Myanmar Election 2015 Monitor

INLE ADVISORY GROUP

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Table of Contents

Myanmar’s Political Transition

Myanmar’s Electoral History 1947-2010

Myanmar’s Constitution

The Current Myanmar Parliament

Key Political Players

The Geography of Myanmar

The 2015 Election

2015 Registered Parties

Information current as of July 11, 2015.Further updates available through our Myanmar Election Monitor service.

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MYANMAR’S POLITICAL TRANSITION

Following the controversial 2008 constitutional referendum and much-

pilloried 2010 election, Myanmar defied international expectations by

transitioning from a despotic, military junta, to an increasingly democratic

government. The international community has responded to the once-

unthinkable steps taken by Myanmar’s president and parliament by easing its

most restrictive financial sanctions and encouraging foreign businesses to seek

opportunities in Southeast Asia’s frontier market. Yet the shine of Myanmar’s initial

success has dulled in the past year, with some critics labeling the country’s recent

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troubles “backsliding.” While Myanmar has its fair share of complex challenges,

and will suffer setbacks on its road to democratization, its transition is in fact

stumbling forward rather than stalling.

Since taking office in March 2011, President Thein Sein, a former member of the

State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) government, has initiated a series

of political and economic reforms resulting in a substantial opening of the long-

isolated country. The president initiated a dialogue with pro-democracy icon Aung

San Suu Kyi, paving the way for her and her National League for Democracy (NLD)

party to contest and win 43 of 45 seats in the April 2012 by-elections. Further,

Thein Sein suspended construction of the controversial Myitsone Dam in response

to country-wide protests, released hundreds of political prisoners through sweeping

general amnesties (most notably in January 2012), forged ceasefire agreements

with 12 of 13 major non-state armed groups, pushed the country to embark on a

nationwide national reconciliation process, insisted on transparency in conducting

tenders for major infrastructure projects, and promoted greater personal and

political freedoms.

Parliament also has done its part by drafting and passing legislation to open the

economy through foreign direct investment and sector-specific policies, and to

protect freedoms of assembly and press as well as the right to peaceful protests.

Under the leadership of ambitious Lower House Speaker, Shwe Mann, the parliament

has transcended the rubber-stamping expected by many Myanmar observers,

meeting regularly and conducting robust inquiry sessions and political debates.

The parliament has increased legislative participation and brought about greater

transparency in Myanmar’s governance.

In response to these and other reforms, the international community suspended

or lifted major restrictive financial and trade sanctions. The opening also led to

a flurry of high-level political visitors from around the world, with historic visits

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by then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, U.S. President Barack Obama, key

leaders from the U.S. Congress, and top decision makers from the E.U., the U.K.,

and Japan. The U.S. restored full diplomatic relations, re-established a U.S. Agency

for International Development (USAID) Mission to Myanmar, began supporting

assessment missions and technical assistance from international financial

institutions, and eased its broad, country-wide restrictions on financial services,

investment, and imports. Australia, Canada,

and the U.K. all lifted sanctions; the E.U. lifted

its restrictive measures as well, and expanded its

bilateral donor programs. Japan’s reengagement

has been the most holistic and effective,

implementing robust government donor

assistance and supporting private investment in

nearly all of Myanmar’s major sectors, including

power generation, telecommunications, and

banking and finance, as well as building special

economic zones. The IMF, World Bank, and

ADB all have resumed lending, and are involved

in major technical assistance and infrastructure

projects designed to help catalyze development.

The fruits of Myanmar’s transition have improved

livelihoods across the country, but benefits have

concentrated in urban areas, where rising standards of living and closer integration

into the global community are expected to yield a doubling of middle-class consumers

by 2020. The number of ATMs in the country has risen from zero in 2010 to 450

in 2014. Cell phone usage has skyrocketed: Myanmar has gone from being one of

the world’s least connected countries to having 3G networks in its largest cities with

affordable SIM cards and cell phones. An underbanked and cash-based society

without credit cards is slowly transforming: there now are more than 2,500 payment

The fruits of Myanmar’s transition have improved livelihoods across the country, but benefits have concentrated in urban areas, where rising standards of living and closer integration into the global community are expected to yield a doubling of middle-class consumers by 2020.

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terminals in the country. And with major new investors from dozens of countries

entering the market, including Coca Cola, General Electric, Gap, Telenor, Ooredoo,

ANZ, and other multinational firms, Myanmar’s working age population has steadily

increasing employment opportunities with decent wages.

While the country has made notable progress, challenges remain. Ethnic and religious

tensions run high, particularly with the Rohingya population in Rakhine State and

ongoing issues between Myanmar’s Buddhist and Muslim populations. National

reconciliation will continue to be a work in progress; the Myanmar government

on March 31 signed a draft ceasefire agreement with the country’s major armed

ethnic groups—a significant step in the decades-long civil war that has scarred the

country—but the most difficult aspects of the agreement, including the political

dialogue framework, have yet to be established. There still are questions about the

country’s relationship with North Korea, and policymaker statements, as well as

additions to the U.S. sanctions list since 2012, suggest that bilateral military ties

have yet to be severed. Myanmar’s military also continues to dominate the country’s

political system, holding 25% of all parliamentary seats, and controlling three key

ministries. It is unclear how much influence President Thein Sein or the executive

branch has over the military, which has defied orders to stop attacking armed ethnic

groups, in particular the Kachin Independence

Army. The country also suffers from capacity

issues that impact its ability to govern and meet

high domestic and international expectations.

The momentum of the political transition will

not be “locked in” by the 2015 election, but its

process and outcome will be key indicators of how the Myanmar story will continue

to develop. The new leadership will face enormous challenges, and will require

assistance, support, patience, and guidance, particularly from the international

community, to maintain Myanmar’s forward momentum.

The momentum of the political transition will not be “locked in” by the 2015 election, but its process and outcome will be key indicators of how the Myanmar story will continue to develop.

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MYANMAR’S ELECTORAL HISTORY 1947-2010

Myanmar’s general election this year marks a milestone in the country’s

democratic transition. The current political environment is not

Myanmar’s first experiment with democracy; the country experienced

parliamentary democracy following independence from the British,

and undertook four elections from 1947 to 1960, and two more in 1990 and 2010.

The three post-independence and pre-coup elections (in 1951-2, 1956 and 1960)

were defined by an increasing ability of the major blocs to exercise control over

Myanmar’s electoral structure, changing the rules to ensure subsequent elections

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would favor the incumbents’ (or later, the military’s) interests. These elections

had low turnout due to unstable security environments, divided opposition, and

boycotts by opposition parties and ethnic minorities. Despite some effective efforts

to develop basic election infrastructure and undertake a credible electoral process,

those elections were plagued by intimidation, falsification of records, bribery, and

other fraudulent electoral activities. Many of the underlying challenges impacting

Myanmar’s political development in the past remain present today, and inform

the likely difficulties and obstacles that the current government and incoming

administration will have to overcome to maintain momentum in Myanmar’s

political and economic transition.

1947Myanmar’s first general election in 1947 was billed as a step towards full

independence, and was conducted as part of an agreement between withdrawing

British colonial authorities and the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League

(AFPFL). The AFPFL was itself an incomplete political party, functioning as a

politicized coalition of anti-Japanese resistance fighters and communist forces

held together by Aung San, who had fought with the Japanese during World

War II (and is the father of pro-democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi), and later

U Nu, the first prime minister of then-Burma. To stabilize the former frontier

areas and bring ethnic minority leaders’ support of the political process, the

1947 general election was marked by extensive military operations, some under

the command of future junta leader, and former comrade of Aung San, Ne

Win. The AFPFL, as a result of its wide coalition bolstered by the military’s

presence in opposition-dominated areas, won all but seven seats which were

won by non-AFPFL communist leaders. For 56 of the 91 seats contested by the

AFPFL, AFPFL candidates were the only candidates. The Karen National Union

(KNU), which stood to lose the privileges promised to them by the British,

and the Burma Communist Party (BCP), which argued that any agreement

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with the British could not yield a legitimate election, boycotted the election.

