**(0

.001

2)**

(0.0

162)

**

If th

e vi

llage

had

a p

ushk

esm

as in

(t-1

) per

iod:

yes

-1, n

o-0

-0.1

948

-0.1

942

-11.

0575

-0.1

373

-0.1

375

-8.6

149

(0.0

119)

***

(0.0

102)

***

(0.0

123)

***

(0.0

067)

***

(0.0

063)

***

(0.0

322)

***

If th

e vi

llage

had

a p

olyc

linic

in (t

-1) p

erio

d: y

es-1

, no

-00.

0462

0.03

60.

2865

0.01

140.

0101

0.09

46(0

.008

2)**

*(0

.008

4)**

*(0

.003

1)**

*(0

.009

5)**

*(0

.008

3)**

*(0

.004

2)**

*

Pop

ulat

ion

of v

illag

e in

(t-1

) per

iod

0.00

816

0.00

575

0.03

420.

0314

0.02

780.

2165

(0.0

029)

***

(0.0

024)

***

(0.0

004)

***

(0.0

051)

***

(0.0

056)

***

(0.0

020)

***

If th

e vi

llage

had

any

term

inal

/sta

tion/

port

in (t

-1) p

erio

d: y

es-1

, no-

00.

0429

0.04

40.

3638

0.02

280.

0202

0.16

18(0

.005

3)**

*(0

.005

8)**

*(0

.002

4)**

*(0

.001

3)**

(0.0

012)

**(0

.016

2)**

*

Vill

age

topo

grap

hy (h

ill a

rea

-0, f

latla

nd-1

)0.

0033

0.00

380.

0525

0.00

110.

0041

0.05

81(0

.002

0)(0

.002

0)*

(0.0

014)

***

(0.0

017)

(0.0

018)

**(0

.024

2)**

Any

dis

aste

r in

last

thre

e ye

ars:

y-1

, no-

20.

0015

0.00

10.

0191

0.00

26-0

.000

6-0

.013

7(0

.001

8)(0

.002

1)(0

.000

9)**

*(0

.001

4)*

(0.0

013)

(0.0

170)

Con

stan

t2.

0232

2.02

361.

3397

1.33

60(0

.002

6)**

*(0

.003

1)**

*(0

.002

0)**

*(0

.002

3)**

*

Obs

erva

tions

5212

752

127

5212

755

129

5508

255

082

R-s

quar

ed0.

090.

100.

09R

obus

t sta

ndar

d er

rors

in p

aren

thes

es*

sign

ifica

nt a

t 10%

; **

sign

ifica

nt a

t 5%

; ***

sig

nific

ant a

t 1%

Dis

trcit

spec

ific

cons

tant

s ar

e no

t rep

orte

d in

the

tabl

e

24

Tabl

e 7:

Loc

al P

refe

renc

e an

d C

hang

e in

Loc

al P

ublic

Goo

ds -

Villa

ge R

oad

Dep

ende

nt V

aria

ble-

Cha

nge

in v

illag

e ro

ad: d

eter

iora

tion-

1, n

o ch

ange

-2, i

mpr

ovem

ent -

3

1996

-200

020

00-2

006

OLS

OLS

OLS

Ord

ered

Pro

bit

Ord

ered

Pro

bit

OLS

OLS

OLS

Ord

ered

Pro

bit

Ord

ered

Pro

bit

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

Vill

age

head

's g

ende

r in

t-1 p

erio

d (m

ale-

1, fe

mal

e-0)

-0.0

004

-0.0

045

-0.0

034

-0.0

093

-0.0

06-0

.021

0-0

.007

3-0

.007

2-0

.023

0-0

.022

8(0

.014

7)(0

.013

2)(0

.013

2)(0

.041

2)(0

.041

4)(0

.010

2)**

(0.0

091)

(0.0

091)

(0.0

260)

(0.0

260)

% o

f wom

en v

oter

in v

illag

e-0

.000

1-0

.000

40.

0025

0.00

69(0

.000

4)(0

.001

4)(0

.000

7)**

*(0

.002

1)**

*V

illag

e he

ad's

age

in (t

-1) p

erio

d 0.

0022

0.00

160.

0015

0.00

480.

0045

0.00

180.

0013

0.00

130.

0036

0.00

36(0

.000

4)**

*(0

.000

3)**

*(0

.000

3)**

*(0

.001

0)**

*(0

.001

0)**

*(0

.000

3)**

*(0

.000

2)**

*(0

.000

2)**

*(0

.000

5)**

*(0

.000

5)**

*V

illag

e he

ad's

edu

catio

n in

(t-1

) per

iod

Not

com

plet

ed0.

0074

-0.0

309

-0.0

331

-0.1

067

-0.1

104

0.02

04-0

.020

6-0

.021

1-0

.051

7-0

.053

2(0

.056

2)(0

.048

3)(0

.051

8)(0

.147

5)(0

.159

2)(0

.036

0)(0

.032

1)(0

.031

9)(0

.089

4)(0

.088

6)P

rimar

y sc

hool

0.08

40.

0196

0.02

80.

0417

0.06

640.

0139

-0.0

371

-0.0

375

-0.0

971

-0.0

983

(0.0

562)

(0.0

45)

(0.0

459)

(0.1

387)

(0.1

425)

(0.0

377)

(0.0

340)

(0.0

339)

(0.0

945)

(0.0

939)

Juni

or h

igh

scho

ol0.

1012

0.04

490.

0519

0.12

20.

1425

0.04

17-0

.019

7-0

.020

1-0

.049

5-0

.050

7(0

.056

9)*

(0.0

459)

(0.0

47)

(0.1

409)

(0.1

457)

(0.0

384)

(0.0

336)

(0.0

334)

(0.0

935)

(0.0

928)

Hig

h sc

hool

0.13

070.

0721

0.07

920.

2019

0.22

30.

0819

0.00

890.

0085

0.03

040.

0296

(0.0

573)

**-0

.046

(0.0

470)

*(0

.141

6)(0

.145

8)(0

.038

3)**

(0.0

335)

(0.0

333)

(0.0

933)

(0.0

927)

Aca

dem

y0.

1791

0.11

010.

1176

0.32

160.

3441

0.10

310.

0233

0.02

270.

0693

0.06

77(0

.057

5)**

*(0

.047

2)**

(0.0

475)

**(0

.145

4)**

(0.1

475)

**(0

.039

1)**

*(0

.034

3)(0

.034

2)(0

.095

9)(0

.095

4)U

nive

rsity

0.14

460.

0775

0.08

520.

2131

0.23

50.

1033

0.02

050.

0201

0.06

230.

