INDONESIA-MALAYSIA RELATIONS IN THE POST-CONFRONTATION …journal.unair.ac.id/download-fullpapers-03-Wardani.pdf · BLS Wahyu Wardhani, “Indonesia-Malaysia relations in the Post-Confrontation

BLS Wahyu Wardhani, “Indonesia -Malaysia relations in the Post-Confrontation Era: The Role of the Serumpun Concept,” Masyarakat,Kebudayaan dan Politik , Th XII, No 3-4, Oktober1999, 25-44.

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INDONESIA-MALAYSIA RELATIONSIN THE POST-CONFRONTATION ERA:

THE ROLE OF THE SERUMPUN CONCEPT

B.L.S. Wahyu Wardhani

The relationship between the Malay people,both from the mainland and archipelago, hasdeveloped over many centuries, well be foreIndonesia and Malaysia formed asindependent countries. Relations, however,have not always been smooth andcooperative but also conflictual and, to acertain degree, rivalries have occured.

This situation was not resolved whenthese people, who originated from the samestock, formed their own countries.Interestingly, relations between the twocountries are fuelled by a ‘love -hate’relationship. The special nature of the bondcan result in cooperation which is, forexample, shown by their strong ten dency tomake ASEAN work as a mechanism forregional organization. On the other hand,there are unresolved situations, such as areluctance to solve certain bilateral conflicts.

This article aims to present theproblems underlying the relationship sincethe post-Confrontation era in a situationwhere the ethnic dimension is still dominantin the relationship.

The fact that the same ethnic stockand other similarities exist between thepeople of both countries nevertheless doesnot always bestow advantages on thedevelopment of the relationship. This isbecause the ‘emotional’ dimension is ofteninvolved and this has a deep influence on therelationship, and sometimes it becomes a’barrier’ to a valuable and effectivepartnership.

The Interaction Among the ‘Serumpun’People

Literally, serumpun means the people of thesame racial or ethnic stock. The majority ofthe people of Indonesia originated from thesame ethnic groups as the people ofMalaysia, called Malays (Melayu).Historically, their ancestors were fromYunnan, in the south of China. However, theorigin of the term Melayu is still clouded inuncertainty. The first mention of“Melayu/Melayur/Malayu” occurs inChinese chronicles in AD 644 when it wasrecorded that an emissary from Melayu inthe vicinity of the Jambi or Batang Haririver in Central Sumatra was present at theChinese imperial court. However, the termwas never used as a term of ethnic identityuntil fairly recent times when Europeantravellers, merchants, missionaries andcolonial officials began to categorise theindigenous people living along the coastalestuaries and surrounding islands ofpeninsular Malaysia as ‘Malays’. Althoughthe Malays themselves did not for a longtime refer to themselves as Malays, this doesnot mean that they were not aware of theirdistinctiveness as a group. With the passageof time, a Malay identity emerged. Thisidentity grew in tandem with an expandingethnic mixture comprising Malay and othersof the same racial stock such as theMinangkabause, Acehnese, Bugis,Banjarese, Mandailings, and Javanese(Tham Seong Chee, 1992:1).


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The interaction among Malay peoplehas taken place from over a thousand yearsago through trade and religion. The feelingof sameness among them is a significantfactor in the relationship which hasconditioned perceptions and expectationsand it is of contemporary significance. Thereare several factors which can represent thesignificance of the relationship betweenIndonesia and Malaysia at present. Besidessharing a high degree of cultural and ethnicsimilarities, both countries aregeographically proximate, and share landand sea borders. The official languages ofthe two countries are almost identical andIslam is the dominant religion of bothcountries which also share similar historicalexperiences.

Several historical moments mark theinteraction between the Malay communities,both in Malaya and in Indonesia. AlthoughIndonesia declared its independence in 1945and Malaya was granted independence byBritain in 1957 and became Malaysia in1963, contact between the two communitiescan be traced back many centuries. Since theera of the Srivijaya Kingdom, for example,Malay culture spread from Palembang,where the Srivijaya Kingdom was located.The Malay language was used by the p eopleboth on the peninsula and in other parts ofSumatra. Furthermore, throughout theFifteenth Century, it is clear that the peopleof Aceh in the west and Ternate in the eastadopted Melaka Malay’s style ofgovernment, literature, music, dance, dress,games, titles, and even pantun after theestablishment of Melaka as a commercialand religious centre (Andaya and Andaya ,1982:54-5). Malays had lived for centuriesin the region before the internationalboundaries were settled in the NineteenthCentury; seafaring Malays, Buginese,Sumatrans and Javanese roamed and settledat will throughout the archipelago and had

little regard for frontiers in the modernsense. Political boundaries have not been avery substantial barrier to the movement ofthe various people throughout the region,even during the last one hundred years(Mackie, 1974:60).

The feeling of ‘oneness’ amongMalay people in Indonesia and Malaysia canbe seen from the spirit of nationalism amongthem. Mackie suggests that Indonesia’squest for national independence made apowerful appeal to young Malays in Malayain the last decade before the Second WorldWar and in the years of Indonesia’srevolutionary struggle against the Dutchbetween 1945-1949. Soekarno and Hattawere regarded as national heroes in Malayaas well as in Indonesia and their photos weredisplayed in many Malay and Borneanhouseholds some years before independence(Mackie: 18).

The general sense of ‘oneness’ hadalso been manipulated, sometimesexaggerated, for political reason s in bothcountries, especially before and duringWorld War II. The notion of serumpunproved to be useful in mobilizing anti -colonial sentiments and boosting a sense ofsolidarity and mutual help among thenationalist groups in both countries. Forinstance, there was a strong impulse fromthe young Malayans and Indonesians for thegrowth of the idea of a closer union betweenMalaya and Indonesia. The Seruan Azhar, amonthly journal which was published by theAssociation of Indonesia and Malay studentsin Cairo (which was originally calledJami’ah Al-Khairiyah) made an appeal forthe people of Sumatra, Java, and Borneo,and Malaya to “unite with one heart forprogress and prosperity” (Roff, 1994:88 -9).

Another monthly journal, PilehanTimur, centered on three main concepts:Pan-Islamism, Pan-Malayanism (unionbetween Indonesia and Malaya), and anti -


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colonial nationalism. There were threepolitical organizations formed in Egyptendorsing the ‘oneness’ of the ‘two bloodbrothers’. The Kesatuan Melayu Muda(Union of Malay Youth: KKM), formed in1937, was a radical nationalist and anti -British organization. The leaders, IbrahimYaacob and Ishak Haji Mohamed, presentedthe concept “Melayu Raya” as beingsynonymous with “Indonesia Raya” (GreaterMalay[sia] and Greater Indonesia) based ona common history linked in continuity to aglorious past. Their dream was for thevarious groups of Bangsa Melayu in boththe Dutch colonial territories and the Malaystates in Malaya to be liberated fromcolonial rule and merge into a sovereignstate of one united bangsa (Omar, 1993:21).

The aspiration of the bangsa orangMelayu is to struggle for the independenceof the land and the bangsa Melayu who willunite again in one great country according tothe interest and desire of the people as awhole. The aim of Melayu Raya is the sameas Indonesia Raya which is the aspiration ofthe Malay nationalist movement, that is torevive again the heritage of Sri Vijaya,which is the common unity of the bangsa.

