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F.No.AAl/ASi\l/02-20/2016 (Class C)
To o\
I) GENERAL MANAGER (ATM)
+ii�8Jll �ti114tFf � AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF INDIA , .
Dt. J9TII, July, 2016
AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF INDIA IGIA/CSIA/NSCBIA/RGIAIKIN CHENNAI AIRPORT DELH 1/M UMBA !/KOLKA T AIHYDERABAD/BENGALURU J. CHENNAI
2) ATS INCHARGE • AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF INDIA
TRIVANDRU�l/COCHIN/AHMEDABAD AIRPORT
SUB: Reclassification or Airspace- Class C
Reference is invited t'O the letter of even �umber dated 271h June, 2016 on the subject. A meeting with VFR operators on the proposal to reclassify the airspace as Class C was conducted on 12th July, 2016 and the "Concept Level Safety Assessm�nt" was held on 15th. July, 20 I & at CHQ. Rajiv Gandhi Bhawan, Safdarjung Airport, Ne!v Delhi� After d�liberations on the prop?sal the stakeholders meeti,ng resolved the followipg:
a) The Lateral & vertical limits of the proposed reclassification ofthe airspace as Class C should be idcnlitied by the stations in consultation with local VFR operators based on the performance of available CNS/ATM infrastructure and local traffic constraints. b) The' tower limit of Class C airspace shall not be below 4000ft. c) The requirements for classifying entire TMA below f:L285 may be identified by the stations 01nd forwarded to CHQ for consideration. d) The trial operation to be conducted frbm 15th August, 2016 at Chennai, Hyderabad & Cochin should
. be for a period of 45 days (H24) and the trial operation should be
conducteq through an 'A· seJies NOT AM issued <\I least seven days in advance. ·
The "Con�ept LcYel Safety Assessment'' conducted at CHQ on 15'h Juiy, 2016 on tl�e proposal has assessed the size of change as "MEDIUM", Safety Outcome as "REASONABLE'' and Overall safety magni�ude as "MODERATE".
.
Please tind attached the system.-<Jescriptlon, presentation madc�in the "Concept Level Safety Assessment'' and SCARS form on the proposal. You arc requested to identify the airspace for reclassification of airspace as Class C bas�d on the performance of avai table CNS/ A TM infrastructure and local traffic constraints and conduct a Safety Assessment on the proposal. In consultation with CNS in-charges. A TS In-charges of Chcnnai, Hyderabad & Cochin arc requested to complete the safety assessment in time so as to commence the trials by '15'11 August, 2'016 without fail since, the same was committed to MoCA:'
(Page lr.)
.. �·� . · . . ·�.Gandhi Bhawan
"�q(ullf w( � � � - 110003 Safdarjung Airport, Now Dolhl-110003
� . �463295{)
Phone:24632950 , .
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:\TS ln-charg�� ofiGIA-Nc" Delhi, C 1-i\lurnbai. N .. CBI-I�oll:atn, KII\-Bcngnluru,
r\hmcdnbad ...\: Tri' ::mdrum 1\ irports arc rcqu�·stcd to exam inc the propo�al and forward
thc1r comments ::md reports to CHQ for pro·c� ·ing Otc same.
TillS rna� plc�e be gi,cn top rric-rit) :1:- the proposed reclassification or Airspace is
betng monitored b� \ 1oC ·\.
Incl: 1 1 Rt.'f'::':1 0t" C\--n.:crt Lc' el afct� Assessment
�) P���t::.ll0:1 0:1 the propos:1l 3\ �:.!-:..-.n ��rir110n
Airports Authority of India Safety Case Assessment and Reporting System
AAI-SAF-103 15th July 2016 Page 1 of 6
Airports Authority of India
Safety Case Assessment and Reporting System (SCARS)
The SCARS form must be used to assess permanent as well as temporary changes to service levels, procedures or equipment, which will affect the performance, functional or technical specification of a system, facility or service and for organisational changes affecting safety accountabilities.
This form must be completed by the process owner possessing specialist knowledge about the proposed change with inputs from other group members (stakeholders) through a process of discussion and then be reviewed and approved by the appropriate Manager.
Introduction: This form must be used to determine the overall safety magnitude of a project/change and the type of safety report required to be produced and the associated requirements for sign-off acceptance. This completed form is NOT a safety assessment report but the first step in the safety analysis of change.
