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BRIEFING PAPER

Number CBP 8337, 12 June 2018

Iraq and the 2018 election

By Ben Smith

Contents: 1. Background 2. Election 2018 3. Domestic scene 4. Outlook

2 Iraq and the 2018 election

Contents Summary 3

1. Background 5 1.1 Old Parliament 5 1.2 Electoral system 5

2. Election 2018 6 2.1 Disparate election coalitions 6

Shiites 6 Kurds 8 Secularists and Sunnis 9

2.2 Election outcome 10 Turnout 10 Results 11 Winners and losers 11 Disputes 11

3. Domestic scene 13 3.1 Destruction and reconstruction 13

Conference 13 3.2 Persistent violence and human rights abuse 14

4. Outlook 16 4.1 Forming a government 16

Abadi to stay? 16 Sovereign ministries 16

4.2 Iran and Saudi Arabia 17 Saudi Arabia 17 Iran 17

4.3 Rebuilding the State 18

Cover page image copyright Workers rebuilding Ramadi town, Iraq by Ben Barber, USAID. Licensed under Public Domain Certification / image cropped.

3 Commons Library Briefing, 12 June 2018

Summary Campaigning for the 2018 election to Iraq’s Council of Representatives began on 14 April, with major themes being the victory over ISIS/Daesh; Iraqi nationalism and the relationship with Iran and the US; sectarianism; and corruption and the delivery of Government services. Iraq elected its Parliament on 12 May 2018.

Disparate coalitions

Iraq’s political scene is highly fragmented and constantly changing. There was a total of 36 coalitions, each made up of several parties. The three most successful coalitions were completely new.

Incumbent Haider al-Abadi was expected to do well, after his declaration of victory over ISIS in December 2017. He mishandled the formation of his Nasr (victory) coalition and tarnished his nationalist credentials, however.

Moqtada al-Sadr, former leader of the Mahdi Army militia, associated himself with widespread secular protests against corruption and mismanagement that had taken place for several months before the poll. His Saairun (Forward) coalition, also known as Alliance of Revolutionaries for Reform, brought Communists (who had played an important role in the demonstrations) together with his more familiar Shiite allies.

Another new coalition was led by Hadi al-Amiri, former rival militia leader to Sadr. The Fatah (Conquest) coalition represented the Shiite militias that were important in defeating ISIS, although the militias themselves were banned from presenting candidates. Fatah is close to Iran.

Abadi’s predecessor Nouri al-Maliki led his State of Law alliance, as he had done at the last election.

The Kurds did not unify around a single coalition. The independence referendum and declaration in 2017, followed by the loss of the disputed city of Kirkuk, caused splits in the traditional ruling duopoly composed of the KDP and the PUK.

Some secularists and Arab Sunni parties called for a delay in the election because so many people were displaced by the fight against ISIS. Former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi’s Iraqiya coalition was the most important of these.

Results

At 44%, turnout was the lowest for any election since 2003. This time, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the leading Shiite cleric in Iraq, did not say it was the duty of Shiites to vote. Moqtada al-Sadr’s Saairun coalition came first, with 54 seats in the 329-seat parliament. Next came Amiri’s Fatah alliance with 47, followed by the incumbent’s Nasr coalition with 42 seats, a surprisingly poor result for Haider al-Abadi. Maliki’s State of Law coalition lost 67 seats compared with the last election.

There were widespread allegations of vote-rigging and some coalition leaders called for a re-run of the election. The outgoing parliament called for a manual re-count. In June, an unexplained fire broke out in one of the warehouses where Baghdad ballot papers were stored.

Domestic scene

The election took place against a background of massive destruction resulting from the battle against ISIS/Daesh. The Iraqi Government requested $100 billion at a reconstruction

4 Iraq and the 2018 election

conference in Kuwait, but donors only pledged $30 billion, mostly in credit lines. Iraq will struggle to take on more debt; corruption is also a hindrance.

Meanwhile, the battle against ISIS is not completely over yet: bomb blasts are still taking place, particularly around Kirkuk. Prosecuting the atrocities that took place remains controversial, with a UN Investigative Team set only to investigate ISIS’s crimes.

Forming a government

Forming a government may take time. Saairun may be the biggest coalition, but Sadr himself has ruled out being Prime Minister and has limited the other coalitions he will work with. Prime Ministers in Iraq are often compromise candidates anyway, rather than coming from the leading coalition. That means that Abadi has a good chance of remaining Prime Minister.

