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Model Safety Case

Contents1. Introduction....................................................................................................................................3

2. Context of the safety case..............................................................................................................3

2.1 Purpose of the Safety Case.....................................................................................................3

2.2 Scope of the SafetyCase.........................................................................................................4

2.3 Demonstration of safety.........................................................................................................4

2.4 Graded approach....................................................................................................................5

3. Strategy for safety..........................................................................................................................6

4. General description of the facilities, actitivies and the waste........................................................7

4.1 Site conditions........................................................................................................................7

4.2 Description of the facilities and activities...............................................................................9

4.3 Description of the waste inventory......................................................................................16

5. Safety assessment........................................................................................................................21

5.1 Introduction..........................................................................................................................21

5.2 Assessment context..............................................................................................................21

5.2.1 Regulatory framework..................................................................................................21

5.2.2 Endpoints for the assessment.......................................................................................23

5.2.3 Approach to the assessment........................................................................................23

5.3 Description of safety elements and functions......................................................................23

5.3.1 Safety elements............................................................................................................23

5.3.2 Site and engineering analysis........................................................................................25

5.3.3 Passive safety and defense in depth.............................................................................28

5.3.4 Operational safety aspects...........................................................................................28

5.3.5 Management system....................................................................................................28

5.4 Development and justification of scenarios..........................................................................29

5.4.1 Normal operation.........................................................................................................29

5.4.2 Scenarios for accidents.................................................................................................33

Postulated Initiating Events (PIEs)...............................................................................................37

Scenarios......................................................................................................................................41

5.5 Formulation and implementation of assessment models.....................................................45

5.6 Performance of calculations and analysis of the results.......................................................53

5.6.1 Radiological impact assessment for normal operation.................................................53

5.6.2 Radiological impact assessment for accidents..............................................................54

5.6.3 Non radiological environmental impact........................................................................59

5.6.4 Management of uncertainties......................................................................................59

5.7 Analysis of assessment results..............................................................................................59

5.7.1 Comparison with safety assessment criteria................................................................59

6 Iteration and design optimization................................................................................................61

7 Identification of safety measures.................................................................................................62

8 Limits, controls and conditions.....................................................................................................62

9 Integration of safety arguments...................................................................................................63

9.1 Comparison with safety criteria............................................................................................63

9.2 Plans for addressing unresolved issues.................................................................................64

10 Interacting processes................................................................................................................65

10.1 Involvement of interested parties........................................................................................65

10.2 Independent review.............................................................................................................65

10.3 Management systems..........................................................................................................65

11 Annex.......................................................................................................................................65

11.1 Standard Operating Procedures...........................................................................................65

1. Introduction

Radioactive materials, mainly sealed radioactive sources (SRS), have been used in Bosnia and

Herzegovina (B&H) for a number of various medical, industrial, research and teaching

activities during the past fifty years.

B&H authorities, in 1998, established Rakovica Radioactive Waste Storage Facility

(Rakovica Facility) in order to accommodate for a relatively long term period the disused

sealed radioactive sources (DSRS) for which regulatory control was lost as a result of the war

(1991-1995). Since then, the Rakovica Facility has been operated as the centralized

radioactive waste storage facility of the Federation of B&H1. The operator of the Rakovica

Facility has been the Institute for Public Health of FB&H (Institute). The purpose of the

Rakovica Facility is to provide for safe and secure storage of DSRS, mainly radioactive

lighting rods (Eu-152/154), but also various industrial gauges and sources used in medicine.

In addition, low level solid radioactive waste collected as a result of the incidents is stored.

2. Context of the safety case

2.1 Purpose of the Safety Case

The purpose of this version of the Safety Case is to assess safety of the existing Rakovica

Facility. A principal application of the Safety Case will be in the license application and

approval process. It will be submitted by the Institute to the Agency as part of the application

to get authorization from the Agency to continue operation of the Rakovica Facility.In

addition, the Safety Case will be used:

for optimization of the dose received by the workers of the Institute,

as a basis for identifying measures to upgrade the facility for conditioning of the

DSRS,

as a case study for the safety cases of the interim storages throughout Bosnia and

Herzegovina, and possibly for the future centralized radioactive waste storage facility.

1B&H consists of two equaly sized administrative units called entities, Federation of B&H and Republic of Srpska.

2.2 Scope of the SafetyCase

The Safety Case documents the assessments of the current status and operation of the

Rakovica Facility based on SADRWMS methodology. Rakovica Facility was evaluated for

compliance with national radiation protection regulatory requirements. Environmental impact

assessment is not within scope of this Safety Case.

2.3 Demonstration of safety

The Radiation Protection and Nuclear Security Act (Act), promulgated in 2007, defines the

legislative framework on radiation safety and security issues in B&H2. The State Regulatory

Agency on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (Agency) was established in accordance

with the Act provisions. The Agency is empowered on legislation, authorization and

inspection in radiation safety and security. In terms of the Act, the Agency is the responsible

authority for licensing and exercising regulatory control over the Institute.

In accordance with the Act provisions, Regulation of the radioactive waste management will

be promulgated by the Agency. A Regulation on safe management of the radioactive waste

and DSRS, based on international safety standards, has been drafted. As such, the draft

version and international standards are used in this safety case as a basis for demonstrating

safety.

The Agency and the Institute are different legal entities in line with principle of independence

of the regulating authority and the operator of the radioactive waste storage facility.

The Institute is established by the Health Care Act of Federation of B&H (1997). Decision of

the Ministry of Health of Federation of B&H (2001) and Licence (2011) by the Agency define

scope of the work of the Institute in radiation protection. The Institute performs individual

radiation monitoring, environmental radioactivity monitoring, workplace monitoring, medical

examination of workers and storage of radioactive waste/DSRS.

The Agency developed the Policy for safety of the sources (Policy)3. The Policy included

radioactive waste management emphasizes protection of humans, workers and population,

now and in future from radioactive waste management activities. 2Untill 2007, entity Acts regulated radiation protection, including several Regulations issued in former Yugoslavia

3 The policy for safety of the sources in B&H, 2012

The following radiation protection principles are described in Policy: Primary responsibility,

The role of the institutions, Management system, Justification of the practice, Optimization of

protection, Risk management, Protection of population now and in future, Prevention of

accidents, Emergency preparedness, Protection actions, Graded approach, Threat assessment,

Multilayer protection measures, Data confidentiality.

The Policy defines that the Agency will establish regulatory framework for radioactive waste

management and will authorize technical services for management of the radioactive waste.

The scope of the waste management license will cover one or more waste management

operations, as appropriate. The primary responsibility for the waste management rests with

the generator of the waste. The preferred option of disused sealed sources management will be

return to supplier.

The Agency developed the national radioactive waste management strategy and defined a

centralized radioactive waste management in B&H (2013)4. Generated radioactive waste,

mainly DSRS that cannot be returned to their suppliers/manufacturers will be stored in the

centralized storage facility. The operator of the centralized radioactive waste storage facility

will be the Institute, as there being no other competent organization to assume this

responsibility. The Agency is currently exploring options for a new site with robust buildings

that could be used for centralized long term storage of radioactive waste/DSRS. Awaiting for

the construction of the new centralized radioactive waste storage facility, the Rakovica

Facility needs safety assessment in order to continue operation.

2.4 Graded approach

The Rakovica Facility is simple designed facility for the basic operations of receipt and store

of the DSRS in working containers and dismantling and store of RLR's. The graded approach

included screening of hazards and identification of the relevant ones. The associated impacts

were analyzed qualitatively or quantitatively for increased exposure of the workers or

population.

4 Strategy of Radioactive Waste Management in B&H, 2014

3. Strategy for safety

The strategy for demonstrating safety of the management of the DSRS at Rakovica Facility is

based on isolation and containment and includes both passive and active elements.

Approach to waste management with regards to the following is regarded as contributing to

safety:

Management system,

o Compliant with B&H radiation protection legislation and relevant international

standards and guidelines

o Clearly defined responsibilities for waste management

o Work procedures designed to reduce duration, frequency, and severity of

exposure to hazards

o Trained, qualified and competent persons undertake work that is safety related

o Appropriate records on waste inventory and dose records kept up to date

Multiple safety functions

o Radiation zones designated

o Radiation monitoring during waste management activities

Defence in depth,

o Fenced area secured by the police

o Robust structure of the buildings with high integrity locks

o System for intrusion detection

Shielding and confinement,

o Storage of DSRS takes place inside proper containment such as the original

working shields or another type of suitable containment

o Dismantling of RLR’s inside shielded hotbox

o The optimization of shielding usage during all waste management activities

including transportation and storage

Selection of appropriate approaches to waste processing,

o DSRS received in original working shields or another type of suitable

containment

o DSRS segregated for conditioning based on half-lives

o Compatibility of the processed waste with the WAC of disposal facilities,

Minimization of the generated waste,

Secondary radioactive waste is only expected when a leaking source is found or during

accident scenarios when a source is damaged. The generation of secondary waste during such

an incident will be minimized by isolating the source in a secondary containment to prevent

further contamination.

4. General description of the facilities, actitivies and the waste

4.1 Site conditions

Rakovica Facility is located in the municipality of Hadzici, approximately 20 km west from

capital Sarajevo on the regional road M5 between Sarajevo and Kiseljak (Fig 1). The site

itself is government owned property with several store buildings within fenced area. The

locality is semi urban with residential and agricultural areas. The closest public houses of the

Rakovica settlement are approximately 100 m distant, both north and south of the Facility.

There has been extensive construction of family houses and it is reasonably to predict that it

will continue.