Project Number File Number
Nil AAI/ATM/ASM/02-20/2016 Part-I
Project Title RECLASSIFICATION OF ATS AIRSPACE ABOVE 4000 FT AMSL AND BELOW FL 285 AS CLASS “C”
Location CHQ Unit AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT
Brief Description of the Project / Change
Currently TMA, Control Area/Zone & Aerodrome Traffic Zone airspace in India is classified as Class D. It is proposed that the airspace (CTR/CTA) of specified dimension around the ARP at airports equipped with Primary Radar and hourly runway traffic handling capacity of 20 or more aircraft per hour be classified as class ‘C’ from at least 4000 ft AMSL to a specified level. The airspace (CTR) from GND to the lower limit of class C airspace will remain as Class D. The lateral and vertical limits of Class C airspace will be decided based on the assessment of local traffic conditions and performance of CNS-ATM infrastructure. The lower limit of the airspace shall not be below 4000 ft AMSL. The proposed airspace changes will be implemented in Ahmedabad, Bengaluru, Chennai, Cochin, Delhi, Hyderabad, Kolkata, Mumbai and Trivandrum airports. In Class C airspace IFR flights are not subjected to any speed restriction unless specified in the procedure (SID/STAR) or imposed by ATC. However VFR flights will have to maintain a speed of 250 KT (max IAS) below 10000 ft. In Class C airspace VFR flights are provided with Air Traffic Control Service for separation from IFR flights.
Airports Authority of India Safety Case Assessment and Reporting System
AAI-SAF-103 15th July 2016 Page 2 of 6
Step 1: Assess the SIZE OF THE CHANGE Complete the following questions to determine the size of the change. For each question, choose a rating from 1 to 7 as defined below and provide justification. 1 – Extremely Low 2 – Very Low 3 – Low 4 – Moderate 5 – High 6 – Very High 7 - Extremely High NOTE: These questions are not definitive and are aimed at providing a generalised framework for the initial assessment of the overall safety magnitude of the change. No. Description Ratings 1 Assess the significance (scope/scale) of the
project/change within AAI. Consider the number of work areas affected: ATM, CNS, Airport Airside Operations, ARFS, etc. Also consider disciplines, systems, locations, business processes and organisation structures.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Justification: Approach Control and ACC (Lower / Upper) units of nine major airports will be affected by the proposed change. Controllers will be vested with the additional responsibility of separating VFR and IFR flights within Class C airspace. CNS will need to ensure adequate coverage and redundancy of CNS facilities within the limits of class C airspace to ensure provision of applicable separation between aircraft.
The significance of the proposed change is high; hence a rating of 6 is given.
2 Assess the significance of the project/change
outside AAI. Consider the number of services users and/or stakeholders affected, including the interfaces between these parties, eg government departments, customers and other ANSPs.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Justification:
Arriving and departing IFR flights will not be required to follow speed restrictions in class C airspace. ATC will separate IFR flights from other IFR as well as VFR flights.
The significance of the proposed change is moderate; hence a rating of 4 is given.
3 Assess the level of new functionality
introduced, or removed, by the proposed project/change, as opposed to the existing system, facility or service. Does the new system enhance/reduce existing functionality or provide different functionality? Consider new technology.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Justification: India is introducing class C airspace for the first time. The essential difference in the way aircraft are separated in Class C and Class D airspace is that IFR flights need to be separated from VFR flights also. The level of new functionality being introduced is moderate; hence a rating of 4 is given.
Airports Authority of India Safety Case Assessment and Reporting System
AAI-SAF-103 15th July 2016 Page 3 of 6
4 Assess the safety significance of the systems, facilities or services affected by the project/change? Consider for example radar systems, communication systems, data systems, AFTN, Runways, Taxiways and any organisation systems such as safety reporting etc (People/Procedures/Technology)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Justification:
It should be ensured that the present level of safety needs to be maintained even after the implementation of the proposed change.
Important safety considerations pertaining to the reclassification of airspace are: 1. Additional requirement of separation of IFR and VFR flights.
2. Availability of CNS infrastructure to ensure that ATC is in a position of provide separation between aircraft in the revised scenario.
Considering these aspects, it is assessed that the safety significance of the proposal is high; hence a rating of 5 is given.
5 Assess the training component associated with implementing the project/change? Consider type of training required, classroom or simulation, time lines, resources, recency requirements, etc.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Justification: Controllers and pilots needs to sensitised regarding the change in airspace classification. VFR pilots need to be trained to navigate in VFR conditions and at the same time follow ATC instructions to get separated from IFR flights. Controllers in surveillance environment should be trained to handle arrivals and departures at higher air speeds.
The training component associated with the proposed change is moderate; hence a rating of 4 is given.
6 Assess the complexity of the transition from the existing system, facility or service? Consider resources available, documentation, time lines, approvals, contingency arrangements, organisational changes, multiple locations etc.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Justification: Transition for Class D to Class C will not be very complex especially when the actual change is preceded by a period of trial operations. Hence a rating of 4 is given.
7 Size of Project/Change Rating. Total the scores from questions 1 to 6 and compare to the values below.
TOTAL
Select the resultant size.
