International Cooperation and Competition A

InternationalCooperation

andCompetition 4

A U.S. national strategy for satellite remote sensing musttake into account the increasing importance of interna-tional remote sensing activities. The growing number ofcountries that are active in remote sensing and the in-

creasing number and depth of international interactions amongremote sensing programs have created expanding opportunitiesfor the United States to benefit from international cooperation inremote sensing. The changing international scene also poses newchallenges to U.S. competitiveness in commercial remote sens-ing and force a reconsideration of national security interests in re-mote sensing technologies.

Several factors have led to the increasing international interac-tions in remote sensing, which include both cooperation amonggovernmental programs and competition in commercial activi-ties. First, the market for satellite data is naturally a global one, interms of both supply and demand. The supply is global becausesatellites are capable of viewing the entire globe as they orbitEarth. 1 The demand is global because users around the world aremaking increasing use of satellite data and because many of the

] Not all $atcllites ha~ e global scope, but all are capable of viewing very large regionsof Earth. Stitelllte\ m polar orbit can observe the entire globe as Earth rotates under theirorbits: tho~e in IOW er-inclination orbits misf regions that are too far north or south; those ingeosynchronous orbit view continuously the same region—roughly a third+f Earth”ssurface. ArtIclc 11 of the Outer Space Treaty (United Nations, Treuf} on Principles G<J\ -erntng [he A ctI\’It{e $ of .5”Iute,\ [n the L’.zploru{[on urrd Use of .Chtcr Spuce, ln<ludtng theMoc~n und O/}wr Cele.\t/al Bed/e\, Jan. 27, 1967) recognizes the right of \atellitcs to pasjo~’er international boundaric~ w ith impunity, and The United Nafion.$ Princi/~le.~ Relufinqto h’emtjlt .%Jn\I’nK ~jflhe h’urlhjr(ml @ce reaffirm the legitimate role of remote sensingsate]] ites. See U, S. Congre\\, Office of Technolog~’ Asseswnen(, Renm~el] S’en.$ et/ f>uftJ..

72chn(~l{~,q.v, Munaxemenf, fJrd Murkels, OTA-ISS-604 (Washington, DC: U.S. Gover-nment Printing Office, Augu\t 1994), box 5-3.

I 101

102 I Civilian Satellite Remote Sensing: A Strategic Approach

applications of satellite data, such as weather fore-casting and global change research, depend on theavailability of global data sets.

The national pursuit of technological self-suffi-ciency has helped produce a second factor behindthe internationalization of remote sensing: the in-creasing international diffusion of technical capa-bilities. Although commercial firms are playingan increasingly large role in satellite remote sens-ing, national governments continue to predomi-nate. Canada, Europe, India, Japan, and Russia allhave substantial and overlapping capabilities inremote sensing. This creates new opportunitiesfor international cooperation in remote sensing,but it poses challenges to U.S. leadership. U.S.policies and practices no longer determine in-ternational standards by default. Instead, theUnited States faces the more difficult task of pro-viding leadership through consensus building andaccommodating the interests of other countries.

The third critical factor affecting internationalremote sensing activities is the worldwide interestin reducing costs. This leads to two competing im-pulses:

the growing interest in international coopera-tion in order to increase the cost-effectivenessof remote sensing programs, particularly toeliminate unnecessary duplication among vari-ous national programs; andthe tendency toward commercialization, pro-vided by government agencies to recover someof the costs of developing and operating remotesensing systems.

These two impulses are in conflict because in-ternational cooperation relies on the relativelyopen exchange of data, while commercializationdepends on the ability to limit data access only topaying customers. Because of this conflict, effortsto promote international cooperation in an era ofmultiple suppliers have focused first on the coor-

dination of data policies. 2 The development ofsuccessful data-exchange policies will be criti-cal to future international cooperation in re-mote sensing.

These three factors have led to programs of in-

t e r n a t i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n a n d p l a n s f o r c o n t i n u i n g

t h e e x p a n s i o n o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n i n r e -

mote sensing. The ultimate scope and direction ofthis cooperation will depend on several factors:

II

II

■

●

the ability to preserve effective data-exchangemechanisms;the ability to share equitably both the costs ofdeveloping and operating remote sensing sys-tems and control over those systems, withoutcreating cumbersome financial and administra-tive arrangements;the confidence of all international partners intheir ability to rely on one another (thus, theUnited States needs to judge the reliability ofits partners and to strive to be a reliable partneritself); andthe uncertain political and economic stability ofRussia.

International cooperation will evolve slowlythrough successive generations of satellite sys-tems as experience determines whether theUnited States can work effectively with othercountries on remote sensing programs.

This chapter begins with a brief discussion ofinternational interests and activities in satellite re-mote sensing. The following sections discuss therisks and benefits of expanded international coop-eration in remote sensing, with particular atten-tion to the implications for commercial marketsand for national security interests. The concludingsections apply these considerations to an analysisof a range of options for future organizationalstructures to support enhanced international coop-eration in remote sensing.

2 U.S. Congress, Offlce of Technology Assessment, Remo/ely Sensed Data: Technology, Marwgement, and Marke[s+ oP. cit., ch. 5.

Chapter 4 International Cooperation and Competition I 103

INTERNATIONAL REMOTE SENSINGNEEDSFor the most part, international uses of remotesensing are similar to those in the United States(see chapter 2). Some of these applications havedata requirements that are truly international incharacter. In other cases, the data requirements areessentially local, although the needs of some for-eign users, particularly in developing countries,are qualitatively different from those of U.S. datausers.

Weather forecasting is the most established in-ternational application of satellite remote sens-ing.3 The related endeavors of scientific studiesand operational monitoring of oceans and climate,as proposed under the planned Global ClimateObserving System (GCOS) and Global OceanObserving System (GOOS),4 also require datathat are international in scope, as would a pro-posed Environmental Disaster Observation Sys-tem (EDOS).5 These global applications requireoperational mechanisms for the international ex-change of raw and processed data, including the insitu data6 that remain critical to the quantitativeinterpretation of satellite data.

Many applications of remote sensing—partic-ularly land remote sensing—require only local orregional data. Yet these uses of remote sensing,

applied in widely dispersed locations, often re-quire nearly identical types of data. With theirglobal coverage, satellites offer an economy ofscope in meeting data needs in different parts ofthe world. Despite this, the desire for technologi-cal development and autonomy has led manycountries to develop independent capabilities inland remote sensing. These countries have taken arange of approaches to the public and private-sec-tor roles.

Other international differences arise from con-trasting data needs in different parts of the world,particularly in the developing world. Poorer, de-veloping countries often lack fundamental in-formation about land cover, land use, and naturalresources and have limited administrative and fi-nancial resources for collecting that informationon their own.7 Providing this basic informationthrough remote sensing could improve substan-tially the ability of developing countries to man-age their natural resources and develop their econ-omies in ways that respect the naturalenvironment,8 although it could also be used tostrengthen the control of authoritarian regimes.Accomplishing development and resource man-agement goals involves much more than simplyproviding satellite data; it often requires foreignassistance in developing national capabilities to

~ For more information on the data-exchange requirements and mechanisms used in weather forecasting, see U.S. Congress, Office of

Technology A~\essment, Rernotel) Sen~ed Data: Technology, Management, and Markets, op. cit., ch. 5.

~ p]ans for GCOS ~d GoOS, Which are cumen[]y under development, will probably reIy on a mixture of new sate]] ite and In situ instruments

and in~truments planned for other purposes. For information on GCOS, see Joint Scientific and Technical Committee for GCOS, GCOS: Re-sponding to the Needfcjr Cl/inure Obser}arions, WMO No. 777 (Geneva: World Meteorological Organization, 1992); f’or information on GCOS,see D.J. Baker, “Toward a Global Ocean Observing System,” Oceans 34(1 ):76-83, spring 1991; and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-ministration, Ftr,sl Steps Tb\~ard a U.S. COOS: Report of a Workshop on U.S. Contributions to a Global Ocean Obser\’ing S>’.stem, October 1992(available from Joint Oceanographic Institutions Inc., Washington, DC).

5 For a history of this idea, see J. Johnson-Freese, “Development of a Global EDOS: Political Support and Constraints,” Space PolicvIO( 1 ) 1 :45-55, 1994. EDOS would not necessarily require a new, dedicated system of satellites, but could rely on timely access to data fromsatellites de~igned primarily for other purposes.

