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COVERING 98% OF WORLD GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND 93% OF WORLD POPULATION Study by DR. SARY LEVY-CARCIENTE 2017 Hernando de Soto Fellow With Contributions by: Prof. Cesare Galli, Esteban Gonzalez INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INDEX Executive Summary

INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INDEX - Liberales Institut · • The Free Market Foundation, South Africa • Civismo, Spain • Foro Regulación Inteligente, Spain • Advocata Institute

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COVERING 98% OF WORLD GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND 93% OF WORLD POPULATION

Study by DR. SARY LEVY-CARCIENTE

2017 Hernando de Soto Fellow

With Contributions by: Prof. Cesare Galli, Esteban Gonzalez

INTERNATIONAL

PROPERTY RIGHTS INDEXExecutive Summary

INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INDEX | 2017 REPORT

2017 IPRI PARTNER ORGANIZATIONS

AfghanistanEconomic and Legal StudiesOrganization,Afghanistan • Foundation for Economic Freedom,Albania • FundaciónAtlas 1853,Argentina •FundaciónBases,Argentina •FundaciónLiberdadyProgreso,Argentina •FundaciónLibertad,Argentina •InstituteforPublicAffairs,Australia •MannkallEconomicEducationFoundation,Australia •MyChoice,Australia •AustrianEconomicsCenter,Austria •F.A.v.HayekInstitute,Austria •TheNassauInstitute,Bahamas •NewDirection,Belgium •CPA,BosniaandHerzegovina •Multi,BosniaandHerzegovia •Populi,Bolivia •InstitutoLiberdade,Brazil •CentroMackenziedeLiberdadeEconômica,Brazil•InstituteforMarketEconomics,Bulgaria•CentreDesAffairesHumaines(CEDAH),BurkinaFaso•FrontierCentreforPublicPolicy,Canada•Macdonald­LaurierInstituteforPublicPolicy,Canada•FundaciónparaelProgreso,Chile•LibertadyDesarrollo,Chile•InstitutoResPublica,Chile•CathayInstituteofPublicAffairs,China•UniruleInstituteofEconomics,China•InstitutodeCienciaPolitica,Colombia•AsociacióndeConsumidoresLibres,CostaRica•IDEAS,CostaRica•CentredeAnalisisparaPolíticasPúblicas(CAPP),DominicanRepublic•InstitutoEcuatorianodeEconomíaPolitica,Ecuador•TheEgyptianCenterforPublicPolicyStudies,Egypt•InstituteforEconomicStudiesEurope(IES),France•NewEconomicSchool,Georgia•FriedrichNaumannFoundation,Germany•InstituteforFreeEnterprise,Germany•IMANICenterforPolicyandEducation,Ghana•GreekLibertiesMonitor(GLM),Greece•Thought4Action,Greece•KEFiM­CenterforLiberalStudies"MarkosDragoumis•CIEN,Guatemala•FundaciónEléutera,Honduras•