27
Small = 6 to 18
Medium = 19 to 30
Large = 31 to 42
Airports Authority of India Safety Case Assessment and Reporting System
AAI-SAF-103 15th July 2016 Page 4 of 6
Step 2: Assess the SAFETY OUTCOME OF THE CHANGE To assess the safety outcome of the project/change, conduct a preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) to determine the likely hazards that may result from the project/change and complete the table below. Giving consideration to the number and criticality of the likely hazards, estimate the Safety Outcome as Minimal, Reasonable or Substantial and enter this below. Hazard (as defined in Doc 9859): A condition or an object with the potential to cause injuries to personnel, damage to equipment or structures, loss of material, or reduction of ability to perform a prescribed function.
Hazard no Hazard Description Consequences of Hazard Existing Controls
Assign Rating based on effect on Safe operations with
existing Controls Brief justification for assigning
Rating
Hazard 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Hazard 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Hazard 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Hazard 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Hazard 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TOTAL: List all persons assisting in the analysis process: *Must include representatives from all significant Stakeholder Groups (eg ATM/CNS, GFS, Aviation Safety) Name: Position: Date: Name: Position: Date: Name: Position: Date: Name: Position: Date: Name: Position: Date:
Enter the estimated Safety Outcome of the change
Result: 52% REASONABLE
Equation for Percentage: Total score x 100 = xxx% (7x No. of Hazards) Safety Outcome Result: Substantial: 73% or more Reasonable: 45% - 72% Minimal: Up to 44%
REFER ANNEXURE 1-PHA
REFER ANNEXURE 2-Attendance Sheet
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Stop 3: Ansess the OVERALL SAFETY MAGNITUDE OF THE CHANGE The Overall Safety Magnitude of the Change is a combination of the size of the change
and the s afety outcome of the change Apply the results obtained from Steps 1 a.nd 2 to
the matrix below and tick the appropriate box to determine the Overall Safety Magmtude of the Change
Overall Safety Magnitude of the Change Overall Change Safety Outcome of the Change
__ Magnitude Size of the Change Substantial Reasonable Minimal
Lnrgc Major [] Major D Moderate D
Modium Major D Moderate II Minor D
Small Moderate D Minor D Minor D
Step 4: Safety Reporting Determination Tick the box in the table below to indicate the type of safety report to be prepared for the change.
Overall Safety Magnitude of Project/Change To be reported as .....
Major D Safety Case + Safety Plan + HAZLOG
Moderate II Safety Statement + HAZLOG
Minor D Safety St atement
Step 5: Safety Statement (For Minor or Moderato Change)
Name: M C DANGI
Statement:
Position: GM (ASM)-CHQ
Date: 15/07/2016
I confirm that using the processes described above that/ am satisfied that/he proposed projec/Jchange is of a MOD£RA T£ safety magnitude I am satisfied that the safety implications of the proposed change will be identified and adequately addressed via station safety management and project management procedures.
NOT£: For moderate safety magnitude projectslclranges, please attach HAZLOG report.
AAI·SAf-103 15" Jul)•2016 l'acc 5 nfb
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-
Strp 6. HJ\ZLOG Rngl5t r (For l.�odcrlltc or ••-Jor Cn�r:;-l
1 HAZLO-G-Rcgistcr Title: I
o�tcd
Loco lion: - ---
-�----- -
Unit:
Stop 7: Safety Case (For Major chango) Roqulrod n (Tick box)
Preparation of Safety Case ass1gned to
S top 8: Process Owner
Sign 1tur /0 t
To be completed by the person or Project Manager who 1Mntt d lhH ch .. nq'l
Position: JT.GM (ATM-ASM)-GHQ
Slgn�turo/Oatc �� BATH KUMAR
[ __ --- -- - ---'--
Step 9: Certification To be completed by the person who facilitated the Safety Assessment (Safely E.-:per•
I certify that the Safety Assessment was conducted fulfilling the reqwremen!s oft"
�s iti on : --
- --,Signature/Date . • Name: 0 DILI P KUMAR
I J I . GM (ATM-ASM)-CHQ - I
�---------------�------
Step 10: Approva ls Relevant Service Delivery Unit Manager-GM (Aerodromes/A TM/CNStOps S. AS'.' o' "-
I approve the change and accept the Safety Assessment
I Name: M C DANGI i Pos;tion:
GM (ASM)-CHQ
Step 11: Review Reviewed and agreed by ASD-CHO (if deemed ne;::essaryl
Signnturc10.:lt� f
1//�1 .... --. · · , ' .. I ·t
I Name
_______ __._I_P_o_s_it_i o_n_· -----�����- --- -S-i-g n_a_::_ �·_'-D�a.l--c:-.
I' , ., .•.
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ A n n e x u r e - 1
P a g e 1 o f 2
CONCEPT-LEVEL SAFETY ASSESSMENT ON RECLASSIFICATION OF AIRSPACE – 15 JULY 2016
PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS
SL. NO: HAZARD DESCRIPTION CONSEQUENCE OF HAZARD EXISTING CONTROLS RATING
1 TO 7 JUSTIFICATION
1
ATC may be unable to separate IFR flights from VFR flights due to lack of adequate two-way communication especially at lower levels
Breach of separation between IFR and VFR flights
• The lateral and vertical limits of Class C airspace will be decided based on the assessment of local traffic conditions and performance of CNS-ATM infrastructure.