In 1938, Persatuan Melayu Selangor(Selangor Malay Association) was formed inKuala Lumpur. This organization proposedto stop all “alien” immigration to the thenMalaya but encouraged Indonesianimmigrants because ‘the Indonesians comefrom the same ethnic stock as the Malays’(Aris, 1977:79). Another organizationendeavoured to link Malaya’s future withIndonesia’s and to declare jointindependence of the two nations; this wasKesatuan Ra’ayat Indonesia Semenanjong(Union of Peninsular Indonesian: KRIS).The other organization was PersatuanPemuda Indonesia dan Malaya (TheAssociation of Indonesia and Malay Youthor Perpindom) (Nasution , 1977:63).

Apart from Egypt, similarorganizations were formed by theassociation of Indonesian and Malayanstudents in Saudi Arabia called PersatuanTalabah Indonesia-Malaysia (TalabahIndonesia-Malaysia or Pertindom). In Iraq,a similar organization was formed and calledMajelis Kebangsaan Indonesia -Malaya (TheNational Council of Indonesia -Malaya:Makindom). Later, this organization wastransformed into Perkumpulan PemudaIndonesia (The Convention of IndonesianYouth: PPI), in which the youths fromMalaya regarded themselves as Indonesianyouths. The Malay Left formed PartaiKebangsaan Melayu Malaya (Malaya’sMalay National Party: PKMM), in October1945. The PKMM held its inauguralcongress on 30 November and adopted eightpoints, two relevant among them were: To unite the bangsa Melayu (Malay race)

and plant kebangsaan in the hearts of theMalays with the aim of uniting Malaya ina big family, that is the Republik IndonesiaRaya.

To work with other bangsa who live in thecountry to live in peace and work towardssetting up the Malayan United Front toenable Malaya to be merdeka(independent), prosperous, and peaceful aspart of the Republik Indonesia Raya.

The congress also adopted theIndonesian flag, the Merah-Putih, as thePKMM’s banner and voiced its support forthe Malayan Union. Besides, PKMM alsoadopted five principles which were verysimilar to Indonesia’s principles ofPancasila.

Undoubtedly, the plan for Indonesianindependence and the realisation of“Indonesia Raya” was intended to includeMalaya. After the Japanese offered theprospect of independence and theconstitutional and political structure of the


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new state came under discussi on, thequestion whether Malaya and British Borneocolonies should be included in the nationalterritory of Indonesia was debated in theInvestigating Preparatory Committee forIndonesia’s Independence ( BadanPenyelidik Usaha-usaha KemerdekaanIndonesia: BPUPKI) on July 1945. Theinclusion of the Malaya was put forward byMuhamad Yamin and Sukarno. Yamin’sargument (Mackie:21) was simple that:

... the areas which should be included inIndonesian territory are those which are givenbirth to Indonesian people: the motherland ofthe people will be transformed into theterritory of a State

The areas he listed as inhabited byIndonesians were the islands of NetherlandIndies (including West New Guinea), Timor,North Borneo, and Malaya (Mackie:21). Inthe BPUPKI meeting, Yamin argued thatMalaya bridged Indonesia, Indochina andthe Asian continent. The Malacca Straits andthe Malaya Peninsula are a passage to andthe neck of the Indonesian archipelago.Therefore, to separate Malaya fromIndonesia meant weakening Indonesia’sgeo-political position and to unite themmeant strengthening Indonesia’s positionand completing and entity with nationalaspirations and this was consistent with theinterset of the geo-politics of land and sea(Dalton, 1972:122-123). Sukarno supportedYamin’s idea by saying:

… I myself am convinced that the people ofMalaya feel themselves as Indonesians,belonging to Indonesia and as one of us ...Indonesia will not become strong and secureunless the whole Straits of Malacca are in ourhands”.

The members of KMM also persuaded theircounterparts in the BPUPKI to put forwardthe “Greater Indonesia” concept to Sukarno.

But there is no indication that the idea ofmerging Indonesia and Malaya wasconsidered again when Indonesia declaredits independence without the inclusion ofMalaya. However, the conception of“Indonesia Raya” refound its momentumagain after West Irian was successfullyincorporated into Indonesian territory. The‘Konfrontasi’ policy was launched bySukarno during 1962-1963. Initially,Indonesia did not oppose the formation ofthe Malayan Federation; this was probablybecause Jakarta was still faced by the WestIrian problem. However, Indonesia’s attitudechanged after negotiations over West Irianwere successful and the Brunei revolt hadoccured. Indeed, the success of theconfrontation style politics it had pursuedwith regards to the Netherlands’ control ofWest Irian, encouraged Indonesia to applythe same diplomatic style to Malaysia(Agung, 1990:445). Indonesia believ ed thatMalaysia (and Singapore) could threaten itssecurity since these two countries hadsupported the PRRI-PERMESTA(Pemerintahan Revolusioner RepublikIndonesia: Revolutionary Government ofthe Republic of Indonesia) rebellion ofseparatist movements against the IndonesianGovernment in 1957-1958 (Penders,1974:176).

Sukarno also opposed the formationof Malaysia because he saw the formation asone manifestation of the ‘marriage betweenMalay feudalism and British imperialism’(Leifer, 1983:80). Sukarno’s foreign policydoctrine was based on a militant -antiimperialist and anti-colonialist ideologyknown as ‘nekolim’ (neo-colonialism,colonialism, and imperialism). Theformation of Malaysia allegedly gavesubstance to Sukarno’s suspicions of theWest’s motives in Southeast Asia.

Confrontation was to lose itscapacity to serve an important political


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function when it was abandoned followingthe elimination of the PKI, the primarysupporter, and the downgrading ofSukarno’s role after the abortive coupattempt in 1965 (Weinstein, 1969:12).

Despite the feeling of ‘oneness’, thedevelopment of serious conflict, meant thatthe relationship was marked by a “love -hate” tendency. Generally each perceives theother in those terms and sometimes exhibitssuspicion and distrust towards each other.Mackie (1977:14) asserts:

... the very mixed feelings which Indonesiansand Malays have shown toward each other inthe last decade - pride in their commonMalay cultural heritage, yet at the same timemutual suspicions: admiration tinged with theapprehension on the Malay side, disdainspiced with both envy and contempt on theIndonesian - are a complex amalgam derivedfrom both recent experience and folk -memories of the past which we findembodied in their myths and legends.

Confrontation had been a bitterexperience for Malaysians and to someextent is considered a betrayal of a specialrelationship by blood brothers across thestarits. Like any other kind of specialrelationship which sours, unfulfilledexpectations or dissatisfactions can causedeep and long-lasting ill feelings. However,before the Konfrontasi era, although theneed to stimulate the serumpun sentimentwas no longer as important as during theanti-colonial era, the presence of thesentiment was still considerably strongamong the Malays in Malaysia. It issignificant that, after Malaysia was formed,Malays still celebrated the anniversary ofIndonesian independence (Abdullah,1993:145).