Figure 1 Maps of the Rakovica area, site layout

The site is hilly and the Rakovica Facility is adjoined to a clay hill from which water comes in

during rain. The site is surrounded with bushes and shrubs.

There are no surface water bodies in the immediate vicinity of the Facility. The closest

surface water body, Rakovica brook is 700 m distant. Geology of the area consists of Upper

Cretaceous Flysch (water impermeable to slightly permeable rock) overlying Middle Triasic

limestones and dolomites (water permeable rock)5.

The territory of B&H is seismically relatively active. The recorded data on earthquakes in the

area for the period 1879 to 2009 range from 3.6 to 5.1 Richter scale6. According to the map of

expected maximum earthquakes (Fig 2), the Sarajevo area is located in area where there is a

risk of earthquakes measuring 5.1 Richter scale. Earthquakes of such magnitude cause

damage to buildings and structures.

Figure 2 Seismic actitivities at the territory of B&H

B&H, due to its geography and relief characteristics, has a complex climate7. Rakovica is

located in the central Bosnia where continental climate prevails. Summarized climate

characteristics are presented in Table 1.

Table 1 Summarized climate characteristics

Period Average temperature (ºC)

Minumum temperature (ºC)

Maximum temperature (ºC)

Average annual precipitation (L/m2)

Minimum monthly precipitation (L/m2)

Maximum monthly precipitation (L/m2)

Maximum daily precipitation (L/m2)

1961-1990

9.6 -21.8 37.4 932 1 259 93.2

2005-2014

10.7 -19.0 38.8 983 5 186 73.3

Basic climate characteristics are severe winters and hot summers. The absolute temperatures

range from approximately -20 ºC to nearly 40ºC. The average annual precipitation is

nearly1000 L/m2, evenly distributed throughout the year. The highest recorded daily

5 M. Basagic, F. Skopljak, An Artesian Aquifer in Rakovica Near Sarajevo Area, RMZ-Materials and Geoenvironment, Vol. 50, No.1, pp.13-16, 2003

6Federal Meteorological Institute data

7Federal Meteorological Institute data

precipitation amounts for 93.2 L/m2. Snowfall contributes significantly to total fallout amount

from November to April period.

4.2 Description of the facilities and activitiesGeneral facility description

The Rakovica Facility consists of two buildings: Storage Building and Waste Processing

Building. The Storage Building is a reinforced concrete building previously used by the

Police force for storage of explosive materials. The Waste Processing Building additionally

constructed building designed for receipt, processing of DSRS/waste and interim store, before

transferred to Storage Building. Even though the Waste Processing Building has never been

finished and completed, it entered operation due to lack of operation capacities in the Storage

Building and rather simple operations of receipt and emplacement of DSRS in working

containers and dismantling of only radioactive lighting rods and smoke detectors.

Buildings layout

The Rakovica Facility consists of two buildings, the Storage Building and the Waste

Processing Building (Fig 3)

The Storage Building is a simple one room building sized 6x5 m. The available storage area is

~25 m2 floor space for heavy loads and three wooden shelves with total available storage

space of ~10 m2 for DSRS in smaller working containers. There is a fence around the Storage

Building with lockable door.

The Waste Processing Building layout provides several areas grouped in a radiation

protection control area and a working area. The radiation protection control area consists of

four rooms for staff preparation activities, while the working area layout is divided into

reception/working area (~7 m2/~29 m2) and interim store (~9.5 m2). The reception/working

area contains a vault of approximately 1m3 for drainage of liquids in case of possible

decontamination. The reception/working area is provided with a workstation which consists

of work bench, tool storage and space for storage of empty containers and the transport

trolley. A fume hood is installed in the workstation. The interim store area is designated for

the storage of RLR’s and DSRS in working containers such as industrial gauges etc., awaiting

for conditioning and transfer to the Storage Building. Interior walls of the Waste Processing

Building separate the various areas and provide radiation shielding. Access to the interim

store is secured by lockable door.

Figure 3 Rakovica Facility layout

Building structure

The Storage Building has a solid anti-seismic design and robust construction. It is one story

building 6x5 m made of reinforced concrete, including floor and ceiling, additionally the roof

is covered with ceramic tiles. It has two openings in the walls for providing natural

ventilation, one glass window for natural illumination, a lockable door and a wooden rack

with three shelves.

The Waste processing building is one story building, 8x10.5 m. It is completely built of fly

ash bricks, both outer and inner walls. The ceiling has not been constructed. The roof is of

ceramic tiles on wooden construction. The building has 6 windows, a double sided lockable

metallic door and wooden lockable door for personnel. A 10 cm thick bench (4x1x0.8 m),

made of cement, constitutes the base of the workstation.

Building base slab/floor

The floors of the Storage Building and Waste Processing Building are reinforced concrete

rafts, which also constitute the working floors of the storage facility. Resistance to the water

penetration from the ground is not provided to the underside of the slab. It is not expected that

water from the ground will penetrate the buildings. The Waste Processing Building is

provided with an internal pit with capacity of at least 1m3. Liquid waste is not and will not be

stored in the Storage Building, which is not provided with an internal drainage system.

Data on the load factor for the floor slab of the Rakovica Waste Processing Facility is not

available. Heavy loads of up to 1 ton have been maneuvered in the building.

The doors

The Storage Building and the Waste Processing Building have a 2 m and 1 m wide access

doors, respectively. Door openings are of enough size for loaded hand trolleys to pass by. A

separate personnel door is provided at the Waste Processing Building to separate personnel

from waste movements.

Finishes

The floor finishes and finish paintings of the workstation have not been done in either of the

buildings.

Shielding

The Storage Building concrete structure (45 cm thickness) provides radiation shielding to

limit exposures outside the building. The door on the Storage Building is less efficient and

radiation shine is observable through the door. Individual packages are shielded by other

packages.

For ordinary concrete with the density of 2.3 g/cm3 the value of l10 (mm) (i.e. attenuation of

the intensity of radiation by the factor of 10) is 274 mm for photon radiation energies of 3

MeV and 250 mm for 2 MeV neutrons8.

The Waste Processing Building structure materials are less efficient as radiation shielding

material. Fly ash bricks approximate density is 0.6-0.65 g/cm3.

Table 2 Dose rates of selected radionuclides with and without concrete barrier

Measurement Shield Calculated

Activity Distance Shield Shield Thickness Dose-Rate

Isotope GBq cm Coefficient Material cm mSv/hr

Co-60 3.7 100 N/A None N/A 1.133568

Co-60 3.7 100 Attenuation/BU Concrete 45 0.035024

Ba-137m 3.7 100 N/A None N/A 0.296649

Ba-137m 3.7 100 Attenuation/BU Concrete 45 0.001774

Eu-152 3.7 100 N/A None N/A 0.457657

Eu-152 3.7 100 Attenuation/BU Concrete 45 0.010388

Ra-226 3.7 100 N/A None N/A 0.64292

Ra-226 3.7 100 Attenuation/BU Concrete 45 0.013399Calculated by Rad Pro Calculator, version 3.0

The shielding for the workstation is assembled of led bricks and led glass. The workstation

design is made of 4 cm thick led bricks assembled in pairs two provide 8 cm thick led barrier.

Calculated dose rates at selected distances with and without shield from RLR containing Eu-

152/154 are presented in Table 3.

Table 3 Dose rates at selected distances from the Eu-152/154, activity 3.6 GBq

Measurement Shield Calculated

Activity Distance Shield Shield Thickness Dose-Rate

Isotope GBq Cm Coefficient Material Cm mSv/hr

Eu-152 3.6 10 N/A None N/A 44.67031

Eu-152 3.6 30 N/A None N/A 4.959869

Eu-152 3.6 100 N/A None N/A 0.445288

Eu-152 3.6 10 Attenuation/BU Lead 8 0.57151



Eu-152 3.6 10 Attenuation/BU Tungsten 2 8.093601



Calculated by Rad Pro Calculator, version 3.0

8 Samarin A., Use of concrete as a radiological shield from ionizing radiation, Energy and Environmental Engineering 1(2):90-97, 2013

Drainage system

Rain water is prevented from entering the Rakovica Facility by drainage channels around the

buildings. Drainage channel is rectangular shaped with width of 0.5 m and flow height of 0.25

m. Calculated volume flow in channel, based on Gauckler–Manning–Strickler formula is

0.825 m3/s, assuming Manning roughness coefficient for concrete (cement) finished = 0.012.

Electrical power and lighting

Electrical power is provided for lighting, small power tools and detection/warning equipment.

Wirings are installed additionally on the inner surface of the walls. An aggregate is provided

as back-up in case of power failure.

Water supply

Water supply is not provided at the Rakovica Facility, although several other buildings have

water supply at the Rakovica complex.

Ventilation

The storage building has openings for natural ventilation. Outlets are located high on the

building walls and covered with grids to prevent the access of animals, birds and insects.

Lightning prevention

There are three conventional lightning rods around the buildings.

Fire protection

Fire extinguishers are provided in line with local fire regulations. Concrete material and fly

ash bricks used for the Storage Building and the Waste Processing Building are not

flammable material. Wooden waste shipment boxes, which contain DSRS/working

containers, are stored in both buildings. Wooden racks are used in the Storage Building.

Access

The Rakovica Facility is located approximately 30 m from the western site boundary and

access to the site is via a single gate from the access road. A paved area between buildings

allows easy vehicle movement to the vehicle access door of the buildings. Personnel access is

via a personnel access door on the Waste Processing Building.