~ In contrast t[~ remotely \en\ed data, in situ data are measured at the location of the phenomenon that is being observed..T India is tie nlain exception (. this ~le, ~lth a \ub\tantia] commitment to developing its own remote sensing capabilities. China and Brazil

also have significant remote \en\ing program~.

* Committee on Earth Ob\en ations Satellites, ‘The Relevance of Satellite Missions to the Study of the Global Environment,” paper pres-ented at the United Nations Conference on En\ ironment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, June 1992.


make effective use of data from satellites and of in festiveness of their national programs. Thissitu data.9

THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OFINTERNATIONAL COOPERATIONThese common interests in remote sensing, com-bined with the equally common desire for techno-logical independence, have led an increasingnumber of countries to undertake civilian space-based remote sensing programs (appendix B). Theprograms have often begun as independent ef-forts, but many countries have pursued interna-tional cooperation as a way to increase the cost-ef-

cooperation has taken a variety of forms (box 4-1).Each cooperative arrangement has dealt with

the problem of facilitating data exchanges andharmonizing data-access policies among the par-ticipating agencies (box 4-2). These efforts tocoordinate satellite remote sensing programs andtheir associated data policies form the foundationfor a steady expansion of international coopera-tion.

International cooperation in remote sensingpresents the United States with an array of benefitsand risks. Many of these benefits and risks apply

9 See the section on international development in U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Remofely Sensed Daru: Technology,Munugemenf, und Murke[s, op. cit., ch. 5.


equally (o interagency coordination within theU.S. government. but some issues are unique ormore pronounced in an international context. Anexpansion of international cooperation shouldaim to enhance the benefits of cooperation with-out adding unnecessary risks.

I Benefits of Cooperation= Reducing cost. Many of the agencies involved

in remote sensing share common goals andhave developed overlapping satellite pro-grams. Facing budget constraints, these agen-cies are looking for ways to coordinate their

programs to eliminate unnecessary duplicationand, thereby, to reduce their overall cost.Reducing technological and program risk.Some degree of redundancy is necessary, par-ticularly for meteorological and other opera-tional satellite programs. The exchange ofbackup satellites between the National Oceanicand Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) andits European counterparts is a case in point:NOAA provided a backup geostationary satel-lite, the Geostationary Operational Environ-mental Satellite (GOES), when Europe hadproblems with its Meteosat program, and Eu-



—


●

●

■

rope returned the favor when NOAA facedproblems with its GOES program, lending Me-teosat 3 to NOAA in place of GOES-East (seeappendix B). Because the United States andEurope could rely on each other for backups,they avoided more serious disruptions in theiroperational programs while maintaining thedeliberate pace of their satellite-developmentprograms.Increasing effectiveness. The elimination ofunnecessary duplication can also free up re-sources and allow individual agencies to matchthose resources more effectively with their mis-sions. This reallocation of resources can elimi-nate gaps that would occur if agency programswere not coordinated. International discussionscan be valuable even if they merely help toidentify such gaps, but they can be particularlyuseful if they lead to a division of labor that re-duces those gaps. Cooperation on data collec-tion and exchange, especially for data collectedin situ, can also provide important benefits.Sharing burdens. International cooperationcan lead to a more equitable sharing of costs forexisting remote sensing programs. One organ-ization, the International Polar OperationalMeteorological Satellite organization (IPOMS),was founded largely for this purpose. IPOMSwas disbanded in 1993, having accomplishedits mission with Europe’s commitment to polarmeteorological satellite programs, particularlythe Meteorological Operational Satellite (ME-TOP).10 The growing interest and activity byother countries in remote sensing has alsohelped to equalize this burden. In 1993, U.S.programs accounted for roughly 40 percent ofworldwide spending for civilian remote sens-ing (table 4-1 ).Aggregating resources. International coopera-tion can also provide the means to pay for newprograms and projects that individual agenciescannot afford on their own. This has been thecase in Europe, where the formation of the Eu-

Agency or countrya

NASANOAADOD (Landsat and DMSP)

Total United States

ESAEumetsatFranceGermanyItalyUnited Kingdom

Total Europe

Japanb

CanadaRussia c

ChinaIndiaOthers d

Total

Budget($ million)

938320150

1,408

354143415

8866

1271,193

39695

2281289039

3,577a NASA = National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NOAA = Na-

tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration DOD =Departmentof Defense, DMSP = Defense Meteorological Satellite Program ESA =European Space Agency

b Including $150 million estimated for the Japan MeteoroloicalAgency

c From Anser - $100 million estimated for Meteord From Anser

SOURCES National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration/Natiion-a Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service, 1994, Anser

Corporation, 1994, Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1994

ropean Space Agency (ESA) and the EuropeanOrganisation for the Exploitation of Meteoro-logical Satellites (Eumetsat) has allowed Euro-pean countries to pursue much more ambitiousand coherent programs than any of them couldhave accomplished alone. The need to aggre-gate resources is particularly great for remotesensing programs, such as the Earth ObservingSystem (EOS), that are organized into large,multi-instrument platforms. In addition to ag-gregating financial resources, cooperation canalso allow countries to combine complementa-ry technical capabilities.

10 The Coordlnatlon Group for Meteorologica] Satc]lites (CGMS ) assumed the remaining coordination functions of IPOMS


■ Promoting foreign policy objectives. Coopera-tion in space also serves important foreignpolicy objectives, as exemplified by the in-ternational space station program. 11 Importantcooperative remote sensing activities grew outof the space station programl2 and from theagreements on space cooperation signed in1993 by Vice President Albert Gore and Rus-sian Prime Minister Viktor Chemomyrdin.13

Cooperation on data exchange helped theUnited States promote the ideal of opennessduring the Cold War.

1 Risks of Cooperation■ Decreased flexibility. The planning, develop-

ment, and operation of a major remote sensingproject require a substantial long-term commit-ment of resources and do not allow a great dealof flexibility. International coordination couldfurther reduce that flexibility y by making the de-cisionmaking process more complicated, lead-ing to inefficient choices that limit the potentialreductions in cost and risk.

■ Increased management complexity. Interna-tional cooperation can introduce an extra layerof complexity to the management of a remotesensing program. Not only does the decision-making process become more complicated, butthe political and budgetary processes of coop-erating agencies in different countries may bedifficult to reconcile.

■ Decreased autonomy. The commitment of asubstantial portion of an agency’s budget to in-ternational activities reduces its ability tomodify its programs in response to changingneeds or budgets. An agency may be forced tocompromise on meeting its own requirements

in order to meet the requirements of an intern-ational program, or it may have to defer desiredprograms of its own.

H Potential unreliability of foreign partners.Complementing the loss of autonomy is theconcern over the reliability of foreign partnersand their commitments. An attempt by onepartner to reduce or withdraw its commitmentto a joint program could jeopardize the entireprogram, including portions that had been pro-ceeding steadily as separate national programs.This could pose particular difficulties whencooperation rests on political arrangements ofuncertain stability, as is now the case with Rus-sia. The reliability of U.S. commitments is alsoa concern to potential foreign partners. givenrecent uncertainties over U.S. commitments tothe space station and other major internationalscience and technology programs. 14

n Decreased scope for private markets. As dis-cussed in chapter 3. one way to meet the gov-ernment’s remote sensing data needs is to pur-chase data from the private sector. This hasparticular advantages when the aggregate de-mand for a certain type of data is large but nosingle agency can afford the satellite system.International agreements to fund remote sens-ing systems jointly could eliminate an impor-tant opportunity for the private sector. On theother hand, agreements to discuss common re-quirements and meet those requirementsthrough coordinated data purchases could stim -ulate private-sector activities.

8 Increased technology transfer. Althoughmany countries now possess the technical abili-t y to build remote sensing systems oft heir own,the United States maintains a substantial lead

I I Lr s congress, Office Of Technology Assessment, Remote/}? Sensed Duta: TtJchnolog>, Mtitzugcmctit, LJtJd tf(lrkef$, OP. cit.. box ~- 1..

‘ 2 In particular, the Earth Observation International Coordination Working Group (EO-ICWG) grc~ out ofthc international polar platformsof the international \pacc \ta[ion program.

1‘I white H o u s e , Plan for Ru.yTlan.Anlerjcun C(x)p(,rutjje pro,qrarns in E(Jrt}l .y(’ien(’e UII(/ ~<n~ lrotl!?l(’tll(l/ ~fonlf(~rln,~ ,fTOnl $/)~J(’~’

(Washington, DC: White House, Oct. 27, 1993).