Recently, there have been someattempts to redefine Malay identity as shownby the formation of Majelis UsahawanSerantau (Overseas Businessman

Assembly). This institution consists of 15prominent leaders from both Indonesia andMalaysia, and five leaders from Singapore.This assmebly exists to promote businessopportunities among them and to explore thepossibilities for investment outside ASEAN.(Republika Online, Sept. 9th 1996). Aseminar was held on 12-13 September 1996in Jakarta with a theme of “Jaringan MelayuAntar-bangsa” (International MalayNetwork). The participants decided toconduct cooperation in various areas,including transportation, trade, tourism andeducation. They resolved to establishUniversitas Melayu Antar -bangsa(International Malay University) inJogyakarta, Central Java. (RepublikaOnline, Sept 11th, 1996) to institutionalform to their aspirations.

Another method to promote Malayunity was to conduct an internationalsymposium on “Melayu Se-Dunia” (MalayThroughout the World), held on 23 -27September 1996 in Selangor, Malaysia. ThisMalaysian-initiated symposium invitedMalay leaders from 16 countries anddiscussed the promotion of Malayeconomic progress and culturaldevelopment. (Republika Online, Sept 24,1996) The symposium was important to“promote the honor” of Malay peop le allover the world and to correct the stereotypesabout Malay people (Republika Online, Sept23rd, 1996). The resurgence of thewidespread interest of the Malay people wasinspired by two strong desires, first, that theMalay people want to be “the mas ters oftheir own country” and to eradicate theimage of Malay people as “coolies” amongother nations in the world. Second, to acertain extent, the resurgence was alsoinspired by the idea of an “Islamic Revival”,considering Islam is the Malay people’sdominant religion in both Indonesia andMalaysia.


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Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur areactively promoting the idea of Malayresurgence as these countries are the largestMalay countries in the world. Theircooperation may contribute to the wealth oftheir people, especially, in terms of theadvent of the Pacific Century. Additionally,it is now time for Malay people to contributesignificantly to the world economy as bothIndonesia and Malaysia are predicted tobecome “Asian Tigers” in the 21st Century.

Post-Confrontation Era

Sukarno was being unreasonable whenIndonesia withdrew from the United Nationsbecause of Malaysia’s membership of theSecurity Council. This cost Indonesia itsfriends and Jakarta became isolated whichled to a closer alignment with Chin a, its onlysupporter in abandoning the UN. WithChina, Indonesia made a futile attempt toorganise a conference of the new emergingforces that was to become the alternative tothe “imperialist dominated” UN, but it nevermaterialized. Indeed, the Confron tationpolicy against the Malaysian Federation wasthe darkest period in the history ofIndonesian diplomacy.

For Malaysia, Confrontation broughtabout a profound change in outlook onforeign policy. Indonesia’s attempt to isolateMalaysia diplomatically and to discredit it ininternational fora led Malaysia to follow amore vigorous foreign policy and itestablished many new Embassies abroad.Describing the impact of the Confrontationepisode on Malaysian foreign policy, theMalaysian Secretary for Fore ign Affairs(Bhattacharjee, 1977:190) stated:

However Confrontation by a big neighbourin 1963 provided a stimulus to foreignpolicy. For example, several new diplomaticmissions in Africa and Asia have been

established and a foreign service recruitmentaccelerated. Indonesian propaganda aimed atdenigrating Malaysia as a ‘neo -colonial’creation far from succeeding, has beenexposed and Malaysia’s reputationthroughout the world correspondinglyenhanced.

When the first Non-AlignedConference was held in September 1961 inBelgrade, Malaya remained indifferent to it,but Kuala Lumpur could not adopt the sameattitude towards the second Non -AlignedConference held in Cairo in October 1964.Malaysia could not make adequatediplomatic preparations to expect aninvitation, but Kuala Lumpur was afraid thatIndonesia would utilize this Conference tocreate among the Non-Aligned Countries afalse impression of Malaysia. This led theMalaysian Prime Minister, Tunku AbdulRahman, to write to all governmentsparticipating in the Conference requestingthem to give his country a “fair hearing”against possible Indonesian abuse. Malaysiathen became active in the Afro -Asianpolitical world and it was accepted of amember of the Non-Aligned countries groupin September 1970 at the Summit MeetingConference held in Lusaka. Furthermore, in1963, Indonesian diplomacy was very activein Africa and it protrayed its conflict withMalaysia as a struggle against neo -colonialism. In order to counter Indonesianpropaganda, Malaysia also initiateddiplomatic activities in Africa. Besides that,Malaysia associated itself intimately withIslamic world. Though Islam is the officialreligion in Malaysia, in the pre -Confrontation era Kuala Lumpur took littleinterest in Islamic affairs. The MalaysianKing’s goodwill visit to some Muslimcountries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, theUnited Arab Republic and Jordan,contributed much to integrating Malaysiawith the Islamic world. Confrontation alsobrought Malaysia closer to the United State s


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which could be relied upon for supportagainst communist aggression. Washingtonprovided military training for Malaysianpersonnel and considered appropriatemilitary equipment for the defence ofMalaysia. In addition, the role of thePeople’s Republic of China during theConfrontation period naturally intensifiedMalaysia’s feelings of hostility towardBeijing. Tunku Abdul Rahman argued that“the whole Confrontation by Indonesia iscommunist-inspired”; in 1966, he again saidthat ASA “would serve as a bulwark againstany effort of Communist China”. Thehallmarks of Malaysian foreign policyduring the Tunku’s era can be instantlyclassified as being pro-Western and anti-communist on the global stage. When TunkuAbdul Razak assumed the PrimeMinistership, Malaysia became even moreactively involved in regional andinternational affairs (Pathmanathan,1984:38).

In the post-Confrontation era, thenature of Southeast Asian politics wasradically changed. This was mainly due tomainly three basic factors. Fir st, Indonesiaabandoned the militant foreign policy ofSukarno and the main objective of foreignpolicy in the New Order has been achievingeconomic development as rapidly aspossible. Second, the British withdrawalfrom ‘East of Suez’ led Malaysia to co nsiderthe defence problem against its regionalbackground which meant that its securitynow become integrally related to thesecurity of Southeast Asia as a whole. Third,the withdrawal of the US after the VietnamWar forced all powers in Southeast Asia toreconsider their policy toward the People’sRepublic of China. These circumstanceshave brought a diplomatic and securityrevolution to Southeast Asia.

In the light of such changes,entering the post-Confrontation period,

Indonesia’s relation with Mal aysia took adifferent form from those of the previousera. According to Donald K. Emmerson,Suharto’s decision to abandon Sukarno’scampaign against Malaysia was rational notonly because it facilitated the achievementof regional peace, but regional p eace itselfwas a rational objective (Jackson, 1986:93).Suharto’s foreign policy was seen as beingsubordinated to Indonesia’s nationaldevelopment and has been confined largerlyto the immediate region. A major goal wasimproving relations with Indonesi a’sneighbours by terminating konfrontasi andsigning agreements on land and sea borderswith most of Indonesia’s neighbours. Thesecond major foreign policy initiative was toengage Indonesia in a regional structure,ASEAN, in order to regain the confide nce ofits neighbours. The stability of theimmediate region is regarded as aprerequisite for the success of Indonesia’snational development efforts. The NewOrder leaders, especially the Army. alsobelieved that regional cooperation wouldcontribute directly to Indonesia’s domesticpolitical security and economic developmentsince such cooperation would help create astable and non-threatening regionalenvironment. Indonesia’s participation inregional organization would ensure thatneighbouring countries remained friendly toJakarta (Anwar, 1994:46), so that Indonesiawould be safe from interference byneighbouring countries, such as was the caseof PRRI-PERMESTA. The creation of afriendly environment meant moving thedanger zone away from Indonesia’ sperimeter whilst the removal of immediateexternal threats would contribute todomestic and economic development.