0612

(0.0

569)

**(0

.046

0)*

(0.0

472)

*(0

.141

5)(0

.146

8)(0

.038

8)**

*(0

.033

7)(0

.033

5)(0

.094

1)(0

.093

5)V

illag

e he

ad's

dur

atio

n in

yea

rs-0

.001

6-0

.000

3-0

.000

2-0

.001

-0.0

007

-0.0

027

-0.0

002

-0.0

002

-0.0

007

-0.0

007

(0.0

006)

***

(0.0

005)

(0.0

005)

(0.0

015)

(0.0

016)

(0.0

005)

***

(0.0

004)

(0.0

004)

(0.0

010)

(0.0

010)

Vill

ages

with

50%

or m

ore

fam

ilies

in p

re-w

elfa

re a

nd w

elfa

re 1

in (t

-1)

perio

d: y

es -1

, no-

0-0

.075

2-0

.059

9-0

.058

7-0

.181

6-0

.179

5-0

.030

0-0

.031

8-0

.031

7-0

.087

3-0

.087

0(0

.010

4)**

*(0

.007

1)**

*(0

.007

1)**

*(0

.021

2)**

*(0

.021

7)**

*(0

.008

3)**

*(0

.006

1)**

*(0

.006

1)**

*(0

.016

7)**

*(0

.016

7)**

*R

oad

hard

ende

d in

(t-1

) per

iod

equa

ls 1

, els

e 0

-0.2

925

-0.3

062

-0.2

998

-0.8

979

-0.8

829

-0.1

529

-0.2

261

-0.2

267

-0.6

381

-0.6

402

(0.0

218)

***

(0.0

213)

***

(0.0

219)

***

(0.0

553)

***

(0.0

569)

***

(0.0

175)

***

(0.0

145)

***

(0.0

145)

***

(0.0

358)

***

(0.0

357)

***

Roa

d_pa

ved

in (t

-1) p

erio

d eq

uals

1, e

lse

0-0

.679

5-0

.751

1-0

.748

2-2

.354

8-2

.361

1-0

.494

7-0

.599

2-0

.599

9-1

.678

6-1

.681

6(0

.021

4)**

*(0

.021

5)**

*(0

.022

0)**

*(0

.067

6)**

*(0

.069

5)**

*(0

.015

8)**

*(0

.014

3)**

*(0

.014

3)**

*(0

.047

0)**

*(0

.046

9)**

*P

opul

atio

n of

vill

age

in (t

-1) p

erio

d X

10^

40.

0108

0.00

665

0.00

650.

021

0.02

080.

0629

0.02

730.

0273

0.08

400.

0840

(0.0

042)

**(0

.003

3)**

(0.0

032)

**(0

.011

)*(0

.011

)*(0

.010

0)**

*(0

.006

4)**

*(0

.006

4)**

*(0

.018

7)**

*(0

.018

7)**

*If

the

villa

ge h

ad a

ny te

rmin

al/s

tatio

n/po

rt in

(t-1

) per

iod:

yes

-1, n

o-0

0.05

070.

0609

0.06

060.

1947

0.19

50.

0289

0.04

600.

0459

0.13

070.

1307

(0.0

097)

***

(0.0

095)

***

(0.0

094)

***

(0.0

296)

***

(0.0

295)

***

(0.0

076)

***

(0.0

062)

***

(0.0

062)

***

(0.0

172)

***

(0.0

173)

***

Vill

age

topo

grap

hy (h

ill a

rea

-0, f

latla

nd-1

)0.

0472

0.05

20.

051

0.15

710.

1543

0.04

650.

0471

0.04

690.

1295

0.12

91(0

.010

7)**

*(0

.010

1)**

*(0

.010

2)**

*(0

.029

7)**

*(0

.030

2)**

*(0

.009

1)**

*(0

.007

1)**

*(0

.007

1)**

*(0

.018

7)**

*(0

.018

7)**

*A

ny d

isas

ter i

n la

st th

ree

year

s: y

-1, n

o-2

-0.0

123

-0.0

318

-0.0

346

-0.1

007

-0.1

088

-0.0

221

-0.0

076

-0.0

077

-0.0

221

-0.0

223

(0.0

107)

(0.0

102)

***

(0.0

103)

***

(0.0

302)

***

(0.0

305)

***

(0.0

073)

***

(0.0

060)

(0.0

060)

(0.0

166)

(0.0

165)

Con

stan

t2.

3061

2.61

572.

6129

1.56

241.

8763

1.75

28(0

.067

5)**

*(0

.054

4)**

*(0

.058

2)**

*(0

.049

7)**

*(0

.035

9)**

*(0

.051

8)**

*O

bser

vatio

ns49

168

4916

846

954

4916

846

954

5199

551

995

5199

551

995

5199

5R

-squ

ared

0.23

0.28

0.28

0.26

0.34

0.34

Rob

ust s

tand

ard

erro

rs in

par

enth

eses

*

sign

ifica

nt a

t 10%

; ** s

igni

fican

t at 5

%; *

** s

igni

fican

t at 1

%D

istrc

it sp

ecifi

c co

nsta

nts

are

not r

epor

ted

in th

e ta

ble

25

Tabl

e 8:

Loc

al P

refe

renc

e an

d C

hang

e in

Loc

al P

ublic

Goo

ds -

Villa

ge R

oadl

ight

Dep

ende

nt V

aria

ble-

Cha

nge

in v

illag

e ro

ad li

ght:

dete

riora

tion-

1, n

o ch

ange

-2, i

mpr

ovem

ent -

319

96-2

000

2000

-200

6O

LSO

LSO

LSO

rder

ed P

robi

tO

rder

ed P

robi

tO

LSO

LSO

LSO

rder

ed P

robi

tO

rder

ed P

robi

tw

ith D

istri

ct F

Ew

ith D

istri

ct F

Ew

ith D

istri

ct F

Ew

ith D

istri

ct F

Ew

ith D

istri

ct F

Ew

ith D

istri

ct F

Ew

ith D

istri

ct F

Ew

ith D

istri

ct F

EV

illag

e he

ad's

gen

der i

n t-1

per

iod

(mal

e-1,

fem

ale-

0)-0

.036

1-0

.018

3-0

.018

-0.0

733

-0.0

715

-0.0

337

-0.0

128

-0.0

128

-0.0

547

-0.0

551

(0.0

140)

**(0

.011

9)(0

.011

9)(0

.000

9)**

*(0

.000

8)**

*(0

.008

3)**

*(0

.006

9)*

(0.0

069)

*(0

.000

7)**

*(0

.000

7)**

*

% o

f wom

en v

oter

in v

illag

e X

10^

20.

0098

90.

0274

0.08

860.

3130

(0.0

42)

(0.0

016)

***

(0.0

533)

*(0

.001

3)**

*

Vill

age

head

's a

ge in

(t-1

) per

iod

X 1

0^2

0.07

130.

0713

0.12

10.

535

0.52

40.

1372

0.14

390.

1432

0.63

740.

6360

(0.0

42)*

(0.0

42)*

**(0

.027

)***

(0.0

02)*

**(0

.001

8)**

*(0

.033

3)**

*(0

.016

7)**

*(0

.016

7)**

*(0

.001

7)**

*(0

.001

5)**

*

Vill

age

head

's e

duca

tion

in (t

-1) p

erio

d N

ot c

ompl

eted

0.03

020.

024

0.04

270.

1929

0.31

950.