I ~ me Cancc]]a[lon of the SuFrconduc[ing Supercol}ider may ~ lnstructl~ e in :it lc~~t t~~o \\r:i}$. Fir\[, I])C \J II ]III:IIC\\ of ~ongrci~ to ~’iill~~l

a large ongoing project casts some doubt on the U.S. abi I ity to make the needed commitment to Iwge coupcrati~ c prt~gran~i. Second, unccrtmnt)over the U.S. commitment to thif project deterred other countriei, particularly Japan, from taking part.


in several critical technologies. Cooperativeprograms require some sharing of technologi-cal information, and simply working togetherinevitably promotes the exchange of techno-logical knowledge. This transfer could, in turn,undermine U.S. national security interests aswell as the technological advantages of U.S.companies in the international market.

International cooperation offers many of thesame benefits and risks as cooperation amongU.S. agencies, with one important difference: In-ternational agreements have no central au-thority like the U.S. federal government to setthe agenda and adjudicate disputes. Central au-thority in the U.S. government is relatively weak,and interagency discussions often resemble in-ternational negotiations, but national political de-cisions can intervene to resolve disputes. For ex-ample, the planned convergence of polarmeteorological satellites was dictated by a Pres-idential Decision Directive NSTC-2 (appendixC), and NOAA and the Department of Defense(DOD) must answer to presidential and congres-sional authority in carrying out that decision.

Two areas that deserve special attention as po-tential constraints on international cooperation inremote sensing are the potential effects on emerg-ing commercial markets and on national security.The next two sections deal with these issues inmore detail.

INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIONIN REMOTE SENSINGCountries compete in remote sensing for manyreasons, including military power, technological

prowess, and political symbolism. This sectionfocuses on the more concrete issue of internationalcompetition in the commercial aspects of satelliteremote sensing.

The United States dominated the developmentof scientific, operational, and commercial ap-plications of remote sensing as part of the Landsatprogram in the 1970s and early 1980s. The LandRemote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984(P.L. 98-365) and the emergence of the FrenchSystéme pour l’Observation de la Terre (SPOT)system in 1987 helped launch an internationalmarket in remote sensing. More recently, enter-prises in Europe, Russia, and Japan have at-tempted to break into the commercial market, andseveral U.S. firms have announced plans to sellhigh-resolution land imagery (box 3-7).

Current markets for remotely sensed data arebecoming more specialized, with the develop-ment of a variety of niche markets, each with itsown requirements.

15 The growth in commercial

data markets has been stimulated by the most rap-idly growing sector: the value-added firms thatconvert raw data into usable information. Euro-pean value-added firms are playing a growingrole,16 although U.S. firms continue to dominatethe market for Geographic Information Systems(GIS).17

National governments continue to dominateboth the supply and the demand for remotelysensed data. Because of this, national remote sens-ing policies play a major role in international datamarkets. To compete in international markets,U.S. firms must confront markets that are shapedin part by foreign governments. European coun-

IS For Cxanlple, agricultural] users require moderate-resolution multispectral images with short revisit times. The mapping and p]anning

market often requires high-resolution stereoscopic images, but timeliness is less important. For an outline of the differing requirements for ‘somecommercial markets, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Remote!}’ Sensed Dula: Technology, Manu,gemenr, and Markers,op. cit., ch. 4.

I h me Countfies of Eastern Europe have demonstrated their interest and capabilities in software development, particularly in analyzing data

for operational purposes. See R. Armani, Managing Director of Vitro-SAAS Kft., testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,Not ember 1993.

11 GIS are flexible, computer-based mapping software systems that allow users to manipulate and combine information of different types

that comes from a variety of sources, including satellite images. For a more detailed discussion of GIS, see U.S Congress. Office of TechncllogyA\\mwnent, Remotel) Sensed Data: Technology>, Management, and Markets, op. cit., ch. 4.

Chapter 4 international Cooperation and Competition I 111

tries in particular have strikingly different policiesfrom the United States on pricing and access todata from government-funded systems, as well ason the role of governments in commercial mar-kets. 18

Furthermore, government standards for dataformat and quality can have major effects—bene-ficial or detrimental----a data markets. They arebeneficial when they reduce market risks by en-couraging users to coalesce around a predictableset of data requirements, and they can be detri-mental if they discourage the emergence of newmarkets that require different types of data. 19

Recent events pose several dangers for U.S.firms in the international market. First, the failureof Land sat 6 has created great uncertain y over thecontinuing supply of Landsat-type data and hasencouraged many users to seek other sources ofsupply, including SPOT data. Any interruption inthe data supply could undermine established val-ue-added firms and make it difficult for U.S. datasuppliers to break back into a reshaped market.

Chapter 3 identified several options for miti-gating these risks, including strengthening gov-ernment support for continuation of the Landsatsystem, developing public-private partnershipsfor a possible Landsat successor or gap-filler, andusing long-term data-purchase contracts. Alterna-tively, the United States could attempt to preventany data gap by exploring the use of data from for-eign satellite systems.20

The lack of a U.S. source for operationalsynthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite data21

also poses a danger for U.S. firms, particularly inthe value-added market. Although heavy data-telecommunication and data-processing demandscurrently make SAR data too expensive for mostcommercial purposes. SAR systems could openup a range of new commercial applications.22 Eu-rope, Canada, and Japan all have experience oper-ating SAR systems, and Europe has promoted thedevelopment of new SAR applications throughpublic-private partnerships. Each of these coun-tries has designated a specific firm23 to market thedata for commercial purposes, and these firmscould have a particular advantage in the value--added market.

As described in chapter 3, the United States hasseveral options in order to avoid being left out ofthe SAR data and value-added market, includingdeploying its own SAR and funding the purchaseof SAR data for the development of commercialapplications. In addition, the United States couldpush for international agreements on equal accessto SAR data from foreign sources. Ideally, suchagreements would prevent foreign countries fromcharging higher rates to U.S. commercial users orgiving preferential access to designated compa-nies.

Finally, U.S. firms could face obstacles in in-ternational markets because of the data policiesand commercial subsidies that other governmentsprovide to their national firms. These issues arisefrequently in international trade negotiations. anda range of trade policy tools is available to addressthem.

‘x Ibid.. ch. 5.

‘g L.S. Conge\s, Office of Technolog}f As\e\\ment, International Security and Space Progrwn, lktu }“ormuf .Sfundard.j /i)r Ci\I/Ian R(-

mo~c .%n}~rt~ Sufcll/Ic.\, background paper (Washington, DC: OffIce of Technology Assewment, April 1993).

‘(i T%e lndian Remote Sensing Satellite (IRS) systcm may be one of the closest to LandwH in its technical chara~teri~tic~, b~lt the Ru~\i:mRe\ur\-O or the Jtipancw Advanced Earth Observing Satellite (A DEOS) s> stem could provide a uwble substitute.

2 ] The only U.S. ipace-baseci SAR system is the Shuttle Imaging Radar-C (SIR-C), which has flown on the Space Shuttle. SIR-C is a muchmore w}phlstlcatcd radar thun anj of [he foreign $y~tenl$. but fire\ onlj in freqwntl).

22 The ability of SAR systems to “see” through cloudi pro~ ide~ a particular ad~ untage o~ cr optical ~> stems in pro} iding prompt and rel]abkimagery when timcline$$ ri critrcal.

23 Eurimagc in Europe, Radar\at ]ntemational rn Canada. and the Remote Sensing Tecbnolog> Center (RESTEC ) in Japan,


NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUESNational security concerns also pose constraintson the extent of international cooperation in re-mote sensing and on U.S. participation in globalmarkets for satellite data and technologies. Re-mote sensing serves a variety of military and othernational security purposes, including many thatare similar to civilian applications, such as map-ping and weather forecasting, and many that haveno obvious civilian counterpart, such as arms con-trol verification, reconnaissance, targeting, anddamage assessment. Because the technologiesand many of the applications are similar, a nation-al strategy for civilian remote sensing must alsoconsider national security concerns.

U.S. military strategy has long relied on tech-nological superiority, including the superior in-formation that comes from advanced remote sens-ing systems. The ability to obtain superiorinformation and to deny it to an adversary can bedecisive on the battlefield. For this reason, mili-tary approaches to remote sensing emphasize con-trol over both technology and data. As discussedbelow, however, U.S. military requirements maychange with the evolving international securityenvironment and the increasing diffusion of tech-nological capabilities.

