A Model of Public Management Reform ; Many Houses:Types of Politico-Administrative Regime

(Review by Christopher Appiah- Thompson, BA, MPhil)

In Public Management Reform:A Comparative Analysis,by Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouckaert(2004),Chapters Two

and Three

1.1 Introduction: Problems and Responses: A model of Public Management Reform

O In the introduction to the Chapter Two of their book “Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis”, the authors present a model of management reform, by identifying the stimuli that appear to have provoked the wave of management changes.

O The authors defined, Public management reform as “consisting of deliberate changes to the structures and processes of public sector organizations with the objective of getting them (in some sense) to run better”, (ibid, p.8).

O The authors posit that the construction of a broad model or map is both useful and possible, even though countries may well have combined the various elements in very different ways. More specific theories are needed to “fill in” the map to explain particular topographical features in particular countries and periods. Thus, Chapter Two establishes a common conceptual vocabulary for the discussion of management reform”, (ibid, p.3).

1.2The broad Architecture of the model: Forces at Work

(E)Political System

FIG.1.1 A Model of Public Management Reform

(A)Socio-economic policies

(L)Administrative System

(B)Global

Economic forces

(C)Social-

Demographic change

(D)National

Socio-economic

policies

(F)New management ideas

(H)Pressure

From citizens

(G)Party

Political ideas

(I)Elite perceptions of what management reforms

Are desirable

(J)Elite perceptions of what management reforms are

feasible

(K)Chance events, e.g. Scandals, disasters

(M)Content of reform package

(N)Implementation process

(o)Reforms actually achieved

The Elite Decision Making at the Centre of the Model(Top-down)

O (I)Elite perceptions of what reforms are desirable

O (J) Elite perceptions of what reforms are feasible

O (I) and (J) Reflects Political life

The Socio-economic factors(A)

O Box (B) Represents the influence of Global economic forces

O Box (C) Represents Socio-demographic change

O Box (D) Represents Socio-economic policies

The Political System(E)O Box (F) The influx of New management

ideas into the public sectorO Box (G) Identifies Party political ideas

as a further influence on Public management change

O Box (H) Represents pressure from citizens

O Box (K) Identifies the effect of chance events such as scandals,etc,.

The Administrative System(L)

O Box (M) Identifies the Content of reform package

O Box (N) Identifies the Implementation process

O Box (O) represents the achievements that eventually results from the process of reform

2.1 Introduction: Many Houses: Types of Politico-Administrative Regime

O Three key features :Structural, Cultural and Functional O 1. The state structure (including the constitution)-this is clearly a

structural featureO 2. The nature of executive government at the central level-this

is a mixture of structural and functional elementsO 3. The way relationships work between political executives

(ministers) and top civil servants (mandarins)-a functional element, with strong cultural overtones.

O 4. The dominant administrative culture (Legalistic or Public Interest)

O 5. The degree of diversity among the main channels through which the ideas come that fuel public management reform-this reflects both cultural and functional elements

O These five key features are depicted in tabular form in Table 1.1, below. The authors then attempt to discuss each feature in turn.

Table 1.1 Types of Politico-Administrative Regime:Five

  1.State Structure 2.Executive Government

3.Minister/MandarinRelations

4.AdministrativeCulture

5.Diversity of Policy Advice

Australia Federal;Co-Ordinated

Majoritarian SeparateMildlypoliticised

Public Interest Mainly civil serviceUntil 1980s

Canada Federal Majoritarian Separate Public interest Mainly civil service

Finland Unitary;Decentralized;Fairly fragmented

Consensual SeparateFairly politicized

Trending to Rechtsstaat

Mainly civil service

France Unitary;Formally centralized;Co-ordinated

Intermediate IntegratedFairlypoliticised

PredominantlyRechtsstaat

Mainly civil service

Germany Federal;Co-ordinated

Intermediate SeparateFairly politicised

Rechtsstaat Mainly civil service(plus a few academics)

Netherlands Unitary;Decentralized;Fairly fragmented

Consensual SeparateFairlypoliticised

OriginallyVery legalistic,But has changed to Pluralistic/Consensual

A broad mixture: Civil servants, academics,Other experts

New Zealand Unitary;Centralized;Mildly fragmented

Majoritarian(until 1996)

SeparateNot politicised

Public interest Mainly civil service

Sweden Unitary;Decentralized

Intermediate Separate Increaselypoliticised

Originally legalistic, but has changed to corporatist

A broad mixture Corporatist processes bring in academic experts and trade unions

UK Unitary;Centralized;Co-ordinated

Majoritarian SeparateNot politicized

Public Interest Mainly civil service until 1980sRecently think-tanks, consultants

USA Federal;Fragmented

Intermediate SeparateVery politicised

Public interest Very diverse:Political appointees,Corporations, think tanks, Consultants

Below are Tables 1.2 and 1.3 depicting how various indicators of decentralization

can be constructed

TABLE 1.3 Two Indices of Decentralization

Country  1.Federalism  2.Special 

Territorial 

Autonomy 

(0-1) 

3.Regional and 

Local government 

Direction  

(0-2) 

4.Functional 

autonomy 

5.Institutional 

Autonomy 

(summary score 

Of columns 1-4) 

6.Central government 

Final consumption  

As a % of final 

Consumption of general government 

 Australia  _ _ _ _ (European countries only)

Canada  _ _ _ _ (European countries only)

Finland  0 1 1 0 =2 33

France  0 0 1 =1 72

Germany(FRG)  2 0 2 0 =4

19

Netherlands  0 0 1 2 =3 45

New Zealand  _ _ _ _ (European countries only)

