Index

ABM Treaty (1972),57,59Absolute gains, 106-107,313

model, 109-112neoliberal institutional model, 136­

137,138payoff, 108structural model, 138-145

Absolute zero power, 218Accept, 310

defined, 304Accidents Measures Agreement (1971),

62Actors, defined, 300Africa, international cooperation and,

67-68Agendas, strategy of, 26Aggarwal, Vinod, 4Agreement on the Prevention of

Nuclear War (1973),62Alexander, 18Allan, Pierre, 4Anarchy

international, 105-106, 109, 116­117

neoliberal institutional model, 134structural model, 143, 144, 146

Antarctica Treaty (1959), 57, 68Approximate equality, 285Arbatov, Georgi, 213Arbitration, 25Arena, 300, 305-306,317,320Argentinean public debt, 307-309

Arms building, 61Arms control, 60-61Arms race, 71n., 76, 78, 79Arms trade, 67Arms transfers, limiting of, 64Aron, Raymond, 136Assignment and matching, 25Assurance game, 119-120, 122Attack/accept (linkage offer), 259, 261-

262,267-268Auctions, 25Aumann, Robert, 13, 15, 16, 18-19,20,

22,211,212Aumann and Dreze theory, 211, 212Aumann-Shapley value, 210-211Austrian State Treaty of 1955, 57, 68Automata models of repeated games,

24Avoiding Accidental Nuclear War

(1971, 1973),57,61Axelrod, Robert, 20,49, 50, 76, 359Axelrod's repeated Prisoner's

Dilemma, 20

Bacharach, Michael, 17Backwards induction, 16Bargaining questions, 203Bargaining set, 23, 39Bargaining theory, 21-22

axiomatic, 21noncooperative, 21-22

373

374

Bargaining time, 207"Basic Agreement" of 1938, 362Battle of the Sexes, 49Bayesian equilibrium, 152, 154Bayes's rule, 191,233,237Belief, linkage possibility, 264Berlekamp, Elwyn, 17Bernheim, Douglas, 18, 24Bilateral coalitions, 56-58Bilateral labor-management

monopolies, 351, 356Bilateral relationships, international

security and, 54-56Binmore, Ken, 13, 14, 16,21,24Biology, 25Bipolarity, 120-122, 226Bipolar world, 54Bluffing, 184-185Bosnian Crisis (1908),248-249Bracken, 1., 44Brams, Steven, 4, 21, 25, 32, 77Brandenburger, Adam, 24Brito, 32Brownie points, 35, 36, 38

Called Bluff, 312-313Calmfors, L., 363-364Camp David agreement, 63Canadian Department of External

Affairs, 204Canadian Department of National

Defence, 204Canning, David, 21-22Caplow, Theodore, 2, 81-82Caplow's coalition theory, 2-3, 81-82Cardinal preference orderings (CPOs),

309,314Cardinal utility schemes, 78Case, James, 19Caucuses, 204-215, 216, 217, 219Centipede sequential game, 3, 4n.Centralization, 363-364Characteristic function, 22, 38-40, 41­

43,44n-person game, 35-36

Characteristic function (coalitional)games, 22-23

Characteristic function form, 51, 53

INDEX

Characterizing function V(S),37-39Chemical weapons agreement, 57Chicken (game), 3,4,49, 76, 77, 78,

281constrained preferences, 311-313,

317contract curve above the stable

Nash equilibrium, 86, 87matrix, 12outcome, 303, 304

Cho, 18Classical cooperative game theory, 76,

78Classical game thoery, 78Classicism, 10-11, 13, 14-15Cline, Ray, 213, 214, 216Cline's index (measures of power

resources), 213, 214Closed economies, 141Clusters, 121Coalitional form, 34-35, 43-44Coalition-bargaining problems, 96-

100Coalition formation, theories of, 23Coalition Formation Game, 342Coalition games, 31-45Coalitions, 78-83, 87-95Coalition-stability analysis, 93Coalition structures, 210Coalition structure value (CS-value),