TheLionRockInstitute,HongKong•CentreforCivilSociety,India•CentreforPolicyResearch,India•LibertyInstitute,India•IndiaInstitute,India•IndiaPropertyRightsAlliance,India•CenterforIndonesianPolicyStudies,Indonesia•IraqInstituteforEconomicReform,Iraq•HiberniaForum,Ireland•JerusalemInstituteforMarketStudies,Israel•Competere,Italy•CampagneLiberali,Italy•Think­in,Italy•IstitutoBrunoLeoni,Italy•PacificAllianceInstitute,JapanInstituteforDevelopmentandEconomicAffairs(IDEA),Kazakhstan•CenterforFreeEnterprise,Korea•BishkekBusinessClub,KyrgyzRepublic•CentralAsianFreeMarketInstitute,KyrgyzRepublic•LebaneseInstituteforMarketStudies,Lebanon•OHRIDInstituteforEconomicStrategiesandInternationalAffairs,Macedonia•InstituteforDemocracyandEconomicAffairs(IDEAS),Malaysia• SoutheastAsiaNetworkforDevelopment(SEANET),Malaysia/ASEAN•CaminosdelaLibertad,Mexico•CenterofResearchandDevelopment(CIDAC),Mexico • InstitutodePensamientoEstratégicoÁgoraA.C. (IPEA),Mexico • FundaciónIdea,Mexico • EBIThinkTankInstitute,Mongolia • Center forEntrepreneurshipandEconomicDevelopment(CEED),Montenegro • TheArabCenter forScientificResearchandHumaneStudies,Morocco •SamriddhiFoundation,Nepal • NewZealandTaxpayers’Union,NewZealand • InitiativeforPublicPolicyAnalysis,Nigeria • Civita,Norway • InternationalResearchFoundation (IRF),Oman • AlternateSolutions Institute,Pakistan • PolicyResearchInstituteofMarketEconomy(PRIME),Pakistan • Pal­Think forStrategicStudies,PalestinianTerritories•FundaciónLibertad,Panama•ContribuyentesporRespeto,Peru•InstituteforLibertyandDemocracy,Peru•InstitutodeLibreEmpresa,Peru•FoundationforEconomicFreedom,Philippines•MinimalGovernmentThinkers,Inc.,Philippines•ForumObywatelskiegoRozwoju,(FOR)Poland•WarsawEnterpriseInstitute,Poland•StowarzyszenieKoLiber,Poland•CenterforInstitutionalAnalysisandDevelopment(CADI),Romania•Libek,Serbia•F.A.HayekFoundation,Slovakia•TheFreeMarketFoundation,SouthAfrica•Civismo,Spain•ForoRegulaciónInteligente,Spain•AdvocataInstitute,SriLanka•Timbro,Sweden•WorldTaxpayersAssociations(WTA),Sweden•LiberalesInstitute,Switzerland•InstituteofFutureStudiesforDevelopment(IFD),Thailand•AssociationforLiberalThinking,Turkey•FreedomResearchAssociation,Turkey•CentrodeEstudiosparaelDesarrollo,Uruguay•BowGroup,UK•GenevaNetwork,UK•InstituteforEconomicAffairs,UK•UkrainianEconomicFreedomsFoundation,Ukraine•PropertyRightsAlliance,USA•ActonInstitute,USA•CenterfortheDisseminationofEconomicKnowledge(CEDICE),Venezuela•ZambiaInstituteforPublicPolicyAnalysis(ZIPPA),Zambia