0375

-0.0

071

-0.0

075

-0.0

202

-0.0

208

(0.0

302)

(0.0

263)

(0.0

259)

(0.0

014)

***

(0.0

014)

***

(0.0

241)

(0.0

135)

(0.0

135)

(0.0

010)

***

(0.0

009)

***

Prim

ary

scho

ol0.

0562

0.02

670.

0454

0.20

710.

3301

0.06

12-0

.002

1-0

.002

40.

0027

0.00

21(0

.030

6)*

(0.0

257)

(0.0

254)

*(0

.001

7)**

*(0

.001

7)**

*(0

.024

8)**

(0.0

127)

(0.0

127)

(0.0

012)

**(0

.001

1)*

Juni

or h

igh

scho

ol0.

0792

0.04

870.

0676

0.29

810.

4208

0.10

280.

0161

0.01

580.

0672

0.06

68(0

.030

4)**

*(0

.025

6)*

(0.0

250)

***

(0.0

015)

***

(0.0

015)

***

(0.0

253)

***

(0.0

128)

(0.0

128)

(0.0

012)

***

(0.0

012)

***

Hig

h sc

hool

0.14

010.

0812

0.10

010.

4292

0.55

10.

1445

0.03

870.

0385

0.16

140.

1609

(0.0

311)

***

(0.0

259)

***

(0.0

252)

***

(0.0

018)

***

(0.0

018)

***

(0.0

258)

***

(0.0

131)

***

(0.0

130)

***

(0.0

013)

***

(0.0

013)

***

Aca

dem

y0.

2059

0.13

260.

1513

0.65

330.

7724

0.16

870.

0598

0.05

940.

2921

0.29

13(0

.032

2)**

*(0

.027

8)**

*(0

.026

8)**

*(0

.002

2)**

*(0

.002

1)**

*(0

.026

6)**

*(0

.014

3)**

*(0

.014

3)**

*(0

.001

3)**

*(0

.001

3)**

*

Uni

vers

ity0.

1939

0.10

440.

1216

0.54

620.

6576

0.16

360.

0465

0.04

620.

2151

0.21

44(0

.031

9)**

*(0

.026

9)**

*(0

.026

6)**

*(0

.002

0)**

*(0

.001

9)**

*(0

.026

8)**

*(0

.013

8)**

*(0

.013

7)**

*(0

.001

4)**

*(0

.001

4)**

*

Vill

age

head

's d

urat

ion

in y

ears

X 1

0^2

0.19

700.

1970

-0.0

021

-0.0

033

-0.0

021

-0.2

910

-0.0

746

-0.0

739

-0.2

837

-0.2

824

(0.0

72)*

**(0

.072

)**

(0.0

430)

(0.0

073)

(0.0

069)

(0.0

579)

***

(0.0

306)

**(0

.030

6)**

(0.0

057)

***

(0.0

053)

***

Vill

ages

with

50%

or m

ore

fam

ilies

in p

re-w

elfa

re a

nd w

elfa

re 1

in (t

-1)

perio

d: y

es -1

, no-

0-0

.076

5-0

.070

1-0

.072

2-0

.287

9-0

.295

4-0

.006

5-0

.027

7-0

.027

7-0

.125

7-0

.125

6(0

.011

3)**

*(0

.007

2)**

*(0

.007

5)**

*(0

.000

6)**

*(0

.000

5)**

*(0

.008

5)(0

.004

0)**

*(0

.004

0)**

*(0

.000

5)**

*(0

.000

4)**

*

Vill

age

road

ligh

teni

ng in

(t-1

) per

iod:

yes

-1, n

o-0

-0.4

857

-0.6

441

-0.6

525

-12.

4429

-12.

4711

-0.3

872

-0.5

447

-0.5

448

-11.

7584

-11.

7485

(0.0

140)

***

(0.0

117)

***

(0.0

106)

***

(0.0

054)

***

(0.0

051)

***

(0.0

111)

***

(0.0

077)

***

(0.0

077)

***

(0.0

051)

***

(0.0

051)

***

Pop

ulat

ion

of v

illag

e in

(t-1

) per

iod

X 1

0^4

0.02

220.

0222

0.01

150.

0405

0.03

950.

0960

0.06

230.

0623

0.63

930.

6399

(0.0

077)

***

(0.0

077)

***

(0.0

048)

***

(0.0

0032

)***

(0.0

0029

)***

(0.0

173)

***

(0.0

093)

(0.0

093)

(0.0

019)

(0.0

018)

***

If th

e vi

llage

had

any

term

inal

/sta

tion/

port

in (t

-1) p

erio

d: y

es-1

, no-

00.

0477

0.09

480.

096

0.41

720.

42-0

.017

70.

0463

0.04

630.

2092

0.20

96(0

.012

0)**

*(0

.009

4)**

*(0

.009

7)**

*(0

.001

5)**

*(0

.001

5)**

*(0

.007

8)**

(0.0

058)

***

(0.0

059)

***

(0.0

013)

***

(0.0

013)

***

Vill

age

topo

grap

hy (h

ill a

rea

-0, f

latla

nd-1

)0.

0958

0.09

510.

0968

0.39

340.

3973

0.06

080.

0471

0.04

700.

2140

0.21

36(0

.011

8)**

*(0

.009

1)**

*(0

.009

3)**

*(0

.000

9)**

*(0

.000

9)**

*(0

.012

2)**

*(0

.005

9)**

*(0

.005

9)**

*(0

.000

7)**

*(0

.000

7)**

*

Any

dis

aste

r in

last

thre

e ye

ars:

y-1

, no-

2-0

.039

1-0

.001

20.

0006

-0.0

011

0.00

53-0

.004

30.

0110

0.01

100.

0441

0.04

41(0

.013

0)**

*(0

.008

7)(0

.008

1)(0

.000

6)**

(0.0

006)

***

(0.0

080)

(0.0

041)

***

(0.0

041)

***

(0.0

005)

***

(0.0

004)

***

Con

stan

t2.

0822

2.27

112.

2258

1.42

391.

3509

1.30

70(0

.038

2)**

*(0

.021

0)**

*(0

.034

7)**

*(0

.033

7)**

*(0

.018

3)**

*(0

.034

2)**

*

Obs

erva

tions

5212

752

127

4985

052

127

4985

055

129

5512

955

129

5512

955

129

R-s

quar

ed0.

240.

350.

350.

30.

510.

51R

obus

t sta

ndar

d er

rors

in p

aren

thes

es

* si

gnifi

cant

at 1

0%; *

* si

gnifi

cant

at 5

%; *

** s

igni

fican

t at 1

%

Dis

trcit

spec

ific

cons

tant

s ar

e no

t rep

orte

d in

the

tabl

e

26

Tabl

e 9a

: Loc

al P

refe

renc

e an

d C

hang

e in

Loc

al P

ublic

Goo

ds -

Prim

ary

Scho

ols

Dep

. Var

iabl

e: C

hang

e in

the

avai

labi

lity

of p

rimar

y sc

hool

s in

vill

age

1996

-200

020

00-2

006

OLS

OLS

OLS

Ord

ered

Pro

bit

Ord

ered

Pro

bit

OLS

OLS

OLS

Ord

ered

Pro

bit

Ord

ered

Pro

bit

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

Vill

age

head

's g

ende

r in

t-1 p

erio

d (m

ale-

1, fe

mal

e-0)

-0.0

006

0.00

390.