The outlook of the New Order underSuharto leadership has had three keyaspects, namely strong anti -communism, acommitment to stability and economic


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development, and a pragmatic internationaloutlook. The New Order leaders saw severalbenefits to Indonesia actively participatingin regional cooperation immediately afterConfrontation. Uppermost was the urgentneed to restore Indonesia’s credibility, bothin the region and in the wider internationalcommunity. Regional cooperation wasfirstly intended to exorcise the “ghost” ofConfrontation . It was not enough just to endConfrontation, this was only the beginningof a more positive and active foreign policyin the region. Indonesia needed to providefurther proof that it was really committed toa good neighbourhood foreign policy.Indonesia had to show enthusiasm forregional cooperation otherwise its sinceitytowards neighbouring countries would be indoubt.

Ideas for the establishment of a newregional association emerged as directnormalization talks in Bangkok began inApril and May 1966. The three ForeignMinisters, Adam Malik, Tun Abdul Razak,and Thanat Khoman, agreed that closerregional cooperation was necessary toprevent the recurrence of Confrontationbetween countries in the region. ASEANwas finally established with the signing ofthe ASEAN Declaration in Bangkok on 8August 1967. In this Declaration the ForeignMinisters of member countries agreed onseveral general major points to improveintra-regional cooperation and work towardthe creation of regional stability.

Changing perceptions of the Serumpunconcept

Indonesia and Malaysia have developed asindependent and sovereign states andadopted different policies and strategies toachieve their national goals. The specificconditions of the two countries have

highlighted the differences in many ways;one important difference is the changingperceptions of the serumpun concept. TheIndonesia Raya or Melayu Raya conceptwhich once desired to unite Indonesia andMalaysia in a single country was consideredunviable. The Malay advocates of theconcept interpreted it in purely racial terms,while Sukarno and Yamin saw it ingeopolitical terms. The main reason for thedifference in perception was that inMalaysia this idea was the product of racialanxiety, while in Indonesia it was anextension of the nationalist attempts to builda multi-ethnic unity.

There has been a recent developmentwhich shows the dissimilarity in eachnation’s perception toward the serumpunconcept. The differences in perceptionhappen not only at the macro level but alsoat the micro level. The variations of and thereasons for the changes are many. Thegeneration gap is the common determiningfactor which contributes to the differenceand is complicated by the recent economic,social, and political realities which currentlyprevail in both countries. The previousgeneration emphasised the similaritiesbetween them based on emotions andabstract notions such as ethnicity, language,religion, culture and history. These notionsserved intended purposes from time to time(pre and during World War) by the oldergeneration, but such abstract nations seemsto be less relevant for the youngergeneration. This is partly because of the lesshistorical orientation among them, the lackof meaningful interaction betweencounterparts and the lack of relevantknowledge and interest in each other’scountry.

Malaysia adopts the policy ofmulticulturalism and uses the term bangsa(nation) which follows that what it means byserumpun can only be applied to the bangsa


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Melayu (Malay people) who constitute onlya part of the whole Malaysian population.The Malays consider themselves asbumiputra (literally means “the sons of thesoil”) and enjoy a privileged position in thepolitical life of the country. Because of that,the Malaysian Federation was not based onany sentiment of Malaysian nationalism.The racial division constitutes the basicproblem of Malaysian nation building.

Different from Malaysia, Indonesiais strongly tied to the philosophy of“Bhinneka Tunggal Ika” (unity in diversity)instead of serumpun. Unity here was meantto express the popular desire of a nati onalunitary state, whereas diversity refers to theplurality of ethnic groups from more than13,000 diverse large and small islands in theIndonesian archipelago. The country -widedesire for unity was strongly felt andnurtured, particularly in the anti -colonialmovements by political organizations, longbefore the founding fathers of the Republicof Indonesia were in position to give realityto the goals. In October 1928, a NationalYouth Congress was held in Jakarta whichunanimously adopted the resoluti on for theformation of “One Nation, One Fatherland,and One National Language”, later knownas Sumpah Pemuda (Youths’ Pledge).

There are at least two reasons whyIndonesia adopts the Bhinneka Tunggal Ikaphilosophy. The first concerns the variationof Indonesia’s ethnic groups. There are morethan 150 ethnic groups spread from Sabangin north Sumatra to Merauke in Irian Jayaand these speak different ethnic languages.But Indonesia has adopted bahasaIndonesia (Indonesia language) as theofficial and unified language, althoughethnic languages are still used in daily andinformal conversation. Although of mainlyMalay stock, there are several other non -Malay groups, such as Manadonese,Irianese, Ambonese, Timorese, and

numerous others. It is inconceivab le that theIndonesians were advocating serumpun asthis concept has strong racial undertones. InIndonesia, the Malays are only one of manyethnic groups. The unity of the variousethnic groups is an Indonesian unity, one inwhich all groups could feel an affinity. Inaddition, Malaysians emphasize thesuperiority of the bumiputra in politics,economics, and socio-cultural areas,whereas in Indonesia, although Javanese arestill dominant and national integration still acrucial problem, the government doe s notallocate superioroty to a specific ethnicgroup, for instance by propagating anidentity based on Javanism. The use ofbahasa Indonesia as the national languageas the national language was designed toavoid conflict caused by domination of theJavanese.

Second, there is the question ofIslam. In Malaysia, a Malay is almostcertainly a Moslem; ‘Malay’ is identical to‘Moslem’. Islam is the official state religionalthough less than fifty percent of theMalaysian population are Moslems. UnlikeMalaysia, Indonesia has no official relogioneven though more than seventy-five of itspopulation are Moslems and Islamobviously has played an important role inIndonesian political and social life. Islam isnot identical to Malay because it does notrefer to a specific ethnic group. In fact,many of Malay stock are non-Moslem. Onthe rejection on a ‘national state’ based onIslam, in January 1953 Sukarno (Brown,1994:123) stated:

If we establish a state based on Islam, manyareas whose population is not Islam ic suchas the Moluccas, Bali, Flores, Timor, the kaiIslands, and Sulawesi, will secede. AndWest Irian, which has not yet become part ofthe territory of Indonesia, will not want to bepart of the Republic.


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Indonesian nationalism embraces all aspectsof Indonesian communities, culturally,ethnically and linguistically. LeoSuryadinata (1988:113) has noted:

... the indigenous minority groups are notexpected to be absorbed into Javanesesociety. The Indonesian national culture isseen as a new culture based on variousindigenous ethnic cultures, of which bahasaIndonesia is the major vehicle. Islam is partof the culture, but not the dominant one ...the minority groups are tolerated/encouragedto retain their ethnic cultures provided thatthey accept the authority of the nationalgovernment and national education.