1 International Issues in ConvergenceThe likely European role in a converged weathersatellite system designed to meet both militaryand civilian requirements raises two related is-sues: control over the data stream, and U.S. re-liance on foreign sources of data. DOD has an ex-plicit requirement that it be able to deny themeteorological data stream to an enemy in a crisisor in wartime (chapter 3). Encryption of the broad-cast data stream would accomplish this, while pre-serving the availability to broadcast cloud imag-

ery to properly equipped troops in the field.On-board data storage would allow uninterruptedrecords for climate and land-use monitoring to bemaintained.

The United States would like to be able to con-trol the data stream from the European METOPplatform as well, and has insisted on control overdata from U.S.-supplied instruments. For ME-TOP- 1, these include the most critical proven me-teorological imaging and sounding instruments:the Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer(AVHRR), the High-Resolution Infrared Sounder(HIRS), and the Advanced Microwave SoundingUnit (AMSU). Initially, Eumetsat has balked atthis proposal, noting that data from these instru-ments is currently freely available by satellitebroadcast. 24

The Clinton Administration’s convergenceproposal calls for U.S. imagers and sounders tocontinue to fly on future generations of METOPsatellites, but Europe will probably develop someof its own instruments. France and Italy are col-laborating to develop the Interferometric Atmo-spheric Sounding Instrument (IASI), which couldbecome a candidate to replace HIRS.25 Similarly,ESA is developing a Multifrequency Imaging Mi-crowave Radiometer (MIMR), which could re-place the Special Sensor Microwave/Imager(SSM/I), although budget and satellite sizeconstraints have led Europe to review both ofthese instruments.26

Operational users would prefer that compatibledata come from the same instruments on METOPas are on the U.S. converged weather satellites. IfEurope wanted to fly its own operational instru-ments, this compatibility could come into ques-tion. Alternatively, European instruments couldfly on all three satellites, but this would raise con-

2J A. LawIer, “Data COntro] complicates Weather Merger,” Space New’s, June 20-26, 1994, p. 3.

25 The Atmospheric Infrared Sounder (AIRS) instrument currently under development by NASA for EOS PM-1 is another candidate toreplace HIRS, as is the Interferometric Tcmperitture Sounder (ITS) proposed by the Hughes Santa Barbara Research Corporation. Chapter 3discusses the development of future meteorological instruments.

26 Europe currentl) has no plans to develop an imager to replace AVHRR.

... ._—— —. .—


cerns over U.S. self-sufficiency in basic meteoro-logical systems.

The use of European imaging and soundinginstruments on METOP would reduce U.S. lever-age over access to and management of the ME-TOP data. Even with a formal agreement on theconditions for restricting access to METOP data,DOD would lose direct control and would haveless confidence in its ability to cut off the data flowduring times of crisis. In part for this reason, theconvergence proposal calls for the United Statesto operate two of the three operational satellites.Restricting the data flow from these two satel-lites-either by outright denial or, more likely, bydelayed access—would reduce the value of thedata from METOP alone. Controlling two of threesatellites also limits DOD’s reliance on foreignsources of data. The convergence plan calls for theUnited States to maintain the ability to launch aspare satellite on short notice, which further re-duces U.S. reliance on European data sources.

Control over the data flow from a convergedsatellite system would not necessarily limit all ac-cess to comparable data sources. DOD has re-sisted attempts to make its meteorological imag-ery available operationally, especially thesea-surface wind data derived from SSM/I, al-though Europe has developed similar capabili-ties.zT Russia also operates polar satellites in theMeteor series, which broadcast some data in thelow-quality Automatic Picture Transmission(APT) format. and China has deployed exper-imental polar weather satellites as well. If thesesources continue and improve, the United Statescould lose all ability to restrict access to high-quality meteorological data. However. maintain-ing open access (except in a crisis) to data from theconverged satellite system could forestall this de-velopment by limiting the motivation of other

countries to develop advanced meteorologicalinstruments of their own.

1 Control of Data and Relianceon Foreign Sources

Military concerns over control of access to andmanagement of U.S. data and reliance on foreignsources of data apply to issues beyond conver-gence. Data from government-run civilian land re-mote sensing systems have primarily civilian ap-plications, although some types of data havesignificant military utility.28 The U.S.-led coali-tion used data from Landsat and France’s SPOTduring the Persian Gulf War, and the United Statesand France restricted the flow of those data to oth-er countries. DOD’s Defense Mapping Agencynow relies heavily on SPOT data, but may switchto U.S. commercial suppliers once their systemsbecome operational.

The United States will remain a leader in pro-viding satellite weather data and will have stronginfluence over the shape of cooperative agree-ments in that endeavor, but the situation could bequite different in other areas. For example, it maybe difficult to establish a working partnership onocean remote sensing that involves two of theleading players—Japan and the U.S. Navy—be-cause of the Japanese policy to support remotesensing only for peaceful purposes. A lack of op-erational experience with civilian SAR systemscould hamper DOD ability to make effective useof data from foreign SAR systems.

Although U.S. security policies have tradition-ally relied on superior intelligence and informa-tion, some people have argued that open access tosatellite intelligence would provide greater securi-ty benefits than keeping access restricted. Frenchand Canadian proposals in the 1980s, which were

27 The .ActI\c Nlicrowave ln~trument (AhlI ) on bowl ERS- I can function af a watterometer, measuring \ea-surface wind speeds.

2X LJ.S. Congrc\\, Office of Twhnologj Asw\\ment, The Futl/rc ofl?emotc Scnfln<zfronl Sp~Jce: Ci\ilian Sutelllfe S?.stems undAppllcafion.r,OT&lSC-55X (Wra\hington, DC: U.S. Go}cmment Printing Office. Jul] 1993), ch. 6 and app. C.


never realized, called for an international satellitemonitoring agency to help verify arms controlagreements and promote openness in military de-ployments in order to defuse military tensions anddeter surprise attacks.29

I Licensing Commercial Data SalesThe differences in technical capability betweenmilitary and civilian remote sensing systems arenarrowing, particularly in the light of proposedhigh-resolution civilian systems. The Land Re-mote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-555)reiterated the authority of the Department of Com-merce to license commercial sales of remotelysensed data. This act presumes that a licenseshould be granted, with possible restrictions ondata access. As noted in chapter 3, several firmshave since applied for and received licenses to selldata with resolutions as high as 1 to 3 meters (m).

In March 1994, the Clinton Administration an-nounced its policy on licensing the sale of remote-ly sensed data (appendix F). This policy requiresthe satellite operator to keep records so that theU.S. government can know who has purchasedwhat data, and it authorizes the government to re-strict the flow of data to protect national securityinterests during a crisis or war.

The principal considerations in permitting suchdata-sale licenses are: 1) the military sensitivity ofthe data in question and 2) the availability of com-parable data through other channels.30 Data with1 -m resolution could certainly be used to identifytargets for military attack, although restrictions ondata access during a crisis or war could limit theiruse against mobile military targets. Data of simi-lar resolution will soon be available international-ly, from SPOT 4, with 5-m resolution,31 from

Russian satellites, with 2-m resolution or less,32

and from the French HELIOS satellite.

U Diffusion of Technological CapabilitiesU.S. export-control policies have been designedto prevent the spread of technologies with criticalmilitary applications, including remote sensing.The United States leads the world in many specif-ic sensor technologies, in the development oflightweight sensors and satellite systems, and inthe hardware and software of signal process ing.33

These advantages are important for the commer-cial competitiveness of U.S. industry as well as fornational security. However, the spread of thesetechnological capabilities as other countries pur-sue remote sensing programs has reduced theseU.S. advantages substantially.

The United States no longer leads in all aspectsof remote sensing technology, and increasing for-eign investments in remote sensing technologyare likely to narrow the gaps. For example, theUnited Kingdom is the world leader in activecooling of infrared sensors. For the type oftechnology involved in international remote sens-ing partnerships, technology transfer has becomea more equal two-way process in which commer-cial control of proprietary technologies is moreimportant than military control of sensitivetechnologies.

International partnerships often involve con-tractual restrictions that forbid those who receivetechnical information to support joint projectsfrom using that information for other purposes.Another way to limit the transfer of sensitivetechnologies is to restrict cooperative programs toless sensitive activities. The imagers and soundersNOAA is providing for METOP-1 fall into this

29 This technlca] capability a]one is not enough [0 prevent such attacks. U.S. intelligence satellites d~te~tcd the Iraqi buildup on Kuwait’s

border in July 1990 but did not conclude that Iraq was planning to attack Kuwait until a few hours before the attack.

3~ These we [he no~al considerations for all expotl COIltl’OIS.