Both the KNU and BCP would afterward launch insurgencies that engulfed the

country for decades; the BCP fell into disarray in 1988, and the KNU entered

into ceasefire negotiations with the current government in January 2012. Voter

turnout in the 1947 elections averaged 46.7% across rural and urban districts,

almost 30% higher than that in the first official

post-independence elections in 1951-2.

1951-2The 1951-2 elections were held in three stages

between June 1951 and April 1952 during a

period of instability and significant security

issues in the country’s periphery areas.

Despite the lengthened timeframe, voter

turnout averaged under 20%, mostly due to an

atmosphere of intimidation generated by the

heavy presence of troops, as well as boycotts by communist groups and the KNU.

The AFPFL secured 147 of the 250 parliament seats through 60% of the votes,

allowing it to form a government approved by only 12% of the electorate.

1956In 1956, improved security conditions and a more organized opposition drove

turnout to twice the 1951 levels, resulting in a decline in AFPFL support to 48%.

However, automatic decisions for uncontested AFPFL seats allowed the AFPFL

to expand its majority to 173 parliament seats. The National United Front,

a Marxist-Leninist opposition group formed by Aung San’s brother just ahead

of the elections, garnered more than 30% of the vote (translating into 48 seats)

The 1951-2 elections were held in three stages between June 1951 and April 1952 during a period of instability and significant security issues in the country’s periphery areas. Despite the lengthened timeframe, voter turnout averaged under 20%, mostly due to an atmosphere of intimidation generated by the heavy presence of troops, as well as boycotts by communist groups and the KNU.

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by consolidating support from trade unions, peasant organizations, and voters

seeking an alternative to the AFPFL. By 1958, the U Nu government’s policies,

particularly its reliance on communist support, created a split in the AFPFL that

nearly cost U Nu the prime minister role from a no-confidence vote led by the rival

AFPFL faction. The political instability sparked by the AFPFL divide, combined

with the military’s fears of communist participation in government and influence

over U Nu, led General Ne Win to stage a coup and establish himself as the trustee

“interim prime minister” of the U Nu government. Ne Win stated that he would

hold power for two years and then hand it back to the democratic government.

1960Ne Win did relinquish power as promised, and the 1960 election then tested the

military’s tolerance for a democratic government that did not necessarily share the

military’s interests or concerns.. The election reduced the NUF’s representation in

government from 30% in 1956 to just 4.8% in 1960. However, the victory of U Nu’s

“clean” AFPFL over the army-backed “stable” AFPFL troubled the military. Two

years later, Ne Win declared that “parliamentary democracy was not suitable for

Burma,” dissolved the legislature, and ushered in decades of military rule.

1990After 26 years of one-party rule by Ne Win’s Burma Socialist Programme Party

(BSPP, the sole legal party during this period of military rule), the 8888 Uprising, a

student-led movement formed in the wake of Ne Win’s disastrous demonetization

policy that brought Aung San Suu Kyi to prominence, prompted the military to

stage a second coup and install the new State Law and Order Restoration Council

(SLORC). A successor organization to the BSPP, the SLORC was formed with

the promise that the military had no desire to “wish to cling to State power for

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long,” and based its legitimacy and tenure

on four goals: providing security, providing

transportation, raising livings standards, and

holding multiparty elections.

Following the ostensible completion of the first

three tasks, SLORC first secretary Major General

Khin Nyunt announced an election to be held

in May 1990. Of the over 200 political parties

born out of the 1988 uprisings, 93 survived

the registration process to compete against the

SLORC-backed party, the National Unity Party

(NUP). The NUP’s primary competitor was the

National League for Democracy (NLD), led by

Aung San Suu Kyi and ex-General Tin Oo, who

were being punished by the military through

house arrest and hard labor, respectively, and

had the overwhelming support of those involved with or sympathetic to the 8888

Uprising. The SLORC worked to shape the election through tight restrictions on

campaigning by non-NUP parties, including on seemingly innocuous choices

such as party symbols, continuous political attacks on the NLD as an agent of

communist forces, and speeches by NUP leadership extolling the military’s role

as guardian of the country. Many NLD and opposition party candidates were

imprisoned or placed under house arrest. These tactics were unsuccessful in

impacting the outcome of the election, and the results were heavily lopsided: the

NLD earned just under 60% of the total popular vote, translating to 80.8% of

seats in parliament to the NUP’s 2.1%. Myanmar watchers interpreted the election

as a referendum on a fully democratic government or power-sharing with the

military, due to similarities in the NUP and NLD’s rhetoric on policy. However,

the NLD intended to translate its electoral victory into a direct transfer of power.

A successor organization to the BSPP, the SLORC was formed with the promise that the military had no desire to “wish to cling to State power for long,” and based its legitimacy and tenure on four goals: providing security, providing transportation, raising livings standards, and holding multiparty elections.

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The SLORC refused the NLD’s demands, and after months of silence ultimately

failed to recognize the election results based on the argument that the original

election structure did not stipulate a date for parliament to convene. The SLORC

announced the creation of a “Roadmap to a Discipline-Flourishing Democracy,”

essentially a political do-over for the military regime to ensure that the next

election would produce the result it desired.

2008 Constitutional Referendum In 2008 the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the successor

entity to the SLORC, announced a constitutional referendum to be held that

year, followed by elections in 2010. This was to be the first vote in Myanmar

in 18 years, and the announcement was met by a mixed response from

the international community. Myanmar’s regional neighbors and ASEAN

expressed support, while most western countries and NGOs voiced doubt over

the legitimacy of the votes. Indeed, the referendum process was stage-managed

by the government in order to minimize the opposition’s voice and to build a

foundation to avoid a repeat of the 1990 election. The nearly 200-page draft

constitution was publicly released on April 9, just a month prior to the scheduled

referendum vote on May 10, limiting the chance to comprehensively analyze the

document. The NLD and other opposition groups strongly opposed the process,

characterizing the referendum as an effort to preserve military control. The

most objectionable terms concerned the allotment of 25% seats in both houses

of the national parliament, as well as the region and state parliaments, to military

delegates, lack of civilian oversight over military affairs, guaranteed military

leadership of key ministries, and an article that would prohibit an Aung San

Suu Kyi presidency. Opposition forces, spearheaded by the NLD, campaigned

for a “no” vote, but were hamstrung by the continued imprisonment of Aung

San Suu Kyi and activist leaders. In contrast, the government mobilized its

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entire political apparatus to campaign for a “yes” vote, including through the

arrest of demonstrators and activists. The impact of Cyclone Nargis further

delegitimized the process. Despite calls to postpone the vote, the SPDC carried

out polls in 278 townships, scheduling a second date only for those 47 townships

most devastated by the cyclone. Turnouts of 99.06%, with 92.4% voting in favor,

were announced against the backdrop of a natural disaster that left 84,537 dead,

53,836 missing and presumed dead, and over 800,000 citizens displaced.

2010 ElectionIn 2010, the SPDC established the Union Election Commission (UEC), led by

the Chief Justice, as the central organization to oversee the election process.

While similar to the body that oversaw the 1990 elections, the UEC commanded

one additional power: the ability to regulate the campaign activities of political

parties. This enabled the UEC to level extremely stringent regulations on party

formation and entry into the election, most notably concerning the inadmissibility

of parties that included former insurgent organizations or those that sought to

“cause societal conflict” or “undermine the constitution.” Moreover, existing

parties would be required to re-register and receive the UEC’s blessing in order

to contest the election. These restrictions, on top of existing concerns about the

constitution and the fact that NLD chairperson Aung San Suu Kyi remained under

house arrest, were too much for the NLD, which refused to re-register. Other

opposition groups, while agreeing that the elections served as a political tool for

the military, argued that the UEC had left enough space to make opposition voices

heard, potentially offering an opportunity to begin to transform the political

system from the inside. The UEC qualified 37 of the 42 registered parties to run

candidates for parliamentary bodies, yielding 3,071 contestants vying for 1,154

seats. Partly due to high registration fees leveled by the UEC, 54 constituencies

saw single-candidate races. The military’s representation was fielded through

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the new Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), which dominated all

other parties in terms of finances, size, and organizational capacity. Other serious

contenders included “pro-democracy” parties, including a breakaway NLD group,

the National Democratic Force and the Democratic Party Myanmar (DP-M), as

well as ethnic parties focusing on seats in regional and state bodies. Campaigning

was muted by both the UEC’s oversight of campaign materials and strict media

controls, and election day was similarly calm. As expected, the USDP dominated

the polls, winning 79.4% of the seats. Combined with the 25% bloc of additional

parliamentary seats granted to the military, the party secured a supermajority

enabling it to block legislative action by all other parties. Independent candidates

did not fare well, winning only 6 of 82 contested seats, including just one in each

of the national bodies. Opposition parties quickly cried foul after the elections,

joining international human rights groups, lobby groups, and foreign governments

to discredit the elections, while ASEAN governments struck a more hopeful tone.