FOR MORE INFORMATION, OR TO BECOME A PARTNER ORGANIZATION, PLEASE CONTACT LORENZO MONTANARI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE PROPERTY RIGHTS ALLIANCE AT

[email protected]

2017 IPRI – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

anorganizationbasedinWashington,D.C.,dedicatedtothepromotionofpropertyrightsaroundtheworld.

In2007,PRAinstitutedtheHernandodeSotofellowshipforthepurposeofdevelopingtheIPRI.Sincethen,

the yearly IPRI has served as a barometer for the status of property rights, ranking the strength of both

physicalandintellectualpropertyrightsincountriesaroundtheworld.

During 2017, PRAworkedwith 111 think tanks andpolicy organizations in 72 countries to compile case

studies, conduct research, formulate public policy, and educate the public on the important role property

rightsplayintheircountries.

Property rights underline the values and principles related to individual liberty and economic freedom.

A strong property rights system, as shown by the correlations with the Index, is conducive to fostering

economic growth, human capabilities, research and innovation, environmental performance,

andthecreationofsocialcapital.Propertyrightsareakeyingredientfortheprosperityofsociety.Thisyear

theIndexhasaddedalibertydimensionofdevelopmenttoevaluateitscorrelationswiththeIPRI.

TheIPRIisbuiltupfrom10factors,gatheredunderthreecomponents:theLegalandPoliticalEnvironment

(LP), Physical Property Rights (PPR), and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). The overall grading scale

oftheIPRIis[0–10],where10isthehighestvalueand0isthelowestvalueineachcategory.

The2017editioncovers98.44%ofworldGDPand93.43%oftheworld’spopulation.

I. RESULTS

The 2017 IPRI ranks a total of 127 countries (Figure 1). The selection of countrieswas determined only

bytheavailabilityofsufficientdata.

On average, the complete sample yielded an IPRI score of 5.6336. The Legal and Political Environment

istheweakestcomponent(5.1715)followedbyIntellectualPropertyRights(5.5027),whilePhysicalProperty

Rightsisthestrongestcomponent(6.2265).ThisyearwefoundanoverallimprovementoftheIPRI(+3.45%)

andofitscomponents(LP+0.81%,PPR+5.98%andIPR+3.18%).

New Zealand leads the 2017­IPRI with an overall score of 8.6335, and has the highest ratings

in the LP (9.0311) and the PPR (8.8255) sub­indexes. Finland ranks second in the 2017­IPRI (8.6257)

and has the second­highest IPR component (8.6714). Rounding out the top five 2017 IPRI scores

are Sweden (8.6084), Switzerland (8.5614) and Norway (8.5326). The Scandinavian countries continue

toreporttopIPRIrankings(Finland#2,Sweden#3,Norway#5,andDenmark#12).Attheendofthetop15

listwefindAustria(8.0122),theUnitedStatesofAmerica(8.0741)andtheUnitedKingdom(8.1292).TheUSA

leads the IPR component (8.7155), followed by Finland (8.6714), and Japan (8.3267). The group of top

countriesremainsalmostthesameandtheirpositionsvarylittlefromthepreviousIPRIedition(Figure2).

Yemenranks127inthe2017­IPRI(2.7281)followedbyVenezuela(3.0566),Bangladesh(3.1170),Moldova

(3.1781),Ukraine (3.4243), andBurundi (3.43). Considering the IPRI components the following countries

have the smallest scores: For LP: Venezuela (1.6795), Yemen (1.6929), theDem. Rep. of Congo (1.8236),

and Burundi (2.0979). For PPR: Brunei (3.2598), Ukraine (3.3779), Bangladesh (3.5024), and Moldova

(3.5102).ForIPR:Yemen(1.7075),Bangladesh(2.6225),Moldova(2.6622),andVenezuela(2.8012).Mostof

thelowestscoringcountriesperformworstontheLPcomponent.Thissituationistheoppositeforthetop

countriesandseemstohintattheabilityofLPtopulltherestofthecomponentsupward.

INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INDEX | 2017 REPORT

3

4

INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INDEX | 2017 REPORT

FIGURE 1.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

PERU 65

THAILAND 66

MEXICO 67

INDONESIA 68

UGANDA 69

TUNISIA 70

GUATEMALA 71

TANZANIA, UNITED REP. OF 72

ROMANIA 73

EL SALVADOR 74

SENEGAL 75

NEPAL 76

VIETNAM 77

TURKEY 78

ZAMBIA 79

HONDURAS 80

LIBERIA 81

KENYA 82

DOMINICAN REP. 83

MALI 84

BULGARIA 85

CROATIA 86

ETHIOPIA 87

GEORGIA 88

GABON 89

MALAWI 90

MACEDONIA, FYR 91

BRUNEI DARUSSALAM 92

ECUADOR 93

MOZAMBIQUE 94

C TE D’IVOIRE 95

BENIN 96

ARGENTINA 97

SIERRE LEONE 98

IRAN 99

PARAGUAY 100

EGYPT 101

KAZAKHSTAN 102

LEBANON 103

CAMEROON 104

MONTENEGRO 105

ALGERIA 106

ARMENIA 107

MAURITANIA 108

MADAGASCAR 109

SERBIA 110

RUSSIA 111

NICARAGUA 112

BOLIVIA 113

NIGERIA 114

115

BOSNIA&HERZEGOVINA 116

CHAD 117

ALBANIA 118

CONGO, DEM. REP. 119

ZIMBABWE 120

PAKISTAN 121

BURUNDI 122

UKRAINE 123

MOLDOVA 124

BANGLADESH 125

VENEZUELA, BOLIVARIAN REP. 126

YEMEN, REP. 127

NEW ZEALAND 1

FINLAND 2

SWEDEN 3

SWITZERLAND 4

NORWAY 5

LUXEMBURG 6

SINGAPORE 7

8

NETHERLANDS 9

AUSTRIA 10

CANADA 11

DENMARK 12

UNITED KINGDOM 13

UNITED STATES 14

AUSTRIA 15

GERMANY 16

IRELAND 17

BELGIUM 18

HONG KONG 19

ICELAND 20

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 21

QATAR 22

FRANCE 23

TAIWAN (China) 24

ESTONIA 25

SOUTH AFRICA 26

ISRAEL 27

CHILE 28

MALTA 29

CHECH REP. 30

PORTUGAL 31

MALAYSIA 32

RWANDA 33

KOREA, REP 34

SPAIN 35

URUGUAY 36

SLOVAKIA 37

MAURITIUS 38

OMAN 39

40

POLAND 41

BAHREIN 42

SAUDI ARABIA 43

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

BOTSWANA 44

COSTA RICA 45

46

SLOVENIA 47

HUNGARY 48

ITALY 49

LITHUANIA 50

PANAMA 51

CHINA 52

GHANA 53

INDIA 54

TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 55

MOROCCO 56

CYPRUS 57

BRAZIL 58

SRI. LANKA 59

GREECE 60

KUWAIT 61

COLOMBIA 62

LATVIA 63

PHILIPPINES 64

II. IPRI GROUPS

Countries were grouped according to their relevant geographical regions, income levels, degree

of development, and participation in regional integration agreements. Averages were calculated for each

grouping.

North America (8.126) and Western Europe (7.664) earned the top positions, while Africa (4.810)

andCEECA(4.937)areatthebottom.AccordingtotheWorldBankgeographicalclassifications,Oceanialeads

thegroups(8.439),followedbytheEU(6.815),andNorthAmerica(7.149).AllregionsbuttheRestofEurope

(­0.124) improved their scores. Central America and the Caribbean increased the most, with

an increase of 10.25% from 2016. According to the World Bank income classification the High Income

(+5.44%)andtheLowIncomecountries(+7.79%)improvedthemost.TheLowIncomeclassification(4.608)

receivedbetter scores than the Lower­Middle­Income group (4.487), so for the first year, the IPRI scores

donotdirectlyfollowincomeclassification(Figure3).

The Regional and Development classification of the IMF shows that the top IPRI­2017 scores are held

bytheAdvancedEconomies(7.419), followedbyMENA&Pakistan(5.210),EmergingandDevelopingAsia

(5.146), and Latin American and Caribbean countries (5.117). Emerging and Developing Asia (+7.72%)

andLatinAmericanandCaribbean(+7.61%)improvedthemost.Allregionsimprovedtheirscorescompared

tothoseof2015.

FIGURE 2.

5

INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INDEX | 2017 REPORT

INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INDEX | 2017 REPORT

TOP COUNTRIES | Ranking Change

FINLAND

NEW ZEALAND

LUXEMBURG

NORWAY

SWITZERLAND

SINGAPORE

SWEDEN

JAPAN

NETHERLANDS

CANADA

DENMARK

AUSTRALIA

HONG KONG (SAR of China)

UNITED KINGDOM (UK)

UNITED STATES (USA)

GERMANY

NEW ZEALAND

FINLAND

SWEDEN

SWITZERLAND

NORWAY

LUXEMBURG

SINGAPORE

JAPAN

NETHERLANDS

AUSTRALIA

CANADA

DENMARK

UNITED KINGDOM (UK)

UNITED STATES (USA)

AUSTRIA

GERMANY

2016 2017

6

INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INDEX | 2017 REPORT

FIGURE 3.