3 I spOT 4 is scheduled for launch in 1996. See appendix B.

32 Russia has indicated (hat it might a]so sell images With resolution of less ‘han 1 ‘“

33 see ~hapter q for a discussion of the r~]e of technology development in the future Of remote sensing.


category. Finally, the use of “black box” arrange-ments can minimize the likelihood of inadvertenttechnology transfers. This entails providing aslittle detail as possible about the internal function-ing of specific instruments while providing suchessential information as their weight, power re-quirements, data quantity and format, and physi-cal tolerances. Such arrangements are generallyconsistent with the standard engineering practiceof modular design, making the components of anoverall system as independent as possible.

With any cooperative project, some technologytransfer is inevitable, even necessary. Having sci-entists and engineers work together is probablythe most efficient way to transfer technologicalknowledge, particularly for system-level technol-ogies such as bus design and spacecraft integra-tion and for signal transmission and processing.The various instruments on a satellite generallyshare common data-communication channels,and the exchange of raw and processed data is es-sential to any cooperative arrangement.

National security concerns about technologytransfer will continue to pose constraints on in-ternational cooperation in remote sensing. Giventhe increasing diffusion of technological capabili-ties, however, the desire to protect competitive ad-vantages in international commercial marketsmay take on greater relative importance, and theability to maintain these advantages throughtechnology controls is likely to erode in any case.

I Licensing Satellite SalesSome countries have expressed an interest in pur-chasing high-resolution remote sensing satellitesystems from U.S. companies, and some U.S.companies have responded with proposals to sell“turnkey” systems for other countries to oper-ate. 34 This type of transfer raises issues that gobeyond concerns over the sale of data. Specifical-

ly, it would offer the recipient country the oppor-tunity to gain experience in satellite operationsand in data processing and management, whilelimiting the ability of the U.S. government to re-strict the flow of data. U.S. policy continues to re-strict the sale of these sensitive technologies (seeappendix F).

1 Export Controls andCooperative Projects

Cooperative remote sensing projects often in-volve foreign agencies providing instruments tofly on U.S. satellites or U.S. agencies providinginstruments to fly on foreign satellites. The trans-fer of instruments for joint projects differs frommore sensitive exports in several important ways.First, instruments can be transferred under a“black box” arrangement that minimizes the op-portunities for technology transfer. Second, thesensors involved in joint projects generally havelittle or no specific military application. Finally,the United States usually undertakes joint projectswith allies who often have comparable technicalcapabilities, so technology transfer is less of aconcern (the placement of the Total Ozone Map-ping Spectrometer (TOMS) instrument on a (then)Soviet satellite was a significant exception).

Currently, most satellite instruments are treatedas munitions under export-control regulations.35

For most joint projects, these controls are not ap-plied at the time of transfer but at the time whenthe Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) gov-erning a project is being negotiated. Such an MOUgives NASA the authority to license the necessarytransfer of instruments.

36 Complete export con-

trol reviews are still required for certain countries,including Russia (although this may change in re-sponse to growing U.S.-Russian space coopera-tion). Another option being considered is to treatremote sensing instruments—at least those that do

~~ J H FrcJ ~esidcn[ of ][ek optical s) s[enl~, testimony before the Senate Se]cct committee on Intel ligcn~c, NO V. 17, 1993,,

~s They are lifted on the U.S. Munitions List, which is administered by the Department of State.36 L Shaffer Ac[lng A\sis(an[ As\ociate Adminis~ator for Extema] Coordination, Office of Mission to planet Eaflh, NASA, Wrsonal cOn~-

munication, July 22, 1994.


not contain sensitive technologies—as dual-usetechnology items

37 rather than as munitions.

OPTIONS FOR INTERNATIONALCOOPERATIONThe preceding sections considered the risks andbenefits of international cooperation in remotesensing. This section applies those considerationsto a range of options for increasing cooperation inthe future.

Current plans for international projects and theagendas of international organizations call for asteady expansion of international cooperation inremote sensing over the next decade and raise theprospect of further long-term growth in interna-tional cooperation. This section analyzes threeprincipal alternative approaches to the long-termfuture of international cooperation in remote sens-ing. Each of these approaches uses existing in-ternational organizations as models or buildingblocks,

■

■

●

Develop an international information coop-erative for environmental data, modeled onthe World Weather Watch (WWW). The freeand open exchange of data has been traditionalboth in operational meteorology and in theearth and environmental sciences but has comeunder increasing pressure from promoters ofrestrictive data-access policies.Develop formal specialization and division oflabor, based on the Earth Observation Interna-tional Coordination Working Group (EO-ICWG). The logical extension of current coor-dination efforts, this approach would developformal commitments outlining specific rolesfor each agency.Create an international remote sensingagency, modeled on ESA or Eumetsat. Thelong-term need for efficient and reliable in-ternational arrangements could lead to a formalinternational organization for satellite remotesensing.

These options are not mutually exclusive, nordo they provide an exhaustive list of possible fu-ture arrangements. They do provide a frameworkfor thinking about the long-term future of interna-tional cooperation in remote sensing. The varia-tions on each of these approaches also illustratepossible paths for evolution toward greater coop-eration.

1 International Information CooperativeModeled on WWW, an international informationcooperative could develop broad institutionalmechanisms for data exchange and for sharing re-sponsibilities for data and information manage-ment. WWW (box 4-3) has three main functionalelements: 1 ) a Global Observing System, consist-ing of the observational equipment whose datastream WWW member countries make availablefor broader use; 2) a Global Data Processing Sys-tem of forecast centers operated by WWW mem-bers; and 3) a Global Telecommunications Systemfor transmitting raw and processed data and fore-cast information among WWW members. TheWorld Meteorological Council meets regularly tocoordinate plans for these systems and for otherpurposes.

The most important feature of WWW may beits underlying assumption that the mutual benefitof open data exchange is greater than the costs ofproviding access to data. WWW members providebasic meteorological data and forecast informa-tion for the general use of all other members in realtime and at no charge. In addition, all programs ofthe WWW are carried out through the voluntarycooperation of WWW members.

Information cooperatives have significant ad-vantages over more-restrictive data-access mech-anisms. Cooperatives are well-suited to moderninformation technologies that make it easy to pro-vide access to data and information but difficult tocontrol that access. They also allow for an infor-mal sharing of the burden of data collection thatdoes not require a strict accounting of costs and

37 ControIs on dual-use [echno]ogy i(ems are administered by the Department of Commerce under the Commerce control List.



benefits to each party. Furthermore, informationcooperatives facilitate the development of in-formation services in the private sector, such asAccu-Weather, by reducing the cost of raw data.Finally, the open data exchange that would occurunder an international information cooperative iscompatible with U.S. government data policiesand practices.38

Information cooperatives also carry substantialdisadvantages, however. Some agencies feel thatthey are bearing a disproportionate share of thecosts of data collection and perceive relatively lowbenefits from the data they receive in exchange.Others will be tempted to act as free riders, usingfreely available data without contributing propor-tionately to the cost of collecting those data. Thegreatest potential disadvantage of an informa-tion cooperative is that it impedes the emer-gence of a commercial market for data and ofthe financial mechanism of data sales thatcould give data users leverage over the data-collection system.

Eumetsat has made the strongest objection tothe free exchange of data: if Eumetsat makes itsdata freely available, nonmember countries willhave little incentive to join Eumetsat and pay itsoperating costs. This is why Eumetsat plans to en-crypt Meteosat data.

39 In addition, some develop-ing countries have reduced their provision of insitu data from weather stations. The countries ar-gue that the benefit goes mainly to developedcountries, so developed countries should pay agreater share of the cost. These circumstanceshave raised fears for the future of the WWW system.

The possible erosion of the WWW systemmight not have a great effect on the availability ofsatellite data to NOAA. As the leading supplier ofsuch data, NOAA would almost certainly retain

access to other sources through bilateral exchangeagreements. However, the erosion of the WWWsystem could undermine the exchange of in situdata as well as efforts to improve the collection ofhigh-quality in situ data that are essential for un-derstanding climate change and other aspects ofglobal change. Furthermore, bilateral data ex-changes usually entail restrictions on access bythird parties, which could undermine the ability ofprivate information services to obtain the datathey need.