Sweden  0 0 2 0 =2 30

UK  0 1 1 0 =2 59

USA  _ _ _ _ (European countries only)

Adapted from: Lane and Ersson, 1991, pp.224, 225

TABLE 3.2 Percentage Shares of Public Employment by level of Government

Country  1985  1990  1994  Other Levels of  

Government(1994 only) 

Australia  _ 15.0 14.6 State 73.3

Local 12.1

Canada  _ 17.9 17.1 Provisional 44.1

Local 38.9

Finland  33.3 24.3 25.2 Municipalities 74.8

France  56.3 55.0 48.7 Subnational 30.7

Health 20.6

Germany  22.1 21.6 11.9 Lander 51.0

Municipalities 37.1

Netherlands  _ _ _ _

New Zealand  _ _ 89.7 Local 10.3

Sweden  27.2 26.7 17.3 Regional 24.6

Municipalities 58.1

UK  48.0 47.7 47.7 Local 52.3

USA  17.9 16.7 15.2 State 22.6

Local 61.1

Adapted from: OECD, 1997c, p.36

What are the consequences of these distinctions for public management

reform?

O All other things being equal, the authors confer that reforms in federal states or highly decentralized unitary states are likely to be less broad in scope and less uniform in practice than in unitary, centralized states (ibid).

2.4 The Nature of Executive Government

TABLE 1.4. Types of Democratic Regime:State Structure and the Nature of Executive Government(Adapted from Lijphart,1984,p.219)

      Factor 2   

  Majoritarian Intermediate Consensual

  Majoritarian New Zealand

UK

Australia

Canada

Germany

USA

Factor 1  Intermediate France

Sweden

  Consensual Finland

Netherlands

(Switzerland)

The form of the political executive can affect change at several stages in the

process of reform

O First, it influences the degree of leverage that can be created to launch a programme of reform.

O Second, it may affect the stability of reforms.O Third, there may also be an impact on the sense

of “ownership” of reform measures.O The implication of all this for public management

reform is that changes-which are highly likely going to disturb the widest range of interests-are less and less feasible the further one moves away from the first category government.

2.5 Mandarin/minister relations

O The authors identify two principal dimensions to this variation.

O First, there is the question of whether political careers are separate from, or are integrated with, the careers of “mandarins” (the authors citing Pierre, 1995).

O Second, there is the extent to which senior civil service positions are themselves politicised, in the sense that most of their occupants are known to have (and have been chosen partly because they have) specific party political sympathies.

2.6 The Philosophy and Culture of Governance: Rechtsstaat or Public Interest?

O Two models were identified:O Rechtsstaat model/Legalistic CultureO Anglo Saxon notion of the “Public

Interest” Model

2.7 Sources of Policy Advice

O The basic proposition here is that the wider the range of customary sources of advice, the more likely it is that new ideas-especially those from outside the public sector-will reach ministers’ ears in persuasive and influential forms.

O Sources-from their own political parties, from their mandarins, from management consultants, from academic specialists, from business corporations

O The source of a particular reform idea may influence its perceived legitimacy and “ownership”.

2.8 The European Commission: A Special Case

O The authors,argue,that the third, fourth and fifth features of the general analysis can be related to the Commission.

O The main differences arise with the first and second-state structure and the style of executive government(p.56).

2.9 Traditional Bureaucracy: the ancien regime?

O According to the authors, “a good deal of the rhetoric associated with public management reform vividly contrasts the new(=good) with the old(=bad).

O The authors, referred to scholars like Osborne, Gaebler(1992,pp.11-12) and an Australian commentator, Hughes(1998,pp.38-9) as being critical of the “traditional bureaucracy” describing the latter as bloated,wasteful,ineffective,sluggish,rigid and bureaucratic, narrowly-focused etc.,

O On the contrary, the authors indicate that “what one might term the ‘Osborne and Gaebler Story’ is misleadingly neat and over-simple.

O First, as is clear from the earlier sections of this chapter, for many years there has not been just one type of administrative regime in existence, but several.

O Second (by way of extension to the first) even if some parts of some public sectors “fitted” the image of the traditional bureaucracy, others definitely did not.

O Third the accounts of traditional bureaucracy given by the Osborne and Gaebler ‘school’ tend to be rather one-sided. They emphasize the negatives (‘rigidity’, ‘centralization’, etc.) but ignore or underplay the positives, such as continuity, honesty and a high commitment to equity in dealing with the citizen-public.

2.10 Concluding remarks

O Features of the existing politico-administrative regime are likely to exert a significant influence over both the choice of reforms to be adopted and the feasibility of implementing certain types of reform(desirability and feasibility-boxes I and J in Figure 1.1.

O State structures, the nature of the central executive government, relationships between ministers and mandarins, the prevailing administrative culture and the diversity of channels of advice all have effects on which ideas get taken up, and how vigorously and widely these are subsequently implemented(p.60).

3.1 Conclusion: Evaluation and Normative Assessment of the Book Chapters

O In my opinion, empirically the authors work is a profound contribution to the field of implementation research in policy science. Moreover, in using the words of James Mahoney to evaluate the authors methodological approach I noticed that the authors used simple but comprehensive nominal(or categorical) comparison, which includes the use of categories that are mutually exclusive(cases cannot be classified in terms of more than one category) and collectively exhaustive(one of the categories applies to each case).Examples of these categories in comparative historical research include various (types of Politico-Administrative regime classification:Federal,Unitary,Unitary-decentralized,Unitary-Centralized and typologies of different Executive-Government classifications(Majoritarian, Consensual, Intermediate) and numerous dichotomous variables(Public Interest and Rechtsstaat ,etc.).

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