However, as voiced by some opposition parties on the eve of registration, the

election may have provided at least token political opening: a stacked election is

progress from no election at all.

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MYANMAR’SCONSTITUTION

The controversial 2008 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar,

one of the final steps in the State Peace and Development Council’s seven step

“Roadmap to a Disciplined and Flourishing Democracy,” was passed in the

wake of the devastating Cyclone Nargis in May 2008 and has since shaped

the country’s political environment. Though heavily criticized for establishing an

outsized role of the military and preventing pro-democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi

from attaining the presidency, the document does provide increased freedoms and

a foundation for a democratic transition. Its language can be vague, opening up the

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constitution to a variety of interpretations, including potential outcomes that favor

democracy and outcomes that favor a return to a junta.

The 2008 constitution establishes a set of new institutions, including an elected

president, a bicameral national parliament, and, for the first time in the country’s

history, fourteen regional governments, as well as regular multiparty elections.

The constitution provides for separation of powers, but this can be undermined

by the president’s ability to appoint, dismiss, or otherwise control legislative and

judicial officials.

The military controls the most powerful ministries, including Defense, Border

Affairs, and Home Affairs, has a strong presence on the National Defense and

Security Council, and holds 25% of all parliamentary seats. It is under the authority

of the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of the Defense Services, not the president or

the legislative branch.

One dominant doctrine featured throughout the document, including as qualifying

characteristics for political leaders and a critical responsibility of the armed forces,

is safeguarding the “non-disintegration of the Union, the non-disintegration of

National solidarity and the perpetuation of sovereignty.” These concerns define

Myanmar and its political conscience, stemming from a colonial hangover and fear

of external and internal threats.

Fundamental Rights and Duties of the CitizensThe constitution outlines several rights for Myanmar citizens, including certain

legal protections, freedoms of speech and assembly, and the principle of non-

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discrimination on the basis of race, birth, religion, official position, status, culture,

sex, and wealth. The constitution even entitles women to the same rights and

salaries as men for similar work. The document prohibits human trafficking and

forced labor. While there currently is considerable tension surrounding this issue,

the constitution guarantees the freedom of religious practice—though it officially

places Buddhism in a “special position”—and recognizes Christianity, Islam,

Hinduism and Animism.

Article 364 contains language that could

potentially be employed to protect those being

targeted by anti-Muslim aggressors: “Moreover,

any act which is intended or is likely to promote

feelings of hatred, enmity or discord between

racial or religious communities or sects is

contrary to this Constitution. A law may be

promulgated to punish such activity.”

Executive – the President

Selecting the PresidentThe president is elected by the Presidential

Electoral College, a constitutional body made

up of representatives from the parliament and

the Defense Services. The two houses of parliament and the Defense Services each

choose a vice president, and one of the three is selected as president. The president

can serve up to two five-year terms. Article 59 (F) prohibits anyone with a foreign

parent, spouse, or child from becoming president, and this provision has received

significant attention as it affects Aung San Suu Kyi.

Article 364 contains language that could potentially be employed to protect those being targeted by anti-Muslim aggressors: “Moreover, any act which is intended or is likely to promote feelings of hatred, enmity or discord between racial or religious communities or sects is contrary to this Constitution. A law may be promulgated to punish such activity.”

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Should the president resign, be impeached, pass away, or be unable to perform

the duties of the office, the vice president having garnered the second highest

number of votes in the presidential election will serve as “acting president.” If the

office of president becomes vacant when the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (parliament)

is in session, the acting president will request that it fill the vacancy within

seven days.

Powers and Functions of the PresidentThe president has a broad range of executive authorities, though many need to

be approved by or consulted with the parliament and/or the National Security

and Defense Council, providing checks on executive power. According to

the constitution, the president is “responsible to” the parliament as are the

vice presidents. The president can appoint ministers (though for military-

controlled ministries, the president must select from a list provided by the

CINC), designate the number of ministers, select chief minister for States and

Regions, choose the CINC (subject to proposal and approval by the National

Defense and Security Council), grant pardons and amnesties (seen in general

amnesties throughout Thein Sein’s term), establish or sever diplomatic

relations and appoint diplomats, enter into treaties, take appropriate military

action, and declare war or make peace.

The National Defense and Security Council, once viewed as a successor to the

SPDC, contains Myanmar’s most powerful political and military leaders. It has

rarely been mentioned in public, and it is unclear how much power this council

wields. Its members include the president, the two vice presidents, the speakers

of both houses of parliament, the CINC, the Deputy CINC, and the ministers of

Defense, Home Affairs, Border Affairs, and Foreign Affairs.

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Legislature – Hluttaw (Parliament)Myanmar has two houses of parliament—Amyotha (the Upper House) and Pyithu

(the Lower House). Taken together, they form the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. When the

2008 constitution was passed, Myanmar watchers assessed that the parliament

would be a rubber-stamping institution that would meet once a year (as required

by the constitution) to pass laws friendly to the military. The parliament has

surprised many, convening regular sessions, holding vibrant question and

answer periods, and pushing through progressive legislation. Members also have

constitutionally protected freedom of speech and voting in parliament, and they

have exercised these freedoms. Much of this is owed to the ambitious Lower House

Speaker, Shwe Mann, who was a ranking member of the former SPDC and now

is a key reformer in the new government. Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, the National

League of Democracy (NLD), has taken advantage of increased political freedom

to promote legislation and participate in committees. The members of parliament

take their “check and balance” role seriously, and at times have disagreed with the

decrees and actions of President Thein Sein.

Pyidaungsu HluttawThe Speaker of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw supervises its sessions, invites the president

to address the chamber, requests that certain organizations or individuals speak

before the parliament (similar to U.S. Congressional hearings), as well as other

duties. The speaker is required to convene a regular session of parliament at least

once a year, and the maximum interval between two regular sessions is twelve

months.

The Pyindaungsu Hluttaw undertakes a number of functions during sessions,

including submitting, discussing, and resolving bills and proposals. Additionally,

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it has the authority to enact laws “if the need arises” for matters where authority

would otherwise sit within regional parliaments and Self-Administered Zones.

Pyithu HluttawThe Lower House of parliament is made up of 440 members; 330 members are

elected on the basis of townships and population, and 110 are selected by the

CINC from the ranks of the military.

Candidates for the parliament must meet the following criteria:

• have attained the age of 25 years;

• be a citizen whose parents are Myanmar citizens; and

• have resided in Myanmar for at least 10 consecutive years up to the time of

the election (unless posted overseas for a government position).

More importantly, members of parliament can be disqualified for among others

the following reasons:

• serving a prison term or being convicted by Myanmar’s courts;

• being of unsound mind;

• being an undischarged insolvent (similar to a feature in India’s constitution,

this means a person who has ceased to pay debts in the ordinary course of

business, or cannot pay debts as they become due);

• having allegiance to a foreign government, or being subject to a foreign

government or to a citizen of a foreign country (with “allegiance” defined

as having a passport or citizenship of another country);

• being entitled to the rights and privileges of a foreign government;

• being a member of an organization that obtains and utilizes directly or

indirectly support in the form of money, land, housing, buildings, vehicles,

property, etc, from the government or religious or other organizations of

a foreign country;

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• being a member of an organization that for political purposes abets the act

of inciting, giving speech, conversing, or issuing a declaration based on

religion to influence the decisions to vote or not to vote;

• being a member of a religious order; and

• being a Civil Services personnel (except as selected and appointed

according to the constitution).

