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Energy Policy 39 (2011) 7265–7274
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Energy Policy
0301-42
doi:10.1
n Tel.:
E-m1 A
with Tu
other co2 EI3 Fo
civil co
security
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol
Intrastate conflict in oil producing states: A threat to global oil supply?
Peter Toft n
Institute for Energy, Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, Westerduinweg 3, 1755 ZG Petten, The Netherlands
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 19 May 2011
Accepted 19 August 2011Available online 8 September 2011
Keywords:
Intrastate conflict
Energy security
Oil supply
15/$ - see front matter & 2011 Elsevier Ltd. A
016/j.enpol.2011.08.048
þ31 224 56 5215.
ail address: [email protected]
series of political upheavals in the Middle Eas
nisian mass demonstrations in December 20
untries in the region including Libya, Syria, a
A global crude oil prices (Brent).
r instance, two recent major European ener
nflict along with other socio-political risks
see: http://reaccess.epu.ntua.gr/Home.aspx;
a b s t r a c t
In this paper I investigate how often and how much outbreaks of intrastate conflict in oil producing
states translates into oil supply shortfalls. The Libyan conflict that broke out in February 2011
highlighted the fear that intrastate conflict in oil producing states may imply shortfalls and ensuing
volatile global oil prices. I argue, however, that it is far from certain that shortfalls following conflict
outbreak will occur, since both sides in a conflict face incentives simultaneously to protect and
maintain oil installations and to strike and destroy these. Based on a quantitative analysis of 39
intrastate wars in oil producing countries (1965–2007) I conclude that outbreak of conflict does not
translate into production decline with any certainty. In fact, likelihoods are less than 50% for reductions
to occur. In many cases growing production actually followed conflict outbreak. I conclude by
investigating four characteristics of intrastate conflict that may explain when oil production is at risk
during conflict: (1) proximity of oil producing fields to key battle zones, (2) duration of conflict,
(3) separatism and the location of oil in separatist territory, and (4) the relative size of oil production.
While the first three factors did not prove important, oil producer size could be significant. But further
research is needed to establish this with greater certainty.
& 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Panic spread across the global oil markets in February 2011after the outbreak of civil war in Libya between the regime ofColonel Ghadaffi and insurgents based in the eastern Libyan townof Benghazi. In the early stages of the conflict, global oil prices,already rising in view of the ‘‘Arab Spring’’1 shot up from around100 USD/barrel on 18 February 2011, the day of the war’s out-break, to around 115 USD/barrel (25 March 2011).2
Intrastate conflict in oil producing countries is routinelyportrayed as a serious risk to oil importing countries’ energysecurity.3 This is particularly the case for oil, which is traded in aglobal market and transported in dense supply networks traver-sing land and sea. But can we make an automatic link betweenintrastate conflict and oil supply disruptions? Linking the twois not baseless. A number of quantitative studies have identifieda statistically significant link between oil production and
ll rights reserved.
t and North Africa that began
10 and spread to Egypt and
nd Yemen.
gy security studies both cite
as serious risks to energy
http://www.secure-ec.eu/.
a heightened risk of intrastate conflict (Ross, 2004). What is more,whereas inter-state war, another perceived serious risk to globaloil markets, is rather rare by comparison, intrastate conflicts aremuch more frequent, ferocious, and often lengthy. Between 1945and 1999 roughly 127 intrastate conflicts occurred in 73 countrieswith an estimated total death toll of 16.2 million—mostlycivilians (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). War usually results in themassive destruction of infrastructures, frightens away investors,and undermines a skilled labor force. Post-conflict reconstructionis usually slow.
The question of threatening supply cuts resulting from intras-tate conflict in oil producing countries is crucial for major oilimporters—the European Union, the United States, Japan, India,and China. Because remaining conventional global oil reservestend to become increasingly concentrated among fewer produ-cers in the coming decades as oil fields are progressively depletede.g. in North America and the North Sea, shortfall from just one ofthese remaining producers could imply a major loss of availablecrude oil for the global market and increasing oil price volatility.However, how often do intrastate armed conflicts actually resultin steep oil production declines and eventual export shortfalls?
Intrastate conflict does not automatically pose a threat to oilproduction. For instance, while energy infrastructures were fre-quently sabotaged during the recent internal conflicts in Colom-bia and Iraq (Toft et al., 2010) oil installations escaped largelyunharmed in the Algerian Civil War of the 1990s (Hagelstein,2007; Lacher and Kumetat, 2011). This indicates that there is no
P. Toft / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 7265–72747266
clear cut link between intrastate war and oil production short-falls. Some intervening characteristics of conflict may come intoplay in determining when oil production is at risk and when it isnot. Knowledge about these can improve both political andmarket foresight and enable decision makers reach strongerassessments of the need for emergency stocks and to make bettermarket forecasts concerning future oil supplies. Consequently,this paper asks: To what extent does the outbreak of intrastate
conflict threaten oil producing countries’ ability to produce crude oil,
and what characteristics of conflict heighten the likelihood of oil
output reductions?
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First I discuss theexisting literature on intrastate conflict and oil arguing that theeffect of intrastate conflict on oil production has not beenadequately addressed. Second, I describe the data used to inves-tigate the research question and present the statistical results.I conclude the study by investigating four characteristics ofintrastate conflict: (1) the proximity of oil producing fields tokey battle zones, (2) the duration of conflict, (3) separatism andthe location of oil in separatist territory, and (4) the relative sizeof oil production. Finally, I discuss the implications of my findingsand potential avenues for future research.