While Sadr has called for a technocratic government, allocating ministries to the various groups that will be needed to form a government remains a problem; they have traditionally been centres of patronage and have not collaborated well.

Saudi Arabia has been rebuilding ties with Iraqi politicians and with the Iraqi economy. As a way of countering Iranian influence, this is very different from the strategy in Yemen, for example. No rupture with Iran is likely, however.

With no strong majority, whatever government is formed will continue to struggle to implement any thoroughgoing reforms.

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1. Background ISIS/Daesh was expelled from Iraq’s second-biggest city, Mosul, in July 2017, having been in control for three years. Iraqi parliamentary elections were originally due to be held in September 2017 but under the circumstances, it was not possible to provide for an election campaign while the battle against the jihadi group was continuing, so the Government in Baghdad postponed it until May 2018.

Even with the final victory declared against ISIS declared in December 2017, violence continued. ISIS is still carrying out regular attacks in northern and central Iraq. Added to that, the government of the Kurdish Autonomous Region held a referendum in September 2017 and subsequently declared independence. Baghdad’s response was to retake control of territories disputed between the Kurds and central government, with the help of Iran-backed militias, throwing Kurdish politics into disarray.

1.1 Old Parliament

Source: Europa World Online

1.2 Electoral system Iraq’s Council of Representatives is elected on a proportional system, with each of the 18 governorates counting as a constituency and differing numbers of Members elected to each from an open list, distributed according to the Saint-Laguë method.

The candidate who secures the highest number of votes on the list is elected while ensuring that a woman candidate is elected after every three winning male candidates, meaning that 25% of seats go to women.1

Added to the 320 regular seats are eight reserved for minorities, attached to certain governorates. Of Baghdad’s seats, one is reserved for Christians and one for Sabeans. One of Dahuk’s seats is reserved for Christians, as is one of Erbil’s seats. Kirkuk has one Christians seat. Ninewa has one seat each for Christians, Yazidis and Shabaks.

1 Inter Parliamentary Union, Council of Representatives of Iraq

Iraqi Council of Representatives, April 2014

The State of Law alliance (including affiliates) 94

Sadrist Movement 31

Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq 30

Mutahhidun (largely Sunni - Osama al-Nujaifi) 28

Wataniya (Ayad Allawi) 21

Kurdistan Democratic Party 25

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 19

Gorran 9

6 Iraq and the 2018 election

2. Election 2018

2.1 Disparate election coalitions Shiites Iraqi Shiites have a mixed record of uniting to take advantage of their numerical strength, but they have been more successful at uniting than the Sunnis. Also, Sunni turnout has often been lower. In 2010, the secularist/Sunni Iraqiya coalition topped the polls, showing that identity politics was not a failsafe way of ensuring Shiite dominance. After the election, the Shia pulled together again and were able to form a government without Iraqiya. After that brush with defeat, Maliki moved closer to Iran.

In 2018, that Shiite strength may be changing: the division between the Abadi, Maliki and Sadr camps is greater than previous differences, and may herald a broader change, where confessional and ethnic identities, dominant in Iraqi politics since 2003, lose some of their importance.

Abadi

Haider al-Abadi heads the Victory (Nasr) Alliance electoral coalition. He based his campaign on the Iraqi forces’ victory against ISIS/Daesh, claiming in December 2017:

We have accomplished a very difficult mission. Our heroes have reached the final strongholds of Daesh and purified it. The Iraqi flag flies high today over all Iraqi lands.2

Abadi also took a hard line on the Kurdish referendum and, with the help of Iran, re-established central government control over the disputed territory of Kirkuk.

At first sight, that was a strong position. The instability of Iraq’s party system has made things difficult for him, however.

Hampered by the earlier mishandling of his coalition launch in January, Abadi appeared to sell out his nationalist credentials in order to guarantee his re-election through a deal with Iran-backed factions of the Fatah Alliance, led by the Badr Organisation, only to see this deal fall through.

Also, one of Abadi’s allies in the Dawa Party alleged that Abadi had also reached a secret agreement with his predecessor as Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, also close to Iran, to merge their coalitions after the election.

Either way, Abadi’s credentials as a nationalist who will resist Iranian domination and on whom the West can rely were questioned.

