Initial Analysis of 13th November Paris Attacks

Matthew Thomas November 15, 2015

Analysis of 13th November Paris Attacks 1

Initial Analysis of 13th November Paris Attacks

1 INTRODUCTION

This short analysis will attempt to piece together what happened during the 13th November 2015 attacks

across Paris. It will give a short timeline of the event and map the locations of the attacks. It will then

look at the perpetrators: their organization and their tactics. It will then finish by looking at the failures

before going on to look at lessons to take away and how to prevent similar attacks in the future.

2 THE ATTACKS

The section of this analysis will look how the attacks occurred by looking at the timeline of the attacks

and then looking at the locations of the attacks before going on to look at how many casualties that

have occurred as a result of the attacks.

2.1 CHRONOLOGY OF THE ATTACKS The attacks against Paris started with the first of three suicide bombing outside the Stade de France (#1

on Figure 1) at 21:20 CMT1, with reports at this time suggesting the bomber had a ticket to the football

game that was ongoing but he was stopped and detonated his device.2 The first of the shooting

incidents occur at 21:25 on rue Alibert, in the 10th arrondissement, against two cafés: La Carillion and

Petit Cambodge (#2 on Fig. 1) followed by a further shooting around the same area at 21:29 against La

Costa Nostra Pizza (#3 on Fig. 1).3 The second suicide bombing occurred at 21:30 outside the Stade de

France.4 The next of the shooting incidents occurred at 21:38 at the La Belle Equipe bar on rue de

Charonne (#5 on Fig. 1).5 The next incidents occurred in and around the Bataclan theatre (#4 on Fig. 1)

between 21:40 and 21:506 which leads to the start of the hostage situation. The third and final explosion

occurs at the Stade de France at 21:53.7 The hostage situation in the Bataclan was ended at 01:30 am

on 14th November.

1 LeJDD.fr, 'DIRECT. "Trois équipes terroristes coordonnées" - leJDD.fr', 2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.lejdd.fr/Societe/Faits-divers/Plusieurs-fusillades-ont-eclate-vendredi-soir-a-Paris-759571. [Accessed: 14- Nov- 2015]. (10:17 Update) 2 J. Landauro, 'Paris Attacks: Suicide Bomber Was Blocked from Entering Stade de France', WSJ, 2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.wsj.com/articles/attacker-tried-to-enter-paris-stadium-but-was-turned-away-1447520571. [Accessed: 14- Nov- 2015]. 3 BBC News, 'Paris attacks: What we know - BBC News', BBC News, 2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34818994. [Accessed: 14- Nov- 2015]. 4 LeJDD.fr, 2015. Op. cit. 5 BBC News, 2015. Op. cit. 6 BBC News, 2015. Op. cit. 7 LeJDD.fr, 2015. Op. cit.



2.2 LOCATIONS OF THE ATTACKS Figure 1 below is a map of Paris showing the locations of the November 13th attacks. The numbered

points on the map refer to the different attack locations, with the red dot showing the location of the

suicide attacks and the orange dots showing the locations of the shootings.

Figure 1 - Map showing locations of November 13th Paris Attacks (Image created by Matthew Thomas, information from multiple sources)

Map of Paris Attacks

M. Thomas 14/11/2015

Key

Suicide Attack -

Shooting -

1

3

2

4

5



2.3 CASUALTIES The current death toll, as of 15th November 2015, is 129 people not including the 8 attackers. The

number of injured is over 350 with under a 100 of those being in critical condition.8 Amongst the dead

are foreign nationals from the United Kingdom, the United States, Belgium and Portugal.9

3 THE ATTACKERS: WHAT IS KNOWN SO FAR

This section will look at the perpetrators of the attack, from the information that is currently available,

in terms of the structure of the group, their motivations and finally look at the equipment and tactics

used by the attackers.

3.1 WHO AND WHY? On 14th November, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) claimed responsibility for the attacks in a media

release that gave the reasons why the attack occurred.10 The release suggests the attack mainly

occurred due to France’s involvement with “crusader” air campaign against ISIS in Syria. But they also

give other reasons which come down to Paris being the capital of vice and prostitution.