2. Intrastate conflict and oil
In 1998 World Bank economists Paul Collier and Anke Hoefflerpublished their pioneering studies on ‘‘Economic Causes of CivilWar’’ (1998) and followed this up with the piece ‘‘Greed andGrievance in Civil Wars’’ (2000). Using quantitative methods, theyidentified, that the endowment of natural resources such as oil ordiamonds tended to heighten the risk of intrastate war. Since thena growing body of mostly quantitative literature has investigatedthis relationship (see e.g. Billon, 2001, 2006; Collier and Hoeffler,2002; DeSoysa, 2002; Fearon, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003;Humphreys, 2005; Ross, 2003a, 2003b). And Ross (2004) concludedin a review paper that there was a general agreement in academiaas to the robustness of the oil/conflict link. But later Fearon (2005)refuted the initial finding by Collier and Hoeffler arguing thatthe statistical significance of the oil-conflict link disappearedwhen the data was analyzed in individual years and not in5-year intervals. Also, Ross (2006) later pointed out that Russiaconstituted an outlier in the data. Once removed the significanceof the oil/conflict link was reduced. Brunnschweiler and Bulte(2009) likewise refuted the robustness of the oil/conflict finding.The ongoing debate on the robustness of the oil/conflict finding isreflected in continuing disagreement over the causal mechanismsthat link the presence of oil and a heightened risk of internalconflict. The ‘‘greed’’ or ‘‘honey pot’’ argument promoted byCollier, Hoeffler and others suggests that abundant mineralsincrease the expected gains for insurgents and improve theiropportunities for financing insurgencies (Collier and Hoeffler,2000; DeSoysa, 2002). But Fearon (2005) suggests that causalitymay be more indirect: it is the diminished institutional capabilityof central government in many resource-dependent, corruptedand inefficient states that gives rise to rebellion rather thanthe resource itself. Ross (2003a) claims that the presence ofoil and other minerals may fuel conflict because outside statesencourage it in the hope of benefiting from future mineralrevenues through intervention. Finally, Humphreys (2005: 511)argues that the risk of civil war is higher in resource rich countriesbecause they are more susceptible to the socially destabilizingeffects of trade-shocks. As stated by Fearon (2005: 504) ‘‘Oilexporters do seem to have been more disposed to civil waronset, but it is not yet clear what the most important mechanismare’’. Thus, although there is some evidence in support of the
oil/conflict link the claim should be made cautiously (Schaffer,2008: 75).
But if, as many studies have suggested, the oil/conflict linkdoes exist this is not only a tragedy for countries with abundantresources, it is also problematic for import dependent countries.The magnitude of the threat, however, depends on how frequentinternal conflicts in oil producing countries translate into oilproduction reductions. But so far no studies have thoroughlyinvestigated whether internal armed conflicts lead to deep pro-duction shortfalls or whether these cases are unique and notrepresentative of a greater trend.
2.1. Why would intrastate conflict decrease oil production?
There are at least two main reasons why a negative outcome inoil output during internal conflict is likely: one is indirect andrelated to the poor level of security during times of armed conflict.The other is direct and related to motivations of the belligerents.
As to the indirect reasons at least three factors may contributeto declining oil production. First, times of conflict are periods ofhigh uncertainty and unpredictability. Investment requires along-term perspective and stability. This is not least the case forcapital intensive industries such as oil extraction. But lack ofstability may compel investors to pull out of a country or simplyrefrain from re-investing. The current Libyan conflict serves as anexample. The Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC), nowrecognized by a number of countries as the government of Libya,has sought to re-start oil exports from partly damaged fields. Butthe Council has found it difficult to persuade the international oilcompanies to return in the current highly unstable situation(MEES, 2011a, 2011b). Another reason to expect conflict to leadto declining oil production relates to the disruption of the normalfunctioning of the economy. In a war-economy it can be virtuallyimpossible to keep oil production at full capacity as spare partsand other crucial components become scarce. A general deteriora-tion of the infrastructure or blocks to building new roads orpipelines is also likely during conflict. This would make itincreasingly difficult to transport people and goods to the producingsites as well as transporting lifted oil away from it. For example,when Karabakh–Armenian forces seized the Zangelanskiy region insouthwestern Azerbaijan during the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict(1992–1994) they effectively ruled out Turkish–Azeri plans toconstruct a new oil export pipeline from Azerbaijan to the Turkishcoast along the planned route (Blank, 1994). Finally, skilled andspecialized oil industry labor may be hard to keep at work or torecruit in times of conflict. International oil companies, especially,may choose to evacuate their staff while local staff may berecruited for the warring armies, flee, or in the worst case becomevictims in the war.
There are also direct reasons to expect oil production to sufferduring intrastate conflicts. Being strategic targets, all parties in aninternal conflict may have incentives to attack oil wells andinstallations under the control of the opponent. A recent exampleis the war in Libya where oil wells and installations wereattacked. As stated by Libyan National Council spokesman Abdek-gafez Ghoqa: ‘‘the [Ghadaffi] regime has concentrated its bom-bardments today [March 10, 2011] on oil industry sites in RasLanuf. The oil wells have been bombarded as well as oil installa-tions’’ (AFP, 2011).
All combatants have incentives to attack oil wells and installa-tions controlled by the other, since successful attacks wouldinflict financial damage by undermining a key source of revenuefor the opponent. But perhaps even more importantly, belliger-ents have incentives to attack the fuel supplies of the other side asoil and its refined products are an essential means with which towage war effectively (cf. Kelanic, 2009, 2010). This is of course
P. Toft / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 7265–7274 7267
more important in large-scale mechanized modern warfare andless so in terms of guerilla war where lightly armed combatantsmove around in small vehicles or even on foot. Still, most modernwar-fighting depends on at least some steady supply of fuel to beeffective. To stay with the ongoing civil conflict in Libya, theMiddle East Economic Survey reported that the efficiency ofColonel Ghaddafi’s continued hold on power in the Libyan civilwar was hampered due to lack of gasoline (MEES, 2011b). Inshort, there are compelling strategic reasons to expect theadversaries in a civil conflict to attack oil installations. But despiteits strategic value an opposite outcome is also plausible becauseall conflict parties share an interest in reaping oil revenues in thepresent and in the future.
From an economic/state-building point of view, oil production istoo valuable to destroy for both sides. Both parties would benefitfrom the oil revenue to finance their government expenditures(present or future). Also, greedy state leaders as well as would-begreedy insurgent leaders may eye the oil rents as a great prize.As Phillipe le Billon explains on the Angolan civil war ‘‘ytheleadership of MPLA craved power for the access to [oil] wealthwhich it delivered; whereas [UNITA leader] Savimbi demonstratedthe characteristics of a genuine megalomaniac who desired powerpurely for its own sake’’ (Billon, 2007: 104). Indeed, oil productionmay even increase during conflict. Waging war is prohibitivelycostly and which party in a conflict that controls oil may thereforeface strong incentives to maximize production in order to finance andmobilize mechanized forces effectively. For instance, in the Libyancivil war, the TNC has gone to great lengths to kick-start oil exportsfrom the areas under its control (MEES, 2011a). Thus, maximizing oilrevenue may turn out to be a deciding factor in a conflict.