211,212-219Coalition theory, 2-3Cold War, 314-321Collective-good theory, 2, 78, 93, 98Colman, Andrew, 13, 15Column, 301Committee on Disarmament (1971),

57,63Committee systems, 218Common Agricultural Policy, 338-339Common knowledge, theories of, 23-

24Common-threat perception, 96Community of interest, 334-335Complementary gains, 83-84Complete information, 227, 228, 229,

231Conference on Disarmament in

Europe (CDE), 206

INDEX

Conference on Security andCooperation in Europe (CSCE),203-219

Confidence-building measures, 203,206

Conflict, 301, 302, 303, 313Conflict analysis, 21Consensual democracy, 360Consensus, defined, 304Consistency of beliefs, 186-187Constrained preferences, 321 n.Constrained preference orderings

(CPOs), 309-311Contract curve, 86, 248Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

(CFE), 206, 213, 216, 217Conventional forces agreement, 57Conway, John, 17Cooperate, 301, 302, 303Cooperation, 301, 303

economic analysi of EC, 327-344in absolute-gains model, 109in international relations theory,

142-143,144,146in labor relations, 347-354, 358-365international 47-48

Cooperation procedure, 327- 328Cooperative equilibrium, 114Cooperative game, 51, 70n.Cooperative takeoff, 119Cooperative tipping point, 118Cooperators, minimum number of, 118Coordination, 76

contract curve above the stableNash equilibrium, 86, 87

Coordination game, 76, 78Core, ll, 39, 96

defined, 23Core group, 205Corporatism, 363-364, 369n.Correlated equilibria, 18-19Cost allocation, 26Cost-benefit, 185-186Council of Ministers, 328, 333-334,

338, 344Countercoalition,41Counterthreat concept, 34Countervailing strategy, 225A Course in Microeconomic Theory, 14

375

Credible neologisms, 197Crises, game-theoretic analysis, 275­

294Crisis bargaining, 234

signaling difficulties with linkage,245-273

Crisis Game, 276, 277full cooperation, 283Nash equilibria, 277, 282-290, 293payoffs and strategies, 278-282

Critical cost, 188Critical risk, 97Cross-alliance rivalry, 121Crossover point, Crisis Game, 276,

277,279Cuban Missile Crisis, 287Cutoff strategy, 157-160, 162

Dalkey, N., 32Dart duel, 19Dasgupta,21Davis, Morton, 11, 14-15Deadlock (game), 302, 304, 354, 356,

359constrained preference orderings,

311-313payoff, 302-303

Deadlock "type" games, 322n.constrained preference orderings,

311-313Dean, Jonathan, 203Debt rescheduling, 305-306, 307-309,

314-321Decision rules, 151-152, 153, 160-163

n-step, 172Defect, 301, 302Defections, 253, 271, 272, 302-303,

331,364- 365Defection threats, 98-99Defense Cooperation, 57Defensive cooperation, 122Defensive positionality, 121, 122Demand, defined, 304Density, 153Desjardins, Robert, 11Deterrence

rational, 179-200signaling and, 182-185

376

Development, lack of, 67Dictatorial-sequential unanimity

games (DSUGs), 156, 161, 164­165

Dictatorial-sequential veto games(DSVGs), 156

Differential games, 19Disagreement vote, 164, 165-168Discount factor, 111-112, 113, 114,

120minimum, 114, 115, 116

Discounting, 20Distributional-coalition theory, 93Divine equilibria, 17Divine sequential equilibrium, 253,

266,269Divinity, 271-272Dixit, Avinash, 13Dollar auction, 16-17Dominated strategies, 198

elimination of, 194-196, 197successive elimination of, 187

Dresher, Melvin, 19Dreze, Jacques, 211, 212Driffill, 1., 363-364Duels, 19Duopoly, 77Dyads, 80Dynamic models, 79Dynamic nonconstant-sum games, 32

Eastern caucus, 204-207, 211, 212Econometrica, 18Economic rigidity, 348Economics of industrial organization,