Groups associated with the militias and Iran took some credit for the defeat of ISIS, taking some of the shine off Abadi’s war record; they did well in the election.3

2 'Iraq declares final victory over Islamic State’, Reuters, 9 December 2018 3 ‘Can the US still rely on Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi?’, Brookings Institution,

19 January 2018

7 Commons Library Briefing, 12 June 2018

Sadrists

Muqtada al-Sadr, the populist Shiite cleric whose support is based in the poorer Shiite areas in Baghdad and the south, formed the Mahdi Army militia in 2003 in response to the invasion of Iraq. The British Army and the militia fought each other in Basra in the early days of the occupation.

Sadr has shifted his position recently. Often described as a ‘firebrand’ and known for stridently sectarian and anti-US views, he has shifted to a more equivocal position, associating his movement with widespread demonstrations led by secularist Civil Democratic Alliance against government corruption.

He has criticised Iranian influence on Iraq (along with any foreign interference), and is opposed to the Muhassasa system for apportioning ministries among factions. He has moderated his anti-US statements recently and has said that violence should not be used against US forces in Iraq, although he supports legal mechanisms to get the US out.

Saudi Arabia has been courting Shiite clerics such as Muqtada al-Sadr and the Shiite Grand Ayatollah, Ali al-Sistani. A new tactic in the Saudi strategy to counter Iranian influence, the charm offensive contrasts with military action in Yemen. Some Iraqi Shiite politicians are keen on improving relations, hoping to attract Saudi money for the reconstruction effort. Others are wary of dragging Iraq into the Iran-Saudi confrontation, and doubt Saudi sincerity – at least until the war in Yemen is scaled back and Saudi Shiites get better treatment.4

The Sadrists allied themselves with the Iraqi Communist Party to form the Alliance of Revolutionaries for Reform coalition, otherwise known as Saairun (‘Forward’). Saudi Arabia has given some backing to Moqtada al-Sadr and the Alliance of Revolutionaries for Reform.5

Amiri

The leaders of Popular Mobilisation Units Shiite (PMU) militias were banned by incumbent Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi from standing in the election. That did not mean, however, that the militias had nothing to do with the poll. The groups backed candidates and formed a coalition called Conquest Alliance, or ‘Fatah’, led by Hadi al-Amiri, head of the former military wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), Badr.

Back in 2007, Badr had clashed violently with the Mahdi Army across the south of Iraq; in one incident fifty Shiite worshippers were killed when the two groups disputed control of a shrine. Later, the Badr organisation became a political party with al-Amiri at its head.

Many groups in the Fatah coalition support radical Islamic positions; some of them used to be under the Sadrist umbrella. But the PMU themselves are quite divided, between those under Iranian influence, those following Ayatollah Sistani and the Sadrists. Sistani has more

4 ‘Sunni Saudi Arabia courts an ally in Iraq’s Shia’, Financial Times, 2 April 2018 5 Factbox: Iraq’s 2018 Parliamentary Elections, Atlantic Council, 8 May 2018

8 Iraq and the 2018 election

recently expressed disapproval of the militias, encouraging Shiites to join the official security forces instead.

Amiri and the Fatah coalition are Iran’s strongest asset in the Council of Representatives. Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition is also associated with Iran, but did less well in the poll.

Maliki

Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki heads the State of Law coalition. He is closely associated with the Popular Mobilisation Forces Shiite militias and with Iran, and presents himself as a strongman who will ensure security.

At the 2014 elections, State of Law was the strongest coalition, with 92 seats. Although Iranian support for Maliki faltered when ISIS surged through the country in 2014 (and he lost the support of Ayatollah al-Sistani, the most important opinion-former among Iraqi Shiites), he remained Iran’s preferred candidate before the election, according to analysts.6

Maliki and his supporters have argued for a presidential system, concentrating more power in one office.

Kurds The Kurds’ traditionally perform strongly in Iraqi general elections. The two main parties, setting aside the divisions of regional Kurdish politics, ran as the Kurdistan Alliance at the 2005 and 2010 elections, with Kurdish voters turning out in strength.

The independence referendum of 2017 and the subsequent takeover of disputed territories around Kirkuk that Kurdish forces had taken from ISIS have clouded the prospect of the 2018 election. The two main Iraqi Kurdish factions are at loggerheads in Kirkuk over the collaboration between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Iran’s Quds Force, the overseas and clandestine operations arm of the Islamic Republic Revolutionary Guards. The PUK’s deal paved the way for Baghdad to take over Kirkuk, a major setback for Kurdish independence aspirations.