• Specific RCF procedures will be incorporated in the SOP
3 Existing control will ensure adequate VHF coverage.
2 VFR flights may be unable to follow ATC clearance due to terrain / weather, while in class C airspace.
Breach of separation between IFR and VFR flights
• ATC will obtain concurrence from VFR pilot regarding acceptance of ATC clearance
• VFR pilot will be required to inform ATC his/her inability to follow any clearance before deviations are made
3 Existing control will ensure sufficient mitigation of the risk.
3
Aerodrome elevation of airports like Bengaluru (3001 ft) and Shamshabad (2024 ft) are high, which will not leave many flight levels below 4000 ft for VFR operations in class D airspace
VFR flights will be flying at very low altitudes (e.g. 1000 ft AGL) and hence CNS coverage will be inadequate to provide services commensurate with class C airspace
• The lateral and vertical limits of Class C airspace will be decided based on the assessment of local traffic conditions and performance of CNS-ATM infrastructure.
3 Existing control will ensure adequate VHF coverage.
4
Basic equipment list of VFR flights may not contain navigational equipment like VOR and SSR transponders, which makes separation with IFR flights very difficult
Lack of onboard navigational equipment will result in inability of ATC to separate VFR flights with IFR flights
• Primary radar coverage within 50 NM
• Helicopter VFR flying takes place at relatively low altitudes compared to IFR flights and hence separation can be achieved in the vicinity of the aerodrome itself
4
Coverage of primary radar may not be equally satisfactory at all airports. Hence a rating of 4 is given
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ A n n e x u r e - 1
P a g e 2 o f 2
5 Overflying VFR flights may have to enter different classes of airspaces (Class D to Class C or vice versa)
Controllers may find it difficult to provide services commensurate with changing classes of airspaces, especially in busy terminal airspaces.
• Nil 5 Existing control will not ensure sufficient mitigation of the risk. Additional mitigation measures will be required.
Total Score = 18 Safety Outcome = 18 / (7 X 5) X 100 = 51.43%. Safety Outcome: REASONABLE
1
PROJECT
RECLASSIFICATION OF ATS AIRSPACE ABOVE 4000 FT AMSL AND
BELOW FL 285 AS CLASS “C”
HAZARD ANALYSIS
(HAZLOG Register)
CONCEPT LEVEL
Date of HAZID Workshop: 15th July 2016 Date of First Review (proposed): 14th August 2016
Page 2 of 6
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT PROJECT: RECLASSIFICATION OF ATS AIRSPACE ABOVE 4000 FT AMSL AND BELOW FL 285 AS CLASS “C”
DATE: 15/07/2016
HAZARD: ATC may be unable to separate IFR flights from VFR flights due to lack of adequate two-way communication especially at lower levels CONSEQUENCES OF HAZARD:
• Breach of separation between IFR and VFR flights HAZARD NO: H-1
IDENTIFIED CAUSES:
1. Reduced VHF range due terrain. 2. Performance limitations of VHF equipment.
EXISTING RISK CONTROLS: • The lateral and vertical limits of Class C airspace will be decided based on the
assessment of local traffic conditions and performance of CNS-ATM infrastructure.
• Specific RCF procedures will be incorporated in the SOP
PROBABILITY SEVERITY RISK CATEGORY
IMPROBABLE (2) MINOR (D) 2D (Class IV)
SUGGESTED RISK CONTROLS TO ACHIEVE ALARP:
• Nil
REVIEW DATE: Not required
RISK PROBABILITY RISK SEVERITY RESIDUAL RISK INDEX
COMMENTS: Nil
Residual Risk Accepting Authority
G Sambath Kumar Jt.GM (ATM-ASM)
3
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT
PROJECT: RECLASSIFICATION OF ATS AIRSPACE ABOVE 4000 FT AMSL AND BELOW FL 285 AS CLASS “C”
DATE: 15/07/2016
HAZARD: VFR flights may be unable to follow ATC clearance due to terrain / weather, while in class C airspace. CONSEQUENCES OF HAZARD:
• Breach of separation between IFR and VFR flights HAZARD NO: H-2
IDENTIFIED CAUSES:
1. VFR flights unable maintain a heading and/or altitude due to adverse weather and/or terrain
EXISTING RISK CONTROLS:
• Surveillance coverage. • ATC will obtain concurrence from VFR pilot regarding acceptance of ATC
clearance • VFR pilot will be required to inform ATC his/her inability to follow any
clearance before deviations are made
PROBABILITY SEVERITY RISK CATEGORY
REMOTE (3) MAJOR (C) 3C (Class II)
SUGGESTED RISK CONTROLS TO ACHIEVE ALARP:
• ATC should provide terrain clearance to VFR flight in class C airspace • Use of emergency separation of 500 ft may be used in contingency. • SOP should be amended to include these clauses.