The International Council of Scientific Unions(ICSU) established an information cooperativethat is similar to WWW, the World Data Centres(WDCS) (box 4-4), to support international col-laboration in earth and environmental sciencesand to archive data gathered during the Intern-ational Geophysical Year in 1957. These centers,which hold both satellite and nonsatellite data,now constitute a valuable resource for globalchange research. WDCS are generally nationaldata centers, but not all national data centers areWDCS. The WDC system provides open access todata on the basis of reciprocal data exchangeamong centers. Because of their desire to recovercosts through data sales, however, some countrieshave reduced their contributions of data to theWDC system.40

The model of an information cooperative couldalso be applied to other areas, such as oceanic andterrestrial monitoring. Programs of the Intern-ational Oceanography Commission (IOC) couldprovide the basis for operational exchanges ofoceanic data, and programs of the Food and Agri-culture Organization (FAO) and the United Na-tions Environment Programme (UNEP) couldprovide the basis for exchanging data about the

38 u s ~]lcy ~lucldated in Office of Managemen[ and Budget Circular A-130, treats information owned by the federal government as. .being in the public domain and allows agencies to charge those requesting information only the marginal cost of fulfilling user requests.

39 L. Shaffer and ML. Blazek (“International and Interagency Coordination of NASA’s Earth Observing System Data and Information SYS-

tem,” ERIM Symposium on Remote Sensing and Global Environmental Change, Graz, Austria, Apr. 4-8, 1993) argue that European countriesalready have substantial reasons to join Eumetsat, including national prestige and the opportunity to have a say in Eumetsat decisions. This mayexplain why 17 countries already belong to Eumetsat, although Austria’s decision to join is generally attributed to Eumetsat’s encryption policy.

4(I For example, Cmada has stopped providing gmrnagmtic data to the WDC for geomagnetism in Boulder* Colorado.


SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment 1994

terrestrial environment. However, interest in theoperational use of these types of data has been rel-atively weak and fragmented, so these exchangemechanisms remain largely unexploited for op-erational purposes.

Alternatively, the Committee on Earth Ob-servations Satellites (CEOS) could provide thebasis for a more comprehensive information

cooperative involving satellite data of all types. Abroad-based information cooperative may be dif-ficult to achieve at a time when many agencies areemphasizing cost recovery and potential commer-cial applications of satellite data. Congress maywish to monitor international negotiations thataddress the challenge of maintaining open ac-cess and exchange of data for operational me-


teorology programs and for global change re-search.

1 International Specialization andDivision of Labor

Rather than pursue comprehensive remote sens-ing programs that go far beyond their means, mostagencies have little choice but to specialize in oneway or another. In some cases, such as NOAA andEumetsat, this specialization reflects the scope ofan agency’s missions, but frequently, it reflectsdeliberate decisions about where to focus limitedresources, particularly in relatively new pro-grams. These decisions are based on a variety offactors, including national and regional needs,technological strengths and opportunities, and thepotential for commercialization.

For example, ESA’S nonmeteorological remotesensing programs place special emphasis on at-mospheric chemistry and the development ofSAR technology and applications. Japan has em-phasized observations of ocean color and dynam-ics and of coastal zones. Canada has focused onthe application of SAR to monitor snow and icecover on land and at sea. Even EOS, which the Na-tional Aeronautics and Space Administration(NASA) originally planned as a comprehensivesystem, has been “rescoped” in response to budgetconstraints in order to focus on observations re-lated to climate change.

41 Although most agen-

cies have activities outside these core areas, thetendency toward specialization is real and signifi-cant.

This specialization arose in part through thecoordination activities of CEOS and the Earth Ob-servation International Coordination WorkingGroup (EO-ICWG) and, more importantly, in part

from the independent choices of independentagencies. Even this informal division of labor al-lows the participants to receive the benefits of acomprehensive remote sensing system withoutany one group bearing all the costs. For example,NASA has been able to reduce its costs for EOSbased on the commitment of other agencies to per-form some of its functions. Specifically, NASAhas eliminated or deferred instruments, such as aSAR and HIRIS, based in part on the fact that Eu-rope, Japan, and Canada are flying similar instru-ments, though these instruments are less capableand less expensive than those NASA would haveflown .42 NASA could also benefit from the coor-dination of atmospheric chemistry missions be-tween NASA’s EOS Chem and ESA’S Envisat.43

Even with some division of labor, however, theUnited States may prefer not to rely too heavily onforeign sources of data, especially in technologi-cally promising areas such as SAR and hyperspec -tral land sensing.44

Relying on the current division of laborwithout formal commitments from foreignagencies carries significant risks. These risksare twofold. First, an agency could eliminate orsubstantially modify its plans so that it no longermeets U.S. needs. Second, even if the programcontinues, the data it produces might not be readi-ly available to users in the United States. Al-though formal agreements can also collapse, theyat least provide assurance of an agency intentionand make it more difficult politically for thatagency to change direction.

Under a formal division of labor, agencieswould agree to take on specialized functions notonly for their individual benefit but for the collec-tive benefit of all cooperating agencies. This

~1 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Furure of fi’emole Sensing flom space, op. cit., aPP. B.

42 me Japanese Advmced Spaceborne Therlna] Emission and R-flecdcm Radiometer (ASTER) will fulfill some of the functions ‘of [he

canceled HIRIS (High-Resolution Imaging Spectrometer), and the SAR instruments on Europe’s ERS- 1, ERS-2, and En\ isa[ and Canada’sRadarsat will fulfill some of the functions of the canceled EOS SAR.

J~ Recornmenda[ion of the EOS payload AdViSOV panel Report, Office of Mission to Planet Earth, National Aeronautics and SpaCc Adnlin-

istration, Dec. 17, 1993, p. I I.

44 see the earlier section on international competition.


would permit each agency to limit the scope of its EO-ICWG provides a framework that facilitatesprograms with some confidence that it would notat the same time narrow the range of data it mightreceive or the applications it might pursue.

A formal division of labor would require astructured mechanism for negotiating and reach-ing agreement on the roles of individual agencies.EO-ICWG provides an example of how this mightwork (box 4-5). In its ongoing efforts to coordi-nate selected agency programs (table 4-2) into anInternational Earth Observing System (IEOS),

the implementation of instrument exchanges andjoint projects. The mandate of EO-ICWG is quitebroad and includes coordinating plans for futureremote sensing programs. This broad mandatewould allow the formation of a joint planninggroup responsible for coordinating agency plans.

The option of a formalized division of laborraises two principal issues. First, can one agencyrely on others to meet its data requirements? Forexample, can NOAA rely on ESA, Eumetsat, and

Country or region Agenciesa SatellitesUnited States NASA, NOAA EOS-AM, EOS-PM,

EOS-Chem, EOS-Alt,EOS-Aero, POES

Europe ESA, Eumetsat Envisat-1

Japan NASDA, JEA, JMA, MITI ADEOS, ADEOS-2

Canada CSA Contributor to Envisat-1

Japan, United States NASA, NASDA TRMMaNASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration: NOAA - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, ESA -

European Space Agency NASDA National Space Development Agency, CSA = Canadian Space Agency

SOURCE National Aeronautics and Space Adminitration, 1994


Japan’s National Space Development Agency(NASDA) for atmospheric and oceanic data? Thelong history of convergence efforts for NOAA andthe Defense Meteorological Satellite Program(DMSP) polar systems shows the difficulties ofbuilding confidence even among agencies of theU.S. government.

45 To build that level Of Confi-

dence, a formal division of labor requires a formalprocess through which the agencies that developand operate remote sensing systems can addressthe requirements of those who use the data.

The risks of relying on foreign agencies for re-motely sensed data are greatest when the data re-quirements are the most demanding, particularlyin terms of operational timeliness and reliability.Therefore, the challenge of international coor-dination grows with the transition from researchand demonstration to operational monitoring,whether for global change research, weather fore-casting, or environmental management.

To meet particularly critical needs, an agencymay provide in-kind contributions of instrumentsor share responsibility for data management. Forexample, NOAA is contributing imagers andsounders to the European METOP platform.NASA is providing a scatterometer to measuresea-surface winds for the Japanese AdvancedEarth Observing Satellite (ADEOS) platform andtaking responsibility for processing the data fromthis instrument. Cash contributions are also pos-sible, but nations usually prefer to make in-kindcontributions in order to develop and maintaintheir own technological capabilities.

The willingness of agencies to continue bear-ing the costs of maintaining and operating a sys-tem they have developed can also be an issue, es-pecially if these costs stand in the way of pursuingnew programs. Eumetsat has moved toward amore restrictive data policy in large part to spreadits costs more broadly. Under a formal division of

labor, it would be clearer what each country re-ceived in return for its contributions and therewould be a mechanism for addressing the divisionof costs, but it would be difficult to avoid the ten-dency for each agency to value its own contribu-tions more highly than what it receives in return.Furthermore, some agencies have relatively nar-row charters and would not benefit from the datathey receive from others. For example, Eumetsatmight not be willing to make data from METOPfreely available to Japan in return for ocean datafrom ADEOS, which would have relatively littlevalue to Eumetsat’s meteorological mission.