24Effective benefit, 97Effectiveness of the coalition, 90Effort levels, 91Ellsberg, 32Embargo, 133, 134Employee participation, 350Epidemics, 66-67Epoch,300,305-306,317,320Equilibrium, 154, 185-193

behavior off the path, 253beliefs off the path, 271effect on reputation, 184

INDEX

imperfect, 282linkage model, 252-265structural model, 141, 142subgame perfect, 282-286, 289-293

Equilibrium proposal, 340, 342, 343,344

Equilibrium theory, 180Escalation, 232-234

Crisis Game, 279-286, 287, 288dynamics of, 225-242partial, in Crisis Game, 277probability of, 233

Essays on the Foundations of GameTheory, 16

European Community (EC),cooperation in, 4

European Community (EC) Treaties,327-344

formal model of two-stagedecision-making process, 337-343

European Council, 333-334European Monetary Authority, 335,

336European Monetary System (EMS),

330,333,335-339,341European Parliament (EP), 327, 335,

338Evolutionarily stable strategy, 25The Evolution of Cooperation, 49Expected internal benefit (K*ij)' 97Expolitation, 256, 259, 260, 264, 301,

359Extensive form, 33-34Extensive form games, 152-174

with two-stage character, 156

Fair division, 26Falklands/Malvinas conflict, 308-309False warnings, 63Farquaharson, Robin, 26Fashoda crisis, 261Fenoaltea, S., 353-354, 366n.Fictitious play, 18Final position, crisis game, 281, 282,

290Finite, defined, 17Finite games of perfect information in

extensive form, 16-17

INDEX

Finite two-person zero-sum games instrategic form, 17-19

First-period equilibrium outcome, 133,134

First-strike advantage, and linkage,251

First-strike advantage for the receiver,255,256-260,264-265

First-strike advantage for the sender,261-262,264-265

First-strike systems, 61, 62Fishburn, 16"Flexible response" doctrine, 225Folk Theorem, 12, 114Forward induction, 17-18Fragmented linkage, 333"Free-for-all" power value, 215Free-rider problem, 78-79Free-trade agreements, bilateral, 329Free-trade outcome, 133, 134, 147n.,

148n.Friedman, James, 14,23Fudenberg, Drew, 14, 18,20Fun and Games, 13Functional differentiation, 143Functional nondifferentiation, 143

Gain, concept of, 82-83Gale, David, 25Gale's game, 16-17The Game of Business, 23Games and Information, 13Games and markets, 25Games in coalitional form, 22-23Games without side-payments, 23Game theoretical models, 79Game theory

coalitonal form, 13international cooperation and, 48-

53levels of difficulty, 9-10limitations of, 15sources for international relations

specialists, 9-26syndromes making books on subject

unsatisfactory, 10-11Game Theory and Economic Behavior,

18

377

Game Theory for the Social Sciences,15

"Game Theory" (Aumann) in NewPalgrave Dictionary of Economics,15

Game Theory in the Social Sciences, 15Game tree, 33Gately, 45General defection, 354, 355, 356, 359Generating function method, 215George, S., 335Gilpin, Robert, 105, 136Global security level, 80-81Gordon, D. G., 32Grand coalition, 52Great Britain, European Monetary

System and, 335-336, 337, 339Green, Jerry, 3, 152, 153, 161Greenberg, 1., 342Greenhouse effect, 65-66Greenwood, Ted, 226Grieco, Joseph, 121, 122, 123n., 149n.Guth, Werner, 20Guy, Richard, 17Guyer, M. 1., 32

Hamburger, Henry, 13, 15, 16Harmony (game), 303, 304

constrained preference orderings,311-313

Harrington, Robert, 18Harris, Milton, 20Harsanyi, J., 32Harsanyi function, 42Harsanyi-Zeuthen critical-risk

principle, 96Hart, Sergiu, 23, 211, 342Harvey, Frank, 281Hegemonic war, 136Helsinki Final Act (1975), 57, 63Hero (game), constrained preference

orderings, 311-313Hildebrand, Werner, 25Holler, Manfred, 14Homicidal Chauffeur, 19Hot Line Agreement (1963),57,58,61Howard, Nigel, 21Hypergames, 21

