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Director of Central Intelligence Top Secret

Special National Intelligence Estimate

117-717'70,—'

Implications ofRecent Soviet Military-Political Activities

APPROVED FOR RELEASED DATE: 13-Apr-2010

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SN1E 11-10-84/JX—495566-141,184'

18 May 1984

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NATI L SECURITY INFO TIONUnaut ed Disclosure Subject to Crimina •nctions

Sensitive IntelWarning Noticee Sources and ods Involved

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SNIE 11-10-84

IMPLICATIONS OFRECENT SOVIET MILITARY-

POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,

EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of theEstimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National SecurityAgency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

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KEY JUDGMENTS

During the past several months, a number of coincident Sovietactivities have created concern that they reflect abnormal Soviet fear ofconflict with the United States, belligerent intent that might riskconflict, or some other underlying Soviet purpose. These activities haveincluded large-scale military exercises (among them a major navalexercise in the Norwegian Sea, unprecedented SS-20 launch activity,and large-scale SSBN dispersal); preparations for air operations againstAfghanistan; attempts to change the air corridor regime in Berlin; newmilitary measures termed responsive to NATO INF de ployments; andshrill propaganda attributing a heightened danger of war to USbehavior.

Examining these developments in terms of several hypotheses, wereach the following conclusions:

— We believe strongly that Soviet actions are not inspired by, andSoviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminentconflict or confrontation with the United States. This judgmentis based on the absence of forcewide combat readiness or otherwar preparation moves in the USSR, and the absence of a toneof fear or belligerence in Soviet diplomatic communications,although the latter remain uncompromising on many issues.There have also been instances where the Soviets appear to haveavoided belligerent propaganda or actions. Recent Soviet -warscare- propaganda, of declining intensity over the periodexamined, is aimed primarily at discrediting US policies andmobilizing "peace" pressures among various audiences abroad.This war scare propaganda has reverberated in Soviet securitybureaucracies and emanated through other channels such ashuman sources. We do not believe it reflects authentic leader-ship fears of imminent conflict.

— We do not believe that Soviet war talk and other actions "mask"Soviet preparations for an imminent move toward confrontationon the part of the USSR, although they have an incentive to takeinitiatives that discredit US policies even at some risk. Were theSoviets preparing an initiative they believed carried a real riskof military confrontation with the United States, we would seepreparatory signs which the Soviets could not mask.

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— The Soviet actions examined are influenced to some extent bySoviet perceptions of a mounting challenge from US foreign anddefense policy. However, these activities do not all fit into an in-tegrated pattern of current Soviet foreign policy tactics.1

— Each Soviet action has its own military or political purposesufficient to explain it. Soviet military exercises are designed tomeet long-term requirements for force development and train-ing which have become ever more complex with the growth ofSoviet military capabilities.

— In specific cases, Soviet military exercises are probably intendedto have the ancillary effect of signaling Soviet power and resolveto some audience. For instance, maneuvers in the Tonkin Gulfwere aimed at backing Vietnam against China; Soviet airpoweruse in Afghanistan could have been partly aimed at intimidatingPakistan; and Soviet action on Berlin has the effect of remindingthe West of its vulnerable access, but very low-key Soviethandling has muted this effect.

Taken in their totality, Soviet talk about the increased likelihood ofnuclear war and Soviet military actions do suggest a political intentionof speaking with a louder voice and showing firmness through acontrolled display of military muscle. The apprehensive outlook webelieve the Soviet leadership has toward the longer term US armsbuildup could in the future increase its willingness to consider actions—even at some heightened risk—that recapture the initiative and neutral-ize the challenge posed by the United States.

These judgments are tempered by some uncertainty as to currentSoviet leadership perceptions of the United States, by continueduncertainty about Politburo decisionmaking processes, and by ourinability at this point to conduct a detailed examination of how theSoviets might have assessed recent US/NATO military exercises andreconnaissance operations. Notwithstanding these uncertainties, howev-er, we are confident that, as of now, the Soviets see not an imminentmilitary clash but a costly and—to some extent—more perilous strategicand political struggle over the rest of the decade.