Whether the short-term strategic imperative to destroy theother side’s supply lines and sources of finance or the longer-termdesire to reap future revenue wins out is hard to predict. It coulddepend on the combatants’ perceptions of chances of victory.If chances of victory are perceived as good, then oil wells andinstallations may be left intact. On the other hand, the losing partmay have incentives to pursue a scorched earth tactic like the armyof Saddam Hussein notoriously did in 1991 when it was routedfrom Kuwait by the US-led United Nations-coalition. If the long-term perspective wins out most of the time, however, and conflictparties avoid destroying oil production, this could also lessen theindirect negative impact on oil production. If the oil is left relativelyunharmed in pockets of stability, producers may continue toproduce and choose to re-invest. In short, whether oil productionwill increase or decrease in times of intrastate conflict is far fromstraightforward. Which one of these two possible outcomes dom-inates in the real world is the subject of the following section.
3. Definitions, data, and empirical strategy
I use data on intrastate conflicts between 1965 and 2007drawn from the Correlates of War dataset (COW) v. 4.0. bySarkees (2010). The definition of intrastate conflict I employ istherefore based on the dataset’s definition. Accordingly, intrastateconflicts are defined as ‘‘organized within-state military conflictsinvolving sustained combat with at least 1000 battle-relateddeaths within a 12-month period’’. The definition covers threesubtypes of intrastate conflict including; civil war, inter-commu-nal war, and regional internal wars.4 Other well-known conflictdatasets employ lower thresholds for conflict e.g. Prio/UCDP (25
4 Civil wars involve the government of a state against a non-state entity:
inter-communal war involves combat between or among two or more non-state
entities within a state; regional internal war involves combat between a regional
government body against a non-state entity (Sarkees, 2010).
battle-deaths) and Regan (2002) (200 battle-deaths). But I use theCOW definition and dataset because it is widely used, its intras-tate war definition is generally accepted, and because I wish todistinguish the extreme phenomenon of intrastate war from othertypes of less-intense domestic political violence e.g. terrorism orsabotage, which is problematic using low-casualty thresholds.
To arrive at results I apply simple descriptive statistics as wellas non-parametric statistical analysis. Non-parametric statistics isuseful when, as in this case, the N is not very large, and the data isnot normally distributed. My independent variable is the pre-sence/non-presence of conflict. The dependent variable is averagemonthly oil production.
Data on oil production is based on BP’s statistical review ofworld energy (2010), which includes oil production data world-wide from 1965 until 2009 for countries with oil production ofmore than 1000 barrels per day (b/d). While the BP data provides asolid dataset that extends back to 1965 allowing for a significanttime span, it also poses a challenge due to its annual rather thanmonthly reporting. Since conflicts begin and end at all times duringa calendar year – not on January 1st – this presents a problem. Butthe advantage of BP’s dataset is that it provides historical data since1965–a period that includes 39 intrastate conflicts in oil producingcountries. Freely accessible open source monthly data is availablefrom other providers including the U.S Department of Energy (EIA)and the Joint Oil Data Initiative (JODI).5 However, these data seriesgo back to the 1990s only. This reduces the time-span and with itthe number of potential observations.
I deal with the BP annual data by transforming the annualaverage data into average monthly data—for non-conflict monthsand conflict months. I do this by assuming that average monthlyproduction the year before a conflict broke out approximates theaverage monthly production in the non-conflict months beforeconflict began. For instance, if average monthly production was1000 barrels per month in the pre-war year, then it is assumed thatmonthly production from January till May in the first conflict-year– where conflict began in say May – was the same until May. SinceBP provides information about the total annual oil production ofthe year in which conflict began I subtract the assumed productionduring non-conflict months and calculate the difference in averageproduction for the remaining conflict months. The same principleis used for calculating production during conflict in final conflictyears where conflict ended sometime in the middle of the year;only here production in the last full conflict year is assumed toequal production during the conflict months in the final year ofconflict. In this way it is possible to approximate the average oilproduction in war months and peace months in the year of conflictonset and conflict termination.
In order to get a feel for the uncertainty, which this methodnecessarily introduces, a comparison of the calculated data and realmonthly data provided by the EIA since 1994 is included (seeAppendix). This shows that the calculated numbers and the realnumbers were close. For this, the calculated numbers are deemed toprovide a sufficiently sound basis for the analysis, not least, sincewhat is of interest here is not so much exact numbers but rather thedegree of production variation from pre-conflict to conflict scenarios.
4. Statistics
According to the COW dataset there were 141 onsets ofintrastate conflict between 1965 and 2007 across 56 countries.39 internal conflicts took place in oil producing countries with
5 The International Energy Agency provides data from the early 1980s.
However, these are not freely available open source.
-100.00% 0.00% 50.00% 100.00% 150.00%
China's Cultural Revolution (Phase 1+2) 1967-1968Biafra 1967-1970 (Nigeria)
Third Iraqi Kurds 1969-1970Naxalite Rebellion 1970-1971 (India)
Dhofar Rebellion Phase 2 1973-1975 (Oman)Fourth Iraqi Kurds 1974-1975Argentine Leftists 1975-1977Angolan Control 1976-1991
East Timorese War Phase 3 1976-1979Overthrow of the Shah 1978-1979
Nigeria-Muslim 1980-1981Hama 1981-1982 (Syria)
Shining Path 1982-1992 (Peru)Indian Golden Temple 1984-1984
Fifth Iraqi Kurds 1985-1988South Yemen 1986-1986
Third Chad (Deby Coup) 1989-1990First Aceh 1989-1991 (Indonesia)
Eighth Colombia 1989-Romania 1989-1990
Kashmir Insurgents 1990-2005 (India)Shiite and Kurdish 1991-1991 (Iraq)Jukun-Tiv War 1991-1992 (Nigeria)
Nagorno-Karabakh 1991-1993 (Azerbaijan)Algerian Islamic Front 1992-1999Angolan War of Cities 1992-1994
South Yemeni Secessionist 1994-1994First Chechnya 1994-1996
Iraqi Kurd Internecine & 6th Iraq vs. Kurds 1994-1996Fourth Chad (Togoimi Revolt) 1998-2000
Third Angolan 1998-2002Indonesisan seperatist conflicts, Moluccas & Aceh 1999-2003
First Nigeria Christian-Muslim 1999-2000Second Chechen 1999-2003
Darfur 2003-2006Second Nigeria Christian-Muslim 2004-2004
First Yemeni Cleric 2004-2005Fifth Chad 2005-2006
Second Yemeni Cleric 2007-2007
% change 1st calender year of conflict% change entire conflict
-50.00%
Fig. 1. Percentage change in oil production from non-conflict to conflict.
Source: BP Annual Statistical Review 2010, Correlates of War Dataset v. 4.