The political atmosphere in the Kurdish Region of Iraq has not improved in 2018. Demonstrations in March against public salary cuts were met with a wave violence against journalists and union members.7 Armed individuals in civilian clothing attacking demonstrators were alleged in the local media to be connected to political parties. The demonstrations were the result of increasing anger with the ruling elites – the reaction to them is likely to have made the situation worse. The PUK and its partner in the traditional duopoly of power, the Kurdish Democratic Party, are now less able to claw back influence, since the oil-based patronage that paid for it is much scarcer following the fall in the oil price and the expenditure on the anti-ISIS campaign.

6 ‘Iraq After the Fall of ISIS: The Struggle for the State, Chatham House, July 2017 7 ‘Iraq: Violence against protesters and journalists in Kurdistan Region shows blatant

disregard for freedom of expression’, Amnesty International press release, 28 March 2018

9 Commons Library Briefing, 12 June 2018

Kurds are less in evidence in powerful posts in Baghdad than they used to be and some Kurdish leaders have given up on the federal government altogether, deciding that Iraq is a lost cause. These factors may have led to a lower Kurdish turnout in May.

After setbacks and division in the Kurdish region, traditional Kurdish parties were vulnerable at the 2018 election; Gorran and possibly other newer parties hoped to pick up seats at their expense.8 In September 2017, Barham Salih, former deputy leader of the PUK and former Prime Minister of the Kurdish Region, formed a new party which then entered a coalition with Gorran and an Islamic opposition party, strengthening the challenge to the ruling KDP/PUK duopoly.

Coalitions

Major Kurdish coalitions are:

Gorran (‘Change’) Party

Leader: Omar Said Ali

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)

Leader: Kosrat Rasul Ali

Kurdistan Democratic party (KDP)

Leader Nechirvan Barzani

Coalition for Democracy and Justice

Leader: Barham Salih (former Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Region)

Secularists and Sunnis New secularism?

Some observers say that there are new, non-sectarian voices trying to be heard in Iraq,9 but argue that support for familiar figures from outside could help perpetuate the old, failed elite.

Many Iraqi politicians have distanced themselves from sectarian rhetoric in the run up to the election, even if their main support comes from particular sects.

Meanwhile, widespread anti-government protests have emerged, equating corruption and ISIS. These demonstrations have attracted support from across the range of ethnic and sectarian identities. Monarchists, women’s rights activists and even monarchists have joined, along with Sadrist Islamists (see above).

Sunni groups

According to the UN, there are 2.6 million Iraqis displaced within the country,10 and Sunni groups, along with Kurds, demanded a delay in

8 ‘Kurdistan Politics at a Crossroads’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 26

April 2018 9 ‘Iraq’s Western Allies Need to Support Institutions, Not Individuals’, Chatham House,

10 April 2018 10 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Iraq: Humanitarian Bulletin,

February 2018

10 Iraq and the 2018 election

the election to allow internally displaced Iraqis to return to their homes.11 12 May was finally agreed, but Sunni commentators say that this would disadvantage them. Because of the presence of Popular Mobilisation Forces (Shiite militias that fought against ISIS, often with Iranian backing), Sunni politicians complain that they cannot campaign, fearful for their safety.12 Some Kurdish politicians have joined the Arab Sunnis in pushing for a delay. Some Sunnis voted for Abadi, on the strength of his war record, particularly in areas reclaimed from ISIS.

Coalitions

The main lists strongly represented in Sunni areas are:

• Iraqi Decision Alliance, uniting candidates from the Muttahidoon and the Arab Project parties and led by Osama Nujaifi

• (Shiite) former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi’s al-Wataniya, or the National Coalition, a mixture of religious, secular, and national parties including both Sunni and Shia.

• Civilised Alliance. The main non-sectarian grouping is called the Civilised Alliance, led by Faiq Al Sheikh Ali, leader of the People’s Party for Reform.

2.2 Election outcome Turnout Low turnout was decisive in this election, falling to about 44%, the lowest for any election since 2003. 62% had turned out at the 2014 parliamentary election. As well as general disillusionment with the many old faces on offer at the election, Iraqi Shias may have been affected by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, whose advice this time was that it was up to Iraqis to choose whether to vote; in 2005 he had said that it was every Iraqi’s duty to vote.