Mechanical handling equipment

Trolley and hand pallet truck are provided for heavy loads handling. Different types of tongs

are provided at the site for handling DSRS.

Security

The controlled zone is designated as security zone category B in accordance with legislative

requirements. It means the requirements for the security are minimization of the possibility

for intrusion and unauthorized access.

Potential radiation threat is categorized as III, as the highest activity of the stored DSRS is category 2.

Physical security is provided by a number of passive physical barriers including a site

perimeter fence, a storage building fence, strong building construction and high integrity

doors and locks.

The Storage Facility is within a police guarded area, with continuous (24/7) presence of the police security.

Legislative requirements include the intrusion detection system and security plan developed

and implemented.

Facility operations, activities

Operational activities within the Rakovica Facility involve reception and emplacement of

packages, dismantling and repacking of RLR’s and smoke detectors, storage of conditioned

and unconditioned waste/DSRS, radiation monitoring, operational checks of the buildings,

equipment and the stored packages and maintenance of the building and equipment.

No processing or manipulation of the DSRS or their housing, containers or packaging is

carried out at the Rakovica Facility. Low activity DSRS, namely radioactive lighting rods

(category 4 and 5) and smoke detectors are dismantled, segregated and prepared for future

conditioning. Solid radioactive waste is stored as received in transport containers/packages

and segregated for future conditioning.

Description of the personnel dose monitoring programme

The personnel dose monitoring programme is applied in accordance with the national

regulations. Two categories of personnel involved in Rakovica Facility activities are

distinguished. The workers of the Institute are categorized as occupationally exposed

personnel and Police force security workers are categorized as members of the public.

Consequently, different dose limits are applied. The personnel dose monitoring services are

covered by the Institute by providing thermo luminescent dosimeters to the workers and the

Police force and also electronic dosimeters to the workers.

The dose records, measured Hp(10), by thermo luminescent dosimetry are updated on

monthly basis, calculated as cumulative annual and five year dose and archived.

The summary results of the personnel dose monitoring is presented in the following table.

Table 4 Summary of the personnel dose monitoring

Annual dose range 2013 Five years (2009-2013) dose

range

Hp(10), mSv/y

Workers 0.10-0.55 0.8-4.4

Police force Background-0.18 Background-1.2

Description of the ambient dose monitoring programme

The ambient dose monitoring programme comprises measurements in predefined points

within the controlled and supervised areas, as illustrated in Figure 6. Dose rate measurements,

H*(10), are performed with hand held dose rate monitors. Typically, ambient dose

measurements in several monitoring points are performed during receipt, transfer of the waste

or any other activity in the Storage Facility. The frequency of full monitoring is twice a year.

Results of recent measurements of the ambient dose rate are presented in Table 15.

Table 5 Dose rate monitoring results (Nov 10, 2014)

Parameter Waste Processing Facility

1A 2A 3A 4A 5A 6A 7A 1B 2B 3B 4B 5BH*(10), µSv/h 0.20 0.35 1.0 25 0.8

00.17 0.17 0.2

50.08 0.90 40 0.30

Neutrons 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Parameter Storage Facility1C 1D 2D 3D 4D 5D

H*(10), µSv/h 200 2.3 0.2 0.5 10 35

Neutrons 2-4 0-1 0-1 2-3 0 2-4

4.3 Description of the waste inventory

Stored waste in the Rakovica Facility consists of conditioned and unconditioned waste.

Conditioned waste consists of two drums with Ra-226 embedded in cement. Unconditioned

waste consists mainly of the DSRS (RLR's, calibration sources, industrial gauges,

brachytherapy sources), low activity sources (smoke detectors and check sources) and solid

LLRW (depleted uranium penetrators/fragments and scrap metal).

Conditioned radioactive waste

The Drum (1) contain 62 mg total amount of Ra-226, equivalent to activity of 2.3 GBq and

the Drum (2) contain secondary waste generated during conditioning process. Those drums

are standardized 200 L drums made of steel. The maximum value of dose rates measured on

the surface of the drums is 2 mSv/h. The conditioning of Ra-226 waste in drums was made

with the assistance of the IAEA. The report on the conditioning contains information on the

total amount of the radium paint and the Ra-226 content.

Table 6 Conditioned radioactive waste stored in Storage Building

Nature of contents

Radionuclide Type of source Type of waste

Activity (GBq)

Drum description

Cemented Ra-226 Radium paint* Solid 2.3 200 L, steel, lidded

Cemented Ra-226 Secondary waste during conditioning process

Solid Unknown 200 L, steel, lidded

*- 31 glass bottles, 80x20 mm, with 20 g of radium paint containing 2 mg Ra-226 each. Total amount of Ra-226 is 62 mg.

Unconditioned radioactive waste – DSRS

The most DSRS account for the industrial gauges (55 sources) and the most activity are

associated with the Co-60 calibration source (897.5 GBq). The DSRS are stored mainly as

received in working containers. The inventory is listed in the following Table 5.

Table 7 DSRS stored in Rakovica Facility

Source storage code

DSRScategory


Activity (GBq) Number of sources

KAL001 2 Co-60 Calibration DSRS in WC1 897.48 1 sourceKAL003 3-5 7xCo-60 Calibration DSRS in WC 127.81 7 sources

KAL002 4 Co-60 Calibration DSRS in WC 10.31 1 sourceKAL004 5 Co-60 Calibration DSRS in WC 0.002244 1 source

KAL005 5 Sr-90 Calibration DSRS in WC 0.02 2 sources

Source storage code

DSRScategory



KAL006 5 Sr-90 Calibration DSRS in WC 0.02 2 sources

KAL007 5 Sr-90 Calibration DSRS in WC 0.02 2 sourcesKAL008 5 Sr-90 Calibration DSRS in WC 0.02 2 sources

KAL009 5 Sr-90 Calibration DSRS in WC 0.02 2 sourcesN001 4 Am-241/B Neutron activation

analysisDSRS dismantled

34.57 1 source

N002 4 Am-241/Li Neutron activation analysis

DSRS dismantled

34.57 1 source

MED001 4-5 Cs-137 Brachytherapy DSRS in WC 14.83 45 sources

MED002 5 Co-60 Brachytherapy DSRS in WC 0.53 3 sourcesMED003 5 Co-60 Brachytherapy DSRS in WC 0.01 3 sources

MED004 5 Ra-226 Unknown DSRS in WC 0.02 1 sourceMED005 5 Ra-226 Unknown DSRS in WC 0.02 1 source

MED06 5 Ra-226 Unknown DSRS in WC 0.01 1 sourceIND001 5 Co 60 Gauge industrial DSRS

dismantled0.03 1 source

IND002 5 Co 60 Gauge industrial DSRS dismantled

0.03 1 source


0.03 1 source


0.03 1 source

IND005 4 Cs 137 Gauge industrial DSRS dismantled

7.21 1 source


7.21 1 source


7.21 1 source


7.21 1 source


7.21 1 source


7.21 1 source

IND011 4 Am-241/Be Moisture gauge DSRS dismantled

1.41 1 source

IND011 4 Cs-137 Moisture gauge DSRS dismantled

0.17 1 source

IND012 5 Am-241 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 8.57E-6 1 source

IND013 4 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC unknown 1 sourceIND014 4 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC unknown 1 source



IND019 4 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC unknown 1 sourceIND020 4 Cs-137 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC Unknown 1 source

IND021 5 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 0.01 1 sourceIND022 5 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 0.01 1 source


IND025 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 3.52E-4 1 sourceIND026 5 Cs-137 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 0.21 1 source

IND027 5 Cs-137 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 0.21 1 sourceIND028 5 Kr-85 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 2.61 1 source

IND029 5 Kr-85 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 2.61 1 sourceIND030 4 Cs-137 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 1.38 1 source

IND031 5 Cs-137 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 0.36 1 sourceIND032 4 Am-241 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 35.58 1 source

Source storage code

DSRScategory



IND033 5 Kr-85 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 0.38 1 source

IND034 4 Cs-137 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC unknown 1 sourceIND035 4 Cs-137 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC unknown 1 source

IND036 4 Cs-137 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC unknown 1 sourceIND037 4 Cs-137 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC unknown 1 source

IND038 4 Am-241 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 10.52 1 sourceIND039 4 Cs-137 Gauge industrial DSRS

dismantled0.00 1 source

IND040 5 Ir-192 Radiography DSRS in WC 1.41E-5 1 source

IND041 5 Ir-192 Radiography DSRS in WC 4.38E-7 1 sourceIND042 5 Ir-192 Radiography DSRS in WC 4.30E-10 1 source

IND043 4 Cs-137 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 4.86 1 sourceIND044 4 Cs-137 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 4.86 1 source






IND055 5 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 0.35 1 source1 - WC, Working container

Table 8 DSRS stored in Rakovica Facility

Typeof source

Drum/ContainerDrum 4 Drum Sources Drum N Working container

DSRS 13 sources 4 working containers/4 sources 2 sources 48 containers/58 sources

Unconditioned radioactive waste –Radioactive lightning rods (RLR’s)

The most DSRS stored in the Rakovica Facility account for the RLR's (106 sources) with Eu-

152/154 and Co-60 initial activities 14.8 GBq and 7.4 GBq, respectively.

Figure 4 Design of the RLR Eu-152/154, Led shield with tungsten ingot

In Tables 7 and 8 inventory of RLR’s are presented.