P. Toft / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 7265–72747268
a production of at least 1000 b/d. The population of possibleobservations is slightly higher as BP does not report productionfigures for countries with production of less than 1000 b/d. Thesample of 39, however, is likely to cover close to 100% of oilproducers experiencing internal conflict since 1965 as the shareof oil produced by countries with less than 1000 b/d only makesup around 1.2–1.5% of world total (BP, 2010).6 Most conflicts in oilproducing countries 1965–2007 happened in Africa (13/33%)and the Middle East (12/30%) followed by Asia-Pacific (7/18%),Europe/CIS (4/10%), and Latin America (3/8%). Conflict was mostfrequent in Iraq (6) and Nigeria (5)—two of the world’s mostimportant oil producers. As is clear from Fig. 1, conflict onsetcoincided with changes in oil production ranging from steepshortfalls to outright increases in production.
4.1. Trends
Fig. 1 reveals that there is no straightforward discernible patternwhen it comes to the onset of intrastate conflict and its possiblenegative impact on oil production. In some cases e.g. the Nigerian
6 Before the late 1980s this share was larger, but this was due to the fact that
the former Soviet Union did not disclose its oil production figures.
conflicts of 1967–70 and 1980–81 or the 1991-Shiite–Kurdishrebellion against the Saddam Hussein regime of Iraq, productiondeclined sharply as conflict broke out. But in Chad (2005–2006),Yemen (1994), and Angola (1976–1991) war coincided with produc-tion increases. Looking at the change in average oil production frompre-conflict to conflict across the 36 valid cases7 (1965–2007) oilproduction decreased in 15 (42%) of the cases whereas productionincreased in 21 (58%) cases. In the short term – defined here as thecalendar year in which conflicts began – shortfalls occurred in 18(50%) cases and production grew in 18 (50%) cases.
The largest production decrease can be observed in Iraq duringthe 1991 Shiite–Kurdish insurgency and during the Nigerian conflictof 1980–1981 where oil production grinded to a halt. At the otherextreme, oil production went up by 130% during the South YeminiCleric secession attempt in 1994, while production grew by 66% inIndia during the Golden Temple uprising in 1984. Fig. 1 demon-strates the diverse range of oil production output changes at theonset of intrastate conflicts. The figure also indicates that the swingsmay tend to be somewhat more extreme in the short term
7 Out of the 39 intrastate conflicts in oil producing countries, data on oil
production were not available in three conflicts (Yemen, 1986, Chad, 1989 and
1998–2000),
Table 1Oil production change from non-conflict to
conflict.
Non-conflict to entire conflictN 39
Valid 36
Mean 0.06
Median 0.01
Std. dev. 0.41
Min. �1.00
Max. 1.30
Non-conflict to 1st calendar year of conflictN 39
Valid 36
Mean 0.01
Median �0.01
Std. dev. 0.49
Min. �1.00
Max. 1.30
Table 2Controlling for 3rd factors.
International war cases omittedMean 0.0803
Median 0.0100
Std. dev. 0.3744
Min. �1.00
Max. 1.30
Depletion cases omittedMean 0.0809
Median 0.0150
Std.dev. 0.4283
Min. �1.00
Max. 1.30
Demand decline cases omittedMean 0.0919
Median 0.0100
Std.dev. 0.3880
Min. �1.00
Max. 1.30
P. Toft / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 7265–7274 7269
compared to the longer term (entire conflict) especially for thoseconflicts with a negative production change. The overall picture isthat in general oil production levels varied significantly as intrastateconflicts began with no clear pattern. In fact, the likelihood forshortfall or increase was close to 50% in both scenarios. Descriptivestatistical analysis corroborates these findings.
Table 1 shows that mean oil production from non-conflict toconflict over the long term did not change significantly across the36 valid cases. Mean oil production rose by 0.06 (6%) from non-conflict to conflict across the cases with a fairly large standarddeviation of 0.41 (741%) and a minimum–maximum rangebetween �1 (�100%) and 1.3 (þ130%). Thus, the generaltendency indicates a small production increase following conflictoutbreak but swings can be quite large. Also, the median of þ1%suggests that the distribution is skewed a to the right due tooutliers indicating that an expectation of production increases asconflict breaks out may be unwarranted. The relatively smallnumber of observations and the uncertainty introduced by thecalculations from annual to average monthly data also combine todownplay any strong expectations of oil production increases asconflicts begin. In the short term a similar picture emerges. With amean change of 0.01 (1%) and standard deviation of 0.49 (749%)this statistic tells a similar story; that the average conflict did notaffect oil production levels but that dramatic swings sometimesdo occur. In short, although intrastate conflict has coincided witha steep decline in oil production levels in some well-known cases,e.g. the Iranian revolution of 1978–79 or in Nigeria and Iraq, theonset of intrastate conflict as such does not appear systematicallyassociated with declines in oil production.
4.2. Controlling for 3rd factors
Oil production in countries struck by intrastate conflict doesnot take place in a vacuum, of course. Factors other thanintrastate conflict may also influence oil production levels andcloud the results presented above. Below I consider three factorsthat may have influenced oil production levels in the countriesunder analysis and obscured the statistical results: (1) simulta-neous interstate war, (2) a general oil reserve depletion in theconflict-ridden state for geological reasons, and (3) decliningglobal oil demand coinciding with a given conflict outbreak.As will be clear below, however, controlling for these three factorsdid not alter the initial findings.
International war is a well-known threat to global oil markets.When states engage in military conflict oil wells, installations andtransportations routes are often a target as both protagonistswould benefit if the other party loses vital oil supplies (cf. Kelanic,
2009, 2010). In the post-WWII period, oil supplies were affectedduring the Suez crisis of 1956, the 1973-Arab–Isreali war, theIran–Iraq war in the 1980s as well as during the Kuwait war of1990–1991. Oil supplies were affected partly as a consequence ofdirect cuts by suppliers but also through embargoes by importingstates (Schaffer, 2008: 36).
In the course of the 1965–2007-period intrastate conflict inoil producing countries coincided with international war fourtimes—three of them related to Iraq: the Iraqi Kurd Rebellion(1985–88) coincided with the Iran–Iraq–war, the Shiite- andKurdish uprising (1991) coincided with the Iraqi defeat inthe Kuwait war (1990–1991), the Nagorno–Karabach conflict(1991–1993) was also an international war between Azerbaijanand Armenia, and finally the Iraqi Kurd Internecine conflict andthe 6th Kurdish uprising (1994–1995) took place in the shadow ofthe continued stand-off between Saddam Hussein Iraq and theInternational Coalition. Controlling for these simultaneous inter-national conflicts did not affect the overall conclusions. With onlyfour simultaneous international wars these did not have much impacton the general picture. Table 2 reveals that when the four cases ofsimultaneous international war are omitted, the mean change in oilproduction levels when internal conflict broke out was negligible andto the positive side rising from 0.06 to 0.08 (6%–8%.)