0043

0.17

890.

1795

-0.0

051

-0.0

013

-0.0

013

-0.0

163

-0.0

169

(0.0

036)

(0.0

035)

(0.0

035)

(0.1

269)

(0.1

286)

(0.0

026)

**(0

.002

3)(0

.002

3)(0

.059

3)(0

.059

3)%

of w

omen

vot

er in

vill

age

X10

^20.

0008

0.08

240.

0458

0.43

86(0

.005

7)(0

.286

6)(0

.052

0)(0

.566

6)V

illag

e he

ad's

age

in (t

-1) p

erio

d X

10^2

0.02

220.

0157

0.00

880.

2422

-0.0

012

-0.0

034

0.00

600.

0059

0.04

020.

0398

(0.0

092)

**(0

.007

4)**

(0.0

001)

(0.0

023)

(0.2

148)

(0.0

120)

(0.0

073)

(0.0

073)

(0.1

467)

(0.1

467)

Vill

age

head

's e

duca

tion

in (t

-1) p

erio

d N

ot c

ompl

eted

0.01

420.

0110

0.01

690.

1944

0.29

630.

0063

0.00

580.

0056

0.03

490.

0322

(0.0

240)

(0.0

206)

(0.0

202)

(0.2

944)

(0.2

934)

(0.0

200)

(0.0

200)

(0.0

200)

(0.1

533)

(0.1

533)

Prim

ary

scho

ol0.

0177

0.01

010.

0154

0.22

660.

3313

0.01

170.

0077

0.00

750.

0658

0.06

43(0

.021

0)(0

.017

0)(0

.017

5)(0

.237

3)(0

.244

3)(0

.019

3)(0

.019

3)(0

.019

3)(0

.146

7)(0

.146

7)Ju

nior

hig

h sc

hool

0.02

140.

0120

0.01

670.

2494

0.34

210.

0121

0.00

770.

0075

0.04

740.

0459

(0.0

210)

(0.0

171)

(0.0

175)

(0.2

410)

(0.2

471)

(0.0

193)

(0.0

193)

(0.0

193)

(0.1

400)

(0.1

400)

Hig

h sc

hool

0.02

460.

0127

0.01

680.

2515

0.32

630.

0177

0.01

120.

0111

0.11

200.

1107

(0.0

212)

(0.0

173)

(0.0

177)

(0.2

474)

(0.2

522)

(0.0

193)

(0.0

193)

(0.0

193)

(0.1

400)

(0.1

400)

Aca

dem

y0.

0253

0.01

260.

0156

0.16

020.

1600

0.01

400.

0081

0.00

79-0

.004

2-0

.005

9(0

.020

9)(0

.017

0)(0

.017

7)(0

.255

8)(0

.272

3)(0

.019

3)(0

.019

3)(0

.019

3)(0

.153

3)(0

.153

3)U

nive

rsity

0.02

680.

0140

0.01

590.

2686

0.22

070.

0159

0.01

050.

0103

0.06

020.

0573

(0.0

212)

(0.0

175)

(0.0

181)

(0.2

712)

(0.2

807)

(0.0

193)

(0.0

193)

(0.0

193)

(0.1

467)

(0.1

467)

Vill

age

head

's d

urat

ion

in y

ears

x 1

0^2

0.01

86-0

.001

70.

0006

-0.0

154

0.10

51-0

.036

50.

0032

0.00

340.

1647

0.16

53(0

.015

3)(0

.011

7)(0

.010

6)(0

.342

9)(0

.342

1)(0

.014

7)**

(0.0

113)

(0.0

113)

(0.2

066)

(0.2

066)

Vill

ages

with

50%

or m

ore

fam

ilies

in p

re-w

elfa

re a

nd w

elfa

re 1

in (t

-1)

perio

d: y

es -1

, no-

0-0

.003

1-0

.003

1-0

.003

1-0

.045

9-0

.044

60.

0042

0.00

030.

0004

0.03

450.

0354

(0.0

015)

**(0

.001

4)**

(0.0

015)

**(0

.039

8)(0

.043

7)(0

.001

6)**

(0.0

013)

(0.0

013)

(0.0

253)

(0.0

253)

If th

e vi

llage

had

a p

rimar

y sc

hool

in (t

-1) p

erio

d: y

es-1

, no

-0-0

.104

5-0

.151

1-0

.162

1-3

.158

8-3

.138

0-0

.130

0-0

.191

3-0

.191

3-1

.651

8-1

.653

2(0

.010

6)**

*(0

.012

0)**

*(0

.011

9)**

*(0

.078

4)**

*(0

.088

0)**

*(0

.012

0)**

*(0

.013

3)**

*(0

.013

3)**

*(0

.044

0)**

*(0

.042

7)**

*

Mea

n di

stan

ce in

dis

trict

in (t

-1) p

erio

d X

intit

ial c

ondi

tion

X10

^20.

1458

0.14

350.

1530

0.59

700.

6288

0.00

080.

0017

0.00

182.

1131

2.15

31(0

.057

2)(0

.061

1)(0

.062

9)**

(0.2

069)

***

(0.2

208)

***

(0.0

021)

(0.0

026)

(0.0

026)

(0.0

107)

**-0

.010

7**

Pop

ulat

ion

of v

illag

e in

(t-1

) per

iod

X10^

40.

0024

0.00

100.

0010

1.39

001.

7600

0.01

730.

0091

0.00

911.

2065

1.20

65(0

.000

9)**

*(0

.000

4)**

*(0

.000

4)**

*(0

.370

0)**

*(0

.310

0)**

*(0

.003

5)**

*(0

.001

8)**

*(0

.001

8)**

*(0

.166

7)**

*(0

.166

7)**

*

If th

e vi

llage

had

any

term

inal

/sta

tion/

port

in (t

-1) p

erio

d: y

es-1

, no-

00.

0023

-0.0

006

-0.0

010

-0.1

200

-0.1

659

0.00

14-0

.002

5-0

.002

5-0

.066

7-0

.066

2(0

.002

1)(0

.002

0)(0

.002

0)(0

.094

4)(0

.094

8)*

(0.0

019)

(0.0

020)

(0.0

020)

(0.0

507)

(0.0

500)

Vill

age

topo

grap

hy (h

ill a

rea

-0, f

latla

nd-1

)-0

.002

1-0

.000

7-0

.000

8-0

.051

2-0

.060

6-0

.003

10.

0004

0.00

040.

0008

-0.0

002

(0.0

020)

(0.0

014)

(0.0

015)

(0.0

458)

(0.0

479)

(0.0

026)

(0.0

015)

(0.0

015)

(0.0

273)

(0.0

267)

Any

dis

aste

r in

last

thre

e ye

ars:

y-1

, no-

2-0

.000

4-0

.001

7-0

.001

7-0

.066

7-0

.070

2-0

.006

90.

0014

0.00

140.