REVIEW DATE: 14 August 2016
RISK PROBABILITY RISK SEVERITY RESIDUAL RISK INDEX
COMMENTS: Nil
Residual Risk Accepting Authority
Page 4 of 6
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT PROJECT: RECLASSIFICATION OF ATS AIRSPACE ABOVE 4000 FT AMSL AND BELOW FL 285 AS CLASS “C”
DATE: 15/07/2016
HAZARD: Aerodrome elevation of airports like Bengaluru (3001 ft) and Shamshabad (2024 ft) are high, which will not leave many flight levels below 4000 ft for VFR operations in class D airspace CONSEQUENCES OF HAZARD:
• VFR flights will be flying at very low altitudes (e.g. 1000 ft AGL) and hence CNS coverage will be inadequate to provide services commensurate with class C airspace
HAZARD NO: H-3
IDENTIFIED CAUSES:
1. Reduced VHF range due terrain. 2. Performance limitations of VHF equipment.
EXISTING RISK CONTROLS: • The lateral and vertical limits of Class C airspace will be decided based on the
assessment of local traffic conditions and performance of CNS-ATM infrastructure.
• Specific RCF procedures will be incorporated in the SOP
PROBABILITY SEVERITY RISK CATEGORY
IMPROBABLE (2) MINOR (D) 2D (Class IV)
SUGGESTED RISK CONTROLS TO ACHIEVE ALARP:
• Nil
REVIEW DATE: Not required
RISK PROBABILITY RISK SEVERITY RESIDUAL RISK INDEX
COMMENTS: Nil
Residual Risk Accepting Authority
G Sambath Kumar Jt.GM (ATM-ASM)
5
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT PROJECT: RECLASSIFICATION OF ATS AIRSPACE ABOVE 4000 FT AMSL AND BELOW FL 285 AS CLASS “C”
DATE: 15/07/2016
HAZARD: Basic equipment list of VFR flights may not contain navigational equipment like VOR and SSR transponders, which makes separation with IFR flights very difficult CONSEQUENCES OF HAZARD:
• Lack of onboard navigational equipment will result in inability of ATC to separate VFR flights with IFR flights
HAZARD NO: H-4
IDENTIFIED CAUSES:
1. Lack of on-board navigational equipment in VFR flights which are used by ATC to provide IFR separation
EXISTING RISK CONTROLS: • Primary radar coverage within 50 NM • Helicopter VFR flying takes place at relatively low altitudes compared to IFR
flights and hence separation can be achieved in the vicinity of the aerodrome itself
PROBABILITY SEVERITY RISK CATEGORY
REMOTE (3) MAJOR (C) 3C (Class II)
SUGGESTED RISK CONTROLS TO ACHIEVE ALARP:
• Stations should decide on the lower limit of Class C airspace based on the on-board equipage of VFR flights generally operating in the area.
• Operations should commence only after implementation level safety assessment at the stations.
REVIEW DATE: 14 August 2016
RISK PROBABILITY RISK SEVERITY RESIDUAL RISK INDEX
COMMENTS: Nil
Residual Risk Accepting Authority
Page 6 of 6
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT
PROJECT: RECLASSIFICATION OF ATS AIRSPACE ABOVE 4000 FT AMSL AND BELOW FL 285 AS CLASS “C”
DATE: 15/07/2016
HAZARD: Overflying VFR flights may have to enter different classes of airspaces (Class D to Class C or vice versa)
CONSEQUENCES OF HAZARD:
• Controllers may find it difficult to provide services commensurate with changing classes of airspaces, especially in busy terminal airspaces.
HAZARD NO: H-5
IDENTIFIED CAUSES: 1. Existence of difference classes of airspaces at the same flight level band
EXISTING RISK CONTROLS: • Nil
PROBABILITY SEVERITY RISK CATEGORY
REMOTE (3) MINOR (D) 3D (Class III)
SUGGESTED RISK CONTROLS TO ACHIEVE ALARP:
• Stations should decide on the lateral limits of Class C airspace and if found feasible, extent it to the entire TMA.
• Operations should commence only after implementation level safety assessment at the stations.