Both Sadrists and Communists may have been better organised when it came to getting their vote out; the Saairun alliance had had the opportunity to work on its organisational skills during the protest movement (see New secularism?, above).

11 ‘Iraqi parliament postpones vote on election date’, Reuters, 20 January 2018 12 ‘Iraq's Sunnis and the 2018 elections’, al-Arabiya al-Jadeed, 27 November 2017

11 Commons Library Briefing, 12 June 2018

Results

Source: Iraq High Electoral Commission/Wikipedia

Winners and losers Democracy did not score well at the election; a turnout below 50% could undermine the legitimacy of whatever Government is assembled from the Council of Representatives. With enormous economic challenges ahead and ethno-sectarian divisions still undermining Iraq’s politics, a stronger mandate would have helped.

Otherwise, the biggest loser was Nouri al-Maliki, who may have taken some of the blame for ISIS, and who was squeezed between the Abadi, Sadr and Amiri coalitions.

The biggest winner was Moqtada al-Sadr, whose radically new political direction and unexpected alliance with secular leftists was convincing to many Iraqis.

Disputes Results were disputed in many areas. Wataniya called for a full rerun of the election, citing the low turnout and allegations of violence and fraud.

The worst tensions emerged in Kirkuk. The three biggest ethnic groups in Kirkuk faced each other in demonstrations near the warehouse where ballot boxes were stored. Turkmen and Arabs alleged that the Kurds

Alliance Seats Change since last election

Forward/Saairun/Alliance of Revolutionaries for reform 54 NewConquest Alliance/Fatah 47 NewVictory Coalition/Nasr 42 NewKurdistan Democratic Party 25 0State of Law Coalition 25 -67National Coalition 21 0National Wisdom Movement 19 NewPatriotic Union of Kurdistan 18 -3Arab Decision Alliance 14 -9Anbar Is Our Identity 6 NewMovement for Change 5 -4New Generation Movement 4 NewBaghdad Alliance 4Civilized Alliance 3 NewMovement of the Will 3 NewArab Alliance of Kirkuk 3 2Nineveh Is Our Identity 3 NewTurkman Front of Kirkuk 3 1National Fortress Coalition 3 New17 coalitions with two seats or less 25Independents 2

Total 329 1

12 Iraq and the 2018 election

had misrepresented the result, in order to try to regain control of the city.13

On 24 May the office of the Prime Minister said that a committee appointed by the cabinet would investigate vote-rigging allegations.

On 28 May the outgoing Council of Representatives passed a resolution calling for 10 million votes to be recounted manually. The Independent High Electoral Commission and ultimately the courts are responsible for any recount decision.

On 10 June, a fire broke out in the largest storage site for ballot boxes. Officials said that the fire only affected only one of four the warehouses at the site, which holds about half of Baghdad’s votes.

The outgoing Speaker of the Council of Representatives, Salim al-Jabouri, said:

The crime of burning ballot-box storage warehouses in the Rusafa area is a deliberate act, a planned crime, aimed at hiding instances of fraud and manipulation of votes, lying to the Iraqi people and changing their will and choices.14

Supporters of Moqtada al-Sadr said that the other parties were trying to overturn his victory.

13 ‘Disputes over election results threaten conflict in Iraq's Kirkuk’, Al-Monitor, 1 June

2018 14 ‘Calls for Iraq election to be rerun after ballot box fire’, Sunday Telegraph, 10 June

2018

13 Commons Library Briefing, 12 June 2018

3. Domestic scene

3.1 Destruction and reconstruction According to Amnesty International, hundreds, if not thousands, of Mosul residents were summarily executed by ISIS. The group also rounded up thousands of non-combatants and forced them into conflict zones, to use them as human shields.15

It was generally in Sunni-majority areas where ISIS grew, where it imposed its reign, and where the greatest destruction was wreaked ousting the group. In December 2017 Associated Press estimated the civilian death toll in Mosul to have been 10 times higher than admitted by the Iraqi authorities, at about 9,000 to 11,000.16 Asked for its estimate, the UK Government declined to give a figure, but said that UK strikes comply with international law:

UK airstrikes always follow the principles of international humanitarian law: necessity, proportionality, distinction between combatants and non-combatant civilians, and the prevention of unnecessary suffering.17

There have been stories of reprisals against perceived supporters of ISIS, some fighters’ families have been expelled and their houses destroyed or confiscated.