It is true that both in Indonesia andMalaysia there is a distinction betweenindigenous and non-indigenous groups,which is expressed by the termspribumi/non-pribumi and bumiputra/non-bumiputra respectively, and refers to mainlyChinese and other ethnic groups. However,there is a difference policy and attitudetoward the non-indigenous comminity inIndonesia and Malaysia. In Indonesia, amemeber of non-indigenous people beganto refer themselves as “Indonesians”, henceindigenous people gradually abandoned thisterm in favour of the more exclusive“Indonesia asli” (native Indonesians). Theterm was introduced into the 1945Constitution, so that there would noinstitutionalization of spec ial rights forindigenous citizens, and it was states “allcitizens have the same position in law andgovernment”. Since the 1958 citizenship lawadopted the jus soli principle, many non-indigenous Indonesians become eligible forIndonesian citizenship (Sh iddique andSuryadinata, 1982:670-672).

In Malaysia, on the other hand, adistinction between bumiputra and non-bumiputra gained prominence as a unifyingmyth in the post-independence period whenUMNO leaders were trying to frame

legislation to institutionalize the ‘specialposition of the Malays’ enshrined in theConstitution. The constitutional definition of‘Malay’ contained in Article 160 (2)provides that a person is considered to be aMalay if he habitually speaks the Malaylanguage, adopts the malay costume and is aMuslim. The major focus of these effortshad been on the issue of language. Thedominant unifying argument was thateducation offered the key to upward socio -economic mobility, and that once Malaybecame the language of education andadministration, the Malay commuity as awhole would benefit and its ‘specialposition’ vis a vis the non-Malay speakerswould be assured. The Islamic element inthe state ideology is designed to rally theMalay community behind UMNO bystrengthening the bumiputra myth. AsBrown asserts, because of this, there areclear tensions between the attempts by theMalays to employ Islam as a tool tofacilitate their own upward mobility into thedominant class and the attempts by poorMalay peaseants to oppose th at classthrough the same medium of Islam, and theemployment of Islam by the dominant classitself as a Malay unifying myth and as astate ideology.

Politics and attitudes regardingpribumi and bumiputra are justified indifferent way in Indonesia and Ma laysia. AsShiddique and Suryadinata conclude, inMalaysia the dichotomy continues in termsof the overall goal of achieving nationalunity, but in Indonesia pribumi policies aremore narrowly justified as being necessaryfor the stability of the political system.Indonesia tends to take a moreassimilationist/absorptionist views towardsthe long-term solution of Chinese minorityproblems, whereas in Malaysia the solutionis generally seen in terms of accomodation.In addition, in Indonesia the general lac k of


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response can be attributed to the fact that thepribumi policy has yet to make a significantimpact on non-pribumi life and they are onlya small percentage, so they do not constitutea formidable political force. It is different inMalaysia, where the Chinese communityconstitutes more than a third of Malaysianpopulation and increasingly feels threatenedby current government bumiputra policies.

Referring back to the serumpunconcept, the younger generation, especiallythose who are Indonesians, approach theconcept with different attitudes than theirMalaysian counterparts. Abdullah gives anexample of such differences in a magazinearticle reporting on a conference calledDialog Malindo (Malaysia-Indonesia YouthDialogue) held in Malacca in Dec ember1988. During the three day conference, mostparticipants from Malaysia made no effort tohide their attachment to the serumpunconcept, which in a way was also meant as ahospitable gesture to welcome “brotherparticipants” from the serumpun nation. Onthat occasion, the Malaysian wanted toemphasize their close relationship so that theIndonesian participants would truly feel athome. Indeed, among the objectives of theconference was to wish to restimulate theserumpun spirit among the youngergenerations so that both nations will be morecooperative. However, the Indonesianparticipants seems to demonstrate a lack ofempathy and regarded such an enthusiasm as“an obsession” of Malay youths and amanifestation of racial politics practiced inMalaysia.

The serumpun approach, in fact, hasbeen an indication of unhealthy relationsbetween Indonesia and Malaysia. Theadoption of such an approach in the twocountries’ relationship as a model ofdiplomacy has aggravated the dissatisfactionin the relationship. This suggests that theproblems which have occured between them

have never completly been solved on thebasis of candid attitudes and discussions(Kompas, July 5th, 1991).

In another context, the spirit ofserumpun has been misused and abused.This is clear from the use of that spirit as a“coercive tool”. For example, Datuk NajibTun Razak, the former Malaysian Ministerfor Sports, said in Dialog Malindo II, thatthe serumpun and brotherhood relations areuseless if the Proton Saga cars, which areMalaysian made, could not enter theIndonesian market. He also asked whyIndonesia limited the landing rights ofMalaysian Airlines to Jakarta to only fourtimes a week whereas Singapore Airlinescould land four times a day. Moreover,Indonesia had maintained that the serumpunbrotherhood was also useless if theMalaysian High Court handed down a deathsentence on Basri Masse, an Indonesian whowas found guilty of smuggling dangerousdrugs into Malaysia. The Indonesians feltthat the sentence was too harsh and appealedto a lighter one. All of these incidentsindicate the importance of re-examining andre-evaluating the serumpun concept.

Maritime Borders, EEZ and ArchipelagicPrinciples

The conflict over maritime borders betweenIndonesia and Malaysia occured as a resultof lack of agreement by some of the majormaritime powers over the UN Conferenceon the Law of the Sea in May 1982.Indonesia and Malaysia (and Singapore) arethe states immediately concerned with thesatus of the Straits of Malacca; how ever,these countries have different views on thissubject. As an archipelagic state, Indonesiaregards the straits as internal waters whereits sovereignty is supreme and free passage aconcession (Indorf, 1984:20). Malaysia, on


36

the other hand, is more concerned withnavigational safety and marine pollution, butconcedes the right of innocent passagethrough territorial waters. To solve thedifferences, the two governments signed aTreaty of Friendship and Delimitation ofTerritorial Seas Treaty regarding the Straitsof Malacca in 1970. Indonesia had declareda 12-mile territorial sea limit in 1957 whichbecame law in 1960. Malaysia had alreadydone the same thing in 1969. As the result ofthese Declarations, the Straits of Malacca ofless than 24 miles was made a territorial seaof Indonesia and Malaysia. The 1970 Treatycontains a non-agression pact. Article 3states that: (Djalal, 1985:63)

The two High Contacting Parties undertakethat in case any dispute on matters directlyaffecting them should arise they will notresort to the threat or use of force and shallat all times endeavour to settle such adispute through the usual diplomaticchannels in true spirit of friendship andgoodwill between two neighbours.

Thus, on the national unity issue,Indonesia guarantees Malaysia that theapplication of the Indonesian archipelagicprinciples in the South China Sea will notaffect Malaysian national unity and politicalstability, especially between West Malaysia(Malayan Peninsula) and East Malaysia(Sabah and Sarawak). This guarantee wasalready formulated and incorporated in theLaw of the Sea Convention.