0328

0.03

30(0

.001

9)(0

.001

6)(0

.001

7)(0

.052

0)(0

.060

9)(0

.003

3)**

(0.0

009)

(0.0

009)

(0.0

180)

*(0

.018

0)*

Con

stan

t2.

0659

2.09

412.

0988

1.44

251.

4952

1.47

19(0

.025

8)**

*(0

.021

0)**

*(0

.020

9)**

*(0

.022

7)**

*(0

.021

3)**

*(0

.031

3)**

*

Obs

erva

tions

5212

752

127

4985

055

129

5512

955

129

R-s

quar

ed0.

0500

0.08

000.

0900

0.1

0.17

0.17

Rob

ust s

tand

ard

erro

rs in

par

enth

eses

*

sign

ifica

nt a

t 10%

; **

sign

ifica

nt a

t 5%

; ***

sig

nific

ant a

t 1%

Dis

trcit

spec

ific

cons

tant

s ar

e no

t rep

orte

d in

the

tabl

e

27

Tabl

e 9b

: Loc

al P

refe

renc

e an

d C

hang

e in

Loc

al P

ublic

Goo

ds -

Juni

or H

igh

Scho

ols

Dep

. Var

iabl

e: C

hang

e in

the

avai

labi

lity

of ju

nior

hig

h sc

hool

s in

vill

age

1996

-200

020

00-2

006

OLS

OLS

with

O

LS w

ith

Ord

ered

Pro

bit

Ord

ered

Pro

bit

OLS

OLS

with

O

LS w

ith

Ord

ered

Pro

bit

Ord

ered

Pro

bit

Dis

trict

FE

Dis

trict

FE

Dis

trict

FE

Dis

trict

FE

Dis

trict

FE

Dis

trict

FE

Dis

trict

FE

Dis

trict

FE

Vill

age

head

's g

ende

r in

t-1 p

erio

d (m

ale-

1, fe

mal

e-0)

-0.0

093

-0.0

076

-0.0

075

-0.0

468

-0.0

466

0.00

170.

0000

50.

0000

5-0

.001

6-0

.001

6(0

.008

1)(0

.008

1)(0

.008

2)(0

.058

8)(0

.059

6)(0

.005

3)(0

.005

2)(0

.005

2)(0

.033

3)(0

.033

3)%

of w

omen

vot

er in

vill

age

X 1

0^2

0.01

110.

0786

0.02

390.

1453

(0.0

231)

(0.1

645)

(0.0

313)

(0.2

000)

Vill

age

head

's a

ge in

(t-1

) per

iod

X 10

^20.

0740

0.07

430.

0718

0.60

600.

5726

0.04

630.

0451

0.04

500.

2673

0.26

66(0

.016

6)**

*(0

.016

1)**

*(0

.016

4)**

*(0

.126

2)**

*(0

.126

2)**

*(0

.012

7)**

*(0

.010

7)**

*(0

.010

7)**

*(0

.066

7)**

*(0

.066

7)**

*

Vill

age

head

's e

duca

tion

in (t

-1) p

erio

d N

ot c

ompl

eted

-0.0

126

-0.0

103

-0.0

030

-0.1

054

-0.0

302

0.01

870.

0109

0.01

080.

0767

0.07

53(0

.018

9)(0

.020

0)(0

.021

8)(0

.182

1)(0

.195

9)(0

.012

0)(0

.012

0)(0

.012

0)(0

.100

0)(0

.100

0)P

rimar

y sc

hool

0.00

450.

0012

0.00

810.

0180

0.07

900.

0187

0.00

810.

0081

0.06

220.

0613

(0.0

186)

(0.0

194)

(0.0

209)

(0.1

749)

(0.1

876)

(0.0

120)

(0.0

120)

(0.0

120)

(0.0

933)

(0.1

000)

Juni

or h

igh

scho

ol0.

0201

0.01

410.

0209

0.13

240.

1900

0.02

270.

0123

0.01

230.

0880

0.08

73(0

.019

0)(0

.020

0)(0

.021

6)(0

.179

4)(0

.192

4)(0

.012

0)*

(0.0

127)

(0.0

127)

(0.1

000)

(0.1

000)

Hig

h sc

hool

0.02

250.

0148

0.02

140.

1371

0.19

130.

0281

0.01

970.

0196

0.13

070.

1293

(0.0

187)

(0.0

196)

(0.0

211)

(0.1

762)

(0.1

889)

(0.0

120)

**(0

.012

0)(0

.012

0)(0

.093

3)(0

.093

3)A

cade

my

0.04

170.

0328

0.03

870.

2760

0.32

440.

0272

0.02

300.

0229

0.14

400.

1433

(0.0

191)

**(0

.020

0)(0

.021

5)*

(0.1

782)

(0.1

904)

*(0

.012

7)**

(0.0

133)

*(0

.013

3)*

(0.1

000)

(0.1

000)

Uni

vers

ity0.

0338

0.02

040.

0268

0.18

630.

2395

0.02

650.

0225

0.02

250.

1440

0.14

27(0

.019

6)*

(0.0

202)

(0.0

212)

(0.1

801)

(0.1

886)

(0.0

127)

**(0

.012

7)*

(0.0

127)

*(0

.100

0)(0

.100

0)V

illag

e he

ad's

dur

atio

n in

yea

rs X

10^

2-0

.008

5-0

.018

4-0

.019

9-0

.106

1-1

.255

3-0

.018

3-0

.017

9-0

.017

7-0

.115

3-0

.115

3(0

.024

7)(0

.025

9)(0

.026

6)(0

.202

0)(2

.165

4)(0

.021

3)(0

.019

3)(0

.019

3)(0

.120

0)(0

.120

0)V

illag

es w

ith 5

0% o

r mor

e fa

mili

es in

pre

-wel

fare

and

wel

fare

1 in

(t-1

) pe

riod:

yes

-1, n

o-0

-0.0

127

-0.0

124

-0.0

117

-0.0

986

-0.0

919

0.00

03-0

.002

5-0

.002

5-0

.011

4-0

.011

4(0

.003

4)**

*(0

.002

9)**

*(0

.002

9)**

*(0

.021

8)**

*(0

.021

7)**

*(0

.002

3)(0

.001

9)(0

.001

9)(0

.012

0)(0

.012

0)If

the

villa

ge h

ad a

juni

or h

igh

scho

ol in

(t-1

) per

iod:

yes

-1, n

o-0

-0.1

598

-0.1

717

-0.1

711

-2.8

449

-2.8

446

-0.1

507

-0.1

580

-0.1

580

-1.6

472

-1.6

472

(0.0

046)

***

(0.0

051)

***

(0.0

052)

***

(0.0

313)

***

(0.0

313)

***

(0.0

043)

***

(0.0

047)

***

(0.0

047)

***

(0.0

227)

***

(0.0

227)

***

Mea

n di

stan

ce o

f jun

ior h

igh

scho

ol in

(t-1

) per

iod

X in

itial

vill

age

cond

ition

X

10^2

0.00

050.

0011

0.00

120.

0076

0.00

77-0

.000

20.

0002

0.00

020.