378

IATO (1949), 57Ideal point, 247IIIing, Gerhard, 14Imperfect equilibrium, 282Implementability of decision rules,

151-152model, 153-154

Implicit agreements, 59Imputation, 35, 36-37Incentive compatibility, defined, 22Incentive theory, 154Incomplete information, 32, 76, 226,

231-232games of, 19-20signaling and reputation modeled by

games of, 20Incremental cost, of submitting in a

limited retaliation, 230Index of instability, 32Indifference curves, 83, 86, 87

linkage, 247-248Indifference map, 83-85, 86-88Indifference point, 270Individual situations (IS), 306-309In extensive form, defined, 16-17Information costs, 332INF Treaty (1987),57,60,62,69Inside gains, 90Institutions, 359Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

(ICBMs), 57, 61-62, 66Interested player, 250International cooperation, 47-48

game theory and, 48-53international security and, 57-64outside area of international

security, 65-68International Journal of Game Theory,

18International regimes, defined, 332International relations theory, 129International security, 47, 76

international cooperation and, 58­64

qualitative characteristic functionapproach,53-58

Intervention cost, 185-186, 188, 2oon.,201n.

Intriligator, Michael D., 2, 32

INDEX

Iran-Iraq War, 64Irresolute defender, 231-232, 233-234Irresolute player, 250, 254-255, 257,

258-260Irresolute senders, 262, 263-264, 271-

272Isaacs, Rufus, 19Issue areas, 330, 337Issue-linkage, 333, 338, 341, 344

James, Patrick, 281Japan, duels and games of timing, 19Jenkins proposals, 335-336Jervis, Robert, 128, 180, 181, 182, 183,

184,189, 190,2oon.Jervis paradox, 3Johnson, Harry, 133, 147n.Joint distribution, 153Joint ventures, 151

decision rule example, 172-174utility of, 151

Jones, Anthony, 11Journal of Economic Theory, 18Journal of Theoretical Biology, 25

Kalai, E., 342Kelly, Jerry, 26Keohane, Robert 0., 123n., 128,329Kernel, 23Kilgour, Marc, 4, 25King Solomon, dilemma of, 22Kirwan, A., 25Kohlberg, Egon, 18Kreps, David, 14, 18, 19,20Kurz, Mordechai, 23, 211, 342

Labor conflicts (1955-1985), bycountry, 349, 351

Labor market, nature of, 352-358Labor relations, 347-365

conflicts (1955-1985),349Labor unions, 359-360Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 3, 152, 153, 161Lambelet, Jean-Christian, 4Languages of game theory, 33-34Large-n Assurance problem, 119-120

INDEX

Law of the Sea negotiations, 204-205Leader (game), 303, 304

constrained preference orderings,311-313

constrained preferences, 317Legislative structure, strategy of, 26Lemma 1,282,289,290,292Lemma 2, 290, 291, 292"Lemmings" effect, 190Levin, Richard, 11Limited nuclear options, 225-242Limited retaliation, dynamics of, 231-

236Limited-retaliation equilibria, 234Limited retaliation strategy, 226-236Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, 57,

58,60Limiting arms transfers, 57Limiting missile proliferation, 57Linkage

enforceability issues, 248in crisis bargaining, 245-273logic of, 246-249model, 249-265"receptive to" condition, 255signaling properties, 249success possibility, 246, 248, 249

Linkage accepted, 260, 262-263, 269Linkage attack, 260, 262-263, 269Linkage offers, 262Linkage reject, 260, 262-263, 269Linked mix, 259-260, 262-263, 264,

268-269,272Lipson, Charles, 128The Ingic of Images in International

Relations, 182Loss, concept of, 82-83Luce, I>uncan, 15, 16, 17, 18,23Luterbacher, Urs, 2-3