Amyotha HluttawThe Upper House has similar functions as the Lower House. The Amyotha

Hluttaw is made up of 224 representatives; each Region or State elects in an

equal number of 12 representatives for a total of 168 members, there is one

representative from each Self-Administered Division or Self-Administered Zone,

and 56 representatives are members of the military. The qualifications to become

a member of the Upper House are similar to those for the Lower House, with the

exception of the requirement to be 30 years of age.

Region and State HluttawsThe Region or State Hluttaws are made of up of two representatives from

each township within the Region or State. As these areas include the bulk of

Myanmar’s ethnic minorities, additional representatives are elected from each

national race whose population constitutes at least 0.1% of the population of

the Union. The Region and State parliaments also include Defense Services

members nominated by the CINC.

Whether a nod to calls for a federal system, or an attempt to begin to decentralize

power, the constitution established regional parliaments in the States, Divisions,

and Special Autonomous Regions. This could provide a greater voice for

Myanmar’s ethnic minorities, should these parliaments exercise the full extent

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of their authority. The chief minister in each State will be appointed by the

president and is expected to be from the main ethnic group of that State.

Throughout Myanmar, however, ethnic communities have potential for gaining

a greater say over their own affairs, at least in “soft” fields such as culture,

language, and education. They might also be better positioned to resist central

government intervention, but their power is limited, as the chief minister of each

State government is subject to appointment

and the will of the president.

Region and State Hluttaws can pass a

wide range of laws, in accordance with the

constitution, including but not limited to

taxes, budgets, infrastructure planning,

development, social welfare, and the

extractives and energy sectors. That said, the

Pyidaungsu Hluttaw can override a Region

or State Hluttaw’s laws.

Passing LawsThe president must sign into law bills that are approved by the Pyidaungsu

Hluttaw within 14 days of receipt. The president, however, has the right to return

bills with comments to the parliament. If the president does not return the bill

or sign it, the bill technically becomes law. All laws passed by parliament are

supposed to be published in a national gazette, though with the parliamentary

frenzy in the last few years, or perhaps by deliberate effort, several laws have

passed unnoticed.

Whether a nod to calls for a federal system, or an attempt to begin to decentralize power, the constitution established regional parliaments in the States, Divisions, and Special Autonomous Regions. This could provide a greater voice for Myanmar’s ethnic minorities, should these parliaments exercise the full extent of their authority.

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JudiciaryPerhaps the most forgotten branch of Myanmar’s government, the judicial branch

has not achieved close to the level of reform that the executive and legislative

branches have attained. The court system maintains vestiges of its colonial past,

but also grapples with statutes from each different governing period in Myanmar’s

history, including the British colonial period, Japanese occupation, parliamentary

democracy, socialist regime, and military junta. Most of these laws and statutory

authorities have been neither revoked nor amended.

Myanmar’s court system includes the Supreme Court of the Union, High Courts

of the Region, High Courts of the State, Courts of the Self-Administered Division,

Courts of the Self- Administered Zone, District Courts, Township Courts, Courts-

Martial, and the Constitutional Tribunal of the Union.

The Supreme Court is the highest court in the country and is the court of final

appeal. It also has the authority to weigh in on bilateral treaty issues, as well as

disputes between the Union and the State and Region governments. Including the

Chief Justice, there are a minimum of seven and a maximum of 11 Judges of the

Supreme Court, and Judges can serve until the age of 70.

Defense ServicesMyanmar’s most powerful institution—the military, or “Defense Services”—

occupies a sole page of the constitution. While its role appears throughout the

document, the constitution remains vague on specific responsibilities. The

constitution provides that all armed forces in Myanmar, which would include

armed ethnic and insurgent groups, are under the command of the Defense

Services. Additionally, with the approval of the National Defense and Security

24

Council, the military has the authority to conscript all citizens to secure and

defend Myanmar.

Constitutional AmendmentsThe constitution can be amended once a proposal in the form of a bill is submitted

to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. Further, if 20% of the total Pyidaungsu Hluttaw

representatives submit such a bill to amend the constitution, it will be considered

by the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw.

Aung San Suu Kyi and pro-democracy activists, including the 88 Generation

Students, had focused on amending Article 436, which states:

If it is necessary to amend the provisions of Sections 1 to 48 in Chapter I, Sections 49

to 56 in Chapter II, Sections 59 and 60 in Chapter III, Sections 74, 109, 141 and 161

in Chapter IV, Sections 200, 201, 248 and 276 in Chapter V, Sections 293, 294, 305,

314 and 320 in Chapter VI, Sections 410 to 432 in Chapter XI and Sections 436 in

Chapter XII of this Constitution, it shall be amended with the prior approval of more

than seventy-five percent of all the representatives of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, after

which in a nation-wide referendum only with the votes of more than half of those

who are eligible to vote.

Without military support, amending the constitution, particularly the most

controversial articles such as those bearing on an Aung San Suu Kyi presidency,

states of emergency, the role of the military in governance, as well as Article 436

itself, would require the votes of all non-military members of parliament plus one

military vote. While the CINC has publicly stated in the past that military members

can vote their consciences, it is unclear if there would in fact be a break in the ranks

25

of the military members of parliament in future

votes. On June 25, the parliament failed to pass

six proposed amendments to the constitution,

including to Article 436. It appears the military

voted as a bloc, particularly as military

members expressed concerns during a debate

that changes to the constitution could impact

stability and the sanctity of the document.

Political PartiesThe constitution provides broad guidelines

on the formation of political parties, leaving

the bulk of the work to the Union Election

Commission (UEC). Parties are required to

support the non-disintegration of the Union,

national solidarity, and preservation of sovereignty, and to be loyal to the state

and abide by the constitution. The NLD previously had issues in supporting the

constitution, but has and will continue to participate in the political process.

The constitution provides potentially concerning bases that could revoke a party’s

status, including:

• being declared an unlawful association;

• directly or indirectly aiding insurgent armed groups; and

• directly or indirectly receiving and expending financial, material, or other

assistance from a foreign government or foreigner or religious association.

There are no clear guidelines indicating how the UEC would deem a party unlawful,

Without military support, amending the constitution, particularly the most controversial articles such as those bearing on an Aung San Suu Kyi presidency, states of emergency, the role of the military in governance, as well as Article 436 itself, would require the votes of all non-military members of parliament plus one military vote.

26

but there likely are a set of vague laws and rules to make it possible. The second

criteria pertains more to ethnic minority political parties, some of which could be

viewed as the political wing of an armed group. Finally, nearly all parties could

technically be disqualified by the last criteria, as the government could direct this

provision against political training provided by international NGOs and other

election assistance or raise concerns that foreign governments may financially

support the pro-democracy opposition.

State of EmergencyContingencies for a state of emergency appear throughout the constitution,

but are dealt with in detail in Articles 417 and 418. A state of emergency is

generally defined as an event or trajectory that may result in the disintegration

of the country and/or national solidarity, or the loss of sovereignty due to acts

or attempts to overtake Myanmar though insurgency, violence, or other forcible

means. When such a situation arises, the president may, after coordinating with

the National Defense and Security Council, promulgate an ordinance and declare

a state of emergency. However, a few paragraphs later, the CINC is granted the

right to take over and exercise sovereign power in accord with the provisions of

the constitution.

Once the president confers authority to the CINC (or once the CINC takes

power), the CINC commands all aspects of government, including the executive,

legislative, and judicial branches, in order to “carry out necessary measures to

speedily restore” law and order. This potentially results in up to two years of

military rule—one year for the initial state of emergency, and two six-month

extensions.

27

The CINC can exercise the powers of all branches of government, or establish a

parliament that includes the CINC’s participation. Executive and judicial powers

may be transferred to and exercised by an appropriate body that has been formed

or by a suitable person. The CINC also has the authority to restrict or suspend, as

required, one or more fundamental rights of citizens. The president can declare

an annulment of the state of emergency based on a report submitted by the CINC

recognizing that the threat has passed. The National Defense and Security Council

must hold a general election within six months of the annulment of a state of

emergency.