In 1960, on the basis of 1957 JuandaDeclaration, Indonesia officially applied itsarchipelagic baselines which conform to therules in the Convention on the Law of theSea. (Valencia and Danusaputro, 1984:462).As a result, Indonesia has incorpotrated inits national jurisdiction an area of 999,000square nautical miles. This comprises oneand a half times the land mass of the wholeof ASEAN combined. Indonesia’sarchipelagic principles have incorporated

Anambas and Natuna Islands in itsterritorial boundaries. This means thatIndonesia’s boundaries are interposedbetween West and East Malaysia.Indonesia’s claims have a traditionalfoundation, based upon its concepts offatherland (tanah air) and the strategic needto ensure the integral unity of its 13,000islands and connecting waterways.Regarding these matters, Indonesia andMalaysia concluded a bilateral agreement asa formal recognition of Malays ia’straditional fishing rights. These rightspertain within Indonesia’s archipelagicwaters off Anambas Island. It took nineteenyears of hard bargaining before the twocountries signed a Memorandum ofUnderstanding in 1976. By recognizingIndonesia’s sovereignty over areas of theSouth China Sea, Malaysia is granted freepassage for its naval and merchant vessels,customary rights for fishing activities, andthe laying of submarine cables and pipelinesand marine research.

Sipadan and Ligitan Islands

The conflict over these islands (which arelocated in the Straits of Sulawesi, betweenSabah and East Kalimantan) has recentlybecome a sensitive issue in the relationshipbetween Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur.Documents confirming who owns theislands are not clear on the point. BothIndonesia and Malaysia claim ownershipbecause each holds different versions ofmaps inherited from the colonial powers.Indonesia holds the Dutch-version andMalaysia holds the British-version maps.The islands then become an ov erlappingzone on the two countries’ boundaries.Indonesia adopts “the natural line ofastronomical reflection” (garis petunjukalam pantulan astronomi) whereas Malaysia


37

adopts “the river indication” ( petunjukaliran sungai). In this regard, Indonesia hasclaimed that the current of the river haschanged and shifted thereby enteringIndonesian territory.

The ownership of these islands wasdiscussed in the talks about thedetermination of the continental shelfboundary (batas landas kontinen) betweenIndonesia and Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur in1969. However, there was no writtenagreement reached, and thus the twocountries decided that the islands be giventhe “status quo” position which means thatlegal position of the islands is not to betinkered with by both countries while tryingto solve the problem with the brotherhoodspirit. The status quo position wasreaffirmed in 1986 and confirmed duringthe visit of Malaysian Prime Minister,Mahathir Mohammad, to Yogyakarta in1988 to meet President Suharto. It was alsoreaffirmed again during the visit of Suhartoto Kuala Lumpur for the G-15 SummitMeeting in 1990 (Suara Pembaruan, Feb.20th, 1991).

In 1980 the Malaysian Governmenthad published its national new map whichincluded Sipadan and Ligitan islands a sintegral part of the Malaysian Federation.On the other hand, according to DaftarNama Pulau di Indonesia (the List of theIndonesian Islands), those islands belong toIndonesia. The problem become moresensitive and critical when a report said thatthe State of Sabah has developed thedisputed island of Sipadan as a tourist resort.Indonesia argues that tourism activities onSipadan island indicate that Malaysia doesnot respect of the status quo position of theisland. It was reported that there are alr eady19 motels built and managed there by theBorneo Divers Company. There are also abrochure titled “Sipadan Island, Borneo,Malaysia” with the text and photography by

Bill Gleason and published by MalaysiaUnderwater Adventure Tours and theMalaysia Airlines System. The brochuresays that the island is the only Malaysianisland located in the centre of the ocean. It isgenerally agreed that the underwater sceneryis one of the five most beautiful diving sitesin the world. From this activity, Malaysiaearns as much as US$ 304,000 per month(Suara Pembaruan, June 4th, 1991).

Indonesia has warned Malaysia notto continue any further development in theSipadan and Ligitan islands because of theirstatus quo position. Indonesian officialssuggests the development of tourist resorts(given the status quo position of the islands)is both provocative and unethical. ( Pelita,June 20, 1991). By developing Sipadan andLigitan islands, Malaysia has changed theposition of the islands from the status quo toa fait accompli situation. The change ofattitude has been made clear by the satementof the Secretary of the DevelopmentMinistry of the Sabah State Government that“there is no doubt that Sipadan is a part ofMalaysian territory” (Suara Pembaruan,June 24th, 1991). Furthermore, he states thatthe state government has a long-term plan topromote Sipadan island as a “marinegarden”, but has been delayed becauseSabah is mindful of the IndonesianGovernment’s wishes. Yet, an Indonesiandiplomat in Kuala Lumpur has s tated:

if they were really thoughful of theIndonesian Government, they should stop thedevelopment of tourist accomodation untilthe status of the island is clear ( SuaraPembaruan, June 24th, 1991).

Indonesian diplomatic circles suspect theMalaysian Government has used delayingtactics to frustate a solution to the problem.This is to earn as much revenues as possiblefrom the investment (Kompas, July 26th,1991).


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Illegal Immigrants

Malaysia presently faces serious problemsof illegal immigration. Many of them arefrom Indonesia, as evident by their presencein town centres and plantation or estates andby the large numbers of them who have beendeported by the authorities. Historically,migration between the two countries wascommon and enshrined in Malay myths andlegends. However, in the post -independenceera, immigration from Indonesia, as well asfrom other countries, has been restricted bythe Malaysian Government in an attempt tocontrol population growth.

The flow of labourers who comefrom Indonesia illegally to Malaysia hasrecently become one of the significant issuesin the Indonesia-Malaysia relationship. Itaffects not only social and economicdevelopment but also aggravates political,security, religious, and cultural problemsand, for both governments, these pressuresare sensitive issues.

There are several problems due tothe massive flow of illegal immigrants. Itcan be explained by push factors fromIndonesia and pull factors from Malaysia.Shrinking employment opportunities inIndonesia are the main push factor. Workers,especially skilled and semi-skilled try to findjobs in other countries such as Saudi Arabia,Brunei and Malaysia. Finding a job overseasmeans remittances are sent home. Workerscan receive much higher wages com pared towhat they can earn at home, although inMalaysia they cannot get the same amountas their local counterparts. The Indonesiansaccept the wage discrimination because it isstill more they can earn at home. Forexample, compared to an average dail ywage in Lombok, one of the porrestprovinces and one of the biggest sources oflabourers to Malaysia, a palm-oil plantationworker gets Rp. 7,000-8,000 compared to

only Rp. 500-1,000 in Lombok. Remittancesreaching Lombok through the BNI 1946State Bank in Mataram, total 200 million amonth, although this has had only limitedimpact on the national economy ( FEER,January 11th., 1990:21)

Malayasia’s similarity in culturalheritage, language and religion has furtherencouraged migration. The relatively cl osedistance between Indonesia and Malaysia isanother encouraging factor. Hence, illegalimmigrants without proper documents, whencaught are deported but usually find itrelatively easy to slip back to Malaysia.

In the mid-1970s the implementationof Malaysia’s New Economic Policy (NEP)gained its momentum; this was amomentous pull factor from Malaysia. Inresponse to the NEP, sizeble portions ofMalay youths from the rural areas moved tourban areas which caused acute labourshortages in the agricultural sector. Tomaintain commodities exports --especiallyrubber and palm-oil which contribute 17.7%of Malaysia’s export earnings -- thegovernment was forced to concede toplantation owners’ demands to allow themto make up their shortages with importedlabour (FEER, April 26th, 1984).