III. IPRI and POPULATION

Thisyear’ssampleof127countrieshasapopulationof6.87billionpeople,with68%ofthepopulationliving

in66countrieswithanIPRIscorebetween[4.5and6.4],while15.2%ofthepopulationenjoyshigherlevels

of property rights protection in 34 countries [6.5­9.4], % of the population live in 27 countries

with thelowestlevelsofpropertyrights[2.5­4.4](Figure4).

FIGURE 4.

2.5 a 3.4

3.5 a 4.4

4.5 a 5.4

5.5 a 6.4

6.5 a 7.4

7.5 a 8.4

8.5 a 9.4

6

21

44

22

13

15

6

127

279,008

873,551

1,693,397

2,978,506

285,176

723,165

33,888

6,866,690

4.06

12.72

24.66

43.38

4.15

10.53

0.49

100

2.646

11.846

30.365

18.510

12.615

16.830

7.187

100

2.307

9.062

22.571

44.605

5.215

15.472

0.768

100

IPRI 2017Countries(number)

P ation(thousand)

P ation(%)

e(%)

IPRI-P ation

IRPI

LP

PPR

IPR

Lower Middle

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

7

IV. IPRI and GENDER

GenderEquality(GE)isagoalinitself.Itsdevelopmentislinkedparticularlytohealth,education,agriculture

andunbiasedaccesstocreditforreducingpoverty.Inthisway,genderequalityplaysadecisiveroleforless

developedanddevelopingcountries.

tocredit,women’saccesstopropertyotherthanland,inheritancepractices,andwomen’ssocialrights.After

calculatinggenderequalityasanindependentmeasuretheresultswerethanaddedasan11thcomponent

totheexistingIPRI,tomaketheIPRI­GEusingascale[0­12].

The2017IPRI­GEshowsresultsfor123of the127countries included inthisyear’ssample.TheGEworld

avarageis7.118whichislowerthanthepriortwoyears(2016=7.466;2015=7.39),whiletheIPRI­GEscore

is 7.438 showing a sustained improvement (2016=6.933; 2015= 6.76). This means that gender equality

is deteriorating as an average, while the property rights protection improves. Looking in detail at the GE

componentwefindthattheInheritancePracticesandWomenAccesstoLandOwnershiparethetwoitems

withthelowestscores.

New Zealand leads the IPRI­GE (10.628), followed by Finland (10.62), Sweden (10.61), Norway (10.53),

Luxembourg (10.46), Switzerland (10.45), Japan (10.31), Netherlands (10.29), Australia (10.24), Canada

(10.17),Denmark(10.16),USA(10.07),andAustria(10.01).OntheotherextremeoftheIPRI­GE,withscores

below 5, we find Yemen Rep. (3.45), Bangladesh (3.91), Congo Dem. Rep. (4.35), Pakistan (4.47), Nigeria

(4.57), Burundi (4.63), Chad (4.63), Moldova (4.76), Mauritania (4.86), and Algeria (4.998)

(Figure5).

The top geographical regions are North America (10.121) and Western Europe (9.655), while

at the bottom we find Africa (5.887) and MENA countries (6.463). Advanced Economies (9.367) lead

the Regional and Development groups, followed by Latin America and the Caribbean (6.785)

and Emerging and Developing Europe (6.630). At the bottom we find CIS (5.664) and Sub­Saharan Africa

(5.926). CIS countries show a high GE score (8.422) but the IPRI score (3.980) pulls down the IPRI­GE.

INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INDEX | 2017 REPORT

FIGURE 5.