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DISCUSSION

Introduction

1. There has been much Soviet talk about theincreased danger of nuclear war. This theme hasappeared in public pronouncements by Soviet politicaland military leaders, in statements by high officialstargeted at both domestic and foreign audiences, ininternal communications, and in other channels. Sovietauthorities have declared that Washington is preparingfor war, and have issued dire warnings that the USSRwill not give in to nuclear blackmail or other militarypressure. The articulation of this theme has paralleledthe Soviet campaign to derail US INF deployment. Itcontinues to this day, although at a somewhat lowerintensity in recent months than in late 1983.1

2. Since November 1983 there has been a high levelof Soviet military activity, with new deployments ofweapons and strike forces, large-scale military exer-cises, and several other noteworthy events:

— INF response: Start of construction of additionalSS-20 bases following Andropov's announcementon 24 November 1983 of termination of the 20-month moratorium on SS-20 deployments oppo-site NATO; initiation in late December of patrolsby E-II nuclear-powered cruise missile subma-rines off the US coast; first-ever forward deploy-ment in mid-January 1984 of long-range missile-carrying D-class SSBNs; and the start ofdeployment also in mid-January of 925-km rangeSS-12/22 missiles in East Germany and Czecho-slovakia, and continued propaganda and activemeasures against INF deployment.

— Response to NATO exercise: Assumption bySoviet air units in Germany and Poland fronf

November 1983 of high alert status withreadying of nuclear strike forces as NATO . con-ducted -Able Archer-83, - a nuclear release com-mand post exercise.

— Soviet exercises: Large-scale exercise activityduring spring 1984 which has stressed integratedstrategic strike operations, featuring the multiplelaunches of SS-20s and SLBMs; survivabilitytraining including the dispersal ofoperational Northern Fleet SSBNs supporte

a large number of ships; and the use of survivablecommand, control, and communications plat-forms, possibly in a transattack scenario.

— Berlin air corridors: Periodic Soviet impositionbeginning 20 February 1984 of minimum flightaltitudes for the entire length of one or more ofthe Berlin air corridors—a unilateral change inthe rules governing air access to Berlin.

— Afghanistan: Deployment in mid-April of sever-al airborne units to Afghanistan, launching of amajor spring offensive into the Panisher Valley,and initiation on 21 April for the first time ofhigh-intensity bombing of Afghanistan by over105 TU-16 and SU-24 bombers based in theUSSR.

— East Asia: Deployment in mid-November 1983of naval TU-16 strike aircraft to Vietnam for thefirst time; positioning of both Soviet operationalaircraft carriers for the first time simultaneouslyin Asian waters in March 1984; and the first jointSoviet/Vietnamese amphibious assault exerciseson the coast of Vietnam in April.

— Caribbean: A small combined Soviet/Cuban na-val exercise in the Gulf of Mexico, with the first-ever visit of a Soviet helicopter carrier in April/May, and Soviet/Cuban antisubmarine drills.

— Troop rotation: Initiation of the airlift portion ofSoviet troop rotation in Eastern Europe 10 dayslater in April than this has occurred for the pastfive years.

This Estimate explores whether the Soviet talk aboutthe increasing likelihood of nuclear war and the Sovietmilitary activities listed above constitute a pattern ofbehavior intended either to alarm or intimidate the United States and its allies or to achieve other goals.' 1

Possible Explanations

3. Specifically, in examining the facts we addressfive explanatory hypotheses:

a. Both the Soviet talk about war and the militaryactivities have been consciously orchestrated

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across the board to achieve political effectsthrough posturing and propaganda. The objecthas been to discredit US defense and foreignpolicies; to put Washington on notice that theUSSR will pursue a hard—perhaps even danger-ous—line, unless US concessions are forthcoming;to maintain an atmosphere of tension conduciveto pressure by "peace" groups on Western gov-ernments; and, if possible, to undercut PresidentReagan's reelection prospects.