At least as important as the election, then, is the effort to rebuild shattered Iraqi communities. Rebuilding housing and other infrastructure, such as drainage and electricity, is crucial politically – to discourage another outbreak of violent Sunni jihadism along the lines of ISIS.

The long record of violence has left the country and its population in enormous need. There are over 3 million internally displaced persons. Almost a quarter of the population is in need of humanitarian aid.18

Conference From 12 to 14 February 2018, the representatives of various governments and the EU gathered at the Kuwait Conference for the Reconstruction of Iraq, co-chaired by the EU and Kuwait. Donors pledged more than US$30 billion but this was well short of the $88 billion - $100 billion the Iraqis had hoped for. Iraqi Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari told a news conference:

If we compare what we got today to what we need, it is no secret, it is of course much lower than what Iraq needs, but we know that we will not get everything we want.19

Although the US and others had hoped for more from the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia only pledged $1.5 billion; other Gulf States offered similar

15 At Any Cost: The Civilian Catastrophe in West Mosul, Iraq, Amnesty International,

October 2017 16 ‘Mosul is a graveyard: Final IS battle kills 9,000 civilians’, Associated Press, 21

December 2017 17 Written question - HL1641, 12 October 2018 18 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Iraq 19 ‘Allies promise Iraq $30 billion, falling short of Baghdad's appeal’, Reuters,

14 Iraq and the 2018 election

amounts, mainly in the form of loans. Turkey ended being the largest contributor, pledging $5 billion in credit lines.

Iran’s Vice President, Eshaq Jahangiri, pledged a $3 billion credit line to Iraq’s reconstruction during a visit to Baghdad on 7 March. Other ways of participating in the Iraqi economy are possible – Iran could have expertise that is useful to Iraq, providing a route for economic influence – but all of them would cost Iran money, something that may be in shorter supply in Tehran in coming years, now that the US has withdrawn from the JCPOA nuclear deal.20

According to one source, Iraq is likely to have to turn down a lot of the loans anyway, because of conditions imposed by the World Bank, which says that Iraq cannot afford to increase its debt stock by so much.21

Many commentators have raised the problem of Iraqi corruption as an obstacle to further funding. Iraq is ranked 169th out of 180 countries for perceived corruption by Transparency International, an NGO.

3.2 Persistent violence and human rights abuse

A spate of terrorist attacks in the Kirkuk Governorate has undermined Abadi’s claim to have expelled the jihadi group from Iraq. Other governorates still suffering from ISIS attacks include Salah ad-Din, Anbar and Diyala, with ISIS attacks occurring almost every day in these governorates north of Baghdad.22 Muqtada al-Sadr even hinted that he might re-activate his militia to restore control.

The UK’s military operation against ISIS continues. Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson updated Parliament on progress in May 2018:

In the air, the RAF has conducted more than 1,600 air strikes in Iraq and Syria—second only to the US—and provides highly advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance to coalition partners. These strikes are undertaken in the collective self-defence of Iraq as part of the global coalition to defeat Daesh, and at the request of the Government of Iraq. On the ground, British soldiers have trained over 60,000 members of the Iraqi security forces in engineering, medical, counter-IED and basic infantry skills. As a result of the coalition’s action, Daesh has lost more than 98% of the territory it once occupied in Iraq and Syria, and 7.7 million people have been liberated from its rule.23

The UK in November 2017 announced investment of £10 million to help build Iraq's counter-terrorist capability. The UK also plans to continue to assist Iraq by training its security forces and enhancing their ability to respond to the threat.24

20 For more information, see the Commons Briefing Paper Can Europe save the Iran

nuclear deal?, 15 May 2018 21 ‘Conference for Iraq draws investors instead of donors’, Al-Monitor, 23 February

2018 22 Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Intelligence Centre 23 HC Written statement 665, 2 May 2018 24 HC Written question – 134805, 16 April 2018

15 Commons Library Briefing, 12 June 2018

The aftermath of the ISIS occupation remains challenging in other ways. According to the Associated Press, about 19,000 alleged ISIS fighters and sympathisers are in Iraqi jails and some 3,000 of them have been sentenced to death. Death Penalty News says:

At the highest levels of power, fast-tracked death sentences, enhanced interrogation and outright barbarity in the form of torture have been condoned as policies necessary to rid Iraq from terrorism.25

The Investigative Team established under UN Security Council Resolution 2379 will gather evidence crimes committed by ISIS and the process will start in Iraq. The UK has committed £1 million to the establishment of this team.26 Its terms of reference have been released, but some have questioned that fact that it is only empowered to investigate atrocities committed by ISIS.27 There have been allegations of atrocities committed by Kurdish,28 Iraqi Government and other forces,29 too. Amnesty International says that Resolution 2379, drafted by the UK, denies justice to many victims because only ISIS will be investigated:

…this flawed resolution sends a dangerous message to all the other parties to the conflict who have also committed serious violations and crimes that they are above justice.30

Despite the expulsion of ISIS from most Iraqi territory, minority religious groups are still threatened.