The type of state of emergency that would hand power back to the military is

unclear. President Thein Sein has exercised states of emergency during his tenure,

including in February 2015 in the Kokang Region in Shan State following clashes

between rebels and government soldiers. Thein Sein made the announcement on

state television, saying that effective immediately, martial law would be imposed

in the Kokang Self-Administered Region for three months. He also declared a state

of emergency in Rakhine State in June 2012 following violence between Buddhists

and Muslims. These actions have not resulted in military rule. The coups of 1958

and 1962 may shed some light on how the CINC and the military could interpret

the roles they believe it should play in national emergencies; the parliament in

those years suffered from gridlock and little political cooperation, resulting in few

laws being passed and the practical aspects of governance not being undertaken.

At the same time, multiple armed insurgencies, including battles with the Burma

Communist Party and the Karen National Union, threatened Myanmar’s largest

cities and population centers. Though Myanmar has not reached the same levels of

political intransigence and violent insurgency as during the 50s and 60s, the same

underlying tensions and issues remain and could trigger a state of emergency,

particularly if Myanmar’s next government is unable to govern.

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The Pyithu and Amyotha Hluttaws, the Upper and Lower Houses of Parliament,

comprise pro-government, pro-democracy, and ethnic minority political

parties. The Union Solidarity and Development Party, made up of former ruling

junta and military officials, commands an ultra-majority through the seats

it holds combined with the support of military parliamentarians. Myanmar’s

legislative branch has surprised many, and dispelled concerns that it would

act as a rubber stamp, through active engagement and debate as well as by

passing many new progressive laws.

THE CURRENTMYANMAR PARLIAMENT

29

NAME PARTY SEATS

Union Solidarity and Development Party USDP 123

Wa Democratic Party WDP 1

Taaung (Palaung) National Party TNP 1

Unity and Democracy Party of Kachin State UDKPS 1

Rakhine Nationalities Development Party RNDP 7

Shan Nationalities Democratic Party SNDP 4

National Unity Party NUP 5

PaO National Organization PNO 1

Phalon-Sawaw Democratic Party PSDP 3

National League for Democracy NLD 5

New National Democratic Party NNDP 1

Military Military 56

National Democratic Force NDF 2

Chin National Party CNP 2

Chin Progressive Party CPP 4

Independent Independent 1

Kayin People's Party KPP 1

Kayin State Democracy and Development Party KSDDP 1

All Mon Region Democratic Party AMRDP 4

223NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (AMYOTHA HLUTTAW)

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431NAME PARTY SEATS

Military Military 110

Kayin People's Party KPP 1

Independent Independent 1

Inn National Democratic Party INDP 1

Chin Progressive Party CPP 2

Chin National Party CNP 2

All Mon Region Democratic Party AMRDP 3

National Democratic Force NDF 6

National League for Democracy NLD 37

New National Democratic Party NNDP 2

National Unity Party NUP 12

PaO National Organization PNO 3

Phalon-Sawaw Democratic Party PSDP 2

Rakhine Nationalities Development Party* RNDP 7

Shan Nationalities League for Democracy SNDP 18

Taaung (Palaung) National Party TNP 1

Unity and Democracy Party of Kachin State UDPKS 1

Union Solidarity and Development Party USDP 220

Wa Democratic Party WDP 2

PEOPLE’S ASSEMBLY (PYITHU HLUTTAW)

31

People's Assembly (Pyithu Hluttaw)

National Assembly (Amyotha Hluttaw)

Logo Party Seats Seats

All Mon Region Democracies Party

3 4 The AMRDP, an ethnic Mon party, was formed by former New Mon State Party members who disagreed with the NMSP's boycott of the 2010 election. The party is led by Ngwe Thein and other former civil servants. As the only Mon party contesting the election, the AMRDP's platform centers on promoting equal rights for ethnic groups, but also promotes democratic and economic ideals, including increasing foreign investment, utilizing modern and advanced technologies, progress on labor and women's rights, and developing Myanmar's agriculture sector.

Chin Progressive Party

2 4 The CPP is one of two ethnic Chin parties. The party is led by Pu No Than Kap. The CPP wants to bring more authority and power to the Region and State parliaments, and supports general democratic and economic development, but does not cite any specific policies.

The Chin National Party

2 2 The CNP, now known as the Chin National Democratic Party (CNDP), is one of two ethnic Chin parties. The two parties have attempted to merge into a single party, but have failed to do so. The CNDP is focused on Chin constituencies and has called for a peaceful solution to ethnic armed conflict, respect for rule of law, and presentation of arbitrary taxation, arrest, torture, and forced labor.

Independent 1 1

Kayin People's Party

1 1 The KPP is an ethnic minority party representing the Kayin and Karen people. The party is led by Tun Aung Myint and Simon Tha, a neurosurgeon who previously worked to broker a peace accord between Karen factions and the former junta. The party aims to promote good relations and trust among the different races in the country, to preserve the culture, literature, religion, and heritage of each ethnic minority group, particularly the Karen.

Military 110 56 Military legislators are appointed by the Commander-in-Chief and occupy 25% of parliamentary seats in each legislative chamber. The military, pursuant to the constitution, chooses one candidate to contest the presidency.

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People's Assembly (Pyithu Hluttaw)

National Assembly (Amyotha Hluttaw)

Logo Party Seats Seats

National Democratic Force

6 2 The NDF, a pro-democracy party, was formed by former National League for Democracy (NLD) members who disagreed with the NLD's boycott of the 2010 election. The NDF has focused on amnesty for political prisoners, a new competition law for businesses, and a new law concerning rights to agricultural land, income inequality, human rights, and national reconciliation efforts.

National League for Democracy

37 5 The NLD, the overwhelming winner of the quashed 1990 election, boycotted the 2010 election but reentered the political system to contest the 2012 election. The party is led by Aung San Suu Kyi and promotes democratic ideals and economic development. The NLD lacks specific policy priorities, but has generally discussed pursuing anti-corruption efforts and social welfare programs.

New National Democratic Party

2 1 The NNDP, a pro-democracy party, was formed by members of the NDF that split from the party after the 2010 elections, including the former NDF Vice Chairman Thein Nyunt.

National Unity Party

12 5 The NUP was originally created to represent the political wing of the former SLORC government in the 1990 election. The party lost to the NLD in 1990, but was expected to once again be the SPDC's party for the 2010 elections, however in a surprise the USDP was formed to take that role. The NUP has focused on land reform and rural workers rights, and sees its core constituency as "peasants, workers, youths and women."

PaO National Organization

3 1 The PNO, an ethnic PaO party, represents the interests of PaO organizations including the Union PaO Organization and the PaO National Organization. The PaO govern a Self-Administered Zone granted by the constitution. The PNO is a pro-government party and its platform centers on promoting the culture and interests of the PaO ethnicity but also includes a strong emphasis on education reform.

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People's Assembly (Pyithu Hluttaw)

National Assembly (Amyotha Hluttaw)

Logo Party Seats Seats

Phalon-Sawaw Democratic Party

2 3 The PSDP is an ethnic Kayin party. The PSDP platform focuses on promoting the culture and interests of the Kayin ethnicity, national unity, protection of human rights, and world peace.

Shan National Democratic Party

18 4 The SNDP is an ethnic Shan party. The SNDP supports the preservation and promotion of ethnic culture and the national reconciliation process, developing Myanmar's economy, particularly the agriculture sector, strengthening education and health programs, and protecting worker rights.

Taaung (Palaung) National Party

1 1 The TNP is an ethnic Taaung party. The TNP platform supports the preservation and promotion of ethnic culture and general economic and political development of Myanmar.

Unity and Democracy Party (Kachin State)

1 1 The UDP is an ethnic Kachin party. The party is rumored to be associated with the military, USDP, and business enterprises in Kachin State. The UDP platform focuses on national reconciliation, democratic rights and development in Kachin State, counternarcotics efforts, and improving health and education.

Union Solidarity and Development Party

220 123 The USDP, a pro-government party that includes former SPDC members and junta officials, including President Thein Sein and Speaker of parliament Shwe Mann, is the parliament's current ultra-mjaority party. The USDP formed out of the SPDC's mass member organization, the Union Solidarity and Development Association, and was the chosen party of the junta in 2010 instead of the NUP. The USDP has surprised many with key leaders promoting pro-democracy policies. The USDP platform centers on market-based economics, freedom of religion, and general political and economic development policies.