Table 9 RLR’s stored in Rakovica Facility

DSRS category

Radionuclide Type of source Type of waste Activity range (GBq) Number of RLR's

4 Eu-152/154 RLR DSRS, dismantled 2-4 975 Co-60 RLR DSRS, dismantled 0.02-0.11 9

Table 10 RLR’s stored in Rakovica Facility

Typeof source

Drum/ContainerDrums 4&5 Drum

2011Container E

RLR 83 20 3

Two drums (4 and 5) were custom made for the containment of sources, mostly Eu-152/154

disassembled from RLR’s. Documentation on the quality of the drums is not available. It is

observable that 4 cm thick led pipes were cemented in the 200 L steel drum. The maximum

value of the dose rate measured on the lower surface of the drum was ~2 mSv/h.

Unconditioned radioactive waste – Low activity sources

A significant number low activity sources have been collected and received. Those sources

include mainly smoke detectors (Am-241) and instrument check sources (Sr-90).

Table 11 Low activity sources stored in Rakovica Facility

Radionuclide Type of source Type of waste Activity (GBq) Number of sourcesAm-241 Smoke detector Working equipment,

Drum Smoke detectors0.000074/source 1643

Am-241 Smoke detector Dismantled, Drum Am-241

0.000074/source 667

Sr-90 Check source Dismantled, Wooden box

Unknown 685

Ra-226 Dial Equipment, Drum Sources Ra-226

~0.0025 2

Ra-226 Marker Equipment, Drum Sources Ra-226

~0.002 4

Unconditioned radioactive waste – Solid radioactive waste

This waste includes depleted uranium ammunition, scrap metal with alloyed thorium and

ribbons with H-3 on the surface of it.

Table 12 Solid radioactive waste stored in Rakovica Facility

Waste category

Radionuclide Waste amount (kg)

Type of source Type of waste Activity range (GBq)

LLRW Depleted 30-40 DU ammunition DU penetrator fragments, Drum PP 0.4-0.6

uranium 20LLLRW Th-232 200 (total

alloy)Thoriated metal Scrap metal, Wooden box Unknown

LLRW H-3 - Marker Solid, ribbons, Drum 20 L (x4) Unknown

Drum/package storage arrangements

Waste in Storage Building is stored as illustrated in Fig 5. Heavy loads are placed on the

floor, while smaller size working containers (<50 kg) are placed on the wooden racks. High

dose rates (~2 mSv/h) drums with conditioned Ra-226 and drums with dismantled RLR’s are

stored on the floor at the right side of the storage.

Waste in the Waste Processing Building is stored as illustrated in Fig. 5. In the working area

heavy weight (~100 kg) working containers with Co-60 sources are placed. In the interim

store area a lead container with Eu-152/154 (~1.5 mSv/h) and three cement lined steel drums

with the sources in it are placed. Working containers with industrial gauges are placed, too.

Figure 5 Drum/package arrangement in Waste Processing Building

5. Safety assessment

5.1 Introduction

The Rakovica Facility was designed to provide for safe temporary storage of conditioned

DSRS and incidental low level radioactive waste for a period until suitable long term storage

is available or repository is available for final disposal. The maximum period of time

anticipated for temporary storage would not exceed 10 years.

The purpose of this assessment is to consider the radiological safety aspects for the existing

centralized waste management facility - Rakovica Facility and activities of the Institute as

operator of the Rakovica Facility.

The assessment covers Rakovica Facility in current operational status. The buildings and

structures are considered to the extent that could interfere with the waste management

operations. Only the radiological risks are addressed. Other possible risk components are not

considered. In order to assess the radiological impact, consideration has been given to the

normal operation of the Rakovica Facility and to accidental situations caused by disturbing

events that could occur.

5.2 Assessment context

5.2.1 Regulatory framework

The following radiological safety criteria, taken from B&H radiation protection regulation,

are used as a basis for evaluation of safety and protection of the Rakovica Facility.

The dose limit and constraint dose for whole body dose to an individual

occupationally exposed worker (worker) are defined as 20 mSv/year and 2 mSv/year9,

respectively.

The dose limit and constraint dose for the most exposed member of the public are

defined as 1 mSv/year and 0.3 mSv/y10, respectively.

The registration and investigation levels for personnel dosimetry are defined as 0.08

mSv/month and 1 mSv/month11, respectively.

Radiation protection workers are classified as Category A workers if their potential

exposure exceeds 6 mSv/y and the rest are Category B workers12.

The radiation zones, controlled and supervised, are distinguished based on potential

for the workers to be exposed to radiation and receive whole body dose in amount of 1

mSv/y (supervised area) and 6 mSv/y (controlled area)13.

The radioactive waste is categorized as Very Short Lived, Very Low Level, Low

Level, Intermediate Level and High Level Radioactive Waste14.

9Regulation on Radiation Protection at Occupational and Public Exposure, 102/11 (2011)





14Regulation on Radioactive Waste Management, DRAFT version (Dec. 2013)

The DSRS are categorized into five categories, from 1-5, based on potential risk for

human health15.

Exemption levels are defined based on IAEA BSS16.

Transport packages surface dose rate must not exceed 2 mSv/h (transport index 10)

and non-fixed, accessible contamination levels must not exceed contamination levels

0.4 Bq/cm2 for beta and gamma emitters and low toxicity alpha emitters or 0.04

Bq/cm2 for all other alpha emitters17.

Radiation threats are categorized from I to V based on potential hazard18.

Security levels are categorized from A to D based on category of stored DSRS19.

5.2.2 Endpoints for the assessment

The assessment of safety involves consideration of radiological impacts. Assessment end

points include:

Doses to workers of the Institute during activities involved in storage of the waste

Doses to the Police security personnel involved in security checks

Doses to the public of Rakovica village during the storage operation and during the

storage period

5.2.3 Approach to the assessment

The approach to safety assessment includes the following components:

Analysis of site and engineering aspects

Identification and screening of hazards based on Rakovica Facility design, operation

and stored waste

Development and justification of the scenarios

Dose assessments for workers, security personnel and members of the public

15Regulation on Notification and Authorization of Practice, 66/10 (2010)

16Regulation on Notification and Authorization of Practice, 66/10 (2010)

17Regulation on Radioactive Material Transport Safety, 96/12 (2012)

18Regulation on Categorization of the Radiation Threats, 102/11 (2011)

19Regulation on Security of the Nuclear Material and Radioactive Sources, 85/13 (2013)

In general cautious assumptions, based on actual data and records and documents from the

Institute, are taken for the assessment of normal operation and accident situations. The

assessment is carried out using deterministic models. Probabilistic approaches are not applied

at this stage of the assessment.

Safety considerations for normal operations consider exposure, i.e. dose received, for

operators of the facility, security personnel and members of the general public living in the

vicinity of the Rakovica Facility.

Analysis of accident conditions considers the effects of those incidents arising from internal

events, i.e. process related events and those incidents arising from external events, i.e. from

events not related to the internal processes.

5.3 Description of safety elements and functions

5.3.1 Safety elements

# NAME DESCRIPTION

1 Limit and condition-Waste Acceptance Criteria

Rakovica Facility is designed for simple operations of DSRS storage in the working containers and dismantling of the RLR's.

2 Monitoring requirement-Buildings integrity checks

Control for human intrusion and general buildings condition.

3 Monitoring requirement-Testing and calibration of dosimetric and activity meters.

Radiation measurement equipment have to be tested before use and calibrated once in three years.

4 Monitoring requirement-Periodical surveys of ambient radiation and surface contamination

Measurements of radiation in defined spots in and outside of the buildings within Rakovica Facility, twice a year at a minimum or more frequently if needed.

5 Maintenance requirement-Power back up aggregate service

Back up aggregate has to be tested before use and serviced annually.

6 Maintenance requirement-Drainage channel clearance

Drainage channel has to be cleared twice twice a year at a minimum or more frequently if needed.

7 Operational procedure-Receipt of waste/DSRS

8 Operational procedure-Dismantling of

RLR's

9 Operational procedure-Storage of the working container with DSRS and/or RLR

10

Operational procedure-Individual radiation monitoring

11

Operational procedure-Ambient radiation monitoring

12

Operational procedure-Waste inventory records

13

Emergency procedure-Recovery of the bare DSRS

14

Emergency procedure-Decontamination of buildings, equipment and workers

15

Emergency procedure-Fire fighting

16

Management rule-Site access to authorized staff

17

Management rule-Classification of workers

18

Management rule-Compliance with BOH radiation protection regulation

19

Management rule-Documented inventory of waste/DSRS

20

Management rule-Documented procedures for specific activities

5.3.2 Site and engineering analysis

Engineering aspects that ensure safety during operations carried out in the Rakovica Facility

are:

Drainage system is provided to prevent flooding of the buildings. The results for the

volume flow of the drainage system, calculated by the Gauckler–Manning–Strickler

formula are presented in the Table 26.

Figure 6 Rectangular shaped drainage channel

Table 13 Results for the drainage channel flow rate

Channel shape Width

Height

Flow area (cross section)

b, m h, m m2Rectangular 0,5 0,25 0,125kn = 1.486 for English units and kn = 1.0 for SI unitsn = Manning coefficient of roughness 0,012S = slope of pipe (m/m) 0,1R = A / P 0,125A = cross sectional area of flow (ft2, m2) 0,125P = wetted perimeter (m) 1The volume flow in the channel can be calculated asq = A v = A kn / n R2/3 S1/2

q = volume flow (m3/s) 0,8235

Assuming rainfall of 90 L/day and the area of 100 m2 calculated amount of water is 0.1 L/s. It

is significantly lower than drainage channel capacity. The drainage system is sufficient for the

anticipated precipitation rate (max. 93 L/m2) provided it is maintained regularly.