MacI>onald, John, 23McGinnis, M.I>., 265Machina, Mark, 16Managerial prerogative, 363Mann, I., 215Marx, Karl, 352Matrix form, 17,34Maximizing behavior, 186-187

379

Maximum winning coalition, 120-121Maxmin approach, 41May, Francis, 11Mayaguez rescue, 180, 182-183, 184,

185,2oon.Maynard-Smith, John, 25Mechanical design, 22Mechanism, 154Mehlmann, Albert, 19Merrill, Samuel, 25Mertens, Jean-Francois, 18,21Metagames,21Minimax theorem, 13Mixed strategies, 185, 314

linkage in crisis bargaining, 270-272, 273n.

Mixed-strategy equilibrium, 185Monotone likelihood ratios, 154Moore, John, 22Morgan, T. C, 248Morgenstern, 0., 11,33, 34, 35, 330,

342Morgenstern's stable sets, 11Morrow, James, 4Moulin, Herve, 15, 19,24,26,85Mutual consensus, 310, 311, 314, 315,

316,318Mutual cooperation, 354, 355, 356, 359Mutual defection, 301, 302Mutual deterrence, 59, 61, 64, 69, 76,

78Myerson, Roger, 14, 18,22

Nacht, Michael L., 226Nalebuff, Barry, 3, 13,32Nash bargaining axioms, 21Nash bargaining functions, 89Nash Bargaining Game, 340Nash equilibria, 3, 16, 148n., 159,314

for the coalition, 94foundations, refinements, and

generalizations, 17-19illustration of full-preference

orderings, 317, 319in Crisis Game, 277, 282-288, 289,

290,293sequential equilibrium, 186utility functions and, 84-87

380

Nash equilibrium solution, IINational Security Council, IINATO High Level Task Force, 205Negotiation analysis, 219Neoliberal institutionalism, 127-130,

138-139,146n.model, 131-138structural model, 142, 143, 144, 145

Neorealism, 127Neutral and nonaligned nations

(NNA), 204, 206-207, 211, 212,216

Never Cooperate (NC) strategy, 110­112,113, 1l7-118, 119

New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics,15-21,23,24

Neyman, Abrahim, 24No consensus (NC), 309, 310, 314, 315,

316,318defined,305

Non-convex-utility possibility curves,86

Noncooperative equilibrium, 116-117Noncooperative game of coalition

formation, 330Noncooperative games, 70n.Noncooperative game theory, 14Nonintervention, 191, 192, 194-195,

197, 198,20In.Nonproliferative regime, 59-60Nontransferable utility (NTV) games,

23"No regret" criterion, 152Normal form, 17North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), 204-205, 206, 213,216

No sidepayment (NSP) game, 38N-person game theory, 15

characteristic function, 35inconclusive state of, 219

N-step decision rule, 172N -step unanimity rule, 17l-172Nuclear deterrence, 226Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

(NPT) (1968),57.58.59-60Nuclear terrorism, 57Nucleolus, 23Nye, Joseph S., Jr., 123n.

INDEX

Oil crisis, 45Oligopoly theory, 24Olson, Mancur, 93Omniscience, paradox of, 76O'Neill, Barry, 2, 3, 32One-step unanimity rule, 168-169, 173Open economies, 141Operations research, 15Optimal reaction curve, 92, 94, 95, 99Ordering principle, 143Ordeshook, Peter, 13, 14, 18,22-23,26Ordinal preference orderings, 311Ordinal preferences, 299-321Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development(OECD) countries, 359, 363

labor relations and economicpolicies, 347

Origin of games, 299-321Orthogonal coalition game, 41"Our Common House," 57Outcome function, 154, 159

implementable, 154Outer Space Treaty (1967),57,60Owen, Guillermo, 23, 211Oye, Kenneth, 128Ozone depletion, 66