A similar story relates to the natural depletion of oil fields. Thenatural productive life cycle of an oil field resembles a bell-shapedproduction curve. Eventually, production peaks and the field iscompletely drilled out. After this, production enters a relativelysharp irreversible decline. As this decline levels off, production cancontinue at relatively low rates and be sustained with various gasor water injection techniques. Simultaneous oil reserve depletionwas relevant in four cases including the Romanian Revolution(1989–1990), First and Second Chechnya War (1994–1996,1998–2003), and the Indonesian separatist conflicts (1999–2003).Omitting these cases from the analysis, however, did not affectmean production change from peace to conflict significantly asmean production changed from 0.06 to 0.08 (6%–8%).
Finally, declining global oil demand coincided with intrastateconflict onset in four cases. This happened during the Dhofarrebellion in Oman (1973–1975), the fourth Iraqi Kurd uprising(1974–1975), the Nigerian conflict (1980–1981) and the HamaUprising in Syria (1981–1982). These conflicts coincided withmajor global recessions due to the first and second oil supplyshocks of 1973 and 1979. When omitted from the analysis, themean oil production in conflict-ridden countries went up from theinitial 0.06 (6%) to 0.09 (9%) (see Table 2). In sum, the three factorsthat could potentially have obscured the impact of intrastate
Table 3
Intrastate conflict and location of oil production vis- �a-vis key battle zones.
Negativechange
Neutral orpositive change
Key oil production sites 7 10
P. Toft / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 7265–72747270
conflict on oil production levels did not affect the results in anysignificant way. In fact, omitting them from the analysis furtherstrengthens the case against the hypothesis that intrastate con-flict in general reduces oil production during conflict. Rather,intrastate conflict appears be neutral or to be related to slightincreases in oil output.
proximate to battleszones
Key battles zones notproximate to main oilproduction sites
8 10
Mann–Whitney test Sign (2-tail) 0.909
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test Sign (2-tail) 0.702
Note: 3 missing due to lack of data.
9 The dataset was modified by adding information on seven conflicts that did
not appear in the PRIO/CSCW but were included in the COW dataset. These are:
The Cultural Revolution Phases 1 and 2 (1967–1968), The overthrow of the Shah of
Iran (1978), the Nigeria-Muslim conflict (1980–1981), the Jakun–Tiv war in
Nigeria (1991–1992), the first Nigeria Christian–Muslim war (1999–2000), and
finally the first and second Yemini Cleric uprising (2004–2005 and 2007).10 The p-value answers the question: If the two populations really have the
same mean, what is the chance that random sampling would result in means as far
apart as observed? If the p-value is small, it is unlikely that the difference is
coincidental and we can conclude that the two population means are truly
different (rejecting the null-hypothesis). On the other hand, if the p-value is large,
5. Location, duration, separatism, and producer size
The onset of intrastate conflict in itself appears too general tobe a predictor of increased risk for oil production.8 Nevertheless,the nearly 50/50 spread in cases with decline and cases withproduction increases as conflicts broke out begs for explanations.Is there some factor that intervenes and explains when intrastateconflict is followed by oil production decline and when produc-tion is left unaffected? Below, four hypotheses that may bepotential candidates for explaining when oil production suffersin intrastate conflict are analyzed including: the proximity of oilproduction vis-�a-vis key battle zones, the duration of conflict,separatism, and location of key oil fields, and finally the relativesize of oil production.
5.1. Proximity to battles zones
The location of oil production may be an important determi-nant for whether production levels are affected during intrastateconflict. For instance Buhaug and Lujala have identified a linkbetween the location of resources inside conflict zones to theseverity of conflict (Buhaug and Lujala, 2005; Lujala, 2008). Thus,the location of oil production inside or in close proximity to mainbattle zones could imply an increased risk for these installationsbecoming targets (intended or unintended), or result in oilcompanies pulling out and shutting down production due to poorsecurity. Conversely, if the oil fields are largely located outside ofthe main conflict zones there is less chance that installationsbecome targets. Also, companies and investors will face a bettersecurity environment and may decide to stay on and workers maydo the same. Off-shore production would probably have the bestchances of staying unaffected due to their isolated location off themain territory. An example of this is the Angolan civil war.According to Philipe Le Billon ‘‘While most of Angola wasdecimated by conflict, the country’s oil sector was, paradoxicallybooming’’ (Billon, 2007: 106). This may have been related to thefact that 95% of Angola’s off-shore oil production constituted ‘‘anenclave off-shore economy’’ out of the reach of the main insur-gency movement of UNITA, which never acquired marine cap-abilities (Billon, 2001: 63). According to Le Billon UNITA onlystaged an attack against on-shore oil installations in Soyo in 1993(Billon, 2001: 63, fn. 29; 2007: 106-09, 120–21). Conversely,on-shore or very shallow water oil installations were inside thezone of fighting in the Biafra war in the Niger Delta (1967–1970)and in the numerous Iraqi conflicts between the religious/ethnicgroups in Kurdish-dominated areas in the north around the Kirkukoil fields and the Basra region dominated by Shiites in the south.
To measure whether proximity to battle zones is closelyassociated with decline in oil production I identified and codedthe location of main oil producing reservoirs across the 39intrastate conflicts according to their proximity to key conflictzones. Were they on the fringes or at the center of fighting? I useddata on conflict location provided by PRIO/CSCW and overlaid thisdata with geographic information on oil production sites from the
8 Of course a 50/50% chance of decline in itself breeds a lot of uncertainty and
thereby heightens risk perceptions. The point here is that perceiving intrastate
conflict as a certain predictor of oil production shortfalls is not warranted.
PETRODATA dataset (cf. Lujala et al., 2007) using ArcGIS-soft-ware.9 The conflict location dataset pins down the epicenter of aconflict and designates a perimeter in which most of the fightingtook place. This procedure generated 36 individual conflict zone/oil maps (3 missing due to lack of data).