The engineering characteristics of the Rakovica Facility ensure structural stability under

extreme environmental conditions. The Storage Building ensures adequate seismic stability.

The Waste Processing Building is of less structure stability.

The characteristics of the walls of the Storage Building allow ensuring a level of dose rate that

complies with the restriction for public exposure (0.3 mSv/h) for the representative person.

The characteristics of the walls of the Waste Processing Building do not ensure a level of dose

rate that complies with the restriction for public exposure (0.3 mSv/h) for the representative

person. Waste arrangement should provide acceptable dose rates that comply with prescribed

limits.

The lighting system is provided in the Rakovica facility, it is adequate and permits the

performance of operations in a safe manner.

Electric power is provided together with back up power supply.

Physical delineation of areas designed for storage and for the main waste management

operations are isolated, this way it is ensured the appropriated segregation of materials

optimizing worker’s exposure during operations.

Each delineated area has a sufficient physical space that ensures a minimal probability of

accident occurrence during package management.

Storage building is one room area, with drum/package arrangement provided shielding to

optimize the exposure of workers.

Drums with sources are stored on a structure in a manner such that packages do not contact

the interior surface of the building walls. This makes easy control operations and the potential

corrosion of packaging/containers is limited.

Contitioned and unconditioned radioactive sources are DSRS and conditioned radium drums

stored to the maximum of free space ensuring normal operation and minimizing probability of

accidents. Their main characteristics are:

o Storage capacity is almost exhausted due to practice of storing the DSRS in working

containers. The current and foreseen needs of management of DSRS require

conditioning of the stored category 4 and 5 DSRS.

o The workstation is adequate for disassembling the RLR’s. Foreseen needs for

conditioning of the DSRS of category 4 and 5, originated from industrial use and use

in medical institutions will require upgrade of the workstation.

o It ensures source segregation. In this way, periodic inspection and radiological

monitoring of the storage building and of the waste drums/packages is facilitated.

Its structure resists the maximum load of the sources that are intended to be stored.

In case of a potential surface decontamination using liquids there is a collection system inside

the Waste Processing Building that prevents liquid contaminant release to the environment.

The system has a retention tank that permits environmental monitoring before releasing to the

environment. Decontamination is provided by the CBR team of the Civil Protection. The CBR

unit is self sufficient team equipped with specialized military vehicles for CBR

decontamination. The CBR unit is capable to develop field decontamination unit consisting of

the decontamination vehicle with its own power supply, water reservoir tank, agents for

decontamination and different decontamination spreading tools, as well as decontamination

unit for its own personnel.

The Rakovica Facility has its own fire extinguishers. The fire protection system prevents the

fire impact on the Rakovica Facility. Regular maintenance and clearance of the vegetation

will prevent the potential for natural fires.

Another issue is erosion and potential slide of the soil to the facility buildings that may affect

efficiency of the drainage system. Regular maintenance prevents the impact on the facility.

Continuous radiation monitoring equipment is not provided within Rakovica Facility. The

hand held radiation monitoring equipment is available for operational activities in the

Rakovica Facility.

Handling equipment that is used for the on-site transport is adequate for the heavy loads. They

are designed for the foreseen loads of the packages the storage building will manage. The

periodical maintenance programs of these handling systems should be designed to ensure

manufacturer’s operational conditions.

Access to the Rakovica Facility and its surroundings is limited by a complex perimeter fence

that prevents unauthorized access. Apart from the fence, the non-intentional access of a non-

authorized person is limited by other passive barriers lockable doors and steel rods at the

windows. Further, security needs upgrade for intrusion detection system as required by

legislation.

5.3.3 Passive safety and defense in depth

Stored waste is mainly DSRS, the form of waste not prone to migrate in the environment. The

DSRS are encapsulated and in working or storage containers, stored in designated rooms and

areas. Limited ammount of conditioned Ra-226 is embedded in cement in 200 L sealed SS

drums. The buildings itself provide additional barrier and restrict access to the sources.

5.3.4 Operational safety aspects

The Rakovica Facility is designated as a radiologically controlled area and workers of the

Institute are designated as occupationally exposed personnel with the necessary dosimetry

control.

The Storage Building, the fenced area around the Storage Building itself and Waste

Processing Building are designated as controlled areas. An additional safety perimeter is set to

approximately 10 m around the buildings and the area is designated as supervised area.

A radiation monitoring programme has been developed to cover routine monitoring of the

Rakovica Facility and its environment, monitoring of specific operations, such as

emplacement activities and any individual measurements that may be required as needed. The

programme has the ability to monitor external radiation levels and surface contamination.

5.3.5 Management system

IPH is public health institution founded by the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and

Hezegovina. IPH is a legal entity with the responsibilities, including radiation protection,

defined in Public Health Act (2010). Organization of the IPH is defined by the Rule/Statute of

the IPH and Regulation on internal organization of the IPH.

Manager of the IPH manages, coordinates and supervise Departments of the IPH. Head of the

RPC, is technical personnel, resposible for the work activities performed by the RPC and

reports to the Manager. Staff of the RPC are technical personnel responsible for technical

performance of the work activities.

Responsibility matrix in the RPC is illustrated in Figure Table xx

Manager RPC Head Technical personnelManagement requirementsOrganization M TManagement system MDocument control MReview of requests, tenders and contracts MPurchasing services and supplies A MService to the customer M TComplaints A M TControl of nonconforming work M TImprovement A M T

Corrective action M TPreventive action M TControl of records M TInternal audits AManagement reviews MTechnical requirementsPersonnel A MTest/work methods M TEquipment A M TReporting the results M TResponsibility: M-Managerial, T-Technical, A-Awareness

5.4 Development and justification of scenarios

5.4.1 Normal operation

Waste management activities include receipt of the waste/DSRS, storage of DSRS in original

shielded container, repacking of RLR’s and smoke detectors and inspections of the waste and

buildings itself.

Normal operation activities are:

1. Waste/DSRS receipt at the Rakovica Facility

a. Off-loading of the waste packages from the transport vehicle

b. Radiation and contamination monitoring of the transport vehicle and the

waste packages

c. Quarantining and subsequent decontamination of the transport vehicle and

the waste packages if contamination is discovered

2. RLR and smoke detectors disassembling

a. Source removal from the holder

b. Contamination check

c. Dose rate check and activity estimation

d. Transfer the source to storage container

3. Storage of conditioned and unconditioned waste

a. Transfer of the waste drums/containers/packages into the storage building;

b. Acceptance and placing of the waste drums/containers/packages into their

storage location within the storage building;

4. Periodic inspection and radiological monitoring of the storage building and of the

waste drums/packages;

a. Quarantining of waste drums/containers/packages within the storage

building if contamination is discovered;

b. Wrapping/bagging of the quarantined waste drums/containers/packages

and transfer to a suitable area for decontamination if contamination is

discovered;

Transport packages sent to the Rakovica Facility are received in the receipt area of the Waste

Processing Building. Sources that arrive at the Rakovica Facility are accompanied by

appropriate documentation indicating the type of sources in the package. It enables Rakovica

Facility staff to ensure that it is handled and stored in the most appropriate and safest manner.

The main hazards in the receipt area of the Waste Processing Building are considered to arise

from external exposure to workers. The hazard of leaking sources and potential intake of

radioactive material should not be neglected.

The DSRS are stored with the working containers, as received, following contamination

check of the outer surface of working container itself. The RLR’s and smoke detectors are

dismantled and transferred to custom made drums. The dismantling of the RLR which source

holder have been deteriorated due to reason that the RLR has been exposed to different

atmospheric conditions for decades is considered anticipated normal occurrence. The

principal hazards existing during unpacking and handling the sources are external exposure to

radiation.

The received waste/DSRS’s are stored in interim store of Waste Processing Building before

transferred to Storage Building for long term storage. The hazards arising from the temporary

storage of DSRS are external exposure to workers during transfer activities with the sources

and regular checks of the stored waste.

The security personnel are exposed to external radiation during security checks of the

Rakovica Facility.

# NAME AFFECTING QUANTITATIVE/QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT

RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES

RELEVANCE

RELEVANCE - JUSTIFICATION (IF NOT RELEVANT)

CATEGORY OF IMPACT (FOR QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENTS)

1 Inspection and radiation monitoring of inside of waste process building

Inside Quantitative Direct external exposure

Relevant

2 Inspection and radiation monitoring of inside storage building


Relevant

3 Inspection and radiation monitoring of outside of facility

Outside Quantitative Direct external exposure

Relevant



RELEVANCE



1 Receipt of DSRS/RLR


Relevant

2 Repack of RLR Inside Quantitative Direct external exposure

Relevant

3 Interim Storage of DSRS/RLR


Relevant



RELEVANCE



1 Repack of DU Inside Quantitative Exposure via inhalation

Relevant

5.4.2 Scenarios for accidentsAccidents internal

# NAME RELEVANCE


1 The acceptance (inadvertent or otherwise) of incoming waste, waste containers, process chemicals, conditioning agents, etc., that do not meet the specifications (acceptance criteria) included in the

Relevant

design basis.

2 The processing of waste that meets acceptance criteria but that is subsequently processed in an inappropriate way for the particular type of waste (either inadvertently or otherwise).

Relevant Simple activities in the facility.

3 A criticality event due to the inappropriate accumulation of fissile material, change of geometrical configuration, introduction of moderating material, removal of neutron absorbing material or various combinations of these.