Panofsky, Wolfgang K., 226Pareto dominance, 253-254, 272Pareto efficient games, 330Pareto efficient proposal, 343, 344Pareto equivalence, 116Pareto optimal contract curve, 86Pareto optimal frontier, 87Pareto optimal limit, 99Pareto optimal set, 86Pareto suboptimal dominant-strategy

equilibrium, 265Partition form of games, 330Partition function form, 42-43,89,91,

161, 162Payoffs, 35, 36, 38

cardinal utility schemes and, 78characteristic function, 40Coalition Formation Game, 342Crisis Game, 276, 278-282, 283, 286,

287

INDEX

free-trade outcome and, 147n., 148n.international cooperation and, 49,

50, 52limited retaliation, 229-230, 235,

237linkage in crisis bargaining, 270multiple, 78-79neoliberal institutional model, 132-

133, 134, 135, 136Prisoner's Dilemma, 359relative gains, 112-113secondary, 78-79structural model, 139-141, 142tit-for-tat strategy in dyads, 110

PD-59,225Pearce, 18Pentagonal world of five global

powers, 54-56Perfect equilibria, 17, 18Perfect equilibrium point, 32Perfect information, defined, 16-17Perfect sequential equilibrium (PSE),

187,197-199,201n.Permutation method, 215Pivotal player, 215Plenary sessions, 207-209, 210Policy coordination, 331Polish debt rescheduling, 314, 317-321Political structure, 129-130Ponnsard, Jean-Pierre, 15Posterior implementability, 157Posterior implementable rules, 161,

164Posterior implementable social-choice

rules, 163Postlewaite, A., 342Powell, Robert, 3-4, 32, 226Power given a specific coalition

structure,2I1Power resource possibility frontier,

95-96Preemptive strike, crisis game, 276Preference orderings, 309-312, 320Prevail, defined, 304-305Principal-agent models, 22Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), 3, II, 13, 15,

21,49-50, 76-78Axelrod's repeated, 20bargaining space, 304

381

bilateral labor-managementmonopoly, 351, 356, 359, 362

constrained preference orderings,3I1-3B

contract curve above the stableNash equilibrium, 86

cooperation in repeated games, 24European Community cooperation

procedure, 329linkage studies, 265mutual cooperation, with

international regimes, 331, 332neoliberal institutionalism and, 130,

131, 132, 133, 135-136ordering and cold war illustration,

315-316payoff, 302-303relative-gains maximization model,

109strategies, 303structural realism and, 146n., 147n.­

148n.as theory of cooperation, 219Tucker exposition, 32

Private values model, 163-164Probabilities, 16Profit sharing, 350Proper equilibria, 17Pseudoquadratic functions as utility

functions, 84Public good decision, 168-172Public-good theory, 78

Quadratic functions, as utilityfunctions, 84

Qualified majority equilibriumproposal, 343, 344

Qualitative characteristic function, 53­58

Qualitative characteristic functionapproach, 53-58

Quotient games approach, 2I1, 212,214-217,219

Raiffa, Howard, 15, 16, 17, 18, 23RAND Corporation, IIRapoport, Anatol, II, 15,21,23,32,50

382

Rasmusen, Eric, 13-14,20Rational decision making, 300Rational deterrence, 179-200Rationality, 19Rationalizability, 18Reaction functions, 86, 87, 88Receiver (linkage), 247-248, 249Reciprocated cooperation, 353Recognition, Rapprochement (1971-),

57Refinements, defined, 17Regional conflicts in Asia, 57Regional Development Fund, 338-339Regional powers, 56Relative effort level inside the

coalition, 91Relative gains, 105, 106-123,313

definition, 108-109international politics as problem of,

106-107maximization, 107, 108maximization model, 109-122neoliberal institutional 'model, 136-

138structural model, 138-145

Relative-gains payoff, 108Relative losses, 137-138Relative power resources of the

coalition, 90Repeated-game model, 136Repeated games, 20-21Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game,

20,49Reputation, 181-182, 189, 190, 192

limited retaliation and, 231-232,242n.