Table 3 includes a simple cross-table with the frequencies ofthe two groups (proximity to battle zones/no proximity to battlezones) combined with neutral-negative change or positive changein oil production at conflict onset. From this I conclude, contraryto the expectation discussed above, that there is no observableassociation between the location of main oil production sites andproduction shortfall during conflict as the cross-table shows thatthe likelihood of a case falling into each category is almostidentical. This finding is backed up by a non-parametricMann–Whitney test of independence between the variables oflocation of key oil production and key battle zones. The statisticaltest is a nonparametric alternative to the two-sample-t-test and isuseful when the condition of normal distribution cannot be met,which is the case here. Like the t-test, the Mann–Whitney testlooks for differences in the central tendency by comparing themeans (or rather the medians which are not affected by outliers)of two groups and provides a p-value—the data points beingranked and summed.10 I also conducted a non-parametricKolmogorov–Smirnov test, which works slightly differently thanthe Mann–Whitney test using the maximal distance betweencumulative frequency distributions rather than the differencebetween median ranks of two samples.11
The two tests resulted in p-values of 0.7 and 0.9, respectively,indicating that no statistically significant difference between thegroup of cases in close proximity to battle zones and thoseoutside. Based on the data and coding used here, this means thatproximity to battle zones was not a strong predictor for heigh-tened risk to oil production during intrastate conflict.
the data do not give strong reason to conclude that the two populations are
different.11 See e.g. ‘‘The Prism Guide to Interpreting Statistical Results’’, http://www.
graphpad.com/articles/interpret/analyzing_two_groups/choos_anal_comp_two.
htm.
P. Toft / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 7265–7274 7271
5.2. Protracted conflict
A second potential explanation for the variance in oil produc-tion changes at the onset of intrastate conflict is its duration. Thelogic of this proposition is that if an intrastate conflict drags on,the likelihood grows that oil wells and installations will beharmed along with other infrastructures. For example, PaiviLujala (2008) has documented that longer intrastate conflictstend to create more combat deaths which could indicate a higherlevel of physical destruction too, in long conflicts. In protractedconflict the likelihood will probably also increase for installationsto fall into disrepair due to sustained underinvestment as well asdue to shortages of skilled personnel in an insecure environmentas argued in section two of the paper. It is, arguably, much morelikely that the oil industry would suffer during the protractedconflicts in Angola spanning three decades from 1976 until 2002than during the brief Romanian Revolution that brought down theregime of Nicolae Ceausescu spanning just a few weeks inDecember 1989. Also, one would expect the prolonged conflictin Columbia that reignited in 1989 with no end in sight to bemore detrimental to that country’s oil production than the fewweeks’ long Nigerian–Muslim conflict of December 1980.
I analyze this proposition by investigating whether thereappears to be a significant correlation between the total lengthof intrastate conflict (measured in total war months) and the sizeof percentage change between pre-conflict oil production com-pared to wartime production levels. Assuming a linear relation-ship, the hypothesis is, in other words, that the longer conflictscontinue the greater is the percentagewise decline in oil produc-tion. To investigate whether a well-approximated linear relation-ship exists I plot the data for conflict duration and percentagechange from peace to conflict in a scatter-plot graph (see Fig. 2aand b), which identifies whether the relationship appears tofollow a straight line. I then calculate the correlation coefficientto estimate the strength and direction of the relationship.
The scatter-plot in Fig. 2a indicates that there is no solid linearrelationship between the two variables which appear to beindependent. The points are quite scattered and do not follow alinear function or other types of functions. Also, if the alternativehypothesis on the effect of duration hold true, the relationshipshould be a negative one, i.e. the longer the conflict the greaterthe production decline. However, as is clear from Fig. 2a, longerduration does not seem related to greater percentagewisedeclines in oil production, in fact the opposite appears the case.This is reflected in the correlation coefficient of R2
¼0.05 far from1 or �1 signifying a strong correlation. However, Fig. 2a alsoshows that four intrastate conflicts were outliers as they lastedlonger than the average conflict. In Fig. 2b these four cases wereomitted in order to explore whether they distorted the centraltendency. Controlling for the four long conflicts, however, did not
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
0
Duration of Conflict (months) (R2 = 0.05)
Cha
nge
in o
il pr
oduc
tion
Con
flict
to N
on-c
onfli
ct, p
ct.
50 100 150 200 250
Fig. 2. (a and b) Duration of intrastate
affect the trend line much. The (non)relationship between dura-tion of conflict and change in oil production from non-conflict toconflict remains weak. The dots are scattered quite randomlyacross the board irrespective of conflict duration and this isreflected in a correlation coefficient close to zero of R2
¼0.02. Inother words, there seems to be no indication that longer conflictsare related to greater oil production decline.
5.3. Separatist conflict
A third explanation is a variant of the proximity hypothesesdiscussed above. But the key issue is the war aim of secession of aspecific territory rather than the broader goal of taking overcentral control. The location of oil producing areas within ouroutside a region seeking independence may explain why produc-tion is affected in some intrastate conflicts but not in others.
Take for instance the Dhofar rebellion that took place in Omanduring 1973–1975. The conflict was centered in the Dhofar-province around the regional capital of Salalah in the very southof Oman. But the key Omani oil fields were located in northernDhofar Province and in central Oman outside the territoryrealistically coveted by the Dhofar separatists. In this case theseparatists would not themselves suffer financially or militarily inthe present or future from attacking the Omani oil fields. Rather, ifthe insurgent forces had the capability to strike into the center ofthe country they would be able to inflict an important economicand military blow to the Omani government. This would not havehad negative effects for the separatists since the hoped-forindependent state of Dhofar would hardly have gotten a stakein Oman’s oil riches anyway. The Nagorno–Karabakh conflict inAzerbaijan is a similar case. The Nagorno–Karabakh enclavewhich effectively separated from Azerbaijan in the civil war of1991–1993 has no oil and is situated at a distance from theCaspian coastline to the east where most of Azerbaijan’s oilreserves are located. The Kurds of Iraq were in the reversesituation. Some of Iraq’s most important oil fields are located inthe area around Kirkuk in Northern Iraq—a region for whichKurdish insurgents have sought independence for decades. TheKirkuk oil fields would in all likelihood constitute the economicbackbone for a future independent Kurdish state. Thus, theKurdish insurgents would have had incentives to preserve theoil production—not to attack it in their fight although doing sowould hurt the central Baghdad government. In short, if separatistaspirations relate to territory without oil fields, separatist armieshave stronger incentives to try to launch attacks against govern-ment controlled oil wells and other installations (if they havecapability to reach them) in order to punish the central govern-ment financially as well as to deny it a key resource with whichto wage war against the insurgents. For instance, Philippe LeBillon argues that oil export revenue proved highly important as
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
0
Duration of Conflict (months) (R2 = 0.02)
Cha
nge
in O
il Pr
oduc
tion
Con
flcit
toN
on-c
onfli
ct, p
ct.