REVIEW DATE: 14 August 2016
RISK PROBABILITY RISK SEVERITY RESIDUAL RISK INDEX
COMMENTS: Nil
Residual Risk Accepting Authority
Safety Risk Probability Table
Probability Meaning Value
Frequent Likely to occur many times 5
Occasional Likely to occur some times 4
Remote Unlikely to occur, but possible 3
Improbable Very unlikely to occur 2
Extremely Improbable
Almost inconceivable that the event will occur 1
Safety Risk Severity Table
Severity of Occurrence Meaning Value
Catastrophic Equipments destroyed Multiple deaths
A
Hazardous
A large reduction in safety margin, physical distress or a workload that operator cannot be relied upon to perform their task accurately or completely
Serious injury Major equipment damage
B
Major
A significant reduction in safety margins, a reduction in the ability of operator to cope with adverse operating conditions as a result of increase in workload, or as a result of conditions impairing their efficiency
Serious incident Injury to persons
C
Minor Nuisance Operating limitations Use of Emergency procedures Minor incident
D
Negligible Little consequences E
Safety Risk Assessment Matrix
Risk Probability Risk Severity
Catastrophic A
Hazardous B
Major C
Minor D
Negligible E
Frequent (5) 5A 5B 5C 5D 5E
Occasional (4) 4A 4B 4C 4D 4E
Remote (3) 3A 3B 3C 3D 3E
Improbable (2) 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E Extremely
Improbable (1) 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E
Risk Category
Class Risk
I 5A, 5B, 5C, 4A, 4B, 3A II 5D, 5E, 4C, 3B, 3C, 2A, 2B III 4D, 4E, 3D, 2C, 1A, 1B IV 3E, 2D, 2E, 1C, 1D, 1E
Risk Acceptance Authority
Class Authority
Cat I Risk unacceptable, action required to treat the risk
Cat II Risk undesirable, may be accepted in exceptional circumstances by the appropriate Executive Director
Cat III Risk tolerable, may be accepted by the appropriate General Manager
Cat IV Risk acceptable with conditions, may be accepted by the Airport Director
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l . . AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF INDIA
2016 l\1eetmg for Concept level Safety Assessment on Class C Airspace on 15!h July, at 1430 hrs in the Seminar Hall, 3rd Floor, RGB, New Delha
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19‐07‐2016
1
Concept Level Safety Assessment Reclassification of Airspace – Class C
1
15th, July, 2016
ATS Airspace Classification
• On March 12, 1990, ICAO adopted the current airspaceclassification scheme.
• The initial goal of ICAO in implementing, in 1992, a new ATSAirspace Classification was to simplify the designation of airspaceand to standardize equipment and pilot requirements for IFR andVFR operations.
• The purpose was to eliminate the confusion between thecharacteristics of CTA, CTR, TMA and ATZ airspaces and to clarifythe services provided to IFR and VFR flights in each class ofairspace.
15 July, 2016
19‐07‐2016
2
ATS Airspace Classification • The airspace classification to be applied to a particular volume ofairspace will depend upon–the number of Air Transport Movements (ATMs) operating within it,–the complexity of Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) operations and– the safety hazards posed to public transport flights operating underIFR.
ICAO airspaces allocate the responsibility for avoiding other aircraft,namely
to ATC (if separation is provided) orto the aircraft commander (if the separation is not provided by ATC).
15 July, 2016
ATS Airspace Classification
The requirements for flights within each class of airspace are defined in ICAO Annex 11 - Appendix 4, in terms of -
1) Type of flight allowed, 2) The separation provided, 3) The services provided, 4) Meteorological conditions, 5) Speed limitations, 6) Radio communication requirements and 7) ATC clearance requirements.
15 July, 2016
19‐07‐2016
3
Annex 11• Air traffic services airspaces. Airspaces of defined
dimensions, alphabetically designated, within which specific types of flights may operate and for which air traffic services and rules of operation are specified.Note.— ATS airspaces are classified as Class A to G as described in 2.6.
• Controlled airspace. An airspace of defined dimensions within which air traffic control service is provided in accordance with the airspace classification.
Note.— Controlled airspace is a generic term which covers ATS airspace Classes A, B, C, D and E as described in 2.6.
• Controlled flight. Any flight which is subject to an air traffic control clearance.
5
15 July, 2016
2.5 Designation of the portions of the airspaceand controlled aerodromes where air trafficservices will be provided
2.5.1. When it has been determined that airtraffic services are to be provided in a particularportion of airspace or in airspace associatedwith particular aerodromes, then those portionsof the airspace shall be designated in relation tothe air traffic services that are to be provided.
6
Annex 11
15 July, 2016
19‐07‐2016
4
2.6 Classification of airspaces2.6.3 The requirements for flights within each class of airspace shall be as shown in the table in Appendix 4.2.6.2 States shall select those airspace classes appropriate to their needs.
3.1 ApplicationAir traffic control service shall be provided:a) to all IFR flights in airspace Classes A, B,
C, D and E;b) to all VFR flights in airspace Classes B, C and D;c) to all special VFR flights;d) to all aerodrome traffic at controlled aerodromes
7
Annex 11
15 July, 2016
Annex 11
19‐07‐2016
5
DOC 44445.2 PROVISIONS FOR THE SEPARATION OF CONTROLLED TRAFFIC5.2.1.1 Vertical or horizontal separation shall be provided:a) between all flights in Class A and B airspaces;b) between IFR flights in Class C, D and E airspaces;c) between IFR flights and VFR flights in Class C
airspace;d) between IFR flights and special VFR flightse) between special VFR flights, when so prescribed by
the appropriate ATS authority;9
15 July, 2016
CAR Section 9 – AIR SPACE AND AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT 8TH
JANUARY 2010
4.4 Unless authorized by the appropriate ATS authority, VFRflights shall not be operated:
a) above FL150.
b) at transonic and supersonic speeds.