However, the situation soon get outof control when illegal immigrants floodedinto Malaysia in 1980s. Concerned about thesituation in both countries, the twogovernments signed a bilateral agreement inMedan, North Sumatra in 1984. Under theagreement, a committee was set up to handlethe “recruitment of Indonesian workers”.Article 3 of the agreement stipulates:“Indonesia agrees to supply to Malaysiasuch numbers and categories of workers asmay, from time to time, be requested byMalaysia.” Based on the amount and type oflabour needed by Malaysia, the IndonesianManpower Ministry would recruit workersand facilitate their entry into Malaysia by


39

providing them with proper documents andexempting them from exit taxes. By t his,both countries hoped not only to curb illegalimmigrants but also to keep track ofimmigrant workers and protect them againstexploitation by Malaysian employers.Nevertheless, this agreement has not stoppedthe influx of illegal entries. The biggeststumbling block to this scheme is found inJakarta which imposes an exit tax on allIndonesians leaving the country; thisdiscourages workers from seeking work inMalaysia through official channels.

The unwelcome guests add to thepresent sensitivity in the Indonesia-Malaysiarelationship. Local resentment againstIndonesians has built up over the years.They are held responsible for rising urbancrime rates; Malaysians read almost daily ofrobbers who “spoke with Indonesianaccents” (Asiaweek, November 27th.,1981:12) It was reported that Indonesiansare involved in crimes such as robbery, rapeand murder in Chow Kit and surroundingareas. The local press has created a badimage of Indonesians by printing newsdiscrediting Indonesians and they seldomhighlight positive things about Indonesia.Sulaiman Muhammad, the youth chairmanof UMNO, comments that illegalimmigrants are falsely treated as identicalwith Indonesians, as if all crimes werecommitted by Indonesians. It is true thatsome Indonesians are involved in criminalactions but compared to the total number ofsuch actions, crimes by Indonesians are nota sizeable portion. In an action to detainsuch criminals and lessen the impact ofillegal immigrants, the government launchedOpearsi Seberang (Across the BorderOpration) in the mid 1980s, and OperasiNyah II (Go Away Operation).

Another problem created by theillegal immigrants is health and settlement.Abdullah suggests, as they enter the country

without any proper health scrutiny, thehealth risk is exacerbated in the congestedareas where they live and contagiousdiseases spread to the local populations. Inaddition, their influx into certain“squattered” areas has reduced the originalresidents to be a minority and, at the sametime, has worsened the standards of livingbacause the rapid growth of the squattercommunity is not commensurate with theincrease in basic social amenities. TheMalaysian public reactions to theunwelcome guests are various. From theeconomic perspective, the trade union areresentful of them, as the influx ofIndonesians is seen as a threat to locallabour. The Indonesians are used to lowerwages without the fringe benefits normallyaccorded to local labourers. Being illegaland unfamiliar with local conditions, t heIndonesians make subservient workers; theycan easily be manipulated and exploited,hence, the employers’ preference forIndonesian workers vis-a-vis the local(Kasim, 1987:265-267). However, theIndonesian workers can be dismissed easilywhen the employers no longer need theirservices.

From the political point of view, thereaction is also influenced by the ethnicgroup factor but this is changing over time.In the early years of their presence, theimmigrants were “silently welcomed’ by theethnic Malays from the main component ofthe bumiputra; the immigrants wereperceived as bangsa serumpun who wouldeventually assimilate with the localbumiputra (Abdullah, 1983:185).Nonetheless, the influx of Indonesians issuspected by non-Malays as an attempt bythe Malay-dominated government toincrease the demographic strength of theMalays and with it, political strength.Because Indonesia and Malaysia areculturally and socially similar, Indonesians


40

can be easily assimilated into Malay societyas in the case of earlier Indonesians. TheDemocratic Action Party, the Chinese -dominated party, alleged that someIndonesians are already being given blueidentity cards which means granting themcitizenship which enables them to vote ingeneral elections. Thus, in the long run, theIndonesians immigrants are regarded ashaving strengthened the Malays’ electoralpower. This assumptions was reinforced bya Deputy Minister of UMNO who stated:

It is true that today the Indonesianimmigrants do not contribute anythingtowards UMNO. But it would be differentafter they stay in this country for ten yearsand are allowed to apply to citizenship andtherby become voters. Even theiroffspringsings in this country willautomatically become Malaysian citizens(Tempo, January, 1987)

There are also socio-culturalproblems associated with the immigrants. Itwas reported that some of the Indonesianillegal immigrants were Christians and therewere those who tried to establish churchesand some were alleged to have spreadChristianity among Malays. The Malays,who are generally orthodox about theirreligion, took it as a sensitive issue and aserious offence. The President of UMNOyouth, Dato Seri Najib Tun Razak,considered it as the “biggest threat facingMuslims in Malaysia today” (Abdullah:177-178).

The concentration of Indonesians ofdifferent ethnic groups within a confinedgeographical area has led to stiffcompetition between them and Malays forlimited resources, especially jobs andhousing. This had led to jealousy, en mity,quarrels and fights between them. Moreover,Malays also complain that Indonesians lacka ‘sense of proprierty’ when it comes todressing and male-female interactions. This

is especially true for the Maduras and theBoyans, but exceptional to Minangka baus(Kasim, 1987:276)

The issue of illegal immigrants ismultidimensional and it seems this willremain a significant and sensitive issue inthe relationship between the two countriesfor some time to come.

Conclusion

The governments of Indonesia and Malaysiahave tried seriously to improve theirrelationship on the basis of cooperation andmutual benefit for almost three decades. InASEAN, Indonesia and Malaysia agreed to“bury” the confrontational era and began thenew phase in the relationship. Ho wever,relations are not always cordial and havebeen uneasy because there are still someunresolved problems. The two countries’diplomatic manoevres and foreign policiesstill reflect sensitivities in their relationship.As developing nations, Indonesia andMalaysia feel the need for a widerinternational forum, and therefore, each oftheir manoevres, to a certain degree,conceals their rivalry in seeking to play theleading role in certain issues. For instance,Indonesia has shown its interest in becomi nga leader of the Non-Aligned Movement bynominating itself as organiser of the SummitConference, while Malaysia is anxious tobecome a leader in the South -SouthDialogue.

Indonesian political relations withMalaysia may be called a commonality offamily relationships. The former MalaysianForeign Minister, Tunku AhmadRithaudden, claims that “relations betweenMalaysia and Indonesia have been veryspecial”. On the one hand, these relationsshow intimacy, but, on the other hand theydisguise many complex problems which are


41

difficult to solve. Sutopo stresses the factthat, as Indonesia is located in the samegeographic area as Malaysia, this makes itdifficult to understand Indonesia’s relationswith Malaysia by only referring to the‘rational’ aspects of interrelationship.Geographic, economic, and cultural tiesemotionally influence Indonesia’s politicalrelations with Malaysia.