20 40 60 80 100
war and change in oil production.
P. Toft / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 7265–72747272
a financial resource for the Angolan MPLA-government in the1990s war with UNITA as outside backing dried up after the ColdWar (Billon, 2007: 118).
Below I investigate this hypothesis. I combine data on the waraims of insurgents (based on the COW-dataset’s coding of waraims) with geographic information about the location of separa-tist territories vis-�a-vis major oil producing areas. This revealedthat in 17 out of the 39 conflicts in the sample did insurgents haveseparatist agendas. I then created a simple cross-table thatdivides the conflicts into four groups concerning whether therewas oil in the separatist territory or not and if production declinedor not as conflict began. If the hypothesis holds true we shouldsee most cases in the bottom-left category, i.e. when there was nooil present in the separatist territory we would expect insurgentsto have attacked strategic targets such as oil wells and installa-tions outside their territory with ensuing declining production.At the same time, there should be few cases in the top-leftcorner which combines cases where oil was present in separatistterritory and where neither insurgents nor government forceswould have a strong incentive to destroy oil related targets.
Table 4 reveals that the hypothesis does not appear to becorroborated. Whether oil was present in separatist territory or notdid not seem to matter for changes in oil production from peace towar. In 12 out of the 17 cases there was neutral or positive changein oil production as conflict set in irrespective of the location of oilin the separatist territory. This is underpinned by the results of theMann–Whitney and Kolmogorov–Smirnov test results also given inTable 4. The Mann–Whitney test which tests whether the mediansof two populations are truly different (in this case if oil productionlevels changed significantly more in cases where oil was locatedwithin or outside separatist territory) also results in ‘‘not signifi-cant’’ results of 0.88—close to 1. I included for extra measure theKolmogorov–Smirnov test, which looks at the maximal distancebetween the cumulated fractions of two groups of data—also todetermine whether they are truly different. This yielded an insig-nificant p-value of 0.94. The hypothesis on separatism and locationof oil therefore did not seem to hold. The numbers, however, are sosmall that it is hard to present this as conclusive evidence; it ismerely indicative. Also, we cannot know from this test whetherinsurgents simply did not have enough capability to strike outsideof their territory and whether this is the real reason that oilproduction was left intact.
5.4. Relative size of oil production
The sample of 39 conflicts in oil producing countries spans aspectrum ranging from major oil producers such as Iran and Iraqto very small producers such as Peru. The varying size of thesecountries’ oil production may be an important characteristicwhich may shed light on when oil production declines whenconflict breaks out and when it is not affected by it. Relative sizeof oil production is an indication of the absolute importance of oilrevenue to the national economy and potentially for governmentbudgets. In most major oil producing countries oil export reven-ues often constitutes the single most important income for the
Table 4Separatist conflict and oil production non-conflict to conflict.
Negativechange
Neutral orpositive change
Oil in separatist territory 4 6
No oil in separatist territory 1 6
Mann–Whitney test Sign (2-tail) 0.884
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test Sign (2-tail) 0.935
state budget and plays a pivotal role for the national economy.This is the case in countries such as Iraq where oil revenuecontributes 90% of government revenues, Nigeria (80% of budgetrevenues), or Algeria (60% of budget revenues).12 The key role thatoil revenues play for the national economy and governmentbudgets makes it all the more strategically interesting for insur-gents trying to undermine the government’s financial and mili-tary power. Therefore, oil industry may constitute an importantstrategic target in intrastate conflicts—and especially so in majoroil producing countries. Conversely, in countries with relativelyminuscule production, oil may not be as vital for the nationaleconomy nor for the government budget. This could make it a lessrelevant target for attacks as insurgents may gain more bychoosing other more vital targets.
I assess this hypothesis by dividing oil producers into threecategories including ‘‘major’’, ‘‘medium-sized’’, and ‘‘minor’’ pro-ducers. I code major oil producers to be producers, who producedmore than 60 thousand barrels of oil monthly before conflictonset such as Russia, Iran, or Nigeria. Medium-sized producers arethe ones with productions ranging from 10 thousand to 60thousand barrels, for instance Angola, Algeria, or India. Minoroil producers are countries with a production of less than 10thousand barrels per month—like Peru, Syria, or Chad.
I examine the average percentagewise change in oil produc-tion from non-conflict to conflict for each group and comparethem using descriptive boxplots and a Kruskall–Wallis (KW) test,a close cousin of the Mann–Whitney test only the KW-testmeasures if the medians of several rather than just two groupsare truly different. Fig. 3 shows the results.
The results indicate that there may be an association betweenproducer size and production shortfall when intrastate conflictsbreak out. Fig. 3a illustrates in a boxplot the cases divided into thethree groups according to producer type. The medium-producergroup and the minor producer group have roughly similar loca-tions and shapes on the chart and the observations are splitaround median lines at approximately 0.2 (2%) for the mediumgroup and at 0.1 (10%) for the minor group with min–max valuesranging from app. �0.25 (�25%) to 0.5 (þ50%). The observationsin the large producer group, however, are clustered in a lowerlocation on the chart with a median of �0.12 (�12%) dividing theobservations. The maximum value is around 0.16 (16%) increaseand minimum �1 (�100%). Thus, the large group seems to differfrom the other two groups. This could indicate that large produ-cers have a higher tendency to experience production declinesduring intrastate war.
But the data points in the large producer group also has agreater spread compared to the other two groups which couldindicate the presence of outliers that may distort the findingsalthough the median of �0.12 holds as this is not affected byoutliers. In Fig. 3b, I excluded outlier cases with productionincreases of more than 1 (100%) or decreases of �1 (�100%).Now the three groups became more similar and the differences inshape and location between the three groups almost vanished.
The KW-test, helping to determine whether the differencesbetween the large producer group and the other two groups werelarge enough not to be due to chance, resulted in a p-value of0.087. As this value is higher than 0.05 but at the same time quiteclose to it the result can be said to be marginally significant as wecan be almost 95% certain that the difference is not random.When outliers are excluded, the finding is clearly not significantwith a p-value of 0.43. In short, the analysis indicates thatthe difference between the three groups may not be purely
12 Data on oil share of government revenues are from CIA: The World
Factbook.Retrieved https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
Fig. 3. Size of oil producer and oil shortfall from non-conflict to conflict. (a) All cases and (b) outliers excluded
P. Toft / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 7265–7274 7273
coincidental and that some systematic effect could be at work.However, further investigation into this potential linkage isneeded with more refined measures and if possible more casesin order to establish this with greater certainty.