Not relevant

Not relevant as fissile material not present in the facility

4 Explosion due to the evolution of explosive gas mixtures

Not relevant

Not relevant as materials that produce/create explosive gas mixtures not present in the facility

5 Spontaneous combustion Not relevant

Spontaneous combustion material not present in the facility

6 Local hot spots generated by malfunctions of structures, systems or components

Not relevant

Not relevant due to simple design and operations in the facility

7 Sparks from machinery, equipment or electrical circuits Relevant

8 Sparks from human activities such as welding or smoking

Not relevant

Not relevant as such actitivites not present in the facility

9 Explosions Not relevant

Not relevant since explosive materials or materials that tend to create explosive mixtures are not present in the facility

10 Gross incompatibilities between the components of a process system and the materials introduced into the system.

Not relevant

Not relevant due to simple design and activities in the facility.

11 The degradation of process materials (chemicals, additives or binders) due to improper handling and storage.

Not relevant

Not relavnt as such materials are not used in simple operations with DSRS

12 The failure to take account of the non-radiological hazards presented by the waste (physical, chemical or pathogenic).

Relevant

13 The generation of a toxic atmosphere by chemical reactions due to the inappropriate mixing or contact of various reagents and materials.

Not relevant

Not relevant as materials or reagents with the potential to create dangerous mixtures are

not present if the facility

14 Dropping waste packages or other loads due to mishandling or equipment failure, with consequences to the dropped waste package and possibly to other waste packages or to the structures, systems and components of the facility.

Relevant

15 Collisions of vehicles or suspended loads with the structures, systems and components of the facility or with waste packages, waste containment vessels and pipes.

Relevant

16 Failures of structures, systems and components Relevant

17 The generation of missiles and flying debris due to the explosion of pressurized components or the gross failure of rotating equipment.

Not relevant

Not relevant as such equipment is not present in the facility

18 The malfunctioning of heating or cooling equipment, leading to unintended temperature excursions in process systems or storage systems.

Not relevant


19 The malfunctioning of process control equipment. Not relevant


20 The malfunctioning of equipment that maintains the ambient conditions in the facility, such as the ventilation system or dewatering system.

Not relevant


21 The malfunctioning of monitoring or alarm systems so that an adverse condition goes unnoticed.

Not relevant


22 Incorrect settings (errors or unauthorized changes) on monitors, alarms or control equipment.

Not relevant


23 The failure to function when called upon of emergency equipment such as the fire suppression system, pressure relief valves and ducts.

Not relevant


24 The failure of the power supply, either the main system or various subsystems.

Relevant

25 The malfunctioning of key equipment for handling waste, such as transfer cranes or conveyors.

Not relevant


26 The malfunctioning of structures, systems and components that control releases to the environment, such as filters or valves.

Relevant Not relevant as such equipment is not present in the facility

27 The failure properly to inspect, test and maintain structures, systems and components.

Relevant

28 Incorrect operator action due to inaccurate or incomplete information.

Relevant

29 Incorrect operator action in spite of having accurate and complete information.

Relevant

30 Sabotage by employees. Relevant

31 The failure of systems and components such as incinerator linings, compactor hydraulics or cutting machinery that poses the risk of significant additional radiation exposure of personnel called on to assist in effecting repairs or replacements.

Not relevant


32 Encountering an unanticipated radiation source in decommissioning (e.g. different in nature or amount) and not recognizing immediately the changed circumstances.

Not relevant

Not relevant for the facility life stage

33 Removing or weakening a structure or component in decommissioning without realizing the possible effect on the structural competence of other structures and components.

Not relevant

Not relevant for the facility life stage

34 Traffic accident when transporting waste on-site to processing facility or from processing facility to storage building

Relevant

External accidents human induced

# NAME RELEVANCE


1 Explosion Relevant

2 Fire Relevant

3 Aircraft crash Relevant

4 Missile due to structural or mechanical failure in nearby installations

Not relevant

Not relevant due to simple design of the facility

5 Ground subsidence or collapse due to tunnelling or mining

Not relevant

Not relevant as such activities are not recorded in the area

6 Ground vibration Not relevant

Not relevant due to simple design of the facility

7 The release of any corrosive, toxic and/or radioactive Not Not relevant for the simple

substance relevant operations with DSRS

8 Geographic and demographic data Not relevant

Not relevant for simple design and operations of the facility

9 Changes in population around facility (including illegal buildings)

Relevant

10

External impacts from industrial and military installations, transport routes of hazardous material etc.

Relevant

11

Power supply and the potential loss of power Relevant

12

Civil strife Not relevant

Not present in the area

External natural accidents

# NAME RELEVANCE RELEVANCE - JUSTIFICATION (IF NOT RELEVANT)

1 Lightning (effect on power supply) Relevant

2 Lightning (effect on surroundings of facility) Relevant

3 Lightning (effect on facility) Relevant

4 Extreme snowing Relevant

5 Extreme rain Relevant

6 Extreme drought Not relevant Not relevant as drought weather conditions are not typical for the area

7 Strong wind Relevant

8 Extreme temperatures Not relevant Not relevant for the simple facility operations and type of waste-DSRS and foreseen storage period

9 Hydrology and hydrogeology Not relevant Not relevant for the simple facility operations and type of waste-DSRS and foreseen storage period

10

Geology of site and region Not relevant Not relevant for the simple facility operations and type of waste-DSRS and foreseen storage period

11

Seismic events Relevant

12

Other effects of ground stability Not relevant Not relevant for the simple facility operations and type of waste-DSRS and foreseen storage period

13

Geomorphology and topography of site Not relevant Not relevant for the simple facility operations and type of waste-DSRS and foreseen storage period

14

Terrestrial and aquatic flora and fauna Not relevant Not relevant for the simple facility operations and type of waste-DSRS and foreseen storage period

15

Potential for natural fires, storms etc. Relevant Considered in Fire event scenario

16

Flooding Not relevant Not relevant due to distant surface waters bodies.

Postulated Initiating Events (PIEs)# NAME

RELEVANCE

PROBABILITY - GIVEN AS NUMERICAL/QUALITATIVE

PROBABILITY - VALUE (QUALITATIVE)

SITUATION

1 Lightning (effect on power supply) Relevant Qualitative Very Low Accidental

2 Lightning (effect on surroundings of facility) Relevant Qualitative Very Low Accidental

3 Lightning (effect on facility) Relevant Qualitative Very Low Accidental

4 Extreme snowing Relevant Qualitative Low Accidental

5 Extreme rain Relevant Qualitative Low Accidental

6 Strong wind Relevant Qualitative Low Accidental

7 Seismic events Relevant Qualitative Very Low Accidental

8 Potential for natural fires, storms etc. Relevant Qualitative Low Accidental

9 Explosion Relevant Qualitative Very Low Accidental

10

Fire Relevant Qualitative Low Accidental

11

Aircraft crash Relevant Qualitative Very Low Accidental

12

Changes in population around facility (including illegal buildings)

Relevant Qualitative Medium Accidental

13

External impacts from industrial and military installations, transport routes of hazardous

Relevant Qualitative Very Low Accidental

material etc.

14

Power supply and the potential loss of power Relevant Qualitative Very Low Accidental

15

The acceptance (inadvertent or otherwise) of incoming waste, waste containers, process chemicals, conditioning agents, etc., that do not meet the specifications (acceptance criteria) included in the design basis.

Relevant Qualitative Low Accidental

16

The processing of waste that meets acceptance criteria but that is subsequently processed in an inappropriate way for the particular type of waste (either inadvertently or otherwise).


17

Sparks from machinery, equipment or electrical circuits


18

The failure to take account of the non-radiological hazards presented by the waste (physical, chemical or pathogenic).


19

Dropping waste packages or other loads due to mishandling or equipment failure, with consequences to the dropped waste package and possibly to other waste packages or to the structures, systems and components of the facility.

Relevant Qualitative Accidental

20

Collisions of vehicles or suspended loads with the structures, systems and components of the facility or with waste packages, waste containment vessels and pipes.


21

Failures of structures, systems and components


22

The failure of the power supply, either the main system or various subsystems.


23

The malfunctioning of structures, systems and components that control releases to the environment, such as filters or valves.


24

The failure properly to inspect, test and maintain structures, systems and components.


25

Incorrect operator action due to inaccurate or incomplete information.


26

Incorrect operator action in spite of having accurate and complete information.


27

Sabotage by employees. Relevant Qualitative Very Low Accidental

28

Traffic accident when transporting waste on-site to processing facility or from processing facility to storage building


Scenarios# NAME IS SAME

AS IN LINKED PIE

RELEVANT

GIVEN AS NUMERICAL/QUALITATIVE

SITUATION VALUE (QUALITATIVE)

1 Lightning (effect on power supply) True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Very Low

2 Lightning (effect on surroundings of facility)

True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Very Low

3 Lightning (effect on facility) True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Very Low

4 Extreme snowing True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Low

5 Extreme rain True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Low

6 Strong wind True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Low

7 Seismic events True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Very Low

8 Potential for natural fires, storms etc. True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Low

9 Explosion True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Very Low

10

Fire True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Low

11

Aircraft crash True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Very Low

12


True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Medium

13



14

Power supply and the potential loss of power


15


True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Low

16



17



18

The failure to take account of the non-radiological hazards presented by the waste (physical, chemical or


pathogenic).

19


True Relevant Qualitative Accidental

20

Collisions of vehicles or suspended loads with the structures, systems and components of the facility or with waste packages, waste containment vessels and pipes.


21



22



23

The malfunctioning of structures, systems and components that control releases to the environment, such as filters or valves.


24

The failure properly to inspect, test and maintain structures, systems and components.