Being neighbours, Indonesia andMalaysia have rationally sought to fix theboundaries of each country’s internalsovereignty. Defence officials from bothcountries stress that no other ASEANmember countries share a longer border thanthat between Malaysia and Indonesia inBorneo, or holds strategic positions such asthe grip on the Straits of Malacca or controlof secondary passages such as the Lombokand Flores Straits. As far as internalproblems are involved, the principle of notinterfering in the affairs of each country hasbeen kept and maintained as far as possible.At the bottom line of the defencecooperation lies one basic tenet: both want areliable partner on the other side ofASEAN’ s longest frontier and each sees theother’s stability as crucial to its own.Jakarta makes no effort to hide its need forMalaysia as a “buffer state” between itselfand Indochina, and an even more distantperceived threat from China and Jakartaquietly supported Malaysia’s defence tieswith the West during the Cold -War era. Atthe official level, relations betweenIndonesia and Malaysia appear to be verygood and no urgent problems seem to bewaiting to erupt.

Emotionally, Indonesia’s relationswith Malaysia conceals an anxiety emergingfrom actual and perceptual factors. Inreality, the existence of the unresolvedproblems between them make thisrelationship often seem very clu msy.i Thecurrent problems which are most noticeable

involve borders and illegal immigrants.Even though in general the two countrieshave been able to settle their border disputeson land and sea, some problems which havenot been solved, can hopefully b e settledappropriately. These problems, continue togenerate a certain hidden reluctancybetween the two countries. This feeling isbased on the belief that they are one offamily, of one stock and should be able tosettle all problems in a favourable wa y. Butthe failure to resolve the status of theSipadan and Ligitan islands, however, whichin some circles is considered futile andshould not shake the foundation ofIndonesian-Malaysian friendship,demonstrates the “awkwardness” in settlingthis problem which is supported by theprinciple of commonality. This actualimpasse is a mixture of the probleminherited from the colonial period and theanxiety of the past experience and culturalpsychology created through the relations ofa larger country (Indonesia) with a smallerone (Malaysia).

From the perceptual point of view,Malaysia, which in general considersIndonesia as its ‘big brother’, hides a feelingof fear that it might be dominated, if notthreathened, as an older sibling sometimesdoes to a younger one. As far as this familyrelationship is concerned, there is a strongdesire that the bond is encouraged to be amore rational, a business-like relationship. Ifthis kind of relationship is to be achieved,both countries need to look for a newapproach for managing future relations.

History and geopolitics have broughtIndonesia and Malaysia to the present stateof their relationship. The formal relationshipwhich has been forged since the twocountries became independent is nowdeveloping in more complex ways as theemotional aspects are much deeper, as


42

shown by some cases mentioned in thisessay.

If the two countries seriously want amore valuable relationship, then a new formis needed so that the positive aspects can bemaximized and the negat ive sidesminimized. The change in the generationsmight facilitate this process as the youngergeneration seems to be more pragmatic andwants the relationship to be based on arational basis. Differences between them,which are normal in the context of b ilateralrelations, should not be a barrier to abalanced relationship.

Indonesia-Malaysia bilateral rela-tions should now be reaching a new phase,one which produces more substance andreduces the “romantic” sense of the past.The two countries should learn and realizethat the serumpun factor, has both positiveand negative aspects. To a certain degree,this element is still relevant and if they wantto use it as a unifying force, both countriescould creatively managed to produce aconstructive relationship.

Bibliography

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Andaya, A History of Malaysia(London: The MacMillan Press,1982).

Anwar, Dewi Fortuna, Indonesia in ASEAN:Foreign Policy and Rgionalism(Singapore: Institute of SoutheastAsian Studies, 1994).

Aris, Othman Mohamed , Ethnic Identity ina Malay Community in Malaysia(Urbana: Illinois, 1977).

Bhattacharjee, G. P., Southeast AsianPolitics: Malaysia and Indonesia

(Columbia: Southeast Asian Books,1977).

Brown, David, The State and Ethnic Politicsin Southeast Asia (London: Routledge,1994).

Damian, Eddy and Budiono Kusumo -hamidjoyo, in Mochtar Kusuma -atmadja’s collection of speech ofPolitik Luar Negeri Indonesia danPelaksanaannya Dewasa Ini(Bandung: Alumni, 1983).

Ide Agung Anak Gde Agung, Twenty YearsIndonesian Foreign Policy 1945 -1965 (Yogyakarta: Duta WacanaUniversity Press, 1990).

Indorf, Hans H., Impediments to Regional-ism in Southeast Asia (Singapore:Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,1984).

Jackson, Karl D., et al, ASEAN in Regionaland Global Context (Berkeley:Institute of East Asia Studies, theUniversity of California, 1986).

Leifer, Michael, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy,(Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1983).

Mackie, J.A.C., Konfrontasi: The Malaysia-Indonesian Dispute 1963-1966 (Lon-don: Oxford University Press, 1977.

Nasution, A. H., Sekitar Perang Kemerde-kaan Indonesia, 1st book, 2nd ed.,(Bandung: Penerbit Angkasa, 1977).

Omar, Ariffin, Bangsa Melayu: MalayConcepts of Democracy andCommunity: 1945-1950 (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1993).

Pathmanathan, M., et al, Winds of Change:The Mahathir Impact on Malaysia’s


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Foreign Policy (Petaling Jaya:Pelanduk Publication Sdn. Bhd.,1984).

Penders, C.L.M., The Life and Times ofSoekarno (London: Sidwick andJackson, 1974).

Roff, William R., The Origins of MalayNationalism, 2nd ed., (Kuala Lumpur:Oxford University Press, 1994).

Tham, Seong Chee, Defining “Malay”,seminar paper, (Singapore: NationalUniversity of Singapore, 1992).

Weinstein, Franklin B., Indonesia AbandonsConfrontation: An Inquiry into theFunction of Indonesian Foreign Policy(New York: Cornell University, 1969).

Journals:

Abdullah, Firdaus Haji, “The RumpunConcept in Malaysia-IndonesiaRelations’, in The IndonesianQuarterly, Vol. XXI, No. 2, 1993.

Djalal, Hasjim, ‘The 1982 of the Sea Con -vention: A Southeast Asia Perspect -ive’, in The Indonesian Quarterly ,Vol. XII, No. 1, January 1985.

Kasim, Azizah, ‘The Unwelcome Guests:Indonesian Immigrants and MalaysianPublic Responses’, in SoutheastAsian Journal of Social Science, Vol.XVI, No. 2, 1988.

Shiddique, Sharron and Leo Suryadinata,‘Bumiputra and Pribumi: EconomicNationalism (Indiginism) in Malaysia

and Indonesia, in Pacific Affairs, Vol.54, No. 4, Winter 1981-1982.

Valencia, Mark J. and MunadjatDanusaputro, “Indonesia: Law of theSea and Foreign Policy Issues, in TheIndonesian Quarterly, Vol. XII, No. 4,October 1984.

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Asiaweek, November 27 th, 1981.

Far Eastern Economic Review, January11th, 1990.

________________________, April 26th,1984.

Kompas, July 5th, 1991

______, July 26th, 1991.

Pelita, June 20nd, 1991.

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______________, June 2nd, 1991

______________, June 4th, 1991.

______________, Juni 5th, 1991.

______________, June 24th 1991

Tempo, January 1987.

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http://www.republika.co.id/


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Others:

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45

Others:

Dalton, John, The Development of MalayanForeign Policy, unpublished PhD.Thesis, University of Michigan,1975.

,