As of 15th November only one of the attackers has been identified. Omar Ismaïl Mostefai was identified

by a fingerprint when found a finger was found in the Bataclan theatre. He had been known to the

police due to petty crimes and “…had been singled out as a high-priority target for radicalization in 2010

but, before Friday, he had never been implicated in an investigation or a terrorist association.”11

3.2 ORGANIZATION OF TERROR GROUP Figure 2 below is a hypothesized organizational chart of the group responsible for the Paris attacks. The

chart has been created from the multiple source emerging about the attack, the primary source for the

groups structure comes from the Paris prosecutor, Francois Molins.12

As per previous terror attacks, the group tends to be structured into planning and execution cells that

operate and train independently. The preparation section will be responsible for the planning of the

operations which would have included identifying potential target locations and doing reconnaissance

on them. Another cell of the planning section would be the equipment section which would be

responsible for procurement of weapons, explosives and other equipment required for the attack. The

8 M. Martinez, 'Paris attacks: ISIS claims responsibility - CNN.com', CNN, 2015. [Online]. Available: http://edition.cnn.com/2015/11/14/world/paris-attacks/. [Accessed: 14- Nov- 2015]. 9 P. Brown and P. St. Claire, 'Paris attack victims - CNN.com', CNN, 2015. [Online]. Available: http://edition.cnn.com/2015/11/14/world/paris-attack-victims/index.html. [Accessed: 14- Nov- 2015]. 10 M. Fisher, 'Here is ISIS's statement claiming responsibility for the Paris attacks', Vox, 2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.vox.com/2015/11/14/9734794/isis-claim-paris-statement. [Accessed: 15- Nov- 2015]. 11 NDTV, 'Omar Ismail Mostefai: From Petty Criminal to Cold-Blooded Terrorist', NDTV.com, 2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/omar-ismail-mostefai-from-petty-criminal-to-cold-blooded-terrorist-1243525. [Accessed: 15- Nov- 2015]. 12 BBC News, 'the suspects: What we know - BBC News', 2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34822265. [Accessed: 15- Nov- 2015].



final part of the preparation section would be responsible for acquiring the transport for the attackers

which would mean this section is mostly likely isolated from the rest of the cell to prevent discovery.

The execution section is directly responsible for the attacks. According to the information currently

available, there are three cells, one being the suicide bombing cell that attempted to attack the Stade de

France and two being responsible for the shootings across Paris. One of the shooting cells may have had

four members as four attackers were killed at the end of the Bataclan theatre hostage situation.

The group is mostly likely led by an ISIS commander or at the least a well trusted member of the group,

with the individual section leader’s also mostly likely being trusted members of the group. The rest of

the group, at the time of writing, appear to be different nationalities including French and Belgian.

3.3 EQUIPMENT USED This part of the section will look into the weapons, explosive devices and vehicles that were used during

and found in the aftermath of the attacks in Paris.

The weapons used during and recovered after the attacks are AK-47 type weapons13, which are

commonly used by ISIS and other terrorist groups across the globe. The explosives in the devices that all

of the attackers were using has been identified as triacetone triperoxide (TATP) which has been used in

13 BBC News, 'Paris attacks: Weapons found in 'getaway car' - BBC News', 2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34825080. [Accessed: 15- Nov- 2015].

Group Leader -ISIS Commander?

Execution Section

Sucide Bombing Cell - Stade de

France

Unknown Male (Possibly Syrian)

Unknown (Possibly Female)

Unknown Male

Shooter Cell #1 (Bataclan)

Omar Ismaïl Mostefai (French)

Unknown Attacker

Unknown Attacker

Unknown Attacker

Shooter Cell #2

Unknown Number

Preperation Section

Planning Cell

Unknown Number

Weapons and Explosives

Preperation Cell

Unknown Number

Transport Cell

Unknown Number

Figure 2 - Hypothesized Organizational Chart of Paris Attack Terrorist Group (Chart by Matthew Thomas, information from French Prosecutors)



other terrorist attacks and is made easily using store bought materials.14 The devices would have had to

be designed and created by someone proficient with explosives as the substance is: “…extremely

sensitive to impact, temperature change and friction.”15 One of the vehicles used during the attacks was

a black SEAT that was found a day later with several AK-47 type weapons inside.16

3.4 HYPOTHESIZED PLAN OF THE ATTACK This part of the analysis will look at a hypothetical plan that could have happened as there is a belief

that the attack did not occur as planned.

The ‘original’ plan may have involved placing a suicide bomber inside the stadium during the football

match and detonating his/her device, killing many and causing a stampede when a second bomber

would then detonate their device increasing the casualty rate. The third bomber may have been kept in

reserve to attack the first responders, as has happened in numerous terrorist attacks across the globe.

The other two cells may have then conducted shooting attacks across Paris to stretch the law

enforcement and security apparatus across the French capital and to increase the casualty rates.