b. Soviet behavior is a response to Washington'srhetoric, US military procurement and R&Dgoals, and US military exercises and reconnais-sance activities near Soviet territory—whichhave excited Soviet concerns and caused Moscowto flex its own military responsiveness, signalingto Washington that it is prepared for anyeventuality.

c. Moscow •itself is preparing for threatening mili-tary action in the future requiring a degree ofsurprise. The real aim behind its recent actions isnot to alarm, but to desensitize the United Statesto higher levels of Soviet military activity—thusmasking intended future moves and reducing USwarning time.

d. A weak General Secretary and political jockeyingin the Soviet leadership have lessened policycontrol at the top and permitted a hardlinefaction, under abnormally high military influ-ence, to pursue its own agenda, which—inten-tionally or not—looks more confrontational tothe observer.

e. The Soviet military actions at issue are not linkedwith the talk about war and are basically unrelat-ed events, each with its own rationale.

Soviet Talk About Nuclear War4. Our assessment of the meaning of alarmist state-

ments and propaganda about the danger of nuclearwar provides a starting point for evaluating recentSoviet military activities.I

5. Soviet talk about the war danger is unquestion-ably highly orchestrated. It has obvious external aims:

— To create a tense international climate that fos-ters "peace" activism in the West and public

• pressure on Western governments to backtrackon INF deployment, reduce commitments toNATO, and distance themselves from US foreignpolicy objectives.

— To elicit concessions in arms control negotiationsby manipulating the anxieties of Western politi-cal leaders about Soviet thinking.

— To strengthen cohesion within the Warsaw Pactand reinforce Soviet pressure for higher militaryoutlays by non-Soviet member states.

The overall propaganda campaign against the UnitedStates has recently been supplemented with the boy-cott of the Olympic Games.

6. The talk about the danger of nuclear war also hasa clear domestic propaganda function: to rationalizedemands on the Soviet labor force, continued consum-er deprivation, and ideological vigilance in the society.This message is also being disseminated

within the Soviet and East EuropeanIbureaucracies,

7. The central question remains: what are the realPerceptions at top decisionmaking levels of the re-gime? Our information about such leadership percep-tions is largely inferential. Nevertheless, we haveconfidence in several broad conclusions.

8. First, we believe that there is a serious concernwith US defense and foreign policy trends. There is alarge measure of agreement among both political andmilitary leaders that the United States has undertakena global offensive against Soviet interests. Central tothis perception is the overall scope and momentum ofthe US military buildup. Fundamentally, the Sovietsare concerned that US programs will undercut overallSoviet military strategy and force posture. Seen in thiscontext, Moscow condemns INF deployment as atelling—but subordinate—element in a more far-reaching and comprehensive US effort aimed at "re-gaining military superiority." The threat here is notimmediate, but longer term. However, the ability ofthe United States to carry out its longer term plans isquestioned by Soviet leaders not only to reassuredomestic audiences but also because they genuinelysee some uncertainty in the ability of the United Statesto sustain its military effort.,

9. Secondly, in our judgment the nature of theconcern is as much political as it is military. There isa healthy respect for US technological prowess andanxiety that this could in due course be used againstthe USSR. The Soviets are thus concerned that theUnited States might pursue an arms competition thatcould over time strain the Soviet economy and disruptthe regime's ability to manage competing military and

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civilian requirements. More immediately, the Sovietsare concerned that the United States could achieve ashift in the overall balance of military power which,through more interventionist foreign policies, couldeffectively thwart the extension of Soviet influence inworld affairs and even roll back past Soviet gains.From this perspective, the United States' actions inCentral America, Lebanon, Grenada, and southernAfrica are seen as a token of what could be expectedon a broader scale in the future.

10. Third, and most important for this assessment,we do not believe the Soviet leadership sees animminent threat of war with the United States. It isconceivable that the stridency of Soviet "war scare"propaganda reflects a genuine Soviet worry about anear-future attack on them. This concern could beinspired by Soviet views about the depth of anti-Sovietintentions in Washington combined with elements oftheir own military doctrine projected onto the UnitedStates, such as the virtues of surprise, striking first, andmasking hostile initiatives in exercises. Some politicaland military leaders have stressed the danger of warmore forcefully than others, suggesting that there mayhave been differences on this score—or at least how totalk about the issue—over the past half year.