4.5 Authorization for VFR flights to operate above FL 290 shall notbe granted in areas where a vertical separation minimum of 300m (1000 ft) is applied above FL 290
10
CAR – Rules of the Air
15 July, 2016
19‐07‐2016
6
CAR Section 9 – AIR SPACE AND AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT8TH JANUARY 2010
4.9 A VFR flight operating within or into areas, or along routes,designated by the appropriate ATS authority in accordancewith 3.3.1.2 c) or d) shall maintain continuous air-groundvoice communication watch on the appropriatecommunication channel of, and report its position asnecessary to, the air traffic services unit providing flightinformation service.
11
CAR – Rules of the Air
15 July, 2016
CAR Section 2 – INSTALLATION OF MODE 'A' / 'C' AND MODE ‘S’TRANSPONDERS.8TH February 1994
3.2 Unless otherwise authorised by DGCA, no person shall operate for commercial air transportoperation in the Indian airspace, from 1st January, 2001,(a) an aeroplane having a maximum certified passenger seating configuration of 20 to 30 or a maximum certificated take offmass in excess of 5700kg, if such aeroplane is not equipped with Mode 'S' transponder.
(b) an aeroplane having a maximum certified passenger seating configuration of 10 to 19 and a maximum certificated take offmass less than 5700kg, if such aeroplane is not equipped with Mode ‘A’ / ‘C’ transponder.
(c) a twin jet engined aeroplane having a maximum certified passengerseating configuration of less than 10 and a maximum certificated takeoff mass less than 5700kg, if such aeroplane is not equipped with Mode‘A’/‘C’ transponder
(d) a helicopter if it is not equipped with Mode ‘A’ / ‘C’ transponder.12
15 July, 2016
CAR – INSTALLATION OF TRANSPONDERS
19‐07‐2016
7
CAR Section 2 – INSTALLATION OF MODE 'A' / 'C' AND MODE ‘S’TRANSPONDERS.8TH February 1994
3.4 Unless otherwise authorised by DGCA, no person shalloperate for general aviation operation in the Indiancontrolled airspace or on promulgated ATS routes, from 1stJanuary, 2003, an aeroplane or helicopter, if it is notequipped with Mode ‘A’ / ‘C’ transponder.
13
CAR – INSTALLATION OF TRANSPONDERS
15 July, 2016
Change – IFR Flights
Class D Class CSeparationProvided
IFR from IFR IFR from IFRIFR from VFR
ServiceProvided
Air traffic control service,Traffic information about VFR flights(and traffic avoidance advice onrequest)
Air traffic controlservice
SpeedRestriction
250 kt IAS below3 050 m (10 000 ft) AMSL
Nil
15 July, 2016
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8
Change – VFR Flights
Class D Class CSeparationProvided NIL VFR from IFR
ServiceProvided
IFR/VFR and VFR/VFRtraffic information(and traffic avoidanceadvice on request)
1) Air traffic controlservice for separation from IFR;2) VFR/VFR traffic information(and traffic avoidance advice onrequest)
SpeedRestriction
250 kt IAS below3 050 m (10 000 ft) AMSL
250 kt IAS below3 050 m (10 000 ft) AMSL
15 July, 2016
Global Practices
16
State Lateral Limit Lower Limit Upper LimitUSA Airspace around designated airport Surface/
GND2500/9400ft
Srilanka Arc of 30/50NM radius 3500/2000
FL245
UK Cotswold Control Areas 1 & 2 below FL195Severn Control Areas 1 & 2 below FL165
Singapore Changi / Seletar CTRPortugal An arc of circle of 30NM radius centered on ARP GND FL85
France UTA* Control zones, classified D or A entirely orpartly, depending on the density and complexityof traffic.
FL 195 FL660
15 July, 2016
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9
- Airports with hourly runway traffic handling capacity of 20 or more aircraft per hour
- Equipped with both Primary and Secondary Radar
- CTR/CTA of 30NM around the ARP from 4000ft to FL285 [ The Lateral and Vertical Limits may be amended based
on the assessment of local traffic constraints andperformance of CNS/ATM Infrastructure.However, the lower limit of Class C shall not be below4000ft AMSL.]
Proposal - Class C Airspace
15 July, 2016
AhmedabadBengaluruChennai*Cochin*DelhiHyderabad*KolkataMumbaiTrivandrum
In Class C airspace IFR flights are not subjected toany speed restriction unless specified in theprocedure (SID/STAR) or imposed by ATC.