Kayin State Democracy and Development Party

0 1 The KSDDP is an ethnic Kayin Party. The party focuses on the development of Kayin State and its ethnic minority population, with an emphasis on infrastructure development and job growth.

34

People's Assembly (Pyithu Hluttaw)

National Assembly (Amyotha Hluttaw)

Logo Party Seats Seats

Rakhine National Party

7* 7 The RNP is an ethnic Rakhine Party formed by a 2014 merger between the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party and Arakan League for Democracy. The new party is creating its structure, policies, and framework, but has publicly stated that “a true federal union should be a union based on national race and democracy,” and it will promote national reconciliation and the interests of the Rakhine ethnic minority.

Wa Democratic Party

2 1 The WDP is an ethnic Wa party. The party platform promotes the interests of the Wa, Kokang, Shan, and Kachin people and the development of the Wa Self-Administered Zone. The party also supports a strong and modern Myanmar military and general development ideals.

Inn National Development Party

1 0 The INDP is an ethnic Intha party. The party has a more specific platform, focusing on labor issues and farmer's rights, as well as general policies on education, health, and support for a free press. The INDP supports a strong and modern Myanmar military.

Total 431 223

*These seven seats were won by the former Rakhine Nationalities Development Party prior to the merger.

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MYANMAR’S KEY POLITICAL PLAYERS

Myanmar’s diverse political landscape includes a myriad of actors that

will shape the future of the country. These individuals and groups

have had varying levels of influence in Myanmar to date, and their

fortunes could either rise or fall after the 2015 election, even if not in

any official capacity. The country’s top government leaders, including President

Thein Sein, Speaker Shwe Mann, Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing, and

Aung San Suu Kyi, wield considerable power and influence in their respective roles

in government. However, members of civil society and Myanmar’s web of ethnic

36

groups can also hold significant sway, solidifying support or playing spoiler to the

government’s agenda. The international community maintains an important role

in the development of the country—whether desired or not—and will be a lesser,

but potentially influential, factor in Myanmar’s political trajectory.

President Thein Sein

An unexpected reform leader, President Thein Sein has guided his government and the country

through its nascent democratic transition since assuming the presidency in March 2011. Thein

Sein rose through the Myanmar Army ranks, becoming a member of the ruling junta’s State Peace

and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997. He held several positions in the SPDC over the years,

assuming his last office as Prime Minister in 2007; that position took him overseas and presented

him as the public face of the junta. He was appointed Chairman of National Disaster Preparedness

Central Committee in May 2008, and coordinated relief efforts following Cyclone Nargis; he was

born and raised in the Ayeyarwady Delta, the area most devastated by the cyclone. After assuming

the presidency in 2011 as a member of Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), Thein

Sein surprised the domestic and international communities by reaching out to longtime adversary

and potential political rival Aung San Suu Kyi, releasing hundreds of political prisoners, engaging

in serious national reconciliation efforts, and pushing through important economic and political

reforms beginning democratization in the country.

37

Thein Sein is also viewed as less corrupt than the other USDP and former junta members in that

he has no business interests or involvement in business. He consistently claims to govern in line

with the “will of the people,” and has suspended major infrastructure projects and called for

formation of investigatory committees in response to public outcry. It is still unclear if President

Thein Sein will contest the 2015 election or retire from politics, but if there is significant popular

support for another term and strong encouragement from members of parliament, he likely will

participate. Though public polling in Myanmar is far from accurate, there is a general sense

that the president is likable and that he has done good things for the country. His deteriorating

relationship with Aung San Suu Kyi may damage his trustworthiness, particularly as she recently

publicly questioned his character. A second Thein Sein term would likely see a continuation of

reforms, though the pace would be considerably slower than the first. He may be concerned

with his legacy and be more cautious in considering bold steps. It is unlikely that the current

relationship between the executive and legislative branches would improve should he remain on

for a second term.

Career Highlights

• President, March 2011–present

• Prime Minister, SPDC, October 2007–February 2011

• Secretary 1, SPDC, October 2004–October 2007

• Secretary 2, SPDC, August 2003–October 2004

• Adjutant General of the War Office, November 2001–August 2003

• Commander of the Triangle Regional Command (Shan State), 1996–2001

• Military Operations Command 4 (Yangon), 1995

• General Staff Officer at the War Office, 1992–1995

• Commander of Infantry Battalion 89 (Sagaing Division), 1990

• Graduate of the Command and General Staff College (Shan State), 1989

• Light Infantry Division 55 (Shan State), 1988

• Graduate of the Defense Services Academy, 9th intake, 1968

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Speaker Shwe Mann

Myanmar watchers considered Thura Shwe Mann most likely to be elected president

in the 2010 election. His position instead as Speaker of the House of Representatives

came as a surprise, and was viewed as a demotion from his previous role, but he has

managed to strengthen and transform the parliament from an institution perceived to be

a rubber stamp to a platform for tangible reform efforts. Shwe Mann rose through the

military ranks, earning the respect from fellow soldiers for his abilities and leadership,

and became a member of the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in

1997. He earned the military title “Thura” in 1989 as a result of his “military bravery” in

fighting the Karen National Liberation Army, the armed wing of the Karen National Union.

Shwe Mann reportedly enjoyed close ties to the former junta leader Senior General Than

Shwe. Shwe Mann’s son Aung Thet Mann is considered to be a “crony” who financially

benefited from ties to the military regime; Aung Thet Mann received lucrative contracts

in Ayeyarwady Division where his father was regional commander, and also was

authorized by the government to export rice. Aung Thet Mann is on the U.S. sanctions list

of Specially Designated Nationals; Shwe Mann was removed from that list in September

2012 in recognition of his support for reform efforts. Shwe Mann’s ties to business and his

role in the SPDC have caused mistrust among the pro-democracy cadre, but he has built

a record as a reformer in the past four years. According to Inle Advisory Group contacts,

39

ethnic minority groups, including the armed groups involved in national reconciliation

negotiations, like Shwe Mann because “he listens” rather than dictates to them. He

has been prolific in outreach to fellow members of parliament, and has included ethnic

minority parties in overseas delegations as well as high-level meetings with foreign

officials. Should he have the support of the parliament or military, he almost certainly

will be a presidential contender, and then likely become leader of the country after

2015. A Shwe Mann presidency would bring a continuation of reforms, cooperation with

opposition parties, and focus on national reconciliation efforts.

Career Highlights

• Speaker, House of Representatives, March 2011–present

• Member, SPDC, 1997–2010

• Chief of General Staff of the Armed Services, 2003

• Joint Chief of Staff of Army, Navy, and Air Force, 2001–2003

• Southwest Region Commander (Ayeyarwady Division), 1997–2001

• Commander, Light Infantry Division 11 (Yangon), 1996

• Tactical Operations Commander, Light Infantry Division 66 (Bago), 1991–1996

• Graduate of the Defense Services Academy, 11th intake, 1969

40

Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing and the Myanmar Military

The military remains Myanmar’s dominant and most powerful institution. The Myanmar

military, or Tatmadaw, was formed to overcome British colonial rule in the advent of

World War II. Aung San, father of pro-democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi, along with

his “Thirty Comrades” created the Burma Independence Army (BIA), and were trained

by the Japanese on Hainan Island. Following Myanmar’s independence in 1948, the

military played a critical part in guaranteeing the country’s sovereignty and protecting

the new government from dozens of ethnic and anti-government militias threatening

secession or coup. It established principles that are still in effect today and appear

throughout the 2008 Constitution: preservation of the union, national solidarity, and

defense of sovereignty. General Ne Win, a member of the Thirty Comrades, took power

in 1958 to settle a political stalemate and to quash uprisings, and then again in 1962, this

time staying in power. Myanmar has been in the throes of war since its independence,

fighting against multiple ethnic militias—some numbering between 20,000-40,000

troops—and other anti-government armies. Waging counterinsurgency operations

became the foundation of Myanmar’s military, shaping its doctrine and institutions

ever since. In the 1970s, Ne Win developed the “four cuts” strategy, which cuts off

access to food and shelter, funds, intelligence, and recruitment, often resulting in a

scorched earth policy in its implementation. The four cuts strategy remains the guiding

41

principal behind the military’s operations, resulting in ongoing human rights violations

that include forced labor, child soldiers, land seizures, displacement, sexual violence,

and human trafficking.