Lower Middle

10

8

6

4

2

0

GE

IPRI-GE

AsimilarsituationhappenswithLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean(GE=8.336;IPRI=5.117;IPRI­GE=6.785),

while the opposite happens with MENA & Pakistan (GE= 4.377) and Emerging and Developing Asia

(GE=5.952),wheretheGEscoreislow(Figure6).

8

INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INDEX | 2017 REPORT

FIGURE 6.

V. IPRI and DEVELOPMENT

Given the extensive literature that reports the important interactions between property rights

anddevelopment,weanalyzeddifferentdimensionsofdevelopment:EconomicOutcomes;Liberties;Social

Capital; Human Capabilities; Research and Innovation; and Ecological Performance with the IPRI

For the Economic Dimension, the ntrepreneurial nvironment (GEI) presented the strongest correlation

with

thebuildingblockofinnovation,investment,production,andeconomicgrowth.Itisalso

important tohighlightthattheGDPpercapitacorrelationsincreasedwhenadjustedbytheGINICoefficient,

which is ameasureofdispersion(orinequality).

ThepropensityofcountriestoexploitopportunitiesofferedbyInformationCommunicationTechnology(ICT)

asrecordedintheNRI,ameasureincludedinthenewLibertiesdimension,showedacorrelationof0.8570.

The strongest correlation is in the IPRILP category (0.881).Allmeasures in theLibertiesDimensionwere

stronger with the LP component. From the Social Capital Dimension, ivic ctivism (0.8013) showed

the strongest correlation, and from Research and Innovation Dimension, uman esources (0.7607)

showedthegreatestfit.

Figure 8 shows that, on average, countries in the top quintile of IPRI scores (i.e. top 20%) have

apercapitaincomealmost13timesthatofcountriesinthebottomquintile.Thisdisparityhasreducedover

time,in2016itwasalmost21timesandin2015almost24timesgreater.

LACAsia

MENA & Sub-Saharan CIS

10

8

6

4

2

0

GE

IPRI-GE

FIGURE 7.

9

INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INDEX | 2017 REPORT

0.814

0.839

0.764

0.720

0.878

0.768

0.675

0.732

0.857

0.747

0.801

0.565

0.656

0.635

0.679

0.605

0.761

0.685

0.594

0.821

0.826

0.767

0.721

0.886

0.812

0.722

0.792

0.881

0.711

0.800

0.631

0.712

0.674

0.738

0.590

0.752

0.635

0.648

0.630

0.659

0.635

0.514

0.690

0.633

0.576

0.499

0.678

0.694

0.605

0.394

0.498

0.445

0.477

0.477

0.553

0.495

0.395

0.788

0.834

0.707

0.744

0.840

0.669

0.565

0.708

0.812

0.685

0.810

0.523

0.595

0.618

0.638

0.610

0.796

0.758

0.574

Production

Investment

Complexity ofProduction

Enterpreneurship

GDP per capita

GDP per capita *GINI

Gross Capital Formationper capita

Economic Complexity

Economic

Absence ofCoercion

Connectivity

Index of EconomicFreedom, IEF

Economic Freedomof the World, EFW

Human Freedom Index, HFI

Networked ReadinessIndex, NRI

Global Enterpreneurship(GEI)

Social Capital Social Capital comp.(Prosperity Index)

Activism Civic Activism

Cohesion Intergroup Cohesion

Trust Interpersonal Safety & Trust

Inclusion Inclusion of Minorities

Current Situation Human Development Index,HDI

Future Condition Global Index on Freedomof Education, GIFE

EcologicalPerformance

EPI-Yale

Human Resource Researchers in R&D

Research & Developmentexpenditure

PPR IPRIPRI LP

Human

R&I

EP

Liberties

10

INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INDEX | 2017 REPORT

FIGURE 8.