modeled by games of incompleteinformation, 20

sequential equilibrium and, 193, 194,195,197-199

value of, 182Reputation paradox, 180, 199Resolute defender, 231, 233-234, 240Resolute player, 250, 254-255, 257,

258-260,261-262Resolute senders, 254, 257, 258-260,

261-262,263-264,271-272Retaliation, Crisis Game, 279-283,

286,289

INDEX

Retaliation function, 282, 288Revelation principle, 152

defined,22Reversed equilibrium, 192-193, 201n.Richardson, 32Riley, John, 20Risk, of defection, 97Risk aversion, 359, 364-365Roberts, 1., 342Rome Treaty, 327Roth, Alvin, 21, 23, 25, 211Row, 292Row, 301Rubinstein, Ariel, 16,24

Sabourian, H., 20Saltsjobaden compromise, 362SALT Treaties (1972,1979),57,60Schelbert-Syfrig, H., 365Schelling, Thomas c., 11, 31-32, 226-

227Schelling diagram, 118Schlesinger, James R., 226Schlesinger doctrine, 225, 231Schouer, Andrew, 22, 24Schwodiauer, Gerhard, 22, 24Scoring systems, 213Scoville, Herbert, 226Seabed Treaty (1970),57,60Security guarantee, 57Segmented labor market, 351Self-falsifying inferences, 184Seiten, Reinhard, 293-294Sender (linkage), 247-248, 249, 254Sequential crisis equilibria, 232, 236,

239- 242Sequential equilibria, 17, 18, 186-188,

191-193,271-272linkage model, 252-265refinements, 193-199

Sequential unanimity games (SUG),151-174

agreed termination, impossibility of,163-174

equivalence between posteriorimplementation and SUGimplementation, 161-163

implementability, 159

INDEX

optimal strategies, 157-159private values model, 163-164

Sequential veto game (SVG), 155, 156Settling regional disputes, 57Settling regional disputes in Africa

(1988),57,64Seven Weeks War (1866),248Shapley, Lloyd, 23, 25, 210-211, 212,

215Shapley-Shubik power index, 210-211,

214,215,216,217Shapley value, 2, 11,23, 52-53, 210­

211,218,342Sharp, Jane, 206Shubik, Martin, 2, 15, 17, 19,23,210­

211,212Sidepayments,44,51Signaling, 17-18

linkage, 249, 273n.modeled by games of incomplete

information, 20strategic use of, 182-185

Simultaneous announcement game,152

Single European Act (SEA), 327-328,330,332,337,338,342,343

Single Integrated Operational Plans(SIOP),231

Sino-American "rapprochement"(1972),75

Sino-Indian War (1962), 261Six-Nation Peace Initiative, 63Sobel, Joel, 20Social choice theory, 26Social decision rules, 157"Solvable Nuclear War Models," 32Sonnenschein, Hugo, 24Snidal, Duncan, 3, 78Spheres of Influence, 59Stability analyses, 93-96Stable equilibria, 17, 18, 113-114Stable set, 39Stag Hunt, 3,49, 323n.

constrained preference orderings,311-313

START, elimination of fixed-siteICBMs, 57, 61-62

Status quo decision, 153Steering committee (NATO), 205

383

Stein, Arthur A., 128, 273n.Step function, 160, 161, 162Stockholm Agreement (1987),57,63Strategic form, 17-19,33-34,40

defined,17Strategic Integrated Operational Plans

(SIOP),225Strategic interaction, 300-301

terminology problems, 301-305Strategies, 154

Crisis Game, 278-287limited retaliation and sequential

crisis equilibrium, 236-242Strategy and Conscience, 15Strong-majority-rule approach, 213Strong ordinal preferences, 32Structural realism, 127-130, 133, 134,

136- 138, 146n.structual model of absolute and

relative gains problem, 138-145Subgame imperfect equilibrium, 289Subgame perfect, 134-135Subgame-perfect equilibria, 143,282-

286,289-293Superadditivity assumption, 51, 71 n.Supergames, 20-21Supervision, 352-354, 366n.Survival Game, 50, 51, 60

dealing with international terrorism,63

Sutton, John, 21-22Sweden, labor relations, 362-363, 364,

365,368n.Switzerland, labor market, 4, 352, 355-

362,364-365, 367n., 368n.Symbolism of the moves, 3Symmetrical decision functions, 88Symmetric games, 70n.