Finally, a division of labor might spread theburden too narrowly among the participatingagencies, and the pressure would remain to spreadthe burden more broadly by restricting data accessand charging others for the use of data.

I International Remote Sensing AgencyOver the years, several authors have proposed es-tablishing an international satellite remote sens-ing agency or consortium.

46 These proposals gen-erally envision an organization that is broad-basedboth in the international scope of its membershipand in the functional scope of its observations andtheir application. It would collect contributionsfrom national governments and, in turn, make dataand information available to those governments.This section considers the assumptions that un-derlie these proposals and summarizes some alter-native approaches.

Many proposals cite the International Telecom-munications Satellite Corporation (Intelsat) as amodel for an international satellite monitoringconsortium. Intel sat provides a mechanism for na-tional telecommunications services to combineresources to pay for satellites that provide interna-tional telecommunications links. National ser-

4S See chapter s for a discussion of convergence.

% J.H. McElro~, ‘. INTELSAT, INMARSAT, and CEOS: Is ENVIROSAT Next?” In Space Monim-ing ofG/obu/ Change, G. MacDonald and

S. Ride (eds.) (San Diego, CA: Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, 1993); J. McLucas and P.M. Maughan,“The Case for Envirosat,” Space Policy 4(3):229-239, 1988,


vices receive access to these links in proportion totheir investment in Intelsat. The InternationalMaritime Satellite Organization (Inmarsat) playsa similar role for mobile and maritime commu-nications.

The Intel sat model may not be directly applica-ble to remote sensing because of the nature of theservice Intelsat provides. It is much more difficultfor remote sensing than for telecommunicationsservices to distribute the benefits of a satellite sys-tem in proportion to contributions. Weather fore-casting and global change research provide in-formation as a public good. Furthermore, invest-ors in Intelsat recoup their costs by charging usersfor the telecommunications service they provide.

Other organizations created for internationalcooperation in the noncommercial applications ofspace technology, such as the European organiza-tions ESA and Eumetsat (box 4-6), may providemore appropriate models than Intelsat for an in-ternational remote sensing organization. Furtherexperience with interagency cooperation throughthe Integrated Program Office, planned as part ofthe convergence of the Polar-orbiting OperationalEnvironmental Satellite (POES) and DMSP sys-tems, may also provide important lessons forstructuring such an organization.

In general, an international remote sensing or-ganization requires a closer, more formal coopera-tive structure that could increase both the benefitsand the risks of cooperation. Compared with an in-formation cooperative or a formal division of la-bor, an international organization offers a greaterability to share costs broadly and equitably47 and amore formal method for meeting international re-quirements. It could also lead to the most cumber-some administrative arrangements. An interna-tional agency also requires the greatest degree oftrust among its participants.

The effectiveness of an international monitor-ing agency will depend on how it deals with sever-al issues:

■

●

m

■

m

How much does each member contribute? Forexample, members of Eumetsat contribute apercentage of their gross domestic product(GDP). Members of ESA contribute to so-called mandatory programs (mostly operationsand overhead) on a percentage-of-GDP basisand to other programs on a voluntary basis.What are the procedures for making deci-sions? ESA and Eumetsat generally requireconsensus among member agencies. whichoften impedes decisionmaking. In contrast, In-telsat makes decisions like a corporation, on thebasis of a majority of share ownership. The de-cisionmaking process is particularly importantin establishing system requirements andmatching those requirements to available re-sources.What are the policies on data access, for mem-ber and nonmember governments as well asfor private organizations? To create incentivesfor membership, ESA and Eumetsat give pref-erential access—providing data at reducedcost, in a more timely manner, or in a morecomplete form-to member governments.What should the agency buy-satellite sys-tems or data-and from whom? Under its“juste retour” policy, ESA spends contractmoney in a member country in proportion tothat country’s voluntary contribution to ESA.This policy has been criticized as cumbersomeand inefficient, but it aims to provide techno-logical and economic benefits in proportion tonational contributions. Intelsat and Eumetsathave no such policies. For now, the absence ofrules on procurement sources would benefitU.S. aerospace firms, which hold the techno-logical lead in many areas. But in the long run,this approach might not guarantee a continuingrole for U.S. companies in providing the sys-tems they currently produce.How comprehensive should the agency’s mis-sion be? Eumetsat focuses on weather and c1i-

47 In p~ncip]e, such an organization could lead tO an unfair distribution of costs. However, it is unlikely to impose a greater relati~’e burden

than current arrangements do on the United States.


mate observations, for example, but most pro- (he synergies between different types of mea-posals envision a comprehensive agency that surements and because measurements oftenencompasses all aspects of operational remote serve multiple purposes, it makes sense to con-sensing. A comprehensive international sider the requirements of multiple applicationsagency offers several advantages. Because of simultaneously. 48 Defining a program too nar-

~ Sce chapter 2 NASA Origlna]]y planned t. make Eos a mrnprehmslve system but has since narrowed the intended scow of EOS to focuson climate. EOS is meant to be a research program rather than an operational one, although some of its elements may lead to long-term opera-tions.

Chapter 4

rowly may make it more difficult to pursue ap-plications that have been left out, and it may ul-timately be simpler to administer a singleinternational program under a single set of pro-cedures than to allow special-purpose organi-zations to proliferate.

But a comprehensive international agency alsocarries significant drawbacks that limit its feasi-bility for the near term. By maximizing the scopeof the proposed agency, one also maximizes thedisadvantages that come with cooperation: ad-ministrative complexity and loss of autonomy.Furthermore, some of the participating nationalagencies have more restricted missions and wouldnot be willing to take part in an internationalorganization with a broader scope.

I Options for a More SpecializedInternational Remote Sensing Agency

A narrowly focused international remote sensingagency could concentrate its cooperative effortson those areas where cooperation may offer great-er benefits, with less risk of disrupting existing na-tional programs. Over time, such an agency couldbroaden its mandate if member governments sawan advantage in doing so.

The main drawback of embarking on a more fo-cused mission is that it could fail to take advantageof the synergies between various remote sensingmissions and capabilities. For example, an oceanmonitoring agency might not give adequateweight to monitoring ocean processes that affectthe climate system. However, in the context ofcurrently emerging mechanisms to address theseissues in other ways, this drawback may not becritical. The following are several possible in-ternational agencies with more limited scope:

8 An international weather satellite agency.Like NOAA’s satellite programs, this kind ofagency could include both polar and geosta-tionary satellites. The polar satellite compo-nent might grow out of a future converged

International Cooperation and Competition I 125

U.S.-European system based on POES, DMSP,and METOP. Because these satellites cover theentire planet, however, the agency that supportsthem might seek a broad global membership in-corporating systems from Russia, Japan, and,possibly, China, although this might make itdifficult or impossible to exercise control overdata for national security purposes. The fund-ing formula and benefits of participation couldbe designed to encourage the broadest possiblemembership and to discourage free riders. andthe administrative procedures would have to berelatively simple. For example, the internation-al agency might simply contract with theUnited States, Europe, or Russia to provide po-lar satellite services. much like the way Inmar-sat, early in its operation, built on preexistingcapabilities, leasing communications channelsfrom satellite operators.

Geostationary satellites have a more limitedscope and, therefore, present slightly differentissues. Rather than contributing to a worldwideagency, members might contribute to regionalagencies centered on the current U. S., Euro-pean, and Japanese programs. The centralAsian region presents a problem because Indiahas not allowed access to its data, and Russiaand China have encountered problems in de-

49 An interregion-ploying satellites of their own.al coordinating body could establish minimumagreed standards for these satellites and simpli-fy data exchange across regions.