25

Incorrect operator action due to inaccurate or incomplete information.


26

Incorrect operator action in spite of having accurate and complete information.


27

Sabotage by employees. True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Very Low

28

Traffic accident when transporting waste on-site to processing facility or from processing facility to storage building


5.5 Formulation and implementation of assessment modelsNormal operation - Impacts

Assessment is made for the selected activities. Exposure to the workers and police security is

quantified taking into account the external exposure based on monitoring results for dose rates

and calculated dose rates from the selected DSRS. Exposure for the public in normal

operation of the Rakovica Facility is not likely due to simple operations and physical integrity

of the DSRS.

# NAME AFFECTING

QUANTITATIVE/QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT


RELEVANCE

OPTIONS FOR DOSE RATE AND EXPOSURE DURATION DATA

1 Inspection and radiation monitoring of inside of waste process building


Relevant Use ext.dose rate specified in system description and one exp. time value

2 Inspection and radiation monitoring of inside storage building



3 Inspection and radiation monitoring of outside of facility

Outside Quantitative Direct external exposure


# NAME AFFECTING



RELEVANCE

OPTIONS FOR DOSE RATE AND EXPOSURE DURATION DATA

1 Receipt of DSRS/RLR


Relevant Calculate ext. dose rate and specify duration for each waste component

2 Repack of RLR Inside Quantitative Direct external exposure

Relevant Calculate ext. dose rate and specify duration for each waste component

3 Interim Storage of DSRS/RLR



# NAME AFFECTING QUANTITATIVE/QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES RELEVANCE

1 Repack of DU Inside Quantitative Exposure via inhalation Relevant

Accidents - impacts

# NAME AFFECTING


RELEVANCE



1 Impact for scenario Lightning (effect on power supply)

Inside Qualitative Relevant Very Low Other

2 Impact for scenario Lightning (effect on surroundings of facility) OUTSIDE

Outside Qualitative Relevant High Release to air inside the build. and to atmosphere

3 Impact for scenario Lightning (effect on surroundings of facility) INSIDE

Inside Qualitative Relevant High Increased direct external exposure

4 Impact for scenario Lightning (effect on facility)

Inside Qualitative Relevant Low Other

5 Impact for scenario Extreme snowing


6 Impact for scenario Extreme rain

Inside Qualitative Relevant Medium Other

7 Impact for scenario Strong wind


8 Impact for scenario Seismic events

Inside Quantitative Relevant Increased direct external exposure

9 Impact for scenario Potential for natural fires, storms etc.

Outside Quantitative Relevant Release to atmosphere only

10

Impact for scenario Explosion

Outside Qualitative Relevant High Release to atmosphere only

11

Impact for scenario Fire INSIDE

Inside Qualitative Relevant Very High Increased direct external exposure

12

Impact for scenario Fire OUTSIDE

Outside Qualitative Relevant Very High Release to air inside the build. and to atmosphere

13

Impact for scenario Aircraft crash

Outside Qualitative Relevant High Release to atmosphere only

14

Impact for scenario Changes in population around facility (including illegal buildings)

Outside Qualitative Relevant Low Other

15

Impact for scenario External impacts from industrial and military installations, transport routes of hazardous material etc. 1

Outside Qualitative Relevant Low Other

16

Impact for scenario Power supply and the potential loss of power


17

Impact for scenario The acceptance (inadvertent

Inside Quantitative Relevant Increased direct

or otherwise) of incoming waste, waste containers, process chemicals, conditioning agents, etc., that do not meet the specifications (acceptance criteria) included in the design basis.

external exposure

18

Impact for scenario The processing of waste that meets acceptance criteria but that is subsequently processed in an inappropriate way for the particular type of waste (either inadvertently or otherwise).


19

Impact for scenario Sparks from machinery, equipment or electrical circuits

Inside Qualitative Relevant High Increased direct external exposure

20

Impact for scenario The failure to take account of the non-radiological hazards presented by the waste (physical, chemical or pathogenic).

Qualitative Relevant Medium

21

Impact for scenario Dropping waste packages or other loads due to mishandling or equipment failure, with consequences to the dropped waste package and possibly to other waste packages or to the structures, systems and components of the facility.


22

Impact for scenario Collisions of vehicles or suspended loads with the structures, systems and components of the facility or with waste packages, waste containment vessels and pipes.

Outside Qualitative Relevant Medium Increased direct external exposure

23

Impact for scenario Failures of structures, systems and components

Inside Quantitative Relevant Release to air

24

Impact for scenario The failure of the power supply, either the main system or various subsystems.


25

Impact for scenario The malfunctioning of structures, systems and components that control releases to the environment, such as filters or valves.

Qualitative Relevant High

26

Impact for scenario The failure properly to inspect, test and maintain structures, systems and components.

Qualitative Relevant Very High

27

Impact for scenario Incorrect operator action due to inaccurate or incomplete information.


28

Impact for scenario Incorrect operator action in spite of having accurate and complete information.


29

Impact for scenario Sabotage by employees.


30

Impact for scenario Traffic accident when transporting waste on-site to processing facility or from processing facility to storage building

Qualitative Relevant Medium

5.6 Performance of calculations and analysis of the results

5.6.1 Radiological impact assessment for normal operationAssessment monitoring

Impact Exposure time (h/year) Dose rate (Sv/h) Annual dose (Sv/year)Inspection and radiation monitoring of inside of waste process building

6 1.20E-006 7.20E-006

Inspection and radiation monitoring of inside storage building

2 2.00E-004 4.00E-004

Inspection and radiation monitoring of outside of facility

6 6.00E-006 3.60E-005


30 1.00E-005 3.00E-004


30 6.00E-006 1.80E-004

Impact Endpoint Dose (Sv/year) Criterion Limit

(Sv/y)Inspection and radiation monitoring of inside of waste process building Worker 7.20E-006 Dose limit

worker 2.00E-002Inspection and radiation monitoring of inside storage building Worker 4.00E-004 Dose limit

worker 2.00E-002Inspection and radiation monitoring of outside of facility

Endpoint Worker Outside 3.60E-005 Dose limit

worker 2.00E-002Inspection and radiation monitoring of outside of facility Endpoint Public 3.00E-004 Dose limit

public 1.00E-003Inspection and radiation monitoring of outside of facility Endpoint Public 1.80E-004 Dose limit

public 1.00E-003

Assessment Processing DSRS and DU

Waste component External dose rate (Sv/h) Exposure time (h/year) Dose (Sv/year)

INC transport container w/Eu-152 5.00E-005 5 2.50E-004INC transport container w/Co-60 cat 3 high 5.00E-005 5 2.50E-004

INC RLR Eu-152 5.00E-005 2 1.00E-004

Impact Exposure time (h/year) Dose rate (Sv/h) Annual dose (Sv/year)Interim Storage of DSRS/RLR 2 1.20E-006 2.40E-006

Impact Endpoint Dose (Sv/year) Criterion Limit (Sv/y)Receipt of DSRS/RLR Endpoint Worker Inside 1 5.00E-004 Dose limit worker 2.00E-002

Repack of RLR Endpoint Worker Inside 1 1.00E-004 Dose limit worker 2.00E-002

Interim Storage of DSRS/RLR Endpoint Worker Inside 1 2.40E-006 Dose limit worker 2.00E-002

Total Endpoint Worker Inside 1 6.02E-004 Dose limit worker 2.00E-002

Impact Exposure time (h/year) Dose rate (Sv/h) Annual dose (Sv/year)Repack of DU 1 1.23E-008 1.23E-008

Impact Endpoint Dose (Sv/year) Criterion Limit (Sv/y)Repack of DU Endpoint Worker Inside 1 1.23E-008 Dose limit worker 2.00E-002

5.6.2 Radiological impact assessment for accidents

Scenario ImpactProbability

- qualitative

Impact - qualitativ

eLightning (effect on power supply) Impact for scenario Lightning (effect on

power supply) Very Low Very LowLightning (effect on surroundings of facility)

Impact for scenario Lightning (effect on surroundings of facility) INSIDE Very Low High

Lightning (effect on facility) Impact for scenario Lightning (effect on facility) Very Low Low

Extreme snowing Impact for scenario Extreme snowing Low LowExtreme rain Impact for scenario Extreme rain Low MediumStrong wind Impact for scenario Strong wind Low LowSeismic events Impact for scenario Seismic events Very Low Very HighFire Impact for scenario Fire INSIDE Low Very HighPower supply and the potential loss of power

Impact for scenario Power supply and the potential loss of power Very Low Very Low


Impact for scenario The acceptance (inadvertent or otherwise) of incoming waste, waste containers, process chemicals, conditioning agents, etc., that do not meet the specifications (acceptance criteria) included in the design basis.

Low Medium


Impact for scenario The processing of waste that meets acceptance criteria but that is subsequently processed in an inappropriate way for the particular type of waste (either inadvertently or otherwise).

Very Low Very High


Impact for scenario Sparks from machinery, equipment or electrical circuits

Low High



Very High


Impact for scenario Failures of structures, systems and components Low


Impact for scenario The failure of the power supply, either the main system or various subsystems.

Low Very Low

Scenario ImpactProbability

- qualitative

Impact - qualitative

Fire Impact for scenario Fire OUTSIDE Low Very HighCollisions of vehicles or suspended loads with the structures, systems and components of the facility or with waste packages, waste containment vessels and pipes.

Impact for scenario Collisions of vehicles or suspended loads with the structures, systems and components of the facility or with waste packages, waste containment vessels and pipes.