0016

0.00

15(0

.000

4)(0

.000

6)**

(0.0

006)

**(0

.004

2)*

(0.0

045)

*(0

.000

3)(0

.000

3)(0

.000

3)(0

.002

7)(0

.002

7)P

opul

atio

n of

vill

age

in (t

-1) p

erio

d X

10^4

0.01

180.

0061

0.00

600.

0348

0.03

420.

0576

0.05

510.

0551

0.53

390.

5346

(0.0

041)

***

(0.0

024)

**(0

.002

4)**

(0.0

150)

**(0

.015

0)**

(0.0

073)

***

(0.0

067)

***

(0.0

067)

***

(0.0

567)

***

(0.0

567)

***

If th

e vi

llage

had

any

term

inal

/sta

tion/

port

in (t

-1) p

erio

d: y

es-1

, no-

00.

0263

0.02

480.

0245

0.18

270.

1824

0.02

250.

0147

0.01

470.

0767

0.07

67(0

.005

4)**

*(0

.005

0)**

*(0

.005

1)**

*(0

.036

6)**

*(0

.037

3)**

*(0

.004

1)**

*(0

.003

7)**

*(0

.003

7)**

*(0

.022

7)**

*(0

.022

7)**

*

Vill

age

topo

grap

hy (h

ill a

rea

-0, f

latla

nd-1

)-0

.001

6-0

.001

2-0

.001

3-0

.009

4-0

.009

70.

0003

0.00

200.

0019

0.00

590.

0057

(0.0

035)

(0.0

032)

(0.0

033)

(0.0

245)

(0.0

248)

(0.0

029)

(0.0

025)

(0.0

025)

(0.0

160)

(0.0

160)

Any

dis

aste

r in

last

thre

e ye

ars:

y-1

, no-

2-0

.006

40.

0004

0.00

010.

0079

0.00

530.

0019

0.00

470.

0047

0.02

890.

0289

(0.0

032)

**(0

.003

0)(0

.003

1)(0

.023

6)(0

.024

0)(0

.002

5)(0

.001

9)**

(0.0

019)

**(0

.011

3)**

(0.0

113)

**

Con

stan

t2.

0288

2.00

731.

9955

1.33

451.

4105

1.39

85(0

.022

0)**

*(0

.022

4)**

*(0

.027

5)**

*(0

.014

7)**

*(0

.014

7)**

*(0

.020

7)**

*

Obs

erva

tions

5212

752

127

4985

055

129

5512

955

129

R-s

quar

ed0.

070.

090.

090.

10.

120.

13R

obus

t sta

ndar

d er

rors

in p

aren

thes

es*

sign

ifica

nt a

t 10%

; **

sign

ifica

nt a

t 5%

; ***

sig

nific

ant a

t 1%

Dis

trcit

spec

ific

cons

tant

s ar

e no

t rep

orte

d in

the

tabl

e

28

Tabl

e 10

a: L

ocal

Pre

fere

nce

and

Cha

nge

in L

ocal

Pub

lic G

oods

- H

ealth

care

Infr

astr

uctu

reD

ep. V

aria

ble:

Cha

nge

in th

e av

aila

bilit

y of

pol

yclin

ic in

vill

age

1996

-200

020

00-2

006

OLS

OLS

OLS

Ord

ered

Pro

bit

Ord

ered

Pro

bit

OLS

OLS

OLS

Ord

ered

Pro

bit

Ord

ered

Pro

bit

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

with

Dis

trict

FE

Vill

age

head

's g

ende

r in

t-1 p

erio

d (m

ale-

1, fe

mal

e-0)

-0.0

066

-0.0

091

-0.0

093

-0.1

136

-0.1

17-0

.006

9-0

.006

3-0

.006

3-0

.046

3-0

.046

3(0

.007

2)(0

.007

4)(0

.007

3)(0

.001

3)**

*(0

.001

1)**

*(0

.005

4)(0

.005

3)(0

.005

3)(0

.000

9)**

*(0

.000

7)**

*

% o

f wom

en v

oter

in v

illag

e X1

0^2

-0.0

17-0

.157

-0.0

045

-0.0

004

(0.0

160)

(0.0

023)

***

(0.0

015)

***

(0.0

207)

***

Vill

age

head

's a

ge in

(t-1

) per

iod

X 1

0^2

0.04

190.

0361

0.63

90.

0359

0.62

20.

0457

0.04

370.

0437

0.42

530.

4253

(0.0

140)

***

(0.0

110)

***

(0.0

031)

***

(0.0

110)

***

(0.0

028)

***

(0.0

227)

**(0

.011

3)**

*(0

.011

3)**

*(0

.001

9)**

*(0

.001

7)**

*

Vill

age

head

's e

duca

tion

in (t

-1) p

erio

d N

ot c

ompl

eted

-0.0

702

-0.0

543

-0.0

698

-0.5

2-0

.603

7-0

.030

6-0

.006

2-0

.006

2-0

.095

3-0

.095

3(0

.041

4)*

(0.0

365)

(0.0

396)

*(0

.002

3)**

*(0

.002

1)**

*(0

.020

0)(0

.016

0)(0

.016

0)(0

.001

1)**

*(0

.001

0)**

*

Prim

ary

scho

ol-0

.070

5-0

.049

1-0

.065

7-0

.460

8-0

.573

1-0

.021

80.

0016

0.00

160.

0129

0.01

29(0

.041

6)*

(0.0

364)

(0.0

391)

*(0

.002

4)**

*(0

.002

4)**

*(0

.019

3)(0

.015

3)(0

.015

3)(0

.001

1)**

*(0

.001

1)**

*

Juni

or h

igh

scho

ol-0

.065

6-0

.045

2-0

.061

2-0

.359

9-0

.467

7-0

.023

30.

0019

0.00

190.

0359

0.03

59(0

.041

9)(0

.036

6)(0

.039

3)(0

.002

4)**

*(0

.002

4)**

*(0

.020

0)(0

.015

3)(0

.015

3)(0

.001

3)**

*(0

.001

3)**

*

Hig

h sc

hool

-0.0

581

-0.0

396

-0.0

556

-0.2

56-0

.367

6-0

.018

50.

0055

0.00

550.

0720

0.07

20(0

.041

7)(0

.036

2)(0

.039

0)(0

.002

6)**

*(0

.002

5)**

*(0

.020

0)(0

.015

3)(0

.015

3)(0

.001

4)**

*(0

.001

3)**

*

Aca

dem

y-0

.027

4-0

.011

9-0

.027

1-0

.012

5-0

.116

7-0

.004

50.

0197

0.01

970.

1660

0.16

60(0

.042

5)(0

.037

0)(0

.039

7)(0

.002

5)**

*(0

.002

3)**

*(0

.021

3)(0

.016

0)(0

.016

0)(0

.001

5)**

*(0

.001

4)**

*

Uni

vers

ity-0

.032

-0.0

284

-0.0

452

-0.1

365

-0.2

519

-0.0

081

0.01

630.

0163

0.13

870.