An international climate monitoring agency.Climate monitoring depends on much of thesame information as weather forecasting but re-quires more precise meteorological measure-ments as well as a broader range of in format ion.For example, satellite measurements must bevalidated by comparison with well-calibratedin situ measurements from around the world.Climate depends on a range of ocean and landprocesses, so climate monitoring requires ob-

w ~c Ru\slm Geo\[atlc)nam Owrationa] McteOro]Ogi~al Sate]li[e (GOMS) has reportedly been ready for launch sin~c 1992 ~nd ‘nay be

awaiting forclgn funding. The C“hlnese FY-2 satellite, \chedulcd for launch in April 1994, was destroyed during ground tefting.


servation of these processes as well. Climatealso depends on information about atmosphericchemistry—the concentration of aerosols andgreenhouse gases—which is not essential formost other applications of remote sensing.50

A climate monitoring agency, which mightevolve from the proposed Global Climate Ob-serving System, could function in severalways. It could operate satellites to collect onlythose data unique to climate studies, such as at-mospheric chemistry measurements, whilemaintaining archives of high-quality meteoro-logical data and related land and ocean data ob-tained from other sources. This would requirethe cooperation of other agencies or programs,which would collect those data. Alternatively,climate monitoring could be carried out by aweather forecasting agency; Eumetsat is con-sidering expanding its mandate to include cli-mate monitoring. Given the broad nationalcommitments to climate research and the scopeof international cooperation in global changeresearch, however, such an agency may not beneeded.

8 An international ocean satellite agency. Thisdiffers from the weather satellite case in that nooperational systems now exist, except as ad-juncts to meteorological systems. An interna-tional agency could facilitate the establishmentof an operational program by aggregating re-sources from the various interested agencies.Because proposed requirements led to highcosts, the United States has been unable tomake a commitment to an ocean observing sat-ellite system, but U.S. participation in an in-ternational system should be more afford-able.51 Like an international weather satelliteagency, however, an international ocean satel-

lite agency would make it more difficult to con-trol data for national security purposes.

An ocean monitoring agency poses someunique problems. One is how to determine na-tional contributions. An island nation such asJapan is naturally more interested in oceanic in-formation than is a landlocked country such asAustria, although both could be concernedabout the influence of oceans on climate. Thissuggests that a division of labor based on vary-ing degrees of’ interest may be more appropriatethan an international agency. However, theformation of an international agency couldsidestep the potential problems of direct coop-eration between Japan and the U.S. Navy, givenJapan’s policy to support only nonmilitary ap-plications of remote sensing.

● An international land remote sensing agency.Internationally as well as nationally, the prob-lem of aggregating demand is particularly acutefor terrestrial monitoring, which involves a va-riety of national and local government agencieshaving overlapping but often quite different re-quirements (see chapter 3). Harmonizing theserequirements into a mutually agreed to and af-fordable basic set presents a considerable chal-lenge. Terrestrial monitoring also faces thegreatest overlap between public and private-sector interests,52 as well as civilian and mili-tary interests. An international agency couldalso stifle the development of commercial ven-tures in land remote sensing.

■ An international data-purchase consortium.Instead of organizing resources to develop andoperate satellite systems, any international re-mote sensing agency could accomplish its mis-sion—whether narrow or comprehensive—through the purchase of data from commercial

so other sa[e]lite instmmen[s Cm also provide important climate information. These include the Earth Radiation Budget Experiment

(ERBE), which measures the balance between incoming solar and outgoing thermal radiation from Earth, and the Active Cavity RadiometerIrradiance Monitor (ACRIM), which measures the total energy flux from the sun.

51 For a discussion of U.S. options for ocean monitoring, see chapter 1.

52 me Pub]lc sector tends t. ~ more in[eres(ed in LandSat-type imagery (high spectral resolution, moderate spatial resolution) while the

private sector may be more interested in high-spatial-resolution imagery prov ided by SPOT and other proposed commercial ventures, but thereis no clear line of demarcation between the two.


suppliers. NASA is testing this relatively novelarrangement with its purchase of data from theSea-Viewing Wide Field Sensor (SeaWiFS)(chapter 3). A data-purchase consortium wouldthen operate a data-management, -processing,and -distribution system to serve its members,but its greatest challenge could be to aggregateand coordinate its members’ data requirementsand to match the needs of its members with theavailable resources. The principal advantage ofthis type of agency is that it would stimulate in-ternational private-sector activity by demon-strating a guaranteed demand for the data inquestion, rather than competing with and po-tentially crowding out private-sector activities.A data-purchase consortium would raise thequestion of data access by third parties, that is,nonmember governments and private compa-nies or individuals.

Any of these proposed organizations couldfunction independently, with varying degrees ofcooperation with other programs. They could alsoprovide manageable steps on the road toward amore comprehensive international remote sensingagency.

I International Convergence ProcessesAll of these cooperative arrangements-an in-formation cooperative, a formal division of labor,or an international agency—face several commonchallenges. In each case, decisionmakers mustconsider the tradeoff between the perceived ad-vantages of cooperation—increased effectivenessand reduced costs—and the drawbacks—reducedautonomy and the risks of relying on others.

These approaches to international cooperationalso provide alternative methods of dealing withthe tradeoff between maintaining a manageableorganizational structure and ensuring a fair alloca-tion of the burden of paying for it. An informationcooperative requires the least formal structure butallows for the greatest inequity in sharing costs. Aformal international division of labor could re-duce but not eliminate these perceived inequitiesand could restore the attractiveness of open in-

formation sharing. An international agency wouldformalize the distribution of costs but would re-quire careful design to avoid becoming excessive-ly bureaucratic.

Over the years, international cooperation in re-mote sensing has steadily expanded. Initially, theopen sharing of meteorological and other environ-mental data from U.S. satellites strengthened theWWW information cooperative. The entry of oth-er countries with more restrictive data policiesthreatens to undermine this tradition, but it couldalso lead to a more equal partnership based on aninternational division of labor. Such a partnershipoffers substantial improvements in cost-effective-ness, providing the participants can accept a rela-tively open exchange of data.

An international agency seems unlikely undercurrent international conditions, but the growth ofmutual trust that could emerge from intermediatestages of cooperation might make it seem feasibleor even inevitable in the future. Because remotesensing systems and programs take decades to de-velop and mature and because some setbacks anddisagreements are inevitable, cooperative rela-tionships will probably evolve through gradual,measured steps.

Intergovernmental cooperation stands in con-trast to the alternative of relying on the private sec-tor for data and allowing individual agencies tofend for themselves in the private-data market. Inprinciple, these markets should provide an effi-cient system of sharing costs without a cumber-some organizational structure. As discussed pre-viously, however, private markets for remotesensing take time to develop and mature and havenot yet demonstrated that they are economicallyviable. Furthermore, reliance on private marketscan discourage investments in remote sensing as apublic good.

9 Cooperation with RussiaThe United States and Europe have sought to ex-pand technological cooperation with Russia, forboth practical and political reasons. This coopera-tion is a symbol of Russia’s reintegration into the


53 and provides financialinternational communitysupport to maintain the Russian economy andRussia’s skills in science and technology. ButRussia’s future, including the stability of its politi-cal relationships and its ability to maintain an am-bitious space program, remains uncertain. Thissituation increases the risk of relying on Russia forimportant remote sensing needs and imposes lim-its on the scope of current cooperative efforts.

In 1993, Vice President Gore and RussianPrime Minister Chernomyrdin signed severalagreements on U.S.-Russian cooperation in spaceactivities. Although these agreements empha-sized Russian participation in an internationalspace station, they also included agreements to ex-pand cooperation in earth science and remotesensing.

54 Russia has a long history and importantcapabilities in civilian remote sensing.

Building on past cooperative efforts, theseagreements include several possible projects:

■ Strengthening Russia’s data-managementcapabilities.

~ Encouraging Russian participation in in-ternational projects of global change re-search.

■ Arranging future flights of U.S. TOMS andStratospheric Aerosol and Gas Experiment(SAGE) instruments on future Russianspacecraft. 55

Congress may wish to explore ways for Rus-sia to contribute to improving the robustness ofexisting operational satellite programs. For ex-ample, Russia’s Meteor satellites could providevaluable backup capability for a converged U.S.and European satellite system. Similarly, Russia’sRESURS-O satellites could help fill in possiblegaps in the U.S. Landsat system.

These projects could provide the basis for Rus-sia’s gradual integration into international coop-erative programs in remote sensing. But this in-tegration must overcome major obstacles andwithstand the test of time. Expanding coopera-tion with Russia on remote sensing depends onsteadily growing mutual confidence in Russia’spolitical relationships and its ability to main-lain its programs through difficult economiclimes.

s~ U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Remotely Sensed Data: Technolog-y, Management, und MarketA, Op. cit., box 5-1.

.5J Whitc House plan f(jr Russ;an.American cooperati~,e Programs in Earth Science and En\’ironrnentul Monitoring from Spuce, op. cit.

55 me Uni[ed states and Russia have agreed in principle tiat a TOMS instrument will fly on a future Meteor satellite, and negOtlatlOnS fOr the

placement of a SAGE instrument are under way.

Documents

International Cooperation and Competition A