11. However, on the basis of what we believe to bevery strong evidence, we judge that the Soviet leader-ship does not perceive an imminent danger of war.Our reasons are the following:

— The Soviets have not initiated the military readi-ness moves they would have made if they be-lieved a US attack were imminent.

— In private US diplomatic exchanges with Moscowover the past six months the Soviets have neithermade any direct threats connected with regionalor other issues nor betrayed any fear of a USattack.

— Obligatory public assertions of the viability of theSoviet nuclear deterrent have been paralleled byprivate assertions within regime circles by Sovietexperts that there is currently a stable nuclearbalance in which the United States does not havesufficient strength for a first strike.

— In recent months top leaders, including the Min-ister of Defense and Politburo member DmitriyUstinov, have somewhat downplayed the nuclearwar danger, noting that it should not be "over-dramatized" (although Ustinov's recent Victory

Day speech returned to a somewhat shrillertone). At the same time, high foreign affairsofficials have challenged the thesis that the Unit-ed States can unleash nuclear war and haveemphasized constraints on such a course ofaction.

Moreover, the Soviets know that the United States is atpresent far from having accomplished all of its forcebuildup objectives

Recent Soviet Military Activities

12. Intimidation? It is possible that some of theSoviet military activities listed above were intended, asancillary to their military objectives, to intimidateselected audiences:

— The East Asian naval maneuvers, deployment ofstrike aircraft to Vietnam, and amphibious exer-cises have displayed military muscle to China.

— The bombing campaign in Afghanistan could beseen not only as an operation against the insur-gency but also as an implicit threat to neighbor-ing countries—Pakistan and perhaps Iran.

— In mounting large-scale and visible exercises(such as the March-April Northern and BalticFleet exercise in the Norwegian Sea) Moscowwould understand that they could be perceivedas threatening by NATO audiences.

13. Soviet INF-related military activities have alsobeen designed to convey an impression to the Westthat the world is a more dangerous place following USINF deployment and that the USSR is making good onits predeployment threats to counter with deploymentsof its own.

14. There is uncertainty within the IntelligenceCommunity on the origins of Soviet behavior withrespect to the Berlin air corridors. It is possible thatSoviet action was a deliberate reminder of Westernvulnerability. Alternatively, airspace requirements forexercises may have motivated this move. The low-keymanner in which the Soviets have handled the issuedoes not suggest that they have been interested insqueezing access to Berlin for intimidation purposes.Nevertheless, the Soviets have been in the process ofunilaterally changing the corridor flight rules andthereby reminding the West of their ultimate power tocontrol access to Berlin. After a short hiatus in lateApril and early May, the Soviets declared new aircorridor restrictions, indicating that this effort contin-

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n fact think there was aNATO attack.

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ues. In a possibly related, very recent development,the Soviets declared tight new restrictions on travel inEast Germany by allied missions located in Potsdam.(s)

15. In a number of instances we have observed theSoviets avoiding threatening behavior or propagandawhen they might have acted otherwise, perhaps insome cases to avoid embarrassment or overcommit-ment. For example, they:

— Never publicly acknowledged the incident inNovember 1983 in which a Soviet attack subma-rine was disabled off, the US coast as it attemptedto evade a US ASW ship, and moved the subQuickly out of Cuba where it had come foremergency repairs.

— Warned Soviet ships in late January to stay awayfrom US ships in the eastern Mediterranean.

— Took no tangible action in March when one oftheir merchant tankers hit a mine off Nicaragua.

— Notified Washington of multiple missile launchesin early April as a gesture of "good will."

16. Reaction to US actions? The new Soviet de-ployments of nuclear-armed submarines off US coastsand the forward deployment of SS-12/22 missiles inEastern Europe are a Soviet reaction to NATO INFdeployment, which the Soviets claim is very threaten-ing to them—although the threat perceived here byMoscow is certainly not one of imminent nuclearattack.