The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which was first formed in the

wake of the 1988 uprising and later transformed into the SPDC, established a seven

step “Roadmap to a Flourishing Disciplined Democracy” that ostensibly set the path to

permanently institutionalize military governance under the guise of a democracy. The

roadmap, which took decades to complete, included the following steps:

1. Establishment of a National Convention to draft a new constitution

2. Proposal of steps needed to establish a democracy following the conclusion of

the National Convention

3. Drafting of a constitution

4. Holding a national constitutional referendum

5. Holding a national election

6. Convening of parliament

7. Building of a modern and “disciplined” democratic nation by the newly elected

parliamentarians

The junta probably did not envision the evolution of the seventh step in the roadmap

bringing about as much political change as it has. However, despite progressive

legislation, the constitution continues to institutionalize a military role in all aspects of

government, awarding it prominent ministerial positions, including Defense, Border

Affairs, and Home Affairs, control over the armed forces, 25% of all parliamentary

seats, and a major presence in the National Defense and Security Council. The military

almost certainly will in the short term refuse any pressure to limit its political prowess,

including to change Article 436 of the constitution that requires a supermajority to

42

amend the constitution, and effectively gives the military veto power. While many

on the civilian side, including in the USDP, would like to see the military eventually

withdraw from politics, most agree that a staged reduction of its direct influence and

parliamentary seats over the course of several years is the most stable and viable

option.

Min Aung Hlaing was appointed the Commander-in-Chief of the military in 2011, and

holds the coveted title of Senior General, a position last held by former SPDC leader

Than Shwe. He almost certainly will be the military parliamentarian nominee for the

presidency, and likely will attain one of the vice presidential slots. Min Aung Hlaing is

expected to retire this year, per the mandatory military retirement age of sixty.

Min Aung Hlaing is a virtual unknown relative to the other likely presidential nominees,

and his views on topics such as political development and national reconciliation must

be divined from his public speeches, recent interviews, and actions. He comes across

as a political hardliner who favors a strong military and stable country, suggesting

he would use force should insurgencies or protests rage out of control. Min Aung

Hlaing has become more open to interviews and, according to local journalists, is fairly

charismatic.

Min Aung Hlaing has spent his formative years in the military in Shan State, including

involvement in actions in 2009 targeting the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance

Army (MNDAA), an ethnic Kokang armed group. The MNDAA in 2015 has been involved

in heavy skirmishes with the military, resulting in internally displaced persons, Myanmar

military deaths, and bombings across the Chinese border. Min Aung Hlaing’s attitude

toward Myanmar’s political transition has been questioned, particularly as he defied

President Thein Sein’s order to halt military offensives in Kachin State. He reportedly is

close to Than Shwe, and would almost certainly be less progressive than his USDP and

NLD colleagues and seek to protect military interests.

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National League for Democracy Chairwoman Aung San Suu Kyi

National icon and Nobel Peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi rejoined the political and pro-

democracy scene following her release from house arrest in November 2010. She is the

daughter of the founder of independent Myanmar and its military, Aung San, who was

Career Highlights

• Commander-in-Chief, March 2011–present

• Joint Chief of Staff of the Armed Services, June 2010–March 2011

• Chief, Bureau of Special Operations 2, 2008

• Commander, Triangle Regional Command, 2002

• Commander, Light Infantry Division 44

• Graduate of the Defense Services Academy, 19th intake, 1974

44

assassinated when she was two years old. After years of study and work abroad, Aung San

Suu Kyi returned to Myanmar in 1988 to nurse her dying mother, and soon became engaged

in the country’s democratic uprising. When former head of state Ne Win stepped down and

called for a multi-party election, Aung San Suu Kyi formed the National League for Democracy

(NLD) party to contest the 1990 election. Despite the imprisonment of Aung San Suu Kyi and

more than half of the other NLD candidates, the party won more than 80% of the vote. The junta

refused to recognize the election results, and embarked instead on the seven-step “Roadmap to

a Flourishing Disciplined Democracy,” ostensibly to ensure a democracy on its terms.

Aung San Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest three times from 1989-2010. During each

period of house arrest her freedom increasingly became more restricted. Aung San Suu Kyi’s

husband died of cancer in London in 1999; government authorities rejected his request to visit

her before his death. The junta urged Aung San Suu Kyi to join her family abroad, but she refused,

believing she would not be allowed to return to Myanmar if she did.

In what became known as the “Depayin Massacre,” tensions with the government came to a

head in May 2003 when an unidentified group of assailants attacked Aung San Suu Kyi’s convoy.

Dozens of NLD members and supporters were reported killed or missing, yet the true figure likely

stands at around one dozen. Following the attack, Aung San Suu Kyi was held in detention and

then placed back under house arrest. In May 2009, just days before her period of detention was

due to expire, Aung San Suu Kyi was arrested and charged with breaking the terms of her house

arrest after a U.S. citizen entered her house and refused to leave. She was sentenced to three

years imprisonment, but the sentence was reduced to 18 months of additional house arrest. The

SLORC and later the SPDC met with Aung San Suu Kyi only a handful of times during her periods

of house arrest; under pressure from the international community and former UN Special Envoy

Ibrahim Gambari, the SPDC in 2007 assigned former Minister of Labor Aung Kyi to be its liaison.

Upon release in November 2010, she began to reshape and reinvigorate the NLD through youth

outreach and adding new members to the NLD’s Central Executive Committee. With some

45

internal debate and controversy, the NLD decided to contest the 2012 by-election, and won 43 of

44 seats. Aung San Suu Kyi would like to assume the presidency in the next administration, but is

constitutionally barred from doing so because her sons hold foreign citizenship. She has forged

a strong relationship with Shwe Mann, and there are rumors that a power sharing agreement

between them already is in place. Beyond the legal obstacles, Aung San Suu Kyi also has come

under fire for her silence on ethnic and sectarian violence and land confiscation issues.

An Aung San Suu Kyi or NLD-led government likely would focus on social welfare issues

and popular issues such as anti-corruption and education. There would be a continuation

of reform efforts, most certainly on expanding personal freedoms. She will be pressured to

address job creation and employment prospects for Myanmar’s large youth population, but it

is unclear exactly where her and her party’s policies on economic reforms lie.

Career Highlights

• Wins a parliamentary seat in by-election, April, 2012 • Meeting with President Thein Sein, August, 2011• Released from house arrest, November 2010• Depayin Massacre, third house arrest, May 2003• Released from house arrest, 2002• Second house arrest, September 2000• Released from house arrest, July 1995• Publishes ‘Freedom from Fear,’ December 1991• NLD wins election, May 1990• First house arrest, July 1989• General Secretary and Founder, NLD, September 1988• Fellow, Indian Institute of Advanced Studies, Simla, 1987• Visiting Scholar, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, 1985–86• Research Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bhutan, 1972• Assistant Secretary, Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary

Questions, United Nations Secretariat, 1969–1971• Graduates from St. Hugh’s College, Oxford University, 1967

46

Civil Society

Since Cyclone Nargis in 2008, and the sitting of parliament in March 2011, the space for

civil society in Myanmar has expanded significantly from its lowest points during the

SLORC and SPDC eras. The interests of Myanmar civil society, which for these purposes

does not include government NGOS (or GONGOs) or non-state armed groups, range

from pro-democracy efforts, to supporting land tenure and students rights, to national

reconciliation efforts.

The 88 Generation Students (88 GS) group, taking its name from the 1988 uprising, is

synonymous with the democratic struggle and civil society movement in Myanmar. The

group’s key members were at the forefront of the 1988, and later the 2007, protests. The

pro-democracy group spent much of the last 25 years in prison; in November 2008, the 88

GS members were sentenced to 65 years in prison apiece, but were released in a general

amnesty in January 2012.

The 88 GS includes some of the most prominent dissidents in the country; the best-known

member of the group is Min Ko Naing, who was the unofficial leader of the underground

student union in 1988. Originally named Paw U Tun, his nom-de-guerre Min Ko Naing

means “conqueror of kings,” and he has won numerous human rights awards for his

nonviolent campaign for democracy. He was arrested a year after the 1988 protests,

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released in November 2004, and then rearrested in 2007. Other key members include Ko

Ko Gyi, Htay Kywe, Pone Cho, Min Zeya, and Jimmy and Nilar, who had to leave their four-

month-old daughter with relatives while unsuccessfully evading arrest.