FIGURE 9. Cluster’s Members & Centroids

2ndQuintile

$60,000

$50,000

$40,000

$30,000

$20,000

$10,000

$0

3rdQuintile

4thQuintile

Bottom20%

$57,230.30

$27,497.63

$13,821.69

$4,627.06 $4,533.16

IPRI Quintile

VI. IPRI CLUSTERS

Aclusteranalysiswasperformedforall127countriesaccordingtotheirvaluesinLP,PPRandIPRaiming

to group similar countries. The analysis showed that three clusters were sufficient to explain country

groupings.Eachclusterrepresentsmorethanagroupingbyvariablesdirectlyassociatedwithpropertyrights;

theyaregroupswithcommoncharacteristicswithinthemandwithdifferentfeaturesbetweenclusters,which

Itisimportanttonoticethatthisyearwefoundasignificantmovementofmostofthecountriestoanimproved

position(Figure9).

11

INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INDEX | 2017 REPORT

In2015Italyimplementedthe“PatentBox”,anoptionaltaxsystemforincomearisingfromtheuseofIPrights.Thefirst

Europeancountry to introducesuchan incentivewas Ireland in2000.ThenFrance,Belgium,Hungary,Luxembourg,

theNetherlands,SpainandtheUnitedKingdomfollowed.AspartofitsBaseErosionandProfitShiftingproject,theOECD

hasrecommendedtheimplementationofacommonapproachaimedatensuringthatonlytheincomecreatedinone

countrycanbenefitfromthatcountry'scorrespondingtaxrelief,proportionatetotheinvestmentmadethere.Despite

its name, however, the Italian patent box appliednot only topatents andknow­how,but also to copyright (at least

partially), designs and trademarks (the latter, however, were excluded in 2017). Furthermore, the Italian Ministry

ofEconomicDevelopmentissuedimplementationrulesaimedatfacilitatinguseofthissystembySMEs.However,the

Ministry of Economy and Finance took an inconsistent approach, whichmultiplied the burdens of thosewhowant

to benefit from the system, by requiring analytical documentation of costs incurred for the creation of every single

intellectualpropertyproduct–oftenanimpossibletask.IthasthuslosttheopportunitytoencourageItaliancompanies

tore­shoretheirIPrightsandmanufacturingactivity.Instead,sinceIPrevenueandproductionofmanyimportantItalian

companiesremainparkedinforeignsubsidiariestheItalianPatentBoxledtoareductionintheamountoftaxrevenue,

ratherthanincreasingthetaxableincomeinItaly.ThishascreateddisappointmentandgarnereddistrustfromItaliantax

authorities.

Patent Box in Italy: Light and Shadow of a Special Tax Regime

By Prof. Cesare Galli, Istituto Bruno Leoni

Thiscasestudyisaboutinstitutionalrulesofthepoliticalgame:collectivedecisionmaking,legislation,governmentin

general,andtheirroleinprotectingindividualrights.Itfocusesonathin,butsubstantial,conceptionoftheruleoflaw

torestatethenormativeargumentforconstitutionaljusticemechanismsaspartofthebasicinstitutionsofafreesociety.

Then, through an analysis of the Mexican juicio de amparo judicial review mechanism, this study argues that

constitutional justice and the protection of human rights require judicial review to have general effects over

unconstitutionalfiscallaws.Thefactthatfiscalamparoprotectsonlytherightsofthosewhogotocourtdamagesjudicial

rationalityandinstitutionallegitimacy.Independenceishurtasthecourtsareusedbyinterestgroupstoadvancetheir

economic interestsoverotherswithout the resources todefendtheirrights.Thisgenerates incentives forpoliticians

totakeintoaccount judicialreview,butnonethelessenactunconstitutional lawseveryyearasonlya fewindividuals

will be protected against them, and incentivizes firms to engage in rent­seeking behavior. In the end, I draw some

reflectionsuponmethodologicalconcernsfortheruleoflawmeasurementandconsolidation.