25 ‘Death sentences raise questions about Iraqi justice’, Death Penalty News, 8 April

2018 26 Written question - HL6962, 30 April 2018 27 ‘UN Releases Guidelines for Team Investigating ISIS Crimes in Iraq’, Just Security, 19

February 2018 28 ‘Kurdistan Regional Government: Allegations of Mass Executions’, Human Rights

Watch press release, 8 February 2018 29 ‘Iraq: Officials Dispose of Potential War Crime Evidence’, Human Rights Watch press

release, 20 April 2018 30 ‘Iraq: Flawed Security Council resolution on IS threatens to entrench dangerous

culture of impunity’, Amnesty International press release, 21 September 2017

16 Iraq and the 2018 election

4. Outlook

4.1 Forming a government Iraq’s central government is intentionally limited – post-2003, the US did not want to allow the return of a strongman like Saddam and created a federal system. After 2010, Nouri al-Maliki, worried about threats to his and Shia dominance, concentrated power around himself and in personal fiefdoms, further weakening the state.31

Before the election, an Iraq expert predicted that organising a dominant Shia coalition would not be possible:

It is unlikely that the communal distribution of resources, the use of identity politics and a narrative of victimhood, the interference of Sistani or meddling by Iran can – together or separately – be expected to forge another Shia coalition in a post-ISIS Iraq.32

Abadi to stay? In the fractured post-2003 Iraqi political scene no Prime Minister has come from the largest bloc after the elections – fraught negotiations have usually produced a compromise candidate. Commentators argue that the same is likely to happen this time; Sadr has ruled himself out as a potential Prime Minister, and said that Saairun will not form a government with either Fatah or State of Law (Maliki), which leaves Maliki’s Nasr Coalition and Saairun at the heart of a new Government. Sadr has promised to appoint technocrats as ministers.

A political source in Iraq was quoted in May 2018 as saying that Haider al-Abadi has the highest chances of remaining Prime Minister.33 Abadi’s advantage is that he is relatively acceptable to all sides, making it easier to build a coalition with him as prime ministerial candidate. Other coalition leaders may see him as a weak candidate, too, allowing them to wield power behind the scenes.

Iran was reportedly trying to strengthen its position after the poll. Qassem Suleimani, leader of the overseas branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) shuttling between politicians in Baghdad trying to get the Fatah Coalition involved in government formation (and a more Iran-friendly politician than Haider al-Abadi installed as Prime Minister).34

Sovereign ministries If the Prime Minister is relatively weak, the distribution of the most important ministries – the ‘sovereign ministries’ as they are known, is extremely important. It will pose a huge challenge to any anti-corruption policy that the new government might want. The interior, finance,

31 Renad Mansour, Iraq After the Fall of ISIS: The Struggle for the State, Chatham

House, July 2017 32 Renad Mansour, Iraq After the Fall of ISIS: The Struggle for the State, Chatham

House, July 2017 33 ‘Abadi Likely to Remain Iraq’s Prime Minister: Source’, Tasnim News Agency, 26 May

2018 34 Tamer Badawi, ‘Iran’s Economic Leverage in Iraq’, Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, 23 May 2018

17 Commons Library Briefing, 12 June 2018

defence and foreign affairs ministries have usually been shared out among the governing parties, which have then staffed them with party and family members, providing endless opportunities for patronage or outright corruption.

4.2 Iran and Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia Iraq is becoming a theatre for rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. But unlike in Yemen, Saudi Arabia is on something of a charm offensive rather than threatening military action. Riyadh was all but excluded from influence over Iraq following 2003 but since re-opening the Saudi embassy in 2016, has pursued a policy of making connections with politicians across the Iraqi political and sectarian spectrum. Riyadh seems to hope that nationalism (rather than sectarianism) is genuinely in the ascendant in Iraq.