Upon release from prison in the January 2012 amnesty, the 88 GS immediately returned

to the pro-democracy cause. They traveled throughout the country to meet with ethnic

minority groups, promoting national reconciliation and development in minority areas.

88 GS members also have met with the government, discussing ways to continue reform

efforts and make progress on national reconciliation efforts.

With the government opening in 2011, other sections of civil society shifted from health

and cyclone-recovery activities to greater engagement in social and environmental

issues; the Save the Irrawaddy campaign resulted in the government suspension of the

Chinese-backed Myitsone Dam project. Civil society organizations have also focused

on rule of law issues, and have protested against land seizures and other political and

civil rights violations. Civil society is a growing voice in Myanmar, and will directly and

indirectly impact the political reform trajectory. These communities provide individuals

and otherwise marginalized groups with a stake in the country’s transition. However, as

Myanmar experts Charles Petrie and Ashley South noted in their paper on Myanmar’s

civil society[1], civil society is not inherently progressive, but can be both reactionary

and repressive, or at least, unaccountable. Many of these groups have had little to no

experience in negotiating, and come to the table with a zero sum mentality, making

consensus more difficult to reach.

[1] http://www.ashleysouth.co.uk/files/EPLO_CSDN_Myanmar_MappingMyanmarPeacebuildingCivilSociety_CPetrieASouth.pdf

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Ethnic Minorities

National reconciliation is Myanmar’s defining issue—Myanmar has been in prolonged

throes of war since its independence in 1948, with continual fighting between the

government and ethnic, politically ideological, and anti-government armies. Decades

of war and military rule have resulted in local populations being subjected to land

grabs, questionable labor practices, environmental degradation, and other human

rights abuses. The junta government in the 1990s forged ceasefire agreements with

more than a dozen armed ethnic groups, halting the civil war, but failing to reach

a political solution. The current government, populated with many generals from

the former junta, has defied expectations on national reconciliation with both the

executive and legislative branches committed to seeking resolution. Thein Sein and

his government since 2011 have made significant efforts towards a durable peace and

a political dialogue with armed ethnic groups and Myanmar’s 135 officially recognized

ethnic nationalities. Ethnic nationalities, for their part, also have actively participated

in the negotiations, and are working to overcome decades of mistrust to achieve a

lasting and stable peace. In March 2015, a draft framework for national reconciliation

was signed between the government and several of the armed ethnic groups. While

the final details of the agreement are far from complete, it represented a critical step

forward in bringing ethnic minorities into politics to end Myanmar’s civil wars.

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Despite positive steps toward national reconciliation, the situation remains tenuous

and fraught with miscalculation. Skirmishes continue to flare in Shan State, particularly

in the Kokang area, and tensions with the Kachin Independence Army and the United

Wa State Army loom over the negotiations. Difficult issues such as resource sharing

and federalism will dominate political discussions, with no easy solutions readily

available. The bulk of Myanmar’s natural resources, including gems and precious

stones, minerals, timber, hydropower potential, and tourism are located in the ethnic

areas, presenting a challenge both to the government and any prospective investors

seeking to engage in those regions.

The ethnic minorities are politically active, and will to the best of their abilities contest

both the national and state and regional elections. Their best chance for increasing

representation is in the state and regional parliaments. According to Inle Advisory

Group contacts, the NLD will likely choose not to contest certain state and regional

seats in order to build a cooperative relationship with these groups and avoid tensions,

with an eye toward coalition building to pursue the NLD agenda. The ethnic minorities

will increasingly be a factor in Myanmar politics, whether through membership in

parliament or their role in the national reconciliation efforts.

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Myanmar Political Elite

Though not key influencers on Myanmar’s political trajectory, individuals such as Tin Aye,

the chair of the Union Election Commission (UEC), Khin Aung Myint, the Speaker of the

Upper House, and members of Thein Sein’s office, including Soe Thane, the coordinating

minister of economic affairs, and Aung Min, the lead government negotiator for the peace

process, play an important role. Tin Aye, a former member of the SPDC, and the UEC will

enforce the way the lead up to and day of the election is conducted, including, but not

limited to, voter lists, political party registration, campaign rules, and participation of

international election observers. The UEC has been open to and has received technical

assistance, and has continually made public statements supporting its intent to hold a

credible election. Khin Aung Myint, a rumored dark horse candidate for the presidency,

participates in several influential political groupings, including the National Defense and

Security Council and six party talks related to national reconciliation. His parliamentary

position allows him to direct how the institution operates as well as what bills are up

for draft, debate, or passage. The members of the Office of the President have been key

advisors to Thein Sein throughout his administration and are credited with assisting the

president craft and enact his reform agenda. These members, particularly Soe Thane and

Aung Min, will almost certainly be involved with Thein Sein’s critical decision of seeking

a second presidential term.

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The International Community

The international community, through foreign governments, business communities, and

human rights organizations, also will continue to play a role in the political trajectory

of the country. Since the 2011 opening, Western governments have lifted or suspended

major financial restrictions, allowing business and money into the country for the first

time in decades. The reestablishment of bilateral and multilateral donor agencies has

pumped millions of dollars into infrastructure projects, technical assistance programs,

and education efforts on electoral and political reforms. While this renewed engagement

is aimed to improve the environment for political and economic reforms to flourish,

some human rights groups contend that the country is insincere in its transition and that

restrictive measures should be reimposed.

Foreign governments have been pressuring the Myanmar government to conduct a

credible election, allow for full participation of political parties, and ensure transparent

conduct leading up to and on the day of the election. Governments and international

NGOs have offered technical and monetary assistance to provide election and democracy

training to both the Union Election Commission and the various political parties.

Should election day not appear credible, or should the next administration stall reform

efforts or slide back toward the former junta governing principles, human rights groups

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almost certainly will demand more restrictive policies, including the reimposition of

sanctions, and divestment from major investment projects. Should the opposite occur,

foreign governments will work to fully normalize bilateral ties, increase assistance

programs, and further encourage businesses to engage in the Myanmar market.

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Myanmar geographically comprises seven states and seven regions, divisions, and

territories. The state names reflect Myanmar’s largest ethnic groups, and they are

located around the country’s periphery. The regions, divisions, and territories run

through the center of the country and house Myanmar’s largest urban areas, including

the administrative capital, Nay Pyi Taw, as well as Mandalay and Yangon. The 2008

Constitution also recognizes five Self Administered Zones and a Self Administered

Division. The zones and division are overseen by governments known as “leading

bodies” which have executive and legislative control over development affairs,

public health, water, and electricity. Members of these leading bodies have said they

have had little authority to enact laws in practice, and that the state governments

intervene to influence local affairs.

THE GEOGRAPHYOF MYANMAR

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MYANMARStates, Divisions &Self Administered Zones

Self Administered Zones

ShanState

KachinState

SagaingDivision

ChinState

MagwayDivision

BagoDivision

Ayeyarwaddy Division Yangon

Division

MonState

KayinState

TanintharyiDivision

RakhineState

Nay Pyi Taw

Naga SAZ

Wa SAD

Kokang SAZ

Pa Laung SAZ

KayahState

PaO SAZ

Danu SAZ

MandalayDivision

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THE 2015ELECTION

The Myanmar government announced on July 8 that the first general

election since 2010 will take place on November 8. The election represents

another critical milestone in Myanmar’s transition toward democracy.

The election itself will not however be the ultimate determinant of

whether Myanmar will progress ahead democratically or slide back into a more

militaristic or “disciplined” governing structure. The real test for those who win

seats in November will be to ensure that all stakeholders are empowered to work

within the system and cooperate, despite differing views, to maintain the country’s

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political and economic trajectory, and the military’s tolerance level for continued

political development.

The government, particularly the Union

Election Commission (UEC), has worked to

make the election as credible as possible. The

UEC set the end of April as the deadline for

political party registration, announced the

election date, and announced constituencies

and registration of candidates. The campaign

period will start in September. Unless there is

a major event on the scale of Cyclo