VFR flights have to maintain a speed of 250KT(max) below 10000FT.
The airspace (CTR) from GND to 4000ft willcontinue as Class D to accommodate VFR flights.
Proposal
15 July, 2016
19‐07‐2016
10
+ FL 285
4000 ft < FL285
4000 ft >
CLASS A
CLASS C
CLASS D
Proposal
15 July, 2016
Thank you
20
15 July, 2016
System Description – Class C Airspace
On March 12, 1990, ICAO adopted the current airspace classification scheme. The classes
are fundamentally defined in terms of flight rules and interactions between aircraft and Air
Traffic Control (ATC). Generally speaking, the ICAO airspaces allocate the responsibility for
avoiding other aircraft, namely either to ATC (if separation is provided) or to the aircraft
commander (if separation is not provided).
The initial goal of ICAO in implementing, in 1992, a new ATS Airspace Classification was to
simplify the designation of airspace and to standardize equipment and pilot requirements
for IFR and VFR operations.
The purpose was to eliminate the confusion between the characteristics of CTA, CTR, TMA
and ATZ airspaces and to clarify the services provided to IFR and VFR flights in each class of
airspace. The requirements for flights within each class of airspace are defined in ICAO
Annex 11 - Appendix 4, in terms of -
1) Type of flight allowed,
2) The separation provided,
3) The services provided,
4) Meteorological conditions,
5) Speed limitations,
6) Radio communication requirements and
7) ATC clearance requirements.
ICAO - APAC Seamless ATM Plan on Airspace Classification recommends that,
7.28 Harmonization of upper airspace classification should be as follows:
a) Category R controlled airspace– Class A; and
b) Category S controlled airspace– Class A, or if there are high level general aviation
or military VFR operations: Class B or C.
In India the TMA/CTA/CTR are classified as Class D. As per DGCA CAR Section 9 Airspace and
Air Traffic Management Class C & D airspace is defined as
“Class C. IFR and VFR flights are permitted, all flights are provided with air traffic control
service and IFR flights are separated from other IFR flights and from VFR flights. VFR flights
are separated from IFR flights and receive traffic information in respect of other VFR flights.
Class D. IFR and VFR flights are permitted and all flights are provided with air traffic control
service, IFR flights are separated from other IFR flights and receive traffic information in
respect of VFR flights, VFR flights receive traffic information in respect of all other flights.”
In India a two digit traffic growth has resulted into congestion in Terminal and Enroute
operation. Considering the volume of traffic the process of “see and avoid” is not possible
in high density airspace. ATM restricts VFR flights based on visibility at the aerodrome which
is limited to the aerodrome only and hence does not reflect the visibility in air. Hence the
responsibility of separation between VFR-VFR and VFR-IFR is with VFR flights. In high density
aerodromes the ATC may not be able to give all the traffic information to IFR/VFR flights and
IFR flights are actually dependent on the capability of VFR flights to see and avoid.
Moreover, in class D airspace both IFR & VFR flights are restricted to a speed of 250Kts
below 10000ft which is a penalty for IFR flights.
To enhance safety and operational efficiency of IFR flights it is proposed to classify airspace
within 30 NM around High Density airspace as Class C. In Class C airspace VFR flights are
provided with Air Traffic Control Service for separation from IFR flights and speed restriction
applies only to VFR flights. ATM will provide traffic information to VFR flights on VFR flights.
To identify an Airspace of high density where “see and avoid” is not possible by VFR flights it
is proposed that the airspace around aerodromes with hourly runway traffic handling
capacity of 20 or more aircraft per hour may be classified as Class C.
The aerodromes with hourly runway traffic handling capacity of 20 or more aircraft per hour
is listed below:
No. Airport Transition Altitude Runway Capacity
1 Ahmedabad 4000 ft 20
2 Bengaluru 7000 ft 32
3 Chennai 4000 ft 29
4 Cochin 11000 ft 29
5 Delhi 4000 ft 75
6 Hyderabad 7000 ft 30
7 Kolkata 4000 ft 30
8 Mumbai 4000 ft 43
9 Trivandrum 9000 ft 20
It is proposed that the airspace (CTR) of 30NM around the ARP of the 9 airports mentioned
above from GND to 4000ft may be classified as Class D. The airspace (CTR/CTA) of 30NM
around the ARP from 4000ft to FL285 may be classified as Class C. Since all the above
airports are equipped with both Primary and Secondary Radar they will be in a position to
separate the VFR traffic from IFR traffic.
As per DGCA CAR Section 9 Series ‘E’ Part I
“Note.— Where the ATS airspaces adjoin vertically, i.e. one above the other, flights at a
common level would comply with requirements of, and be given services applicable to, the
less restrictive class of airspace. In applying these criteria, Class B airspace is therefore
considered less restrictive than Class A airspace; Class C airspace less restrictive than Class B
airspace, etc.”