A Century of Injustice: Rule of Law, Constitutions and Property Rights in Mexico

By Esteban Gonzalez Herrejón, Caminos de la Libertad

TheWestern Balkan countries of Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and Kosovo lag

behindotherEuropeantransitioncountriesintermsofeconomicdevelopmentandEuropeanUnionaccession.Although

thesecountrieshaveintroduceddeepreformsinmanyareas,especiallyduringthetransitionprocessofprivatizationand

democratization,propertyrightsinthesecountriesarenotwellprotectedwhichhindersfurthereconomicdevelopment

and social change. Instead of protecting property rights, state governments in these countries choose to infringe

theserightstopursuepoliticalgoals.Insteadofprotectingpropertyrights,stategovernmentsinthesecountrieschoose

Weak Governments and Partial Protection: Property Rights

in the Western Balkans

INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INDEX | 2017 REPORT

ThereisadebateinVenezuelaoverwhoownsnaturalenergyresourcesandwhoshouldreceiverevenuederivedfrom

their sale. Currently, the resources are said to be owned by the nation, yet revenue from these resources

do not go to the public but to the Executive Branch, which is under the control of the dominant political party.

This has created a power imbalance and caused a great deal of political instability as the incumbent party is able

totakeadvantageofthenationalresourcesforpartisanpurposes.ThispapersuggeststhecreationofanEnergyCouncil

tooversee revenuedistribution fromresourceextraction industries.This is a starkcontrast from thecurrentpolicy,

whichisaproductof“socialisminthetwenty­firstcentury”ideas.WithanEnergyCouncil,managementdecisionstouse

revenuesderivedfromresourceextractionindustrieswouldbetiedtogetherandallocatedmoreefficiently,sterilized

frompoliticalmanipulation.Theexistingsocialistpolicy,implementedbythepastandcurrentBolivariangovernments

hasnationalizedelectricity,oil,gas,andminingindustries.Theresultshavebeennothingshortofdisastrous:shortages

ofessentialgoodsanddecliningrevenue.Itistimeforchangeandnewideas.TheEnergyCouncilwillplayastabilizing

role by separating the oil, gas, coal, and gold industries from partisan politics. The paper contains details on how

thecurrentsystemoperatesandhowanindependentenergycouncilcanbeformedtoplayaconstructiveroleinsolving

theVenezuelancrisis.

Jewish economics is derived from its theology and its legal system – the Halakha. According to its theology,

manwascreated“inGod’simage”withaGodlyportionwithinhim.Jewishtraditioninsiststhatmancan,andshould,have

apowerfulimpactuponthematerialworld,tohavedominionandtoaccumulatewealth.Thisinsistenceplaysitselfout

inavastlydifferentviewofpropertyrights.Ownershipdoesnotgenerateonlypleasure,butalsoresponsibilitytowards

theneedy, and throughthis responsibility it expresses theGodlyportionwithinman.Ownership,orpropertyrights,

in Judaism, are not given to the individual from the state and they are not respected because of their contribution

tosociety.AccordingtotheJewishlegalsystem,theHalakha,propertyrightsareperceivedasajustright,andtheyare

generated from the divine law, as prohibitions and obligations of every person towards his fellow's dominion over

hisproperty.

A Special Case Study on Religion & Property Rights: Property Rights from a

Judaism Perspective. Dominion and Property Rights in Judaism

toinfringetheserightstopursuepoliticalgoals.TheaimofthispaperistopointoutdifferencesbetweenWesternBalkan

countriesintheirtransitionpathfromothertransitioncountriesintheregion.Thepaperillustratestheimpactofthese

differencesonpropertyrightprotectionswithcasestudiesfromSerbia,andBosniaandHerzegovina.Thepaperdescribes

thepresentandpaststateofprivatepropertyrightsinWesternBalkancountrieswithafocusonthetransitionperiod

from communism to democracy. In conclusion, based on the comparative analysis, this paper offers a set

ofrecommendationsforimprovingprivatepropertyrightsintheWesternBalkans.

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