17. Soviet military exercises themselves sometimesembody a "reactive" element. They frequently incor-porate Western operational concepts and weapon sys-tems into exercise scenarios, including projected US/NATO weapons and systems well before these systemsare actually deployed. On occasion there is real- ornear-real-time counterexercising, in which US/NATOexercise activity is incorporated into "Red" scenarios,thereby sensitizing Soviet forces to the US/NATOopponent. A key issue is whether this counterexercis-ing takes on the character of actual preparation forresponse to a perceived threat of possible US attack.

18. A case in point is the Soviet reaction to "AbleArcher-83." This was a NATO command post exerciseheld in November 1983 that was larger than previous"Able Archer" exercises and included new command,control, and communications procedures for authoriz-ing use of nuclear weapons. The elaborate Soviet

reaction to this recent exercise included

increased intelligence collection flights, andthe placing of Soviet air units in East Germany andPoland in heightened readiness in what was declaredto be a threat of possible aggression against the USSRand Warsaw Pact countries. Alert measures includedincreasing the number of fighter-interceptors on stripalert,

Although the Soviet reactionwas somewhat greater thanened readiness to selectedrevealed that it did not ipossibility at this time of a

19. How the Soviets choose to respond to ongoingUS military activities, such as exercises and reconnais-sance operations, depends on how they assess theirscope, the trends they may display, and above all thehostile intent that might be read into them. We are atpresent uncertain as to what novelty or possible mili-tary objectives the Soviets may have read into recentUS and NATO exercises and reconnaissance operationsbecause a detailed comparison of simultaneous "Red"and "Blue" actions has not been accomplished. TheSoviets have, as in the past, ascribed the same threat-ening character to these activities as to US militarybuildup plans, that is, calling them preparations forwar. But they have not charged a US intent to preparefor imminent war.

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20. Preparation for surprise military action?There is one case in our set of military activities thatmight conceivably be ascribed to the "masking" ofthreatening Soviet initiatives. For the first time in fiveyears, the airlift portion of the troop rotation inEastern Europe began on 25 April rather than 15April. This may have reflected a change in trainingand manning practices or the introduction of newairlift procedures. The change of timing of the airliftportion of the annual troop rotation could also be astep toward blurring a warning indicator—a compre-hensive delay of annual Soviet troop rotations whichwould prevent degradation of the forces by withdraw-ing trained men. But the rail portion of the rotationbegan ahead of schedule and, in any event, the patternof rotation was within broad historical norms

21. In early April, when the Soviets began to assem-ble a bomber strike force in the Turkestan Military

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District, there was some concern that it might repre-sent masking of preparations for operations againstPakistan, or even Iran, rather than against the mostobvious target, Afghanistan. At this point the force isclearly occupied against Afghanistan. It was neversuitably deployed for use against Iran. We believethat, although the force could be used against Pakistan,a major air offensive against Pakistan without fore-warning or precursor political pressure would serve noSoviet purpose and is extremely unlikely.

22. Soviet military exercises display and contributeto steadily growing Soviet force capabilities. Theseexercises have become increasingly complex as Mos-cow has deployed more capable and sophisticatedweapons and command and control systems. Theexercises have stressed the ability to assume a wartimeposture rapidly and respond flexibly to a variety ofcontingencies. We know that this activity

is planned and scheduled months or yearsin advance. Typically, these plans have not beensignificantly affected by concurrent US or NATOexercise activity. We see no evidence that this pro-gram is now being driven by some sort of target dateor deadline. Rather, it appears to respond—in annualand five-year plan increments—to new problems andoperational considerations that constantly arise withongoing force modernization. Thus, we interpret theaccelerated tempo of Soviet live exercise activity as areflection of the learning curve inherent in the exer-cise process itself and of long-term Soviet militaryobjectives, rather than of preparations for, or maskinigof, surprise Soviet military actions