1387

(0.0

426)

(0.0

368)

(0.0

390)

(0.0

021)

***

(0.0

020)

***

(0.0

207)

(0.0

160)

(0.0

160)

(0.0

018)

***

(0.0

017)

***

Vill

age

head

's d

urat

ion

in y

ears

X10

^2-0

.018

6-0

.002

96-0

.032

60.

0015

2-0

.025

8-0

.008

4-0

.003

8-0

.003

8-0

.142

0-0

.142

0(0

.025

0)(0

.022

0)(0

.009

9)**

*(0

.023

0)(0

.008

9)**

*(0

.032

0)(0

.019

3)(0

.019

3)(0

.006

1)**

*(0

.005

7)**

*

Vill

ages

with

50%

or m

ore

fam

ilies

in p

re-w

elfa

re a

nd w

elfa

re 1

in (t

-1) p

erio

d:

yes

-1, n

o-0

-0.0

268

-0.0

228

-0.0

223

-0.3

172

-0.3

046

-0.0

154

-0.0

143

-0.0

143

-0.1

267

-0.1

267

(0.0

038)

***

(0.0

032)

***

(0.0

032)

***

(0.0

012)

***

(0.0

011)

***

(0.0

038)

***

(0.0

023)

***

(0.0

023)

***

(0.0

005)

***

(0.0

005)

***

If th

e vi

llage

had

a p

olyc

linic

in (t

-1) p

erio

d: y

es-1

, no-

0-0

.513

3-0

.591

2-0

.595

2-1

3.87

51-1

3.82

17-0

.456

0-0

.482

0-0

.482

0-9

.219

1-9

.219

1(0

.023

2)**

*(0

.022

5)**

*(0

.023

1)**

*(0

.015

1)**

*(0

.015

5)**

*(0

.013

3)**

*(0

.010

7)**

*(0

.010

7)**

*(0

.009

3)**

*(0

.009

3)**

*

If th

e vi

llage

had

a p

uske

smas

in (t

-1) p

erio

d: y

es-1

, no-

00.

0801

0.07

160.

0722

0.60

090.

6037

0.03

350.

0390

0.03

900.

2320

0.23

20(0

.007

3)**

*(0

.005

7)**

*(0

.005

7)**

*(0

.001

9)**

*(0

.001

9)**

*(0

.005

1)**

*(0

.004

4)**

*(0

.004

4)**

*(0

.002

1)**

*(0

.002

1)**

*

Pop

ulat

ion

of v

illag

e in

(t-1

) per

iod

X 10

^40.

0217

0.01

070.

0462

0.01

050.

0458

0.13

870.

1000

0.10

000.

4440

0.44

40(0

.007

4)**

*(0

.004

1)**

*(0

.000

4)**

*(0

.004

0)**

*(0

.000

4)**

*(0

.010

7)**

*(0

.011

3)**

*(0

.011

3)**

*(0

.001

7)**

*(0

.001

6)**

*

If th

e vi

llage

had

any

term

inal

/sta

tion/

port

in (t

-1) p

erio

d: y

es-1

, no-

00.

0526

0.05

310.

0535

0.39

750.

4022

0.02

470.

0319

0.03

190.

1820

0.18

20(0

.007

1)**

*(0

.006

7)**

*(0

.006

7)**

*(0

.002

5)**

*(0

.002

4)**

*(0

.006

4)**

*(0

.004

9)**

*(0

.004

9)**

*(0

.002

1)**

*(0

.002

1)**

*

Vill

age

topo

grap

hy (h

ill a

rea

-0, f

latla

nd-1

)0.

0103

0.00

890.

009

0.16

160.

1658

0.00

760.

0129

0.01

290.

1140

0.11

40(0

.002

8)**

*(0

.002

6)**

*(0

.002

6)**

*(0

.001

1)**

*(0

.001

0)**

*(0

.004

2)*

(0.0

030)

***

(0.0

030)

***

(0.0

009)

***

(0.0

007)

**

Any

dis

aste

r in

last

thre

e ye

ars:

y-1

, no-

2-0

.002

60.

0032

0.00

330.

0481

0.04

76-0

.001

60.

0001

0.00

010.

0064

0.00

64(0

.003

3)(0

.002

7)(0

.002

8)(0

.000

7)**

*(0

.000

7)**

*(0

.002

7)(0

.002

2)(0

.002

2)(0

.000

6)**

*(0

.000

6)**

Con

stan

t2.

0754

2.04

772.

0723

1.35

521.

2985

1.29

92(0

.043

3)**

*(0

.037

8)**

*(0

.041

0)**

*(0

.024

0)**

*(0

.016

0)**

*(0

.019

3)**

*

Obs

erva

tions

5212

752

127

4985

052

127

4985

055

129

5512

955

129

5512

955

129

R-s

quar

ed0.

210.

250.

260.

220.

280.

07R

obus

t sta

ndar

d er

rors

in p

aren

thes

es

* sig

nific

ant a

t 10%

; ** s

igni

fican

t at 5

%; *

** s

igni

fican

t at 1

%D

istrc

it sp

ecifi

c co

nsta

nts

are

not r

epor

ted

in th

e ta

ble

29

Tabl

e 10

b: L

ocal

Pre

fere

nce

and

Cha

nge

in L

ocal

Pub

lic G

oods

- H

ealth

care

Infr

astr

uctu

reD

ep. V

aria

ble:

Cha

nge

in th

e av

aila

bilit

y of

pus

kesm

as in

vill

age

1996

-200

020

00-2

006

OLS

OLS

with

O

LS w

ith

Prob

it w

ith

Pro

bit w

ith

OLS

OLS

with

O

LS w

ith

Prob

it w

ith

Pro

bit w

ith

Dis

trict

FE

Dis

trict

FE

Dis

trict

FE

Dis

trict

FE

Dis

trict

FE

Dis

trict

FE

Dis

trict

FE

Dis

trict

FE

Vill

age

head

's g

ende

r in

t-1 p

erio

d (m

ale-

1, fe

mal

e-0)

-0.0

051

-0.0

069

-0.0

071

-0.0

791

-0.0

820

-0.0

038

-0.0

042

-0.0

042

-0.0

480

-0.0

484

(0.0

054)

(0.0

055)

(0.0

056)

(0.0

011)

***

(0.0

010)

***

(0.0

036)

(0.0

036)

(0.0

036)

(0.0

087)

***

(0.0

087)

***

% o

f wom

en v

oter

in v

illag

e X

10^2

0.01

410.

1590

-0.0

085

-0.4

213

(0.0

130)

(0.0

240)

***

(0.0

153)

(0.0

180)

***

Vill

age

head

's a

ge in

(t-1

) per

iod

X 1

0^2

0.03

690.

0408

0.03

950.

5250

0.52

700.

0219

0.02

670.

0267

0.31

400.

3180

(0.0

110)

***

(0.0

110)

***

(0.0

110)

***

(0.0

260)

***

(0.0

270)

***

(0.0

073)

***

(0.0

073)

***

(0.0

073)

***

(0.0

187)

***

(0.0

193)

***

Vill

age

head

's e

duca

tion

in (t

-1) p

erio

d N

ot c

ompl

eted

0.02

150.

0219

0.01

520.