14 In his book titled ‘‘the J-Curve’’, Ian Bremmer suggests that stability is a
function of a nation’s ability to withstand shocks and its ability to avoid producing
them. This in turn depends on the legitimacy and/or coercive power of a
government and its institutions. Whereas countries resting on legitimate institu-
tions are most stable, countries based on coercion and charismatic leadership may
6. Conclusions
From the perspective of global energy security intrastate con-flict in oil producing countries can have serious global repercus-sions due to their important energy supplier role. However, thisstudy shows that the outbreak of intrastate conflict is in itself notan automatic mechanism leading to oil supply shortfalls. Analyzinghow oil production changed from non-conflict to conflict in 39 oilproducing countries that experienced intrastate conflict since1965, this paper reveals that, in general the output of oil did notchange significantly as conflict broke out. In fact, there were majorvariations spanning steep reductions to no change at all or even tomajor production increases over the duration of conflict. Thus,overall the onset of intrastate conflict is in itself not a sufficientexplanatory factor to account for changes in oil productionpatterns during internal conflict. Once intrastate conflicts breaksout there seems to be less than 50% chance that reductions follow.
Thus, the perception of risk among global oil traders and somepolitical risk analysis frameworks on the one hand and the real-world risk appears out of sync. To be sure, a slightly less than50/50 chance of shortfall still leaves high uncertainty. And thisuncertainty can off course go a long way in explaining thefluctuations of oil prices in the early stages of internal conflictsoutbreaks in oil producing regions while oil markets anxiouslyawait the course of events and hedge against the potential risk oflosses or speculate in potential gains. What matters, at least in theshort term, is not that chances are that an intrastate conflict willnot prove to have a negative effect on oil production losses, butwhether financial markets fear it might.13 If we knew more aboutwhat characteristics of intrastate conflict intervene to heighten orlessen the risk for production shortfalls, this would improve theefficiency of market expectations and perhaps reduce the politicalrisk premium to global oil prices.
In this paper I examined four such intervening factors in orderto see whether they could help specify when intrastate conflict
13 I thank an anonymous reviewer for making this point.
causes oil supply shortfalls. These factors included the proximityof key oilfields vis-�a-vis key battle zones, the duration of conflictas well as location of oil fields within or outside separatistterritory. Finally, I looked at relative oil producer size. The resultsindicated some linkage between large oil production and produc-tion decline as conflicts set in. But the association is weak andfurther research and better measures are needed.
In general, the study highlights that future research intoadditional characteristics of internal conflict in oil producingstates would be beneficial in order to better specify the circum-stances where intrastate conflict is likely to affect oil outputnegatively. Factors of potential interest could include the relativestrength of insurgents versus government forces or governments’ability to protect oil production sites. Such variables, however, areunfortunately difficult to measure in any exact way. Anothervariable of interest is the degree of involvement by internationaloil companies (IOC) in a conflict-ridden country’s oil sector. IOCsmay be more risk averse than national oil companies and mightpull out their (international) staff and shut down production inthe event of conflict quicker than national oil companies would.Comparative case studies supplementing quantitative investiga-tion may be highly useful in discovering additional mechanismslinking conflict to production shortfalls.
The results of the study imply both good and bad news forglobal oil markets and energy security in general. On the positiveside, intrastate conflict in oil producing states do not automati-cally translate into a decline in supplies for the global oil market.With recent turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa in mind,this is comforting as many key oil producers appear to be weakstates with deep-seated grievances hiding under a shallow sur-face of stability often won by draconian means rather thanpolitical legitimacy. And even if these states initiate reforms, aprocess of greater instability could follow—even leading tointrastate conflict (Bremmer, 2007).14 However, as this papershows such instability may not necessarily spill over into oil
also prove very stable. However, the latter are more easily destabilized by shocks
e.g. economic crisis or new ideas, which may quickly erode the power/legitimacy
of the government.
Table A1Post-1994 real and calculated figures for oil production.
Intrastate conflicts Pre-conflict monthly oilproduction (1000 barrels)
Average monthly oil production duringentire conflict (1000 barrels)
Real EIA figures Calculated BP Real EIA figures Calculated BP
South Yemeni Secessionist 1994a 6365 6365 9740 14,658
First Chechnya 1994–1996a 218,051 218,051 185,964 182,119
Iraqi Kurd Conflicts 1994–1996 13,840 13,840 17,440 16,890
Fourth Chad (Togoimi Revolt) 1998–2000 n.a n.a n.a n.a
Third Angolan 1998–2002 21,686 22,526 22,945 22,543
Indonesian Seperatist Conflicts 1999–2003 49,127 46,208 45,715 41,588
First Nigeria Christian–Muslim 1999–2000 65,684 65,877 64,812 61,323
Second Chechen 1999–2003 184,526 187,523 218,266 216,734
Darfur 2003–2006 (Sundan) 7310 7326 10,153 8976
Second Nigeria Christian–Muslim 2004 69,292 68,035 71,474 78,163
First Yemeni Cleric 2004–2005 13,095 13,609 12,206 12,202
Fifth Chad 2005–2006 5181 5100 5231 7201
Second Yemeni Cleric 2007 11,500 11,552 9760 9436
Total 665,659 666,013 673,705 671,833
a BP figures since EIA reporting only begins in1994.
P. Toft / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 7265–72747274
production shortages. The bad news is that chances of oil supplyshortages are still high. Also if the finding that large oil producersare more likely to experience output shortfalls during conflictthan medium-sized and minor producers, intrastate conflict insuch countries naturally implies a greater risk to global oilsupplies due to the absolute magnitude of losses in such cases.More knowledge on the circumstances that lead to oil productionshortfalls during intrastate conflict would be helpful in getting abetter understanding of the risk.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are purely those of theauthors, and may not in any circumstances be regarded as statingan official position of the European Commission. I would like tothank Anne Rasmussen, Arash Duero, Helder Lopes Ferreira, BeatrizMunoz Delgado, Peter Zeniewski, Arne Eriksson, and two anon-ymous reviewers from Energy Policy for their invaluable commentsand suggestions on various parts and aspects of the article.
Appendix
For post-1994 real and calculated figures for oil production,see Table A1.
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