23. Policy impact of leadership weakness orfactionalism? The Soviet Union has had three Gener-al Secretaries in as many years and, given the age andfrail health of Chernenko, yet another change can beexpected in a few years. This uncertain politicalenvironment could be conducive to increased maneu-vering within the leadership and magnification ofpolicy disagreements. Some have argued that eitherthe Soviet military or a hardline foreign policy factionled by Gromyko and Ustinov exerts more influencethan it could were Chernenko a stronger figure.Although individual Soviet military leaders enjoy greatauthority in the regime and military priorities remainhigh for the whole leadership, we do not believe thatthe Soviet military, as an institution, is exerting unusu-ally heavy influence on Soviet policy. Nor do webelieve that any faction is exerting influence otherthan through Politburo consensus. Consequently we

reject the hypothesis that weak central leadershipaccounts for the Soviet actions examined here.

24. A comprehensive pattern? In our view, themilitary activities under examination here do tend tohave their own military rationales and the exercisesare integrated by long-term Soviet force developmentplans. However, these activities do not all fit into anintegrated pattern of current Soviet foreign policytactics. The different leadtimes involved in initiatingvarious activities argue against orchestration for apolitical purpose. A number of the activities representroutine training or simply refine previous exercises. Inother cases, the activities respond to circumstancesthat could not have been predicted ahead of time.

Conclusions

25. Taken in their totality, Soviet talk about theincreased likelihood of nuclear war and Soviet militaryactions do suggest a political intention of speaking witha louder voice and showing firmness through a con-trolled display of military muscle. At the same time,Moscow has given little sign of desiring to escalatetensions sharply or to provoke possible armed confron-tation with the United States.

26. Soviet talk of nuclear war has been deliberatelymanipulated to rationalize military efforts with do-mestic audiences and to influence Western electoratesand political elites. Some Soviet military activitieshave also been designed to have an alarming orintimidating effect on various audiences (notably INF"counterdeployments," the naval exercise in the Nor-wegian Sea, and naval and air activities in Asia).

27. Our assessment of both Soviet talk about nucle-ar war and Soviet military activities indicates a verylow probability that the top Soviet leadership is seri-ously worried about the imminent outbreak of nuclearwar, although it is quite possible that official propa-ganda and vigilance campaigning have generated anatmosphere of anxiety throughout the military andsecurity apparatus. The available evidence suggeststhat none of the military activities discussed in thisEstimate have been generated by a real fear ofimminent US attack.

28. Although recent Soviet military exercises com-bine with other ongoing Soviet programs to heightenoverall military capabilities, we believe it unlikely thatthey are intended to mask current or near-futurepreparations by the USSR for some directly hostilemilitary initiative. Moreover, we are confident thatthe activities we have examined in this Estimate would

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not successfully mask all the extensive logistic andother military preparations the Soviets would have tocommence well before a realistic offensive initiativeagainst any major regional security target.

29. Both the talk of nuclear war and the militaryactivities address the concerns of a longer time hori-zon. Moscow's inability to elicit major concessions inthe arms talks, successful US INF deployment, and—most important by far—the long-term prospect of abuildup of US strategic and conventional militaryforces, have created serious concern in the Kremlin.We judge that the Soviet leadership does indeedbelieve that the United States is attempting to restore amilitary posture that severely undercuts the Sovietpower position in the world.

30. The apprehensive outlook we believe the Sovietleadership has toward the longer term Western armsbuildup could in the future increase its willingness toconsider actions—even at some heightened risk—thatrecapture the initiative and neutralize the militarychallenge posed by the United States. Warning of suchactions could be ambiguous.

31. Our judgments in this Estimate are subject tothree main sources of uncertainty. We have inade-quate information about:

a. The current mind-set of the Soviet politicalleadership, which has seen some of its optimisticinternational expectations from the Brezhnev eradisappointed.

b. The ways in which military operations and for-eign policy tactics may be influenced by politicaldifferences and the policy process in theKremlin.

c. The Soviet reading of our own military opera-tions, that is, current reconnaissance andexercises.

Notwithstanding these uncertainties, however, we areconfident that, as of now, the Soviets see not animminent military clash but a costly and—to someextent—more perilous strategic and political struggleover the rest of the decade.