Tactical linkage, 333Tariffs, 133, 134, 142, 147Taylor, P., 335Technology of warfare, 148n.Termination, agreed, impossibility of,

163- 174Terrorism, international, 63Theology, 76Theories of coalition formation, 23

384

The Theory of Industrial Organization,14

Theory of moves, 21Thinking Strategically, 13Thomas, L. c., 21, 25Threat, 39,44

characteristic and partition functionforms, 39-43

Threat concept, 34Threat Game, 281, 282Threat point, 340Threat strategies, 86threat value, 98Three-caucus form of bargaining, 204-

215Timing, games of, 19Tipping point, 118, 119, 120Tipping zone, 119Tirole, Jean, 14, 18,20,24Tit-for-tat rule, 49-50Tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy, 110-112,

113, 117-118Tracing procedure, 18Tradeoff functions, 89, 91Tradeoff gains, 83-84Transaction costs, 332"Trembling-hand perfectness," 282,

285,289,293-294Triads, 78-100Trianguar trade, 50-51Trieste crisis (1954), 262Trilateral coalitions, 56-57Troops reduction, 203Tucker, A. W., 11, 32The 2X2 Game, 32Two-person game thoey, 15Two-person zero-sum games, 11Two-person zero-sum theory, 11Two-step unanimity rule, 169-172

Ultima ratio, 136Ultimate payoff (utility), as two-step

process, 108 .Unanimous equilibrium proposal

(UEP), 340, 342, 344Uninterested player, 250United Nations, 63United Nations (treaty) (1946),57

INDEX

United Nations Educational, Scientific,and Cultural Organization(UNESCO), constitution, 69

U.S. Army's Armored DivisionEquivalent method, 213

U.S. Electoral College, 218Unit square, games on, 19Universal divinity, 187, 196-197Universally divine equilibria, 17Unlimited attack, 228-229, 230-231Unlinked mix, 259. 262-263, 268, 272Unlinked offer, 258-259, 262, 264Unlinked offer accepted, 257-258,

266-267,260-261Unlinked offer rejected, 258-259, 261,

267Unstable dynamic equilibria, 86Upper constraint, of limit of resources,

90User's Manual, 18, 20Utilities, 16, 35, 36, 38, 77-79

extensive form game, 153for linkage issue, 250state's, 139strategies in linkages, 270-272

Utility functions (i), 89-91, 168,340Utility function (U), 83-84Utility possibility frontier, 86

Value, 39van Damme, Eric, 15, 18,20,25Vienna Arms Talks, 203-219Von Neumann, J., 11,33, 34, 35, 330,

342Von Neumann stable sets, 11Voting, strategy of, 26

Wage rigidity, 350Waltz, Kenneth, 105, 107, 128, 129­

130, 136, 139, 143, 146War, structural model, 139-141, 142-

143War initiation, 76Warning systems, 63Warsaw Pact, 204, 206, 213Weber, Robert, 18,20,25Weber, Shlomo, 4, 342

INDEX

Western caucus, 204-207, 211, 212-213

Wiesmeth, H., 4Williams, John, IIWilson, Robert, 20Winning Ways for Your Mathematical

Plays, 17Winter War (1939-1940),246"Workers involved" series, 357-358,

367n."Working days lost" series, 357-358,

367n.Working groups, 204-205World powers, 54-56

Worth, 35, 36, 38

Yom Kippur War (1973), 277Young, H. P., 211Young, Peyton, 25

Zagare, Frank, 15, 770-1 normalization, 350-1 normalized form, 71n.Zero sum, defined, 17Zero-sum games, 11,49Zeuthen's principle, 322n.

385