As well as talking to the coalition of Moqtada al-Sadr, Saudi Arabian politicians have visited Baghdad and promised some reconstruction money; new consulates are planned in Najaf and Basra, and the two countries have reopened their Arar Border Crossing and restored commercial air traffic for the first time in more than 25 years. Over 60 Saudi companies participated in the 2018 Baghdad International Fair. A Saudi Arabia-Iraq Coordination Council was inaugurated in 2017.

Iraqis seem to be welcoming the positive approach, although the Saudis would need to be patient; any move to a more aggressive sectarian or anti-Iranian position could undermine that support.35

Saudi Arabia has historically pursued aggressive policies to counter Iranian influence, disseminating extreme-conservative sectarian Sunni ideology and, more recently, taking direct military action in Yemen. Whether the new approach to Iraq means a general re-assessment of these confrontational policies or not remains to be seen.

Iran Having been attacked by Saddam’s Iraq in 1980, Iran wants a government in Baghdad that is compliant enough not to pose a military threat. Iran would also like to increase its stake in the Iraqi economy and to increase cross-border trade; all of Iraq’s neighbours are aware of Iraq’s enormous economic potential, sitting as it does on probably the world’s fifth biggest oil reserves.

Although Moqtada al-Sadr used nationalist rhetoric during his campaign and may have received financial support from Saudi Arabia,36 he also criticised foreign interference in general and is likely to try to balance the influence of the US, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Iran still retains influence in the Iraqi Council of Representatives through the second-placed coalition, Fatah; a rupture with Tehran is unlikely.

35 International Crisis Group, Saudi Arabia: Back to Baghdad, 22 May 2018 36 ‘Saudi Arabia pays Iraqi Shia cleric Sadr $10 million to set up consulate in Najaf’, Al-

Arabiya al-Jadeed, 2 August 2017

18 Iraq and the 2018 election

4.3 Rebuilding the State Renad Mansour, an Iraq specialist for Chatham House, looked forward in July 2017 to the forthcoming election:

The prospect of the eventual defeat of ISIS’s ’caliphate’ project, together with the provincial and federal elections due in 2018, presents a renewed chance to reinforce the Iraqi state. The last time such an opportunity for state-building emerged was in 2008, when ISI forces were defeated and forced underground (later to evolve into ISIS). Following the 2009 provincial and 2010 federal elections, the competition among various actors for control of Iraq’s state institutions had the effect of undermining rather than reinforcing those institutions – one of the critical factors that led to the state’s incapacity to resist the ascendant ISIS in 2014.37

The first of those milestones has been passed. Despite ongoing violence, the ‘caliphate’ in Iraq is no more. Could the elections lead to a strengthening of the Iraqi state?

It appears that sectarian voting has been eroded and that cross-community concerns such as corruption may be increasing in importance; Ayatollah Sistani was reluctant to call for Shiite unity this time.

The results suggest that some re-alignment is taking place and that voters do indeed want to strengthen the state, controlling corruption and improving services to the public – those were the strongest campaign messages of the Saairun Coalition.

On the other hand, both the democratic elements of Iraq’s system and the existing elite may have been weakened by the poor turnout, a sign of widespread disillusionment, as Renad Mansour argued after the election:

Before Iraqis went to the polls, the general mood in most major cities was disillusionment. When asked about their preferred candidate, many Iraqis did not believe that the election would bring about real change. They saw yet another vote with over 90 per cent of the same electoral lists and coalitions promising reform. To them, the corrupt promising to fight corruption seemed farcical.38

Appointing a genuinely technocratic government will be complicated, given the way that the sharing out of ministries to different parties (and their subsequent reluctance to work with each other) is such a familiar feature of Iraqi politics.

And the Council of Representatives is just as fragmented as it was before the election, meaning that the Government will still struggle to pass laws, as one analyst noted:

37 Renad Mansour, Iraq After the Fall of ISIS: The Struggle for the State, Chatham

House, July 2017 38 Renad Mansour, ‘Why Iraq’s Elections Were an Indictment of the Elite’, CVhatham

House, 18 May 2018

19 Commons Library Briefing, 12 June 2018

One of the problems under Abadi is he didn’t have a working majority so he couldn’t get legislation to pass. There will be no genuine working majority in the next government [either].39

39 ‘Iraq’s new government hamstrung by old economic woes’, Financial Times, 24 May

2018

BRIEFING PAPER Number CBP 8337 12 June 2018

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