The suicide bombing section of the plan could have failed due to the discovery of the suicide device by

security guards at the stadium, who then prevented the bomber from entering.17

4 LOOKING FORWARD

This last section will look at the failures that have emerged from the attacks and then look at the lessons

that need to be learnt to prevent similar attacks as well as preventing other future threats from

emerging.

4.1 FAILURES Some instances of intelligence and security failures have emerged in the aftermath of the attacks in

Paris. One of the failures is of cooperation and information sharing between the French and the

Germans. On the 5th November, a Montenegro man was stopped and arrested during a traffic stop

where German authorities found a large cache of weapons and explosives hidden throughout the car.18

The key failure was the GPS was programmed for Paris, all of this information was not passed on to anti-

terror police and no information was passed onto French authorities despite the GPS information.

14 S. Brown, 'Paris suicide bombers used TATP, a powerful, homemade explosive: officials', Nydailynews.com, 2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/paris-suicide-bombers-tatp-homemade-explosive-article-1.2435082. [Accessed: 15- Nov- 2015]. 15 J. Pike, 'Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP)', Globalsecurity.org, 2011. [Online]. Available: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/tatp.htm. [Accessed: 15- Nov- 2015]. 16 ITV News, 'French police launch hunt for black Seat car over Paris attacks', 2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.itv.com/news/update/2015-11-14/french-police-launch-hunt-for-black-seat-car-over-paris-attacks/. [Accessed: 15- Nov- 2015]. 17 Landauro, 2015. Op. cit. 18 H. Austin, 'Paris attacks: Man arrested in Germany for smuggling firearms and explosives linked to French attacks', International Business Times UK, 2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/paris-attacks-man-arrested-germany-smuggling-firearms-explosives-linked-french-attacks-1528726. [Accessed: 15- Nov- 2015].



Another of the failures that is coming apparent is that one of the attackers, Omar Ismaïl Mostefai, was

on a security watch list for his alleged associations with armed groups.19 More information will emerge

to show if this was an intelligence and security failure or if he was viewed not to be a threat at the time.

4.2 LESSONS LEARNT Even though there was failures, many vital lessons can be taken away from these attacks and the

responses to them, not only for France and Europe but across the world.

One vital lesson that needs to be learnt is the importance of coordination and information sharing

between both domestic law enforcement and intelligence agencies but also increasing international

information sharing and cooperation to be able to counter terrorist threats but also criminal threats.

The German/France case that has emerged as a result of these attacks is a key example of the need for

cooperation and information sharing.

Another vital lesson to take away is the need for better monitoring and control of suspects known to the

police and security services. There is need to improve and increase the intelligence and security agencies

ability to locate and monitor suspect individuals so that they cannot go onto to commit attacks across

the continent like they have been doing.

One issue that needs to be resolved is over the use of social and news media quickly reporting news that

may not be accurate and assists in causing confusion and panic. During the attacks, Twitter and other

social media sites were full of people reporting about what was happening and as well as reporting on

the movements of the police. This has occurred for every major incident in the last 5 years where social

media acts as an instant news source that is often unproven or unconfirmed. The lesson that needs to

be taken away from this is educating people to reducing the amount that is posted online and try to

keep information to only confirmed sources.

One positive lesson that emerged from these attacks was the vital capability of rapid response units in

Paris that been stationed within the city to be able to counter the terrorist threat after the Charlie

Hebdo shootings in January of this year. Other cities and nations need to increase and improve their

respective rapid reaction units to counter fast moving threats that happened in Paris.

The final lessons to be taken away is the need for security plans to counter terrorist threats but also the

need to put them into place very early on in the attack to allow the security and police forces to have

the greatest impact against the attackers.

5 CONCLUSIONS AND KEY POINTS

The attacks in Paris are the deadliest attacks in Europe since the Madrid bombing in 2004. The terrorist

threat to France and Europe as a whole will remain a permanent feature for the foreseeable future until

19 Al Jazeera, 'Victims mourned as France investigates Paris attacks', 2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/french-police-identify-attacker-paris-killings-151115032957285.html. [Accessed: 15- Nov- 2015].



groups like Al-Qaeda and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria are destroyed or their ability to operate freely is

restricted.

5.1 KEY POINTS

5.1.1 On the Attacks

A complex and coordinated attack across a large area of Paris

Over 120 killed and over 300 injured20

Three cells of attackers with suicide vests and automatic weapons

5.1.2 On Lessons to be learnt

Need for greater cooperation and information sharing between agencies and countries

Need for security plans and fast reaction units

Need for better monitoring of suspected individuals

20 At the time writing



References

Websites

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Documents

Initial Analysis of 13th November Paris Attacks