3603

0.27

56-0

.000

70.

0014

0.00

140.

0074

0.01

01(0

.012

4)*

(0.0

121)

*(0

.011

7)(0

.001

5)**

*(0

.001

5)**

*(0

.008

0)(0

.008

0)(0

.008

0)(0

.004

9)(0

.005

0)**

Prim

ary

scho

ol0.

0236

0.02

840.

0212

0.45

240.

3620

0.00

150.

0045

0.00

450.

0364

0.03

93(0

.011

9)**

(0.0

116)

**(0

.010

8)**

(0.0

020)

***

(0.0

020)

***

(0.0

073)

(0.0

073)

(0.0

073)

(0.0

059)

***

(0.0

061)

***

Juni

or h

igh

scho

ol0.

0248

0.03

190.

0254

0.50

100.

4192

0.00

050.

0069

0.00

690.

0542

0.05

83(0

.012

0)**

(0.0

117)

***

(0.0

107)

**(0

.002

2)**

*(0

.002

3)**

*(0

.007

3)(0

.007

3)(0

.007

3)(0

.006

1)**

*(0

.006

3)**

*

Hig

h sc

hool

0.03

100.

0386

0.03

180.

5950

0.50

820.

0040

0.01

030.

0103

0.09

330.

0980

(0.0

120)

**(0

.011

8)**

*(0

.010

8)**

*(0

.002

3)**

*(0

.002

3)**

*(0

.007

3)(0

.007

3)(0

.007

3)(0

.005

9)**

*(0

.006

1)**

*

Acad

emy

0.04

720.

0536

0.04

600.

7508

0.65

790.

0063

0.01

330.

0133

0.11

930.

1253

(0.0

128)

***

(0.0

125)

***

(0.0

113)

***

(0.0

021)

***

(0.0

020)

***

(0.0

080)

(0.0

080)

(0.0

080)

(0.0

051)

***

(0.0

051)

***

Uni

vers

ity0.

0309

0.03

770.

0317

0.59

820.

5219

0.00

710.

0145

0.01

450.

1247

0.13

07(0

.012

3)**

(0.0

122)

***

(0.0

112)

***

(0.0

026)

***

(0.0

025)

***

(0.0

073)

(0.0

080)

*(0

.008

0)*

(0.0

059)

***

(0.0

060)

***

Vill

age

head

's d

urat

ion

in y

ears

X 1

0^2

-0.0

004

0.00

700.

0112

0.01

640.

0516

0.00

19-0

.015

0-0

.015

0-0

.029

1-0

.032

1(0

.017

0)(0

.017

0)(0

.018

0)(0

.095

0)**

*(0

.098

0)**

*(0

.013

3)(0

.012

7)(0

.012

7)(0

.066

7)(0

.066

7)V

illag

es w

ith 5

0% o

r mor

e fa

mili

es in

pre

-wel

fare

and

wel

fare

1 in

(t-1

) per

iod:

ye

s -1

, no-

0-0

.008

3-0

.009

8-0

.009

8-0

.128

0-0

.127

0-0

.002

6-0

.001

9-0

.001

9-0

.046

5-0

.046

2(0

.002

2)**

*(0

.002

2)**

*(0

.002

2)**

*(0

.000

7)**

*(0

.000

7)**

*(0

.001

3)**

(0.0

012)

(0.0

012)

(0.0

063)

***

(0.0

064)

***

If th

e vi

llage

had

a p

uske

smas

in (t

-1) p

erio

d: y

es-1

, no-

0-0

.196

2-0

.195

3-0

.195

7-1

1.03

82-1

1.05

78-0

.138

0-0

.138

0-0

.138

0-4

.269

6-4

.271

6(0

.011

9)**

*(0

.010

3)**

*(0

.010

4)**

*(0

.012

5)**

*(0

.012

4)**

*(0

.006

7)**

*(0

.006

3)**

*(0

.006

3)**

*(0

.011

3)**

*(0

.011

3)**

*

If th

e vi

llage

had

a p

olyc

linic

in (t

-1) p

erio

d: y

es-1

, no-

00.

0447

0.03

490.

0362

0.27

280.

2839

0.01

110.

0098

0.00

970.

0893

0.08

87(0

.008

1)**

*(0

.008

4)**

*(0

.008

4)**

*(0

.002

9)**

*(0

.002

7)**

*(0

.009

3)(0

.008

7)(0

.008

7)(0

.006

7)**

*(0

.006

7)**

*

Pop

ulat

ion

of v

illag

e in

(t-1

) per

iod

X 10

^40.

0078

0.00

550.

0054

0.04

090.

0396

0.03

040.

0269

0.02

690.

2313

0.23

06(0

.002

8)**

*(0

.002

4)**

(0.0

023)

**(0

.001

4)**

*(0

.001

4)**

*(0

.005

1)**

*(0

.005

6)(0

.005

6)**

*(0

.008

0)**

*(0

.008

7)**

*

If th

e vi

llage

had

any

term

inal

/sta

tion/

port

in (t

-1) p

erio

d: y

es-1

, no-

00.

0422

0.04

330.

0448

0.35

350.

3673

0.02

260.

0199

0.01

990.

1700

0.16

80(0

.005

3)**

*(0

.005

7)**

*(0

.005

4)**

*(0

.002

2)**

*(0

.002

1)**

*(0

.004

0)**

*(0

.003

9)**

*(0

.003

9)**

*(0

.006

3)**

*(0

.006

3)**

*

Vill

age

topo

grap

hy (h

ill a

rea

-0, f

latla

nd-1

)0.

0027

0.00

280.

0031

0.03

940.

0442

0.00

080.

0036

0.00

360.

0240

0.02

49(0

.002

0)(0

.002

0)(0

.002

1)(0

.001

0)**

*(0

.000

9)**

*(0

.001

7)(0

.001

8)**

(0.0

018)

**(0

.007

3)**

*(0

.007

3)**

*

Any

dis

aste

r in

last

thre

e ye

ars:

y-1

, no-

20.

0020

0.00

110.

0000

0.02

100.

0061

0.00

26-0

.000

6-0

.000

60.

0298

0.02

96(0

.001

8)(0

.002

1)(0

.002

1)(0

.000

7)**

*(0

.000

6)**

*(0

.001

4)*

(0.0

013)

(0.0

013)

(0.0

062)

***

(0.0

063)

***

Con

stan

t1.

9835

1.98

121.

9818

1.33

251.

3232

1.32

79(0

.013

5)**

*(0

.013

6)**

*(0

.013

8)**

*(0

.008

7)**

*(0

.008

7)**

*(0

.012

0)**

*

Obs

erva

tions

5212

752

127

4985

052

127

4985

055

129

5512

955

129

5512

955

082

R-s

quar

ed0.

090.

10.

10.

090.

110.

11R

obus

t sta

ndar

d er

rors

in p

aren

thes

es* s

igni

fican

t at 1

0%; *

* sig

nific

ant a

t 5%

; ***

sig

nific

ant a

t 1%

Dis

trcit

spec

ific

cons

tant

s ar

e no

t rep

orte

d in

the

tabl

e