Very Low Medium


Impact for scenario External impacts from industrial and military installations, transport routes of hazardous material etc. 1

Very Low Low


Impact for scenario Changes in population around facility (including illegal buildings) Medium Low

Aircraft crash Impact for scenario Aircraft crash Very Low HighExplosion Impact for scenario Explosion Very Low HighLightning (effect on surroundings of facility)

Impact for scenario Lightning (effect on surroundings of facility) OUTSIDE Very Low High

Potential for natural fires, storms etc. Impact for scenario Potential for natural fires, storms etc. Low

Scenario ImpactProbabilit

y - qualitativ

e

Endpoint Case Dose (Sv) Criterio

nLimit (Sv)

Seismic events Impact for scenario Seismic events Very Low

Endpoint Worker Inside 1

Assesment case 1

2.95E+002

Dose limit worker

1.00E-003



LowEndpoint Worker Inside 1

Assesment case 1

5.00E-005

Dose limit worker

1.00E-003




Assessment case 2

5.60E-004

Dose limit worker

1.00E-003

The processing of waste that meets acceptance criteria but that is subsequently processed in an

Impact for scenario The processing of waste that meets acceptance criteria but that is subsequently

Very Low Endpoint Worker Inside 1

Assesment case 1

3.47E-002

Dose limit worker

1.00E-003

inappropriate way for the particular type of waste (either inadvertently or otherwise).

processed in an inappropriate way for the particular type of waste (either inadvertently or otherwise).



Endpoint Worker Inside 1

Assesment case 1

2.53E-003

Dose limit worker

1.00E-003


Impact for scenario Failures of structures, systems and components


Assessment case

Dose limit worker

1.00E-003

Scenario Impact Probability - qualitative Endpoint Case Dose

(Sv) Criterion Limit (Sv)

Potential for natural fires, storms etc.

Impact for scenario Potential for natural fires, storms etc.

Low Endpoint Public 1

Assesment case 1

4.57E-001

Dose limit public

1.00E-003

5.6.3 Non radiological environmental impact

Not covered by the scope of the SC.

5.6.4 Management of uncertainties

For the purpose of the scenarios development, modelling and used parameters the professional

judgment approach is combined with the conservative approach. The selected scenarios and

associated models were selected based on the experience and professional judgment. The

calculations were done based on conservatively selected parameters.

5.7 Analysis of assessment results

5.7.1 Comparison with safety assessment criteria

Normal operation

The results are maximum estimated values for a single worker performing all the activities.

An assessment for the worker covering normal operation including anticipated operational

occurrences reveal potential estimated exposure of 1.35 mSv/a (whole body), which is less

then prescribed constraint and limit values. It is somewhat higher then the personnel dose

monitoring datam probably due to conservative approach. The measured dose with thermo

luminescent dosimeters for the workers ranged 0.10-0.55 mSv/a in 2013. The measured

values confirm that exposure of the workers is within prescribed limits, and bellow dose

constraint value too. Radiation monitoring and cautious approach to shipment of the

radioactive material is crucial for the execution of the activities in safe manner as required by

the legislation and good practice. The adequate skills for handling of radioactive material are

prerequisite for the fast and precise performance of the handling operations. Those skills

coupled with appropriate shielding proves to be sufficient for safe performance of the normal

operations in Rakovica Facility.

An assessment of the police security personnel followed concept of maximum allowable

working hours. In order to assure that the annual dose for the security personnel will be lower

than population constraint value of 0.3 mSv 30 working hours is recommended. Even though

that security personnel is classified as population they are covered by the dosimetry

programme. The results for the annual doses for the security personnel confirm they are

within constraint value.

The risk for the population during normal operations the Rakovica Facility is not likely, due

to fact that there are no releases of the radioactive material to the environment.

Accidents internal

The internal faults can contribute a significant proportion to the total risk of the Storage

Facility. High dose rates are expected in the vicinity of the bare sources if shield is lost, either

in case that DSRS in not properly enclosed in transport container or dropping of the source

during handling or collisions of the load with the structures. The calculated dose rate for the

Co-60 category III source is 126 mSv/h, which indicate significant risk. Another issue is

erroneously repacking of the Co-60 category III source into less shielded container.

Calculated dose rate is 34.7 mSv/h reveals potentially significant exposure for the workers.

The unpacking process, source removal and handling are monitored with handheld radiation

and contamination monitors and this reduces the possibility of handling contaminated sources

and prevents accidental exposures above prescribed limits.

Release of the radioactive material caused by the fire started outside or inside the Facility is

elaborated in the Accidents external natural section.

Accidents external human induced

Identified external accident situations could result in the fire that can spread in the area.

Release of the radioactive material caused by the fire started outside or inside the Facility is

elaborated in the Accidents external natural section. Unauthorized removal of the radioactive

material is.

Accidents external natural

The relevant accident situations due to external factors involve natural fires and earthquakes.

Stored waste, namely DSRS, smoke detectors and DU are not readily dispersible even in

extreme conditions. Still in case of violent fire and assumption of 1% of the stored waste

airborne calculated dose for the staff outside facility ammounts for 457 mSv. The hazard of

intake radioactive material in case of fire accident would be significantly lower for the nearby

population due to dilution effects. The risk is associated with possible intake of radioactive

material via inhalation for fire fighters and workers in supervised area. In case of earthquake

and collapse of the building associated risk due to shield damage of the working container is

external exposure of the first responders and workers during operatios of the recovery of

sources. Loss of shield for stored category II Co-60 source can give rise to ambient dose rate

and result in 295 mSv/h dose rate in close vicinity of the source.

6 Iteration and design optimization

The current version of the safety case is to be considered as the baseline safety case. The

future evolution of the safety cases for the Rakovica Facility are described in the following

Table.

Safety case stage

Description of safety assesssment

Baseline Safety assessment of the current status of the Rakovica Facility; with the current waste

inventory, limited amount of DSRS or solid waste to be received, repacking of RLR's.

Options Safety assessment will include analysis and identification of the viable management options of

stored DSRS and solid waste in the Rakovica Facility.

Prosess and

storage

Safety assessment will include further upgrade of the design of the Rakovica Facility for the

purpose to receive and manage foreseen amount of the DSRS and solid waste.

The Safety Case will be updated as required, minimally in five years. In case of significant

operational changes eg plan for conditioning of the DSRS or receipt of the DSRS from

interim stores throughout the country, the Safety Case will be updated following upgrade of

the Facility.

7 Limits, controls and conditions

The assessment is made for the current inventory of the waste and limited amount of the

incoming waste. The incoming waste limits to DSRS, category 3-5, low activity smoke

detectors and only limited amount of the solid LLRW waste generated in the case of accident.

In case of significant increase of incoming waste the assessment should be updated.

The incoming waste should be adequately packed: DSRS in working or transport containers,

solid waste in standard stainless steel drums.

Rakovica Facility will accept:

DSRS used in industrial, medical, laboratory premises,

Solid radioactive waste, including DU

Rakovica Facility will not accept:

NORM material

Liquid radioactive waste

Hazardeous waste - biological, pyrophoric, explosive

The waste package must be labeled in accordance with the transport regulation.

The documents on radioactive waste must contain the following information:

Waste origin

Waste form – DSRS/solid

Radionuclides content

Activity total (Bq) for DSRS with reference date

Activity total (Bq) and/or activity masic (Bq/g) for solid waste with reference date

Dose rate (mSv/h) at the surface and 1m

Dimensions and weight for packages

The dismantling activities restrict to the RLR’s and smoke detectors. The dismantling and

conditioning of the DSRS category 3-5 needs upgrade of the workstation and update of the

assessment.

The foreseen amount of waste within 5-year period of time is listed in the following Table

Waste type Waste unit Quantity per year Total quantity

RLR Source 10 50

DSRS category 3-5 Source 10 50

Solid waste including scrap metal 200 L/25 L standard drum 2/8 10/40

Smoke detectors Source 500 2500

8 Integration of safety arguments

8.1 Comparison with safety criteria

The facility design is such to make management of DSRS operations simple and easy to

undertake in the least time possible. The Rakovica Facility design is simple and straight

forward. The facility design provides for receipt, handling of radioactive waste packages,

dismantling of RLR's and smoke detectors, containment of the radioactive waste/DSRS,

isolation of the radioactive waste/DSRS from the accessible environment and for secure

storage.

The Storage Building structure is adequate for the envisioned lifetime of 10 years of the

Rakovica Facility. The Waste Processing Building, although of less robust structure, may

serve for planned operations, as the processes involved in the storage Waste Processing

Building are simple.

Under normal operation conditions, taking into account the engineering features of the storage

buildings, the inventory of radioactive material it manages and the operations activities, the

delivered doses ensures the compliance with the restriction for the public exposure (0.3

mSv/y) and occupationally exposed personnel (6 mSv/y). It corresponds to the personnel dose

monitoring data and ambient dose rate monitoring data.

Under normal operation the risk for the workers and the security personnel is within radiation

protection legislative requirements. The hazards arising in the storage facility are unlikely to

result in major disruptive events anywhere in the process.

Under normal operation the Rakovica Facility does not pose a risk for the nearby population.

Members of the public are unlikely to be affected by normal operation, as well as, internally

generated fault conditions in the storage facility. Elevated radiation is measurable in the close

vicinity of the Rakovica Facility, at a safe distance from the boundary fence. Even if fault

conditions occur, the resultant risks for the members of the public will be negligible.

The storage arrangements facilitates retrieval if necessary, transfer to other stores and final

disposal. It is possible to safely visually inspect the items stored in the facility throughout the

period of storage.